The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War Kuwait

Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -7325 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Web: www.csis.org/burke

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War

Kuwait

Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al -Rodhan Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Visiting Fellow [email protected] [email protected]

Working Draft for Review and Comments Revised: June 28, 2006 Cordesman & Al -Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Kuwait 6/28/06 Page 2

Introduction Kuwait is a mall nation of only 17,820 square kilometers. Its strategic position makes it uniquely vulnerable and its recent history has been anything but peaceful As Map 1 shows Kuwait has common borders with Saudi Arabia (222 kilometers) and Iraq (240 kilometers) and is with a few kilometers of Iran. It is within easy missile and artillery range of its three large neighbors, its large oil reserve and wealth make it a tempting target, and it has no secure route to export its oil except through vulnerable tanker shipping lanes that run the entire length of the Gulf. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are still negotiating a joint maritime boundary with Iran, Kuwait claims territorial waters 12 miles from the shore. 1 While Kuwaiti -Saudi relations have been peaceful ever since World War II, Saudi Arabia nearly invaded Kuwait during the rise of King Abdulaziz al -Saud (also known as Ibn Saud), and was only deterred by the fact Britain controlled Kuwait’s foreign relations and defense and demanded Saudi forces h alt. 2 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia still have neutral zone on their border. According to the U.S. E nergy Information Administration (EIA), the Neutral Zone (or “Divided Zone”) is a 6,200 square -mile area divided equally between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia under a 1 992 agreement. It has an estimated 5 billion barrels of oil and 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. Oil production in the Neutral Zone is shared equally with Saudi Arabia, and currently averages close to 600,000 barrels per day (around half offshor e and half onshore). The Neutral Zone onshore oil fields include Humma, South Fawaris, South Umm Gudair, and Wafra. There are two offshore fields called Hout and Khafji. 3 During the Iran -Iraq War, Kuwait’s support of Iraq led to constant threats by Iran, s everal Iranian sponsored terrorist attacks and occasion penetrations by Iranian aircraft. These threats help lead to the “tanker war” of 1987 -1988, during which Kuwaiti ships were reflagged with U.S. flags to escape Iranian attack and the U.S. Navy was for ced into several major clashes with the Iranian Navy. Kuwait has also been threatened and invaded by Iraq. Iraqi threats and troops movements forced Britain to redeploy troops shortly after Kuwait’s independence from the British in 1961. Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, and occupied it until it was liberated by a UN coalition in 1991. Iraq officially recognized Kuwait's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, as well as its borders as defined by the United Natio ns, in November 1994. Potential disputes still exist over the sharing of oil fields that extend across the borders of both countries, however, and Kuwait and Iraq have not agreed on a maritime boundary that affects Iraq’s access to its main port at Umm Qas r.4 Map 1: Kuwait

2006 © All Rights and Copyrights are reserves to the authors. This is a chapter of a rough draft of a book that will be published by Praeger in the fall of 2006. No further attribution, quotation, or further circulation of this text should be made without the written permission of the authors. Cordesman & Al -Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Kuwait 6/28/06 Page 3

Source: CIA, “Kuwait,” 1996, available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kuwait_pol96.jpg

If location is one liability, Kuwait’s oil wealth is another. Kuwait sits atop some 99 billion barrels of oil, the fourth largest reserve in the world after Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. It has oil fields that are shared with Iraq (Ratqa/Rumaila) and Saudi Arabia (in the Neutral Zone); there is also a natu ral gas reservoir shared with Saudi Arabia and claimed by Iran (Dorra field). This geography creates the possibility for border disputes or conflict, although relations are relatively amicable with Saudi Arabia, in abeyance with Iraq, and improving with Ir an. Kuwait has bilateral defense agreements with all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and has used its procurement program to strengthen ties with them. Kuwait is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In practice, how ever, Kuwait relies on the protection of the United States: on April 2, 2004, Kuwait was granted major non -NATO ally (MNNA) status. Members of MNNA receive $3.0 million per year in counterterrorism financial assistance, and are provided with help in procur ement in explosive detection and R&D projects in counterterrorism. 5 Kuwait was and remains the main logistical base for the U.S. Military’s activities in Iraq. Military Spending & Arms Imports Following the Gulf War, Kuwait began a 10 -year $11.7 -$12.0 bill ion overhaul of its armed forces. Its focus was to strengthen the army and air force, with the navy as a secondary priority. The operational doctrine produced by the Defense Review Group before the 1991 Gulf War

aimed at ensuring the armed forces could wit hstand an attack for 48 -72 hours until international reinforcements came to Kuwait’s aid. The doctrine has not changed, although Kuwait’s tactical approach has evolved to protecting key areas as opposed to trying to defend the whole country. Military spen ding is an issue. Kuwait gets some 90 -95 percent of its total export earnings and around two -fifths of its GDP from oil and must plan for the day when its reserves decline. Kuwait puts some 10 percent of its oil revenues into the "Future Generations Fund" in preparation for the time its production begins to decline. 6 Kuwait faces far more immediate pressure, however, from the fact that it has a comparatively larger native population for such a small country, and some 65 percent of the population it under th e age of 25. Kuwait has also become a rentier state and roughly 90 percent of employees in the private sector are non -Kuwaiti citizens. As a result, the government must either find ways of hiring young Kuwaitis or of using its revenues to invest directly i n economic diversification or attract additional foreign investment. 7 At present, over 90% of the native Kuwaiti work force is employed mostly (over 90 percent) by state -owned enterprises and the government. Kuwait's national assembly passed a "Foreign Di rect Investment Act" in March 2001 to try to attract foreign investment and has sought to privatize state -owned businesses (outside the oil sector). In practice, however, military spending is seen as competing with the government’s ability to provide jobs, money, and subsidies for Kuwaiti citizens. 8 Kuwait’s economy has benefited from the recent surge in oil prices. The economy grew by about 5.2% in 2003 and 5.7% in 2004, and real GDP growth for 2005 and 2006 was estimated at 5.8% and 4.7%, respectively. T he Kuwaiti budget has run consistent surpluses for six straight years to FY2004/2005. The Reserve Fund for Future Generations (RFFG), which is a fund set up to save part of Kuwait’s current oil wealth for the future, holds around $80 billion (2004) and rec eives 15% of all oil revenues. 9 Military spending in Kuwait’s military expenditures have been increasing steadily since the 1980s. According the IISS, Kuwait’s defense budget was $1.63 billion in 1985, $1.53 billion in 1990, $2.91 billion in 1995, $2.31 bi llion in 2000, $5.1 billion in 2001, $3.5 billion in 2002, $3.8 billion in 2003, $4.0 billion in 2004, and $4.27 billion in 2005. Defense spending as percentage of GDP has fluctuated over the years based on perceived threat to Kuwait, but has remained com paratively high in spite of growing debates in the National Assembly and Kuwait’s domestic politics. Kuwait’s defense budget was estimated to be 7.6% of GDP in 1985, 5.9% in 1990, 10.9% in 1995, 6.9% in 2000, 12.1% in 2001, 10.1% in 2002, 9.4% in 2003, 7.9 % in 2004, and 7.5% in 2005. The decline since 2003 is partly due to the fact that the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq disappeared, and partly due to an increase in internal security spending. Like other states in the Gulf, Kuwait has been a major arms i mporter. Figure 1 shows new arms deliveries and new arms agreements by supplier between 1993 and 2004. After the Gulf War, Kuwait spent a considerable amount —approximately $4.6 billion —in new arms deliveries, from the United States, Russia, and Western Eur ope. Between 1997 and 2000, Kuwait’s arms’ deliveries declined dramatically to $800 million —largely due to the “oil crash” of the late 1990s and the subsequent decline in oil revenues. Since the attacks of “9/11,” Kuwait’s arms deliveries, however, have st arted to climb up again. During the period between 2001 and 2004, Kuwait’s

arms deliveries jumped up again to a total of $2.3 billion, the vast majority of which from the United States. It is equally important, however, to note that Kuwait has not spent e nough to fully re undercapitalize its forces since the late 1990s. Its arms agreements are declining at a faster rate than its arms deliveries. Figure 2 shows the clear downward trend in new arms agreements between 1993 and 2004. During this period, Kuwait ’s new arms agreements declined by 72 percent from $5.3 billion between 1993 and 1996; to $2.9 billion between 1997 and 2000; and $1.5 billion between 2001 and 2004. Western Europe and the United States remained Kuwait’s major suppliers, with occasional pu rchases from China (self -propelled howitzers) and Russia (BMP -3 AIFVs). Kuwait’s arms purchase also involve more than symbolic purchases. Although Kuwait’s forces remain small, Kuwait’s military readiness and training levels have improved to moderate in recent years, and its training is now effective at the brigade and squadron level. Unfortunately, its tendency to politicize its arms imports has prevented it from buying the best and most interoperable systems to meet its needs. Recent major purchases inc lude AH -64 attack helicopters. However, Kuwait has sought to purchase several modern C 4I systems, but its parliament has blocked the move, claiming that the Ministry of Defense had improperly negotiated a specific C 4I contract. It is unclear if an investig ation is under way into the allegations and it is equally uncertain whether Kuwait will continue to pursue the systems in question. 10

Figure 1: Kuwait’s Arms Deliveries by Supplier, 1993 -2004 (In Current Million $US) 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004

US 3,100 500 1,800 Russia 800 0 100 China 0 200 200 Major W. European 700 00 Other European 000 All Others 0 100 200 Total 4,600 800 2,300 Source: R ichard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers To Developing Nations, 1997 -2004 , CRS, August 29, 2005; and Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers To Developing Nations, 1993 -2000 , CRS, August 16, 2001. Figure 2: Kuwait’s New Arms Agreements by S upplier, 1993 -2004 (In Current Million $US)

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0 1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004

US 2,500 1,400 1,000 Russia 800 0 100 China 0 200 200 Major W. European 1,900 1,200 0 Other European 100 100 0 All Others 00200 Total 5,300 2,900 1,500 Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers To Developing Nations, 1997 -2004 , CRS, August 29, 2005; and Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers To Developing Na tions, 1993 -2000 , CRS, August 16, 2001.

