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This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ Victory and Strategic Culture The Marines, the Army and Vietnam; First Corps Tactical Zone 1965-1971 Velicogna, Arrigo Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). 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Oct. 2021 Victory and Strategic Culture: The Marines, the Army and Vietnam; First Corps Tactical Zone 1965-1971 A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the subject of WAR STUDIES By Arrigo Velicogna King’s College London, March 2013 1 Abstract The Vietnam War has been subject of considerable research, both immediately after its conclusion and in more recent times in light of the new prolonged conflicts involving the United States armed forces. Yet, despite the considerable amount of published and unpublished material several assumptions have been accepted without the necessary criticism. One of these assumption is the fact that the US Army under General William C. Westmoreland was a static and unimaginative organization while the US Marine Corps had found the key to defeat the communist insurgency in Vietnam. The aim of this thesis is to examine this assumption in the context of the two services development before 1965 and of the conduct of their operations during the actual war. Examining the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine demonstrates that the US Army was not a passive spectator but took an active lead in the process. Furthermore there is no evidence that the US Marine Corps (USMC) was able to craft a war winning strategy in Vietnam and that its inability to operate in a combined arms and combined services environment damaged the overall effectiveness of the American war effort. These differences emerge from the fact that, contrarily to the common opinion, the USMC was the less flexible organization dominated by a close group of infantry officers while the Army, owing to its more complex make up, was able to operate with flexibility and efficiency crafting an effective method to fight in Vietnam. 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................... 6 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 8 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 9 Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 10 A Still More Important Question?................................................................................. 15 Existing Literature ......................................................................................................... 16 Secondary Sources ........................................................................................................ 18 Problems and Methods ................................................................................................. 29 Chapter 1: Development of US Army ‘small wars’ doctrine ....................................... 36 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 36 1.2 Early COIN 1945-1953 ............................................................................................ 40 1.3 Counterinsurgency in the New Look era ................................................................ 55 1.5 COIN Doctrine 1960-1965 ....................................................................................... 64 1.6 Counterinsurgency doctrine evaluated .................................................................. 69 Chapter 2: USMC and counterinsurgency 1945-1963 ................................................. 78 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 78 2.2 US Marine Corps Approach to Doctrine................................................................. 82 2.2 Post War doctrine ................................................................................................... 85 2.3 Amphibious Assault and Air-mobility ..................................................................... 88 2.4 COIN resurgence? ................................................................................................... 92 2.5 Marines and COIN, a balance .................................................................................. 95 Chapter 3: Entering Vietnam, 1961-65 .................................................................... 101 3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 101 3.2 Vietnam 1956-1960, Initial Assistance and Planning ............................................ 102 3.3 1960-1963 COIN by Advisor .................................................................................. 116 3.3 The Failure of Advice 1963-1964 .......................................................................... 128 3.4 Invasion 1964-65 ................................................................................................... 133 3.5 An Army in Search of a Mission ............................................................................ 141 3.6 Bullies and Termites, toward a Campaign Plan, 1965 .......................................... 142 3.7 The Right Direction? ............................................................................................. 146 3 Chapter 4: Marines and Strategy, 1965-1966 .......................................................... 149 4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 149 4.2 The I Corps Tactical Zone ...................................................................................... 152 5.3 The Creation of the III MAF ................................................................................... 161 4.4 Initial operations, June-September 1965 ............................................................. 168 4.5 Emerging Strategic Patterns ................................................................................. 178 4.6 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 187 Chapter 5: Securing the I CTZ, 1966-1967 ................................................................ 198 5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 198 5.2 Continuing Trends and Problems .......................................................................... 199 5.3 Losing the Laotian Border ..................................................................................... 208 5.4 Defending the DMZ, round one ............................................................................ 215 Chapter 6: The Years of the Offensives 1967-1968 .................................................. 226 6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 226 6.2 The McNamara Line and the evolution of the frontier strategy .......................... 228 6.3 The PAVN Summer-Fall offensive ......................................................................... 232 6.4 General Offensive General Uprising. .................................................................... 238 6.5 Counterattack ....................................................................................................... 247 6.6 Back into the A Shau, first try. .............................................................................. 259 6.7 Defending the DMZ, Round Three ........................................................................ 263 Chapter 7: High Mobility and Stand-Down 1969-1971 ............................................. 271 7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 271 7.2 The III MAF new campaign plan ............................................................................ 274 7.3 Protecting the DMZ ..............................................................................................