The YMAS REVIEW

The YMAS REVIEW A Publication of the ew York Military Affairs Symposium o. 44, Spring, 2008 Annual Special Civil War Issue Copyright © 2008 NYMAS & the Authors ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The YMAS 2007 Award for Lifetime at the general’s reasoning might well strengthen the Achievement in Civil War Studies case in his favor. has been presented to Despite this, the work provides an excellent look at the development of the strategic situation in the Prof. James M. McPherson, Eastern Theater on the eve of the great campaigns of author of the Spring and Summer of 1862. As an aside, at the Battle Cry of Freedom rate he is going, Beatie’s efforts seem likely to require and numerous other notable works. six or eight volumes before the tale of the Army of the Feature Review Potomac reaches its end. Army of the Potomac: Vol. III, McClellan’s First Army of the Potomac: Vol. III, McClellan’s First Campaign, March-May 1862: A Wide-Ranging Study Campaign, March-May 1862: A Wide-Ranging Study of the Army’s Leaders and Their Decisions, of the Army’s Leaders and Their Decisions, by Russel by Russel H. Beatie . H. Beatie. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. Pp. xxi, McClellan’s First Campaign, the third volume in 723. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. $45.00. ISBN: Russel H. Beatie’s major study of the Army of the 978-1-9327-1425-8 Potomac, picks up the story with McClellan poised to --A.A. ofi. CA undertake a major, possibly war winning, offensive ~~~~~~~ against the Confederacy. This period saw the Reviews beginnings of the Valley Campaign through to the Lincolnites and Rebels: A Divided Town in the movement of the Army of the Potomac to Virginia and American Civil War , by Robert Tracy McKenzie. New the onset of the Peninsular Campaign. York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 306. Illus, Characterized by relatively little fighting, it was time append, notes, biblio., index. $35.00. ISBN -13 978-0- of great debate over strategy and organization, 19-518294-1. infighting among generals and politicians, a major Lincolnites and Rebels is a valuable contribution to clash of wills between Lincoln and McClellan, inter- Civil War literature. McKenzie’s complicated task was service disputes, and more. Beatie recounts all this in to demonstrate how Knoxville, Tennessee experienced a good deal of detail, while building his case that the Civil War and how it changed as a result. McClellan was a much better commander than the Knoxville is generally believed to have been the verdict of history indicates, and arguing that Lincoln most important Southern Unionist center. However, hampered the war effort. Since the focus of the work the first thing McKenzie does is to dispel that notion to is primarily a military one, it fails to address critical some degree. He details the demographics showing political issues that necessarily had to affect military that the town was diverse, economically and ethnically, policy, and tends to avoid McClellan’s contempt for and its leading citizens were largely slave holders. the president. Once the war came, however, its loyalties were split As has been his style, Beatie provides numerous 50/50, although the surrounding rural areas were profiles of important military figures, and in this work Unionist. makes a useful analysis of the difference between McKenzie makes several important points. Firstly, those commanders who belonged to the “Bull Run Knoxville was by no means as pro-Union was thought Pool” and those who did not. Although conceding that at the time, a belief largely fomented by William G. McClellan was sometimes reluctant to use the fine “Parson” Brownlow, the fiery editor of the Knoxville army that he had created, Beatie argues that his actions Whig. In addition, Lincoln’s call for the militia after were dictated by what was known at the time. This the firing on Fort Sumter pushed the state and town to gives McClellan a pass for his uncritical embrace of the Confederate side, since Secessionists charged that: the unreliable information being gathered by the inept opposition to secession was support for coercion by the Alan Pinkerton; Beatie fails to provide an analysis of federal government. Unionism revived somewhat once why McClellan willingly accepted Pinkerton’s flawed Confederate troops occupied the town and the draft figures, despite evidence to the contrary; a careful look was imposed, as the thought occurred that citizens had just traded one “tyranny” for another. Overall, the The YMAS Review, Spring 2008 ultimate political divide seemed to rest on old party forces throughout the South. Unlike Lee and Davis, ties, that is, the Unionists were former Whigs, and the Grant and Lincoln correctly conceptualized their Confederates, Democrats. After the war, the town problems and in their minds had the whole strategic “reconciled” through the issue of white supremacy. picture in focus. Among other topics covered are military occupations The only major criticism of Bonekemper’s analysis