The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War Kuwait
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Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -7325 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Web: www.csis.org/burke The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War Kuwait Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al -Rodhan Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Visiting Fellow [email protected] [email protected] Working Draft for Review and Comments Revised: June 28, 2006 Cordesman & Al -Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Kuwait 6/28/06 Page 2 Introduction Kuwait is a mall nation of only 17,820 square kilometers. Its strategic position makes it uniquely vulnerable and its recent history has been anything but peaceful As Map 1 shows Kuwait has common borders with Saudi Arabia (222 kilometers) and Iraq (240 kilometers) and is with a few kilometers of Iran. It is within easy missile and artillery range of its three large neighbors, its large oil reserve and wealth make it a tempting target, and it has no secure route to export its oil except through vulnerable tanker shipping lanes that run the entire length of the Gulf. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are still negotiating a joint maritime boundary with Iran, Kuwait claims territorial waters 12 miles from the shore. 1 While Kuwaiti -Saudi relations have been peaceful ever since World War II, Saudi Arabia nearly invaded Kuwait during the rise of King Abdulaziz al -Saud (also known as Ibn Saud), and was only deterred by the fact Britain controlled Kuwait’s foreign relations and defense and demanded Saudi forces h alt. 2 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia still have neutral zone on their border. According to the U.S. E nergy Information Administration (EIA), the Neutral Zone (or “Divided Zone”) is a 6,200 square -mile area divided equally between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia under a 1 992 agreement. It has an estimated 5 billion barrels of oil and 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. Oil production in the Neutral Zone is shared equally with Saudi Arabia, and currently averages close to 600,000 barrels per day (around half offshor e and half onshore). The Neutral Zone onshore oil fields include Humma, South Fawaris, South Umm Gudair, and Wafra. There are two offshore fields called Hout and Khafji. 3 During the Iran -Iraq War, Kuwait’s support of Iraq led to constant threats by Iran, s everal Iranian sponsored terrorist attacks and occasion penetrations by Iranian aircraft. These threats help lead to the “tanker war” of 1987 -1988, during which Kuwaiti ships were reflagged with U.S. flags to escape Iranian attack and the U.S. Navy was for ced into several major clashes with the Iranian Navy. Kuwait has also been threatened and invaded by Iraq. Iraqi threats and troops movements forced Britain to redeploy troops shortly after Kuwait’s independence from the British in 1961. Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, and occupied it until it was liberated by a UN coalition in 1991. Iraq officially recognized Kuwait's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, as well as its borders as defined by the United Natio ns, in November 1994. Potential disputes still exist over the sharing of oil fields that extend across the borders of both countries, however, and Kuwait and Iraq have not agreed on a maritime boundary that affects Iraq’s access to its main port at Umm Qas r.4 Map 1: Kuwait 2006 © All Rights and Copyrights are reserves to the authors. This is a chapter of a rough draft of a book that will be published by Praeger in the fall of 2006. No further attribution, quotation, or further circulation of this text should be made without the written permission of the authors. Cordesman & Al -Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Kuwait 6/28/06 Page 3 Source: CIA, “Kuwait,” 1996, available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kuwait_pol96.jpg If location is one liability, Kuwait’s oil wealth is another. Kuwait sits atop some 99 billion barrels of oil, the fourth largest reserve in the world after Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. It has oil fields that are shared with Iraq (Ratqa/Rumaila) and Saudi Arabia (in the Neutral Zone); there is also a natu ral gas reservoir shared with Saudi Arabia and claimed by Iran (Dorra field). This geography creates the possibility for border disputes or conflict, although relations are relatively amicable with Saudi Arabia, in abeyance with Iraq, and improving with Ir an. Kuwait has bilateral defense agreements with all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and has used its procurement program to strengthen ties with them. Kuwait is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In practice, how ever, Kuwait relies on the protection of the United States: on April 2, 2004, Kuwait was granted major non -NATO ally (MNNA) status. Members of MNNA receive $3.0 million per year in counterterrorism financial assistance, and are provided with help in procur ement in explosive detection and R&D projects in counterterrorism. 