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The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts JOLMA The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts Vol. 1 – Num. 1 Edizioni June 2020 Ca’Foscari The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts Direttore Luigi Perissinotto Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia Dorsoduro 3246, 30123 Venezia URL http://ecf.unive.it/it/edizioni4/riviste/the-journal-for-the- philosophy-of-language-mind-an/ The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts Rivista semestrale General Editor Luigi Perissinotto (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Scientific Board Jocelyn Benoist (Université de Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, France) Annalisa Coliva (University of California, Irvine, USA) Pascal Engel (EHESS, Paris, France) Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis, USA) Garry L. Hagberg (Bard College, New York, USA) Wolfgang Huemer (Università di Parma, Italia) Daniel Hutto (University of Wol- longon, Australia) John Hyman (University College, London, UK) Oskari Kuusela (East Anglia University, UK) Michael Lüthy (Bauhaus-Universität, Weimar, Deutschland) Diego Marconi (Università degli Studi di Torino, Italia) Anna Marmo- doro (University of Oxford, UK) Kevin Mulligan (Université de Genève, Suisse) Claudio Paolucci (Università di Bologna, Italia) Francesca Piazza (Università degli Studi di Palermo, Italia) Pierre Steiner (Université de Technologie de Compiègne, France) Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte (Universidad de Valencia, España) Claudine Tiercelin (Collège de France, France) Jesús Vega Encabo (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, España) Editorial Board Cristina Baldacci (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Pietro Conte (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Marco Dalla Gassa (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Roberta Dreon (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Mat- teo Favaretti Camposampiero (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Susanne Franco (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Mattia Geretto (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Alessandra Jacomuzzi (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Ita- lia) Diego Mantoan (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Eleonora Montuschi (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Gian Luigi Paltrinieri (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Luigi Perissinotto (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Begoña Ramón Cámara (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, España) Carlos Vara Sánchez (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Editorial assistants Filippo Batisti (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Alessandro Cavazzana (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Marco Gigante (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Francesco Ragazzi (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Alice Morelli (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Elena Valeri (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Managing Editor Luigi Perissinotto (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Head office Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia | Dipartimento di Filosofia e Beni Culturali | Palazzo Malcanton Marcorà | Dorsoduro 3484/D - 30123 Venezia | Italia | [email protected] Publisher Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing | Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari | Dorsoduro 3246, 30123 Venezia, Italia | [email protected] Print Logo srl, via Marco Polo 8, 35010 Borgoricco (PD) © 2020 Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia © 2020 Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing per la presente edizione cb Quest’opera è distribuita con Licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License Certificazione scientifica delle Opere pubblicate da Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing: tutti i saggi pubblicati hanno ottenuto il parere favorevole da parte di valutatori esperti della materia, attraverso un processo di revisione anonima sotto la responsabilità del Comitato scientifico della rivista. La valutazione è stata condotta in aderenza ai criteri scientifici ed editoriali di Edizioni Ca’ Foscari. Scientific certification of the works published by Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing: all essays published in this volume have received a favourable opinion by subject-matter experts, through an anonymous peer review process under the responsibility of the Scientific Committee of the journal. The evaluations were conducted in adherence to the scientific and editorial criteria established by Edizioni Ca’ Foscari. The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts Vol. 1 – Num. 1 – Giugno 2020 Sommario On Dispositions Two Epistemological Arguments Against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms Andrea Guardo 7 Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional Alberto Voltolini 21 Aesthetic Cognitivism Anna Marmodoro 35 Laws, Exceptions and Dispositions Max Kistler, transl. Alice Morelli 47 Allgemeines zur Lehre von den Dispositionen Alexius Meinong 69 General Remarks on the Theory of Dispositions Alexius Meinong, transl. Lindsay Parkhowell and Sascha Freyberg 95 States of Possibility. Meinong’s Theory of Dispositions and the Epistemology of Education Sascha Freyberg 121 URL http://ecf.unive.it/it/edizioni4/riviste/the-journal- for-the-philosophy-of-language-mind-an/2020/1/ DOI http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma//2020/01 Printed on behalf of Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing, Venice in July 2020 by Logo s.r.l., Borgoricco, Padova Printed in Italy On Dispositions 5 The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts Vol. 1 – Num. 1 – June 2020 Two Epistemological Arguments Against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms Andrea Guardo Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Abstract Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Pri- vate Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Nor- mativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemologi- cal in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language. Keywords Psychology of meaning. Metaphysics of meaning. Rule-following paradox. Kripkenstein’s paradox. Semantic dispositionalism. Normativity argument. Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Semantic Dispositionalism in the Philosophy of Mind. – 3 The Normativity Argument in the Philosophy of Mind. – 4 Semantic Dispositionalism in the Metaphysics of Language. – 5 The Normativity Argument in the Metaphysics of Language. – 6 Conclusion. Peer review Submitted 2020-02-24 Edizioni Accepted 2020-04-01 Ca’Foscari Published 2020-06-30 Open access © 2020 | cb Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License Citation Guardo, A. (2020). “Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms”. The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts, 1(1), 7-20. 7 Andrea Guardo Two Epistemological Arguments Against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms 1 Introduction In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1981), Saul Kripke puts forward three arguments against dispositional analyses of meaning. One has to do with the fact that speakers are disposed to make mistakes in their use of language. Another has to do with the fact that speakers’ dispositions do not cover all the possible occasions of use. And then there is what has come to be known as ‘the Norma- tivity Argument’, which Kripke ([1981] 1982, 37) thus summarizes: Suppose I do mean addition by “+”. What is the relation of this sup- position to the question how I will respond to the problem “68 + 57”? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of this rela- tion: if “+” meant addition, then I will answer “125”. But this is not the proper account of the relation, which is normative, not descrip- tive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by “+”, I will answer “125”, but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of “+”, I should answer “125”. [...] The relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive. The first two arguments I discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., Guardo 2012a, 2012b). In this paper I want to focus on the third. In the literature, there is a lot of debate not just about the strength of the Normativity Argument, but also about its content – different commentators have given very different readings of Kripke’s remarks concerning the normativity of meaning and intention. Here I will set aside the exegetical issue, embracing without argument what may be called ‘the epistemological reading’ of Kripke’s remarks,1 and fo- cus on the task of assessing its strength. In this connection, I will argue for two theses. The first one is that in his book Kripke dis- cusses, even though he is not very explicit about it, two different, al- beit related, problems – one in the philosophy of mind and the other in the metaphysics of language (or, more precisely, in metaseman- tics) – and so his whole discussion of semantic dispositionalism, Nor- mativity Argument included, should be seen as twofold in the very same way: there is a normativity argument against semantic dispo- 1 The epistemological reading is defended in Guardo 2014 and Zalabardo 1997. For a different reading see, e.g., Boghossian 2003, 2005; Gibbard 2012; Glüer, Wikforss 2009; Hattiangadi 2006, 2007; Miller 2010; Whiting 2007, 2009; Wikforss 2001. Note that – as I explain in Guardo 2014, 755 fn.
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