Featured in this Issue 'IE Rainbow 5- win or lose the War in the Pacific in a single day; a hypothetical Carriers ar War scenario from 1942 ~E Back to the Bulge - the battles at Bastogne and St Vith offer unique challenges ~E Danger in the Valley Stonewall Jackson bluffs the Yankees at Kernstown Carriers at War II provides more tension, more excitement and tougner'opponents in more great naval battles i:rofn World War II. The cat-and-mouse nature o£ air-naval war~~:Qe is \iividly recreated · where entire battles can turn on the achievement of a single plane. The eight brand new-scenarios in Carriers at War II, som~ hypotheti... cal, others controv.ersial, explore all the fascinating options avail- .• able to the catrier f~rces of the Ubifed States, Great Britain and Jap~n. Carriers at WarN uses an improved version of the:driginal Carriers ~ar gam .system to recreate car.ciJ~r warfare from its earliest days tq the final, climactic assault on the Japanesemainland,,.made unqer ~ the clottd of . nstant Kamikaze attack! ..... Run 5 Issue 21
~ Editor's Chance Notes, work in Progress ... 2
Book of the Quarter . Rommel's Infantry Attacks 3
The Q Store Have a look at our special offers ... 4
Letters You tell us what you think 4
Bastogne & St Vith Foundations for victory 5
Kernstown Jackson wins by losing?? 33
Rainbow 5 Win or lose WWII in one day 43 Editor Disk Stephen Hand Subscriptions Editor Emeritus EDITOR'S Disk subscriptions are now available Ian Trout for IBM and Macintosh users. The cost is the same for all formats. CHANCE Contributing Editors IBM users must tell us whether they Roger Keating prefer 3.5" or 5.25" format.If you don't Gary Makin specify a format, you will receive the IT WAS ALL MY FAULT! 3.5" diskette. If you wish to switch Having sung the praises of Steve Ford's Gregor Whiley disk subscriptions from one machine Battlefront and Decisive Battles graphics format to another, just let us know. Steve Fawkner I was more than a little embarrassed to When we find the time, we intend to find that IBM disk subscribers had ac Brett Harrison upgrade all the scenario disks from cidentally received scenarios with par back issues into the new formats and U.S. Operations tially finished maps. I hereby accept allow new users to acquire them or 125% of the blame and throw myself on current users to upgrade to them. John Gleason your mercy. The correct files have been We'll keep the cost as low as possible; Illustrator it will depend on how much time it sent to everyone concerned along with this issue's scenarios. It won't happen Nick Stathopoulos takes and how many scenarios we can fit onto a disk. again. Mentor While I'm in on the subject of apolo Ken Trout gies, we have had a few queries as to when we are going to publish the hy Colour Artwork pothetical"Invasion Hawaii" scenario John Mockridge promised for Issue 20. We fully in Graphus Pty Limited tended to have this scenario ready for Upgrading to the last issue but the pressures of work Printing on Carriers at War 2 have forced us to Pirie Printers New Machines delay work on magazine scenarios for We have received a large number of the Carriers at War Game System. The Run 5 is published 4 times per year requests from our users to upgrade a consolation is that CAW 2 is looking by Strategic Studies Group Pty particular title from one machine to really good. The graphics are out of this Limited. All Rights Reserved. © another. In response to this demand, world and there are eight scenarios SSG 1993. we have decided upon the following dealing with a wide range of strategic policy. Australian Office situations. Furthermore, in this issue P.O. Box 261, Drummoyne, NSW. Any title from our range may be up we present the first reader scenario we 2047. Tel (02) 819-7199. Fax (02) graded from one machine to another have received, Rainbow 5, more on for a cost of half the retail price of the 819-7737. which, later. Suffice it to say that "Inva new version. You must send us the sion Hawaii" will appear just as soon American Office original program disk and the front as we can free up enough time to com page of the manual from that game. P.O. Box 30085, Pensacola, FL. plete it. 32503-1085.Tel(904)469-8880.Fax We will send you a complete copy of the new version of the game. (904) 469-8885. For example, if you wish to upgrade a COLOR, COLOR, COLOR ISSN 0816-7125 C-64 version of Halls of Montezuma to Yes, we've added some color and the IBM/Tandy version, you should doesn't it look great. I can't wait to see send us the original C-64 disk, the Online Addresses how a screen shot looks in full glorious front page of the manual and the ap Compuserve: Strategic Studies propriate cheque, money order or technicolor.We hope you like it. Group-72040 ,34 MC/Visa number. Applelink: Strategic Studies North American users must send their IN THIS ISSUE Group-AUST0161 components and funds to our US Of For Battlefront players we have two GEnie: SSG fice. Everybody else must use our scenarios dealing with aspects of Hit Australian Office. ler's Ardennes Offensive. These are St Vith and Bastogne. These scenarios have a certain similarity in that they 2 Book of the Quarter both deal with German attempts to Confederates out there that if you want Over the last few months I have been trying take vital road junct ~ ons. There the simi to win this scenario you will, have to to read a number of"classics" in the field of larity ends. InSt Vith the German player kill a whole lot of Yankees. The North military history. Last issue I reviewed must break through successive Ameri will win by delaying Early long enough Guderian's Achtung Panzer, this issue I'm can lines of resistance before reinforce for the Washington defences to be bol looking at another book by a prominent ments arrive to garrison the town of St stered by the arrival of a Corps of WWII German General, Rommel's Infan Vith. In Bastogne the Germans have Grant's veterans. try Attacks. only one chance to take Bastogne itself, that is before the 101st Airborne get JUST RELEASED ... there. If the "Screaming Eagles" hold We all know Rommel as the "Desert the town then it's "Nuts!" to von Since the publication of Issue 20 we Fox", the audacious commander of the Luttwittz and only a matter of time have released the following game Afrika Korps in the western desert. before Patton brea~ through to link up Carriers at War II (IBM ) However, like most German generals with the paratroops. Yes, we have finally finished the sequel of WWII, Rommel served as a junior Kerns town, for the Decisive Battles Game to Carriers at War. Eight new scenarios officer in WWI. He served on three System is fought at regimental level and fabulous new graphics make this fronts, the western and eastern fronts with half hour turns. See how 4200 men a must have game. The scenarios are and on the Italian front. Everywhere he under Jackson could spook the entire (in chronological order) Plan Orange, served, Rommel showed the brilliance Union and prevent McClellan from tak Task Force Z, Port Darwin, Java Sea, that was to characterise his command ing Richmond. And all this was Trincomalee, Leyte Gulf, Okinawa and in the desert. His book, first published achieved by Jackson losing the battle1 Operation Olympic. in 1937, recounts his experiences as an infantry officer and provides many les Finally we have our first reader sce sons for the conduct of small unit nario for Carriers at War. Patrick WORK IN PROGRESS operations, even today. Murphy, a long time scenario designer The Macintosh versions of both War has sent us his version of the hypotheti Infantry Attacks dispels many myths lords II and Carriers at War II are well on cal American operation "Rainbow 5". about the First World War, still one of the way and can be expected before the Just about every carrier and capital the most poorly understood conflicts middle of 1994. ship available to the US is steaming in history. It was the only war in his towards Wake Island. The Japanese The Warlords II Scenario Builder is set tory where a commander in charge of a plan to meet them half way and end the to be released in the second quarter of battle had no communications with his war in the Pacific in a single afternoon. this year. It will feature a map drawing attacking troops. Once men went" over No wonder the US Navy decided facility which is simplicity to use as the top" they may as well have been on against implementing such an ali-or well as the ability to change the names, Mars for all the C. in C. knew. All he nothing plan! statistics and pictures for all the ar could do was to make the best plans mies. This will allow you to create any possible but as Napoleon had said, even army type imaginable (unless of course the best plan will not survive contact NEXT ISSUE you are, like me, one of the artistically with the enemy. It was not until radios It's time to go back to Russia. Issue 22 challenged). You will also be able to were fitted into tanks and the Walkie will include a scenario for the Battle edit the city and shield g:raphics. To top Talkie was developed that communi front Game System covering the south off all this the Scenario Builder will cations with the front line were re ern pincer of the Kiev pocket at include 24 brand new scenarios cre established. But these developments Kremenchug in September 1941. This ated by us and our playtesters. These had to wait for another war. is another Steve Ford scenario in which will include new city and army graph Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig said of the Germans have to force a river cross ics prepared by our resident artistic the First World War that it was a pla ing in the teeth of Soviet infantry. Can demigod, Nick Stathopolous. toon commander's war. This brings us you get the armour across the Dnieper Our other projects (one of which is a back to Rommel who was a platoon before the Russian tanks arrive? military history game; the other isn't) commander in August 1914. Reading Decisive Battles players will be treated are getting started and look really ex the first few pages of Rommel's book, it to one of the most one sided battles of citing. By the next issue I might even be becomes apparent that even the most the war, Monocacy. Rather than the able to say something meaningful about professional army in the world could normal case where both sides were of one or both of them. roughly comparable troop quality, at Monocacy Jubal Early's veterans went through an army of Union garrison Continued on p.32 troops like a dose of salts. I warn all you 3 THE Q STORE LETTERS TO THE EDITOR RUNS GAMES SUBSCRIPTION RATES IN NORTH AMERICA Dear Sirs, I am writing first and foremost to com (4 issues) FOR IBM pliment you on your superb wargames. IN AUSTRALIA Carriers at War ($USD 70.00) I first bought one seven years ago Carriers at War II (&USD 70.00) Magazine/disk sub. = $AUD 65.00 (CAW) and since then a mate and my Warlords II ($USD 70.00) self have bought all of your games be Magazine only sub. = $AUD 20.00 Carriers at War Construction Kit ($USD 60.00) tween us. I prefer playing your games Warlords ($USD 50.00) to any others that are on the market, IN NORTH AMERICA Gold of the Americas ($USD 40.00) Magazine/disk sub. = $USD 65.00 Reach for the Stars ($USD 40.00) and I have no doubt that I would buy Magazine only sub\ =$USD 20.00 Decisive Battles of the American Civil War any title on any topic that you would Vols 1 -3 ($USD 40.00 ea.) put out. The design kits (War Plan and ELSEWHERE Battlefront Series Games- Halls of Montezuma, War Paint), the appealing graphics on (Surface Post) Rommel, Panzer Battles, MacArthur's War the IBM versions, and especially the AI ($USD 40.00 ea.) Magazine/disk sub. = $AUD 80.00 routines are really what make your games stand out from the rest and so Magazine on ly sub. = $AUD 35.00 FOR MACINTOSH enjoyable to play. (Airmail Post) Carriers at War ($USD 70.00) Warlords ($USD 50.00) I know you blokes are busy (as you Magazine/disk sub. = $AUD 90.00 Gold of the Americas ($USD 40.00) keep telling us), but I would like to Magazine only sub. = $AUD45.00 Decisive Battles of the American Civil War suggest a few possible future projects To subscribe, consult the schedule of fees Vols 1 -3 ($USD 40.00 ea.) anyway. Firstly, I would dearly love Battlefront Series Games- Halls of Montezuma, above and make sure you include your you to bring out a "Decisive Battles of Rommel, Panzer Battles, MacArthur's War the Napoleonic Era". I'm sure that hav computer type (IBM or Mac) with your ($USD 40.00 ea.) cheque or money order if you want a disk ing covered the ACW it would not be subscription. difficult for you to take one more step IN AUSTRALIA back in history to cover theNa poleonic BACK ISSUES (& - ELSEWHERE) Wars. Certainly you would not lack for battles (both real and hypothetical Single Issue = $AUD 6.00 FOR IBM "what ifs") to cover. Plus $AUD 1.00 shipping (max.) Carriers at War ($AUD 85.00) Secondly, and my only real gripe, is Customers outside North America or Aus Carriers at War II ($AUD 85.00) Warlords II ($AUD 85.00) that I wish you would live up to your tralia should add $2.00 per mag. surface Carriers at War Construction Kit ($AUD 75.00) name of Strategic Studies Group a little shipping or $4.50 per mag. air shipping. Warlords ($AUD 60.00) more often and publish some more Gold of the Americas ($AUD 50.00) strategic level games. Fighting indi Reach for the Stars ($AUD 50.00) vidual battles is good, but fighting them Customers in North America should send Decisive Battles of the American Civil War in succession, with the results affecting their Visa, Mastercard, cheque or money Vols 1 -3 ($AUD 50.00 ea.) entire campaigns, and being able to order to- Battlefront Series Games- Halls of Montezuma, control their location, forces involved Rommel, Panzer Battles, MacArthur's War etc. under the guise of strategic plans Strategic Studies Group Inc. ($AUD 50.00 ea.) across whole theatres and command P.O. Box 30085, Pensacola, FL. FOR MACINTOSH ing armies is simply so much better. 32503-1085. USA. Carriers at War ($AUD 85.00) Think of the things you could do with (Tel: 904-469-8880; Fax: 904-469-8885) Warlords ($AUD 75.00) "Russia" on the 16-bit machines, that Customers in Australia and Elsewhere can Gold of the Americas ($AUD 50.00) you only ever dreamed of when work dial direct (Tel: 02-819-7199; Fax: 02-819- Decisive Battles of the American Civil War ing with 64K of memory space. West 7199) for Visa and Mastercard orders or Vols 1 -3 ($AUD 60.00 ea.) ern Front, Mediterranean Theatre, and send their cheque or money order to- (Eu Battlefront Series Games- Halls of Montezuma, perhaps even Pacific Theatre games ropean Customers should note that Euro Rommel, Panzer Battles, MacArthur's War would make perfect compliments. checks are not acceptable) ($AUD 50.00 ea.) Customers outside North America or Australia Strategic Studies Group Pty Ltd should add $5.00 per game for surface shipping P.O. Box 261, Drummoyne, NSW. or $10.00 per game for airmail shipping. 2047. AUSTRALIA Florida residents add 6%. Continued on p.32 4 Ba~togne & St Vith Bastions in the Ardennes December 16-25, 1944 Two Scenarios for the Battlefront Game System by Roger Keating, Ian Trout, Steve Ford and Stephen Hand