Military Manpower Kuwait may have problems in employing its youth in civil jobs, but it also has a comparatively small pool of men to draw upon for military purposes. (Kuwait does allow women in its police force.) I n 2006, it had some 864,745 males of military age (18 -49), and some 737,292 men “fit” for military service, but only 18,743 native males reach military age that year. 11 National service lasts for two years and all men are supposed to receive a 30 -day traini ng annually, though few actually do. Total Kuwaiti active military manpower is estimated to be between 15,500 and 16,200 in 2006. Kuwait is also estimated to have an additional 23,700 personnel as reserves, though there is no breakdown of where these reser vists belong. In addition, Kuwait has an estimated 6,000 -7,000 strong paramilitary force that is charged with internal security. Kuwait has largely maintained similar level of manpower since the Gulf War in 1990. The only key difference is decrease in its active army personnel from 16,000 in 1990, to 11,000 in 2000, and has maintained the same level to 2006. Its air force manpower grew modestly from 2,200 in 1990, to 2,500 in 2000 and 2006; and it added around 500 coast guardsmen in 2000. Kuwait holds regul ar joint training exercises with the United States. Generally, while Kuwait may have well trained junior officers and NCOs, it lacks effective professional training programs to keep up with its advanced weapon systems and build manpower quality. It is equa lly clear, however, that officers in Kuwait’s armed services are receiving far more professional training than they were before the Gulf War in 1990. But the focus of its training centers around delaying incursions for 48 hours before enforcement arrives. 12 The Kuwaiti Army The Kuwaiti army is small relative to its larger neighbors, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait’s active army force is estimated to be around 11,000. This includes an estimated 1,600 -3,700 3,700 foreign personnel. 13 As noted earlier, Kuwa it is also estimated to have 23,700 reservists. It is, however, unclear how many of them serve in its army. Kuwait has three army bases. The army’s headquarters is based in Kuwait City. In addition, Kuwait has two more bases located at Al - Jabah and Mina Ab dullah. Force Structure As Figure 3 shows, the Kuwaiti army’s force structure is organized into three armored brigades, one mechanized reconnaissance brigade, two mechanized infantry brigades, one commando battalion, one artillery brigade, one engineer br igade, and one Emiri Guard brigade. In addition, Kuwait is forming a new Special Forces unit. In practice, Kuwait’s brigades are small by Western standards, roughly the equivalent of small regiments or large battalions. They are also “cadre forces,” kept up to 80 percent of full strength with the balance made up by reserves in case of war. 14 Kuwait did, however, react to Iraq’s invasion the 1991 Gulf War by increasing its army manning between 1990 and 2006. The manpower increased from 20,300 in 1990 to 34, 700 in 2000. Between 1990 and 2000, Kuwait added a mechanized reconnaissance brigade, a mechanized infantry brigade, a commando battalion, an engineer brigade and an Emiri Guard brigade.

Armor and Anti -Armor Weapons Kuwait’s fleet of main battle tanks (MB Ts increased from 251 in 1990, to 385 in 2000, and 368 in 2006. Its armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV) increased from 245 in 1990, to 355 in 2000, and 450 in 2006. Its artillery weapons increased from 112 in 1990, 148 in 2000 and 218 in 2006. Its an ti -tank arsenal increased mostly after 2000, and only its APC fleet decreased during this period, from 430 in 1990 to 321 in 2006. Kuwait’s main battle tanks consist of 218 M1 -A2 Abrams and 150 M -84 tanks (half of which, an estimated 75 tanks, are in stor age). It is unclear how many of its M1 -A2 Abrams are fully operational. In 2000, according to the IISS, Kuwait was estimated to have 17 Chieftains that were in storage, but it remain uncertain if those tanks are operational, remain in storage, or they have been decommissioned out of service. 15 The army’s armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV) fleet includes up to 76 BMP -2, up to 120 - 126 BMP -3, and 254 Desert Warriors (including variants). As noted earlier, Kuwait also has an estimated 350 armored persona l carriers (APC). This force includes 230 M -113A2, 40 M -577, 11 TPz -1 Fuchs, and an estimated 40 TH -390 -Fahd, which are believed to be in storage. In addition, Kuwait is estimated to have 20 VBL reconnaissance vehicles, but the IISS estimates that these ve hicles may have been shifted to Kuwait’s paramilitary forces. Kuwait is also reequipping its forces to deal with infiltrators and the threat of terroprism. In November 2004, the Kuwaiti National Guard received 8 German Rheinmetall Landsystem Condor 2 4x4 A PCs. They are equipped with VFI run -flat Tyres, air conditioning system, a one - man turret armed with 12.7mm heavy and 7.62mm medium machine guns, and can go as fast as 95km/h. They will also have vision devices that allow the occupants of the APC to fire the weapons from inside the vehicle. Each car can carry as many as 10 people. 16 Kuwait has shown interest to purchase 62 8x8 APCs for the Emiri Guard. In early 2006, it was evaluating two bids for “BAE Systems Land Systems/Mowag Piranha III fitted with Gen eral Dynamics Land Systems LAV -25 turret armed with an ATK 25 mm M242 cannon; [and for] Finland’s Patria Vehicles Armoured Modular Vehicle fitted with an Oto Melara HITFIST 30 turret armed with an ATK 30 mm MK44 cannon.” 17 According to Jane’s , Kuwait may ex pand to more than 123 8x8 APCs for the Emiri Guard and 60 APCs for the National Guard. Kuwait is seeking to purchase 60 heavy equipment transporters (HETs) to increase the mobility of its M -1A2s. The three vehicles under consideration are the T816 -6VWN9T 8x8, the MAN 40.633 6x6 DFAETX, and the Actros 4160AS 8x8. 18 Kuwait’s anti -tank missiles include some M47 Dragon, 44 TOW MSL/TOW -2, 66 HMMWV, 8 M-901, and an estimated 200 Carl Gustav; Jane’s reports that Kuwait has 1,743 TOW -2BI anti - tank guided missiles. Kuwait has requested the sale of up to 436 anti -armor guided missiles from the US, in a deal valued at about $19 million. The precise breakdown is: 288 TOW -2A missiles, four TOW -2A “Fly -to -Buy” missiles, 140 TOW -2BH missiles, and four TOW -2B “Fly -to -Buy” missiles. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) presented the Kuwaiti request to the U.S. Congress in August 2005. 19

Artillery Army artillery equipment includes 18 AU -F-1 (in storage), 23 M -109A3, 18 MkF3, 54 PLZ45, 27 9A52 Smerch. Mortar hol dings include 60 81mm, 6 M -30 and 12 RT -F1. This is a reasonable pool of modern artillery for a small force, and the Smerch 300mm rockets give it a long -range weapon with a range of 20km to 70km, and which either have a warhead with 72 HE -FRAG (High Expl osive Fragmentation) submunitions or HE -FRAG separable unitary warhead. According to army -technology.com , the rockets can also be fitted with a warhead containing five Bazalt MOTIV -3F anti -armor submunitions. These “smart” submunitions have dual -color infr ared sensors for terminal guidance and kinetic energy fragment warheads which are said to be able to penetrate 70mm of armor at an angle of 30° to the normal. Kuwait may purchase an improvement rocket with a maximum range of 90 kilometers and an improved w arhead carrying 25 anti -tank mines. 20 Overall Assessment At least two of Kuwait’s brigades now seem capable of deploying with their full equipment strength, although their maintenance and sustenance needs can only be met while operating in Kuwait and withi n relatively short range of their bases. As noted earlier, however, Kuwait relies heavily on the United States for protection. Its armed forces have been trained at holding their position for 48 -72 hours before reinforcement from the U.S., NATO, or region al powers arrive. Whether the current strength and training level prepares the Kuwaiti army of its mission, however, remain uncertain. More generally, even more than the other Gulf States, Kuwait must now adapt its force posture to the fact that Iraq no lo nger is a major threat, but terrorism and Islamist extremism are creating new sources of regional instability. It must also adapt to the potential spillover of sectarian and ethnic tensions if Iraq should escalate to a major civil war, or divide in ways t hat would put a largely Shi’ite dominated part of Iraq – possibly tied to Iran – on Kuwait’s northern border. The threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq has been replaced by the threat of asymmetric attacks by terrorist organizations such as al -Qaeda, an evolv ing insurgency in Iraq, and the ongoing uncertainty regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Its force structure has been largely static since 2000, and there has been little evidence of improved interoperability and jointness between its military services, inter nal security forces, and neighboring states.

