Globalizing : State Strategies and Modalities of Religion

By Yoshiko Ashiwa Professor of Anthropology and Global Issues Hitosubashi University [email protected]

David L. Wank Professor of Sociology and Global Studies Sophia University [email protected]

Paper for presentation at International Studies Association Annual Meeting, April 6-9 2021 Panel: “Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power: Theories and Cases”

Draft version for presentation only. Do not cite or circulate without authors’ permission.

Abstract Since coming to power in 1949, the the Communist Party of (CPC) has developed a state system for controlling religoin and using it to promote CPC aims. Since the rise to power of in 2012, the system has been repurposed to support CPC aspirations for China to be recognzied as a great power. One of its activites is the global promotion of Buddhism as religion and culture. This essay has five sections. First, is a survey of the origins and development of the state system of religious control since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Second, is an overview of state’s international uses of Buddhism to further Chinese interests from the 1950s to the 2010s. Third, is an examination of the commitment in 2015 by PRC Buddhist establishment to globally promote Buddhism. Fourth, it is an overview of the modalities of Buddhism and their promotion around the world. Fifth, is an examination of the promotion as the local activities of a prominent monk. The conclusion considers the historical particularity of this promotion of national modalities of Chinese Buddhism as a universal religion and global culture.

Since Xi Jinping became leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2012, the

Chinese state has stepped up its global promotion of Chinese Buddhism. The aim is not to spread belief in Buddhism as religion but rather to further the aspiration of the

Communist Party of China (CPC) for China to be recognized as a country that has inherited a civilization in the modern world. This aspiration is expressed in the “China

Dream,” Xi’s vision of China regaining the glory of the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the time when Buddhism from India was Sinicized into Chinese culture and flourished.

Buddhism is also part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that aspires to reconnected

China to Europe via trade routes through central Asia and the Indian Ocean. The routes overlap with the historical passage of Buddhism from India to China, but now is the time to spread Buddhism from China to Asian countries and beyond. Thus, the global promotion reflects a view that the rise of China as an economic and political power needs to be accompanied by culture and religion.

The key claim of this essay is that the Chinese state’s global promotion of

Buddhism operates as both soft power and sharp power.1 Xi considers Buddhism to be a key element of traditional Chinese culture, and, among China’s deepest cultural soft power. Since taking office he has advocated using Buddhism to explain to the world that the “rise of China” is peaceful and spreading “excellent” Chinese culture to contribute to

1 Christopher Walker, “What is ‘sharp power’?,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 9-23. 2 the world peace and prosperity.2 However, we see the state promotion as operating as sharp power because it proceeds through the state system that uses religion to further the

CPC’s political aims domestically and internationally.3 This system, created after the founding of the PRC in 1949, has been repurposed by Xi to use Chinese religion and culture, especially Buddhism, for the CPC’s aspiration for China to be seen as a great power. It does by creating and controlling relationships and discourses in ways that further Chinese geopolitical and economic interests. We see this global promotion of

Buddhism by the Chinese state as analogous to the historical rise of European global power accompanied by Christianity.

This essay has five sections. First, is a survey of the origins and development of the state system of religious control since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Second, is an overview of state’s international uses of Buddhism to further Chinese interests from the

1950s to the 2010s. Third, is an examination of the commitment in 2015 by PRC

Buddhist establishment to globally promote Buddhism. Fourth, it is an overview of the modalities of Buddhism and their promotion around the world. Fifth, is an examination of the promotion as seen in the local activities of a prominent monk. The last two sections are an ongoing inquiry and, perforce, exploratory.4

It is instructive to point out that the PRC is the world’s largest Buddhist country. It contains all three Buddhist traditions: Mahayana Buddhism practiced by Han Chinese,

2 CITE 3 This analysis and insights expressed in this brief draw from an ongoing research project and are, perforce, tentative. In particular the insights of the fourth and fifth section are based only preliminary fieldwork and should be considered hypothetical. 4 The project is “Chinese Buddhism in Globalization: States, Communities, and the Practice of Religion” funded by the Henry Luce Foundation Program on Religion in International Affairs. 3

Theravada Buddhism practiced by the Dai people, and Vajrayana Buddhism practiced by

Tibetans and Mongolians. Although Buddhism, as well as other religions were, were severely suppressed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), it has since recovered.

By 2012, there were thirty-three thousand Buddhist temples, 240,000 clerics, and thirty- eight Buddhist seminaries.5 Now, hundreds of millions of Chinese visit Buddhist temples as a custom to pray to the Buddha, bodhisattvas and other deities for health and fortune, although few have taken vows as Buddhist devotees.