On June 6th 1944 the long-awaited second front became a reality as Allied troops came Italy was another possibility. However, ashore on the Normandy beaches. For the next month and a half the Allies inched forward the numbers fighting there were so until, with the launching of Operation "Cobra" on the 25th of July, American forces broke small and the terrain so favourable to outofNormandy. Exactly a month later Paris was liberated. With thecaptureoftheFrench the defence that no significant advan Capital and the closure of the Falaise Pocket, German resistance crumbled. The race across tage could be gained by an offensive Northern France was dramatic, but could not be sustained as supply lines lengthened. As there. The only alternative was the the front began to stabilise near the German Border, Hitler perceived he had one last chance Western Front. The odds here were far to turn the tide of the War. On 16th September, during a briefing at OKW Headquarters better than in Russia and the terrain, as the Fuhrer was told of some local successes in the Ardennes. His reaction was immediate, the Germans knew from 1940, was "I have just made a momentous decision, I shall go over to the counterattack. That is to say, amenable to an armoured break here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective Antwerp." through. At the time Hitler settled on the Ardennes Offensive, the Western Front was being held by the Allies with 38 The outlook for Germany at the time of his reserves into one final offensive to divisions (although on September 1st Hitler's decision was dire. Their armies knock out one or other of the Allies. It the allies had 2 million men in 38 com- were collapsing east and west and their was a huge gamble, but Hitler was a allies were leaving the sinking ship. student of Clauswitzian theory. Here Following the destruction of Army alised that he had come to the point in Group Centre in the Soviet Spring Of the war when a great gamble, being the fensive, Romania and Bulgaria had only alternative to certain defeat, was declared war on Germany, and Fin really no gamble at all. land had signed an armistice agree Once the decision had been made to ment with the USSR. Only Hungary launch a great counterattack, it re and Japan remained as Germany's al mained to be decided where the attack lies. would stand the greatest chance of suc Germany was being forced back to its cess. The Eastern Front was the deci pre-war frontiers. The resultant con sive front of the Second World War, traction of the German frontage, how just as the Western Front had been in ever, coupled with the allied supply World War One. It was estimated that difficulties brought on by their own the Russians had 555 divisions facing advances, resulted in a stabilisation of the Germans. Hitler calculated that he German defences. As all sides could free up between 30 and 40 divi regrouped, Hitler was faced by there sions for his counterattack. Even if these ality that he could no longer hope to men could have destroyed double their win the war purely by defending number of Russians, the odds against against future allied attacks. The only the Germans would still have been The Big Three alternative to this scenario of inevita overwhelming. Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton meet ble defeat was for Hitler to commit all in Bastogne after its relief. 5 Front Line on the Night of: -AACHEN December 15th ~
December 18'th
December 25th ~
s0 eArlon Charleville/Mezieres e Sedan LUXEMBOURG- Situation Map for the Bastogne and St Vith Scenarios bat divisions facing only 700 000 Ger tive was intended to achieve two aims. plans and fell back to his original idea mans in 41 divisions: This gives some Firstly the capture of Antwerp would of a single breakthrough, calling his idea of the relative sizes of the logistical deny this vital port to the Allies and plan "Wacht am Rhein" (Watch on the "tails" of the two armies). A successful force them to continue trucking sup Rhine). His subordinates felt that this attack by 30 to 40 German divisions plies from Normandy across most of was beyond the abilities of the could totally change the complexion of Northern France. Secondly, it would Wehrmacht in late 1944. If the offen the war in the West. Just as Hitler had threaten to pocket the bulk of sive succeeded in reaching the coast it no valid military alternative but to Montgomery's 21st Army Group. would create a giant pocket, if it failed throw all his reserves into a final coun Hitler's generals argued against the it would result in a salient. This would terattack, the only front on which it plan and offered several alternatives. be worse than useless as it would give could be effective was the Western Most of these were more limited in the allies the opportunity to create their Front. scope and involved a two-pronged at own pocket. The decision to attack out of the tack at some point of the line to create In reality both Hitler and the staff at Ardennes with Antwerp as an objec- a pocket. Hitler refused all alternative OKW were right about Wacht am Rhein 6 BASTOGNE -Map 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 WOOD/ QCLEAR ROUGH fZJ ROAD G RIVER HEAVY WOODS ~ BRIDGE ~TOWN and in another sense they were both Germany was at the stage where noth would only be gained by the total de wrong. Hitler was right that the plans ing in the military sphere could save struction of Germany. put forward by his staft although prac them from defeat. Hitler should have On the allied side supply was still be ticat would have little effect on the realised this and been at the negotiat ing trucked in from Normandy, the overall outcome of the war. However ing table before he ever thought about only other suitable Allied-held port OKW was right in stating that a plan of a counterattack. But of course by that being Antwerp. Although the Allies the scope of Wacht am Rhein was too stage of the war Hitler's capacity for held Antwerp they did not hold the optimistic and would not succeed. self delusion was so great that peace estuary of the Scheldt, the port's outlet 7 SCENARIO Nationalit] 1st Ind II 3rd Ind I BASTOGNE I GERMAN ~ ~ 2nd Ind 4th Ind Division 2nd ~ ~ 1st Regt 2nd Regt I 2 I 304 1st Bn 1st Bn ~ [2] 2nd Bn 2nd Bn ~ ~ 3rd Bn 3rd Bn ~ ~ 4th Bn 4th Bn ~ ~ HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXHQ 1/RHQ 2/RHQ 3/RHQ 4/RHQ HQ I.D. [8] 2nd XX 2 304 UNIT TYPE [8] Panzer Mech Inf Mot Inf HQADMIN 0-7 4 4 4 LEADERSHIP 0-7 6 5 5 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 3 4 4 BRITTLE 0-1 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 12 N/A N/A ARRIVAL 0-99 2 N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 25,7 N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION 11/111 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 1/2 2/2 3/2 4/2 1/3 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3 1 2 38p 2P 1 2 38p 2P 1/3 2/ 3 2P 38 LOCATION (x,y) 25,6 25,6 25,6 25,6 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,6 25,6 CLASS 0-13 2 2 10 6 1 1 10 6 11 11 13 7 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 1 1 11 12 1 1 11 12 13 14 22 2 MOVEMENT 0-31 16 16 16 20 16 16 16 20 16 16 16 16 ARRIVAL 0-99 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 MAX STREN. 0-15 9 9 5 6 9 9 5 6 9 9 8 9 INIT. STREN. 0-15 9 9 5 6 9 9 5 6 9 9 8 9 RATING 0-15 8 8 11 7 8 8 11 7 10 12 10 10 RANGE 0-15 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 9 0 FATIGUE 0-7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 EXPERIENCE 0-7 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 5 6 6 5 5 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N /A N / A N / A N /A N /AN/A N / A N / A 2 2 2 1 8 SCENARIO Nationalit 1st Ind II 3rd Ind I BASTOGNE GERMAN ~ ~ . Division 2nd Ind 4th Ind Lehr ~ ~ 1st Regt 2nd Regt 3rd Regt I 901 I 902 I 903 1st Bn 1st Bn 1st Bn CJ CJ CJ 2nd Bn 2nd Bn 2nd Bn ~ ~ ~ 3rd Bn 3rd Bn 3rd Bn ~ ~ ~ HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXHQ 1/RHQ 2/RHQ 3/RHQ 4/RHQ HQ I.D. [8] Lehr 901 902 903 UNIT TYPE [8] Panzer Infantry Mech In£ Mech In£ HQADMIN 0-7 4 5 5 5 LEADERSHIP 0-7 6 5 5 6 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 3 4 4 4 BRITTLE 0-1 0 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 12 N/A N/A N/A ARRIVAL 0-99 3 N/A N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 25,0 N/A N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION II/III 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 1/2 2/2 3/2 4/2 1/3 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 11- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3 1 2 Lr 1 2 Lr 1 2 Lr Lr Lr Lr Lr LOCATION (x,y) 25,14 25,14 25,14 24,0 24,0 24,0 21 ,0 .21 ,0 21,0 21,0 24,0 21,0 21 ,0 CLASS 0-13 2 2 10 2 2 10 2 2 10 6 7 11 13 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 12 2 13 22 MOVEMENT 0-31 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 20 16 16 16 ARRIVAL 0-99 7 7 7 2 2 2 5 5 5 1 3 5 5 MAX STREN. 0-15 12 12 5 12 12 5 12 12 5 9 9 9 8 INIT. STREN. 0-15 12 12 5 12 12 5 12 12 5 9 9 9 8 RATING 0-15 8 8 11 8 8 11 8 8 11 7 10 10 10 RANGE 0-15 0 0 1 0 0 l 0 0 1 1 0 1 9 FATIGUE 0-7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 EXPERIENCE 0-7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N / A N / A N / A N / AN/ A N / A IN / AN/ AN/ A 2 2 3 3 9 SCENARIO Nationalit] 1st lnd 3rd Ind I BASTOGNE II GERMAN ~ ~ Division 2nd Ind 4th Ind 26VG ~ ~ 1st Regt 2nd Regt 3rd Regt 39 77 78 I I I '· 1st Bn 1st Bn 1st Bn ~ [2] [2] 2nd Bn 2nd Bn 2nd Bn [2] [2] [2] 3rd Bn 3rd Bn 3rd Bn CD CD CD HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXHQ 1/RHQ 2/RHQ 3/RHQ 4/RHQ HQI.D. [8] 26VG 39 77 78 UNIT TYPE [8] Infantry Infantry Infantry Infantry HQADMIN 0-7 4 4 4 4 LEADERSHIP 0-7 5 4 5 4 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 3 6 6 6 BRITTLE 0-1 0 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 8 N/A N/A N/A ARRIVAL 0-99 6 N/A N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 25,8 N/A N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION II/III 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 1/2 2/2 3/2 4/2 1/3 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 26 26 26 26 LOCATION (x,y) 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,8 25,14 25,8 25,8 CLASS 0-13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9 13 13 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 2 10 6 7 MOVEMENT 0-31 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 12 12 12 ARRIVAL 0-99 7 7 7 5 5 5 9 9 9 5 7 9 9 MAX STREN. 0-15 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 4 4 INIT. STREN. 0-15 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 4 4 RATING 0-15 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 9 8 8 10 RANGE 0-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 9 FATIGUE 0-7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 EXPERIENCE 0-7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N /A N / A N /A N / AN/ A N / A N / AN/ A N / A 2 1 2 2 10 SCENARIO N ationalit] 1st Ind I BASTOGNE I U.S. A. ~ D·ivision 2nd Ind I Mix. Arm. ~ 1st Regt 2nd Regt I eeR/9A I jeeR/lOA I 1st Bn 1st Bn IT] [2] 2nd Bn 2nd Bn OiJ ~ 3rd Bn 3rd Bn ~ ~ 4th Bn ~ HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXHQ 11RHQ 2/RHQ 3/RHQ 4/RHQ HQ I.D. [8] Mix. Arm. eeR/9A eeR/lOA UNIT TYPE [8] Ad Hoc Armour Armour HQADMIN 0-7 2 1 3 LEADERSHIP 0-7 4 2 4 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 4 2 4 BRITTLE 0-1 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 12 N/A N!A ARRIVAL 0-99 0 N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 13,9 N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION II/III 111 2/1 3/1 4/1 1/2 2/2 3/2 4/2 1/3 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 11- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3 2 52 73 3 20 420 90 58 811 LOCATION (x,y) 21 ,7 21 ,9 18,8 15,8 15,7 13,8 14,6 18,7 21,5 CLASS 0-13 11 2 13 11 2 13 6 13 10 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 9 16 3 9 16 3 21 3 8 MOVEMENT 0-31 16 16 16 16 16 16 20 16 16 ARRIVAL 0-99 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 MAX STREN. 0-15 7 8 3 12 12 4 9 4 9 INIT. STREN. 0-15 7 8 3 12 12 4 9 4 9 RATING 0-15 9 5 8 9 5 8 6 8 10 RANGE 0-15 1 0 8 1 0 8 0 7 1 FATIGUE 0-7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 EXPERIENCE 0-7 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N / A N / A N / A N / AN/ A N / A N / A 1 1 11 SCENARIO NationalitY, 1st Ind 3rd Ind .__I __B_A---.-ST_O_G_NE _ ___.I I U.S.A. J ~.._ __ ..... ----~ Division 2nd Ind 4th Ind ~I£:=~ ....._ __ .... ~ 1st Regt 2nd Regt 3rd Regt 4th Regt 1 501 1 502 1 506 1 327 1· 1st Bn 1st Bn ------~ -----~~ 2nd Bn _____ [2]2nd Bn -----~[2] 3rd Bn .:;;.....--~~ 4th Bn 4th Bn 4th Bn ....._ __ .... ~ ...... _ __ .... ~ ..___ ..... ~ HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXHQ 1/RHQ 2/RHQ 3/RHQ 4/RHQ HQ I.D. [8] 101 501 502 506 327 UNIT TYPE [8] Airborne Airborne Airborne Airborne Airborne HQADMIN 0-7 6 5 5 5 5 LEADERSHIP 0-7 6 5 4 5 4 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 7 5 5 ·5 5 BRITTLE 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 11 N/A N/A N/A N/A ARRIVAL 0-99 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 0,4 N/A N/A N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION II/III 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 1/2 2/2 3/2 4/2 1/3 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 11- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3 1 3 321 1 2 3 377 1 2 3 463 1 2 401 326 705 755 907 2 - LOCATION (x,y) 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,4 0,8 0,8 0,8 CLASS 0-13 3 3 3 13 3 3 3 13 3 3 3 13 3 3 3 7 10 13 13 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 17 17 17 19 17 17 17 19 17 17 17 19 18 18 18 2 8 5 6 MOVEMENT 0-31 8 8 8 12 8 8 8 12 8 8 8 12 8 8 8 8 16 12 12 ARRIVAL 0-99 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 7 6 MAX STREN. 0-15 11 11 11 4 11 11 11 4 11 11 11 4 9 9 9 9 9 4 4 INIT. STREN. 0-15 11 11 11 4 11 11 11 4 11 11 11 4 9 9 9 9 9 4 4 RATING 0-15 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 10 11 8 RANGE 0-15 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 6 6 6 0 1 14 8 FATIGUE 0-7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 EXPERIENCE 0-7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 5 6 6 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N / A N / A N /A N /A N / AN/ A N / A N / A N! AN/ A N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 1 2 3 3 12 SCENARIO Nationalit] 1st Ind 3rd Ind I BASTOGNE II U.S.A. ~ ~ . 2nd Ind 4th Ind Division 4th ~ ~ 1st Regt 2nd Regt 3rd Regt I CCA I CCB I CCR 1st Bn 1st Bn 1st Bn ~ ~ co 2nd Bn 2nd Bn 2nd Bn ~ ~ OLJ 3rd Bn 3rd Bn 3rd Bn ~ ~ ~ HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXHQ 1/RHQ 2/RHQ 3/RHQ 4/RHQ HQ I.D. [8] 4 CCA CCB CCR UNIT TYPE [8] Armour Armour Armour Armour HQADMIN 0-7 6 5 5 5 LEADERSHIP 0-7 7 6 6 5 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 6 4 3 4 BRITTLE 0-1 0 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 12 N/A N/A N/A ARRIVAL 0-99 18 N/A N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 7,20 N/A N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION II/III 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 1/2 2/2 3/2 4/2 1/3 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 11- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3 37 10 94 35 51 22 8 53 66 25 24 253 177 LOCATION (x,y) 8,20 9,20 9,20 13,20 14,20 12,20 8,20 ·9,20 8,20 15,20 8,20 13,20 13,20 CLASS 0-13 11 2 13 11 2 13 11 2 13 6 7 13 13 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 9 16 3 9 16 3 9 16 3 21 2 3 5 MOVEMENT 0-31 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 20 16 16 12 ARRIVAL 0-99 18 18 19 17 17 17 19 19 20 17 18 18 20 MAX STREN. 0-15 11 12 4 10 9 4 11 10 4 8 10 4 4 INIT. STREN. 