Figure 3: Kuwaiti Army’s Force Structure, 1990 -2006

1990 2000 2005 2006 Manpower 16,000 11,000 11,000 11,000 Active 16,000 11,000 11,000 11,000*

Combat Units 6 11 12 13 Army Reserve Brigade 1 1 1 1 Armor ed Brigade 3 3 3 3 Mechanized Recce 0 1 1 1 Mechanized Infantry 1 2 2 2 Special Forces Unit 0 0 0 1 Commando Battalion 0 1 1 1

Artillery Brigade 1 1 1 1 Engineer Brigade 0 1 1 1 Guard (Amiri) Brigade 0 1 1 1 Air Defense Command 0 0 1 1

Tanks 251 385 368 368 M1 -A2 Abrams 0 218 218 218 M-84 6 150 (75) 150 (75) 150 (75) Chieftain 165 (17) 0 0 Vickers MK (70) 0 0 0 Centurion 10 0 0 0

RECCE 190 0 0 0 Saladin (100) 0 0 0 Ferret 90 0 0 0

AIFV 245 355 450 450 BMP -2 245 46 76 76 BMP -3 0 55 120 120 Desert Warrior (incl. Variants) 0 254 254 254

APC 430 140 321 321 M-113A2 200 60 230 230 M-577 0 40 40 40 TH 390 Fahd 100 (40) (40) (40) TPz -1 Fuchs 0 0 11 11 Saracen 130 0 0 0

Artillery 112 148 218 218

SP AU -F-1 0 (18) (18) (18) SP M -109A 3 0 23 23 23 SP Mk F3 20 18 18 18 SP PLZ45 0 0 54 54 SP M -109A2 36 0 0 0 MRL 300mm 9A52 Smerch 0 27 27 27 MOR 81mm ? 44 60 60 MOR 107mm M -30 0 6 6 6 MOR 120mm RT -F1 40 12 12 12 TOWED 105mm M101 16 0 0 0

Anti -Tank 208 118 318 318 TOW -2/TOW –MSl 0 44 44 44 TOW M -901 56 8 8 8 TOW HMMWV 0 66 66 66 RCL 84mm Carl Gustav ? 0 200 200 FROG -7 12 0 0 0 AT -4 Spigot 120 0 0 0 HOT 20 0 0 0 Source: IISS, Military Balance , various editions including 1989 -1990, 1999 -2000, 2004 -2005, 2005 -2006. Notes: * O f the 11,000 manpower, 3,700 are estimated as foreign. Numbers in parentheses indicate storage. All question marks refer to weapons that Kuwait is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in their possession are unknown. Reserve manpower includes t he terms of service obligation to age 40 (one month annually). The Kuwaiti Air Force The Kuwaiti air force has 2,500 personnel and is headquartered in Kuwait City, with bases at Ahmed al -Jaber, Ali al -Salem, and Kuwait International Airport. The operationa l doctrine of the air force is to provide air support to ground forces. Like Kuwait’s army, it is not designed to fight a major neighbor alone, but rather to provide a deterrent forward shield, buy time for reinforcement, and then fight as part of a coalit ion. Like the Army, it also faces the reality that it is allied with the U.S. in de facto terms, regardless of the fact that Kuwait is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The GCC has never developed a meaningful concept of integrated air operations, and even the upper Gulf part of the GCC – Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia – still effectively fight as independent forces. Figure 4 shows the recent trends in the force structure, manning, and equipment of the Kuwaiti Air Force. The main changes since the Gu lf War in 1990 -1991, are the addition of forty F -18 Hornets, sixteen Tucano T MK 52 combat -capable trainers, and sixteen AH -64D Apache helicopters, which have the capability to defeat the battlefield air defense systems employed by Iran and pre -2003 Iraq. 21 This is a major modernization effort, although manning problems,

dependence on contract support, and poor maintenance has led to the gradual inoperability of certain systems. The air force is believed to be organized into the following squadrons: 9 Squadr on (Ahmed al - Jaber base) with F -18C/D Hornet in AD/Attack role; 12 Squadron (Ali al -Salem) with Hawk Mk64 in Attack/Training role; 18 Squadron (Ali al -Salem) with Mirage F -1-CK2 in AD/Attack role (non -operational); 19 Squadron (Ali al -Salem) with Tucano T Mk 52 in Training role; 25 Squadron (Ahmed al -Jaber) with F -18C/D Hornet in AD/Attack role; 32 Squadron (Ali al - Salem) with SA 330F Puma in Transport role; 33 Squadron (Ali al -Salem) with SA 342L Gazelle in Attack / Scout role; 41 Squadron (Kuwait IAP) wit h L -100 -30 Hercules in Transport role; and 62 Squadron (Ali al -Salem) with AS 532SC Cougar in anti -ship Attack/SAR role. Combat Air Strength Figure 4 shows the trends in Kuwait’s force structure since the Gulf War. The figure shows the shift of Kuwait’s ai r force toward supporting ground troops. Since 1990, Kuwait added 39 fighter ground attacks aircrafts. Its fighter intercepts declined from a two squadron/18 aircraft capable force to a force that has all of its interceptors in storage, with no clear comma nd and structure. In 2006, the Kuwaiti air force had 31 -32 F/A -18C Hornets, and eight F/A -18D Hornet. In addition, the Kuwaiti air force has 14 -15 F -1CK2 Mirages in storage, which are flown by senior Kuwaiti air force officers. 22 In addition, Kuwait’s air f orce has one squadron/19 aircrafts combat capable trainers. This force includes 11 -12 Hawk MK64, and eight Tucano T -MK -52 Kuwait has “shown interest in purchasing an undisclosed number —a package of 20 has been mentioned —of Boeing F/A -18E/F Super Hornet mul tirole fighter aircraft to upgrade its fleet of 39 F/A -18C/Ds acquired from 1992 under a $1.8 billion contract.” 23 Reports speculate that the purchase of new aircraft “could involve a part -exchange deal with some of the current Hornets being returned to Boe ing for refurbishment and resale.” 24 At the same time, Kuwait has signaled its intent for a contract to provide logistics support, contractor maintenance, and technical services for the country’s F/A -18 aircraft up to 2011, a contract valued at about $295 m illion. 25 Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Its transport fleet includes three L -100 -30 Hercules and two DC -9, of which one is operational. Its helicopters include 16 AH -64D Apache, 24 SA -342 Gazelle with HOT, with 16 operational, six AS -332 Super Puma, wi th three to four operational, and 12 SA -330 Pumas, nine of which are in service. 26 Attack helicopters offer Kuwait a way of providing rapid forward defense as well as some capability to compensate for its lack of strategic depth. They also offer a way of de aling with infiltration across its borders. It is not clear, however, how well Kuwait has trained its forces or can sustain them, or whether it has effective plans for joint operations with the land forces and security forces. The level of IS&R support is also an issue. Overall Assessment Kuwait’s air force has a large array of equipment, and has done a better job of managing its arm purchases than the United Arab Emirates. However, it has serious manpower limitations, even though its professional training and readiness are steadily getting better. The Air Force also

would badly need U.S. support in terms of airborne air control and warning platforms, intelligence, targeting, and electronic warfare. The GCC and Kuwait’s neighbors have not organized to provi de such support with any real effectiveness, and Kuwait is too exposed for its air force to operate efficiently without it. The air force may be capable of meeting its broad operational objective, giving air support to ground forces until international ai d arrives, but has serious limitations that a small, exposed nation cannot overcome on its own.

Figure 4: Kuwaiti Air Force’s Force Structure, 1990 -2006

1990 2000 2005 2006 Manpower 2,200 2,500 2,500 2,500 Active 2,200 2,500 2,500 2,500

Fighter Inte rceptor 2/18 14 (14) (14) F-ICK Mirage 2/18 14 (14) (14)

Fighter Ground Attack 0 40 39 39 F/A -18C Hornet 0 32 31 31 F/A -18D Hornet 0 8 8 8

Combat Capable Trainer 1/12 1/28 1/19 1/19 Hawk MK64 1/12 1/12 1/11 1/11

Tucano T MK52 0 16 16 (8) 8

Transp ort Planes 8 4 4 4 L-100 -30 4 3 3 3 DHC -4 2 0 0 0 DC -9 2 1 1 1

Helicopters 33 28 29 45 Anti -Tank AH -64D Apache 0 0 0 16 Assault SA -342 Gazelle with HOT 17 16 16 16 Support AS -332 Super Puma 6 4 4 4 Support SA -330 Puma 10 8 9 9 Source: IISS, Milit ary Balance , various editions including 1989 -1990, 1999 -2000, 2004 -2005, 2005 -2006. Note: Numbers in parentheses imply inoperative/in storage. Reserve manpower includes the terms of service obligation to age 40.

The Kuwaiti Air Defense Kuwaiti land -base d air defense is under the operational control of the air force, although its forces appear both in the army and air force sections of force structure analyses. Figure 5 shows the recent trend it is force structure. It is important that there are no indepe ndent estimates of the Kuwaiti air defense manpower. Major Air Defense Missiles The force has a range of air defense surface -to -air missiles, including some very modern systems. The most advanced is the s a Patriot system, which includes five batteries and an inventory of 210 missiles, though some have been fired. These batteries and missiles have been integrated into the C 3I system that Hughes Aircraft developed for Kuwait, as have the HAWK batteries (4 batteries with six launchers). According to GlobalSec urity.org , Patriot has advanced phased array radar that electronically searches a new area every few microseconds, and which is very resistant to electronic countermeasures. The control station is highly automatic and the computer can assist in target iden tification and prioritization or carrying out fully automatic operations. The Launcher can be located up to 1 kilometer away from the command center to reduce vulnerability to air attack, and receive commands microwave data link. The missile reaches supers onic speed almost immediately after leaving the launcher and is then continuously updated by the computer in the command unit. It has a maximum range in excess of 100 kilometers. 27 The version of Patriot deployed in Kuwait is far superior to the system depl oyed during the Gulf War in 1990 -1991, and the system seems to have been further improved in terms of identification of friend or foe (IFF) and low altitude capabilities as a result of lessons learned during the Iraq War in 2003. It successfully engaged ni ne Iraqi tactical missiles during the fighting in 2003. 28 The Patriot has some ballistic missile defense capability against Scud -like and other systems, but would be largely a point defense system against incoming missiles with very high closing velocities. Other Air Defense Systems Kuwait air defense also seems to have had 48 Stardust launchers with 250 missiles in 2006. There are six Amoun batteries, and each includes one Skyguard radar, two Aspide launchers, and two twin Oerlikon 35mm AA guns. It is unce rtain how many Oerlikon AA guns Kuwait has. Overall Assessment Kuwait put heavy emphasis on its air defense capabilities following the 1991 Gulf War and its force posture has improved significantly, with the majority of weapons systems acquired after the war with Iraq. Its overall readiness and sustainability is unclear, but the Patriot units seem properly trained and to have acquired good capability by regional standards. They deployed to defensive positions around Kuwait City during the war with Iraq, an d at least one battery had seven out of eight launchers operational. 29

