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Download Thesis This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ Israel Deterring Hamas Tactical Successes, Strategic Challenges Kirchofer, Charles P Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 29. Sep. 2021 Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas Israel Deterring Hamas: Tactical Successes and Strategic Challenges PhD Thesis in War Studies Charles P. Kirchofer Department of War Studies King’s College London Supervisors: John Bew and Thomas Rid 9 May 2016 Page 1 of 292 Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas Abstract Deterrence has played a large role in Israel’s management of its conflict with Hamas throughout three distinct periods (1987-2000, 2000-2007, 2007-present). To accomplish deterrence against an actor that has varied in form across distinct periods with different political contexts, it has utilized myriad forms of deterrence, some of which are not part of the everyday deterrence vocabulary elsewhere. After initial instability, each of the three distinct periods has so far featured extended periods of calm following Israeli tactical shifts and the establishment of new deterrence relationships. The shifts between periods themselves, however, have led relatively stable deterrence relationships previously established to collapse or become irrelevant. Explaining these shifts and illuminating the operation of deterrence during each of these periods is an integral part of the first aim of this thesis and is a primary focus of its body chapters. Israel’s myriad tactical successes have not thus far provided a stable, enduring situation of calm. After each significant shift in the political context within which Israel and Hamas operate, both sides have had to ‘re-learn’ deterrence. This calls into question the long-term effectiveness and stability of deterrence as a means for managing the conflict. Nevertheless, there does not currently seem to be a vision for moving beyond deterrence in some way. The conclusion contains a discussion of this and of Israel’s options for bolstering deterrence in the short- to medium term and perhaps moving beyond it in the longer term. Page 2 of 292 Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas Acknowledgements A number of people have helped me along the way with this project, which at times seemed daunting and surely could not have happened without their help. Above all, I’d like to thank my supervisor, Dr. John Bew, for helping me through the process of actually writing the thing. His repeated exhortations to ‘dig deeper’ eventually led to a eureka moment, when I finally understood what was needed. I’m eternally grateful to him for not giving up on me. I’d also like to thank all the interview participants, who lead busy lives but were willing to take the time to talk to a completely inexperienced PhD researcher, not to mention a newcomer to the field of Israeli security studies. Dr. Shmuel Bar, Dr. Benedetta Berti, and Gil Murciano deserve particular thanks for their assistance in my earliest phases. There were others whose contributions are not mentioned anywhere else, like my friend Rabbi Ariel Naveh, who has long been my general advisor on all things Judaic and Talmudic, and Yoel Rozenkier in Tel Aviv, who has repeatedly been ready to answer annoying questions and assist in finding Hebrew-only sources. I’d also like to thank Ayed Atmawi for showing me around Ramallah and helping explain the Palestinian perspective on current affairs. Finally, I’d like to thank my mother, Wendy, for proofreading the entire thesis near the end and helping me to achieve a level of clarity in my writing I otherwise would not have obtained. Last but not least, I’d like to thank the Department of War Studies and the School of Social Science and Public Policy at King’s College London for the small grants (one each) they provided to assist in funding my research trips to Israel and Palestine. Page 3 of 292 Charles Kirchofer: Israel Deterring Hamas Table of Contents 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................5 1.1 Aims........................................................................................................................9 1.2 Methodology.........................................................................................................10 2. Deterrence Theories.....................................................................................................17 2.1 Nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and the first three ‘waves’...........................18 2.2 Insights from the ‘fourth wave’ and criminology literatures; indirect deterrence; deterrence vs. compellence.....................................................................................38 2.3 The strategy of cumulative deterrence and the Iron Wall doctrine.......................53 2.4 Cumulative and specific deterrence, push factors, and positive reinforcement: An updated deterrence model for Israel and Hamas....................................................58 3. Hamas’s Characteristics and Deterrence......................................................................63 3.1 The formation of Hamas and its ideals.................................................................63 3.2 Deterrability: Hamas’s beliefs, ideological rigidity, and the problem of high motivation...............................................................................................................70 3.3 Deterrability: Organizational structure, internal divisions, and the problem of multiple ‘return addresses’.....................................................................................86 3.4 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................92 4. Hamas’s First Decade: Tolerance, Disruption, and Indirect Deterrence, 1987 to 2000 ................................................................................................................................96 4.1 Hamas’s roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and its birth in the First Intifada.......99 4.2 Israel’s response to armed resistance to the Oslo peace process.........................112 4.3 1996 and thereafter: More stick and less carrot..................................................124 4.4 Acceptance, deterrence, and disruption of Hamas in its early years:..................130 5. The Second Intifada to Hamas’s Gaza Takeover: Towards Direct Deterrence, 2000 to 2007......................................................................................................................143 5.1 The outbreak of the Second Intifada: The collapse of the indirect deterrence relationship...........................................................................................................145 5.2 Direct deterrence by punishment: targeted killings............................................157 5.3 Direct deterrence by denial: the security barrier and a political opening...........169 5.4 Hamas’s election win, fighting between Hamas and Fatah, takeover of Gaza...183 6. Hamas in Power: Compellence and Deterrence-by-Punishment, 2007 to 2014........197 6.1 ‘Flowering Fatahland, wilting Hamstan’: An attempt at compellence...............198 6.2 Direct deterrence of Hamas: Cast Lead and its aftermath..................................209 6.3 After Pillar of Defence: Israeli policy as a rare constant....................................229 7. Conclusion.................................................................................................................251 7.1 Israel’s deterrence of Hamas—types, methods, successes, and failures.............252 7.2 Beyond deterrence? Cumulative deterrence and conflict resolution between Israel and Hamas............................................................................................................263 7.3 The only game in town? Israel and the two-state solution..................................277 7.4 The benefits and limitations of deterrence..........................................................279 Bibliography..................................................................................................................282 Primary sources.........................................................................................................282 Secondary sources.....................................................................................................285
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