The Siege of Khe Sanh
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CHAPTER 14 The Siege of Khe Sanh Digging In—Opening Moves—"Incoming!"—The Fall of Khe Sanh Village Reinforcement and Fighting Back—Round Two—The Fall of Lang Vei—The Intensifying Battl e Settling the Score—Operation Pegasus Digging I n By late January, U .S. planners at every level wer e determined to defend Khe Sanh, despite the suggest- ed possibility of " another Dien Bien Phu ."* General Westmoreland voiced numerous reasons for defend- ing the remote outpost . It was a valuable base for monitoring North Vietnamese infiltration throug h Laos along the "Ho Chi Minh" and "Santa Fe " Trails.** It was also important to Westmoreland' s planned invasion of Laos by which he intended phys- ically to cut the trails . Moreover, Khe Sanh served as left flank security for the Strong Point Obstacle Sys- tem, also known as the Dyemarker Project . Finally, and vitally significant when considering the unpopu- larity of the war to many Americans by 1968, was th e psychological significance of Khe Sanh . While it had no intrinsic political importance, being neither a cul- tural nor economic center, to relinquish it in the face of North Vietnamese pressure would result in a majo r enemy propaganda victory.*** Admiral Ulysses S . Grant Sharp, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, an d Unnumbered Department of Defense (USMC) Phot o Westmoreland 's immediate superior, concurred i n An aerial view of the Khe Sanh Combat Base looking wes t this analysis, saying "withdrawal from any portion o f was taken during the siege. The runway of the airstrip ca n Vietnam would make immediate and sensationa l be seen below and in the top right of the picture is wha t news, not only through the Western news media, but appears to be a rocket pod hanging below the aircraft taking also through the Communist capitals as a major pro- the picture. paganda item ."' rounding Communist forces . With three infantry bat- At Khe Sanh, the 26th Marines had the responsi- talions, an artillery battalion, and a full range of sup- bility to prevent the base from falling to the sur- porting units, including tank and antitank detach- ments, antiaircraft weapons, engineers, shore party, air *See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the events preceding the Battle for Khe Sanh . control, communications, and a host of others, Colone l **The "Santa Fe" Trail was actually part of the Ho Chi Minh Trai l David E . Lownds, the 26th Marines commander, con- network, entering South Vietnam from Laos northwest of Khe Sanh . tinued improving his defenses . See Chapter 3 . The Marine positions arced around the comba t ***In his comments, General Westmoreland wrote that "the aban- donment of that central terrain feature (Khe Sanh) would have mad e base from the westnorthwest to the north, forming a available to the enemy a route to the populated area near the coast . Our line of heavily fortified, mutually supporting strong - control of Khe Sanh forced the enemy to change his battle plans and t o points. Seven kilometers northwest of the comba t . " Gen Willia m reduce the threat to the coastal areas and its population 1 C . Westmoreland, USA), Comments on draft, dtd 18Oct94 (Vietna m base, Company I and Company M occupied Hill 88 Comment File) . South, from which Company I sortied on 20 Januar y 255 256 THE DEFINING YEA R meeting heavy Communist resistance .* Three kilome- the hill outposts in a band 25 meters wide in many ters to the east of Hill 881 South, Company K sat places. Marines placed explosives inside rolls of barbe d atop Hill 861 . The 2d Battalion's main position wa s wire to produce boobytraps which, when activated by on Hill 558, just over a kilometer east of Company K, a tripwire or detonated on command, would send sharp overlooking the Song Rao Quan valley. Further still shards of twisted metal flying in every direction . In to the east, and almost four kilometers north of the some places, the defenders emplaced drums offougasse, combat base, the 2d Platoon of Company A sat high a mixture of gasoline and diesel fuel detonated by plas - atop the dominant precipice known as Hill 950 to tic explosive which produced a wall of flame certain to guard the radio relay site there. At the combat base discourage even the most determined attacker. Still proper, the 1st Battalion and Company L, 3d Battal- there were shortcomings in the Marine defenses . For- ion defended the airstrip with the headquarters ele- mer Washington Post correspondent Peter Braestrup , ments, and the firing batteries of the 1st Battalion , who served as a Marine officer during the Korean War , 13th Marines. remembered that after he visited Khe Sanh at the end Adjacent to the combat base and just north of of January, 1968, "I saw on main base [that) man y Route 9 