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00C764d8c1a90160c125716f F A S T Update Kosovo Semi-annual Risk Assessment November 2005 to April 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | November 2005 to April 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (absolute) 4 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (absolute) 6 Appendix: Description of Indicators Used 8 The FAST International Early Warning Program 9 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 01 Dr. Florian Bieber Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | November 2005 to April 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 69 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: • The level of Country Stability increased from November 2005 to January 2006 and decreased again in February and March this year. Despite the beginning of the status talks in February 2006, generally, there has been a decrease in Conflictive Events since the last FAST Update. However, in April, this tendency changed as there has been a remarkable increase of Conflictive Events again. Although the long-term level of Country Stability has been relatively high, it is fluctuating greatly, often mirroring the number of Conflictive Events, which suggests that the situation remains volatile. This reflects the unconsolidated framework in which Kosovo finds itself. • Kosovo has successfully avoided major conflict following two potential trigger events in the recent months: the beginning of status talks (February 2006) and the death of long-time President and political leader Ibrahim Rugova on 21 January 2006. Shortly thereafter, the government was reshuffled and the Prime Minister replaced, as was the President of the Assembly. This resulted in a near complete reorganization of the top leadership of Kosovo’s institutions. Moreover, in a controversial move, in March 2006 the ICTY permitted Ramush Haradinaj to become politically active again, in spite of his awaiting trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He has, however, not taken any formal position in neither the negotiation team nor the government. The continued stability despite such potentially sensitive events is largely attributable to intense international pressure on the political actors in Kosovo. There is furthermore a broad recognition that violence and political haggling would worsen the negotiation position of Kosovo Albanians, as any conflictive actions against Serbs in Kosovo would have a negative impact on the process of the status negotiations. Therefore, even though the status talks emotionally destabilize Serb-Albanian relations within the region, on the whole, the negotiations have a stabilizing effect on the situation in Kosovo. • The ‘controlled’ stability in Kosovo suggests that a number of underlying tensions within Kosovo remain unresolved and have the potential to destabilize the region in the future. In particular, difficulties in the framework of status talks - foreseeable as Kosovo authorities are likely to have to offer more protection of and concessions towards Kosovo Serbs than originally prepared - and splits in the dominant Democratic League of Kosovo are two of the major potential causes of instability. © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | November 2005 to April 2006 | Page 4 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (absolute) Average number of reported events per month: 69 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: • After a brief period - from February to March 2006 - in which the number of Cooperative Domestic Events exceeded Conflictive Domestic Events, the Conflictive Domestic Events increased again, in line with the overall increase in tensions resulting from the status talks over Kosovo. • With the beginning of status talks, there have been additional policing measures of vulnerable communities to prevent escalatory acts by extremist groups in sensitive areas. Nevertheless, a number of violent incidents took place over the past reporting period, such as the repeated bombings of buses frequently used by minorities. In the most serious incident, a Serb youth was stabbed close to the bridge dividing Mitrovica in March 2006. Such incidents have been rarer than earlier and the arrest of suspects a few days after the stabbing suggests an overall improvement in the field of interethnic violence. However, interethnic violence remains a serious potential threat, not yet autonomously, but rather combined with further political mobilization. • Kosovo politics has witnessed a major reconfiguration during the reporting period. The death of Ibrahim Rugova from cancer in January 2006 ended an era which began with his rise to the political leadership of Kosovo Albanians in 1990. The era was characterized by his peaceful and also passive approach to opposing Serb oppressive rule and later by his patriarchal and dominant role in Kosovo politics. Although his death did not bring about an immediate political crisis, it weakened the dominant Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in favor of its coalition partner, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). The election of Rugova’s successor, Fatmir Sejdiu, proved relatively smooth and without major political disputes, even if he was not elected with a broad majority. The death of Rugova brought more uncertainty into the political landscape of Kosovo, in particular as there is no other politician who would command a comparable degree of domestic support and international respect. The LDK will be particularly vulnerable to splits (as the unifying figure of Rugova no longer holds the party together) and waning importance in the coming months. © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | November 2005 to April 2006 | Page 5 • The resignation of Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi in March 2006 brought about the second important political reconfiguration within a short period. He was forced to resign after his own Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) withdrew its support. His replacement by Agim Ceku, formerly the head of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), signaled the election of a non-party leader to the office. • Earlier, the President dominated over relatively weak Prime Ministers (with the exception of the brief rule by Haradinaj), whereas the changes in early 2006 de facto strengthened the Prime Minister over the President, accentuating the further rise of former UCK members to power. A few days later, Nexhat Daci, the long-time President of parliament was voted out of office after refusing to resign as part of a reshuffle among the governing coalition. • The complete change of leadership within the key institutions of Kosovo brought uncertainty at a time when status negotiations were just beginning. The election of Ceku as Prime Minister signals the coming to power of a new leader who drives legitimacy from his war-time past and his leadership of the KPC (which many Albanians hope to evolve into the future army of Kosovo). As such, he is hoped to follow the example of Ramush Haradinaj who governed energetically before having to resign after being indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague. The degree of cooperation among Albanian parties and the new President, Prime Minister and President of the Assembly will be put to a test in the context of status talks. • The level of political conflict between Serb and Albanian parties in Kosovo showed no concrete signs of abating. While Oliver Ivanovic from the moderate Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija suggested to end the boycott of Kosovo institutions, pressure from Serbian authorities and more hard-line groups prevent a participation of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo institutions, with the exception of the small Serb Democratic Party of Slavisa Petkovic. The status talks which pit the Kosovo Serbs as part of the Serbian negotiating team against Kosovo Albanians effectively prevent cooperation at the institutional level in Kosovo. • The coming months might see an increase in domestic conflict, in particular over political influence among Kosovo Albanians following the death of Rugova. International and domestic pressure might have postponed or tamed this leadership struggle, but with major reshuffles having taken place in recent months, a future questioning of the new governmental representatives and therefore increased conflict can be expected. © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | November 2005 to April 2006 | Page 6 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (absolute) Average number of reported events per month: 69 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: • As opposed to the domestic framework, Cooperative International Events continuously exceed Conflictive International Events. There has been a lull in Conflictive International Events which appears to be connected to the early phases of the status talks, which have not yet focused on the most controversial issues of the status, and therefore, major conflicts were yet avoided. Considering that the most contentious topics with regard to the status remain to be discussed and that there has not yet been any substantial rapprochement between Serbia and Kosovo, this trend has little reason to continue. • Indications by diplomats from within and outside the Contact Group and the team mediating the status talks that a form of independence for Kosovo
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