0-15 11 12 4 10 9 4 11 10 4 8 10 4 4 RATING 0-15 9 5 8 9 5 8 9 5 8 6 9 8 11 RANGE 0-15 1 0 8 1 0 8 1 0 8 0 0 8 14 FATIGUE 0-7 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 EXPERIENCE 0-7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N / A N / A N / A N / AN/ A N / A ~J! AN / A N / A 2 1 2 3 13 BASTOGNE Briefing AXIS ALLIED (SCENARIO [16]) Bastogne SIDE [16] SIDE [16] BRIEFING [26] ( _Germany ) (United States ) Nuts! ~CORPS [16]~ ~CORPS [16]~ 18th-25th December 1944 lXLVIl Panzer Korpsj l_lliiVII Corps ) (0-3) START= I 0 (: CO~MANDER [16] l r_ COMMANDER [16] l am (1-31) DATE= 18 l Luttw1tz ) l Patton ) I 18th December 1944 ------(1-12) MONTH= I 12 J (0-99) YEAR= 44 DAY IINIGHT I SUPPORT DAY IINIGHT (0-20) CENTURY= 19 2 0\ QUANTITY 16 0 (0-99) (1-16) LENGTH= 8 RELIABILITY 2 (0-3) WEATHER= 0 0 0 (0-3) 0 PRECIPITATION (0-7) FORECAST= 0 STORMY RATING 8 0 (0-7) CLIMATE= 0 EUROPEAN 6 0 (0-15) (0-31) MECHMIN = 12 AIR SUPERIORITY (0-7) I BRITTLENESS NIGHT CAPABLE STATUS= [2J STRONG ALLIED (0-9) AXIS_= [QQJ % (0-1) AXIS= [Q_J RELIABILITY = [2J DEPENDABLE (0-9) ALLIED = [QQJ % (0-1) ALLIED= [Q_J BASTOGNE- Terrain Effects Chart TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN COSTS PER HEX ATTACK EFFECTS CODE NAME ART . (TO-T15) [10] MECH NON-MECH ARM INF (0-31) (0-31) (0-7) (0-7) (0-7) TO ------T1 Clear 3 1 7 7 7 T2 Wood/Rough 16 3 3 4 5 T3 Hvy Woods 10 2 4 4 6 T4 ------TS - - - - -· - T6 ------T7 ------T8 ------T9 ------T10 ------T11 ------T12 ------T13 -. - - - - - T14 ------T15 ------ROAD 1 1 N.A. N.A. N.A. - FORT N.A. N.A. 7 7 7 - CITY N.A. N.A. 5 5 6 - BRIDGE 2 2 5 7 5 - RIVER N.A. 6 4 7 4 14 BASTOGNE - Objectives & Miscellaneous Factors I.D. ·Name Map Loc Div. De£. Start End Pts/T Pts/E [11] [x,y] (0-3) (0~1) (1-99) (1-99) (0-30) (0-255) l(AX) Noville 17,2 0 0 1 31 4 20 2(AX) Longchamps 9,4 0 0 1 31 5 25 3(AX) Salle 0,4 2 0 1 ' 31 10 50 4(AX) Chenogne 2,13 3 0 1 31 10 50 5(AX) Nives 1,19 1 0 1 31 10 50 6(AX) South Edge 13,8 2 0 1 31 5 150 7(AX) Hompre 13,15 2 0 1 31 2 50 8(AX) Bastogne 13,9 1 0 1 31 10 100 9(AX) Sibret 8,14 2 0 1 31 5 25 lO(AX) E. Bastogne 14,9 2 0 1 31 2 25 ll(AX) Oberwampach 21,9 1 0 20 31 0 1 12(AX) 1(AL) Bastogne 13,9 1 0 12 31 3 75 2(AL) Hom pre 13,15 3 0 15 31 2 25 3(AL) Neffe 16,10 3 0 19 31 3 25 4(AL) Noville 17,2 1 0 1 8 10 0 5(AL) Sibret 8,14 2 0 25 31 2 10 6(AL) Longchamps 9,4 2 0 15 31 5 25 7(AL) Oberwampach 21,9 3 0 9 31 10 100 8(AL) South Edge 13,18 2 0 6 31 2 25 9(AL) E. Bastogne 14,9 2 0 1 31 1 0 lO(AL) N. Bastogne 13,8 3 0 15 31 1 0 11(AL) Crossroads 19,8 2 0 1 10 1 0 12(AL) ADJACENT ENEMY VICTORY POINTS PER MAP HEX PENALTY (AXIS/ALLIED) STRENGTH POINT SIZE (0-15) ELIM. (0-15) NON = = ACROSS 1}1 1st Hex [QIQJ 4th Hex lli] MECH MECH (0-2) L:!:.J 2nd Hex = [!IQJ 5th Hex = [iJ3J AXIS [I] IT] DOWN ~ (0-3) LIJ 3rd Hex = ~ 6th Hex = [±Jl] ALLIED [!] [I] 15 signed to Seventh Armee was one of flank protection. After making anini tial breakthrough Brandenberger was to "peel off" his divisions one by one to protect the vulnerable southern flank of the salient. The Germans had amassed a great enough superiority in ground troops but they were lacking one vital ingredi ent of Blitzkrieg warfare, air superior ity. Since Normandy this had been the ,• Allies' trump card. It had decisively slowed the movement of reserves and supplies to meet the Allied invasion, making road movement during day light almost impossible. Above all the Germans needed unham Brewed Up pered road movement in the Ardennes. Panther 126 of the Hitler Jugend Division reached the vicinity of Krinkelt before Their offensive plans relied on speed. suffering this fate. _ ,. There was no way that German air superiority could be obtained for Wacht am Rhein. The best that could be to the sea. At the time when the capture Ardennes Bradley overconfidently re achieved was for the attack to take of the Scheidt estuary should have taken plied "Let them come". place in weather conditions which ren dered air operations impossible. Such top priority, Montgomery was launch The attacking German force was made conditions existed as the offensive ing his abortive attempt to cross the up of three armies. The Sixth SS opened at dawn on the 16th of Decem Rhine at Arnhem. Panzer Armee was commanded by ber. As German divisions were transferred Josef "Sepp" Dietrich, an ardent Nazi, from the eastern front the German the Fifth PanzerArmee was under At the Northern end of the line the strength in the west steadily increased. Hasso von Manteuffel, an efficient East LXVII Korps was heavily repulsed from At the same time the Allied casualties Front veteran and the Seventh Armee in front of Monschau. The armour was at Aachen, Hurtgen Forest and in Lor was commanded by Erich not to be committed in this sector until raine were greater than the number of Brandenberger. The most powerful an infantry breakthrough had been replacements. In order to maintain the army was the Sixth which contained made. ISS PanzerKorps, south of offensives against the industrial regions five infantry and four SS Panzer divi Monschau made slow progress, but of the Ruhr and the Saar it was neces sions. The Sixth SS PanzerArmee was the hoped for breakthrough eluded sary for the Allies to thin out other to cross the Meuse in the vicinity of them as well. During the night of the parts of the line. Liege and was responsible for break 16th fierce fighting continued around The Ardennes was a quiet portion of ing through in an area between the vital Losheim Gap. In the early the front and was considered, despite Monschau and St Vith. hours of December 17th the way was the Blitzkrieg of 1940, to be unsuitable South of the Sixth, Manteuffel' s Fifth cleared for the advance of for offensive operations. It was there PanzerArmee consisted of four infan Kampfgruppes Peiper and Hansen, the fore held extremely lightly. Conse try and three Panzer divisions. spearhead of the 1st SS Panzer Divi quently the most thinly held portion of Manteuffel was facing the most weakly sion. the Allied line was precisely where the held portion of the US line and was The northernmost formation of Germans intended to attack. probably the most competent of the Manteuffel' s 5th PanzerArmee was the The Ardennes was held by the men of three army commanders. His mission under strength LXVI Korps. Their ob General Hodges' 1st Army, part of was to capture the vital road junctions jective was the crossroads of St Vith. Bradley's 12th Army Group. They had of St Vith and Bastogne and cross the Facing them were two regiments of the little warning of the impending attack Meuse between N amur and Dinant. U.S.106thinfantryDivision. These two due to the strict security under which Brandenberger's Seventh Armee was units were in an exposed position and preparations were carried out. When by far the weakest of the three. Con vulnerable to being pocketed. The en he was warned by an intelligence of taining four infantry divisions the army circlement operation was successfully ficer of a possible counterattack in the was also weak in artillery. The job as- carried out on the 16th. Despite this 16 BASTOGNE - Equipment cal superiority at any point in the ticipated by Hitler had not material 0 . Ardennes. Their objective was to over ised. Steady progress had been made 1 Pz Gren run the single infantry regiment op and several U.S. units were on the verge posing them and drive for the critical of collapse but the overall result of the 2 Assault road junction of Bastogne. Here, as else day was that the staunch resistance of 3 105mm SP where, resistance was surprisingly the front line troops had gained the strong. It was only near the end of the Allies the time they needed to react to 4 150mm SP day, when the tanks of the 2nd Panzer the offensive. 5 155mm How Division moved across a temporary Initially the Allies were slow to react. bridge, that the American defence col Hodges was not overly concerned and 6 105mm How lapsed. in any case only had two combat com Brandenberger's Seventh Armee was mands of the 9th Armoured Division 7 150J;Tim How attacking south of Bastogne. LXXXV in immediate reserve. CCB was released 8 M10s Korps made slow but steady progress and ordered to St Vith where a collapse during the day against an of the Losheim Gap defences seemed 9 M4s understrength regiment of Hurtgen imminent. 10 75mm AT Forest veterans. LXXX Korps, the Bradley suspected that it was a spoil southernmost formation of Wacht am ing attack rather than a major offensive 11 StuGills Rhein faced an infantry regiment and a but Eisenhower was more troubled. 12 APC 234s combat command of the 9th armoured He ordered the transfer of the 7th and division. Reasonable gains were made, lOth Armoured divisions to 1st Army. 13 Mk IVs the only significant result being the The 7th, from 9th Army to the north, 14 Mk Vs bypassing of Echternach and its garri was ordered to St Vith and the 1Oth, son. from Patton's third Army to the south, 15 Gren At the end of the first day of Wacht am was ordered to Luxembourg. 16 Half Trk Rhein the,brilliant breakthroughs an- 17 Paras 18 Glider 19 75mm How 20 Demol'n 21 M5s/APCs 22 105/50SP success the expected breakthrough to the south of the pocket was stopped by the resistance of the third regiment of the 106th. Consequently St Vith re mained in U.S. hands at nightfall on the 16th. LVIII PanzerKorps, attacking between St Vith and Bastogne was facing only one regiment of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division. The G.I.s, however, were oc cupying a particularly strong portion of the West wall. Despite their numeri cal superiority the Germans made only minor gains at the cost of heavy casual ties. The Enemy Von L u ttwitz' s powerful XL VII 'Sepp' Dietrich, commander of Sixth SS Panzer Armee confers with Gerd von PanzerKorps had the greatest numeri- Rundstedt, commander of Ob. West. 17 On the morning of the 17th of Decem German spearheads north and south As the situation became more serious ber the Germans re:sumed their attempt suggested that to do so would simply Eisenhower released practically his to break through the U.S. positions be to place themselves into the same only strategic reserve, the 82nd and around Monschau. The U.S. 2nd and pocket. The units were deployed for lOlst Airborne Divisions. The 82nd 99th Divisions were forced to retreat the defence of St Vith. moved towards the nose of Peiper' s but this was more because of the break As the llOth Regiment of the U.S. 28th salient in the north and the lOlstmoved through in the Losheim Gap than pres Division collapsed in front of von towards Bastogne. sure on their own front. If anything the ·Lu ttwitz' s XL VII PanzerKorps the Ger As the 18th of December dawned American position was becoming mans surged forward in the direction Kampfgruppe Peiper was in position stronger as a battalion of Rangers and of Bastogne. Unable to make any to get across the Meuse as scheduled. CCR of the 5th Armoured Division progress on its own front the 116th However, the destruction of a vital moved into the area. The 12SS Panzer Panzer Division was directed south to bridge across the Ambleve River forced Division was committed to try to break follow in von Luttwitz' s wake. Peiper to move south. the deadlock but merely contributed to The northern units of Seventh Armee There was heavy fighting as mounting casualties on both sides. were able to make use of the successes Kampfgruppe Hansen penetrated to Around Losheim Gap the 422nd and to their north and outflanked the 109th within a couple of miles of St Vith 423rd Regiments of the 106th Division Regiment of the 28th. This unit was before being repulsed by units of 7th had been pocketed and Kampfgruppe forced to retire southwards. Elsewhere Armoured. Frontal attacks by LXVI Peiper had pushed through to Brandenberger met with limited suc Korps on St Vith were similarly thrown Malmedy, northwest of St Vith. Peiper cess which prompted Allied leaders to back. Hitler consented to the commit had captured 50 000 gallons of fuel and bring two combat commands of lOth tal of the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade into pushed ahead. The .. other two Armoured Division into action to shore the fight for St Vith. Kainpfgruppes of 1st SS Panzer Divi up the American line. As von Luttwitz' s panzers approached sion were moving towards St Vith from The other combat command of lOth Bastogne they ran into several hastily the north. Armoured was despatched to Bastogne. thrown up roadblocks. The town was Hodges intended to use 7th Armoured This decision was to prove vital to the being held by a scratch force of engi Division to break into the 106th Divi defeat of Wacht am Rhein. neers and armour. Despite desperate sion pocket but the proximity of the resistance, units of the Panzer Lehr Division under Fritz Bayerlein, Rommel's ex chief-of-staff, reached to within three miles of Bastogne. With reports coming in to him of strong U.S. forces up ahead, Bayerlein lost his nerve and halted his spearhead to regroup the Division. 116th Panzer Division, after crossing the Our in the wake of XL VII PanzerKorps widened the break through, meeting no resistance and capturing Houffalize. Seventh Armee once again made slow progress on the 18th. What progress they did make was due mainly to the 5th PanzerArmee breakthrough to their north. With their left flank in the air the units opposing Seventh Armee chose to pull back, refusing their flank rather than risking envelopment. Although by the evening of the 18th the first breakthroughs had occurred and Manteuffel' s Panzers were on the In the Bag move, it had become clear to both Model Thousands of American G .I.s were photographed for propaganda purposes and von Rundstedt that the offensive while on their way into captivity. had failed. Both commanders made 18 STVITH-Map 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0 0 1 1 2 ~~~~1!! 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 QCLEAR . ROUGH ~ RIVER HEAVY ~ TOWN FORD \_) FRONT LINE • WOODS X\ HIDDEN MINEFIELD . WOODS ~ ROAD 0 19 SCENARIO Nationalit] 1st Ind 3rd Ind I ST VITH II GERMAN ~ ~ 2nd Ind X Army 4th Ind I 6th Panzer ~ ~ 1st Div 2nd Div 3rd Div 4th Div 1 9th ss IFuhrBglt I I 3rd FJ I 12VG 1st Bde 1st Bde 1st Bde 1st Bde I \,19G I ~ ~ ~ 2nd Bde 2nd Bde 2nd Bde 2nd Bde ~ ~ ~ ~ 3rd Bde 3rd Bde 3rd Bde ~ [§] ~ 4th Bde 4th Bde 4th Bde ~ ~ 14FW I HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXXHQ 1/DIV 2/DIV 3/DIV 4/DIV HQI.D. [8] 6th Panzer 9SS FuhrBglt 3rd FJ 12VG UNIT TYPE [8] Armee Panzer Panzer FsmJgr VGrenad. HQADMIN 0-7 5 7 5 4 7 LEADERSHIP 0-7 6 7 6 3 7 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 3 3 6 6 6 BRITTLE 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 16 N/A N/A N/A N/A ARRIVAL 0-99 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 22,2 N/A N/A N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION III/XX 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 112 2/2 3/2 4/2 1/3 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3] 19G 20G Pz Pgr 200 Flk 9FJ SFJ 8FJ 388 27F 989 991 4FW KgP 501 9SS 150 LOCATION (x,y) 25,3 25,3 25,3 25,3 25,3 25,3 18,6 -21,6 25,3 21,7 19,1 19,3 21,2 21,1 25,3 25,3 25,3 25,3 CLASS 0-13 0 0 11 2 12 8 3 3 3 13 0 0 0 13 11 11 11 11 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 28 28 11 30 5 31 20 20 20 10 27 27 27 15 29 14 4 12 MOVEMENT 0-31 7 7 10 10 10 10 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 3 10 10 16 12 ARRIVAL 0-99 12 12 8 8 8 9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 8 3 MAX STREN. 0-15 11 11 9 12 9 6 12 12 10 12 12 12 12 12 13 9 6 9 INIT. STREN. 0-15 11 11 9 12 9 6 12 12 10 12 12 12 12 12 13 9 6 9 RATING 0-15 12 11 10 11 10 12 9 9 9 10 9 9 9 14 15 15 11 12 RANGE 0-15 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 FATIGUE 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 EXPERIENCE 0-7 7 6 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 6 7 7 6 6 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N/A N/A N/AN/A N/A N/A ~/AN/AN/AN/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 20 SCENARIO Nationalit] 1st Ind 3rd Ind I ST VITH I GERMAN ~ ~ 2nd Ind 4th Ind XXX Army I 5th Panzer ~ ~ 1st Div XX 2nd Div 3rd Div 4th Div I 560 VG I 116 Pz I 62 VG I 18VG 1st Bde 1st Bde 1st Bde 1st Bde ~ ~ ~ ~ 2nd Bde 2nd Bde 2nd Bde 2nd Bde ~ ~ ~ - ~ 3rd Bde 3rd Bde 3rd Bde 3rd Bde ~ ~ ~ ~ 4th Bde 4th Bde 4th Bde 4th Bde EJ ~ ~ ~ HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXXHQ 1/DIV 2/DIV 3/DIV 4/DIV HQ I.D. [8] 5th Panzer 560 VG 116 62VG 18VG UNIT TYPE [8] Armee Volksgrn Panzer Volksgrn Volksgrn HQADMIN 0-7 7 4 7 4 6 LEADERSHIP 0-7 7 5 7 2 6 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 4 6 6 6 6 BRITTLE 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 16 N/A N/A N/A N/A ARRIVAL 0-99 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 17,22 N/A N/A N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION III/XX 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 1/2 2/2 3/2 4/2 1/3 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 11- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3] 28 30 29 7FW 156 60 1Pz 2Pz 164 183 190 1FK 293 294 295 244 116 228 16W 401 LOCATION (x,y) 6,23 7,21 25,15 11,21 8,21 12,19 12,23 13,22 17,20 -13,18 13,17 16,22 16,15 19,6 19,8 19,7 10,22 11,22 18,17 13,21 CLASS 0-13 0 0 0 13 2 2 11 11 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 12 11 10 13 13 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 27 27 27 15 30 30 12 11 27 27 27 31 27 27 27 5 4 6 15 10 MOVEMENT 0-31 7 7 7 3 10 10 12 10 7 7 7 10 7 7 7 10 16 10 3 3 ARRIVAL 0-99 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 MAX STREN. 0-15 12 12 12 13 11 12 12 10 12 12 12 5 12 12 12 7 6 6 12 8 INIT. STREN. 