Reconsidering the Impact of Affective Forecasting

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Reconsidering the Impact of Affective Forecasting Responses and Dialogue Reconsidering the Impact of Affective Forecasting NADA GLIGOROV A response to ‘‘Affective Forecasting and Its Implication for Medical Ethics’’ by Rosamond Rhodes and James J. Strain (CQ 17(1)) In the article ‘‘Affective Forecasting and forecasting is as all-encompassing as the Its Implications for Medical Ethics,’’ authors claim. In the next section, I Rhodes and Strain1 present current re- consider the effects of biases in affec- search documenting a psychological tive forecasting on policymakers. I as- bias that affects our ability to correctly sert that, although the research on the predict future emotional states. The impact bias reveals misconceptions bias they discuss is the wrongful esti- about what is needed for happiness, it mation of the emotional impact of does not provide guidelines for en- significant events. Research on affec- dorsing policies. In the third section, I tive forecasting by T.D. Wilson and consider how the bias affects doctors D.T. Gilbert2 indicates that people tend and patients differently. I argue that to overestimate both the positive and doctors are not affected by the bias in negative impact of events. Rhodes and the same way as patients. In the fourth Strain correctly note that the conclu- section, I argue against Rhodes and sions derived from the research—that Strain and claim that affective forecast- bad events do not seem to affect us as ing does not diminish decisional ca- much as previously assumed—has appli- pacity. I argue further that because cations for medicine. In a field where the bias is incorrigible, paternalism doctors are often faced with delivering will not help in restoring patient bad news and offering treatments that autonomy. will significantly alter the lives of their patients, information that bad events Values and the Impact Bias are not as emotionality deleterious as once thought is good news. Wilson and Gilbert’s research purports I argue in agreement with the authors to capture a universal psychological that the research on the impact bias could mechanism. As such, the bias affects support an attitude change in terms of all people who make predictions based how doctors approach and communicate on future emotional states. Rhodes and with their patients. It can contribute, also, Strain claim that ‘‘once we recognize to a change in attitude when doctors are that affective forecasting is part of faced with the grim task of telling patients normal human psychology, we are that they have a chronic illness or that alerted to consider just who in the they are faced with making difficult deci- medical environment is susceptible to sions about their health. its effects. Patients are. The families of I disagree, however, that the pre- patients are. Clinicians are. And poli- dicted impact of the biases in emotional cymakers are.’’3 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2009), 18, 166–173. Printed in the USA. Copyright Ó 2009 Cambridge University Press 0963-1801/09 $20.00 166 doi:10.1017/S0963180109090276 Responses and Dialogue Let us first consider the influence ness. Doctors, policymakers, and pa- of this psychological bias on policy- tients share this predicament, but I makers. The research on the impact do not take that to indicate that par- bias cannot offer any help when it ticular policies are the result of the comes to policy issues because the impact bias. Rhodes and Strain’s claim results of the research are explanatory is that affective forecasting biases in- and not predictive. The research shows fluence policymaker’s decisions. Con- that we are not good predictors of our sider policies regarding promotion of future emotional states but it does not health.Wecanconcludebasedonthe allow for predictions about what will new information about the impact bias make us happy. Policies, however, are that not being healthy is not as devas- an attempt to promote or protect uni- tating emotionally as we once thought. versally held values. If the studies on Plenty of people can be happy even affective forecasting were to have an if they have lived through or are still impact on policymaking, they should living with illness. We may not need help in the selection values to be en- health for happiness. But does this dorsed. I claim that the affective fore- mean that policies promoting health casting research cannot be used to do that. are based on biased affective forecast- I take affective forecasting research to ing? I assume that most people would show that there is a disconnect between disagree with that conclusion. Even if some of our values, which are set in we decide that health is no longer termsofwhatweexpectwillmakeus worth promoting, predictions about happy, and what actually makes us which values should be promoted can- happy. The findings