was the massive bunker complex of the secre- perimeter trenches were waist high, no more . Marines tive SOG Forward Operating Base 3 (FOB—3) whose don't like to dig ."3*** members conducted clandestine anti-infiltration In addition to the physical preparation of the operations in Laos and along the border. Outlyin g ground at Khe Sanh, higher headquarters entered th e defensive positions further south included those of picture to assist in the defense of the combat base and Combined Action Platoons Oscar and the 915t h its outlying positions. General Westmoreland ordered Regional Force Company protecting the hamlets of that Khe Sanh receive maximum support from Boein g Khe Sanh Village as well as the small MACV adviso- B—52 Stratofortress heavy bombers and ordered the 1s t ry team at the district headquarters located there . Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to prepare to deploy Further to the southwest was the Lang Vei Special to I Corps Tactical Zone on 24-hour notice . General Forces CIDG Camp located on Route 9, nine kilome- Cushman directed the 3d Marine Division to shift ters from the combat base and only two kilometers heavy artillery units for better support of Khe Sanh and from the border with Laos .** requested that the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Divi- In every position, the defenders continuousl y sion be alerted for deployment to the Hue-Phu Bai are a worked to prepare for the coming battle . Following a on 24-hour notice .4 visit to Khe Sanh, General Cushman directed that all Logistical preparations went forward at the sam e fighting holes have overhead cover capable of with- time . By the third week in January, Khe Sanh had at standing direct hits from 82mm mortars and that th e least a 30-day supply of ammunition for all of its ammunition supply point be reorganized to provide better protection for the ammunition stocks, much o f ***For discussion of Marine vulnerabilities at Khe Sanh se e which were outside the revetments .2 Fortification Chapter 4 . See also LtGen Philip B . Davidson, Vietnam at War, The material was in short supply, but the Marines used History : 1946—1975 (Novato, CA : Presidio Press, 1988), pp . 554—56 ; LtCol Frederick J . McEwan, Comments on draft, dt d many field expedients, including damaged portions o f 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) ; and William J . O'Connor, Com- the airstrip's steel matting and metal pallets used for air ments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafte r delivery of supplies . Rolls of "German tape," with its O'Connor Comments . See also the references to Marine shortcom- razor-like edges, were added to the multiple layers of ings in building fortifications and bunkers in Chapter 1, especiall y protective barbed wire ringing the combat base an d with reference to comments by Major Gary E . Todd who served o n the 3d Marine Division intelligence staff in 1968 and Colonel Joh n C . Studt . Colonel Studt, who as a lieutenant colonel took over the *A detachment of three 105mm howitzers from Battery C, 1s t 3d Battalion, 26th Marines at Khe Sanh in March 1968, observed Battalion, 13th Marines was attached to Company Ion Hill 881 Sout h that "the first thing I undertook was a total reconstruction of ou r to provide additional fire support for the base . Colonel Kent O. W. defensive positions starting with the company commanders buildin g Steen, who served with the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines as a young offi- a proper bunker with me ." Col John C . Studs, Comments on draft , cer in 1968, wrote : "There were times when these three artillery pieces dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File) . From another perspective , were all that could be brought to bear on attacks on the . main base . " Colonel Kent O. W. Steen, an artillery officer at Khe Sanh, com- Col Kent O . W. Steen, Comments on draft, dtd 1Dec94 (Vietna m mented, "we did homemade bunkers not because we wanted to o r Comment File), hereafter Steen Comments ; 1/13 ComdC, Feb68 . didn't know better, but that there weren't enough airlift and con- **See Chapter 4 relative to the activities and establishment o f struction resources in Vietnam to provide the materials we nee d these organizations in the Khe Sanh sector. once the threat was understood ." Steen Comments . THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH 25 7 Top is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190273 while the bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190685 . Top, a Marine infantryman takes a brief nap in his covered overhead bunker, protecting him fro m incoming artillery and mortar rounds. Below, the photograph is an overview of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines bunker defenses along the western perimeter of the base .