The State Religious System

Despite being an atheist political party that its proscribes members from believing in them the CPC has recognized the existence of five religions—Buddhism, Catholicism,

Daoism, Islam, Protestantism—in the PRC. The original rationale, articulated in the

1950s, was that suppressing religion would be too divisive among the popular and detract from more pressing economic and political needs of building a strong socialist country.

However, the CPC averred that the complexity of religion, intertwined with class issues and the threat of foreign control, necessitated a state system of religious control of manage religion and ensure that its practioners worked for the benefit of the country.

The state system founded in the 1950s consists of elements that predate the founding of the PRC in 1949. The concept of “religious freedom” in the PRC has roots in the debates over the drafting of the national constitution in the Republic of China,

5 Ji Zhe et al (eds.), Buddhism After Mao: Negotiations, Continuities, and Reinventions, (University of Hawai’i Press, 2019). 4 established in 1912 as the first modern Chinese state.6 The global propagation of nationally defined forms of Chinese Buddhism as universal values and ethics was foreshadowed from the 1920s by Ven. 太虛, a famous advocate for the modern reform of Chinese Buddhism.7 The system operates through the CPC’s united front practices first devised in the 1930s to identify and coopt influential persons in non-CPC groups to work for CPC aims.8 Thus, the system builds on stream of modern state formation, the modern reform movement of Buddhism, and CPC experience in the revolutionary civil war and Anti-Japanese War in the first half of the twentieth century.9

After its founding the PRC has recognized the existence of religions within a state system of institutions and organizations that mobilizes them to work for CPC goals.10 The system was founded in the early 1950s. Its key institution is patriotic religion, expressed in the slogan "love country, love religion."11 This basically means that clerics must obey the CPC and work for its goals. Another institution is the constitutional right of "religious freedom." It protects the "religious belief" of individuals but not collective practices.

Religious rituals and teachings are only allowed if they are “normal” and are conducted

6 Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank (eds.), Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China (Stanford University Press, 2009) 7 Don A. Pittman, Taixu’s Reforms: Towards a Modern Chinese Buddhism (University of Hawaii Press, 2001). 8 Lyman Van Slyke, “The United Front in China,” Journal of Contemporary History 5, no. 3 (1970): 119-135. 9 Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 10 The exception is during the Cultural Revolution when the state encouraged the suppression of religion. 11 After the Cultural Revolution, the foundational document of Chinese religious policy is “Document 19: The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist” Period, (CPC Central Committee, 1982), https://is.muni.cz/el/1421/jaro2011/KSCB023/um/24029748/Document_no._19_1982.pdf 5 within the confines of religious activity sites, namely temples, churches, and mosques authorized by the state. Foreign religious organizations cannot operate inside the PRC to prevent foreign domination of Chinese religions.

The state system of administrative control of religion was formally established in the 1950s. It has three national actors, each with central, provincial, and local offices. The most powerful is the United Front Work Department (UFWD), an organ of the CPC that supervises the other two actors. The UFWD was established in 1943 to manage CPC relations with non-party groups, including religion. It develops the CPC’s ideological position towards these groups and coopts friendly groups' elites while isolating enemies.

It operates behind-the-scenes to cultivate ties with elite individuals for furthering CPC aims, and can coordinate with different agencies across the state. The second actor is the

State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA),12 which is part of the government, and not the CPC. It was established in 1953 for routine administration of religions. It translates CPC ideology into policies for religions and supervises their implementation.

The third actor is the Buddhist Association of China (BAC). Its members were elite clerics approved by the UFWD. The BAC adapts state religious policies to the situation of Buddhism, disseminate knowledge of state policies through publications, ensure the compliance of the clerics and devotees, and mobilize them to work for CPC aims.13

The system is coordinated by the UFWD through overlapping personnel appointments and communication channels to ensure unity of purpose. The UFWD meets regularly with the Religious Affairs Bureau officials, some of whom may hold concurrent

12 From its founding in 1953 until 1997, it was called the Religious Affairs Bureau. To avoid confusion we refer to it throughout the text by its current anacronym SARA. 13 In locales, religious and ethnic affairs are often in the same bureau. 6 appointments in the UFWD. It may give concurrent appointments to Religious affairs officials. Officials of the UFWD and Religious attend important BAC meetings to give speeches on CPC concerns to shape its policy directions. Furthermore, the UFWD places influential clerics on the Chinese People’s Consultative Political Conference, which proposes legislation, and the National People’s Congress, which approves legislation, thereby exposing them to broader policy debates. Therefore, much of its work consists of managing networks of relationships through meetings, congresses, and other gatherings that help drive a discursive landscape of terms, concepts, and values supportive of CPC economic, political, and security projects.

