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CIA Documents Expose Al-Qaeda-Ira 12 November 12, 2017 Special focus The bin Laden files CIA documents expose al-Qaeda-Iran alliance Mark Habeeb Ed Blanche is East-West Editor of The Arab Weekly and adjunct professor of Global Politics and Security at Georgetown University in Washington. Beirut l-Qaeda’s murky rela- tionship with Iran over Osama bin Laden the years has been a big question mark, largely because the jihadists are diehardA Sunni extremists, which saw jihadist Iran, a Shia state, bitterly opposes and is fighting in Iraq and Syria. In recent months the links be- tween al-Qaeda and Iran have in- opportunity creasingly become a political is- sue in the United States. President Donald Trump has escalated his confrontation with both, not just in ‘Arab spring’ with verbal accusations but also military action against al-Qaeda’s three functioning satellites — in trove of al-Qaeda door for jihadists.” He predicted North Africa, Yemen and Somalia — documents, made that al-Qaeda would establish as well as special forces operations public by the US itself in Libya and then take jihad in West Africa. Central Intel- across the Mediterranean to Eu- Trump has locked onto disclo- ligence Agency rope. Libya, he said, “will be the sures by the Central Intelligence (CIA), revealed Somalia of the Mediterranean.” Agency (CIA) that al-Qaeda has that Osama bin Bin Laden’s observations dur- been in cahoots with Tehran since LadenA thought hard about how ing the time are not just interest- the late 1990s, primarily because of the terror group he headed could ing for historical reasons; they their shared enmity of the United take advantage of the popular also reveal that he was very States. uprisings across the Arab world conscious of the role that politi- CIA Director Mike Pompeo, known as the “Arab spring.” cal and social instability play in whom Trump appointed, had, as CIA Director Mike Pompeo providing fertile ground for ji- a US congressman, vociferously approved the release of 470,000 hadist groups. Of course, he had opposed the landmark Iran deal documents taken when US Navy first-hand experience with this, under which Tehran agreed to cur- SEALs raided bin Laden’s com- having forged his terror move- tail its nuclear project in return for pound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, ment while fighting in Afghani- the lifting of crippling US-led sanc- on May 2, 2011. Bin Laden was stan at a time when that country tions. killed during the raid. was a failing state in the midst of The CIA’s release on November 1 Prior to the raid, bin Laden was civil war. Bin Laden saw how the of nearly half a million documents, closely watching the regional Taliban exploited the situation to computer files, flash drives and turmoil that began in Tunisia grab power. videos seized by US Navy SEALs in December 2010 and quickly Bin Laden must have been from Osama bin Laden’s Pakistan spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, aware that the “Arab spring” hideout in May 2011 appeared to Unfinished saga. A 2011 picture shows residents gathering outside a house in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where al-Qaeda leader Osama Bahrain and Syria. Perhaps the revolutions were the result of shed new light on al-Qaeda’s sup- bin Laden was killed in a raid. (AP) most interesting of the newly deep grievances against existing posed alliance of convenience with released documents is a journal regimes, which were seen as cor- Iran. It is also likely to intensify the al-Qaeda leader dictated to rupt and, in many instances, as Trump’s anti-Iran campaign. gust 1998 bombings of the US em- en documents did not contain ma- one of his daughters. being in collusion with the West. The timing of the CIA’s action has bassies in Kenya and Tanzania that terial relevant to the accusation. Added to these sentiments were raised suspicions that the release killed 224 people and wounded The Wall Street Journal said that feelings of injustice, humiliation of the declassified documents was hundreds more. the files indicated an al-Qaeda-Iran and hopelessness — a perfect done for political purposes, in- The material seized in bin Lad- “pragmatic alliance that emerged recipe for jihadist recruitment. tended to give weight to Trump’s en’s hideout is being used by some out of shared hatred of the US and Bin Laden’s observations that position that the Tehran regime to imply that Tehran backed bin Saudi Arabia… While pleased it was “chaos” and “the absence cannot be trusted to adhere to the Laden’s attack on the United States “Both sides were willing to over- with the chaos, of leadership in the revolution” 2015 nuclear agreement it signed on September 11, 2001, a charge look profound ideological and reli- that