Figure 5: Kuwaiti Air Defense’s Force Structure, 1990 -2006

1990 2000 2005 2006 AD/SAM ? 96 84+ 84+ PAC -2 0 5/210 5/210 5/210 SA -7/ -14 ? 0 0 0 TOWED I -HAWK Phase III MIM -23B 0 24 24 24 STATIC Aspide 0 12 12 12 MANPAD Starburst 0 48 48 48 TOWED 35mm Oerlikon 0 12 ? ? Source: IISS, Military Balance , various editions including 1989 -1990, 1999 -2000, 2004 -2005, 2005 -2006. The Kuwaiti Navy The Kuwaiti Navy has about 2,000 men, includi ng 500 Coast Guards. Its naval forces are small and limited largely to coastal defense of Kuwait’s 499 -kilometer long coastline, and supporting customs and carrying out anti -infiltration missions. Kuwait maintains several naval bases. Its main base is at R as al -Qalaya, and it has facilities at Um Qasr Port on the Gulf (which was handed over to Kuwait by the United Nations Border Commission), as well as at Shuwaikh, Umnm al -Hainan, and al -Bida on its coastline. 30 The naval forces suffered greatly during the G ulf War, as is clear from the analysis of force trends shown in Figure 6 . Since 1990, however, Kuwait rebuilt and maintained relatively similar naval force structure, but the composition of the force, with only one major vessel being part of both the 1990 and 2000 force posture. Surface Combat Forces Kuwait’s navy includes eight French -made Ubn Almaradin -class fast attack craft -missile were delivered between mid -1999 and mid -2000. The vessels are 245 tons, armed with four Sea Skua missiles and a 40mm gun, a nd are fitted for launchers for 6 Sadaral air -to -surface missiles. The crews are French -trained and Kuwait has tried to develop ten crews to keep the ships at sea. The navy also has one Istiqlal class (Lurssen FPB -57) missile patrol boat, armed with two t win MM -40 Exocet launchers. The ship was extensively refitted in 1995. Kuwait also has one Al Sanbouk class (Lurssen TNC -45) missile patrol boat, armed with two twin MM -40 Exocet launchers. This boat escaped to Bahrain in 1990, during Iraq’s invasion of Ku wait. It has been laid up since 1997, awaiting a major refit or decommissioning. The Kuwaiti navy is trying to enhance its inshore interceptor capability with 12 Mk V class fast interceptor craft with a Rheinmetall Waffe Minition 27mm MLG 27 lightweight na val gun system. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified the U.S. Congress of a potential $175 million Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deal to supply such craft to Kuwait. At this point, the timetable for this sale is not clear. 31 The Kuwa itis have committed to significantly upgrading their communication and surveillance capabilities. Kuwait will spend $50 million to acquire the Advanced Tactical Communications

System VHF radio. 32 The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry has procured an aerostat, along with the necessary components, that will provide low -altitude airborne surveillance. 33 Amphibious and Support Boats Kuwait has two Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) boats, and four support craft. It is, however, uncertain whether these boats are operational. Coast Guard The coast guard belongs to the ministry of interior and has bases in Shuwaikh, Umm al -Hainan and Al -Bida. Its manpower is estimated at 500, as is shown in Figure 7 . Kuwait has four Inttisar 150 -ton gun patrol boats and one 104 -ton Al Shaheed cla ss gun patrol boats in its Coast Guard, with plans to buy nine more. It has 12 Manta class inshore patrol boats that are inoperable due to design defects, and 23 operational light inshore patrol craft, and plans to buy three more. It has three LCU 215 -ton. The coast guard has also ordered 16 P46s fast patrol boat from Dubai’s Victory Team under a contract signed in April 2004. The first of the boat was revealed in the February 2005 IDEX exhibition. 34 The coast guard force structure increased between 1990 and 2000 with the addition of 2 PCC al Shaheed patrol boats, four Inttisar patrol boats, and a number of small boats and craft. Kuwait also added amphibious craft in the decade after the Gulf War. Overall Assessment The Kuwaiti Navy has limited capability, bu t may be able to deal with low -level infiltration by forces like terrorists or Iran’s Naval Guards. It would need support from the U.S. Navy, or some other larger force, in any serious confrontation with Iran.

Figure 6: Kuwaiti Navy’s Force Structure, 199 0-2006

1990 2000 2005 2006 Manpower* 2,100 1,800 2,000 2,000 Active* 2,100 1,800 2,000 2,000

PFM 8 8 10 10 Al Sanbouk 0 1 1 1 Istiqal 2 1 1 1 Um Almaradim 0 6 8 8 Al Boom 6 0 0 0

Amphibious Craft 4 2 2 2 LCM 4 2 2 2

Logistics and Support 3 4 4 4 Support Craft 3 4 4 4 Source: IISS, Military Balance , various editions including 1989 -1990, 1999 -2000, 2004 -2005, 2005 -2006. Note: *Manpower Includes Coast Guard. Figure 7: Kuwaiti Coast Guard: Force Structure

1990 2000 2005 2006 Manpower 0 400 500 500 Active 0 400 500 500

Patrol and Coastal Combatants 15+ 36+ 35+ 35+ PCC Al Shaheed 0 2 1 1 Inttisar 0 4 4 4 Msic Boats and Craft 15+ 30+ 30+ 30+

Amphibious Craft 0 3 3 3 LCU 0 3 3 3

Source: IISS, Military Balance , various editions includin g 1989 -1990, 1999 -2000, 2004 -2005, 2005 -2006.

Paramilitary, Security, and Intelligence Forces As is the case with the other Gulf States, the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq disappeared, but has been replaced with the threat from terrorism, asymmetric w arfare, and the spillover threat of the Iraqi insurgency. The changing nature of threat has forced the Gulf States to start rethinking their internal security apparatus, and Kuwait is no exception. It is, however, equally important to note that Kuwait’s paramilitary and internal security apparatus largely has the same force structure that it had in 1990, as is shown in Figure 8 .

Kuwait’s paramilitary force manpower declined from a total of 7,000 in 19990 to 6,600 in 2006. This force is comprised of a nati onal police force (4,000 strong), a National Guard (6,000), and a Civil Defense force (2,000). Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Kuwait’s internal stability largely depends on the effectiveness of its police and internal intelligence apparatus. Its Nat ional Guard is largely organized to put down political uprising, but it is unclear whether its counterterrorism capabilities remain uncertain. The driving force in Kuwait’s internal security, however, remains the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Reports by the United States Department of State argue that the administration of civil and security law under the Ministry of Interior is divided, and can be inefficient as well as present human rights problems: 35 The constitution provides for some judicial independence; however, the emir appoints all judges, and the Ministry of Justice must approve the renewal of most judicial appointments. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were some instances in which element s of the security forces acted independently of government authority…. There was one reported arbitrary or unlawful killing. On February 8, Amer Khlaif al -Enezi, the 30 -year -old leader of the Peninsula Lions militant group responsible for January confronta tions with security forces, died in a military hospital. Although there were allegations of torture, the government denied detainee abuse, and the hospital attributed the death to heart failure. National Assembly members called for an investigation. At yea r's end an investigation was not conducted. The Ministry of Interior's (MOI) forensics office produced a medical report that, Amnesty International (AI) and other critics claimed, was not impartial. On January 31, one civilian was killed during security f orce battles with Islamic militants …. The law prohibits such practices; however, some police and members of the security forces reportedly abused detainees, and there were allegations of torture during interrogation. Police and security forces were more l ikely to inflict such abuse on noncitizens, particularly non -Gulf Arabs and Asians, than on citizens. The government stated that it investigated all allegations of abuse and punished at least some of the offenders; however, in most cases the government did not make either the findings of its investigations or punishments it imposed public. …. In February a citizen journalist claimed security officers beat him with sticks after he was arrested January 5 on charges of spreading news that harmed the national i nterest…. On May 24, six Islamic militants, whose leader died in custody … suspected of engaging in deadly gun battles with security forces in January alleged they had been tortured, including beatings to their backs and on their feet, while in police cust ody. On September 6, a court -appointed, independent medical commission confirmed that the suspects had scars from beatings; however, it did not indicate the presumed cause or estimated date of the injuries. There were reports of police raping detainees. I n August 2004 three policemen were arrested for allegedly raping a female domestic employee of Asian origin at a police station and at another location. Officials from the victim's embassy reported the incident to the police, who launched an investigation. There were no public developments at year's end. Defendants have the right to present evidence in court that they were mistreated during interrogation; however, the courts frequently dismissed abuse complaints because defendants were unable to provide ph ysical evidence of abuse. Members of the security forces routinely concealed their identities during interrogation, complicating confirmation of abuse. According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment , the Kuwaiti national police as “semi -military organisa tion, equipped with small arms, light weapons and all -terrain vehicles, and is capable of dealing with violent disorder as well as performing normal police duties.” 36

