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What Just Happened? a Historical Evaluation of Project Checo

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What Just Happened? a Historical Evaluation of Project Checo WHAT JUST HAPPENED? A HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF PROJECT CHECO BY MAJ DANIEL S. HOADLEY A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA JUNE 2013 DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. Form Approved Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2. REPORT TYPE JUN 2013 00-00-2013 to 00-00-2013 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER What Just Happened? A historical Evauation Of Project CHECO 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION School Of Advanced Air And Space Studies,,Air University,,Maxwell Air REPORT NUMBER Force Base,,AL 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT Project Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO) was an Air Force program during the Vietnam War that employed civilians and active duty officers to write the history of air operations as the war was unfolding. Their products also doubled as a unique tool for operations analysis. The study that follows is an effort to document the history of Project CHECO and evaluate the program both as a work of history and a tool for operations analysis. Chapter 1 records CHECO???s story including the personalities, formative guidance, and significant events that shaped the program. Chapter 2 contains profiles of four CHECO reports that are representative of the project???s work, evaluating their content for bias, accuracy, and influence on USAF operations. This study concludes that although the authors did a remarkable providing objective and critical studies, the Air Force did not use them to their full potential. The paper closes with some parallels to the documentation and analysis of USAF operations in Afghanistan. 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 124 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 APPROVAL The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master’s-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression. ___________________________________ RICHARD R. MULLER (Date) ___________________________________ JAMES D. KIRAS (Date) ii DISCLAIMER The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University. iii ABOUT THE AUTHOR Major Daniel Hoadley graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 2000 with a commission as a 2nd Lt and a BS in History. In 2001 he completed an MA in Military History at The Ohio State University. After pilot training at Vance Air Force Base, Major Hoadley qualified in the B-52H and served in the 23 BS at Minot AFB, ND. In 2005, he transferred to Whiteman AFB and served in the 393 BS flying the B-2 and T-38. Major Hoadley graduated from the United States Air Force Weapons School in 2008, and he spent his last 2 years at Whiteman as a Weapons School Instructor. In June 2013, Major Hoadley will be assigned to the Aviation Tactics and Evaluation Group (AVTEG) at the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I sincerely appreciate the attentive guidance from my thesis advisor Dr. Richard Muller and reader Dr. James Kiras. The thoughts and words that follow have been significantly elevated because of their mentoring and insightful critique. I am also indebted to Warren Trest, Dr. John Schlight, Dr. David Mets, Dr. Philip Caine, Dr. Richard Kott, Dr. Robert Burch, and Dr. John Pratt. Their recollections of Project CHECO provided an insider’s perspective of the program that immensely increased the paper’s quality. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife who patiently tolerated long hours of my physical and spiritual absence. v ABSTRACT Project Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO) was an Air Force program during the Vietnam War that employed civilians and active duty officers to write the history of air operations as the war was unfolding. Their products also doubled as a unique tool for operations analysis. The study that follows is an effort to document the history of Project CHECO and evaluate the program both as a work of history and a tool for operations analysis. Chapter 1 records CHECO’s story including the personalities, formative guidance, and significant events that shaped the program. Chapter 2 contains profiles of four CHECO reports that are representative of the project’s work, evaluating their content for bias, accuracy, and influence on USAF operations. This study concludes that although the authors did a remarkable providing objective and critical studies, the Air Force did not use them to their full potential. The paper closes with some parallels to the documentation and analysis of USAF operations in Afghanistan. vi CONTENTS Chapter Page DISCLAIMER……………………………………………………………………iii ABOUT THE AUTHOR…………………………………………………………iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………….v ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………...vi INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………...……....…1 1 A HISTORY OF PROJECT CHECO……….…………………………………...12 2 THE REPRESENTATIVE CHECO REPORTS…...……………………………44 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………..72 APPENDIX A……………………………………………………………………87 APPENDIX B……………………………………………………………………99 APPENDIX C…………………………………………………………………..100 APPENDIX D…………………………………………………………………..102 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………110 Illustrations Figure 1 Phil Caine, Dick Kott, Dave Folkman off to get a CHECO story, Mar 1970……30 2 Handling of CHECO Studies.……..………………………..…............................32 3 Project CHECO Staff, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam, Mar 1970…………………37 4 CHECO “Morale” Patch…………………………………………………………39 5 The Crew of Boxer 22……………………………………………………………59 6 CHECO Organization, 1962 – 1965………………….………………………...100 7 CHECO Organization, 1966 – 1973……………………………………………101 8 Distribution List for “The Fall of A Shau”……………………………………102 9 Distribution List for “USAF Support of Special Forces in SEA”……………...103 10 PACAF CoS Letter for “USAF Support of Special Forces in SEA”…………...109 vii INTRODUCTION In 1962 the Air Force initiated Project CHECO (Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations), an unprecedented official history program which published 251 monographs on USAF involvement in Southeast Asia (SEA). Project CHECO had two mandates that distinguished it from past official history programs: to document the role of airpower in SEA for the long term and to fill the immediate needs for operational analysis.1 CHECO’s credibility suffered by association with the sins committed by past official history programs. Although history professionals cannot seem to agree on many of the central issues of their field, they hold a virtually universal disdain for official military histories. B.H. Liddell Hart observed, “History that bears the qualification ‘official’ carries with it a natural reservation; and the additional prefix ‘military’ is apt to imply a double reservation . The history of history yields ample evidence that the art of camouflage was developed in that field long before it was applied to the battlefield.”2 Critiques of official military histories generally highlight three flaws – they are official, contemporary, and often attempt to derive specific lessons.3 A review of the debate in each category creates a useful tool for evaluating the development of Project CHECO. Ultimately, CHECO’s legacy is defined by the extent to which it met its dual purpose while avoiding the pitfalls of past official histories. Official histories bear their moniker for two reasons. First, the authors have access to classified official documents and key individuals within an organization. Second, the organization provides financial and administrative support for completing the study.4 Critiques of the ‘official’ label center on what organizations ask in return for access and the level of academic freedom allotted to the author.5 Organizations employ 1 Col W.J. Meng, Executive to the Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, to PACAF, Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, 30 June 1962, K717.062-2, IRIS No. 898522, “CHECO Correspondence, 1964-1969,” AFHRA. 2
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