CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE

Pakistan

Abdullah Shah shrine, , 7 October 2010 1 | CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE:

Introduction

Explosive weapons are weapons that share common on individuals and communities through photographs characteristics of affecting an area around a point of and interviews in three different contexts. The stories detonation, through a mixture of blast, fragmentation, and images in this series illustrate both the immediate and heat effects.1 They include air-dropped bombs, suffering caused by explosive weapons at the time artillery shells, mortar bombs, rockets, missiles, and of the incident as well as some of the indirect and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), amongst others, longer lasting impacts. The reports cover a double and share the capacity to inflict wide-ranging damage IED attack on a shrine in Pakistan, an explosion in and destruction. When used in populated areas, their a stockpile of explosive weapons in the Republic of impacts are often indiscriminate and can cause Congo, and the sustained bombardment of cities in severe immediate and long-term harm to civilians.2 Libya by explosive weapons with wide-area impacts.

This series of case studies builds upon previous These cases are only a snapshot of the continuing research by Action on Armed Violence, which pre- harm caused by explosive weapons. Each demon- sented a compelling need for addressing the harm strates the need for urgent action to address the caused by explosive weapons in populated areas problem of explosive weapons in populated areas as a distinct humanitarian problem.3 In 2011, AOAV’s and for the establishment of stronger international 100 Incidents of Humanitarian Harm examined the standards to protect civilians from the types of suffer- broad pattern of harm caused by explosive weap- ing documented here. This need is at the heart of a ons in populated areas. In 2012, AOAV published civil society call—through the International Network Monitoring Explosive Violence, analysing a 12-month on Explosive Weapons (INEW)—for states and other dataset of incidents of explosive violence recorded actors to take immediate action to prevent human by AOAV’s Explosive Violence Monitoring Project suffering from explosive weapons in populated areas.5 (EVMP). The use of explosive weapons in populated In his 2012 report to the United Nations Security areas was recorded to have killed and injured civil- Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed ians on a daily basis in 2011.4 However, data on the Conflict, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon scale of deaths and injuries does not fully convey the called the humanitarian impact of such weapons diverse range of harm. People affected often suffer “disastrous.” The report highlighted their use in injuries with life-long impacts, psychological trauma, Libya, Syria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sudan, and urged and socio- and economic harm through loss of liveli- parties to conflicts to refrain from using explosive hoods, displacement, and damage to infrastructure weapons with a wide-area impact in densely pop- and vital services, as well as from the risks posed ulated areas. In tandem, Ban Ki-moon urged states, by unexploded ordnance (UXO). UN actors, international organizations, and NGOs to intensify their efforts on the issue, including through This series, entitled Case Studies of Explosive more focused discussion and further data collection Violence, explores some of these diverse impacts and analysis.6 CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN | 2

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Shrapnel used in the IEDs ( Police) Remains of the first explosive vest recovered (Sindh Police)

IEDs are explosive weapons that have not been The frequency with which IED attacks have occurred mass-produced, though they may contain compo- in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan nents or explosive materials that have been.7 IEDs on a regular basis has arguably created a sense of vary considerably in size and composition. Broadly, tacit acceptance of such attacks as a regular feature they consist of a hard casing, an initiating system, in world news stories. This incident, for example, and an explosive charge. This charge can be com- hardly made news headlines outside of Pakistan. prised of either homemade explosives, such as fertil- Furthermore, most media reports in the aftermath izers or from military or commercial stocks.8 The term of IED attacks focus on immediate casualties and IED includes devices as small as cigarette boxes posi- do not capture the indirect and longer-term impacts. tioned on the side of the road, and as large as trucks This case study therefore seeks to explore the filled with explosive materials driven into buildings. humanitarian impacts of what unfortunately seems Methods of initiation include delay fuses, remote or to be a relatively typical incident of an IED attack mechanical command, or victim-activated triggers.9 and to provide insights into the effects on individ- uals and the local community. AOAV’s media monitoring of incidents of explosive violence found that in 2011, IEDs were the explosive Research on the incident and its impacts was carried weapon of choice for non-state actors.10 In total, IEDs out in May 2012 by a local journalist and resident of were responsible for 60% of all recorded civilian Karachi, Mr Salman Ahmed, who was present at the casualties caused by explosive weapons in 2011, shrine in the aftermath of the attacks. Mr Ahmed killing and injuring at least 13,179 civilians. AOAV conducted research through interviews with the found that 85% of all civilian IED casualties occurred government, police, medical officials, and survivors when IEDs were used in populated areas.11 of the incident, as well as relating his personal ex- perience. AOAV has compiled Mr Ahmed’s research The incident at the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine with media reports in this case study.12 was relatively small compared to many of the IED attacks that made world news headlines in 2011. 3 | CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN

