Israel and the Middle East News Update

Monday, September 8

Headlines:  Israeli Official: Hamas Has Begun Repairing Gaza Tunnels  Foreign Ministry Proposes International Force in Gaza, Favors EU Troops  Israeli Politicians Praise Sisi Plan for a Palestinian State in Sinai  Palestinian PM: Palestinians Face Boycott Threats Over Hamas Wages  Abbas Threatens to Break Partnership with Hamas  Hamas Accuses Abbas of Sabotaging Unity Government  Riots in Jerusalem: One Man Lightly Injured; Gas Station Vandalized  PM to West: Nip Islamic Extremism in the Bud

Commentary:  The National Interest: “The 2014 Israel-Hamas War: A Preliminary Net Assessment”  By Shai Feldman  Yedioth Ahronoth: “General Michael Hayden: Deal with ISIS Like We Dealt with al- Qaida”  By Ronen Bergman

S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace 633 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 www.centerpeace.org ● Yoni Komorov, Editor ● Nathaniel Sobel, Associate Editor

News Excerpts September 8, 2014 Ha’aretz Israeli Official: Hamas Has Begun Repairing Gaza Tunnels Israel has received intelligence indicating that Hamas has begun reconstructing the attack tunnels that were destroyed during Operation Protective Edge, a senior Israeli official said on Sunday. Two weeks have passed since the cease-fire went into effect, the official said, and Hamas has already begun preparing for the next confrontation and is focused on replenishing its arsenals. The senior official said that Hamas militants have returned to arms smuggling through several tunnels that remain intact under the Philadelphi Route in Rafah. He said that the smuggling continues despite the Egyptian security forces' more concentrated and effective efforts to stamp out the tunnels. FROM ISRAEL RADIO: “Security officials yesterday criticized the statements made by a political official, who said that Hamas has renewed the rocket production, the rebuilding of the tunnels and the smuggling from Sinai to the Gaza Strip”

Ha’aretz Foreign Ministry Proposes International Force in Gaza, Favors EU Troops The Foreign Ministry submitted a classified document to the security cabinet two weeks ago with a proposal for stationing an international force in the Gaza Strip to monitor rehabilitation and prevent the rearming of Hamas and other terror groups. The Foreign Ministry believes that such a force could serve Israel’s interest if it carries out effective security work in Gaza. The two-page document, entitled “Principles and Parameters for Deployment of an International Force in Gaza,” was given to the ministers of the security cabinet on August 21, by the Foreign Minister director-general.

Jerusalem Post Israeli Politicians Praise Sisi Plan for a Palestinian State in Sinai Israeli politicians responded enthusiastically Monday to reports that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was willing to give Palestinians land in Sinai adjacent to Gaza for a state. Science and Technology Minister Yaakov Peri, a former Shin Bet chief, said he's surprised by Sisi's generosity, calling the proposal "worth discussing seriously." On Monday, Army Radio reported that Sisi had offered Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas 1,600 square kilometers in Sinai to expand the Gaza Strip to five times its current size. According to the plan, the territory would serve as a Palestinian state under the complete control of the PA. The new territory, composed of Gaza together with the extra land in Sinai, would be a demilitarized state that would serve as a home to which Palestinian refugees could return. See also, “Sisi denies offering PA state in Sinai to Abbas” (i24 News)

Agence France Presse Palestinian PM: Palestinians Face Boycott Threats Over Hamas Wages The international community has threatened to boycott the Palestinian leadership if it pays the salaries of former Hamas employees in Gaza, prime minister Rami Hamdallah told AFP on Sunday. In an exclusive interview, Hamdallah said he had been warned he would face problems if he visited the Gaza Strip without first sorting out the salaries issue. Hamdallah, who heads the Palestinian 2 government of national consensus, said the question of wages had become the main stumbling block to an intra-Palestinian reconciliation deal. "This unity government should control both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but there are many things blocking its work," he said.

Ynet News Abbas Threatens to Break Partnership with Hamas The rift between Fatah and Hamas, which developed over the course of Operation Protective Edge, continued to widen Saturday, when Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas spoke to Egyptian reporters, threatening to break their current partnership if the organization in Gaza doesn't begin to make some changes. "If Hamas won't accept a Palestinian State with one government, one law, and one weapon - then there won't be any partnership between us," said Abbas. "This is our condition, and we won't back away from it."

