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Pro-U.S. Fatwas KURZMAN: PRO-U.S. FATWAS PRO-U.S. FATWAS Charles Kurzman Dr. Kurzman teaches sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is editor of the anthologies Liberal Islam and Modernist Islam, 1840-1940 (Oxford University Press, 1998 and 2002) and author of The “Unthinkable” Revolution in Iran, 1977-1979 (Harvard University Press, forthcoming in 2004). n testimony before the Senate Armed have been issued during each of Services Committee on April 10, Wolfowitz’s two stints in the Department 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense of Defense, one by senior Saudi Arabian IPaul Wolfowitz hailed a recent religious scholars allowing U.S. troops to proclamation by Ayatollah Ali Sistani of be stationed in Saudi Arabia, and one by a Najaf, Iraq, as “history’s first pro-U.S. variety of Middle Eastern religious scholars fatwa.”1 This claim was apparently drawn allowing Muslims in the U.S. armed forces from an op-ed by Amir Taheri that ap- to pursue the war on terrorism “against peared three days earlier in The Wall whoever their country decides has perpe- Street Journal, calling Sistani’s proclama- trated terrorism against them.” These tion “the first pro-U.S. fatwa in modern instances represent two sorts of pro-U.S. political Islam.”2 fatwas: those which support the United If true, this development would support States for strategic reasons, and those the position of American foreign-policy which do so out of sympathy for U.S. hawks, who argue that the active projection victims of terror. A third, partially overlap- of U.S. power around the world, and ping category involves Islamic statements especially in the Middle East, will help to that are pro-U.S. in a deeper sense, that of bring political order to the world. Sistani’s promoting values that most in the United fatwa, issued during the U.S.-led invasion of States hold dear, such as democracy. In the Iraq, suggests that “political Islam” will aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, Ayatollah prudently retreat in the face of U.S. deter- Sistani issued just such a fatwa, urging the mination. The fatwa appears to confirm the popular election of the body that is sched- old cliché that “they,” be they Muslims or uled to draw up Iraq’s new constitution. other groups, only understand force. Wolfowitz’s blanket statement discounts But Wolfowitz’s claim is not true. this longstanding liberal tradition within Sistani’s statement is not history’s first pro- Islam, at precisely the time when the “war U.S. fatwa. In fact, important fatwas on terrorism” makes such ideological explicitly supportive of the U.S. military partners indispensable. 155 kurzman.p65 155 7/31/2003, 11:51 AM MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. X, NO. 3, FALL 2003 STRATEGIC ALLIANCES Foundation in London announced that it Ironically, Sistani’s famous fatwa may had received unconfirmed information that not have existed. Sistani was in seclusion at Sistani “asks the Iraqi people to keep silent the time, most probably hiding from the and not resist the forces. Some sources dangerous combination of Baathist forces, say the forces he meant are the coalition U.S. troops and Shii gangs loyal to Muqtada forces. If the coalition forces are in Al- al-Sadr, son of the late Ayatollah Najaf, the ayatollah does not want blood to Muhammad al-Sadr. The elder Sadr was a be shed, and Al-Najaf inhabitants should long-time competitor of Sistani’s mentor and remain in their houses until things are predecessor as the chief religious scholar of clarified.”7 The same day, the U.S. Army Najaf, Ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoi; announced the news at a briefing at Muhammad al-Sadr, killed by the Baathist Central Command headquarters at Camp regime in 1999, favored Islamic revolution, Al-Sayliyah near Doha, Qatar: while al-Khoi shied away from political involvement.3 As Saddam Hussein’s regime In the wake of yesterday’s operations fell, Muqtada Sadr’s followers used strong- near Najaf and [inaudible] operations arm tactics to threaten rivals, going so far as to date, a prominent cleric, Grand to stab al-Khoi’s son Abdul-Majid at the Ayatollah Sistani, who had been Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, drag him to placed under house arrest by the regime for a considerable period of Muqtada Sadr’s home for a verdict, then time, issued a fatwa. And it was done 4 shoot him dead. this morning, instructing the popula- Sistani, like Khoi, is not politically tion to remain calm and to not interfere outspoken. Indeed, it was strange for with coalition actions. We believe this Taheri to associate him with “modern is a very significant turning point, and political Islam” given his political disengage- yet another indicator that the Iraqi ment. But