The attack

On Thursday 7 October 2010, two teenagers wearing vests packed with explosives attacked a popular Sufi shrine in Karachi. The perpetrators carried out the attack just after sunset at around 6:30 pm.13

Thursday evening is a particularly significant time for According to eyewitnesses, within thirty seconds as it marks the start of Friday prayers. Many another young teenage boy ran through the first thousands of Muslims attend shrines like the Abdullah entrance and reached the long flight of stairs leading Shah Ghazi shrine in crowds to pay their respects and to the shrine, where he triggered his explosive vest ask for blessings.14 Several thousands of people are and caused the second explosion. This was only a few estimated to have been present at the shrine at the feet away from the first explosion and deeper inside time of the attacks, with hundreds of people queuing the crowded shrine.17 Media reports described body to receive free food provided by the shrine.15 parts strewn across the site and chaos among screaming survivors.18 On the evening of the incident, the first attacker walk- ed through the entrance of the shrine, and at the first security checkpoint, the boy triggered the bomb as It was like the floor had been washed he was being searched.16 It is not exactly clear what in blood, with limbs and flesh strewn happened in the immediate aftermath of the first and a strong smell of burnt explosive explosion. Witnesses described hearing a loud bang and a flash of light at the entrance. Fearing that it and burnt flesh hung in the air. was a bomb explosion, several people ran towards Salman Ahmed, the blast site to help the injured. journalist and Karachi resident, recalling arriving at the shrine, 26 May 2012

Police diagram of the attack (Sindh Police) “ CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN | 4

The weapon

According to ballistic reports of the Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU) of the Sindh Police, the attackers of the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine wore vests containing high explosives and shrapnel material. The BDU reported that the first attacker’s vest contained at least 4-6kgs of explosives and 5-6kgs of shrapnel material. The second attacker’s vest contained 8- 10kgs of explosives and a similar quantity of ball bearings to create shrapnel. The BDU retrieved 110 ball bearings 2mm in size in its inspection of the blast site and recorded an additional 100 holes from pellets and ball bearings in the shade covering the courtyard of the shrine.

The explosives carried by the first attacker were positioned low down in the vest in order to direct blast and fragmentation into the crowd, and to maxi- Remains of the first explosive vest recovered mize deaths and injuries. The second attacker was (Sindh Police) wearing explosives positioned higher in the vest in order to reach people above the courtyard on the This attack involved a relatively small explosive staircase overlooking the blast location.19 content compared to many other IED incidents in Pakistan. On 26 May 2011 for example, in Hangu, Pakistan, 36 people were killed and 60 more were wounded by a car carrying nearly 40 times the amount of explosive material used in the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine incident.21 Reports claimed that at least 15 shops near the detonation area were razed to the ground by the blast.22

Ball bearings used in one of the devices (Sindh Police)

In order to be expected to escape life-threatening injury from blast or fragmentation effects, a person would have to be evacuated at least 518 metres from the point of detonation for an IED containing just under 10kgs of TNT-equivalent explosive (a comparable content to that used in this attack).20

Entrance to the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine, one of the oldest landmarks in Karachi. 5 | CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN

Casualties

According to the police and medical authorities, nine public hospitals in Pakistan are often not very well people were killed and 74 were injured in the attack.23 equipped to perform serious trauma surgeries on Two of those killed and 12 of the injured were children.24 each and every victim in situations of mass casual- ties. Some of the seriously injured in the Abdullah The coroner and the police reported that the first ex- Shah Ghazi shrine blasts had died by the time they plosion caused most of the fatalities and injuries as reached the hospital due to not receiving appropriate the majority of people present along with the security emergency medical care in the ambulances or from staff were in the shrine’s courtyard. Due to the manner excessive blood loss, she said.26 in which the bombs were constructed, most of the injuries sustained by people after the first attack were Victims who survived were left with expensive bills below the waistline. Many of the injuries sustained for their treatment at a time when they were unable by people further away from the attacker were to work. After the attack, the government rushed to caused by flying ball bearings, nails, and other pieces announce a detailed compensation plan for the dead, of scrap metal contained in the IED vest. People nearer the injured, and those who suffered permanent dis- to the attacker suffered more severe injuries such as abilities. It was announced that 500,000 Pakistani dismembered limbs and injuries to internal organs.25 rupees (Rs, approximately GBP 3,454) would be paid to the families of the deceased, whereas the injured Dr Seemin Jamali, a senior doctor working in the would receive Rs. 100,000 (GBP 692).27 It is not clear Jinnah hospital at the time of the incident, said that however if the government paid the compensation to the injuries sustained by victims were typical of an all persons affected. Several survivors of the incident IED attack, consisting of blast injuries including seri- reported that, as of May 2012, they had not received ous tissue damage, dismemberment of limbs, and any money despite having continually approached injuries to internal organs. Secondary injuries, such government authorities. They claimed that authorities as shrapnel and puncture wounds and burns were were delaying simple payment procedures, almost also common, she said. Dr Jamali stated that two years after the incident.28