Since its establishment the system and the religious policy has been continuously adapted to changed circumstances and CPC concerns. In particular, the UFWD has played an expanding role in coordinating global impressions and reactions to the “global rise of China.” Scholars have increasingly likened it to an “influence” operation that proceeds through the establishment of networks, and generation of a discourses that support CPC interests and projects.14 The growing importance of the UFWD is reflected in the state reorganization in 2018 that has merged government functions, such as religious and overseas Chinese affairs into the UFWD. The functions of religious control no longer proceed through the government but rather are directly managed by the CPC.

These shows the growing expectations of Xi and the CPC towards religion in advancing

14 See for example, Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo et al, China’s New United Front Work in Hong Kong: Penetrative Politics and it Implications (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Gerry Groot, “The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work Department under Xi,” China Brief, 18, 7 (2018), https://jamestown.org/. 7

China’s interests globally.15 (From 2020, one of these interests has been using Buddhism to counter negative impressions of China due to the global COVID-19 pandemic).16

Overview of Buddhist Diplomacy, 1950s-2010s

CPC use of Buddhism in PRC international relations can be divided into three period. First is from the 1950s to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. During this period the CPC developed what may termed state Buddhist diplomacy in regard to

Buddhist countries in Asia. Key activities included lending Buddha relics for public veneration and giving funds to rebuild temples in other countries, and creating bilateral

Buddhist friendship associations, and pushing Chinese clerics take leadership in international Buddhist organizations. The key aim is described by Holmes Welch, an expert on Chinese Buddhism, as follows: "In any Asian neighbor, whenever a segment of society like the sangha came to look to China as a model or fell under the domination of a pro-Chinese faction, it slightly increased the internal pressure on the government of that country to adopt a pro-Chinese foreign policy.”17 However, the effectiveness of this diplomacy fell short of CPC expectations. The BAC formed only a few friendship associations because many Buddhist countries at the time were anti-communist and did not recognize the PRC. Furthermore, international organizations could resist BAC efforts

15 Alex Joske, “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Religious Affairs Work,” China Brief 19, 9, https://jamestown.org. 16 Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank. “Special Report: COVID-19 Impacts Chinese Buddhism, State Control, and Soft Power,” Religion and Diplomacy (April 20, 2020). See website at https://religionanddiplomacy.org.uk/2020/04/20/special-report-impact-of- covid-19-on-chinese-buddhism-and-soft-power/ 17 Holmes Welch, Buddhism Under Mao (Harvard University Press, 1972), 169. 8 to politicize them. For example, in 1961, the World Fellowship of Buddhists meeting in

Phnom Penh refused the BAC request to expel the delegation, prompting the

BAC to walk out.18

The second period, from 1979 until the early 2000s, is coterminous with the revival of Buddhism after the Cultural Revolution. During the 1980s, the revival of Buddhism was intertwined with the new policies of creating a market economy by attracting foreign investment. In particular local governments in Southeast China that were the “ancestral homelands” of the overseas Chinese encouraged the revival of Buddhism, as well as

Daoist temples, ancestral halls, and shrines to local gods, to persuade overseas Chinese businesspersons that the CPC had renounced the “leftist” Marxist ideology. Local officials felt that permitting overseas Chinese to come to China to rebuild temples and worship would overcome their fears about the commitment of the CPC to the market economy and private property, thereby encouraging their investment. Then, in the 1990s, the CPCP revived the earlier practices of Buddhist diplomacy. In 1994, the BAC initiated the establishment of the China-Korea-Japan Friendship Buddhist Exchange Association in 1994, demonstrating that the PRC was again an active center of Buddhism in the world. In 1995 Buddhist relic exchanges began again with Southeast Asian countries to improve China’s image in other countries after the violent suppression of the 1989 student movement, and counter growing unease at China rising power. Buddha relic visits also took place to Hong Kong (1997) and Taiwan (2002) to underscore the cultural unity of China, while underscoring that the origins of the culture lay inside the PRC.

18 Welch, 1972: 213-214. 9

The third period started in the early 2000s as the CPC came to see China as a major world power requiring a global cultural presence. In 2006, Chinese leader Hu

Jintao, apparently embracing Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power, declared, “it to be a paramount state mission to improve China’s soft power.”19 The next year , the CPC called for “improving China’s soft power for the country’s peaceful rise.”20 However, the initial emphasis was on Confucianism, not Buddhism. This reflected the use of the

Confucian term “harmony”21 in the Hu Jintao administration. In 2007, Confucius

Institutes began to be established on universities in other countries to promote and culture. At the same time, the BAC embraced these new trends. It began emphasizing Buddhism as cultural practices, such as tea ceremony and meditation for the people to promote harmony in people’s lives as a respite from the challenges of the market economy. In 2006, it reintroduced itself to global Buddhist society by convening the , the first major international religious conference in the PRC.