0-15 12 12 12 13 11 12 12 10 12 12 12 5 12 12 12 7 6 6 12 8 RATING 0-15 7 7 7 14 11 11 13 11 7 7 7 12 7 7 8 10 11 12 14 10 RANGE 0-15 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 8 FATIGUE 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 EXPERIENCE 0-7 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 2 2 2 5 3 3 3 5 6 6 6 6 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N / A N / A N / A N / A N / AN/ A N / A N / A N / AN/ A N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 2 2 4 4 21 SCENARIO Nationalit] 1st Ind 3rd lnd I ST VITH I U.S.A. ~ ~ 2nd Ind 4th Ind Corps I VIII ~ ~ 1st Div 2nd Div 3rd Div XX 4th Div I 106th 7th I 14 Cav 1 28/112 1st Bde 1st Bde 1st Bde 1st Bde · ~ I CCA I ~ ~ 2nd Bde 2nd Bde 2nd Bde 2nd Bde ~ @] ~ ~ 3rd Bde 3rd Bde 3rd Bde 3rd Bde ~ @iJ ~ ~ 4th Bde 4th Bde 4th Bde ~ ~ ~ HEADQUARTERS DATA FORMATION HQ XXXHQ 11DIV 2/DIV 3/DIV 4/DIV HQ I.D. [8] VIII 106th 7th 14Cav 28/112 UNIT TYPE [8] Combined Infantry Armour Mixed Infantry HQADMIN 0-7 6 3 7 6' 6 LEADERSHIP 0-7 6 3 7 5 7 HQ SUPPLY 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 BRITTLE 0-1 0 1 0 0 0 MOVEMENT 0-31 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A ARRIVAL 0-99 6 N/A N/A N/A N/A LOCATION (x,y) 0,9 N/A N/A N/A N/A UNIT DATA FORMATION III/XX 111 2/1 3/1 4/1 112 2/2 3/2 4/2 113 2/3 3/3 4/3 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 1/- 2/- 3/- 4/- UNIT I.D. [3] 422 423 424 Eng CCA CCB CCR 814 18 32 394 9Ar 112 447 174 9Ab 811 402 333 LOCATION (x,y) 18,11 15,14 12,18 4,11 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 18,7 5,10 18,3 0,20 7,20 7,18 4,17 0,4 2,16 6,12 12,9 CLASS 0-13 0 0 0 7 11 11 11 10 11 6 0 11 0 8 13 11 10 13 13 MODE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EQUIPM'T 0-31 2 2 2 2 8 8 8 9 25 17 2 8 2 26 10 8 7 10 10 MOVEMENT 0-31 7 7 7 7 10 10 10 10 16 16 7 10 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 ARRIVAL 0-99 0 0 0 3 7 7 7 7 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 MAX STREN. 0-15 12 12 12 4 12 12 11 5 6 6 12 10 12 4 6 12 5 9 5 INIT. STREN. 0-15 12 12 12 4 12 12 11 5 6 6 12 10 12 4 6 12 5 9 5 RATING 0-15 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 14 3 3 9 10 9 12 11 10 10 11 11 RANGE 0-15 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 8 1 1 8 8 FATIGUE 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 EXPERIENCE 0-7 2 2 2 4 6 6 6 6 4 4 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 ATTACHM'T 0-4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AN/A N/A N/A N/AN/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 1 1 3 22 ST VITH - Ob.~Jec t.1ves an lSCe 11 aneous Fac t ors I.D. ' Name Map Loc Div. De£. Start End Pts/T Pts/E [11] [x,y] (0-3) (0-1) (1-99) (1-99) (0-30) (0-255) 1(AX) St Vith 4,10 2 0 5 19 10 50 2(AX) Bullingen 12,1 1 0 3 8 10 5 3(AX) Losheim Gap 18,7 1 0 0 2 3 1 4(AX) Steinbruck 6,12 2 0 2 12 5 5 5(AX) Oudler 2,16 2 0 2 19 3 1 \ 6(AX) Weissenhof 11,16 2 0 0 3 5 1 7(AX) 8(AX) 9(AX) 10(AX) 11(AX) •I 12(AX) 1(AL) St Vith 4,10 1 1 5 19 3 15 2(AL) Steinbruck 6,12 1 1 3 19 2 10 3(AL) Oudler 2,16 1 1 0 19 0 10 4(AL) Weissenhof 11,16 1 0 0 19 2 10 5(AL) Bullingen 12,1 1 1 3 8 2 10 6(AL) Losheim Gap 18,7 1 0 0 19 5 10 7(AL) 8(AL) 9(AL) 10(AL) 11(AL) 12(AL) ADJACENT ENEMY VICTORY POINTS PER MAP HEX PENALTY (AXIS/ALLIED) STRENGTH POINT SIZE (0-15) ELIM. (0-15) NON ACROSS l}l 1st Hex = [QI!J 4th Hex = ru MECH MECH (0-2) '---.:.J 2nd Hex= ~ 5th Hex = [II!] AXIS 0 [I] DOWN ~ (0-3) LlJ 3rd Hex= ~ 6th Hex = ~ ALLIED [!] [!] 23 STVITH Briefing AXIS ALLIED (SCENARIO [16]) St Vith SIDE [16] SIDE [16] BRIEFING [26] (Nazi Germany ) (United States ) Stalemate in the Ardennes! ~CORPS [16] ~ ,----:CORPS [16] ~ 16th-20th December 1944 lHeeresgruppe B ) l~orps _) (0-3) START= 0 rCOMMANDER [16] rCOMMANDER [16] l J (1-31) DATE= 16 l.9FM Model _ l_9en Middleton _ (•m16th December 1944 (1-12) MONTH= 12 J (0-99) YEAR= 44 DAY IINJGHT I SUPPORT DAY IINIGHT (0-20) CENTURY= 19 5 3 \, QUANTITY 5 0 (0-99) (1-16) LENGTH= 5 RELIABILITY 2 0 (0-3) WEATHER= [jO PRECIPITATION 1 3 (0-3) (0-7) FORECAST = [jO STORMY 8 RATING 10 0 (0-7) CLIMATE= I 5 ARCTIC 10 (0-15) I (0-31) MECHMIN = 10 AIR SUPERIORITY (0-7) I I BRITTLENESS NIGHT CAPABLE STATUS= []_] ------STR0NG ALLIED (0-9) AXIS= [QQJ % (0-1) AXIS= W RELIABILITY = [ZJ DEPENDABLE (0-9) ALLIED = (§Q] % (0-1) ALLIED= [QJ ST VITH - Terrain Effects Chart TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN COSTS PER HEX ATTACK EFFECTS CODE NAME (TO-T15) [10] MECH NON-MECH ARM ART INF (0-31) (0-31) (0-7) (0-7) (0-7) TO ------T1 Clear 3 1 7 7 7 T2 River - 12 7 7 7 T3 Rough 6 3 4 4 4 T4 Woods 8 3 2 2 3 TS Hvy Woods 10 4 0 0 2 T6 St Vith 1 1 0 0 0 T7 Bridge - 10 5 7 6 T8 Ford 16 7 6 7 7 T9 ------T10 ------T11 ------T12 ------T13 ------T14 ------T15 ------ROAD 1 1 N.A. N.A. N.A. - FORT N.A. N.A. 2 1 3 - CITY N.A. N.A. 0 0 0 - BRIDGE 3 2 4 6 5 - RIVER N.A. 9 0 6 3 24 ST VITH - Equipment "Spatlese", an attack by 15th Armee terattack in the Bastogne area with three 0 north of Aachen. Three divisions were divisions. He estimated that he could 1 Mot In£ transferred to the Ardennes. have these men on the battlefield by the Hitler's reinforcements were matched morning of the 21st. The majority of 2 by those of the Allies. 1st and 30th observers considered this just another 3 H' Track Infantry Divisions moved south to take piece of Patton exaggeration but prepa up positions on the northern shoulder rations had already been made for just 4 Sdkfz250 of Peiper' s breakthrough. Just as the such a move even before Wacht am Rhein commenced. 5 II Allied front line was crumbling, troops s were being brought up to fill the gaps. The failure of German units to follow 6 Pz IV The narrow northern breakthrough was up Kampfgruppe Peiper's break in danger of being cut off. The southern through led to the isolation of that unit 7 M10TD breakthrough, however, consisted of near Stavelot. Outnumbered and with 8 M4 Sherman four divisions. Racing to oppose them severe supply problems, Peiper moved was the 101st Airborne, one division. over to the defence. Attempts to break 9 M36TD There could not have been a better through to the spearhead were defeated 10 Mxd Art formation to oppose von Luttwitz. by 30th Division. The morning of the 19th saw a confer The IISS Panzer Corps consisting of the 11 PziV ence of all the major Allied command 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions was 12 ers. The textbook approach to a break earmarked to exploit the breakthrough through was to be used. The shoulders begun by the ISS. The failure of 13 of the salient were to be reinforced Dietrich's Army, however, resulted in 14 channelling the enemy advance into an the 2nd SS being switched to Fifth Pan ever shrinking frontage. Key road junc zer Armee front. Although still part of 15 Werfers tions like St Vith and Bastogne were to the 6th the division was to advance in 16 Rockets be held strongly, slowing the advance. the wake of Manteuffel' s troops. Patton, whose third army was to the As the pocketed 422nd and 423rd Regi 17 Arm Car south of the breakthrough was to coun- ments of the U.S. 106th Division sur- 18 Para 19 Volksturm 20 Fs 21 US AB 22 Maltier 23 ther 24 Armd Ar 25 M5 Stuart 26 Mxd Art 27 VolksGren 28 SS Pz Gren 29 SS H Arm 30 Pz Gren 31 88mm Flak Tiger 222 Perhaps the most photographed tank in the Ardennes. Belonging to schwere SS Panzer-Abteilung 501 the huge tank is carrying men of the 9th regiment of the 3rd Hitler aware of their views and both Fallschirmjager Division. were accused of defeatism. Hitler did, however cancel a subsidiary operation, 25 rendered, the posiVon of the 7th Ar 101st. The 10th Armoured Division had become the de facto spearhead of the moured Division in St Vith became virtually ceased to exist but they had entire offensive was poised to cross the more tenuous. Practically surrounded, bought enough time for Bastogne to be Ourthe River north of Bastogne when the defenders continued to hold out. relieved. the bridge they were about to cross was At Bastogne the 101 st Airborne had not The first phase of the Bastogne battle blown. Had they got across they would arrived and the two combat commands was over. Three divisions were aligned have been opposed by only a few engi of the 1Oth Armoured defending the against the paratroops in the town. The neers. The way to the Meuse would approaches to the town were badly advance schedule did not allow for the have been open. As it was, the Division mauled by the Panzer Lehr Division. reduction of strongpoints by mecha was forced to hike a long detour to the The 2nd Panzer Division was closing in nised forces and consequently the 2nd north. Here they were opposed by CCR on Bastogne from the north and was on Panzer and the bulk of the Panzer Lehr of the 3rd Armoured Division. the point of breaki~g through the light began to flow around Bastogne leaving The delay to the panzers gave time for defences when the U.S. tanks were re the 26th Volksgrenadiers to mop up. the 560th Volksgrenadiers to move up inforced by the first regiment of the The 116th Panzer Division which had to the front alongside them. To the south of Bastogne the 5th Fallschirmjager Division moved to surround Bastogne from the south. Elsewhere on the Seventh Armee front progress was slow or non-existent. Two U.S. combat commands had been shifted into the path of the German advance and in places these tanks even regained ground. By the end of the 20th there was a command crisis in Bradley's 12th Army Group. Headquarters was on the southern flank of the sali ent and control had largely been lost with those troops on the northern flank. Consequently Eisenhower trans ferred control of the bulk of Hodges' 1st Army to Montgomery. Ike hoped by this move to draw British reserves into the fight and take some pressure off the Americans. What he gained was bad feeling between U.S. and British commanders. Within a few minutes of arriving at Hodges' HQ Monty had suc ceeded in offending everyone present. Eisenhower did, however, get his reinforcements, in name anyway. XXX Corps was to be moved up to the Meuse as a second line of defence. There were to be no Brit ish lives risked, but if a real disas ter threatened, the Brits were to be ready to play the role of the Free Ride cavalry and come to the rescue of Morale seems high amongst these fallschirmjagers, again on Tiger 222 their unfortunate allies. 26 By the morning of. December 21st the Meuse. The encirclement of Bastogne Patton's second and third objectives 2nd Panzer Divis~on was across the was complete. The 26th were to relieve Bastogne and to cut off Ourthe and would have been across V olksgrenadiers could now begin to the German spearhead. To achieve this the Meuse by that afternoon had it not reduce the pocket. Initial attacks made he attacked with one armoured and been for one thing; they were out of ground but were costly to both sides. It two infantry divisions. Steady progress fuel. The Division did not resume its became clear that the town was going was made against tough opposition forward movement until late in the to take several days to capture. In the and Patton ordered the attack to con day. meantime all supplies to the lead Ger tinue throughout the night. In the north the 12SS Panzer Division man units would have to take a circui As Third Army's attack continued the assaulted the 1st U.S. Division and was tous route via backroads around final decisio~ was made by repulsed with heavy losses. A similar Bastogne. This meant more delay for Montgomery to retire from the posi advance by the 3rd Panzergrenadier the Germans and gained more time for tions around St Vith. Although the com Division met a like' fate. the Americans to seal off the break manders on the spot argued with the through. Kampfgruppe Peiper was still isolated decision it was agreed to by General from the bulk of the German forces As Patton prepared his counteroffen Hodges. The position, which had be and, under constant attacks, its perim sive from the south, Brandenberger's come known as the "fortified goose eter was shrinking fast. The 9SS Panzer Seventh Armee prepared to defend its egg", contained around 20, 000 men. Division attacked just north of St Vith gains. A request for reinforcements was Withdrawal was not going to be a sim in an attempt to break through and met by the release of the 79th ple affair. create a new spearhead for Sixth SS Volksgrenadiers and the elite Fuhrer Inside Bastogne the 101st were cut off Panzer Armee. Thisattackwasrepulsed Grenadier Brigade. from outside supply. Ammunition was the same as the others. · Patton had a series of objectives for his running low and, knowing this, Gen As German units both north and south 22nd of December counterattack. Firstly eral von Luttwitz called on the Ameri of St Vith pushed westward the Ameri he had to feed units into the line facing cans to surrender. Hearing of the offer can hold on the town became increas Seventh Armee to shore up the ex General McAuliffe's response was"Aw ingly tenuous. On the night of the 21st, hausted defenders of the shoulder. The nuts". After some discussion this be after taking heavy casualties, the 7th first of these units was the 5th Infantry came the official response and a letter Armoured Division pulled out of St Division. was drafted which read- "To the Ger- Vith. Even so, the area west of St Vith was still in danger of becoming a pocket. It was only lack of fuel that prevented the 2nd SS Panzer Division from driv ing north to complete the encirclement. St Vith had held for six days and had put the Germans three days behind schedule. It had given the Americans enough time to bring up reserves and halt the one German breakthrough in the northern sector. On the 21st and 22nd of December the 116th Panzer Division made steady progress west against increasingly stiff opposition. The impetus of the spear head was dying away as units were rushed in to extend the northern shoul der of the "Bulge". The 84th Infantry Division was moved up and placed squarely across the German line of ad vance, defending the major highway to the Meuse. Shermans in the Snow With the 101st Airborne firmly en These tanks of 40th Battalion, 7th Armoured Division are in position defending St sconced in Bastogne, the Panzer Lehr Vith. Division moved south around the town and continued westward towards the 27 man Commander: ,NUTS! The Ameri bulk of the occupants of the "fortified terpart and pocketed two can Commander':. When this was goose egg". Kampfgruppes. A counterattack by the handed to the Germans they were con Throughout the 23rd and 24th the 2nd Panzer Lehr Division was repulsed and fused about its meaning. Colonel Panzer and the Panzer Lehr pushed the pocket stayed closed. Harper of the 327th Regiment explained west towards the Meuse. On the 24th The 15th Panzergrenadiers launched "If you don't understand what NUTS advance elements of the 2nd clashed an all-out assault on Bastogne on Christ means, in plain English it is the same as with the British 29th armoured bri mas morning. The first line of defence 'Go to Hell'. And I will tell you some gade. was pierced and the attack was only thing else: if you continue to attack, we On Christmas Eve the lead elements of halted by a second defensive line on will kill every goddamned German the U.S. VII Corps came up on the right the outskirts of the town. South of who tries to br~ak into this city". flank of the northern shoulder. Bastogne Patton was bogged down in On the morning of the 23rd the German Montgomery expected the lead two front of the stubborn 5th spearhead was poi~ed to push over the divisions to assume a defensive role Fallschirmjagers. Swinging CCR of the Meuse near Dinant. One factor changed but General "Lightning Joe" Collins 4th Armoured Division around the that morning altering the entire nature had earmarked his elite 2nd Armoured western flank of the main fighting he of the Ardennes battle. The weather division to cut off the German spear found a largely unguarded road. The cleared allowing the Allied air forces to head. attack was pressed into the night, gain gain control over the battlefield. The ing considerable ground. At Bastogne the attacks continued with Luftwaffe flew 800 sorties on the 23rd little to show