by both the Confederate and Union armies, General is that he undervalues the role of Union commanders, Longstreet’s siege of the town that trapped Ambrose such as William S. Rosecrans, the U. S. Navy, and the Burnside’s Ohio forces, the travails of African- support the Lincoln administration provided Grant. American soldiers in the town, and the many people For example, at Forts Henry and Donelson (see forced to become political refugees. nymas.org: “The Tennessee River Campaign”) and McKenzie makes one error that turns what might Chattanooga. have been a great book into just a very good one. He Overall, however, this is a very well thought-out is just plain wrong when he states that the Lincoln work. It suggests that the most important keys to administration never considered the relief of East military success are critical conceptualization and Tennessee to be a major military priority at the start of decision-making; flexibility and economy of force, and the war. He also somewhat fails in his purpose, since bulldog determination. -- C. Kay Larson while he demonstrates that the mountain folk were real Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862, by O. Unionists, he never investigates them in depth. What Edward Cunningham, edited by Guy D. Joiner and was the point of analyzing Unionism in the city of Timothy B. Smith. New York: Savas Beattie, 2007. Knoxville, when the real Unionists resided outside of Pp. xxix, 476. Illus., maps, append., notes, biblio., town? In short, McKenzie never addresses what index. $34.95. ISBN: 978-1-932714-27-2. should be the most important question, “Why was East Since its completion in 1966 as the late Prof. Tennessee such a hotbed of Unionism?” Cunningham’s doctoral dissertation, Shiloh and the -- C. Kay Larson Western Campaign of 1862 has long held a niche in Grant and Lee: Victorious American and Vanquished Civil War studies as an essential read for the Shiloh Virginian, by Edward H. Bonekemper III. Westport, campaign. It is thus quite surprising that we had to Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2008. Pp. xxi, 436. Maps, wait until 2007 for a published edition to make the append., notes, biblio., index. $49.95. ISBN: 978-0- work available outside the scholarly community. 313-34971-3. Dr. Cunningham’s work is a highly detailed strategic For those interested in Ulysses S. Grant or Robert E. and tactical analysis of events in the Western Theater Lee (and really, what Civil War addict isn’t?), this during the Henry-Donelson and Shiloh Campaigns; book is a must read. Bonekemper convincingly this is operational analysis on the grand scale. It opens demonstrates that Grant was the better general and has with three chapters exploring the geographic, cultural, conducted some ground breaking analyses of Lee’s and political background, Union strategic decision performance. As outlined by Bonekemper, Lee’s making, and the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. major failings were: 1) a passion for the aggressive There follow three chapters on strategy and operations offensive with disastrous use of frontal assaults; 2) to the eve of the Battle of Shiloh, then fully eight very weak leadership during battles that could result in detailed chapters on the battle itself, and then a chapter uncoordinated attacks; and 3) a Virginia-centric view on claiming and blaming, one analyzing the results, of operations–continually asking for more troops from and a final one setting the stage for what followed. other theaters and refusing to send troops out of area. The treatment is excellent, very detailed, well- Lee is most damned by casualty figures: cumulatively reasoned, and highly readable. he suffered a 20.2 percent casualty rate (p. 244) while Keeping in mind that Dr. Cunningham’s research he was at an overall 4:1 manpower disadvantage; was done over 40 years ago, and that he relied rather Grant’s forces suffered 11 percent casualties which heavily on the publications of the Southern Historical was sustainable. In his first 14 months of command, Society, lending the work a generally “Southern” slant Lee suffered casualties as great as the number of men not always borne out by more recent scholarship, the with whom he started (p. 130). editors have carefully made occasional changes, well- In terms of battlefield leadership, Grant issued labeled, to his text, based on documents and research precise orders, keeping up a continuous flow of unavailable at the time the work was written, and often information, but flexible control of operations during provide little “side bars” in footnotes explaining some battles. The Vicksburg campaign especially showed complex issues of fact or interpretation. Grant’s efficient, effective use of forces in a “classic By making Shiloh and the Western Campaign of surprise maneuver.” Once he became general-in-chief, 1862 available the editors and publisher have made a Grant used the armies in tandem to defeat Confederate great contribution to Civil War studies.

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