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How States Spent Millions to Get Their Accused War Criminals Off the Hook

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How States Spent Millions to Get Their Accused War Criminals Off the Hook January 17-30, 2014 l #126 l Price 1€ Prishtina Insight Repatriation: What happened to those forced to come home? PAGE 2 Choked up: Prishtina’s air went from bad to downright dangerous. PAGE 5 DEFENDING MACHINE How states spent millions to get their accused war criminals off the hook. PAGE 8 Culture: Swiss-Balkan l PI Guide: Creativity in decor, sensibility in the kitchen. PAGE 12 fusion yields great things l Opinion: Kosovo backslides on in Gracanica. PAGE 16 smoking inside. PAGE 14 2PageTwo n January 17-30, 2014 n Prishtina Insight Repatriation confusion People who are forcibly returned to Kosovo often lack essential rights such as education, health care, civil registration and social assistance. The OSCE is pressuring Prishtina officials to determine how many individuals repatriated who sought asylum are still living in Kosovo. “Without such data it is not possible to assess how many individuals (or even families) have access to THE 21 COUNTRIES: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, housing, education and other basic the Czech Republic, Croatia, services, how many have found Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, sustainable employment—or even Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, how many remain in Kosovo,” the Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, OSCE said in a report released in the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, January. Sweden and Switzerland According to the AN OSCE, “a quarter of AVERAGE RATE OF from the editor repatriated persons are members 2,500 TO 3,500 of communities EACH YEAR. considered by the KOSOVO UNHCR to be ‘at A cheap city? risk’ and in need of international That’s a myth protection.” Last week, during a visit back home, I Kosovo may have lower raw cost than stopped at a cafe in San Francisco for a in the West, it is much more expensive bottle of mineral water. I nearly gasped for most people living here. when I saw the price: $2.50 (around The World Bank estimates that, 1.83 euro). Back in Prishtina, I thought, according to Purchasing Power Parity, that bottle would have set me back 1 the income of the average Kosovar is euro at most at equivalent to $7,500 (5,500 euro) in the a nice cafe and United States. In other words, the euro From January 2005 to June 2013 less if I shopped of a Kosovar does go farther, but not as 27,000around 25,000 to 27,000 refugees were around. far as it should. repatriated to Kosovo. San Francisco This can be lost on those of us from 17,000 is one of the most Nate. the West. Michael McKenna, a Canadi- expensive cities Tabak an editor at Kosovo 2.0, in a recent blog in the US, but the @birn.eu.com post about rising energy bills, wrote in 2013 average income that Prishtina is “not a hugely expen- Many in Kosovo Editor-in-Chief 2,372,450€ is about $72,000 sive city in which to live.” still seek asylum (52,000 euro). Much has been said and written in other European What is Kosovo doing for repatriated So, though double the price, that bottle about the fact that most foreigners liv- countries. In individuals? In 2014, Kosovo government of water was still far cheaper than one ing in Kosovo enjoy a high standard 2013 alone, there distributed 2,372,450 euro to assimilate from a cafe in Prishtina. An average of living - particularly those who work were 17,000 repatriated individuals from Western San Franciscan could buy about for governments or international applications. countries. 29,000 bottles of water at that cafe, organisations who typically earn far whereas the average Kosovar, earning more in a month that most Kosovars 3,600 euro per year, can buy anything earn in a year. While they are not from 3,600 to 7,200 bottles. That water to blame for earning what often are Prishtina Balkan Investigative Reporting Network • Mensa e Studenteve, would have to cost $10 to $20 in San tightly regulated salaries, there is Insight first floor, 10000, Prishtina, Kosovo PHO• NE: +381 (0) 38 24 33 58 Francisco to be on par with the price in something to be said for showing • EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: Nate Tabak • STAFF: Jeta Xharra, Marcus Tanner, Kosovo. humility. Petrit Collaku, Parim Olluri, Flutura Kusari and Arijeta Lajka. • DESIGN: Trembelat • While just a rough comparison, A good start: avoid the temptation Prishtina Insight is supported by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, Norwegian it reflects the fact that while living in to remark on how cheap everything is. Embassy, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network. January 17-30, 2014 n Prishtina Insight n 3 4 n January 17-30, 2014 n Prishtina Insight Nation IT’S NOT JUST Fog JOINING THE FIGHT Stagnant 2,500 The