As for the role of the police in Kuwait’s internal security, the U.S. State Department de scribed their role as follows: 37 The police, responsible for law enforcement and nonnational security -related crimes, constitute a single national force. The Kuwait State Security oversees intelligence and national security -related matters. Both are under t he purview of civilian authorities of the MOI. The military is responsible for external security. During the year there were credible reports of police corruption and abuse of detainees during interrogation … In September the criminal court sentenced two prison guards for smuggling cell phones to prisoners in exchange for bribes. However, unlike in the past, no security officials were relieved of their duties as a result of credible allegations of abuse of detainees during interrogation. In cases of allege d police abuse, the district chief investigator examines abuse allegations and refers worthy cases to the courts for trial. There were no reported government efforts during the year to reform the police or security forces. ….According to the penal code, s uspected criminals may be held at a police station for up to four days without charge, during which time security officers may prevent lawyers and family members from visiting them. In such cases lawyers are permitted to attend legal proceedings but are no t allowed to have direct contact with their clients. If charges are filed, prosecutors may remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21 days. Prosecutors also may obtain court orders for further detention pending trial. There is a functioning bail sy stem for defendants awaiting trial. Detainees were allowed prompt access to a lawyer of their choice. There were no reports of political detainees. Of the approximately 3,500 persons serving sentences or detained pending trial, approximately 150 were held in the "state security ward" on security grounds, including some held for collaborating with Iraq during the 1990 -91 occupation. The government did not return deportees to their countries of origin forcibly, allowing those who objected to remain in deten tion. Arbitrarily lengthy detention before trial was a problem, and approximately 10 percent of the prison population consisted of pretrial detainees. The national police force is estimated to have a strength of around 4,000 that is based in all major urb an centers. Its chain of command goes through the Ministry of Interior directly to the Emir of Kuwait. In addition, it is estimated that 90 percent of the head of departments in the MoI are police officers. The national police responsibilities include crim inal investigation, logistics, traffic and rescue, immigration affairs, and airport security. 38 The National Guard is organized into three battalions, an armored vehicle unit, a Special Forces unit, and a military police battalion. As Figure 8 shows, here a re 20 VBL Recce vehicles and 70 Pandur 6x6 light APCs and 22 Shorthand S600 series APCs. The National Guard has several missions. These include protecting the Kuwaiti royal family. The specific mission is: “providing assistance to the military and security forces, in addition to the execution of any assignment entrusted to it by the Higher Defence Council, such as safeguarding establishments and utilities of a sensitive nature and importance.” 39 During the 1990s, the National Guard boosted its ability to wit hstand chemical attack and ordered, in 1998, 12,000 M - 95 gas masks and filters from Finland’s Kemira Safety. The Civil Defense Force was formed before the Gulf War to cope with the threat of Iranian bombing. Its role has been to deal with the effects of a n invasion, as well as to prepare to handle events such as national disasters. Before the 2003 invasion against Iraq, the Civil Defense force focused on conducting exercises on how to deal with the possibility that Iraq may attack Kuwait’s oil facilities w ith chemical or biological weapons. 40 Over time, the force has been relatively stable: in 1990, the total manpower was with the addition of 20 VBLs from 1990 to 2000. The APC fleet has also increased from 82 to 92, though the

composition of the forces chang ed: 70 Pandur 6x6 light APCs and 22 Shorthand S600 series APC instead of the V -150 and V -300 Commando APCs. Figure 8: Kuwaiti Paramilitary’s Force Structure, 1990 -2006

1990 2000 2005 2006 Manpower 7,000 5,000 6,600 6,600 Active 7,000 5,000 6,600 6,600

Combat Units ? 6 6 6 Armored Battalion ? 1 1 1 Special Forces Battalion ? 1 1 1 Paramilitary/National Guard Battalion ? 3 3 3 Military Police Battalion ? 1 1 1

Recce 0 20 20 20 VBL 0 20 20 20

Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) 82 70 92 92 V-150 20 0 0 0 V-300 Commando 62 0 0 0 Pandur 0 70 70 70 S600 0 0 22 22 Source: IISS, Military Balance , various editions including 1989 -1990, 1999 -2000, 2004 -2005, 2005 -2006. Kuwait’s Struggle Against Terrorism The insurgency in Iraq poses a growing security th reat to Kuwait. In the short -term, the infiltration of militants through Kuwait into Iraq risks destabilizing the Emirate, as militants who await deployment to Iraq can wreck havoc in Kuwait in the meantime. In the long -term, the return of Kuwaitis who fou ght in Iraq can have the same effect as the return of Afghan -war veterans had in Saudi Arabia: radicalized war veterans who return to a country and use their skills and energy to challenge internal stability. There are a number of reasons Kuwait might bec ome a terrorist target. There are about 22,000 Western expatriates. Kuwait’s oil industry is, of course, a major potential target, though the country’s plans to develop its non -oil sector also depend on a degree of confidence by foreign investors that can be shaken by a terrorist attack in the country. Kuwait is also the main logistics node supporting the United States presence in Iraq. At any given point, there are about 20,000 U.S. personnel in the country, along with a smaller number of non -US soldiers f rom coalition countries. 41 Kuwait also has elements that could provide a base for Islamist extremists. It is a society with a deeply conservative tribal and religious base making recruitment possible. There are about 120 Soviet -era Afghan -war veterans livin g in Kuwait, but they are under tight surveillance and there is no proof that they are actively involved in terrorist activities. By November 2005, there were 11 Kuwaitis held in Guantanamo Bay. 42

Kuwait has been spared the organizational emphasis that al -Qaeda has placed on countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The efforts to extend the organization’s reach to the Gulf “have been haphazard and have been seen of secondary importance compared to the struggle to organise and escalate operations in Saudi A rabia itself.” 43 As a result, the al -Qaeda presence in Kuwait, although hard to establish with precision, does not seem very large. Western security sources estimate that Osama bin Laden may have up to 20 operatives in Kuwait. 44 On January 17, 2005, an extr emist website featured a post celebrating the October 2002 attacks U.S. marines (see chronology of terrorist attacks below). It was signed by a group calling itself “Al -Qaeda.” Some of the attackers have been identified as Saudi or Kuwaiti fugitives who fo ught in Fallujah, Iraq. 45 Former Information and Oil Minister Sheikh Saud Nasser Al -Sabah has warned of sleeper cells in Kuwait’s security services. 46 Although these claims have not been verified, this is a serious warning given that military personnel in Ku wait’s armed services has been arrested and sentenced for plotting attacks against U.S. targets. There are two terrorist groups operating in Kuwait: the “Mujahideen of Kuwait” and the “Peninsula Lions.” According to Jane’s Intelligence Review , there seems to be a division of labor, with the “Kuwait Mujahideen ” being responsible to transfer terrorists to Iraq through Syria, and the “Peninsula Lions” having responsibility for attacks inside Kuwait. At the same time, the “Mujahideen of Kuwait ” claimed respons ibility for a January 2005 incident against a U.S. military base in Kuwait, implying that whatever division exists, it is not too rigid. 47 Members of the Peninsula Lions seem to have fought in Iraq. Their tactics involved roadside IEDs and ambushes to captu re and execute U.S. personnel. The plan included videotaping these activities to boost recruitment. The Peninsula Lions have been linked, according to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior, to the Saudi -based al -Haramain Brigade. The Kuwaiti Minister of Interio r, Sheikh Nawaf Al -Ahmad Al -Sabah, said that, “Initial investigations have proved that the financing of the terrorist elements came from outside the country, specifically from one of the brotherly neighbouring countries.” 48 The link to Saudi Arabia is exis tent but hard to probe completely since the linkages are mostly anecdotal. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review :49 The recovery of residual Al -Qaeda affiliate cells in Kuwait will likely centre on the relatively intact segments associated with suspected insurgent leader Khalid al -Dosari and Ahmad al -Mutairi. According to a Western journalist who met al -Dosari in September 2003, he is a former non -commissioned officer from the Kuwaiti Air Force whose journey from peaceful Salafist to militant jihadist may have began when he was allegedly detained and tortured by the Moroccan and Kuwaiti security establishments in 2002. Al - Mutairi is one of the three associates originally arrested by the Kuwaiti Security Services along with al - Fadhli in November 2002. Both t he al -Dosari and al -Fadhli tribes have wings in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and both clans have contributed numerous high -profile members to terrorist attacks in the Arabian Peninsula and a range of jihadist causes outside the region. As a result, the ties bet ween Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti terrorist cells are likely to continue, linking the fortunes of the security campaigns in the two countries. Indeed, the close interplay between the Kuwaiti Security Services and Saudi general security service is one of the r easons that Kuwait's terror cells fell in such quick succession in early 2005. Regardless of these ties, the overall internal threat to Kuwait’s internal security since the 911 attacks continues to be a concern to the Kuwaiti leadership. The following deta iled chronology of events shows the extent of the threat that Kuwait has faced: • October 11, 2001 : A Canadian contractor was shot dead during a drive -by shooting in Kuwait City. 50