A Pakistani woman stands waiting for treatment for her injured children (Asif Hassan/ AFP/ Getty Images) CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN | 6

FARZANA ABDUL LATIF is a single mother who works at a school during the day and in the evening as a security guard at the women’s entrance of the shrine. Just around sunset, Farzana was inside her security booth when the first explosion happened nearby. She described how flames leapt up from under the walls of the security booth. Farzana sustained several lacerations and puncture wounds to her back and legs. She remained in the hospital for eight days after the attack and was unable to work for two months during which time she had to pay for her own recovery and rehabilitation. The doctors decided to leave most of the pellets inside her body. Farzana had been fighting for almost two years to claim the Rs. 100,000 compensation promised by the provincial government.29

MUNAWAR KHAN has been ushering crowds at the shrine for many years. On the evening of 7 October, Munawar was having a casual chat over a cigarette when the first blast occurred nearby. Munawar suffered a deep laceration over seven inches long to his abdomen. He recalls how his intestines were hanging outside of his body. He remembers the initial bomb going off, and then looking down and seeing only blood. He managed to get himself to the road and wait for an ambulance to take him away. Due to shock, he does not remember the second explosion. He says it took him five months in the hospital to fully recover. Like Farzana, two years after the incident Munawar had not received any compensation from the government.30 7 | CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN

Community impact

The explosions caused relatively little physical dam- age to the shrine, as they occurred in an open court- yard area. Two walk-through security scanners were destroyed, shrapnel damaged some of the surround- ing walls, and the metallic shade across the main courtyard which stood about 4.5m high and about 15m in length was badly damaged and was later removed from the premises. Windows throughout the shrine were shattered and electrical wiring was left exposed.31

The attack at the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine had a broader, destabilising effect on the community. Shrines across Karachi were closed for up to three months due Shade which covered the courtyard at the shrine to security concerns.32 According to local journalist Salman Ahmed, the closure of the Abdullah Shah Ghazi were dependent on the shrine for free food provided shrine had a wide impact on the community and in par- from charity kitchens would have struggled for the ticular the very poor.33 He noted that many people who month in which the shrine was closed.

The poorest in society flood the shrine for what it offers in the shape of hope and blessings, and from the small array of charitable industrial kitchens that feed thousands of meals everyday. For almost a month those who relied on the shrine’s kitchens to feed them would have struggled.34 Salman“ Ahmed, journalist and Karachi resident, May 2012

Pakistani people receive rice from the distribution centre at the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine on 22 May 2008 (Asif Hassan/AFP/Getty) CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN | 8

In the aftermath of the attack, markets and fuel stations were also closed across Karachi due to We are doing our best to take the insecurity.35 Outbreaks of shooting and arson shortly after the attacks in Lines Area, Shah Faisal Colony, injured people to the hospitals … and New Karachi forced shops to close and traffic and are investigating the matter. to keep off the roads.36 Three religious groups, the Sunni Tehrik, the Jafria Alliance, and the Majlis Pakistan has been under threat for Wahdat-i-Muslimeen announced a three-day period a while. We also have this fear [of of mourning after the attack and the All Karachi attacks] at the back of our minds… Trade Union also announced a one-day strike.37 We received warnings of threats to Protests and tension in the days after the attack shrines earlier … We keep warning caused markets to close and banks to cut short 40 their opening hours.38 The Korangi Association of the public to avoid public places. Trade and Industry Chairman, Johar Ali Quandhari, Zulfiqar Mirza, Home Minister, said that worker attendance across the city was low 9 October 2010 due to the disruption of public transport services “ from strikes, protests, and road closures, and that “some 30-40 percent industrial production was During the police investigation into the incident, it was affected.” He claimed that the closure of businesses revealed that CCTV cameras had been removed a few in Karachi for one day would cost the city around days before the attacks. One official claimed that the Rs 2 billion (GBP 13.8 million).39 government did not have the resources to install cam- eras on a permanent basis.41