indicate that there not be based on affective forecasting. is not a clear connection between what If emotional states do not trail or we value and pursue—like health, em- depend on the events in one’s life, ployment, wealth, and prestige—and one can only conclude that what we happiness. In other words, the research thought were necessary ingredients for shows that there is a cleavage between happiness are not essential to it. Poli- some of our current commonly held cies are meant to endorse generally values and what we require for happi- accepted values that rest on ideas peo- ness. The disconnection between happi- ple have about what is good or worth ness and values was manifested in the promoting. If we do not require good following way: People tend to overesti- events, or the absence of bad events, mate their emotional reaction to nega- for happiness, one has no resources tive events, but also to positive ones.4 It left for making predictions about what is not just that losing a limb does not to promote. One can conclude that make somebody as unhappy as pre- the impact bias research indicates that dicted, but that positive events, such as illness might not devastate your life job promotions, are not likely to make but that research does not provide one as happy as predicted. Significant guidance in the selection of policies events do not seem to make a large, pertaining to healthcare. lasting difference on our emotional con- dition overall. Momentous events might The Impact Bias from Different cause a spike in positive or negative Perspectives feeling, but one ultimately settles back toone’spreviousemotionalstate. Although research on the impact bias The impact bias exposes our deep supports the claim that forecasting ignorance about the nature of happi- biases are part of human psychology, 167 Responses and Dialogue the way in which such biases affect other words, it might be a problem for reasoning is different for patients and me but not for my doctor. At the very those deciding for the patients. least the problem is not of the same Affective forecasting is a first-person nature from the two perspectives. My phenomenon. The research on the bias doctor might know that I will do much supports the view that we tend to be better dealing with my illness than I wrong about our own reactions to expect. She might be able to reason free events. From the first-person point of from bias when it comes to my case. view the bias is incorrigible, because The research itself gives no indication a person who has gone through bad that people deciding for others are events is likely to continue wrongful susceptible to the influence of affective estimates about her future emotional forecasting. Studies only show that states. In fact, we tend to be wrong people are affected with this bias when about how we feel all the time. In they are trying to predict how this or a review of the literature on emotional that event will make them feel. Con- memory, Christiansen and Safer con- ceivably the doctor might reason by cluded that ‘‘there are apparently no adopting the patient’s perspective and published studies in which a group imagine what it would be like for her of subjects has accurately recalled the to be in the patient’s condition. If the intensity and or frequency of their pre- process of reasoning is simulating the viously recorded emotions.’’5 This con- patient’s point of view, the effects of clusion can be explained in part by the impact bias could be transferred to appealing to the workings of the ‘‘psy- the doctor. It strikes one as much more chological-immune system,’’6 so termed likely that when a doctor is thinking by Gilbert and Wilson. A person recov- about future states of her patient, she is ers emotionally from a traumatic event probably doing so based on probabili- by making sense of it.7 The negative ties about what happens on average for event becomes normalized and its emo- a particular population. The doctor’s tional impact is less likely to be re- reasoning will be based on her experi- membered accurately. Past good or bad ence with past patients with similar events become less extraordinary be- conditions. Moreover, if the doctor cause of the ameliorating effect of the takes into account information about psychological immune system. Thus, the impact bias, she may reach a differ- the disconfirmation of the prediction entconclusionthanthepatient.Thedoc- remains unnoticed because our mem- tor’s forecast, then, will be free from ory of past emotional states is often error. inaccurate. If we cannot draw on past In contrast to the patient, the doctor experience to generalize for the future, whose reasoning might be influenced the impact bias continues to affect our by the impact bias is not in the same predictions about emotional states.8 predicament as the patient.
Recommended publications
  • Is It Possible to Accurately Forecast Suicide, Or Is Suicide a Consequence of Forecasting Errors?
    UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM Is it Possible to Accurately Forecast Suicide, or is Suicide a Consequence of Forecasting Errors? Patterns of Action Dissertation Sophie Joy 5/12/2014 Word Count: 3938 Contents Abstract 2 Introduction 3 Can Individual Behaviour Be Forecasted? 4 Can Suicide be Accurately Forecasted? 5 The Suicide Process 6 Mental Health 8 Interpersonal Psychological Theory of Suicide 8 A History of Suicidal Behaviours 8 Is Suicide a Consequence of Poor Affective Forecasting? 10 Can HuMans Accurately Forecast EMotions? 10 FocalisM 11 IMpact Bias 11 Duration Bias 11 IMMune Neglect 11 Application of Affective Forecasting Errors to Suicidal Individuals 12 What is the IMpact of Poor Affective Forecasting on Suicide? 13 Rational Choice Theory 13 Conclusion 15 Reference List 16 1 Is It Possible to Accurately Forecast Suicide, or is Suicide a Consequence of Forecasting Errors? “Where have we come from? What are we? Where are we going? ...They are not really separate questions but one big question taken in three bites. For only by understanding where we have come from can we make sense of what we are; only by understanding what we are can we make sense of where we are going” Humphrey, 1986, p. 174. Abstract Forecasting has been applied to Many disciplines however accurate forecasting of huMan behaviour has proven difficult with the forecasting of suicidal behaviour forMing no exception. This paper will discuss typical suicidal processes and risk factors which, it will be argued, have the potential to increase forecasting accuracy. Suicide is an eMotive social issue thus it is essential that the forecasting of this behaviour is atteMpted in order to be able to successfully apply prevention and intervention strategies.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Feelings Stray: Sources of Affective Misforecasting in Consumer Behavior Vanessa M
    Why Feelings Stray: Sources of Affective Misforecasting in Consumer Behavior Vanessa M. Patrick, University of Georgia Deborah J. MacInnis, University of Southern California ABSTRACT drivers of AMF has considerable import for consumer behavior, Affective misforecasting (AMF) is defined as the gap between particularly in the area of consumer satisfaction, brand loyalty and predicted and experienced affect. Based on prior research that positive word-of-mouth. examines AMF, the current study uses qualitative and quantitative Figure 1 depicts the process by which affective misforecasting data to examine the sources of AMF (i.e., why it occurs) in the occurs (for greater detail see MacInnis, Patrick and Park 2005). As consumption domain. The authors find evidence supporting some Figure 1 suggests, affective forecasts are based on a representation sources of AMF identified in the psychology literature, develop a of a future event and an assessment of the possible affective fuller understanding of others, and, find evidence for novel sources reactions to this event. AMF occurs when experienced affect of AMF not previously explored. Importantly, they find consider- deviates from the forecasted affect on one or more of the following able differences in the sources of AMF depending on whether dimensions: valence, intensity and duration. feelings are worse than or better than forecast. Since forecasts can be made regarding the valence of the feelings, the specific emotions expected to be experienced, the INTRODUCTION intensity of feelings or the duration of a projected affective re- Before purchase: “I can’t wait to use this all the time, it is sponse, consequently affective misforecasting can occur along any going to be so much fun, I’m going to go out with my buddies of these dimensions.
    [Show full text]
  • What We Mean When We Talk About Suffering—And Why Eric Cassell Should Not Have the Last Word
    What We Mean When We Talk About Suffering—and Why Eric Cassell Should Not Have the Last Word Tyler Tate, Robert Pearlman Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Volume 62, Number 1, Winter 2019, pp. 95-110 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/722412 Access provided at 26 Apr 2019 00:52 GMT from University of Washington @ Seattle What We Mean When We Talk About Suffering—and Why Eric Cassell Should Not Have the Last Word Tyler Tate* and Robert Pearlman† ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the phenomenon of suffering and its relation- ship to medical practice by focusing on the paradigmatic work of Eric Cassell. First, it explains Cassell’s influential model of suffering. Second, it surveys various critiques of Cassell. Next it outlines the authors’ concerns with Cassell’s model: it is aggressive, obscure, and fails to capture important features of the suffering experience. Finally, the authors propose a conceptual framework to help clarify the distinctive nature of sub- jective patient suffering. This framework contains two necessary conditions: (1) a loss of a person’s sense of self, and (2) a negative affective experience. The authors suggest how this framework can be used in the medical encounter to promote clinician-patient communication and the relief of suffering. *Center for Ethics in Health Care and School of Medicine, Oregon Health and Science University, Portland. †National Center for Ethics in Health Care, Washington, DC, and School of Medicine, University of Washington, Seattle. Correspondence: Tyler Tate, Oregon Health and Science University, School of Medicine, Depart- ment of Pediatrics, 3181 SW Sam Jackson Park Road, Portland, OR 97239-3098.