• October 8, 2002 : Two Kuwaitis attacked U.S. Marines training in Faylakah Isla nd. One Marine was killed and another was wounded. U.S. forces killed the assailants. Seven Kuwaitis were put in prison in connection to the attacks. 51 • November 2002 : A Kuwaiti policeman shot and seriously wounded two U.S. soldiers on a highway south of Kuw ait City. He was later arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Three Kuwaiti Afghan -war veterans were arrested for channeling money to Yemen to finance attacks on Western targets, including the French oil tanker Limburg. 52 • January 21, 2003 : Civil serv ant arrested after a shooting incident near the U.S. military’s Camp Doha in which one U.S. military contractor was killed and another wounded. Kuwaiti officials arrested a Kuwaiti soldier suspected spying for Iraq and planning to attack U.S. targets in Ku wait and, even, to poison U.S. troops. 53 • March 2003 : Reports of shots fired at U.S. troops training in the Kuwaiti desert before the Iraq invasion. 54 • December 2003 : A number of letter bombs sent to Kuwaiti journalists from Lebanon. The ministry of communicat ions intercepted all of them. 55 • December 2003 : Four U.S. soldiers wounded in two separate attacks on military convoys. One person was arrested as a result. 56 • December 15, 2003 : Gunmen attacked a bus that they believed carried U.S. servicemen. Three Indian an d two Egyptian workers were wounded as a result. Four Kuwaitis were arrested and found to possess many weapons, including RPGs 57 No connection to other terrorist groups was established. 58 • April 2004 : Case dropped against Mohsen al -Fadhi and three associates who were arrested in connection to the October 2002 attack. Al -Fadhi had served both in Chechnya and Afghanistan and was believed to be a protégé of Kuwaiti Suleiman Abu Ghaith and Chechen insurgent leader Ami ibn al -Khattab. He was also suspected of main taining ties to clerics in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (In early 2005, al -Fadhi was added to the U.S. Treasury list of specially designated global terrorists. He was recaptured in January 8, 2005.) 59 • June 2004 : Four Kuwaitis were expatriated from Syria for tr ying to cross over to Iraq and fight with the insurgents. 60 • July 2004 : Fourteen people were arrested for connection to extremist groups. According to officials, maps and arms, found in their possession, indicated plans to attack U.S. forces in both Iraq and Kuwait. 61 • December 15, 2004 : The U.S. embassy in Kuwait warned that, according to credible sources, an attack was imminent in the country. 62 • January 3, 2005 : The Kuwaiti army arrested a number of soldiers planning attacks against friendly forces in the coun try. Fifteen men, four officers among them, were questioned, and four men were detained. The men would be court -martialed. 63 • January 8, 2005 : Mohsen al -Fadhi was recaptured. • January 10, 2005 : Kuwaiti security forces fatally wounded a wanted militant Fawaz Talaiq al -Qtabi in the Hawalli suburb of Kuwait City. Two policemen were killed during the raid. 64 • January 15, 2006 : The Kuwaiti Security Services raided a rural property at Umm al -Haiman (near the Saudi border) and killed one suspect and arrested 13 other s, including two clerics. Six suspects escaped. 65 • January 16, 2005 : One Saudi gunman was killed and two police officers were wounded in a gun battle in the town of Umm al -Haiman. A Kuwaiti militant was also arrested. 66 • January 17, 2005 : The Kuwaiti Securit y Services captured 350 mortars and explosives in the Al - Sabahiyya area close to Umm al -Haiman and the Abdullah Salem part of Kuwait City. 67

• January 19, 2005 : The Kuwaiti Security Services rumbled another cell in Abdullah al -Salem and they also found a bomb -making workshop in the Jaber al -Ali Jaber. Ten suspects were captured. Grenades and mortar shells (probably remnants of the 1991 Gulf War) were found. They had been converted into nine improvised explosive devices and packed into bags. 68 • January 30, 2005 : Kuwaiti forces engaged with suspected terrorists in a building in a residential part of the capital. Five people were killed, three militants, one security officer and a Bahraini student. Among those killed was Nasser Khlaif al -Enezi, the leader of Peninsu la Lions. 69 • January 31, 2005 : Security forces killed five more suspects and numerous others including the group’s spiritual leader, Amer Khlaif al -Enezi. 70 • February 5, 2005 : Three Saudi and two Jordanian suspected terrorists were arrested in Kuwait. Accordin g to officials, they were planning to kidnap and execute U.S. soldiers and other Westerners. 71 • February 8, 2005 : Amer Khlaif al -Enezi died in prison. The interior ministry announced it was due to heart attack. 72 • February 13, 2005 : Arab Times, a Kuwaiti newsp aper, reported that Abu Musab Al -Zarqawi instructed some terrorism cells to move operations and attack the U.S. supply line in Kuwait. 73 • March 2005 : The Kuwaiti minister of justice, Ahmad Baqer, announced that Kuwait had a total of 32 suspects connected to the January attacks. According to the ministry, 17 were Kuwaitis and 15 foreigners. Other sources, including Jane’s Intelligence Weekly , wrote that there were 37 captives, of which 32 were Kuwaiti. Two soldiers accused of plotting to overthrow the governme nt were released. 74 • May 12, 2005 : A criminal court in Kuwait sentenced 18 men, most of them Kuwaitis, to three yeas in prison. Five were accused of intending to go to Iraq to fight U.S. forces. The rest were charged with training other militants to use wea pons. 75 • May 13, 2005 : The public prosecutor announced he would seek the death penalty for 20 of those who were arrested in connection to the January 2005 attacks. 76 The counter -terrorism methods of the Kuwaiti Security Forces changed after January 2005. Prio r to the upsurge in attacks, “the Kuwaiti government’s first instinct was to adopt the Egyptian approach to counterterrorism, emphasizing hard security tools such as surveillance, direct action, key point security and censorship.” 77 Following the attacks in tensified, however, Kuwait changed course to deal with the root causes of terrorism. According to Michael Knights of Jane’s Intelligence Review :78 Since February, the government has announced a raft of measures to attack the ideological and logistical base of violent extremism. Stricter monitoring of preachers is the coercive end of the spectrum. In other fields, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour sent warning letters to a range of charity foundations, threatening fines if these organisations continue to skirt around government oversight on money -raising. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs has “convened a special commission to deal with the issues and questions considered important to Kuwaiti youth, bringing together sociologists, psychologists , clerics and educational experts to create initiatives to ‘combat extremism and terrorism that have reached a dangerous level.’” 79 The Kuwaiti government has also focused on gathering the surplus firearms and explosives that have been around the country s ince the end of the 1991 Gulf War. Following the January 2005 attacks, parliament reactivated a 1992 -1994 law allowing local prosecutors to authorize warranted searches to allow police to enter Kuwaiti homes to search for illegal arms. Intensifying the cra ckdown on drug smuggling is another part of Kuwait’s strategy, aimed both at reducing

the drug problem facing Kuwait but also draining the financial link between the drug trade and terrorism. 80 Kuwait’s Continuing Strategic Challenges In addition to the thr eat of terrorism, Kuwait’s internal stability is facing social, political, and demographic dynamics. The following list outlines key areas of uncertainty that Kuwait is facing presently and likely to face in the foreseeable future: • Political rivalry : Kuwai t’s ruling family has suffered from internal divisions for many years, but recent developments have brought these tensions front and center. The royal family, al -Sabah, has two branches — al -Jaber and the al -Salem —has traditionally alternated in ruling Kuwai t. This tradition, however, has changed following the death of Jaber al -Sabah, and internal political tensions remain a key area of uncertainty in Kuwait. • Divisions in the National Assembly: Kuwait’s national assembly is relatively free from the control of the central government. Divisions along ideological lines, however, have limited the parliament ability to influence key policies such as foreign investment, oil production capacity expansion plans, and defense planning. One key uncertainty that remains, however, is the balance between the national assembly and the central government on issues such as succession, the presence of foreign troops, and the real of foreign policy including Kuwait’s relations with its neighbors. • Sectarian tensions: The majority of Kuwait’s population is Sunni, but 30 percent of its population is estimated to be Shiites. Following the Iranian revolution and during the Iran -Iraq War, Sunni -Shiite tension was at its highest point. At times the tension turned into violent frictions b etween the two sects. After the Gulf War, however, it was thought that national sentiments united Kuwaitis and lowered the importance of their sectarian differences. But, the ongoing insurgency in Iraq and the struggle between Sunnis and Shiites in the reg ion have caused many to ask about internal stability in Kuwait. • The demographic problem: As is the case with other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Kuwait faces a “youth explosion.” It is estimated that 61 percent of its population are under the age of 30. This reflects the need to integrate many young and unemployed Kuwaitis into the economy, reform its outdated entitlement program, and deal with Kuwait’s reliance on foreign workers. • Brewing radicalism: Another difficulty that the demographic dynamics present is the potential of youth radicalization. In the case of Kuwait, there have been some elements of radicalization, as mentioned above, including sings of “sleeper cells,” and connections to transnational terrorist organizations such as al -Qaeda. The attacks by al -Qaeda against Kuwaiti targets have been largely limited in scope and impact. Kuwait’s internal security apparatus has not been challenged, and it remains a key area of uncertainty. In addition to Kuwait’s internal stability problem , Kuwait’s international challenge rests on the ability to maintain good relations with its three major neighbors: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Kuwait’s strong alliance with the United States and its gradual discussion about opening ties with Israel are ot her important aspects of foreign policy. The greatest uncertainty remains terrorism —indigenous, related to Kuwait’s radicalizing youth, and extraterritorial, linked to the explosive developments in neighboring Iraq. The following sections will explore the se uncertainties in detail. Political Challenges Kuwait faced a succession crisis following the death of Sheikh Jaber al -Sabah in January 2006. The crisis revolved around whether Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah al -Ahmad al -Sabah or Crown Prince Sheikh Saad al -Abdullah would become Emir. The latter was nominally next in line but was sick and unable to even take the oath of office in parliament; at the same time, naming

