Journalism Studies, Volume 1, Number 1, 2000, pp. 101–112 The Propaganda Model: a retrospective EDWARD S. HERMAN University of Pennsylvania, USA ABSTRACT This article describes the “propaganda model” of media behavior and performance, initially set down in the book Manufacturing Consent, and addresses some of the scholarly criticisms leveled against the model since its inception a decade ago. Drawing on contemporary examples of media reporting, the article argues for the continuing, if not increasing, relevance of the propaganda model in explaining current media behavior. KEY WORDS Conspiracy Theory, Mass Media, Political Economy, Propaganda In Manufacturing Consent: the political and contend that the media behave economy of the mass media, Noam fairly and responsibly.1 The exclusion Chomsky and I put forward a of the propaganda model perspective is “propaganda model” as a framework noteworthy for one reason, because for analysing and understanding how that perspective is consistent with long- the mainstream US media work and standing and widely held elite views why they perform as they do (Herman that “the masses are notoriously short- and Chomsky, 1988). We had long sighted” (Bailey, 1948, p. 13) and are been impressed by the regularity with “often poor judges of their own inter- which the media operate on the basis ests” (Lasswell, 1933, p. 527), so that of a set of ideological premises, de- “our statesmen must deceive them” pend heavily and uncritically on elite (Bailey, 1948, p. 13); and they “can be information sources and participate in managed only by a specialized class propaganda campaigns helpful to elite whose personal interests reach beyond interests. In trying to explain why media the locality” (Walter Lippmann, 1921, p. perform in this way we looked to struc- 310). In Lippmann’s view, the “manu- tural factors as the only possible root of facture of consent” by an elite class the systematic patterns of media be- had already become “a self-conscious havior and performance. art and a regular organ of popular Because the propaganda model government” by the 1920s (Lippman, challenges basic premises and sug- 1921, p. 248). gests that the media serve antidemo- Clearly, the manufacture of consent cratic ends, it is commonly excluded by a “specialized class” that can over- from mainstream debates on media ride the short-sighted perspectives of bias. Such debates typically include the masses must entail media control conservatives, who criticize the media by that class. Political scientist Thomas for excessive liberalism and an adver- Ferguson contends that the major me- sarial stance toward government and dia, “controlled by large pro t-maximiz- business, and centrists and liberals, ing investors do not encourage the who deny the charge of adversarialism dissemination of news and analyses ISSN 1461-670X Print; 1469-9699 Online/00/010101-12 Ó 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd 102 EDWARD S. HERMAN that are likely to lead to popular indig- and they are funded largely by adver- nation and, perhaps, government ac- tisers who are also pro t-seeking enti- tion hostile to the interests of all large ties, and who want their investors, themselves included” (Fer- advertisements to appear in a support- guson, 1995, p. 400). Political scientist ive selling environment. The media Ben Page provides evidence that there also lean heavily on government and are common “elite-mass gaps”, with major business rms as information “ordinary citizens … considerably less sources and both ef ciency and politi- enthusiastic than foreign policy elites cal considerations and, frequently, about the use of force abroad, about overlapping interests, cause a certain economic or (especially) military aid or degree of solidarity to prevail among arms sales, and about free-trade the government, major media and other agreements. The average American is corporate businesses. Government much more concerned than foreign pol- and large non-media business rms icy elites about jobs and income at are also best positioned (and home” (Page, 1996, p. 118). Page suf ciently wealthy) to be able to press- notes that “the problem for public delib- ure the media with threats of with- eration is most severe when of cials of drawal of advertising or TV licenses, both parties and most mainstream me- libel suits and other direct and indirect dia take positions that are similar to modes of attack. The media are also each other and opposed to the public” constrained by the dominant ideology, (Page, 1996, p. 119). The propaganda which heavily featured anti-commu- model explains the “elite-mass gaps”, nism before and during the Cold War as well as elite and mainstream media era, and was often mobilized to induce hostility to this mode of analysis: re- the media to support (or refrain from fusal to allow it entry into the debate is criticizing) US attacks on small states understandable given that the gaps are that were labeled communist. embarrassing and suggest that the me- These