Reuters Hamas Accuses Abbas of Sabotaging Unity Government Hamas on Monday accused Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas of trying to sabotage a fragile reconciliation agreement after he accused them of running “a shadow government” in Gaza. In a sharply worded attack on Hamas, Abbas on Saturday threatened to break off the unity agreement over the group’s de facto control of the Gaza Strip. But Abbas’s words sparked an angry response from Hamas, with spokesman Fawzi Barhoum accusing him in turn of trying “to destroy the reconciliation and play into the hands of the Americans and the Israelis.”

Walla Riots in Jerusalem: One Man Lightly Injured; Gas Station Vandalized Violent demonstrations erupted last night in a number of locations across Jerusalem, following the death of Mohammed Sinokrot, who had been critically injured in rioting in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Wadi Joz the week before. One Israeli man sustained light injuries from a stone that was thrown at him in A-Tur in East Jerusalem. At the same time a group of young men threw stones at passers-by in Issawiya. Security forces who were called in dispersed the demonstrators with crowd dispersal means.

Jerusalem Post PM to West: Nip Islamic Extremism in the Bud Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warned Monday that the extremism represented by groups such as the Islamic State is a threat to the entire world, not just the Middle East. Speaking during a meeting with visiting Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende, Netanyahu said that those who do not "nip it in the bud" immediately, will find the Islamic extremism seen today in the Middle East "at their doorsteps tomorrow." Netanyahu told Brende that there is "a growing awareness in the international community of the threat posed by Islamist terror and radicalism. Groups like ISIS, Hamas, al Nusra, al-Qaida, al Shabaab, Hezbollah supported by Iran, they form a clear and present danger to our civilization, to our way of life, our values."

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The National Interest – September 8, 2014 The 2014 Israel-Hamas War: A Preliminary Net Assessment By Shai Feldman  On August 26, after more than fifty days of fighting, the latest phase of the Israel-Hamas War ended with an Egyptian-mediated ceasefire. It will be months, if not years, before the ramifications of the 2014 war will become clear and fully apparent. At this early point, just over a week after the ceasefire was announced, any assessment of the violence must be considered tentative at best. The following are a number of early reflections on this recent explosion of Palestinian-Israeli violence:  First, as reflected in the ceasefire agreement, neither Israel, nor Hamas has gained anything significant from the violence. Hamas may have gained a modest expansion of fishing rights for Gazans and may gain some improvement in the ease of movement and access of people and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip. Israel may eventually gain some tightening of the constraints on the smuggling of weapons and ammunition into the Strip. None of these constitute strategic gains. Hamas did not gain any significant change in Gaza’s isolation— neither its demands for building a seaport, nor for the rebuilding of the airport were accepted.  Similarly, there is little hope that Israel’s wish to see the Gaza Strip demilitarized will ever materialize. Talk of a grand bargain in the framework of which Hamas will agree to disarm in exchange for massive reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will most likely remain just that—talk. A second prism leading to the conclusion that neither side has gained anything significant in the war is that the fighting ended not because one or both sides had achieved their objectives, but rather because at some point, Israeli and Hamas leaders concluded that there was no point to the war’s continuation. Namely, that more fighting with its associated costs were not likely to yield a different result.  Given its limited resources and unlimited aims, Hamas could not coerce Israel into making significant concessions merely by increasing Israel’s pain and suffering incrementally through the further use of rocket fire. Its attempts to increase Israeli costs dramatically through a “game changer”—the imaginative use of “attack tunnels”—was defeated by a combination of Israeli technology and the agility of the IDF’s response teams. Similarly, Israel was unlikely to coerce Hamas into submission by conquering additional neighborhoods in the outskirts of Gaza City.  Yet it was reluctant to attempt to do this through a “game changer” of its own: a deep penetration of the heart of Gaza by ground forces in an attempt to destroy the command and control structure of Hamas’ military arm.  This reluctance was fueled by four concerns: First, the expectation that such a strike would be associated with very high casualties on both sides; Second, unwillingness for Israel to find itself once again holding a population of 1.6 million Gaza Palestinians against its will; Third, huge uncertainty about an “exit strategy”—what would allow Israel to end its reoccupation and leave? And finally (and perhaps most importantly), fear that with Hamas destroyed, the IDF’s eventual withdrawal would leave Gaza completely chaotic and Jihadi groups far worse than Hamas would enjoy an ideal breeding ground. The third insight is that no factor seems to have played a greater role in determining the parameters of the war than the dramatic changes 4