Under the title theme “harmonious society” that brought together Buddhist delegations representing Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana schools from three dozen countries around the world.22 In 2008, the BAC approved the construction of Zhonghua Temple in

19 Xinhua News Agency, “Hu Jintao’s Speech at the 8th Artists’ Conference,” November 17, 2006. Quoted in J. Zhang, “China’s Faith Diplomacy,” in Religion and Public Diplomacy, edited by P. Seib (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 75-97. For the introduction of the concept of soft power into Chinese policy circles see Hongyi Lai, “Introduction: The Soft Power Concept and a Rising China,” China’s Soft Power and International Relations, ed. Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 1-20. 20 Xinhua News Agency, “Senior Official Stresses Need for Developing Soft Power,” April 8, 2007. Quoted in J. Zhang, China’s Faith Diplomacy. 21 For a discussion of the term “harmony” in Confucianism and different political periods in China see Jana S. Rošker, “The Concept of Harmony in Contemporary P.R. China and in Taiwanese Modern Confucianism,” Asian Studies XVII (2013), 2:3-20. 22 For the introduction of the soft power concept into Chinese policy circles see Hongyi Lai, “Introduction: The Soft Power Concept and a Rising China,” China’s Soft Power 10

Lumbini, Nepal. This was the first time for the BAC to officially approve the construction of a temple overseas (discussed further in this essay).

In 2012, the inauguration of the Xi Jinping administration of Xi Jinping began to deepen the use of Buddhism to support the “global rise of China.” While Xi considered

Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism as foundations of Chinese civilization, he appeared partial to Buddhism for conveying it around the world.23 Confucius Institutes were becoming controversial in Asia, Europe and North America over issues of academic freedom.24 As for Daoism, its appeal beyond overseas Chinese communities was open to question. In contrast, Buddhism was a world religion that has long existed in many Asian countries, and, more recently as religion and “culture” in western countries. Soon, Xi was expressing the view that Chinese Buddhism could convey China’s “excellent traditional culture to “tell the Chinese story” and “explain China to the world,” in order to further

“shared prosperity” and the “common destiny of humankind.” Since then the BAC, in the context of the PRC religious system, has undertaken the global promotion of Buddhism.

Adoption of the Policy to Undertake Global Promotion of Buddhism

The BAC built on Xi’s encouraging view of Buddhism to undertake the global promotion of Buddhism. In 2015, the BAC Ninth National Congress confirmed this as one of key areas of work for the next five years. An article in Fayin, the official BAC

and International Relations, ed. Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 1-20 23 See, for example, Xi Jinping’s speech at UNESCO Headquarters (March 27, 2014), www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1142560.shtml. 24 Jennifer Hubbert, China in the World: An Anthropology of Confucius Institutes, Soft Power, and Globalization (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2019). 11 journal of announced that this was the first time for the BAC to strongly encourage

Chinese Buddhism to “go out” of China to other countries in order to “tell the Chinese story well" to their peoples so they could realize China’s accomplishments and peaceful intentions. These efforts were variously referred to in the article as “soft power” (ruan shili), “public diplomacy” (gongyi waijiao), and “person-to-person diplomacy” (renjian waijiao).25

In the runup to the congress, rationales for global promotion were publically expressed by BAC leaders. An instance of this was a 2014 inteview with state media by

BAC vice-president Ven. Juexing 覺醒. He characterized the existing strategy as

“inviting in” (qing jinlai) foreign Buddhists to China, an example being World Buddhist

Forums. He noted such practices were useful for developing relationships showing the strength of Buddhism in China but did little to raise the status of Buddhism globally. In contrast, Tibetan Buddhism and Theravada Buddhism were distinctive global “brands,” while Buddhists from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have aggressively furthered their

Buddhisms abroad. Juexing argued that Chinese Buddhists must

…take the initiative to go out of the country (zou chuqu), promote Chinese Buddhism, and spread Chinese culture. This is related to the international competitiveness of Chinese Buddhism, improving the ability of Buddhism’s non-governmental diplomacy, enriching connotations in public diplomacy, and expanding the development channels of non- governmental diplomacy. This is necessary to make Chinese culture and values known and accepted by people around the world.26