factors are linked together, dia do serve narrow elite interests. re ecting the multi-leveled capability of This article brie y describes the government and powerful business propaganda model, addresses some of entities and collectives (e.g. the Busi- the criticisms that have been leveled ness Roundtable; the US Chamber of against it and discusses how the model Commerce; the vast number of well- holds up a decade or so after its publi- heeled industry lobbies and front cation.2 Examples are provided to illus- groups) to exert power over the ow of trate the ways in which the propaganda information. We noted that the ve fac- model helps explain the nature of me- tors involved—ownership, advertising, dia coverage of important political top- sourcing, ak and anti-communist ics at the turn of the century. ideology—work as “ lters” through which information must pass, and that individually and often in cumulative The Propaganda Model fashion they greatly in uence media choices. We stressed that the lters What is the propaganda model and work mainly by the independent action how does it work? Its crucial structural of many individuals and organizations; factors derive from the fact that the and these frequently, but not always, dominant media are rmly embedded have a common view of issues as well in the market system. They are pro t- as similar interests. In short, the propa- seeking businesses, owned by very ganda model describes a decentralized wealthy people (or other companies); and non-conspiratorial market system THE PROPAGANDA MODEL 103 of control and processing, although at ganda model explained everything or times the government or one or more that it illustrated media omnipotence private actors may take initiatives and and complete effectiveness in manu- mobilize co-ordinated elite handling of facturing consent. It is a model of me- an issue. dia behavior and performance, not of Propaganda campaigns can occur media effects. We explicitly pointed to only when they are consistent with the the existence of alternative media, interests of those controlling and man- grassroots information sources and aging the lters. For example, these public scepticism about media truthful- managers all accepted the view that ness as important limits on media ef- the Polish government’s crackdown on fectiveness in propaganda service, and the Solidarity Union in 1980 and 1981 we urged the support and more vigor- was extremely newsworthy and de- ous use of the existing alternatives. served severe condemnation; whereas Both Chomsky and I have often pointed the same interests did not nd the to the general public’s persistent re- Turkish military government’s equally fusal to fall into line with the media and brutal crackdown on trade unions in elite over the morality of the Vietnam Turkey at about the same time to be War, the desirability of the assault on newsworthy or reprehensible. In the lat- Nicaragua in the 1980s and the merits ter case the US government and busi- of the North American Free Trade ness community liked the military Agreement in the 1990s, among other government’s anticommunist stance matters. The power of the US propa- and open-door economic policy; the ganda system lies in its ability to mobi- crackdown on Turkish unions had the lize an elite consensus, to give the merit of weakening the left and keeping appearance of democratic consent, wages down. In the Polish case, propa- and to create enough confusion, mis- ganda points could be scored against a understanding and apathy in the gen- Soviet-supported government, and eral population to allow elite programs concern could be expressed for work- to go forward. We also emphasized the ers whose wages were not paid by fact that there are often differences Free World employers. The t of this within the elite that open up space for dichotomization to corporate interests some debate and even occasional (but and anticommunist ideology is obvious. very rare) attacks on the intent as well We used the concepts of “worthy” as the tactical means of achieving elite and “unworthy” victims to describe this ends. dichotomization, with a trace of irony as Although the propaganda model was the varying treatment was clearly re- generally well received on the left, lated to political and economic advan- some complained of an allegedly pessi- tage rather than anything like actual mistic thrust and implication of hope- worth. In fact, the Polish trade unionists less odds to be overcome. A closely quickly ceased to be worthy when com- related objection concerned its appli- munism was overthrown and the work- cability to local con icts where the pos- ers were struggling against a sibility of effective resistance was often western-oriented neoliberal regime. greater than in the case of national The travails of today’s Polish workers, issues; but the propaganda model does like those of Turkish workers, do not not suggest that local and even larger pass through the propaganda model victories are impossible, especially lters.