5 Kuwait was and remains the main logistical base for the U.S. Military’s activities in Iraq. Military Spending & Arms Imports Following the Gulf War, Kuwait began a 10 -year $11.7 -$12.0 bill ion overhaul of its armed forces. Its focus was to strengthen the army and air force, with the navy as a secondary priority. The operational doctrine produced by the Defense Review Group before the 1991 Gulf War 2006 © All Rights and Copyrights are reserves to the authors. This is a chapter of a rough draft of a book that will be published by Praeger in the fall of 2006. No further attribution, quotation, or further circulation of this text should be made without the written permission of the authors. Cordesman & Al -Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Kuwait 6/28/06 Page 4 aimed at ensuring the armed forces could wit hstand an attack for 48 -72 hours until international reinforcements came to Kuwait’s aid. The doctrine has not changed, although Kuwait’s tactical approach has evolved to protecting key areas as opposed to trying to defend the whole country. Military spen ding is an issue. Kuwait gets some 90 -95 percent of its total export earnings and around two -fifths of its GDP from oil and must plan for the day when its reserves decline. Kuwait puts some 10 percent of its oil revenues into the "Future Generations Fund" in preparation for the time its production begins to decline. 6 Kuwait faces far more immediate pressure, however, from the fact that it has a comparatively larger native population for such a small country, and some 65 percent of the population it under th e age of 25. Kuwait has also become a rentier state and roughly 90 percent of employees in the private sector are non -Kuwaiti citizens. As a result, the government must either find ways of hiring young Kuwaitis or of using its revenues to invest directly i n economic diversification or attract additional foreign investment. 7 At present, over 90% of the native Kuwaiti work force is employed mostly (over 90 percent) by state -owned enterprises and the government. Kuwait's national assembly passed a "Foreign Di rect Investment Act" in March 2001 to try to attract foreign investment and has sought to privatize state -owned businesses (outside the oil sector). In practice, however, military spending is seen as competing with the government’s ability to provide jobs, money, and subsidies for Kuwaiti citizens. 8 Kuwait’s economy has benefited from the recent surge in oil prices. The economy grew by about 5.2% in 2003 and 5.7% in 2004, and real GDP growth for 2005 and 2006 was estimated at 5.8% and 4.7%, respectively. T he Kuwaiti budget has run consistent surpluses for six straight years to FY2004/2005. The Reserve Fund for Future Generations (RFFG), which is a fund set up to save part of Kuwait’s current oil wealth for the future, holds around $80 billion (2004) and rec eives 15% of all oil revenues. 9 Military spending in Kuwait’s military expenditures have been increasing steadily since the 1980s. According the IISS, Kuwait’s defense budget was $1.63 billion in 1985, $1.53 billion in 1990, $2.91 billion in 1995, $2.31 bi llion in 2000, $5.1 billion in 2001, $3.5 billion in 2002, $3.8 billion in 2003, $4.0 billion in 2004, and $4.27 billion in 2005. Defense spending as percentage of GDP has fluctuated over the years based on perceived threat to Kuwait, but has remained com paratively high in spite of growing debates in the National Assembly and Kuwait’s domestic politics. Kuwait’s defense budget was estimated to be 7.6% of GDP in 1985, 5.9% in 1990, 10.9% in 1995, 6.9% in 2000, 12.1% in 2001, 10.1% in 2002, 9.4% in 2003, 7.9 % in 2004, and 7.5% in 2005. The decline since 2003 is partly due to the fact that the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq disappeared, and partly due to an increase in internal security spending. Like other states in the Gulf, Kuwait has been a major arms i mporter. Figure 1 shows new arms deliveries and new arms agreements by supplier between 1993 and 2004. After the Gulf War, Kuwait spent a considerable amount —approximately $4.6 billion —in new arms deliveries, from the United States, Russia, and Western Eur ope.