25 26 Zhou Fang. “Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee member Ven. Juexing: Chinese Buddhism Should ‘Go Out,’” (quanguo zhengxie weiyuan juexing fashi: zhongguo fojiao ying zou chuqü), Zhongguo Minzu Bao (March 5, 2014). Reposted on Zhongguo shehui kexue wang, www.cssn.cn/zjx/zjx_zjsj/201403/t20140305_1020038.shtml 12

He urged Chinese clerics to emulate Buddhists from Taiwan in establishing overseas branch temples. This would “‘open up overseas bases for the spread of Chinese

Buddhism and Chinese culture, which is beneficial to enhancing the country’s cultural soft power.’” In doing so, he suggested that Chinese clerics could benefit from the greater freedom of religion in other countries. “Foreign systems are different from China’s systems, and there are diverse ideologies. Therefore, as long as the spread of religion and culture in other countries meets the requirements of their laws and regulations, the development space and prospects should be relatively optimistic.”27

In 2015, the BAC Ninth National Congress formally recognized the global promotion of Chinese Buddhism as a key activity.28 A speech by BAC president

Xuecheng integrated the key terms of political discourse of Xi Jinping into the new program for globally promoting Buddhism. It was titled “Love the Country, Love

Religion, be Faithful and Righteous, Promote the Healthy and Comprehensive

Development of Buddhism so as to Contribute to Realizing the China Dream and the

Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” and concluded on the following note:

Buddhism is not only a cultural bridge for friendly exchanges between China and the peoples of East, South and Southeast Asia, but also a spiritual bond for friendly exchanges with Buddhists all over the world. We must continue to do a good job in holding the Buddhist friendly exchange meetings between China-Korea-Japan Buddhist Friendship Exchange Conference, improve the exchange platform and mechanism, and strengthen the golden bond between China, Korea and Japan. We must consolidate and develop the traditional Buddhist friendship with Buddhist countries and regions in South and Southeast Asia, enhance feelings between their peoples, and promote good neighborliness and

27 Zhou Fang, 2014. 28 For a summary of the congress, see Chen Xingqiao. "The Significance, Bottlenecks, and Strategic Thinking of Chinese Buddhism Going Out," (zhongguo fojiao zou chuqu de yiyi, pingjing ji qi zhanlüe sikao), Foxue yanjiu (2015), www.chinabuddhism.com.cn/yj/2015-07-21/9189.html 13

friendship. We will further develop friendly exchanges and cooperation with other parts of the world, especially the Buddhist circles in Europe and the United States. We will actively participate in the activities of international Buddhist organizations and religious peace organizations, participate in world religious dialogue, and constantly improve the participation and discourse power of Chinese Buddhist circles in international Buddhist affairs. We will continue to successfully run the World Buddhist Forum and enhance the international influence of Chinese Buddhism. The ancient land and sea silk road was not only a road of Sino- foreign trade, but also a road for the promotion of Buddhism, a road for cultural exchange, and a road for integration of peoples. The Buddhist community should give full play to its unique advantages, carry out cultural exchanges and religious dialogue with the countries related to the new “Silk Road Economic Belt,” promote the regional sharing and joint protection of Buddhist cultural heritage; and strengthen friendly exchanges with the Buddhist communities in countries related to the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and promote Chinese Buddhism to go out and contribute to the implementation of the "One Belt and One Road" strategic concept. Through friendly exchanges with foreign countries, we will play an active role in promoting lasting world peace and common prosperity.29

Modalities of Buddhism and Strategies of Promotion

The promotion has emphasized three discursive modalities of Buddhism in China.

While the following terms that signify them have existed for some time, they have acquired new political overtones under Xi Jinping. First is “Sinicized Buddhism”

(zhongguohua fojiao). Sinicization has long referred to the historical process by which

Buddhism from North India adapted to China in the Tang Dynasty and flourished. Now, the term has been politically adapted to refer to the incorporation of Chinese values, such as harmony, into Chinese Buddhism. Second is “Chinese Buddhism” (zhongguo fojiao).

29 Xuecheng 學誠, 愛國愛教 正信正行 推動佛教事業健康全面發展 為實現中華 民族偉大復興的中國夢貢獻力量 [aiguoaijiao tuidong fojiao shiye jiankang quanmian fazhan wei shixian zhonghuo minzu weida fuxing de zhongguomeng gongxian liliang] “Love the Country, Love Religion, be Faithful and Righteous, Promote the Healthy and Comprehensive Development pf Buddhism so as to Contribute to Realizing the China Dream and the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” Fayin 5 (2015), www.chinabuddhism.com.cn/fayin/dharma/2015.5/g201505f005.htm. 14

This term previously referred to the coexistence of the Mahayana, Theravada, Vajrayana traditions in China under the umbrella of BAC, but now also refers to Chinese Buddhism as the center of all Buddhism in the world. Third is “Buddhist culture” (fojiao wenhua).