on either side except casu Patton also commenced an attack at the but was overwhelmed by the Alli~s alties. Patton's 4th Armoured Division base of the salient with 4th and 5th who flew thousands. got closer to relieving the paratroopers Divisions. The Germans were forced to but were being forced to fight all the pull back from Echternach across the way. The 80th Division was stopped Sauer River. In one day the Americans dead by the fresh Fuhrer Grenadier had rubbed out the bulk of Seventh Brigade and 79th Volksgrenadiers. On Armee's gains for the entire battle. the German side the prospects of break Further withdrawals west of St Vith ing into the town were raised by the stabilised the American line along the arrival of the 15th Panzergrenadier northern shoulder. The two divisions Division. of IISS Panzer Korps fought their op All thoughts that Sepp Dietrich may ponents to a standstill in some of the have had about a renewed break most desperate fighting of the cam through north of St Vith must have paign. In fact most of the U.S. com evaporated on the evening of the 24th manders on the ground were reticent of December as the 800 survivors of about retiring but were ordered to do Kampfgruppe Peiper staggered back so by Montgomery. On top of his retro into German lines. Most of their heavy grade movements Montgomery confi equipment had been abandoned. dentlytoldPattonthat1stArmywould be unable to attack for three months. As Christmas Eve passed into Christ He was evidently unaware of the suc mas Day the 2nd Panzer Division was cessful counterattack taking place on The Face of War three miles from the Meuse. It was his right flank at this very moment. meant to have been supported by the 9th Panzer Division arrived at the tip of The air cover came just in time for the 9th Panzer Division, but lack of fuel the bulge on the 26th in time to join defenders of Bastogne who received and American air interdiction saw that with Panzer Lehr in another abortive tons of supplies from the air. Also grate formation bogged down well to the attempt to rescue the trapped elements ful were the forces retreating from the rear. of 2nd Panzer. With the failure of this St Vith pocket. It was late afternoon General Joe Collins was in little doubt assault the men of VII Corps were free before the air activity died down and that Montgomery would refuse his re to reduce the pocket which they largely the 2nd SS Panzer Division could start quest to attack with the overstrength succeeded in doing by the end of the an attack to seal off the retreat path. 2nd Armoured so he simply didn't con day. Even allowing for their late start the sult his conservative superior. Collins fresh division sliced into the American had intelligence reports that the Ger The other pocket, Bastogne was finally line and made significant gains. Not mans were experiencing extreme sup relieved in the late afternoon of the . significant enough, however, to pre ply problems. The 2nd launched an 26th. CCR of the 4th Armoured had vent the successful retirement of the enveloping attack on its German coun- pushed through to the town but had 28 suffered extreme casualties. The two area just to the east of Bastogne fresh counterattack by the 17th Airborne latest divisions stripped from Third infantry divisions made gains, push Division ran into prepared positions Army front, the 35th and the 6th Ar ing back the tired units of manned by the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade. moured were detailed to expand the Brandenberger's seventh Armee. The horrendous casualties which fol corridor and hold it open. 5th By the 29th of December Hitler had lowed shook most of the U.S. com Fallschirmjager was on the point of formed an ad hoc army purely for the manders. The Germans were down, collapse and it appeared as if the entire purpose of reducing Bastogne. Von but they were certainly not out. southern front was about to burst open. Luttwitz, whose XL VII Panzerkorps There was to be one final German at The Germans could not compete with had made the deepest penetration was tack on Bastogne, by the fanatical chil the Allied mastery of the air. 3,500 made commander of Armeegruppe von dren of the Hitler Jugend Division and planes were flying multiple sorties Luttwitz. On that day five divisions the veterans of the 15th every day and as well as being unable attacked the Bastognecorridor. The cru Panzergrenadiers on the fourth of Janu to move troops and supplies the aver cial Bastogne-Arlon highway was cut ary. It was another bloodbath, with age German soldier was losing morale for a time before being recaptured by nothing to show for the attack but a fast under constant aerial bombard American annour. The raw U.S. 11th huge butchers bill on either side. This ment. Armoured Division took heavy casual was to be the last German attack of the With the relief of Bastogne and the ties but was able to throw back the Ardennes Offensive. destruction of the 2nd Panzer Division more experienced Germans. From January 5th to 11th the Allies it was clear to the more capable Allied The attacks continued for the next few pushed slowly forward with the Ger commanders like Patton and Bradl~y days with both sides losing heavily. mans doggedly giving ground. Both that the Germans had shot their bolt. The one result of all the fighting around sides looked to be settling in for an The time to counterattack was the Bastogne was that Hodges 1st Army agonising battle of attrition before the present and the attacks should be at the had a chance to take replacements and Soviet winter offensive forced Hitler to base of the salient in order to nip off the recover from the constant fighting of entire bulge. Eisenhower, however, was the last two weeks. swayed by the pessimistic arguments Eisenhower was no doubt regretting of Montgomery and Hodges and set his decision to put American troops tled on a compromise plan. In this plan under Montgomery. The British com attacks would be made half way up the mander had sent Ike a letter demand bulge, from Bastogne, now a salient of ing to be made supreme land com its own, and from an equivalent area mander in north-west Europe. Eisen on the northern side of the bulge. hower was furious and was intending Without knowing the Allied intentions to write to the combined chiefs of staff Hitler coincidentally ordered most of giving them a choice of him or Monty. his armoured divisions to concentrate In the end Montgomery's chief of staff around Bastogne. Having finally ac persuaded his boss that it wouldn't be cepted that the operation was a failure Ike who was sacked and Montgomery Hitler petulantly decided that the de signed a prepared letter of apology. fenders of Bastogne must be wiped out Hence Hitler's professed aim of split to a man. ting the Anglo-American alliance was All along the line German command nearly realised, though not in the way ers decided on the 27th to suspend he envisaged. offensive operations. The exception was On January 3rd Montgomery was fi at Bastogne where the Fuhrer Begleit nally persuaded to attack along the 1st Brigade, just arrived in the area, Army front north of Bastogne. For the launched· an assault on the corridor first time British units came into action into the town. The assault was repulsed as the 53rd and 6th Airborne Divisions but Hitler demanded more attacks and attacked the nose of the salient. von Luttwitz formed a new Korps, with the sole job Despite the general advance to the north of taking Bastogne. the Germans continued to attack The commander of XL VII Panzer Patton committed the 4th Armoured Bastogne, this time frontally attacking Korps and one of the most capable Ger Division to keeping communications the town itself. In a battle which drew man generals in the Bulge. open with Bastogne but moved his praise from each side for the other the other reserve units further east. In the panzers were finally thrown back. A 29 pull men out of the Ardennes for the losses had been extreme and supplies Preparing the Disk [3]. Boot up the eastern front. Tne sixth SS Panzer that had been stockpiled for the assault Master Disk and select 32 The Battle of Kernstown "A Bloody Nose for Jackson" March 23rd 1862 A Scenario for the Decisive Battles Game System by Stephen Hand Stonewall Jackson has a deservedly brilliant reputation based on his Shenandoah Valley Garnett, Ashby's cavalry and 6000 men campaign of early 1862. His rapid and purposeful manoeuvring along interior lines, and under Brigadier General Loring. These his consequent defeat of several numerically superior Union forces is in stark contrast to latter had just been defeated by George the uninspired movements of the outclassed Federal commanders. The valley campaign, B. McClellan in Western Virginia and however, did not open as auspiciously as Jackson might have wanted. His first battle as an were demoralised, as well as being army commander, Kerns town on March 23rd, was badly botched. But the moribund Union poorly officered to start with. command failed to press their advantage. Jackson got away relatively unscathed and his With around 10 000 menJackson moved mere presence created a confusion amongst Union leaders far outweighing any material north up the Shenandoah. Reaching effect that he could, in his wildest dreams have imagined. the Potomac he destroyed a dam on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and moved west along the River. Reaching the town of Bath, Jackson turned south.· Thomas Jonathan Jackson, an undis Washington. As such, the possibility Romney was captured without a fight, tinguished lecturer at the Virginia Mili existed of the Shenandoah being used interposing Jackson between the Fed tary Institute came to prominence as as a route by which Confederate forces eral troops in Maryland and Western the man responsible for the Confeder could cut off supply to Washington or Virginia. atelineholdingatFirstBullRun. "There even attack the capital from the rear. is Jackson standing like a stone wall". The fact that Jubal Early succeeded in Jackson decided to place Loring's Divi These words, uttered by General Bee doing this in 1864 showed that there sion into winter quarters around gave Jackson and his brigade their fa were some foundations for the ever Romney, a bleak and desolate town. mous nickname. present fear felt in Washington. Loring objected to this and petitioned the Secretary of theWar Office to allow Jackson was promoted to Major-Gen The Valley could equally have acted as him to move to a more hospitable area. eral soon after the battle and was given an invasion route of the South, though In the face of all military principles the command of the Valley District, one of not with the same effect. A Union force Secretary agreed to Loring's request three districts in Joseph E. Johnston's debouching from the southern end of and, without Jackson being informed, Department of Northern Virginia. the Shenandoah would still be north of Loring began moving his men. Jackson Richmond, but could well find itself The Shenandoah Valley was of vital was furious! He immediately resigned between the Confederate Capital and strategic importance in the Virginia his commission, only relenting when an army protecting the northern ap Theatre for a number of reasons. Shel Joe Johnston and Governor Letcher of proaches to the city. tered between the Blue Ridge Moun Virginia persuaded the Secretary of tains to the east and the main body of All these factors combined to make the War to write Jackson an apology. the Appalachians to the west the Shenandoah Valley prime real estate On March 7th 1862, Johnston withdrew Shenandoah is a highly fertile region. for both the Union and the Confed his forces from Manassas to positions The strong secessionist views of the eracy. Itwasinevitablethatarmiesfrom south of the Rappahanock. He was inhabitants of the Shenandoah made both sides would contest the Valley. probably influenced in his decision by the Valley an important food source for Jackson was initially given only 1500 the concentration opposite Harpers the Rebel armies in Virginia as a whole. militia with which to oppose whatever Ferry of Banks' V Corps, over 20 000 The main importance of the Valley, numbers the Union might send against men of all arms. OutnumberingJackson however, was as a semi-protected high him. Jackson requested more men and by 5 to 1, Loring's Division having been way into the heart of Union Maryland. was promptly sent them. He received transferred out of Jackson's command, Its northern end was well north of the Stonewall Brigade, now under it was reasonable to think that Banks 33 unopposed then he could begin trans While the messenger was away, Jackson ferring troops to McClellan and the pushed forward some of his regiments, main operation against Richm.ond. forcing the Union skirmish line back Banks made plans to march all but onto its main body. These regiments Shields' Division east over the moun were in turn forced back, Jackson con tains to link up with the Army of the tenting himself with a return to his Potomac. defensive positions south of Jackson could not allow this to occur. Kerns town. He advanced north again and at 4 PM At 10 AM Shields sent back his mess en on the 22nd of March Ashby's cavalry ger, informing Kimball, not simply to came into contact with Union forces advance, but exactly how to advance. just south of Winchester. Ashby was One can imagine Kimball's reaction to well equipped with artillery pieces and this direction of the battle from the commenced a bombardment of Fed bedside. In a masterful understatement eral positions, followed by vigorous he later wrote that "Convinced that the skirmishing with his cavalry. As Shields General did not comprehend the situa came up with reinforcements he was tion... I determined to remain on the wounded and soon after this Ashby defensive ... " Shields reacted by bring retired. ing up Tyler's Brigade, although at the During the night Colonel Kimball, com time of Jackson's main attack this was manding Shields' 1st Brigade was or still some distance from the battlefield. dered to pursue Ashby at first light on By 1 PM Jackson had his entire force on "Stonewall" Jackson the 23rd. This order was duly carried the field and surveying the scene in A religious zealot and a mediocre tacti out with the consequence that skir front of him he determined to attack. cian, he was nevertheless one of the mishing commenced again at dawn. Concluding that the Union positions finest operational commanders of the Ashby had been reinforced with some were too strong Jackson decided on a Civil War. infantry and was able to swap long flank attack with the brigades of Garnett range volleys with Kimball's men until and Fulkerson while Burk and Ashby the Union advance compelled them to demonstrated in front of Kernstown. might simply overwhelm the small retire at about 8 AM Kimball occupied This movement commenced at 2 PM Valley army. This would put Johnston Pritchard's Hill just to the north of and while a savage firefight took place in an untenable situation. Kernstown and awaited further devel in front of Kernstown, Garnett and opments from this strong position. Fulkerson moved around Kimball's On March 11th the expected ad vance flank to positions behind a stone wall began. The following day Banks occu Ashby had reported back to Jackson as running northwest-southeast. pied Winchester unopposed. Jackson the latter brought his three infantry fell back to Strasburg and awaited the brigades onto the field that the Union As Kimball saw the flank move begin next Union movement. This occurred forces opposing him numbered no to develop he ordered Tyler's Brigade on the same day that McClellan's army greater than 3000 men. That was prob to move to the same stone wall. The began embarking for the Peninsula, ably accurate, the only problem being Confederates reached the position first the 17th of March. Banks detached the that neither Jackson nor Ashby real and sent out skirmishers before ad 9000 man Division of Brigadier-Gen ised that Shields had two brigades of vancing beyond the wall. The skirmish eralJames Shields south down the Val infantry that had not been committed line was thrown back by the advance of ley. Shields advanced into thin air. to the action of the previous day. In all Tyler. Jackson retreated in front of the Fed Shields had 7000 men with which to For several hours a battle raged over eraladvance,leavingonly Ashby's cav oppose Jackson's 4200. possession of the stone wall. The Con alry to hold up the advance. Sullivan's Brigade had been moved up federates were unable to advance be Half way down the Valley, at during the morning to take position on yond the obstacle but were able to pre Woodstock, Shields halted his advance, Kimball's left. Word was received from vent the Union from advancing. having encountered only light cavalry Shields to Kimball (now in command During this battle both commanders skirmishing. He informed Banks that on the field) to advance at once. Kimball brought up reinforcements, Burk and the Valley was clear of Confederate pointed out the enemy infantry de Kimball's Brigades disengaged from troops! Banks did not question his sub ploying on a ridge south of the town to their firefight in front of Kernstown ordinate, after all, he was hearing ex the messenger and bade him return to and reinforced their respective sides at actly what he wanted to hear. If he was Shields with this information. the stone wall. Sullivan's Brigade 34 KERNSTOWN - Map 0 1 . 