witnessed in the broader Middle East in the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring. Most importantly, Hamas found itself completely alone in the fight. No Arab or non-Arab state and no significant nonstate actor came to its assistance and no significant expressions of mass sympathy with Hamas could be observed. Indeed, it is remarkable that the few pro-Hamas demonstrations in Europe during the war were far larger than anything seen in the Middle East during the fighting.  Hamas’ isolation resulted from three factors: First, its decision in late 2011 to side with the rebels in Syria and to relocate its headquarters away from Damascus. At the very least, the decision alienated Syria’s Assad regime, Iran and Hezbollah who saw Hamas’ behavior as nothing short of betrayal. Second, the July 2013 counter-revolution in Egypt resulted in a new regime which regards the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat. As Cairo’s new leaders view Hamas as an arm of the Brotherhood, by implication it has also come to be regarded as a threat to Egypt’s national security. Third, the disintegration of some Arab states—notably Syria, Iraq and Libya—and the inward focus of all other Arab states produced an environment in which the fate of Hamas was not a priority for any important player in the Middle East.  Another important determinant of the war’s course and consequences was the dysfunctional domestic politics of both Hamas and Israel. In Hamas’ case, the geographic split between the leadership in Gaza and Khaled Mashaal’s residence in Qatar proved a serious obstacle to ceasing the fire. Backed by Qatari money, Mashaal took a hard line in the talks to end the fighting, in the hope of extracting what Israel would never yield.  In the end, the decision to accept a ceasefire was taken by Hamas’ Gaza leadership, sidelining, if not altogether ignoring, the objections that Mashaal raised. Similarly on the Israeli side, Israel’s prime minister seemed to be challenged by members of his own cabinet as much as by Hamas. Immediately after the abduction and killing of the three Israeli teenagers in June, right- wing politicians began to argue that Netanyahu’s response was weak, hesitant and indecisive.  Later and throughout the fighting, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Economics Minister Naftali Bennett openly disputed the limited operational objectives defined for the IDF—suppressing Hamas’ rocket and mortar fire, locating and destroying the attack tunnels, and restoring Israeli deterrence. Instead they argued for ordering the IDF to defeat and destroy Hamas. Not surprisingly, both took strong objection to Netanyahu’s decision to accept the ceasefire proposal. “Without destroying Hamas,” argued Lieberman, “another round of fighting is only a matter of time.” Needless to say, the specter of a foreign minister keeping his office despite having criticized his prime minister’s policy in no uncertain terms is without precedent even in the Western world.  These attacks seemed to have been successful, with negative consequences for Netanyahu as well as for Israel at large. In the short term, the attacks sank Netanyahu’s approval rating to its lowest point. This was partly because many Israelis were persuaded that in dealing with Hamas their prime minister was indeed weak, hesitant and indecisive. But equally, as he tolerated his right-wing opponents’ attacks, Netanyahu seemed increasingly to have lost control over his own government, thus giving ammunition to critics on the left who argued that he was weak, hesitant and indecisive.