This refers to Chinese Buddhist-inspired values and practices that people can pursue as lifestyles and hobbies without questioning matters of belief, understanding Buddhist teachings, and engaging in worship. Under Xi, the concept has also referred to Chinese values, such as harmony and peace that should be spread around the world as universal values.

The strategies of promoting these modalities of Buddhism varies locally by such factors as a country’s history of Buddhism, its degree of economic dependency of China, and its geopolitical importance to the CPC. Based on preliminary research we see promotion varying by three types of countries. First, are Asian countries with Buddhist majorities, or large minorities, that are economically dependent on China, including

Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Key strategies include: 1) establishing bilateral Buddhist friendship associations; 2) setting up Buddhist broadcasting networks; 3) organizing joint religious and cultural rituals, such as praying for peoples' health during the coronavirus pandemic, and commemorating historical

Buddhist ties between the countries; 4) providing funds to restore temples; 5) inviting foreign Buddhists to participate in BAC-initiated regional Buddhist conferences; 6) undertaking joint Buddhist scholarship and student exchanges; 7) engaging in charity and disaster relief projects; 8) investing in Buddhist-themed BRI infrastructure to appeal to populations in these countries and enhance the position of their leaders. Many of these activities, such as conferences, rituals and inviting people (clerics, politicians, ministers 15 of culture) to the PRC, further the aim of the UFWD to develop ties with persons to make them favorably disposed to the PRC. They also and amplify discourses. One scholarly analysist of current UFWD activities sees these “friendship” activities as seeking to establish “political influence…by engineering a favorouable discourse landscape” that amplifies ways of talking about China that surround decision-makers in other countries with ways of talking about China that furthers CPC aims, such as the BRI, while marginalizing critical scrutiny of these aims.30

Second, are western countries with recent histories of Buddhism and growing popular appreciation of Buddhist culture as Asian culture in daily life. In these countries, we see efforts to build Chinese Buddhist temples to further Buddhist cultural activities.

(These activities appear less promoted in Buddhist-majority Asian countries, as these would offend populations that already have their long Buddhist traditions). These are especially visible in such countries as Australia and Canada with strong multiculturalism policies and sizable immigrant communities from the PRC (at least three percent of the population). One reason may be that such visible projects bolster the status of the Chinese clerics associated with them in the eyes of host countries’ society and government. This can increase PRC-linked voices in the public sphere of these countries, offsetting those of

Buddhists that the CPC considers competitors, such as the Dalai Lama. Furthermore, for

Buddhists and Chinese tourists, the projects are sites of worship and pilgrimage, while to the general populations of these countries, they appear as Chinese cultural theme parks.

30 Jichang Lulu, “Repurposing Democracy: The European Parliament China Friendship Cluster,” Sinopsis, November 26 (2019): 28. 16

Third, are strategies for Asian countries—India, Japan, Taiwan—that the CPC sees as geopolitical rivals, and the BAC views as competing for global status in Buddhism. In these countries the strategies appear far less concerned with exerting influence and shaping images among their respective populations than in raising the status of China’s

Buddhism. China competes directly with India as being seen as the center of Buddhism.

In this regard, China is establishing Buddhist academies and expanding Buddhist sites in

China and other countries. This serves to elevate China as the center of Buddhist teaching and pilgrimage, while undermining the importance of India. In Japan, Chinese clerics and devotees are recovering the Shingon school of the Vajrayana school that disappeared in

China but still exists in Japan. This will create an alternative Chinese Vajrayana to

Tibetan Buddhism within the PRC that could help dilute its influence within the PRC, and maybe, eventually, globally. Regarding Taiwan, Buddhist clerics undertake charity and cultural activities in other countries that may compete with those of Taiwan-based

Buddhist organizations, such as and the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu

Chi Foundation. This, of course, can be seen as efforts to marginalize the status not only of Taiwan’s Buddhism, but of Taiwan more generally because, as its international relations have been reduced it has increasingly relied on non-governmental channels, such as charity and disaster relief for international presence and visibility.

The visible face of global promotion are ordained clerics who have studied in

Chinese universities or Buddhist academies after the Cultural Revolution as. They understand the CPC religious discourse and policy, understand state expectations towards religion, and know how to cooperate with the system. Some of the most prominent ones have transnational careers, including simultaneously leading temples inside China and 17 abroad.31 This situation is difficult to imagine in regard to Catholicism, Daoism, or

Protestantism. For clerics from the PRC who are active abroad, the state system of religion can provide resources. The UFWD can coordinate with overseas Chinese chambers of commerce and business persons to provide funds for temple construction projects.32 The development of large-scale projects abroad can further enhance the visibility of Chinese Buddhism, and the status of the clerics in those countries to the governments of these countries. Prominent Chinese clerics from abroad are often invited back to China and feature prominently as speakers and guests honor at congresses of the

BAC and other organizations in China.