Sheikh Sabah of the al -Jaber branch of the family as Emir would violate the traditional alter ation in power between the two branches of the al -Sabah family. The intervention by parliament complicated this conundrum. On January 24, the parliament voted to oust Sheikh Saad, exercising an unprecedented level of influence into the issue of succession . Although parliament is supposed to endorse a new emir, this power is nominal. It was on January 24 that, for the first time in the country’s history, it became real. The hold to power of the al -Jaber branch was consolidated further by the appointment of Sheikh Sabah’s brother, Sheikh Nawaf al -Ahmed al -Sabah, as Crown prince and of his nephew, Sheikh Nasser Muhammad al -Ahmed al -Sabah, as prime minister. In January 2006, the sixteen -member cabinet included one al -Salem and six al -Jabers, underlying the dis parity in power between the two families. 81 It is too soon to fully know the impact this crisis, but two issues stand out: the first is the relative balance of power between the two branches of the al -Sabah family, and the extent to which the al -Salem bran ch will acquiesce to the power -drive engineered by Sheikh Sabah. The second is the relative power between parliament and the ruling family; having succeeded in intervening into what was hitherto a family business, parliamentarians may turn more ambitious. How these two power struggles develop remains a big unknown in the Kuwait’s political future. Putting aside the issue of succession, there are other political difficulties that Kuwait is facing, revolving primarily around the composition and relative infl uence of various elements in the National Assembly. The “elected members broadly form five blocs: conservative tribal leaders, young technocrats, radical Arab nationalists, Sunni Islamic fundamentalists, and representatives of Kuwait’s Shiite Muslim minori ty.” 82 Kuwait’s National Assembly is rather conservative and has often blocked reforms brought by the ruling family. There are no political parties in Kuwait, though they are neither allowed nor permitted by law to exist. Efforts to organize politically, h owever, have been stymied. According to the U.S. State Department: 83 On January 29, Salafi Islamist leaders, an opposition faction, held a press conference announcing the establishment of a political party, Hizb Al -Ummah (Nation's Party), to confirm the rig ht of political pluralism, transfer power through peaceful means, adopt Shari'a, and reject all forms of foreign occupation. On February 1, in response to the group's pronouncement, the public prosecutor charged nine of the Salafi leaders with plotting to overthrow the government and violating association and press laws, crimes carrying a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison. They were released on $1,026 (300 dinars) bail after a 10 -hour interrogation. The case never came to trial. The power of Islamist p arties, however, remains strong: 84 Of the 50 seats contested [in the June 2003 elections], only about 10 of the elected members of parliament could be described as secular, liberal or progressive. Between 17 and 21 of the successful candidates came from par ties that describe themselves as Islamists, including nine seats held by representatives associated with political groupings such as the Salafi Movement, the Scientific Salafi Group or the ICM (the renamed Muslim Brotherhood). The balance of members of par liament are now independent tribal leaders, most of whom have strong traditional and Islamist tendencies. On May 16 2005, Kuwait granted women the right to vote, driven by a softened conservative vote and by a rapidity that prevented the emergence of stron g opposition by the Islamic parties. The amendment passed by 35 to 23 and was initiated by then prime minister and current Emir Sheikh Sabah.

The efforts to elevate the political status of women and to integrate them better into society were furthered on June 5, 2005, when two Kuwaiti women were appointed to the municipal council. Women have traditionally done better at school and are better educated than men. The cause of women’s rights was also buttressed by the valor that Kuwaiti women showed during th e Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 85 Women are scheduled to vote in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Under the new law, about 200,000 women are eligible to vote, compared to approximately 140,000 registered male voters. 86 Given this electoral arithmetic, the im pact of women onto the political system can be substantial. At the same time, the potential backlash against that role should not be under - estimated. The period to and following the 2007 parliamentary elections will be crucial and one that could alter the political landscape in the country, for better or worse. Another high -profile debate in Kuwaiti politics is that of education reform. Altering the school curriculum is one of the government’s main tools in combating extremism. The perception is that the cu rrent school curriculum incites extremism having undue focus on the “jihad and war verses” of the Koran; it also brings an overtly religious message even in classes where it is hardly needed (for example, Arabic grammar classes). The Ministry of Education is full of Islamist ideologues who came to Kuwait from Egypt to take advantage of the favorable climate following the disbandment of the Kuwaiti parliament in 1976. At the same time, these efforts are controversial; senior education officials doubt whethe r a topic that is as central to Islam as jihad ought to be removed from school texts. 87 Socioeconomic Challenges As noted earlier, demography is another challenge facing Kuwait, whose population went from 0.74 million in 1970 to 2.7 million in 2005 and i s projected to increase to 4.3 million by 2030 and 5.28 by 2050. 88 The age structure, according to the IISS, shown in Figure 9 , is 35% under 20, and only 3% over 65 years old. Kuwait has an unbalanced sex ratio: 1.52 males/females (total), with 1.04 males/f emales at birth and 1.77 males/females for the 15 -64 age group. The IISS estimates Kuwait’s population to be 2.3 million, with 35% nationals, 35% other Arabs, 9% South Asian, 4% Iranian, and 17% other. The CIA World Fact Book 2006 offers a different estim ate, putting the native Kuwaiti population at 45% and the “other” category at 7% (all other percentages remain the same). 89 Kuwait’s foreign population remains large but has decreased as a percentage of total population: 66% in 1975, 72% in 1985, 59% in 199 5, and 49% in 2003. 90 Andrzej Kapiszweski estimates the foreign population by origin as follows: Indians 295,000, Pakistanis 100,000, Egyptians 275,000, Bangladeshis 160,000, Sri Lankans 160,000, Filipinos 60,000, Jordanians/Palestinians 50,000, Syrians 95, 000, and Iranians 80,000. 91 The legal status of the bidoon, estimated in 2004 at 107,000, also remains unresolved. The bidoon “are Arabs who have residency ties to the country, some persisting for generations and other for briefer periods, but who either la ck or conceal documentation of their true nationality.” 92 The resolution of their legal status is complicated: “the political, economic, and long -term budgetary implications associated with extending citizenship, and the general welfare benefits that come w ith it, to the equivalent of roughly 5 percent of the population have rendered the issue highly divisive.” 93

Figure 9: Kuwait’s Demographic Distribution, 2006

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

0% 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65+ Female 13% 4% 5% 5% 11% 1% Male 14% 4% 7% 9% 25% 2% Total 27% 8% 12% 14% 36% 3% Source: IISS, Military Balance 2005 -2006. The Sunni - Shiite split is among the country’s more serious fault lines. In 1985, a Shiite Muslim extremist tried to assassinate Sheikh Jaber al -Sabah, underlying the energizing effect that regional politics, in that case Iran’s revolution, could have on sectarian violence in Kuw ait. The Sunni - Shiite split is 70/30, with Muslims comprising 85% of the total population. According to the United States Department of State, the Shiite population consists of 287,000 citizens and 100,000 non -citizens. 94 Shiites, however, are underrepres ented: there are 36 Shiite mosques compared to 1,070 Sunni mosques in the country, and there are no facilities to train Shiites imams. High school textbooks refer to Shiites as non -believers, references that Shiite leaders have called on the ministry of ed ucation to eliminate. 95 The Shiite representation in government is also limited. In the June 2003 elections, five Shiites were elected in the 50 -member National Assembly, down from six in the previous one. The 2003 cabinet included one Shiite, as minister o f information, but he resigned on January 2, 2005, pending a parliamentary questioning by Salafist elements in the assembly, who “were outraged by what they termed his ‘failure to keep Western ways out of Kuwait’ by his issuing licenses to hold musical eve nings or permitting singers to hold entertainment soirées on the occasion of Id al -Fitr. 96 In the June 2005 elections, no Shiite was either elected or appointed by the government. This disenfranchisement produced a reaction by Mohammad Baqer Al -Mutri, the head of the Shiite Clerics Congregation in Kuwait, who said that this under -representation was threatening the country’s national unity and risked fragmenting the country. As a result, the government appointed Massouma al -Mubarak, on June 15, 2005, as mini ster for planning and minister of state for administrative development affairs. 97 On October 7, 2005, a mob of 50 youths set fire to a vehicle and threw stones to Shia worshipers and a mosque in Jahra, a town 40km west of Kuwait City. This came a week after prosecutors asked for the highest penalty for members of Peninsula Lion suspected of attacking security forces in Maidan Hawalli, Umm Al -Haiman, Salmiya and Mubarak Al Kabir in January 2005.

This event underscored the linkage between Sunni militarism in g eneral and the Sunni -Shiite split in particular. 98 The economic challenges facing Kuwait are also substantial —particularly in its labor market. It is estimated that 15,000 Kuwaitis enter the job market annually; official unemployment numbers are 8% (CIA Wor ld Fact Book estimated this number to be as low as 2.2%), though only 16,000 of a total Kuwaiti labor force of 297,000 work in the private sector, burdening the Kuwaiti budget with having to sustain so many people. In 2004, “a parliamentary report [which] indicated that 75 per cent of all Kuwaiti job seekers are unqualified led the head of the Employment and Jon Opportunities Affairs Committee to state that there exists a ‘serious imbalance between actual unemployment and availability of job’.” 99 The oil win dfall has also generated large increases in the Kuwait stock market. From June 2001 to October 2005, the Kuwait stock exchange rose by roughly 560%. 100 The political implications of a reversal are acute, however: in March 2006, investors staged a protest out side Kuwait’s parliament, following the largest single -day loss and after the stock exchanged reached a six - month low. At the same time, it was only 16.6% down from its all -time high, signifying both the potential for further losses as well as for angrier and more substantial protests. 101 Relations with Neighboring States Kuwait’s relations with Saudi Arabia are probably the most cordial among Kuwait’s neighbors, though the unresolved border issues between the two countries in the offshore Dorra gas field cou ld prove problematic, especially since Iran too is laying claim to the reservoir. Saudi Arabia’s hostility towards Qatar is also problematic as it is hindering closer ties between Qatar and Kuwait. This is particularly manifest in the Saudi opposition to a $2 billion 600 -kilometer natural gas pipeline running from Qatar’s North Field to Mina Al Ahmadi in Kuwait. 102 Kuwait’s relations with Iran are improving: in March 2006, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding for enhanced security cooperati on and communication. At the same time, Kuwait remains particularly concerned about Iran’s nuclear programs and regional ambitions, both of which have the prospect of threatening Kuwait. 103 Kuwait’s relations with Iraq are obviously better since Saddam Husse in’s regime was topped, but there remain underlying issues that may flare up in the future. Iraq’s territorial grudge towards Kuwait is part historical, part territorial. Kuwait was part of the Ottoman province of Basra, and hence considered by many Iraqi politicians (including Saddam Hussein) as a natural part of Kuwait. Ever since independence in 1961, Kuwait has relied on a foreign protector to guarantee its security, first the United Kingdom, then the United States. The territorial side of Iraqi -Kuwait i tensions emerges from Iraq’s narrow access to the open seas. Iraq’s only port is Umm Qasr on the southeast of the country and the northwest of the Persian Gulf. Access to that port passes through Kuwaiti territorial waters, potentially compromising both Iraq’s commerce and security. This reality creates a great sense of strategic vulnerability for Iraq and lies at the root of many problems between the two states. The shared oil field of Ratqa/Rumaila is another territorial issue that may create tension. S addam Hussein accused Kuwait of drilling horizontally into Iraqi reservoirs as part of his justification to invade Kuwait in August 1990. The settlement of a similarly -stranded oil field with Saudi Arabia