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 QoPEN ROUGH fZJ ROAD Q RIVER RUGGED ~~ BRIDGE ~ORD STONEWALL WOODS Q ~ ~ WOODS ~ KERNSTOWN 0 FRONT LINE 35 0 10 , Fredericksburg ...... § § f . Jackson's Valley Campaign March-June 1862 Road Railroad 111111111111111 1 Union Victory • March 23 moved to cover the positions vacated The decisive point came when three The Confederates were badly beaten by Kimball and skirmished with regiments from Kimball's Brigade and . but they had managed to hold on to Ashby's cavalry. two from Sullivan's launched a coordi nightfall, preventing a Union pursuit. While both sides had three infantry nated assault on the stone wall. This Jackson had no choice except to retire brigades, the Union brigades were came as Garnett's Stonewall Brigade during the night. The Southern losses much larger than their Confederate was on the point of running out of totalled 718,ornearly20% oftheirforce. counterparts and consequently in the ammunition. At 6 PM Garnett ordered Shields' Division lost 590 ,less than 10% fight at the stone wall Jackson's men a retreat, in contravention of direct or of their numbers. were slowly forced back through sheer ders to stand. His retrograde move If one looks simply at the battle itself weight of numbers. ment uncovered Fulkerson's flank and there is no way to get around the fact forced him to follow suit. that it was a Confederate defeat. If one 36 UNION FORCES Garnett's Brigade 2Va (2Va; 350 inf, 2 guns), 4Va could satisfy both these criteria and (4Va; 350 inf,2 guns), SVa (SVa; Shield's·Division that was by attacking Shields. Once he 450 inf, 3 guns), 27V a (27V; 350 had come to that conclusion there was inf,2 guns), 33Va (33V; 350 inf, 2 Col. Nathan Kimball no point in putting off the inevitable guns) battle. Kimball's Brigade Jackson did not defeat Shields. Neither Burk's Brigade 14 Ind. (14I; 550 inf, 3 guns), 8 army was destroyed at Kerns town and Ohio (80h; 250 inf, 3 guns), 67 21 Va (21 V; 350 inf,2 guns) ,42Va so control of the Valley was still in Ohio (670; 550 inf,3 guns), 84 Pa. (42V; 350 inf, 2 guns), 1st Irish doubt. But what of Jackson's other ob (84P; 550 inf, 3 guns) (llr; 250 inf, 2 guns), jective, to tie down as many of the enemy as he could. Shields could not conceive of Jackson having attacked Sullivan's Brigade Fulkerson's Brigade him with an inferior force. It made no 39 Ill. (39I; 550 inf, 1 gun), 13Ind. 23Va (23V; 250 inf, 2 guns), 37V a tactical sense. The conclusion that (13I; 550 inf, 1 gun), 5 Ohio (SOh; (37V; 250 inf, 2 guns) Shields came to was that Jackson must 550 inf, 1 gun),62 Ohio (620; 550 be as strong as he himself was. He inf, 1 gun) immediately went onto the defensive and cabled Banks for the return of some of the recently departed regiments. Tyler's Brigade looks at the bigger picture, however, The division left at Harpers Ferry to 7 Ind. (7In; 550 inf, 2 guns), 7 one can see why Jackson attacked at block the northern end of the Valley Ohio (70h; 550 inf, 2 guns), Kernstown, and why a defeat there was sent to reinforce Shields. A divi 290hio (290; 550 inf, 2 guns) 110 7 was far more valuable than the inevita sion earmarked for the Peninsula was Pa. (110;450inf,1 gun), 1W. Virg. bility of failure that would have re removed from McClellan's army and (lWV; 450 inf, 1 gun), sulted from doing nothing. sent to Western Virginia. Most signifi cantly McDowell's 40 000 strong I Corps Jackson's job was to defend the valley at Fredericksburg was removed from Brodhead's Brigade and, what is more important, to tie the Army of the Potomac and forced to 1Pa. (lPa; 100 cav, no guns), 1W. down as many Union soldiers as he stay on the defensive in order to protect Virg. (lWV; 200 cav, no guns), could, thus making the odds more fa Washington. That job was to have been lMich pMi; 200 cav, no guns), 1 vourable elsewhere in Virginia. Early done by Banks, leaving McDowell free Ohio (lOh; 100 cav, no guns), in the campaign he achieved both aims to ad vance on Richmond from the Mass. Ind. (MI; 200 ca v, no guns), quite adequately by ducking and weav north. A few weeks after Kernstown ing in front of Banks' advance. Joe Johnston was having trouble find What were Jackson's options, however, ing enough men to oppose McClellan when Banks felt he was able to detach on the Peninsula without having to CONFEDERATE troops from the Valley to join McClellan on the Peninsula? Jackson could have FORCES manoeuvred in front of Shields' 70DO men as effectively as he had done in Armies The Valley Army front of Banks' 20 000. This would not, however, have achieved either of his N/S aims. The Union would beneutralising SIDE SOUTH NORTH Maj-Gen. Thomas J. COMMANDER [9] Jackson Kimball Jackson with barely more men than Jackson SECOND I.C. [9] Jackson himself had and would also ARMY I.D. [11] Army of the Shields' have been able to control much of the [11] Shenandoah Division Attached to Army HQ Valley. MAP LOCATION (x,y) 7,17 13,0 The only way Jackson could retain con ARRIVAL 0-95 1 0 Ashby's Rgt. (7Cv; 350 cav, 4 OFF. OBJ. #1 0-23 3 trol of the Valley was by defeating 0 guns) OFF. OBJ. #2 0-23 5 0 Shields. The only way he could draw DEF. OBJ. #1 0-23 0 3 Union troops back into the Valley was DEF. OBJ. #2 0-23 0 2 by convincing the Union commanders MOVEMENT 0-15 12 9 that he posed such a threat that more STAFF 0-7 5 4 troops were required to defeat him. STRENGTH 0-7 1 3 There was only one way that Jackson LEADERSHIP 0-7 5 3 37 KERNSTOWN - Brigades UNIT NUMBER 1-127 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 UNIT J.D. (Full) [9] 2Va 4Va 5Va 27Va 33Va 21Va 42Va 1st Irish 23Va 37Va Ashby UNIT J.D. (Abbr) £31 2Va 4Va 5Va 27V 33V 21V 42V 1Ir 23V 37V Ash UNIT SIZE [3] Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt MAP LOCATION (x,y) 10,17 10,17 11,17 11,17 9,17 13,17 14,17 16,17 7,17 8,17 12,13 CORPS 0-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DIVISION 0-39 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 0 ARRIVAL 0-95 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 UNIT TYPE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 OBJECTIVE 0-23 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 0 SMALL ARMS 0-31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 ARTILLERY 0-31 3 2 4 2 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 TROOP STREN. 0-31 7 7 9 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 7 MOVEMENT o-t5 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 12 BATTERY STR. o-15 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 SHATTERED 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LEADERSHIP 0-7 5 5 5 5 6 4 4 5 5 4 6 COHESION 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 EXPERIENCE 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 7 REGIMENTS 0-7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 LIKELIHOOD 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 UNIT NUMBER 1-127 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 UNIT J.D. (Full) [9] 14Ind 80hicr 670hio 84Pa 39Ill 13Ind 50hio 620hio 7Ind 70hio 290hio UNIT J.D. (Abbr) [:H 141 SOh 670 84P 391 131 SOh 620 7In 70h 290 UNIT SIZE [3] Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt MAP· LOCATION (x,y) 8,12 8,11 9,12 7,12 15,9 16,9 15,10 16,10 12,2 12,1 11,3 CORPS 0-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DIVISION 0-39 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 ARRIVAL 0-95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 UNIT TYPE 0-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OBJECTIVE 0-23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SMALL ARMS 0-31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ARTILLERY 0-31 3 4 5 2 4 2 3 2 5 5 1 TROOP STREN. 0-31 11 5 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 MOVEMENT 0-15 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 BATTERY STR. 0-15 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 SHATTERED 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LEADERSHIP 0-7 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 COHESION 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 EXPERIENCE 0-7 5 2 4 1 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 REGIMENTS 0-7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 LIKELIHOOD 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 UNIT NUMBER 1-127 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 UNIT I.D. (Full) [9] 110Pa lWVirg 1Pa 1WVirg 1Mich 10hio Mass Ind UNIT I.D. (Abbr) [3] 110 1WV 1Pa 1WV 1Mi 10h Min worry about another 40 000 men a d- UNIT SIZE [3] Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt Rgt vancing from another direction. MAP LOCATION (x,y) 12,3 12,0 14,11 15,11 16,12 14,12 17,11 So it can be seen that the Battle of CORPS 0-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DIVISION 0-39 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 Kernstown had results far beyond the ARRIVAL 0-95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 immediate loss of life and ground. The - UNIT TYPE 0-3 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 timidity of the Union commanders i n OBJECTIVE 0-23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 the face of Jackson's audacity cost them SMALL ARMS 0-31 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 Richmond. Quite possibly it also lo st 0-31 1 0 0 0 0 ARTILLERY 5 5 them the chance of a restoration of the TROOP STREN. 0-31 9 9 2 4 4 2 4 MOVEMENT 0-15 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 Union in 1862. BATTERY STR. 0-15 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 SHATTERED 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LEADERSHIP 0-7 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 CREATING THE SCENARIOS COHESION 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 The units of manoeuvre for Kernstow n EXPERiENCE 0-7 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 are regiments rather than the brigades REGIMENTS 0-7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 for which the Decisive Battles system LIKELIHOOD 0-7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 38 KERNSTOWN - Divisions DIV. NUMBER 1-39 1 2 3 6 7 8 9 DIVISION I.D. . [9] Garnett Burks Fulkerson Kimball Sullivan Tyler Brodhead CORPS 0-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TYPE 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ORDERS 0-2 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 OBJECTIVE #1 0-23 3 1 3 2 4 0 4 OBJECTIVE #2 0-23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LEADERSHIP 0-7 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 STAFF 0-7 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 \ KERNSTOWN- Terrain Effects Chart TERRAIN# 0-31 2 3 4 5 6 7 TERRAIN NAME [ 11] Open Woods ~uggedWooc Stone Wall Kerns town Rough SIGHTING VAL. 0-7 1 5 8 8 4 4 MOVEMENT 0-7 .,.. 1 3 6 6 2 4 COVER VALUE .. 0-7 0 3 4 4 3 2 FORT VAL. (N) 0-7 0 0 0 2 0 0 FORT VAL. (S) 0-7 0 0 0 2 0 0 KERNSTOWN - Objectives OBJ. NUMBER 1-23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 OBJ. NAME [11] Kerns town Pr'chards H Stone Wall Hogg Run Toll H Hill Parkins to Winchest AbrahamsCl MAP LOCATIO!' (x,y) 9,14 8,10 2,9 15,13 9,5 13,1 13,0 17,3 START (N) 1-95 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 STOP (N) 1-95 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 VPs/TURN (N) 0-255 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 VPs AT END (N 0-255 15 5 10 10 5 5 5 5 MANEUVER (N) 0-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 START (S) 1-95 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 STOP (S) 1-95 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 VPs/TURN (S) 0-255 0 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 VPs AT END (S 0-255 5 25 25 5 25 25 25 25 MANEUVER (S) 0-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 was designed. References in the game changes the game system works well ommend you follow these directions. to brigades should be read as regi and gives a believable result for regi The letters in parentheses after each ments and references to divisions mental actions. There are a number of heading refer to the corresponding sec should be read as brigades. Each well known battles that would best be tion in the Decisive Battles manual. strength point represents 50 men rather represented on a regimental scale so I There is some additional information than 100 as is usually the case. Turns would welcome any comments that for IBM users at the end of this section. represent half an hour rather than one readers might have on Kernstown. Be sure to read it, especially if you have hour. Therefore both the numbers of If this is the first time you have tried to an EGA/VGA card and want to take men and the time shown on the moni transfer a magazine scenario onto a advantage of our "full map" graphics. tor will not be correct. Despite all these save-game disk (or hard disk), we rec- 39 Macintosh users should note there are If you have one disk drive, remove the this scenario. Select (or paint) the icons some changes to the numbering sys Master Disk and replace it with a blank of your choice to represent the ten ter tem in their design manual and that disk. If you have two drives, remove rain types. access to the various design routines is the Scenario Disk from the second drive Create Map [5a(iii)]. Select the obtained through conventional, pull and replace it with a blank disk. 40 Scenario Setup [Sd(i)]. Enter the fol finished. The rest of the data for the lowing data. Date C23), Month (3), Year scenario may be entered with the "full (62), Century (18), North Maximum map" graphics either disabled or ena Hex Movement is (6,0,10,0,9), South bled. There is a full explanation of "Full Maximum Hex Movement is Map" graphics in Issue 14. (8,0,12,0,12), neither side is encamped. Re-boot the program (this time with The entrenchment values (introduced the "full-map" graphics enabled) and only in Volume II) are 4 for both sides. use the "full-map" WarPaint™ tool to VP awards are 15 per leader, 3 per 100 build up the map. In other words, the men (North), and 15 per leader, 4 per "full-map" graphics are only graphic 100 men (South). IBM and Macintosh images and do not affect the play of the users should note the combat value for game. this scenario is 3 for both sides. Scenario Details [Sd(ii)]. This is a one A NOTE ON .LBM FILES day scenario. Enter the following data for Day 1. The weather is Clear (O), the The .lbm files contain the graphic im North is Defensive (0) and the South is ages. DPaint2™ from Electronic Arts Offensive (1), lOam to llpm are day can be used to manipulate the file. Up (3), move (1) turns and 12pm is a dusk to 250 hexes can be created but (2), End (2) turn. Finally, save again DPaint2™ must be used to change the and the scenario is ready to play. .,. size of the .lbm file. To do this, use the · 'Page Size' function to alter the height of the file. Brigadier-General James Shields NOTES FOR IBM USERS The Decisive Battles program