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w w w.coleurope.eu Papers prepared for the Colloquium “Working for Europe: Perspectives on the EU 50 Years after the Treaties of Rome” Chambre belge des représentants Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 9 March 2007 Bruges Political Michele Chang, Eric De Souza, Research Papers Sieglinde Gstöhl, and Dominik Hanf, ©2007 Cahiers de recherche politique de Bruges No 4 / June 2007 European Political and Administrative Studies/ Études Politiques et Administratives Bruges Political Research Papers / Cahiers de recherche politique de Bruges No 4 / June 2007 Papers prepared for the Colloquium “Working for Europe: Perspectives on the EU 50 Years after the Treaties of Rome” Chambre belge des représentants Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 9 March 2007 ©Michele Chang, Eric De Souza, Sieglinde Gstöhl, and Dominik Hanf, 2007 European Political and Administrative Studies/ Études Politiques et Administratives Dijver 11, B-8000 Brugge, Belgium www.coleurope.eu/pol Editor’s note: The Chamber of Representatives of the Belgian Parliament asked the permanent professors of the College of Europe to write brief papers for a conference organized in honour of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The objective of these papers was to highlight the main challenges facing the European Union in four different issue areas (Lisbon Strategy, enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and institutional reform) and to generate a debate among Belgian academics, politicians and members of civil society. The papers produced used to promote this discussion are reprinted here. A transcript of the proceedings (including interventions by participants) can be found on the Belgian Chamber of Representative’s website, http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/comm/committee/col029-PR.pdf About the Authors Michele Chang is Professor in the European Politics and Administrative Studies Department at the College of Europe (Bruges). Eric De Souza is Professor in the European Economic Studies Department at the College of Europe (Bruges). Sieglinde Gstöhl is Professor in the European International Relations and Diplomacy Department at the College of Europe (Bruges). Dominik Hanf is Professor in the European Legal Studies Department at the College of Europe (Bruges) and Visiting Professor in European Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies at the College of Europe (Natolin). Address for Correspondence: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Editorial Team Michele Chang, Mauro Gagliardi, Ugo Lopez, Andrea Maier, Dieter Mahncke, Daniele Marchesi, Jérémie Pélerin, Ariadna Ripoll-Servent ׀ Fax +32 (0) 50 477 280 ׀ Tel. +32 (0) 50 477 281 ׀ Dijver 11, B-8000 Bruges, Belgium website www.coleurope.eu/pol ׀ email [email protected] 1 Table of Contents The Lisbon Strategy 3 by Michele Chang Enlargement of the EU 10 by Eric De Souza EU External Action: European Neighbourhood Policy 19 by Sieglinde Gstöhl La réforme des institutions de l’Union européenne : Perspectives cinquante ans après la signature des traités de Rome 32 de Dominik Hanf 2 The Lisbon Strategy Paper prepared for a panel discussion Michele Chang Professor, European Political and Administrative Studies, College of Europe, Bruges In March 2000 the European Council launched the Lisbon strategy, the purpose of which was to create “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion." This paper will trace the development of the Lisbon strategy from its inception until the present day, highlighting the essential points of debate in terms of the strategy’s contribution to the EU’s competitiveness, social objectives, and democratic legitimacy. The distinguishing feature of the Lisbon strategy was the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), an intergovernmental form of cooperation that employed soft law. Hodson & Maher1 described the OMC as s a “heterarchical, decentred and dynamic process [that] supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity, offers an alternative to treaty rules on enhanced co-operation, and addresses some of the legitimacy issues” (p719). Though these soft law mechanisms had existed and been implemented in the previously outlined initiatives on employment, the OMC would be extended to new issue areas such as social policy, R&D, and macroeconomic policy, as well as maintaining its use in employment policy. The distinguishing feature of the OMC was that nation states would retain the ability to make policy decisions, and legislation at the Community level 1 Dermot Hodson and Imelda Maher, “The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39, 2001, pp. 719- 746 3 was “explicitly excluded.” 2 In 2001 sustainable development was added to the Lisbon agenda’s objectives at the Gothenburg summit. Member States jointly identified and defined common objectives, and the Commission monitored progress towards achieving these goals. Member States implemented these objectives through the development of National Action Programmes (NAPs). The NAPs would not only encourage policymaking coordination at the EU level, they would engage various economic and social actors at the EU and domestic levels. Benchmarking, naming and shaming, and peer pressure were the mechanisms used to promote compliance. The Lisbon strategy was welcomed for its innovative approach to integration. In particular, this new form of governance could lead to enhanced cooperation and improve legitimacy problems of the EU by involving more social actors in the policy process, thus creating a dialogue as well as aggregating diverse preferences at multiple levels.3 Moreover, integration via the OMC was seen as less threatening to Member States that were averse to further integration, as the states retained their ability to direct and implement the economic and social policies associated with it.4 For example, Member 2 Fritz Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity” MPIfG Working Paper 2002 3 See James S. Mosher, “Open Method of Coordination: Functional and Political Origins”, ECSA Review, 31, 2000; Maurizio Ferrera, Anton Hemerijk and Martin Rhodes, The Future of Social Europe: Recasting Work and Welfare in the New Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Dermot Hodson and Imelda Maher, “The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39, 2001, pp.719-746; Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, “Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US” in Jonathan Zeitlin and David Trubek (editors), Governing work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Burkard Eberlein and Dieter Kerwer, “New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42, 2004, pp.121-142; Kerstin Jacobsson, “Soft Regulation and the Subtle Transformation of States: The Case of EU Employment Policy”, Journal of European Social Policy, 14, 2004, pp.355-370. 4 Oliver Gerstenberg and Charles F. Sable, “Directively-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?” www2.law.columbia.edu/sable/papers/gerst-sabel1029.doc, 2000; Christoph O. Meyer, “The Hard Side of Soft Policy Co-ordination in EMU: The Impact of Peer Pressure on Publicized Opinion in the Cases of Germany and Ireland”, Journal of European Public Policy, 11, Michele Chang 4 States are loath to harmonize their different welfare models, but the OMC allowed for a dialogue that encouraged convergence without necessitating harmonization.5 However, the Lisbon strategy and the OMC also faced detractors in regards to effectiveness, legitimacy, and policy outcomes. In terms of the effectiveness of the OMC, it is unclear whether or not soft law promotes further cooperation. Its voluntary nature makes it difficult to ascertain if reforms were undertaken as a result of policy learning or if they would have been adopted anyway. It is also unclear if policy learning via the OMC is even realistic; while the business world has successfully employed peer review and benchmarking techniques to improve performance, applying such strategies at the level of international policy is difficult.6 Governments do not possess the same type of resources as multinational corporations, and the Lisbon Strategy’s budget does not provide sufficient funds to rectify this situation, thus limiting the prospects for innovative policy to emerge.7 Though it was originally touted as making the policy process more democratic via the social dialogue, the OMC can be criticized for exacerbating the legitimacy problem due to the lack of transparency in the process, the limited role that civil society plays in practice,8 and the muted role for the more democratic institutions of the EU (like the European Parliament) and of national governments (national parliaments).9 Indeed, accountability is quite difficult in a system that easily conflates decision-making with implementing 2004, pp.814 - 83 5 Caroline de la Porte, “Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?” European Law Journal, 8, 2002, pp.38-58 6 Martin Lodge, “The Importance of Being Modern: International Benchmarking and National Regulatory Innovation”, Journal of European Public Policy, 12, 2005, pp.649-667 7 James Arrowsmith, Keith Sisson, and Paul Marginson, “What Can 'Benchmarking'