Saddam Hussein’s end game regime is approaching its end.8 allowed for no disengaged bystanders. On March 13, 2003, Sistani and other leading Taheri claimed to have gotten confir- Shii religious scholars issued fatwas that mation of the fatwa from Sistani himself were publicized by the Iraqi state. “It is the via satellite telephone.9 Yet no text of the duty of Muslims at these critical conditions fatwa has been published, and Sistani to unify their word and do everything in apparently signed a statement denying that their power to defend dear Iraq and protect he issued such a fatwa.10 A pop-up it against the schemes of the covetous window on his official website rejected enemies,” Sistani’s fatwa began. “The “anything said by the Western press Iraqis, people and leadership, will certainly agencies” about the supposed fatwa,11 and stand united, supporting one another, against his son, Sayyid Muhammad Rida, denied its any aggression. They will resist this aggres- existence.12 sion using all their power, and they will Interestingly, Muhammad Bakr al- frustrate the hopes of the aggressors with Hakim, leader of the Iran-based Supreme the help of God Almighty.”5 Council of the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) On April 3, 2003, Sistani allegedly in Iraq, did indeed make a statement to the reversed this position.6 The al-Khoi same effect, with little publicity: “Now 156 kurzman.p65 156 7/31/2003, 11:51 AM KURZMAN: PRO-U.S. FATWAS Iraqis are caught between Saddam duty is dictated by necessity in the Hussein’s forces and the occupation current circumstances, and made forces. This is why I urge all Iraqis not to inevitable by the painful reality, and its get involved in the fighting. They should not legal basis and evidence dictates that side either with Saddam’s forces or with the man in charge of the affairs of Muslims should seek the assistance of the U.S.-led forces.”13 This message was one who has the ability to attain the not relayed at a CENTCOM press briefing, intended aim. The Quran and the perhaps because al-Hakim’s next sentence Prophet’s Sunna (activities and was a threat to “resist [American] hege- statements) have indicated the need to mony by all means possible,” should U.S. be ready and take precautions before forces stay in Iraq. But even clearer pro- it is too late.16 U.S. fatwas can be found in recent history. One need only look back to the previous The Saudis also solicited support from Gulf War. the Muslim World League, which gathered When Iraqi troops overran Kuwait on 350 Islamic scholars in Jeddah in early August 2, 1990, Saudi Arabia may have September 1990. After bus tours of Mecca been the next target. Regardless of and Medina showing visitors that non- Saddam Hussein’s actual intentions, the Muslim troops were not stationed in these Saudi monarchy felt threatened enough to hallowed sites, the League issued a state- invite U.S. forces to serve as a deter- ment that backed the Saudi decision as a rent.14 At the same time, the Saudi monar- temporary, emergency measure.17 chy appears to have worried that the When Operation Desert Shield was presence of non-Muslim soldiers could, in transformed into Operation Desert Storm, unsympathetic eyes, be viewed as incom- switching from defense of Saudi Arabia to patible with the regime’s self-proclaimed the reinstatement of the al-Sabah monarchy responsibility to protect the two holy in Kuwait, Bin Baz again issued a supportive mosques, the foundational sites of Islam in fatwa: “The jihad that is taking place today Mecca and Medina. King Fahd and other against the enemy of God, Saddam, the ruler Saudi leaders convinced Shaykh Abd al- of Iraq, is a legitimate jihad on the part of Aziz Bin Baz, chairman of the Supreme Muslims and those assisting them,” Bin Baz Council of Ulama (religious scholars), to stated. “For he has wrongly transgressed and issue a fatwa in support of the regime’s committed aggression against and invaded a decision.15 peaceful country. Therefore it is obligatory to Bin Baz and his colleagues did so. wage jihad against him to expel him uncondi- Given the need to defend the nation tionally from Kuwait, to assist the oppressed, to restore justice and to deter the oppres- by all possible means . the Supreme sor.”18 Bin Baz was later promoted to chief Council of Ulama supports what was mufti (religious official) of the monarchy, no undertaken by the ruler, may God doubt in part for his supporting the grant him success: the bringing of monarchy’s alliance with the United States.19 forces equipped with instruments Bin Baz’s support for alliance with capable of frightening and terrorizing non-Muslims was a departure from his the one who wanted to commit an usual position that Muslims should avoid aggression against this country.
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