Pakistani activists of Islamic party Jamiat-e-Ulama Pakistan (JUP) shout slogans during a protest in Karachi on 8 October 2010 to condemn the suicide bomb attack on the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine (Rizwan Tabassum/ AFP Photo/ Getty images) 9 | CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN

Conclusion

The twin IED attacks on the Abdullah Shah Ghazi States and other actors should: shrine on 7 October 2010 offer a glimpse into some 1. Acknowledge that use of explosive weapons in of the impacts the use of explosive weapons such as populated areas tends to cause severe harm to IEDs can have on individuals and their communities. individuals and communities and furthers suffer- Those who lost family members or suffered injuries ing by damaging vital infrastructure; were clearly most directly affected, but the fear and 2. Strive to avoid such harm and suffering in any insecurity following the attack caused widespread, situation, review and strengthen national policies albeit less visible damage to the community. and practices on use of explosive weapons and gather and make available relevant data; IED attacks in populated areas like the one in the 3. Work for full realisation of the rights of victims Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine are seen on a near daily and survivors; basis around the world and the impacts of these 4. Develop stronger international standards, includ- weapons are replicated in each incident, often on ing certain prohibitions and restrictions on the a much larger scale. While increasing attention has use of explosive weapons in populated areas. been placed in recent years on countering IEDs by various state militaries, emphasis should also be In developing such standards, INEW urges states placed on the humanitarian harm caused to civilians and all other actors to refrain from using explosive as a driver for further action. A shift to consider the weapons in populated areas. AOAV believes that issue of IED use through their impacts and their tech- stronger measures are urgently needed from the nical characteristics as explosive weapons can pro- international community to limit the impacts of IEDs vide a more comprehensive framework through which on civilians. States should increase efforts to control to address the harm caused by these weapons, rather access to the components of IEDs, including trans- than the traditional “terrorism” lens, and its focus fers and trading of chemicals, ensuring the security on political motivations behind the attacks, through of stockpiled explosive ordnance, and rapid clear- which the phenomenon of IED use is often portrayed. ance of explosive remnants of war. Dialogue with non-state actors and other means of engagement Comprehensive assistance to those affected by the should also be pursued with the aim of preventing twin IED attacks at the Abduallah Shah Ghazi shrine, further violence. Ultimately, however, greater efforts by as well as to all victims and survivors of IED incidents, states and the international community to stigmatize should be provided with the aim of fully realising their the use of all explosive weapons categorically in pop- rights. Financial compensation is one form of such ulated areas is likely to provide the most significant assistance, but it should not be seen as sufficient to means for reducing the prevalence of IED attacks. meet the specific individual needs of survivors, which could include life-long medical care, as well as social AOAV believes that the harm caused by explosive and economic assistance to enjoy their full rights as weapons is both predictable and preventable. In order members of their communities. to address this harm in a comprehensive manner, greater efforts are urgently needed aimed at prevent- AOAV is a founding member of the International Net- ing further human suffering from explosive weapons. work on Explosive Weapons (INEW), which calls for At the same time, greater efforts should be taken immediate action to prevent human suffering from to address the existing harm caused by explosive the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. weapons through rehabilitation and recovery for victims and survivors.

NOTES

1 The characteristics of explosive weapons are further detailed in Maya the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) of a Brehm and John Borrie, “Explosive Weapons: Framing the Problem,” concentration of civilians as : “any concentrations of civilians, be it Background Paper No 1 of the Discourse on Explosive Weapons permanent or temporary such as in inhabited parts of cities, or in- (DEW) project, UNIDIR, explosiveweapons.info/wp-content/ habited towns or villages, or as in camps or columns of refugees uploads/2011/04/DEW-paper-No-1.pdf or evacuees, or group of nomads.” “Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (Protocol III),” 2 The term populated area is based on the definition in Protocol III of 10 October 1980, www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/515 CASE STUDIES OF EXPLOSIVE VIOLENCE: PAKISTAN | 10