(in the Neutral Zone) offers comfort that a shared field need not lead to conflict; but this remains an issue that could flare up, particularly if relations between the two countries are poor. Terrorism remains the thorniest issue between the two countries (more on this in the next section), as many extre mists who fight in Iraq go through Kuwait first. The attempt to improve cross -border security has been impeded by the fact that there exist no clear and agreed -upon borders between the two countries. The result has been occasional clashes between Iraqi and Kuwaiti security forces. Kuwait’s relations with Israel are also undergoing reevaluation, albeit at non -official levels (primarily in the media). Kuwait is negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with America, and one of America’s conditions for agreeing to the FTA is for Kuwait to dismantle the economic boycott against Israel and permit trading with Israeli companies (currently banned); Bahrain, for example, accepted this provision when it signed its FTA with America, and it is possible that Kuwait would have to do the same. 104

1 CIA, “Kuwait,” World Factbook , 2006 , available at http ://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ku.html 2 Britain took de facto control of Kuwait from 1899 until independence in 1961, although t he al -Sabah family continued civil rule. 3 EIA, “Kuwait,” Country Analysis Brief , available at http://www.eia. doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kuwait.html 4 EIA, “Kuwait,” Country Analysis Brief , available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kuwait.html ; and CIA, “Kuwait,” World Factbook , 2006, available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ku.html 5 Joseph Rohe “US grants Kuwait ‘major non -NATO ally’ Status,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , April, 02, 2004. 6 EIA, “Kuwait,” Country Analysis Brief , available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kuwait.html 7 EIA, “Kuwait,” Country Analysis Brief , available at http://www.ei a.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kuwait.html 8 EIA, “Kuwait,” Country Analysis Brief , available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kuwait.html 9 EIA, “OPEC Revenues: Country Details,” June 2005, available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/orevcoun.html 10 Riad Kahwaji, “ Parliament -MoD Row Delays C4I Deal in Kuwait,” Defense News , December 1, 2003, p. 34. 11 CIA, “Kuwait,” World Factbook , 2006, available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ku.html 12 “Army, Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Th e Gulf States , October 24, 2005. 13 According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , Kuwait has 1,600 foreign personnel in its army, where the IISS, Military Balance estimated the number is closer to 3,700. 14 “Army: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , October 24, 2005 15 IISS, Military Balance 2000 -2001 . 16 Christopher Foss, “Kuwait Receives Latest Condor 2,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , November 25, 2004. 17 Christopher Foss, “Decision time looms for Kuwaiti APC selection,” Jan e’s Defence Weekly , January 25, 2006 18 Jiri Kominek, “Two Gulf States Weigh Up Heavy Transporter Bids,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , July 2, 2003, p. 18. 19 “Kuwait - TOW -2A/B Anti -armor Guided Missiles ,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency News Release, August 4 , 2005, available at: http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36 -b/2005/kuwait_05 -38.pdf 20 Smerch 9K58 multiple rocket system available at http://www.army -technology.com/projects/smerch/ 21 “Air fo rce: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , October 24, 2005

22 The lower estimates are from the IISS, Military Balance 2005 -2006, and the higher are from Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment -The Gulf States , December 19, 2005. 23 Ed Bla nche, “Regional Briefing - Gulf States: Winds of Change,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , February 9, 2005 24 Katy Glassborow, “General Electric lands Hornet engine contract,” Jane’s Navy International , March 1, 2006 25 James Murphy, “US Congress notified of possible F/A -18 support sale to Kuwait,” Jane’s Defence Industry , October 1, 2005 26 Jane’s and IISS , Military Balance mostly agree on the number of operational helicopters: the total number including non -operational comes from Jane’s. For the AS -332 Super Puma, th e lower estimate is from Jane’s and the higher is from the IISS ’ Military Balance . 27 http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/patriot.htm . 28 The U .S. Army claimed in a press rele ase on December 10, 2004 that. “Patriot missile operations were conducted on an extremely dense and complex battlefield where more than 41,000 sorties were flown by coalition air forces. Forty -one active duty Army and 13 coalition Patriot batteries were de ployed to OIF, serving in 8 countries.

Two unfortunate incidents of fratricide or “friendly fire,” involving U.S. Navy F/A -18 and British Royal Air Force Tornado aircraft resulted in three fatalities. The U.S. Army regrets the loss of life and expresses co ndolences to the

family members.

In a third incident a U.S. Air Force F -16 fired on a Patriot battery but there were no deaths or injuries. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) concluded their investigations into these incidents and results are poste d on the

CENTCOM web site at www.centcom.mil. Application of lessons learned in OIF has already improved upon Patriot’s performance and the system will be continuously refined. Improvements include combinations of hardware

modifications, software changes a nd updates to tactics, techniques and procedures.

Some changes include the integration of satellite radio technology at the Battalion Information Coordination Central which provides improved situational awareness through voice and data connectivity with h igher headquarters

Identification and Engagement Authority as well as enhanced command and control; and software improvements that enable better identification, classification and correlation of airborne objects. In addition the Army continues to explore a nd evaluate new opportunities to improve performance and reduce the risk of fratricide.”

29 Voice of America, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/1998/980222b_voa.htm 30 “Kuwait, Navy,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment -The Gul f States , October 25, 2005. 31 Richard Scott and Robin Hughes, “Kuwait seeks FMS deal for fast interceptor boats,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , December 14, 2005 32 “Kuwait Selects SINCGARS,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , November 13, 2002. 33 “Kuwait Buys Aerostat,” Jane ’s Defence Weekly , December 10, 2003. 34 “News in brief: Patrol boats for Kuwait,” Jane’s Navy International , March 1, 2005 35 US State Department, Kuwait: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005, Washington, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and L abor, March 8, 2006 , available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61692.htm 36 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , June 13, 2005 37 US State Department, Kuwait: Country Reports on Human Rights P ractices - 2005, Washington, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006 , available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61692.htm 38 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , June 13, 2005 39 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , June 13, 2005 40 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , June 13, 2005 41 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulne rable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 42 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005

43 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnera ble to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 44 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , June 13, 2005 45 Stephen Ulph, “Gulf – Islamic militancy kicks off in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , February 1, 2005 46 Stephen Ulph, “Gulf – Islamic militancy kicks off in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , February 1, 2005 47 Stephen Ulph, “Gulf – Islamic militancy kicks off in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , February 1, 2005 48 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 49 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Revie w, October 1, 2005 50 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 51 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 and “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 52 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 and “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 53 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 and “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 54 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 55 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 56 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 57 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 58 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 59 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , Octobe r 1, 2005 60 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 61 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 62 “Security and Foreign Forces : Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 63 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 64 Stephen Ulph, “Gulf – Islamic militancy kicks off in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , February 1, 2005 and “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 65 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 66 Stephen Ulph, “Gulf – Islamic militancy kicks off in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , February 1, 2005 and “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 67 Stephen Ulph, “Gulf – Islamic militancy kicks off in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , February 1, 2005

68 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 69 “Security and Foreign F orces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 70 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 71 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 72 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 73 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 20 06 74 “Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 75 “Kuwait – Kuwaiti court sentenced 18 men to three years’ imprisonment,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor , May 18, 2005 76 “Security and Forei gn Forces: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 77 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 78 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerab le to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 79 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 80 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 81 “Sheikh -up,” The Economist , January 21, 2006 82 Simon Henderson, “Kuwait’s Parliament Decides Who Rules,” PolicyWatch #1073, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy , January 27, 2006 83 “ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait ,” US Department of State , March 8, 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61692.htm 84 Michael Knights, “Northern Gulf vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups ,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 2005 85 “Seismic shock in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , July 1, 2005 86 According to Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , there are just under 140,000 male votes in Kuwait. “Seismic shock in Kuwait,” Jane’s Isl amic Affairs Analyst , July 1, 2005. According to the US Department of State, there are 143,000 male votes. “ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait ,” US Department of State , March 8, 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61 692.htm 87 “Seismic shock in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , July 1, 2005 88 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. 89 CIA, World Fact Bo ok 2006 , available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ku.html 90 UN, World Population Policies 2003 91 Andrzej Kapiszweski, “Arab Labor Migration to the GCC States,” IOM, September 2003, p. 14 92 “ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: K uwait ,” US Department of State , March 8, 2006, available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61692.htm 93 “ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait ,” US Department of State , March 8, 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt /2005/61692.htm

94 US State Department, Kuwait: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005, Washington, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006 , available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61692.htm 95 US State Department , Kuwait: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005, Washington, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006 , available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61692.htm 96 Stephen Ulph, “Gulf – Islamic militancy kicks off in Kuw ait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , February 1, 2005 97 “Security: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 98 “Kuwait’s internal divisions exposed,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , October 28, 2005 99 “Security: Kuwait,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Gulf States , January 4, 2006 100 Khalid Al -Rodhan, “The Saudi and Gulf Stock Markets,” CSIS Report, October 25, 2005, available at: http://www.csis.org/ 101 “Arab stock markets hit by loses,” Al -Jazeera.Net, March 14, 2006 , available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/140F02FE -0CEE -4785 -B7A4 -4DD1976B94D2.htm 102 “Saudi blocks Qatar pipeline,” Jane’s Foreign Report, November 3, 2005 103 “In Brief: Iran, Kuwait sign security MoU,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , March 29, 2006 104 “ Kuwait’s internal divisions exposed,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst , October 28, 2005