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As ISIS Reels, Al-Qaeda Returns with Another Bin Laden

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As ISIS Reels, Al-Qaeda Returns with Another Bin Laden October 1, 2017 9 Spotlight Al-Qaeda’s comeback As ISIS reels, al-Qaeda returns with another bin Laden Ed Blanche fought on the front lines in the ji- hadist wars, although he repeat- edly begged his father to let him Beirut do so. Letters found in Osama bin Laden’s hideout after he was killed s the Americans and indicate that he was grooming more recently the Rus- Hamza, who preaches violent ji- sians worked to crush had, as his successor. the Islamic State (ISIS) Little was heard from Hamza in Syria and Iraq, they until May 2015 when Zawahiri re- alsoA have had to face an older, and leased a series of audio messages seemingly wiser, enemy: A resur- by the younger bin Laden, calling gent al-Qaeda, which has exploit- for attacks on the United States, ed the critical reverses suffered by Europe and a new enemy, Russia, its savage progeny over the last 18 which is keeping Syrian President months to stage a comeback. Bashar Assad in power. Adding to the déjà vu, al-Qaeda’s “We must be proud of our en- advances in Syria may prove to mity of America and Russia, for be a launching pad for Osama bin they are the pharaohs of this age,” Laden’s favourite son, Hamza, be- Hamza declared. lieved to be in his late 20s, to take This suggests that Zawahiri, command of the organisation as it whose own standing with al-Qae- claws its way back into leadership da’s rank-and-file has steadily fall- of the global jihad. en, is promoting Hamza to consoli- Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of the date the campaign to re-establish Washington-based Foundation al-Qaeda’s primacy in the jihadist On the rise. An artist impression of how Hamza bin Laden may look like now using age progression (CBS) for Defense of Democracies noted sphere. technology. that al-Qaeda “seems to have more However, some analysts say that lives than a cat… It has skilfully Hamza may become little more caliphate. In September, Russian and Syr- logical — necessity. played itself off ISIS to portray the than a figurehead, with military Adel, 57, was described by one ian warplanes blunted an offensive Brett McGurk, the key US trou- organisation as being the ‘mod- veterans, such as strategist Saif Western intelligence official as in north-eastern Syria by HTS, a bleshooter against the jihadist on- erate jihadists,’ people who you al-Adel, a former special forces “one of the most capable and dan- signal that the expanding jihadist slaught in Afghanistan, Iraq and might not like but you can do busi- colonel in the Egyptian Army, and gerous extremists active today.” group has become a serious threat. Syria under three US presidents, ness with.” other battle-hardened senior al- He has a $5 million US bounty Colonel-General Sergei Rudskoi, said he’s “very concerned about Qaeda operatives infiltrated into on his head and has been on the spokesman for Russia’s General Idlib,” where “al-Qaeda is working The sharp Syria by Zawahiri since 2013, call- Americans’ most-wanted list since Staff, boasted that an estimated hard to take the reins of power.” intensification of ing the shots. They would include the August 1998 bombing of the US 850 jihadists were killed and 11 US intelligence has long insisted tensions between Shias al-Qaeda’s Syrian chief, Moham- embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, tanks destroyed during 24 hours of that al-Qaeda central, its leadership and Sunnis gave med al-Jolani, who has overseen the jihadists’ first real assault on combat. hiding from US air strikes in the Pa- the group’s dramatic resurgence the United States. He has been a The figures have not been in- kistani badlands, has infiltrated the al-Qaeda’s rebranding in the country while it has made pivotal figure in al-Qaeda since it dependently confirmed but, if ac- veteran operatives, which it calls effort a major boost. significant gains elsewhere in the was formed. curate, they would mark a serious the Khorasan Group, into Syria to Middle East, in Africa and the In- Hamza bin Laden’s focus on Rus- setback for HTS amid its growing mastermind terror attacks in West- If the younger bin Laden does dian subcontinent aided by the sia follows the rise of a new rebel resurgence as al-Qaeda’s main ji- ern Europe and the United States. come out on top, it will have “po- Taliban. alliance in Syria dominated by al- hadist rival, ISIS, faces a crippling tentially deadly consequences for War-torn Syria has become the Qaeda’s Syrian wing, Hayat Tahrir military defeat. the West and the rest of the world,” organisation’s primary operational al-Sham (HTS,) which is centred on For months, exploiting ISIS’s re- Syria has become said Ali Soufan, a Lebanese-Amer- focus where, analysts say, it plans the strategic north-eastern prov- verses, al-Qaeda has been building al-Qaeda’s primary