3 “Explosive violence: the problem of explosive weapons” (2009) 19 Research conducted by Salman Ahmad, Karachi, May 2012, and established explosive weapons as a category, identifying a common Sindh Police Bomb Disposal Unit Report, “BDU (S.B.) Report,” series of effects which follow their use in populated areas. Richard undated, on file with AOAV. Moyes, “Explosive Violence: the problem of explosive weapons,” 20 US Department of Homeland Security, “Bomb Threat Stand-Off www.aoav.org.uk/uploads/changing_policy/august_2009_explosive Chart,” www.fbiic.gov/public/2009/june/DHS-BombThreat %20violence_the_problem_of_explosive_weap.pdf Chart-6-5-09.pdf 4 AOAV found that at least 21,499 civilians were killed or injured by 21 Officials reported that the bomb contained around 400kg of explosive weapons in 2011. Henry Dodd and Robert Perkins, explosives. “Pakistan: Suicide car-bomber strikes in Hangu,” BBC, “Monitoring Explosive Violence: The EVMP dataset 2011,” AOAV, 26 May2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13565904 March 2012, www.aoav.org.uk/uploads/changing_policy /reports/Monitoring%20Explosive%20Violence%202011.pdf 22 32 people killed in Hangu suicide bombing,” The Daily Times, 27 May 2011, www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? 5 International Network on Explosive Weapons, “Call Commentary,” page=2011%5C05%5C27%5Cstory_27-5-2011_pg1_1 www.inew.org/about-inew/inew-call-commentary 23 “Death toll in Karachi blast rises to 9,” CNN, 8 October 2010, 6 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in “Report of the http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/08/ Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,” pakistan.shrine.blasts/ UN Security Council, S/2012/376, 22 May 2012, www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep12.htm 24 Research conducted by Salman Ahmed, Karachi, May 2012; Fawad Shah, “Another shrine attacked,” The Express Tribune, 7 There is not a universally agreed definition of an IED. The NATO 8 October 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/59905/ definition is “a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner another-shrine-attacked/ incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. 25 Interviews by Salman Ahmed with Dr Seemin Jamali, Karachi, It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from 24 and 26 May 2012. non-military components.” NATO Standardisation Agency, “NATO 26 Interviews by Salman Ahmed with Dr Seemin Jamali, Karachi, Glossary of Terms and Definitions,” 2008, 24 and 26 May 2012. www.fas.org/irp/doddir/other/nato2008.pdf 27 Fawad Shah, “Another shrine attacked,” The Express Tribune, 8 The most common explosives are military munitions, usually 8 October 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/59905/another- 122mm or greater mortars, or tank and/or artillery rounds. shrine-attacked/ Currency conversions accurate as of 20 May Headquarters, Department of the Army United States Marine 2012 according to Oanda. Corps, “Improvised Explosive Device Defeat,” September 2005, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-34-119-excerpt.pdf 28 Interview by Salman Ahmed with Farzana Abdul Latif, Karachi, 24 May 2012. 9 Headquarters, Department of the Army United States Marine Corps, “Improvised Explosive Device Defeat,” September 2005, 29 Interview by Salman Ahmed with Farzana Abdul Latif, Karachi, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-34-119-excerpt.pdf 24 May 2012. 10 AOAV’s Explosive Violence Monitoring Project found that 64% of all 30 Interview by Salman Ahmed with Munawar Khan, Karachi, recorded incidents of non-state use involved IEDs. Henry Dodd and 24 May 2012. Robert Perkins, “Monitoring Explosive Violence: The EVMP dataset 31 Research conducted by Salman Ahmed, Karachi, May 2012. in 2011,” AOAV, March 2012, www.aoav.org.uk/uploads/changing_ policy/reports/Monitoring%20Explosive%20Violence%202011.pdf 32 “Manghopir shrine opened despite security risks,” Daily Times, 24 January 2011, www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? 11 Henry Dodd and Robert Perkins, “Monitoring Explosive page=2011%5C01%5C24%5Cstory_24-1-2011_pg7_3 Violence: The EVMP dataset in 2011,” AOAV, March 2012, www.aoav.org.uk/uploads/changing_policy/reports/Monitoring 33 Research conducted by Salman Ahmed, journalist and local %20Explosive%20Violence%202011.pdf resident, Abdullah Shah Ghazi Shrine, Karachi, 24 May 2012. 12 Names of officials interviewed have been withheld when requested. 34 Research conducted by Salman Ahmed, journalist and local resident, Abdullah Shah Ghazi Shrine, Karachi, 24 May 2012. 