made the “Arab spring” a with the United States and five that — if ever proven — would al- gious differences to combat com- bin Laden feared potential boon to al-Qaeda is leading global powers. most certainly generate a biparti- mon enemies.” that things were worth contemplating. He cor- However, the new disclosures to san clamour for US military action On October 25, the US House of rectly pointed out that a revolu- some validate Trump’s hard-line against Iran. No one, however, has Representatives approved legisla- happening so tion without leadership quickly approach to Iran and his October come up with hard evidence of tion targeting Iran’s ballistic mis- fast that better descends into anarchy and that allegation that Iranian proxies, an Iran link to the attacks and the sile programme and its key figures. organised in anarchic situations people meaning Lebanon’s Hezbollah, US 9/11 Commission said it found Director of National Intelligence naturally look for anything that trained the al-Qaeda cell that car- nothing to substantiate such a Dan Coats warned that Iran’s mis- counter- promises to restore direction ried out the near-simultaneous Au- charge. The release of the bin Lad- siles were “inherently capable” of revolutionary and purpose. This phenomenon may explain the Islamic State’s forces would initial success in establishing prevail. its so-called caliphate in Iraq Enter Hamza bin Laden, primed for succession and Syria that were essentially ungoverned. Societies are based on a sense Ed Blanche stani hideout in May 2011, is wide- Washington. of accepted communal behav- ly seen as a figurehead lacking his Al-Qaeda’s leadership has re- iour among their members and predecessor’s charisma and inno- leased on supportive websites au- “This chaos and the absence of government’s role is to protect Beirut vative operational zeal. dio and video recordings of Hamza leadership in the [‘Arab spring’] and enforce this behaviour. If ISIS appears to be on its last calling on followers to carry out revolutions is the best envi- you remove government — that mid strong indications legs militarily after a string of de- lone-wolf attacks on civilian tar- ronment to spread al-Qaeda’s is, if a country becomes ungov- that al-Qaeda is stag- feats and the loss of most of the gets, ISIS’s signature tactic, using thoughts and ideas,” bin Laden erned — social order can crumble ing a major comeback, territory it held in Syria and Iraq. any means possible. said. He praised Qatar-based with remarkable speed, creat- new leaders are vying Al-Qaeda seeks to harness ISIS’s To mark the 16th anniversary television network Al Jazeera, ing a societal vacuum that an to take command of the legion of disaffected supporters of al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001, which was apparently his main al-Qaeda or an Islamic State are pioneeringA jihadist organisation and seasoned combat veterans and attacks on the United States, the source of news, for “working on more than willing to fill. and the front-runner seems to be its propaganda is clearly aimed at group posted footage of the blazing toppling regimes” and for “car- It is no wonder that bin Laden Osama bin Laden’s supposed fa- winning them over as their organi- Twin Towers of the World Trade rying the banner of the revolu- was encouraged by the way the vourite son, Hamza. sation fragments. Centre in New York with images of tions.” “Arab spring” was playing out in Al-Qaeda’s ageing leadership is “At a time when Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden and Hamza as a While pleased with the chaos, early 2011. clearly promoting Hamza, in his [ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] boy superimposed on the carnage. bin Laden was concerned about One of the most fascinating tit- late 20s and dubbed “the crown seem to be fading, Hamza is the Osama bin Laden initially fa- the speed of developments, bits in bin Laden’s journal is his prince of terror” by British law- heir apparent,” said Riedel, who voured his elder son, Saad, as his fearing that things were happen- recounting of a trip to the United makers, as the successor to his is director of the Brookings In- successor but he was killed in a ing so fast that better organised Kingdom he took when he was late father as it seeks to regain the stitution’s Intelligence Project in July 2009 US drone strike in Paki- counter-revolutionary forces 13 years old. He reports that he primacy in the jihadist world that stan. would prevail. visited the 16th-century house in the Islamic State (ISIS) snatched in To protect Hamza, al-Qaeda has “I am upset by the timing which William Shakespeare grew 2014. only released images of him as a of the revolutions,” bin Laden up in Stratford-upon-Avon.
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