Clerics as Buddhist Globalizers: The Career of Ven. Yinshun

The career of a prominent clerics illustrates both the working of the system and the role of clerics as its visible face. Yinshun 印順 is credited as one of the first clerics to establishing contacts with religious leaders, government leaders and academic representatives of countries in Asia to expand the influence, communication power and reputation of Chinese Buddhism. His career illustrates what a cleric can do with the backing of the system to provide funding for local Buddhist ventures that are integrated with the state media, industry sectors (i.e. tourism, transportation, construction) and

31 Is it difficult to imagine this in regard to Catholicism, Daoism, or Protestantism, but in the case of Buddhism it appears possible, most likely only for clerics who have remained citizens of the PRC. 32 For the relationship of the UWFD to overseas Chinese business see, Gerry Groot, “Understanding the Role of Chambers of Commerce and Industry Association in United Front Work,” China Brief 18, 11 (June 19, 2018), https://jamestown.org/program/understanding-the-role-of-chambers-of-commerce-and- industry-associations-in-united-front-work/. 18 various levels of the PRC state and CPC organs at various levels of the state in ways that promote both the three modalities of Buddhism, as well as such state projects as the BRI and sovereignty claims over the South China Seas. His activities focus on other Buddhist countries in Asia, with implications for competing Asian countries, especially India.

Yinshun career illustrates that of an elite cleric in the system. He born in 1974 from

Xiangyan, Hubei Province to family of teachers, studied philosophy at Peking University and completed a doctorate in Buddhism from Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University. In

2000, he was ordained a monk under his teacher Ven. Benhuan 本焕 (1907-2012), 44th generation of , and one of the last living links to the great master monks of the first half of the twentieth century. Benhuan had helped found Hongfa Temple in the

1980s, the first new temple opened in the PRC, which was built in an effort to add a cultural dimension to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone created in 1981 at the very beginning of China’s market liberalization policies. In 2008, Ven Yinshun became abbot of Hongfa Temple, which, as a new temple, makes it easier for it to be site of innovation, as described below. Yinshun was subsequently selected for national and provincial leadership positions, including vice-president of the BAC, and representative on the standing committee of the People’s Political Consultative Council of Guangdong and

Hainan provinces, and Shenzhen City.33 He also has international recognition, most

33 許嬌蛟 , 印順：我願傾盡一生用大愛撫慰人 [yinshun; wo yuan qing jin yisheng yong da ai fuwei ren] Yinshun: I Wish to Spend my Whole Life using Great Love to Comfort People, CPPCC 中國政協, September 29, 2018, http://cppcc.china.com.cn/2018- 09/29/content_64311809.htm. 19 notably in 2011 when the King of Thailand gave him the title of Supreme Chinese

Buddhist Cleric.34

Yinshun has played a leading role in extending Chinese control over the Buddhist heritage of Nepal, one of Asia’s poorest countries. Nepal is also of great strategic importance to the CPC due to its location on border with Tibet and lying between China and India. In 2001, Yinshun became abbot of the Zhonghua Temple 中華寺 in Lumbini, where Gautama Siddhartha is said to have been born in the fifth century BCE.

This was the first large-scale temple authorized by the BAC for construction outside of the PRC, and was financed by China to build goodwill with the Nepali government. Its construction has helped elevated the status of Lumbini as a pilgrimage site that competes with India’s Bodh Gaya, site of Buddha’s enlightenment and teaching activities, as the holiest site in Buddhism. Second, the construction of the temple was significant foreign investment that furthered Nepal’s economic dependency on China to gain concessions from the Nepali government. One concession is permission to develop a rail link between

Lhasa and Lumbini to serve the growing number of Chinese tourists, but which India sees as a security threat. Third, the Nepali government has deepened marginalization of the

Tibetan exile community, which is strongly desired by the CPC, by new measures to discourage Tibetan refugees from coming to Nepal. Furthermore, Zhonghua Temple can be considered as a base to weaken the Tibetan Vajrayana Buddhism widely practiced

34 Zhou Yuanchun 周元春， 中視網, 印順成泰國華僧大尊長 [Yinshun cheng taiguo hua seng da zunshang] Yinshun becomes Supreme Chinese Buddhist Cleric, CCTV 中視 網, December 7, 2011, http://news.cntv.cn/20111207/111116.shtml. 20 among the 10 percent of Nepalis who are Buddhism, by creating a Chinese Buddhist alternative in the country.35

Another of ’s activities is creating “friendly exchanges” that bring together influential clerics, ministers of culture, and even retired senior statespersons from other countries to amplify and spread Chinese discourses that link Buddhism with other aims.