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 But even more important, in the immediate aftermath of the war, the attacks forced Netanyahu to attempt to restore his credibility and credentials as the leader of Israel’s right wing. He did this by allowing the decision to confiscate a thousand acres of land in the West Bank, presumably for additional settlement construction.  This decision is bound to have two interrelated strategic consequences: first, increasing Palestinian despair regarding the prospects of resolving the conflict with Israel. Now more of them are convinced that Netanyahu was never serious about his stated commitment to a two- state solution. Second, further weakening PA President Mahmoud Abbas by making him appear as collaborating with Israel’s continued occupation. Thus, any Israeli hopes of strengthening Abbas as a long-term strategy of building him as an alternative to Hamas were discarded under the short-term pressures to restore Netanyahu’s right-wing credentials.  The negative international reaction to the postwar land confiscation further exacerbated the most consequential of Israel’s losses during the almost eight weeks of fighting: Hamas seems to have won the so-called “war of the narratives.” In the latter arena, Israeli assertions that the large number of civilian casualties in Gaza resulted from Hamas’ strategy of using human shields to protect its weapons and command structure—hiding their rocket launchers and commanders in homes, schools, mosques and hospitals—could not overcome the negative emotional resonance of the observable mass devastation of Gaza’s neighborhoods as reflected in international media photos and footage.  Finally and possibly most tragic of all, at the end of the fighting, Israel and Hamas both remain locked into their prewar strategic impasse. As long as Hamas continues to adhere to its ideological rejection of Israel’s right to exist and thus to its unlimited aims, Israel will not make any concessions that dramatically improve Hamas’ capacity to meet the minimal aspirations of Gaza’s population. And as long as Israeli policies—especially its continued settlement construction—continue to undermine any prospects for implementing a two-state solution to the conflict, Palestinians will continue to resist “occupation,” thus making another violent clash unavoidable if not inevitable. Shai Feldman is the Judith and Sidney Swartz Director of Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies and a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

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Yedioth Ahronoth – September 8, 2014 General Michael Hayden: Deal with ISIS Like We Dealt with al-Qaida By Ronen Bergman  The “assassination policy”—this is the strategy that is required in the war against ISIS, according to the person who was considered to be the highest-ranking official in US intelligence in the past decades, and was at the forefront when the former US president, George Bush, employed this strategy against al-Qaida leaders who found shelter on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.  The same action should be taken against ISIS as we took against al-Qaida: to reach them and neutralize them, explains General Michael Hayden, 69, who was called by many “the super-spy of the United States,” as the only person who filled all four senior posts in the US intelligence community: commander of the Air Intelligence Agency, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and director of the CIA.  It was Hayden who requested that President Bush adopt a policy of targeted killings against senior al-Qaida figures. I came to him and said: ‘We can’t arrest these people, but we have to uproot them from the battlefield one way or another,’ he said. This is a difficult decision. Israel is the only country in the world that thinks, as the United States does, that assassinations are legal. I think that this is legal, but we don’t have a friend in the world who thinks that it’s legal except for Israel. For this reason, it was clear to us that we were kind of on the edge in terms of international public opinion, and that if we were going to do this—it had to be done perfectly. But the fact is that it succeeded: These al-Qaida guys can’t hurt anyone any more, said Hayden  Hayden is aware of the problems involved in taking aggressive action against senior terrorists, which at times also leads to hurting innocent civilians—as shown by the sharp criticism leveled against Israel in the course of the latest warfare in Gaza. Today’s democracies confront the question of protecting these civilians, said Hayden. I was always much more tolerant towards Israel’s actions in comparison to other Americans. Of course, for me too, hurting civilians is very sad, but in terms of intelligence—Hamas is certainly a target for the United States, said Hayden  In the interview—which will be published in full on Friday in Yedioth Ahronoth’s 7 Days weekend magazine—Hayden tells about the cooperation between the Israeli and American intelligence services. I know the former Mossad director, Meir Dagan, well and we have a very close friendship, he says. We have a saying in the CIA: ‘I’ve got a lot of time for him.’ That’s how I feel about Meir, and that’s also the way I see my relationship with Amos Yadlin, said Hayden. Hayden notes that despite the close cooperation—there have also been more than a few differences of opinion between the intelligence organizations of the two countries. Hayden: The assessments and the analysis of the information were sometimes different, mainly when it came to Iran, he said , referring to the issue of estimating the length of time that it would take Tehran to obtain an operational nuclear weapon. Hayden: There are all kinds of ways at looking at the facts, and when we examined them we reached the conclusion that it would take about 18 months until the Iranians could build an atom bomb. Israel looked at the same information and estimated a much shorter timeframe. But I completely understand this:

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It’s natural, you’re much closer to the danger, and if I were an Israeli intelligence officer I would do the exact same thing. […]

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