    [Show full text]
  • Loneliness, Mental Health Symptoms and COVID-19 Okruszek, Ł.1, Aniszewska-Stańczuk, A.1,2*, Piejka, A.1*, Wiśniewska, M.1*, Żurek, K.1,2*
    Safe but lonely? Loneliness, mental health symptoms and COVID-19 Okruszek, Ł.1, Aniszewska-Stańczuk, A.1,2*, Piejka, A.1*, Wiśniewska, M.1*, Żurek, K.1,2* 1. Social Neuroscience Lab, Institute of Psychology, Polish Academy of Sciences 2. Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw * authors are listed alphabetically Corresponding author information: Łukasz Okruszek, Institute of Psychology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Jaracza 1, 00-378 Warsaw, Poland (e-mail: [email protected]) Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic has led governments worldwide to implement unprecedented response strategies. While crucial to limiting the spread of the virus, “social distancing” may lead to severe psychological consequences, especially in lonely individuals. We used cross- sectional (n=380) and longitudinal (n=74) designs to investigate the links between loneliness, mental health symptoms (MHS) and COVID-19 risk perception and affective response in young adults who implemented social distancing during the first two weeks of the state of epidemic threat in Poland. Loneliness was correlated with MHS and with affective response to COVID-19’s threat to health. However, increased worry about the social isolation and heightened risk perception for financial problems was observed in lonelier individuals. The cross-lagged influence of the initial affective response to COVID-19 on subsequent levels of loneliness was also found. Thus, the reciprocal connections between loneliness and COVID- 19 response may be of crucial importance for MHS during COVID-19 crisis. Keywords: loneliness, mental well-being, mental health, COVID-19, preventive strategies Data availability statement: Data from the current study can be accessed via https://osf.io/ec3mb/ Introduction Within three months-time since the first case of the novel coronavirus originating from Wuhan (Hubei, China) has been officially reported, COVID-19 has spread to 210 countries and territories affecting over 1602 thousand individuals and causing 95735 deaths as of 10th April (Dong, Du, & Gardner, 2020).
    [Show full text]
  • Examining Affective Forecasting and Its Practical and Ethical Implications
    Examining Affective Forecasting and its Practical and Ethical Implications Emily Susan Brindley BSc Psychology 2009 Supervisor: Prof. David Clarke Contents Page Introduction 1 1. Affective Forecasting – What do we know? 1 2. Biases – Why people cannot predict their emotions accurately 3 2.1 Impact Bias 3 2.2 ‘Focalism’ 4 2.3 Immune Neglect 4 2.4 Dissimilar Context 4 3. The Self-Regulating Emotional System 5 4. Affective Forecasting Applied 6 4.1 Healthcare 6 4.2 Law 7 5. Can AFing be improved? 8 6. Ethics: Should people be taught to forecast more accurately? 10 Conclusions 12 References 13 Examining Affective Forecasting and its Practical and Ethical Implications Introduction Emotions are important in guiding thoughts and behaviour to the extent that they are used as heuristics (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2007), and are crucial in decision-making (Anderson, 2003). Affective forecasting (AFing) concerns an individual’s judgemental prediction of their or another’s future emotional reactions to events. It is suggested that “affective forecasts are among the guiding stars by which people chart their life courses and steer themselves into the future” (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg & Wheatley, 1998; p.617), as our expected reactions to emotional events can assist in avoiding or approaching certain possibilities. We can say with certainty that we will prefer good experiences over bad (ibid); however AFing research demonstrates that humans are poor predictors of their emotional states, regularly overestimating their reactions. Further investigation of these findings shows that they may have critical implications outside of psychology. If emotions are so influential on behaviour, why are people poor at AFing? Furthermore, can and should individuals be assisted in forecasting their emotions? These issues, along with the function of AFing in practical applications, are to be considered and evaluated.
    [Show full text]
  • Matt Hayes of School of Accountancy W.P
    Distinguished Lecture Series School of Accountancy W. P. Carey School of Business Arizona State University Matt Hayes of School of Accountancy W.P. Carey School of Business Arizona State University will discuss “Risky Decision, Affect, and Cognitive Load: Does Multi-Tasking Reduce Affective Biases?” on September 13, 2013 1:00pm in MCRD164 Risky Decisions, Affect, and Cognitive Load: Does Multi-Tasking Reduce Affective Biases? Matt Hayes W.P. Carey School of Accountancy First Year Research Paper August 30, 2013 Abstract This paper examines the effects of cognitive load on risky choices in a capital budgeting setting. Research by Moreno et al. (2002) demonstrated that affective reactions to a choice can alter risk-taking tendencies. Their control participants’ decisions were influenced by the framing effects of prospect theory. However, once affective cues were introduced, participants’ reactions to these cues dominated the framing effect, leading to prospect theory inconsistent choices. Some studies of cognitive load show that high cognitive load leads to greater reliance on affective cues (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). Other research has shown high cognitive load may impair processing of affective information (Hoerger et al. 2010; Sevdalis and Harvey 2009). In this paper I am able to replicate the original finding in Moreno et al. (2002), but find that cognitive load moderates the affect-risk-taking relationship. Specifically, in a gain setting, cognitive load versus no load participants were more likely to make prospect theory consistent choices, despite the presence of affective cues. These findings suggest that cognitive load may inhibit processing of affective information, and is an important consideration when studying decision making in managerial accounting.