ican veteran of the jihadist wars to declare an Islamic emirate to ince of Idlib, now largely held by up its military power in northern who has hunted down many of al- replace ISIS’s seemingly doomed the jihadists. Syria as well as re-establishing its operational focus Qaeda’s hard men. influence in other parts of the Mus- where it plans to Since Osama bin Laden was lim world, as far afield as Afghani- declare an Islamic killed by US special forces in a raid stan, Pakistan, Indonesia and even emirate to replace on his Pakistani hideaway in May The nightmare scenario: India. ISIS’s seemingly 2011, al-Qaeda has been led by his In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arab long-time deputy, veteran Egyp- Peninsula, one of the movement’s doomed caliphate. tian jihadist Ayman al-Zawahiri, ISIS and al-Qaeda unite most dangerous affiliates, has an organiser who lacks the cha- “emerged arguably as the big- To achieve this, al-Qaeda, in risma of his warrior predecessor Ed Blanche stronger… This new model has not gest winners of the failed political whatever manifestation it oper- and who, as an Egyptian, is seen by only survived its founder’s death, transition and the civil war that ates, must first topple the Assad many of al-Qaeda’s Gulf Arab stal- Beirut it has expanded its membership followed,” said the Brussels-based regime, which is kept in power by warts as an interloper. exponentially,” he observed in International Crisis Group. Russian and Iranian forces. “Many factors suggest that ome analysts say that al- his book “The Anatomy of Terror: In July, HTS, with a fighting force Gartenstein-Ross observed that Hamza could be a highly effective Qaeda and the Islamic From the Death of Bin Laden to of 30,000, consolidated its grip on the sharp intensification of ten- leader,” Soufan observed. State (ISIS), the two most the rise of the Islamic State.” Idlib, which borders Turkey and sions between Shias and Sunnis, “His family pedigree, not to powerful jihadist organisa- The rivalry between the two has a population estimated at 2 due in part to ISIS’s ferocious cam- mention his dynastic marriage to tions, may set aside their groups, the first and second gener- million. paign against Shias, gave al-Qae- the daughter of an al-Qaeda char- Sviolent 2013 schism and reunite, ations of global jihadists, fostered The following month, “the group da’s rebranding effort a major boost ter member (Abu Mohammed al- possibly under Osama bin Laden’s some hopes “that a power struggle moved one step further in its he- by allowing the group “an opportu- Masri), automatically entitles him son, Hamza, but with al-Qaeda, might weaken both groups, mak- gemonic project when it publicised nity to present itself as a bulwark to respect from every jihadi who now greatly empowered and resur- ing it easier to defeat both,” ob- its intention to establish a ‘civil against Iranian influence in places follows bin Laden’s ideology… gent, firmly in the driving seat. served A.J. Caschetta of the Mid- administration’ for northern Syria, like Syria and Yemen.” “His long-standing jihadi fer- “If the Islamic State were once dle East Forum. said Hassan Hassan of the Tahrir “If Western policy-makers con- vour and obvious charisma and again stateless and a bin Laden “But many Iraqi analysts have Institute for Middle East Policy in tinue on their current course… his closeness to al-Qaeda’s most were once again at the head of al- always believed the fissure was Washington. al-Qaeda will continue to advance senior operatives” bolster his lead- Qaeda, ISIS jihadists might return only temporary.” On August 22, it asked Idlib’s ci- along its path towards an emirate,” ership qualities, Soufan, a former to the fold — and the global form Hisham al-Hashimi, who moni- vilian council to step aside as the said Charles Lister, a Gulf-based FBI special agent, noted. of jihad as originally advocated by tors terrorist groups and advises group takes control of governance analyst who has spent years study- “It remains to be seen how, ex- Hamza’s revered father,” veteran the Baghdad government, pre- in the city. ing the jihadist factions, often face- actly, the organisation will make US intelligence operative Ali Sou- dicted in October 2014 that “the HTS, formerly known as al-Nusra to-face. use of him, but it is clear that his fan observed. Islamic State, regardless of how Front, al-Qaeda’s army in Syria, has “Only by empowering local star is on the rise,” Soufan wrote in Al-Qaeda’s main strength, he big or small it becomes, will come absorbed or eliminated most of its groups opposed to its transnational a September analysis published by said, is its ability to evolve and back to its mother: Al-Qaeda.” rivals in Idlib and controls a long jihadi agenda can we avoid gifting the US Combating Terrorism Cen- adapt to circumstances, even after Analyst Abdul Basit warned of sector of the north-western border north-western Syria to al-Qaeda tre.
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