reads the It was Shields' Division that fought IBM users with CGA, MCGA, Tandy size of the .lbm file on loading and Jackson at Kernstown evn though or Hercules graphics can create the sce adjusts the WarPaint™ values auto Shields himself was recovering from a nario using the advice given above. matically. If you don't want to worry wound in nearby Winchester. There is a minor change in the wea pons about manipulating .lbm files, choose data base. You do not have to set limits a scenario with a 250-hex .lbm file as Macintosh users will find no such com for weapons. Thereisspacefor31 weap the template to build the new scenario ons of each type. on. plications when it comes to creating scenarios. Follow the directions given IBM users with EGA or VGA cards When saving an .lbm file, a temporary must first create the game rna p with the in the design section of any Decisive file is created first. When the tempo Battles game manual. "full-map" graphics disabled. To do rary file is successfully saved the origi this, run the program as DB2 f (or DB3 nal is deleted and the temporary file PLAYER'S NOTES for DBl f) which will by-pass the "full renamed. This means there must be map" graphics. Select a scenario as a enough space on the current disk to North template as explained above and save hold the temporary file. You have far more men than Jackson, it in a save-game location. Build up the even if they are not as experienced. map in the usual way and save when Don't allow the Rebs to use their quali tative advantage by concentrating their forces on one portion of your line. If you can bring all your units into action KERNSTOWN - Small Arms you will win. Send Tyler towards the Stone Wall and then move to mobilise Sullivan and SMALL ARMS # 1-31 1 2 Kimball. Keep your men in contact with SM. ARMS I.D. [ 11] Rifle Mus Pistol the enemy and they will quickly run out of fresh troops. RANGE 0-1 1 0 South FIRE VALUE 0-7 6 1 Your aim is to isolate a portion of the MELEE VALUE 0-7 6 7 Union army and destroy it. To do this you must concentrate your forces at 41 the critical point and leave enough of a isolated by his, and other infiltration enemy is, you must do what he doesn't screen along the r~st of the line to keep units' forward movements. The third expect you to do and you must be the Union boys busy. Your best bet is to Italian position, along the top of the prepared to change your plans at a break through Tyler as he comes up mountain ridge south of the Isonzo moment's notice because things will and threaten the approaches to Win River was very strongly garrisoned and not go according to plan. chester while the bulk of the Union lookedcapableofholdinguptheoffen Infantry Attacks is a delight to read. army attempts to pin down Burk' s Bri sive until artillery support could be That Rommel's unbelievable exploits gade in front of Kernstown + brought up. actually happened only makes it more The Rommel detachment moved par enjoyable. If more British officers had allel to the Italian line, moving two read this book before taking on kilometres from the point at which an Rommel's Afrika Korps they might other unit was assaulting the Italians. have better understood what they were Infantry Attacks Here they captured an outpost without up against. Continued from p. 32 a shot. Approaching the line they were able to take the Italian garrison by sur Infantry Attacks was written by Erwin prise. After all the Italians were two Rommel, translated by G.E. Kidde and kilometres from the fighting and their is published by Greenhill Books of Lon- have defeated Rommel's men. They outpost had not raised the alarm. were in a position where one offensive Once into the Italian position Rommel move from them would have brought narrowly avoided being destroyed by a rain of bullets and grenades, result a heavy counterattack. There were no ing in heavy casualties. Few units are further attacks and this allowed time prepared to fight under those circum for German reserves to come up. LETTERS stances. Rommel was reinforced and was able Continued from p. 32 Before being sent to the Italian Front, to continue his attack. Rommel's battalion was equipped with Under cover of an attack along the light machine guns. This increased the ridge Rommel moved his detachment firepower of the unit immensely. In around the flank of the Italian posi Italy the Wurttemberg Mountain Bat tions, cutting the main supply road to Dear Stephen talion was to be used, along with the the front. Here he was able to intercept Thank you for giving me a chance to rest of the Alpine Korps to spearhead all traffic up the road. test Warlords II. the Tolmein Offensive. This offensive, Realising that something was wrong, in a highly mountainous region on the I think that Warlords II is good but I the Italian reserves in this portion of Italian-Austrian border later came to find that I can't play on the Macintosh the line moved up the road into an be known to the Allies as Caporetto. anymore because I've forgotten how to ambush. After an extended firefight play Warlords I. When I next see you I Rommel, in charge of three infantry 2000 men were captured by the Rommel will tell you some ideas for if you make and one machine gun companies easily detachment. Warlords III. I think the best things pierced the Italian first line which had A complete collapse of the Front was about Warlords II are the 'flags' and been subjected to an intense but brief now prevented only by Italian control enabling towns to produce allies. bombardment. The second line, half of Mt Matajur, a commanding peak. way up a series of mountains was un This was captured on the third day of affected by the bombardment and From the offensive by Rommel after he had Rommel's detachment came under outflanked another series of Italian Stephen Bernard (Aged 8) heavy fire when they reached it. Retir positions. This left the way clear for the Croydon N.S.W. ing, Rommel scouted up and down the Germans and Austro-Hungarians to line and found a section of the defences Australia pour onto the Italian plain, exploiting that he could approach under heavy the total collapse of the Italian line. For cover. He promptly surprised the gar these series of attacks over three days rison and captured a section of Italian Rommel was awarded the Pour le P.S. Sorry for the bad printing trenches. Merite, the highest award that could be In accordance with the principles of given in the German Army. infiltration tactics Rommel progressed The basic lessons of Infantry Attacks are to the third Italian line. This left the that intelligence, surprise and flexibil unengaged Italians behind him to be ity are vital. You must know where the 42 RainbowS Armageddon in the Pacific February 2nd-9th 1942 A Scfnario for the Carriers at War Game System by Patrick Murphy In 1931 Japan began down the road that lead to war with the United States an~ her ~llies. In July 1934, a new government was Needing raw materials to feed her ever growing military forces, and markets m whzch to named in Japan, with Admiral Keiske sell her goods, she began a decade of co~quest. named Prime Minister. The military's control over Japan became tighter. But, with the navy controlling the govern On September 18th of that year, the a country in a ceremony held at ment, a switch in theatres became evi "Manchurian Incident" was the pre Changchun. dent. Whereas the army looked west text used by the K wantung Army to The regent was Henry Pu-yi, the last of and north, the navy looked south at the embark on its conquest of Manchuria. the Manchu Emperors who was mineral and petroleum rich areas of Throughout the month, Japan contin crowned as the emperor ofManchukuo the south Pacific. ued to bomb cities and to occupy terri on 1 March 1934. He had abdicated the Another result of the change of govern tory in Manchuria despite protestations throne of China in 1912 and was a ment was when Japan declared its in from China and the League of Nations. convenient puppet for the Japanese tention, on December 29th, not to ad By 11 December, the Japanese cabinet who controlled all Manchurian activi here to the provisions of the 1922 Wash resigned and was no longer a buffer ties through advisers and officials in ington Naval Treaty. This treaty had between the militarists and the League appropriate positions. established limitations on the relative Council. After much drafting of resolutions by size of many national fleets (5 : 5 : 3 : On 4 January 1932 Japan completed her the League of Nations, the Japanese 1.67 : 1.67 for the U.S., Britain, Japan, conquest of Manchuria with the occu evacuated Shanghai on 31 May 1932. Italy and France respectively) pation of Shanhaikuan. On the 29th, This temporary acquiescence was shat On 15November1935,inaresumption after increasing violence, the Japanese tered when on 1 January 1933, fighting of Japanese moves to gain greater con attacked Shanghai. The battle for the erupted at Shanhaikuan, on the Man trol of China, the pro-Japanese China city continued till the 3rd of March. churian-north China border. It set the commissioner of the demilitarised zone, Impressive actions by the communist stage for the occupation of Jehol Prov YinJu-keng, called for an autonomous 19th Route Army and V Corps had a ince. Even though the 200 000 Chinese north China. He then declared eastern decided psychological effect on the defenders outnumbered the Japanese Hopei province to be independent and Chinese civilian population who clam 4 to 1, the Chinese were routed and under the administration of the Anti oured for resistance. However, the J ehol province in northern China was Communist Autonomous Council. Chinese military was forced to yield to occupied. At this time, only the communists un superior Japanese forces. By coincidence, on the same day the der Mao had "declared war" on Japan, On 17 February, the puppet state of Japanese finished evacuating Shang during the invasion of Shanghai, and Manchukuo was created by the Japa hai, the truce of Tangku was signed to had put up any kind of military resist nese. A North Eastern Administrative end the fighting between China and ance. Japan was seeking the coal and Committee was set up by the Japanese. Japan. This confirmed Japan's control port facilities of the region. Hopei was Shortly afterwards the administration over Manchuria and the Jehol Prov to become a key source of narcotics that issued a"declaration of independence" ince. A four year period of comparative flowed to countries around the world. for the Manchu-Mongolian state. peace in China resulted from the truce. By the 12th of December, both the Hopei Manchukuo was officially declared as 43 and Chahar Provinces, bordering Man Each porttakenslowlymoved the mili and conferences initiated by the League churia, were decl~ red autonomous tary position southward. Continuing of Nations and the United States may under a Japanese-controlled "Political in the same vein, Japanese marines oc have been handled and defused by Ja Council". Japan was on the move again. cupied the port city of Tsingtao when pan, had a civilian government been in At the London Naval Conference in employees staged a lockout of a Japa control, but, since the early 30s, the January 1936, Japan withdrew after nese cotton mill. The army didn't know cabinets of Japan had steadily become objecting to the quantitative limitations it, but every piece of territory they took militarised. This hold was maintained submitted by other delegations. meant a larger commitment, and there due to the peculiarity of the Japanese fore more of a say from the navy, when cabinet making process. To make matters worse, that same it came to military matters. month, Chanpeh, 40 miles north of Under Japanese law, if a member chose Kalgan, was . occupied by Inner to resign, the entire cabinet felt neces Mongolians and V{as immediately in sitating the appointment of an entirely corporated into Manchukuo. Japan con new cabinet. Since the military cabinet tinued to gain territory and the raw posts were filled by active duty mili materials for war contained therein. tary men, and not by civilians, the hard Hard on the heels of these matters, a line factions maintained military power coup was attempted by Japanese Army and actually increased their holdings extremists in an attempt to put a more every time the cabinet fell! pro-military-socialistic-dicta tors hip in By 1938, the navy faction was begin power in Japan. Though it failed, j t ning to make inroads into the army's bode ill for the future. stranglehold on the cabinet. The split Prernier Hirota, who became receptive between the services was brought on to the views of extremists in the mili by the jealousy that arose on the divi tary, outlined Japan's foreign policy sion of the budget for military expendi goals to the Emperor. These included tures. Furthermore the navy viewed expansion into the Dutch East Indies, fighting Russia and China as being a Manchurian economic growth, inde two-front war. Also, they saw the com pendence for the Philippines, and the pletion of the Singapore defences as a elimination of white rule in Asia. He British move to "outflank" them in the hoped to accomplish all this with con south. tinued peace between Japan, the U.S. The navy's response was to develop and Britain! This was the first time that war plans to outflank the British. This the shift in national policy from north Carriers at War necessitated taking territory in the south ward towards Russia to the Pacific was Pacific, not an unpalatable decision for stated. the navy as the oil rich areas of the In November 1936, Japan joined the Dutch East Indies would fuel their bun This direction would not be realised Comintern Pact and a proposal to limit kers as western oil embargos cut into for a few more years as the army was naval gun calibre to 14 inches was them. heavily committed in China and the turned down by the Japanese on 27 Chinese were starting to organise ef March 1937 on the grounds that ships On 12 February 1938, Japan refused to fective resistance. A clear indication of of other maritime powers already had reveal its naval building plans, saying this came on 24 August 1936 when a ships equipped with 15 and 16 inch "mere communication of information mob in Chengtu killed two Japanese weapons. This clearly demonstrated concerning the construction of vessels newsmen during a demonstration pro where they stood regarding world alli wilt in the absence of quantitative limi testing a Japanese move to reopen its ances and the desire to build the ships tation, not contribute to any fair and consulate general in the Szechuan capi the navy deemed necessary. equitable measure of disarmament". tal. The consulate had been closed in All the grabbing of provinces and ports In addition, on December 22, Premier 1932. came to an end on the 7th of July when Konoye said extermination of the To add fuel to the flames, two Japanese full scale war erupted at the Marco Kuomintang regime was an essential consular policemen were killed in Polo Bridge that spanned the Hun River element ofJapan's "new order" in east Hankow on the 19th of September. The at Lukouchiao. From herein the Sino Asia. The U.S. responded on the 31st, Japanese responded by landing ma Japanese war continued until1945. saying "there is no need or warrant for rines in Hankow and Pakhoi. On the any one power to take upon itself to From this point on relations ran stead 23rd, Honkew was seized after three prescribe what shall be the terms and ily downhill between Japan and the sailors were killed. conditions of a "new order" in areas United States. Protestations, embargos 44 Rainbow 5 - Map not under its sovereignty and to consti with Japan on 26 July, in an attempt to Indies, noting that should "the hostili tute itself the repository of authority bring Japan to heel. With the outbreak ties in Europe be extended to the Neth and the agent of destiny". Storm clouds of war in Europe in September, Presi erlands Indies, it would ... interfere were now appearing on the horizon. dent Roosevelt proclaimed a state of with the maintenance and furtherance From May to September 1939, Japa "limited national emergency". As are of ... economic independence and co nese and Russian troops engaged in a