13 While Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for that attack it was reported that the organisation Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were the local 35 Jahanzaib Haque, Shaheryar Popalzai and, Ali Syed, “Twin handlers. Salman Siddiqui, “October 7, 2010: Abdullah Shah Ghazi suicide attacks at Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine,” The Express shrine attack case unsolved one year on,” The Express Tribune, 8 Tribune, 7 October 2010, October 2011 http://tribune.com.pk/story/269164/october-7-2010- http://tribune.com.pk/story/59617/twin-blasts-in-karachi/ abdullah-shah-ghazi-shrine-attack-case-unsolved-one-year-on/ 36 Imran Ayub, “Two children among eight dead in blasts at Abdullah 14 Huma Imtiaz, “Sufi shrine in Pakistan is hit by a lethal double Shah Ghazi’s mazar: Landmark Karachi shrine attacked,” Dawn, bombing,” The New York Times, 7 October 2010, 7 October 2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/33900 www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/asia/08pstan.html 37 Jahanzaib Haque, Shaheryar Popalzai and Ali Syed, “Twin 15 Interviews by Salman Ahmed with survivors of the incident who suicide attacks at Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine”, The Express were working at the shrine on the day of the incident, Karachi, 24 Tribune, 7 October 2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/59617/ and 26 May 2012, and Huma Imtiaz, “Sufi shrine in Pakistan is hit twin-blasts-in-karachi/ and Imran Ayub, “Two children among by a lethal double bombing,” The New York Times, 7 October 2010, eight dead in blasts at Abdullah Shah Ghazi’s mazar: Landmark www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/asia/08pstan.html Karachi shrine attacked,” Dawn, 7 October 2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/33900 16 Interviews by Salman Ahmed with survivors of the incident who were working at the shrine on the day of the incident, Karachi, 24 and 26 38 Moonis Ahmed, “Aftermath of twin blasts at Abdullah Shah May 2012. Imran Ayub, “Two children among eight dead in blasts at Ghazi shrine,” Daily Times, 9 October 2010, Abdullah Shah Ghazi’s mazar: Landmark Karachi shrine attacked,” www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C10% Dawn, 7 October 2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/33900. 5C09%5Cstory_9-10-2010_pg5_13 Huma Imtiaz, “Sufi shrine in Pakistan is hit by a lethal double 39 Currency conversions accurate as of 20 May according to bombing,” The New York Times, 7 October 2010, Oanda. Moonis Ahmed, “Aftermath of twin blasts at www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/asia/08pstan.html Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine,” Daily Times, 9 October 2010, 17 Interviews by Salman Ahmed with survivors of the incident who www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C10% were working at the shrine on the day of the incident, Karachi, 5C09%5Cstory_9-10-2010_pg5_13 24 and 26 May 2012, Huma Imtiaz, “Sufi shrine in Pakistan is hit by 40 Fawad Shah, “Another shrine attacked,” The Express Tribune, a lethal double bombing,” The New York Times, 7 October 2010, 8 October 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/59905/another- www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/asia/08pstan.html shrine-attacked/ 18 Huma Imtiaz, “Sufi shrine in Pakistan is hit by a lethal double 41 Fawad Shah, “Another shrine attacked,” The Express Tribune, bombing,” The New York Times, 7 October 2010, 8 October 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/59905/another- www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/asia/08pstan.html Imran Ayub, shrine-attacked/ “Two children among eight dead in blasts at Abdullah Shah Ghazi’s mazar: Landmark Karachi shrine attacked,” Dawn, 7 October 2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/33900 CONTACT Action on Armed Violence 5th Floor, Epworth House 25 City Road London EC1Y 1AA T +44 (0)20 7256 9500 F +44 (0)20 7256 9311 E [email protected] www.aoav.org.uk

Report by Henry Dodd and Robert Perkins

Editor Katherine Harrison

Research by Salman Ahmed

With thanks to Nerina Cevra,ˇ Richard Moyes, Steven Smith and all who cooperated with this research.

All photos (unless separately credited) taken by Salman Ahmed.

Clarifications or corrections from interested parties are welcome.

Research and publications funded by the Government of Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of Austria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Copyright © Action on Armed Violence, Top photo- Security checkpoint June 2012 of the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine on 24 May 2012. Design and printing Tutaev Design Bottom photo- Aftermath of the attack (Sindh Police).