    [Show full text]
  • Religious Perspectives on Human Suffering: Implications for Medicine and Bioethics
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Sydney eScholarship Postprint This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in [Journal of Religion and Health] following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [Fitzpatrick SJ, Kerridge IH, Jordens CFC, Zoloth L, Tollefsen C, Tsomo KL, Jensen MP, Sachedina A, Sarma D. Religious perspectives on human suffering: Implications for medicine and bioethics. Journal of Religion and Health 2016; 55:159–173] is available online at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10943-015-0014-9 Please cite as: Fitzpatrick SJ, Kerridge IH, Jordens CFC, Zoloth L, Tollefsen C, Tsomo KL, Jensen MP, Sachedina A, Sarma D. Religious perspectives on human suffering: Implications for medicine and bioethics. Journal of Religion and Health 2016; 55:159–173. Religious perspectives on human suffering: Implications for medicine and bioethics Scott J FitzpatrickA,B, Ian H KerridgeB, Christopher F C JordensB , Laurie ZolothC, Christopher TollefsenD, Karma Lekshe TsomoE, Michael P JensenF, Abdulaziz SachedinaG, Deepak SarmaH (2015/16) ACentre for Rural and Remote Mental Health, University of Newcastle, Orange, Australia; BCentre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine (VELiM), University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia; CCentre for Bioethics, Science and Society, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois, USA; DDepartment of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Colombia, South Carolina, USA USA; EDepartment of Theology and Religious Studies, University of San Diego, San Diego, California, USA; FMoore Theological College, Sydney, Australia; GAli Vural Ak Centre for Global Islamic Studies, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA; HReligious Studies, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
    [Show full text]
  • ANXIETY DISORDERS in ADULTS the Disorders, Their Treatment and Prevention
    Angstlidelser hos voksne, engelsk Information about ANXIETY DISORDERS IN ADULTS The disorders, their treatment and prevention Psykiatri og Social psykinfomidt.dk CONTENTS 03 What are anxiety disorders? 05 Why do some people suffer from anxiety disorders? 06 What happens in the brain when someone suffers from anxiety? 07 What types of anxiety disorders are there? 08 What are the symptoms of anxiety disorders? 10 Different degrees of anxiety disorders 11 How are they diagnosed? 12 What treatment is available for anxiety disorders? 15 What can be done to prevent anxiety disorders? 16 What can you do yourself if you are suffering from anxiety? 18 What can relatives do? 21 Where can you find more information? Anxiety disorders are the most common mental disorders in the population in the Western world. This brochure describes anxiety disorders, their specific characteristics as well as what they have in common, and their treatment. It also offers some advice to anxiety sufferers and their relatives. This brochure is for adults (age 18 and above), and it is mainly intended for people being treated for anxiety disorders by the psychiatric service in Region Midtjylland, and for their relatives. It is important for you and your relatives to learn about anxiety disorders. The more you know, the better you will be able to relate to the disorder when it occurs, and prevent relapses. Regional psychiatry in Region Midtjylland has six clinics offering outpatient treatment of anxiety disorders. We hope this brochure will help you and your relatives to become better informed about anxiety disorders. Kind regards The psychiatric service in Region Midtjylland Tingvej 15, 8800 Viborg Tel.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Suffering in Theories of Emotion
    Suffering and Emotion 1 Running head: SUFFERING AND EMOTION The Role of Suffering in Theories of Emotion Joseph de Rivera Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology Clark University Suffering and Emotion 2 There is a good deal more suffering in human life that there is in our theories of emotion. One reason for this appears to be that our theories tend to focus on individual emotions or moods. Thus, we focus on terms such as anger or anxiety without considering that there common root is anguish. Another reason is that we want to ground our theories in our evolutionary heritage, so we focus on emotions that we share with other animals and that are clearly observable, such as the Big Four of anger, fear, happiness and sadness. Yet while animals certainly appear to experience pain, and show the effects of loss, they do not the way anticipate pain and loss in the way we do when we consider aging, sickness, death, and the loss of those we love. Hence, in addition to examining specific emotions and relating emotion to our animal heritage, it is important to contexturalize emotion in our broader human being. When we do this we must come to grips with emotional experiences such as suffering and mysticism. When we begin with such experiences, rather than with facial expressions, we find that they are focused on our relationship with something that is radically Other than ourselves. Today, in our secular culture with its scientific parlance, we may speak as Jim Averill has, of our “system of cognitive constructs,” but these cognitive constructs are beliefs about the World in which we live.
