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“Turning Pebbles” RIGHTS Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya WATCH

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“Turning Pebbles” RIGHTS Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya WATCH Kenya HUMAN “Turning Pebbles” RIGHTS Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya WATCH “Turning Pebbles” Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya Copyright © 2011 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-836-8 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org DECEMBER 2011 ISBN: 1-56432-836-8 “Turning Pebbles” Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya Glossary of Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 1 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 3 Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 6 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 9 I. Background: Cycles of Violence and Impunity ................................................................ 10 Empowered by Impunity: The 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence ............................................. 12 Ongoing Abuses ..................................................................................................................... 14 Looking Abroad for Justice ...................................................................................................... 15 II. Half-Hearted National Efforts toward Accountability...................................................... 16 Initial Caseload: Priority Cases ................................................................................................ 17 The Department of Public Prosecutions Report of February 2009 ............................................. 18 Police Investigation of Sexual Offences .................................................................................. 20 Failure to Create a Special Tribunal ......................................................................................... 22 The Department of Public Prosecutions Report of March 2011 .................................................. 25 Kenya’s Investigations of ICC Suspects ................................................................................... 27 III. Government Prosecutions of “Priority” Cases and Other Serious Crimes: A Failure ....... 29 Acquittals and Withdrawals in Six High-Profile Cases .............................................................. 30 1. Republic v. Stephen Kiprotich Leting & 3 Others (The Kiambaa Church Burning) ............. 30 2. Republic v. Jackson Kibor ............................................................................................. 32 3. Republic v. Edward Kirui ............................................................................................... 33 4. Republic v. Paul Kiptoo Barno, James Yutor Korir, and Isaiah Kipkorir Leting: The Killing of Benedict Omolo and Elias Wafula Wakhungu .................................................................... 34 5. Republic v. Francis Kipn’geno and Others: The Killing of Administration Police Officer Hassan Omar Dado .......................................................................................................... 36 6. The Killing of Father Michael Kamau ............................................................................. 37 Acquittals and Withdrawals in Other Serious Cases ................................................................. 37 Convictions in High-Profile and Serious Cases ......................................................................... 39 1. Republic v. Robert Kipngetich Kemboi and Kirkland Kipngeno Langat: The Killing of Police Officers Peter Githinji and David Odhiambo ..................................................................... 40 2. Republic v. John Kimita Mwaniki ................................................................................... 41 3. Republic v. Charles Kipkumi Chepkwony ....................................................................... 41 4. Republic v. James Mbugua Ndungu and Raymond Munene Kamau ................................ 41 5. Republic v. Willy Kipngeno Rotich and 7 Others ............................................................. 42 6. Republic v. Peter Ochieng ............................................................................................. 42 Cases Pending Before the Courts ............................................................................................ 42 IV. Weaknesses in Investigations and Prosecutions .......................................................... 45 Poor Investigations by Police ................................................................................................. 46 Inaccurate or Incomplete Qualifications of Charges ......................................................... 49 Cases that are Pending Arrest of Known Suspect ............................................................... 50 Ailing Police Prosecutorial System, Overburdened State Counsel ............................................ 50 Lack of Witness Protection ...................................................................................................... 52 Law Enforcement Officials under Political Pressure ................................................................. 53 Judges’ Errors in Evaluating Evidence and Premature Dismissal of Charges .............................. 56 Corruption .............................................................................................................................. 57 Absence of Legal Framework and Expertise to Prosecute International Crimes ......................... 58 V. Impunity for Police Shootings and Misconduct ............................................................. 60 Refusal to Take Reports .......................................................................................................... 61 Failure to Investigate Complaints ............................................................................................ 63 Failure to Conduct Internal Investigations .............................................................................. 64 Reasons for Lack of Accountability for Police Abuses............................................................... 65 Civil Cases for Police Shootings: Failure to Pay Compensation ................................................. 67 VI. Status of Reforms, Steps Required, and the Case for a Special Mechanism ................. 70 Police Reforms........................................................................................................................ 71 Judicial Reforms ..................................................................................................................... 73 The Case for a Special Mechanism .......................................................................................... 74 Non-Judicial Accountability ..................................................................................................... 77 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission ............................................................ 77 Reparations and Compensation ........................................................................................ 78 Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ 81 Appendix I: Case Studies by Human Rights Watch by Jurisdiction .................................... 82 Appendix II: Letter to Commissioner Matthew Iteere ......................................................... 93 Glossary of Abbreviations AfriCOG Africa Centre for Open Governance CID Criminal Investigations Division CIPEV Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence (Waki Commission) CREAW Center for Rights Education and Awareness DCI Directorate of Criminal Investigations DPP Director of Public Prosecutions EACJ East African Court of Justice FIDA Federation of Women Lawyers GHRC Genesis for Human Rights Commission Mombasa ICA International Crimes Act ICC International Criminal Court ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICJ-Kenya Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists ICTJ International Center for Transitional Justice IDP Internally displaced person IO Investigating officer KANU Kenya African National Union KEJUDE Kenyans for Justice and Development KHRC Kenya Human Rights Commission KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights KNDR Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation KTN Kenya Television Network MP Member
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