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Berne, August 2001 F • A • S • T Kazakhstan Country Update 3 / 2001 May – July 2001 Matthias Müller Dr. Heinz Krummenacher © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs Berne, August 2001 F • A • S • T Table of Content 1 Risk Assessment Kazakhstan ...................................................... 1 2 Chronology Kazakhstan................................................................ 4 3 Tension Barometers Kazakhstan.................................................. 7 4 Analytical Raster Kazakhstan ...................................................... 8 Note by the authors: For more general information on Kazakhstan (e.g. socio-demographic figures) see: FAST Report on Central Asia, 2 / 2000, p.16ff. © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs F • A • S • T 1 Risk Assessment Kazakhstan1 There is no likelihood of major domestic or international armed conflict involving Kazakhstan within the next three to six months. Although we do not expect conflict escalation on the domestic level in the short term, we do see the ongoing enrichment of the country’s small elite along with the economic and political marginalisation of a considerable part of the Kazakh population as fertile grounds for Islamic extremist ideology. If opposition forces outside the government’s sphere of influence – for example, Islamic extremists – can orchestrate existing frustrations, destabilisation and armed conflict could occur in the mid- or long term. Factors increasing the likelihood of armed conflict There have been no events during the period under consideration having the potential to spur armed conflict over the next three to six months. Nevertheless, several developments and events could aggravate the situation within the Kazakh society and bear the potential for armed conflict in the mid or long term: First, the growing disparity in the standard of living between the small Kazakh upper class and the remainder of the population increases tensions within the Kazakh Society and even jeopardises national cohesion. The increasing performance of the Kazakh economy does not affect the man on the street. In fact, those who are profiting from rising oil and gas revenues are the members of the Kazakh elite who have concentrated all-important economic assets in their hands. Examples for this ongoing process of enrichment of the political and economic elite of the country during recent months are: • In mid May President Nursultan Nazarbayev started a campaign to lure capital back to Kazakhstan by offering tax amnesty to those who illegally put their untaxed profits on foreign accounts during the last decade. About 3000 people of the Kazakh political and financial elite seized the opportunity to whitewash an amount of about 500 million US 1 This assessment is based on the analysis of events and developments from May to July 2001 along the FAST Analytical Monitoring Raster for Kazakhstan (see heading 4). © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs 1 F • A • S • T Dollars. However, The tax amnesty, after all, penalises law-abiding citizens and institutions and favours tax dodgers. In the eyes of many citizens, the capital amnesty is only benefiting the upper class while it does not help the domestic economy. • President Nazarbayev moved another important step forward in the ongoing process to place his relatives in top positions in the county’s politics and economy by appointing his son-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev, to the position of first deputy chairman of the Kazakh National Security Committee (successor of the KGB). On the other hand, the standard of living – especially in Southern Kazakhstan – is decreasing continuously. According to Seidakhmet Kuttykadam, leader of the opposition “Orleu” movement, people in this region hardly have any job opportunities. Also the infrastructure is almost completely run down. People even face great difficulties getting access to fresh water. Thus, not surprisingly, during recent months thousands of people left Southern Kazakhstan to western and eastern provinces. Most of the people who left the southern provinces were not engaged in political Islamic activities. Therefore, they don’t benefit from the social security programs of Islamic organisations. This in turn changes the proportion of people supporting the Islamic extremists to those who still favour a secular state. In the mid and long term the concentration of the economic and political resources in the hands of one family clan combined with growing disparities, and grave poverty could provide fertile grounds for Islamic extremist ideology as the only alternative to the current regime. Eventually, this could lead to armed conflict, especially in the much-deprived Southern part of Kazakhstan. © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs 2 F • A • S • T Factors decreasing the likelihood of armed conflict Despite existing tensions and existing conflict potential which may threaten the country's stability in the mid to long-term, Kazakhstan can still be considered a relatively stable country. This is reflected by the Tension Barometers showing that on the one hand the “Conflict Carrying Capacity” remained consistently high while almost no forceful actions were reported (see p. 7). This stability can be credited to the recent economic boom that, while favouring only the country's small elite, would resolve tensions along clan, regional, ethnic and linguistic divisions by infrastructure investment in disadvantaged regions. Kazakhstan’s GDP and industrial output have increased by more than 10% in the year 2000. Oil exports account for the biggest part of the performance (26% more than in 1999) enabling Kazakhstan to present a household surplus for the past year and to increase its bank reserves. © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs 3 F • A • S • T 2 Chronology Kazakhstan © Reuters, Itar Tass News Service, Soros Foundation, FAST Local Network Date Events 2001 May 1 In a May Day address, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated “inter-ethnic accord is the key to democracy and economic development”. Nazarbayev said the preservation of inter-ethnic accord was a result of the "rational and balanced" domestic policy and that no ethnic group should be considered superior to others. He praised the people for showing tolerance and openness, adding that the state remained dedicated to the policy of democratisation. 2001 May 2 About 25 workers of the Sokolov-Sarbay Iron Ore developing facility in Qostanay Oblast, Northern Kazakhstan, started a hunger strike demanding their overdue salaries to be paid off. 2001 May 4 Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a decree according to which Altynbek Sarsenbayev – who until today was Kazakh Minister of Culture, Information and Social Concord – was appointed as Secretary of Kazakhstan's Security Council. He has been replaced by Mukhtar Qul-Mukhammed, a member of Kazakh parliament’s Upper Chamber. Marat Tazhin, who was Secretary of Kazakhstan's Security Council became Chairman of Kazakhstan's National Security Committee (KNB, formerly KGB). Alnur Musayev, who was the former Chairman of Kazakhstan's National Security Committee, became Chief of Presidential Body-Guarding Service. 2001 May 4 Kazakh security officials have detained a Russian citizen, Ziyavudin Ziyavudinov, on suspicion of involvement in the bombing of an apartment building in Buinaksk, northern Daghestan, in September 1999. Fifty-eight people were killed in that blast and a further 87 injured. Ziyavudinov was living in Almaty using forged Kyrgyz papers. 2001 May 4 The Kazakh Cabinet has drafted plans for building a new rail link connecting Qostanay in Northern Kazakhstan with Aqtobe in northwest Kazakhstan. The new railroad will be about 300 kilometres long and cost about $140 million, and will make it possible to transport wheat, petroleum and other goods between the two regions without crossing Russian territory. 2001 May 4 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly chairman Adrian Severin called on the Kazakh leadership to embark on a dialogue with the opposition. Severin stated that Kazakhstan needs a strong opposition, as a weak opposition "is hysterical and incapable of compromise." President Nursultan Nazarbayev claimed that "unfortunately - and I stress unfortunately - we do not have a normal opposition that would be able to offer the country a program of development”. 2001 May 10 President Nursultan Nazarbayev's son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, has been named to head the newly created state pipeline company Oil and Gas Transport. That agency was created on the basis of the oil transportation company KazTransOil. 2001 May 11 Arat Narmaghambetov, a leading member of the “OTAN” party created in January 1999 to support President Nursultan Nazarbayev, has addressed an open letter to Kazakhstan's Prosecutor- General Rashid Tusypbekov, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Swiss Justice Ministry stressing that President Nazarbayev has repeatedly rejected as untrue articles published in the U.S. press over the past 18 months implicating him in accepting huge bribes from Western oil companies that were allegedly paid into foreign bank accounts. In the letter, Narmaghambetov appeals to Tusypbekov to bring legal proceedings for insulting the honour and dignity of the president against the foreign newspapers that published