    [Show full text]
  • IS THERE MEANING in SUFFERING? by Dimitrios G
    IS THERE MEANING IN SUFFERING? By Dimitrios G. Oreopoulos MD. Toronto, Canada This article was first published in Humane Medicine, Volume 5, Number 2, 2005. What is suffering? Before we explore its meaning we should understand how we define suffering. In 1982 the New England Journal of Medicine published the now classical paper “The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine.” In it, Eric Cassel said that suffering can be defined as a state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the intactness of the person. It can occur in relation to any aspect of the person in the realm of his social role, his group identification, his relation with self or body, or in relation to family or relation with a personal or transcendental source of meaning. Suffering never affects only one part of a person but it affects the whole being; i.e. physical, emotional, mental, spiritual and social aspects.1,2 Suffering can occur when one does not expect it, or the patient does not report it when it is expected. Also, a person can suffer enormously at the distress of another, especially a loved one Finally, as I mentioned in my introduction, suffering is a unique personal experience and can only be defined by the person who suffers.1,2 Pain and suffering Although closely identified, these two experiences are phenomenologically distinct. It is believed that the greater the pain the greater the suffering but this is not always the case. Thus childbirth can be extremely painful yet it is considered to be rewarding.
    [Show full text]
  • Towards a Conceptual Model of Affective Predictions in Palliative Care
    Accepted Manuscript Towards a conceptual model of affective predictions in palliative care Erin M. Ellis, PhD, MPH, Amber E. Barnato, MD, MPH, Gretchen B. Chapman, PhD, J. Nicholas Dionne-Odom, PhD, Jennifer S. Lerner, PhD, Ellen Peters, PhD, Wendy L. Nelson, PhD, MPH, Lynne Padgett, PhD, Jerry Suls, PhD, Rebecca A. Ferrer, PhD PII: S0885-3924(19)30059-4 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpainsymman.2019.02.008 Reference: JPS 10037 To appear in: Journal of Pain and Symptom Management Received Date: 4 September 2018 Revised Date: 24 January 2019 Accepted Date: 10 February 2019 Please cite this article as: Ellis EM, Barnato AE, Chapman GB, Dionne-Odom JN, Lerner JS, Peters E, Nelson WL, Padgett L, Suls J, Ferrer RA (2019). Towards a conceptual model of affective predictions in palliative care. Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 57(6), 1151-1165. doi: https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jpainsymman.2019.02.008. This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 1 Running title: AFFECTIVE PREDICTIONS IN PALLIATIVE CARE Towards a conceptual model of affective predictions in palliative care Erin M. Ellis, PhD, MPH (National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, MD, USA; [email protected]) Amber E.
    [Show full text]
  • Subjective Well-Being: Measuring Happiness, Suffering, and Other Dimensions of Experience
    This PDF is available from The National Academies Press at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18548 Subjective Well-Being: Measuring Happiness, Suffering, and Other Dimensions of Experience ISBN Arthur A. Stone and Christopher Mackie, Editors; Panel on Measuring 978-0-309-29446-1 Subjective Well-Being in a Policy-Relevant Framework; Committee on National Statistics; Division on Behavioral and Social Sciences and 204 pages Education; National Research Council 6 x 9 PAPERBACK (2013) Visit the National Academies Press online and register for... Instant access to free PDF downloads of titles from the NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 10% off print titles Custom notification of new releases in your field of interest Special offers and discounts Distribution, posting, or copying of this PDF is strictly prohibited without written permission of the National Academies Press. Unless otherwise indicated, all materials in this PDF are copyrighted by the National Academy of Sciences. Request reprint permission for this book Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Subjective Well-Being: Measuring Happiness, Suffering, and Other Dimensions of Experience Subjective Well-Being Measuring Happiness, Suffering, and Other Dimensions of Experience Panel on Measuring Subjective Well-Being in a Policy-Relevant Framework Arthur A. Stone and Christopher Mackie, Editors Committee on National Statistics Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Subjective Well-Being: Measuring Happiness, Suffering, and Other Dimensions of Experience THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
    [Show full text]