sult, all U.S. military forces were au existence and co-prosperity". second battle on the Manchurian-Mon thorised increases in manpower and TheJapanesearmy,acknowledgingthe golian border. By September, Japanese reservists were called to duty. The U.S. Navy's dominance in policies of eco forces were to suffer 18000 casualties was now attempting to rectify years of nomics, renewed their offensive in the versus the 9000 lost by the Soviets. The neglect of its armed forces. The U.S. Hupei Province in an attempt to fur Japanese army was stunned by the Navy, the best prepared of the U.S. ther subjugate China before the theatre quality of Soviet armour, aircraft and forces, sailed from west coast ports in of operations was switched. In June, tactics. This latest round of border fight March 1940 for manoeuvres in the Ha the stranglehold the military held over ing convinced them of Russian superi waiian area in an attempt to flex its the cabinet was firmly cemented when ority and the need not to antagonise muscles, then permanently shifted its a new Japanese cabinet was formed by them when easier battles could be won base in 1941 from San Diego to Hawaii. Prince Konoye with General Hideki in China or areas that the navy was The shift in Japanese emphasis to the Tojo as minister of war. interested in taking. south was clearly demonstrated when, Before the month was over, Japan de Meanwhile, the U.S., who had always on 15 April, the Japanese Foreign Min clared the South Seas as an area where viewed China as the underdog, de ister,Arita,said Tokyo wished to main it had a special interest, broadening its nounced its 1911 commercial treaty tain the status quo in the Dutch East 45 assumed sphere of influence. Foreign This was followed 10 days later when natural resources for the production of Minister Arita sai~, "The countries of an export restriction was placed on fuel oils. The nearest and easiest cen East Asia and the regions of the South Japan, cutting back on U.S. commodi tres were in the Dutch East Indies. With Seas are geographically, historically, ties and a reduction on aviation fuel the U.S. held Philippines between Ja racially and economically very closely and specific categories of iron and steel pan and Borneo, Japanese plans were related ... The uniting of all those re scrap. It was not a strict embargo, but stepped up for the taking of the islands. gions in a single sphere on a basis of the Japanese ministers took it as such. On 9 September U.S. destroyers began common existence, ensuring thereby Japan retaliated the next day by arrest operating with the Royal Navy in the the stability of that sphere, is a national ing foreign nationals on various charges North Atlantic and the largest naval conclusion." No clearer statement could vaguely associated with alleged spy procurement order in history was be issued on the direction the empire ing activities. Foreign Minister Yosuke awarded by the U.S. Navy; 210 ships was to expand and whom it would Matsuoka informed the British Am including 12 carriers and seven battle become embroiled,with. Unfortunately, bassador in Tokyo that Japan "was ships. The U.S. was moving; but too most eyes of the west were focussed on determined, and in fact, compelled by late. It was only three days later when the war in Europe. circumstances, to step up a new order U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in On the 18th of July 1940 Britain com in the Far East". On 31 July all aviation Tokyo warned Secretary Hull that the plied withJapan'sdemand to end ship fuel destined for use outside the West Japanese might retaliate in the face of ments of war materiel to China through ern Hemisphere was embargoed by U.S. embargoed oil shipments· to Ja Burma and Hong Kong. Japan was se the United States. A formal protest was pan. Later that month, U.S. intelligence curing her western flank before pro filed by Japan to the U.S. concerning was able to decode for the first time a ceeding southward. The following cfay this action on 3 August. On the same complete Japanese message transmit President Roosevelt signed the Naval day, the U.S. National Guard was fed ted in the Purple supersecret diplo Expansion Act, adding 1425 000 tons to eralised and 60 000 men were included matic code used by Tokyo and a loan of the navy; a 70% increase plus 15000 in the first induction. This was a clear $25 million to shore up the Chiang Kai planes of all types. message that the Japanese could not shek government was issued. ignore, since she was totally out of the October was a hectic month in the Pa cific as Roosevelt again rejected an of fer by Churchill to station U.S. ships in Singapore and Prime Minister Konoye said a war between Japan and the U.S. was inevitable if the U.S. saw the Axis alliance as "hostile". Another protest was filed by Japan against the U.S. protesting the embargo on aviation fuel, machine tools and iron and steel seraps. Ambassador Kensuke Horinouchi said the actions "cannot fail to be regarded as directed against Japan, and as such, to be an unfriendly act." After the issue of the statement, U.S. citizens were advised by Washington to leave the Far East "in view of abnormal condi tions in those areas". Japan then made the ridiculous offer to the U.S. to join the Tripartite Alliance. On 6 December 1940, on Thai initiative, Thailand and Japan concluded a treaty of friendship. War between the United States and Japan was one year and one day away. The year 1941 was one week old when Thailand began attacking Cambodia CVSaratoga and seized disputed border areas. The Taken in march 1932 this picture shows the Saratoga with a full complement of following day, on 8 January, Roosevelt's biplanes. This is how the ship would have appeared if "Plan Orange" had become budget message to Congress requested reality and the US had been at war with Japan in 1936 a defence appropriation of 46 $1081,000,000 for the fiscal year 1942. government with Vice Admiral Soemu ests, to prevent the liquidation in the Just two days lat~r a bill to provide Toyoda succeeding Matsuoka as for United States of assets obtained by lend-lease was introduced in the United eign minister in the only actual shift. duress or conquest, and to curb sub States Congress. The U.S. issued direc The navy was beginning to dominate versive activities in the United States". tives requiring export licences for the the cabinet. Three days later Japan oc Britain followed suit the same day and shipment of copper, brass, bronze, zinc, cupied bases in French Indochina. "We the Netherlands the following day. Ja nickel, potash and semi manufactured merely want to protect Indochina", pan retaliated on the 28th and 29th by products made from those materials. explained Japan's ambassador in the doing the same and began landing in The action gave Washington further United States and have a "need to guar Indochina. The naval facilities of control over trade with Japan. On the antee military security in the light of Camranh Bay in French Indochina were 16th, Roosevelt asked Congress to ap Free French and Chinese agitation". By to become an excellent staging base for propriate $350 million for the construc the23rd UnderSecretary of State Wells their coming offensives. tion of 200 merchant ships. In response, told Ambassador Nomura thatthe U.S. Emperor Hirohito was told of the risks onthe26th,MatsuokarepeatedJapan's felt there was no reason to continue of going to war against the U.S. in an determination to impose a "new or talks with Japan since the Indochinese imperial conference on 6 September. der" in Asia. Ambassador Grew ad actions showed the "Japanese Govern Konoye was permitted six weeks to vised Washington the following day of ment intended to pursue the policy of effect a diplomatic settlement of all reports circulating in Tokyo of a Japa force and of conquest". The next day outstanding issues with the U.S. after nese attack on Pearl Harbour being Vichy agreed to permit the Japanese the Emperor had been told that, "al planned by the Japanese military in full use of military bases in Indochina. though America's total defeat is judged case of "trouble" with the United Stah~s. This action placed the Japanese in a utterly impossible, it is not inconceiv Events were moving quiokly and on 5 strategic position from which to launch able that a shift in American public April1941Japandeclareditwouldcon diversified ground and naval assaults. opinion due to our victories in South trol all rubber exports from Thailand, On the 25th Foreign Minister T oyoda east Asia or to England's surrender Indochina and the Dutch East Indies told U.S. Ambassador Grew that Japan might bring the war to an end". War through a Japanese association of rub was being encircled(!) by hostile forces was now only three months and one ber dealers. Japan was down to a in southeast Asia and that their actions day away. were defensive in nature. In response, month's supply of rubber stocks. On On 16 October Prince Konoye resigned the following day, all Japanese assets the 21st Japanese troops occupied as Prime Minister of Japan and was were frozen in the U.S. "to prevent the Fochow in China, tightening her de replaced by General Hideki Tojo. To use of financial facilities of the United fence of her western flank. The follow Tokyo's military leaders, talks with the States in trade ... in ways harmful to ing day 2000 U.S. Army reinforcements U.S. were hopelessly deadlocked. A were dispatched to the Philippines. national defence and American inter- On 18 June Japan broke off trade talks with the Dutch East Indies government because the Dutch insisted on unilat eral rights to decrease the export of goods that were deemed essential by the Japanese. This action convinced the military faction that the Dutch East Indies had to be included in their pro gram of conquest. At the beginning of the following month, Japan ordered all merchant ships in the Atlantic to return to home ports. The shipping was to be used for the conquest of the South Pa cific. In a desperate attempt to reconcile with the U.S. on 16 July, the Japanese gov ernment resigned, with Foreign Minis ter Matsuoka holding out for a hard line position in dealing with the U.S. Death of a Carrier and to break talks with Washington. The CVE St Lo explodes after being hit by a kamikaze, the first carrier to be sunk On the 18th Prince Konoye formed a by this technique new, but basically identical Japanese 47 thoroughly milit~ry dominated gov Numerous exchanges from allies and PLAYER'S NOTES ernment was inevitable since the from Indochina alerted world leaders Japan Konoye cabinet represented the final to movement of Japanese land and na Your mission is quite simple; to meet civilian effort to resolve the impasse val forces in their regions over the pe the American Fleet in the middle of the with Washington. The next day the riod of the next week. Pacific and defeat it. Your pilot quality U.S. Navy ordered all American mer By 6 December, the Japanese strike force is at the peak of perfection and your chant ships in Asian waters to put into had arrived undetected off the coast of entire fleet is present, minus a few old friendly ports. Oahu. On 7 December 194:1, "A day light cruisers, a handful of destroyers Little did Ambassador Grew know on that will live in infamy", Japanese forces and some slow light escort carriers. 3 November when he cabled to Wash attacked the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Those ships continue to support land ington that Japan "might resort with Harbour. U.S. losses were staggering, ings in the south Pacific. dangerous and qramatic suddenness but fortunately all the carriers were out Each of your task forces, according to to measures which might make inevi at sea performing other duties and not Japanese doctrine, is supported by air table war with the United States" that back for the debacle. By the end of the cover, and the Advance Fleet has the Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's plan to month,fourofthe U.S. battleships were dual mission of luring the Americans attack was approved by the Japanese back in west coast ports undergoing out by bombarding Midway. Keep an command. Two days later secret in repairs. Between the days of 7 Decem eye out for TF 38 (the American battle structions (Combined Fleet Ultrasecret ber to 23 December, numerous assaults, ships) as a night engagement with it Operation Order I) were issued to the landings and outright subjugation of may prove to be fatal for any fleet. TF Japanese Navy for the attack on Pearl non-belligerent territories, were con 38 is not the best fleet in quality, but it Harbour. On the 6th the Japanese South ducted by the Japanese. Wake Island makes up for any deficiency in weight ern Army was ordered to prepare for fell on the 23rd after defeating a previ of shot. attacks on the Philippines, Malaya, ous assault by the Japanese. A relief Thailand and the East Indies. Years of force was 425 miles away when it was Whittle the U.S. Fleet down with air preparation were coming to fruition. told to turn back. Many say the rein strikes and then close for the decisive Though diplomatic messages contin forcements would have been there be battle. ued to flow back and forth between fore the Japanese if the Americans had both countries till7 December, the time been more decisive in their planning United States for reconciliation had passed. War was and implementation process. Your mission is to retake Wake Island one month and one day away. It is now 2 February 1942 and the U.S. in your first step towards relieving the Clear indication of an upcoming war fleet is escorting reinforcements to the Philippines. Every capital ship has been was the removal of 750 U.S. Marines Philippines according to War Plan Rain scrounged up for operation Rainbow from China (183 were held up by trans bow 5. First stop will be Wake Island 5. While you are heavy in aircraft carri portation delays and eventually im for the sake of prestige. The Japanese ers, remember the short range of your prisoned) and U Maung Saw, Premier are sortieing out according to their War aircraft and lack of experienced pilots. of Burma, left London after failing to Plan for a "meeting engagement". Good Four of your battleships in TF 38 are win a promise of independence from Luck. survivors from Pearl Harbour and the British. By the 26th, the Japanese haven't been totally repaired. Regard Pearl Harbour Attack Force under Vice A Note for non-disk subscribers less, a night action with this group will Admiral Chuichi N agumo completed normally bring you great satisfaction. its rendezvous and sailed from iso This is the first issue containing a sce Your fleets are well balanced, but TF 38 lated Tankan Bay in the Kuriles. nario for the Carriers at War game sys tem. Due to the size of the data file is without air cover and responsible for Events rapidly escalated as on 1 De required to create a Carriers at War sce the slow transport fleet. Don't let the cember Japan made its irrevocable de nario it is not possible to include this transports get caught by the Japanese, cision to go to war. On the 2nd the data in the magazine. Therefore "Rain and if you are controlling TF 17, try to cabinet was reshuffled again because bow 5" and subsequent Carriers at War stay close enough to support TF 38. of "the deteriorating international situ scenarios will only be available to disk Your multitude of task forces should ation" while at the same time the Prince subscribers. There is, however, no rea keep the Japanese sufficiently busy. of Wales and the Repulse pulled into son to despair. Disk subscriptions are Ignore controlling the third American Singapore. The new cabinet affirmed still the same reasonable price and we task force as it only contains the AV the final decision to attack Pearl Har would like to see all you magazine only Langley performing a fly off mission to bour and the code message to proceed, subscribers become disk subscribers. Midway and "straggler control" duty "Climb Mount Niitaka" was flashed to Information on disk subscriptions can for crippled vessels. the naval attack force the next day. be found at the front of the magazine. 48 ------~------~~------ The Warlords II game is required to use this product