number of followers of the Facebook page smog leaves Krenaria Islame (Islamic Pride), as of Wednesday. Krenaria Islame is posting pictures and propaganda on behalf of Albanians reported to be fighting in Syria for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group. One picture posted on the page shows about a dozen armed Prishtina man, wearing black masks, with the title, “Albanian mujahedeen of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with their battalion leader, Lavderim Muhaxheri.” choking Combination of power plant pollution and high pressure blamed for dense fog that is leaving many people gasping for air. By Edona Peci around my mouth and nose just so I could breathe,” she added. Prishtina often gets more than its share Her doctor told Prishtina Insight that Kosovo, Albania push of hazy days, with the nearby Obiliq bad air was to blame for Cakolli’s recent power plant pumping out some of Eu- troubles. joint EU integration rope’s most polluted gases. In December, Prishtina averaged But in recent weeks the air has been 174.1 micrograms per cubic meter of air By Edona Peci said the meeting would also worse than usual in the Kosovo capital of PM10, which is how the presence of and Besar Likmeta discuss the problems facing and other parts of the country. larger hazardous particles in the air is the small Albanian commu- At times, thick smog has covered the measures. The governments of Kosovo nity in Serbia. capital, reducing visibility to as little as According to EU standards, a PM10 and Albania will hold their The meeting would be 10 metres. The key measure of pollution level of 50 is considered the highest ac- first joint meeting on Satur- “a sign of solidarity with the has averaged more than three times the ceptable limit, which should not be ex- day in Prizren, in Kosovo, to Albanian community in the EU standard. ceeded more than 35 days per year. mull their joint EU perspec- Presevo valley [in south- The unusually stagnant air, blamed While the authorities have not en- tives. ern Serbia] to which both on high pressure, has meant that pollu- gaged in any public awareness cam- Kosovo Prime Minister governments will agree on a tion from the power plants Kosovo A and paigns, to alert people to the potential Hashim Thaci said the meet- special fund for the increase B, and from other sources, has nowhere risk to health, Dr Gazmend Zhuri, a ing “marks the start of a joint of new births. to go, Letafete Latifi, head of Kosovo’s Hy- pulmonologist, is urging people to stay strategic governance with “We will open a new dro Meteorological Service, explained. indoors. one aim and one vision, the page of cooperation be- “There is not enough circulation of the “One cannot remove the smog just Euro-Atlantic vision.” tween governments of the air,” she said. like that. What people should do is to “The meeting in Prizren two countries facing the More than 50 people have been tak- stay inside,” he said. marks a new chapter and challenges of democratiza- en to the city’s public hospital, the Uni- Latifi, of the Hydro Meteorological sends out a European mes- tion, modernization and versity Clinical Center, with respiratory Service, said the situation should im- sage for everyone - the mes- integration of both Albanian problems linked to the smog, recently. prove this week, as the weather turns. sage of a region with open countries into the European Two weeks ago, Selvete Cakolli, who “There will be low air pressure and good borders and without barri- union,” Rama wrote on had a pre-existing lung condition, found conditions for rain,” she said. ers of the past,” he added. No Facebook. herself struggling to breathe. “I could feel Rain would also welcome in Prishti- information on the precise The meeting was it every morning when I had to go to the na for other reasons. A wintertime topics to be discussed was announced in Septem- work,” the 44-year-old said. drought has left the water reserves, given, but the Albanian ber when Rama visited “I had a feeling that my lungs were which supply the 400,000 people in the Prime Minister, Edi Rama, Prishtina. constricted; I had to cover the area area, dangerously close to running dry. January 17-30, 2014 n Prishtina Insight n 5 Briefly FIFA Allows Friendly Match- es With Kosovo. Players of the Football Federation of Kosovo (FFK), will in future be able to compete with international rivals after FIFA confirmed a set of modalities concerning "friendly" matches involving teams from Kosovo. In a concession to oppo- A nents of Kosovo's independence, the international body stressed that Kosovo teams “may not display national symbols (flags, emblems, etc.) or play national anthems.” “The decision taken by the FIFA Emergency Commit- tee represents a major boost for football development in Kosovo and it once again confirms the extraordinary power of our sport to bring people together,” FIFA President Sepp Blatter said.
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