He has established annually recurring venues, most notably the South China Sea

Buddhism Shenzhen Round Table 南海佛教深圳圓桌會議 and the Religious Leaders

Dialogue session held at the Baoao Forum, China’s answer to the Davos World

Economic Forum. The former was founded in 2016 and is hosted by Hongfa Temple. It invites clerics from other Asian countries to discuss and approve such shared activities, as exchanges of clerics, Buddhist scholarship, and charity, in ways that also align with CPC interests. One alignment is using Buddhism to legitimize the geocultural imaginary of a

South China Sea region as a distinct cultural region in Southeast and South Asia integrated through China. For example, the roundtable approved the formation of a South

China Silk Road Cultural Fund, in which the term Silk Road is synonymous with the

BRI. Another alignment is how the anodyne theme of each roundtable can encompasses both Buddhism and Chinese state interests. For example, at the 2018 roundtable, under the theme “Welcome the Contributions of All Parties and Build a Common Future,” participating clerics from twelve countries signed a document calling for stable peace in the region. The political implications were apparent when participants denied that China was militarizing the South China Sea and attributed regional tension to unnamed outside

35 For related articles see: Lauren Jackson, “China is Winning the War for Nepali Buddhism,” The Diplomat, March 21 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/china-is- winning-the-war-for-nepali-buddhism/ 21 powers. One monk in the US delegation was quoted as saying, “Sending aircraft and warships will only increase the intensity in the region and trigger unnecessary panic among people living in the region.”36

A third area of Yinshun’s activities has been to help develop the state-approved modalities of Buddhism while simultaneously establishing China as a world center of

Buddhist education. Of particular note in this regard is his founding of the Nanhai

Buddhist Academy in China’s southernmost province of Hainan which is open to enrollment of clerics from other countries. Within China it is referred to as China’s

Nalanda, an appropriation of the name of the oldest Buddhist school in the world located in India. Since opening in 2017, the Nanhai Buddhist Academy has taken the lead in developing a curriculum that includes the three modalities. First, the academy teaches all three traditions of Chinese Buddhism. The curriculum replaces Sanskrit with Chinese, thereby. challenging the authority of western Buddhist scholarship, and Indo-Sri Lankan

Buddhist study, which deems Sanskrit to be the authentic language for understanding

Buddhism. The majority of the departments are devoted to teaching Buddhist culture, including tea, music, architecture, and charity management. The academy is also a platform for the exchanges of clerics approved by the Shenzhen South Chinese Sea

Buddhism Roundtable. There are annual slots for specific countries, including as forty for

Laos and sixty for Cambodia to study for up to several years.37 This educates clerics from other to understand the situation of Buddhism in China, and absorb the discourse of

36 Li Ruohan, Buddhist Masters Urge Understanding to Preserve Sea Peace,” Global Times, October 31, 2018, 37 Leng Shumei, “Monks Offer Peaceful Approach to Enhance Civil Communication in South China Sea Region,” Global Times, October 22, 2019, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1167611.shtml 22

Chinese Buddhism before returning to their countries. Finally, the academy serves the economic interests in the increasingly tourism-dependent economy of Hainan Province. It is adjacent to the Nanshan Culture Tourism Zone, massive theme park encompassing

34.7 square kilometers that included a Buddhism Culture Park, Nanshan Temple, which is also headed by Yinshun and the park with the 108-meter high statue of

Guanyin. The presence of the academy helps legitimate the entire zone as both a

Buddhist religious and cultural site.

Conclusion

In the globalization of current globalization of Buddhism is unprecedented in scope and scales. The closest parallel is the Japanese military government’s use of Buddhism in its colonial empire in the early twentieth century. This use sought to legitimate Japan’s invasion of Asian Buddhist countries, although history shows that it caused strong anti-

Japanese sentiments.38 The current Chinese state promotion of Buddhism is operating on a much vaster scale. An issue that the CPC will have to face is how Sinicized Buddhism representing the Chinese civilization will interact with other locally embedded Buddhist traditions in Asian countries, as well as westernized Buddhism that seeks ecumenicism.

Without well-considered strategies, the global promotion of Buddhism may trigger results that are contrary to CPC expectations.

38 Nam-Lin Hur, “The Sōtō Sect and Japanese Military Imperialism in Korea,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 26, 1-2 (1999):107-134.