INSIDE COVER USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA Heinrich Böll Stiftung P.O.Regional Box 10799-00100, Office for East GPO, and HornNairobi, of Africa Kenya Tel:Forest ++254-20-3750329, Road -3744227, -2680745, Mobile: ++254 752-372594, -372670 Fax: ++254-20-3749132 Web: www.boell.or.ke Email: [email protected] Heinrich Böll Stiftung D-10178Hackesche Berlin Hofe Tel:Rosenthaler (49) 0303 Street 285 40-41340 Fax: (49) 030 285 34 109 ISBNEmail: 9966-7172-2-6 [email protected] © 2010 Heinrich Böll Stiftung, East and Horn of Africa All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher, except for brief quotation in books and critical reviews. For information and permissions, write to Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Opinions expressed are the responsibility of the individual authors and do not necessarily constitute the official position of USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province Mwandawiro Mghanga USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA Axel Harniet-Sievers Axel Mombasa seascape view from Fort Jesus i Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA Table of Contents Abbreviations iii MisleadingMap of Coast quiet: Province, An introduction with District Boundaries,to Coast Province 2007 viv during and beyond Kenya’s post-election crisis by Axel Harneit-Sievers Usipoziba ufa utajenga ukuta: Land, Elections, and Conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province by Mwandawiro Mghanga Acknowledgements 1 1. Introduction 2 2. The Land Question 19 3. Taita and Taveta 29 4. South Coast: Kwale, Mwambweni and Kinango 41 5. Mombasa, Kilifi and Kaloleni 51 6. Malindi 67 7. Tana River and Tana Delta 73 8. Lamu 81 9. Conclusions 87 Appendix:References Election and Referendum Results in Coast Province, 1997-2007 10096 About the Author 107 About the Heinrich Böll Foundation 108 ii Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA List of Abbreviations AFC Agricultural Finance Corporation AU African Union CBO Community-Based Organisation CCU Chama Cha Uzalendo CDP Community Development Party CIPEV Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence DC District Commissioner DDCDO District Development Committee DP District Officer Democratic Party DRC Democratic Republic of Congo DSC District Security Committee EAC East African Community of Kenya ECKFBI Electoral Commission FORD Federal Bureau of Investigation ForumGikuyu for the Restoration of Democracy GEMAHBF , Embu, Meru Association HDI Heinrich Böll Foundation Human Development Index ICCIDP International Criminal Court Internally Displaced Person KADDU Kenya Africa Democratic Development Union KADU KenyaKalenjin African Democratic Union KAMATUSA , Maasai, Turkana and Samburu KANU Kenya African National Union KENDA Kenya National Democratic Alliance KENGEN Kenya Electricity Generating Company KHRC Kenya Human Rights Commission iii Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA KNCHRKPTJ Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice KPUKTN Kenya People’s Union KWS Kenya Television Network LPK KenyaLabour Wildlife Party of Service Kenya MP Member of Parliament MUHURI Muslim Human Rights Organisation NARC National Rainbow Coalition – Kenya NARC-Kenya National Rainbow Coalition NEMANGO National Environment Management Agency NSIS Non-GovernmentalNational Security Organisation ODM Intelligence Service ODM-Kenya Orange Democratic Movement Orange Democratic Movement – Kenya PC Provincial Commissioner PNUPPO Party of National Unity RLP Provincial Police Officer SDP Republic Liberty Party SPK Social Democratic Party Shirikisho Party of Kenya UNDP United Nations Development Programme Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province iv USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA Figure 1: Map of Coast Province: Districts (2007) Source: Based on the “Kenya District Map”, dated 31st January, 2008, by Data Exchange Platform for the Horn of Africa (DEPHA), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LRAY-7BLPNA?OpenDocument; adapted and reproduced with kind permission by Alex Lugadiru, DEPHA. Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province v USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA Misleading Quiet: An Introduction to Coast Province During and Beyond Kenya’s Post- Election Crisis By Axel Harneit-Sievers Director, Regional Office for East & Horn of Africa, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Nairobi th 2007 general The large-scale violence that erupted in Kenya after the controversial 27 December elections was no single major explosion. Different parts of the country were affected in very different ways. While many parts of Kenya were burning, the Coast Province remained relatively calm, despite the longstanding history of socio-political tension and even violent conflict in this part of the country. How did the nation-wide conflict after the 2007 general elections affect Coast Province, and to what extent did it become violent? How was an even more violent escalation of conflict avoided? And what do the events in Coast Province following the December 2007 general elections tell us about the risk of future conflict in the Coast? The study by Mwandawiro Mghanga, published in this book, shows in 2007- that there is no reason to underestimate, or be complacent about, the potentials for current and future conflict in Coast Province. Even though the Coast did not belong to the hotspots of violence 08, this does by no means guarantee future peace. Observers and policy-makers should take note of Backgroundthe severe, and growing, risk of possibly violent conflict in Kenya’s Coast Province. of the election th , Nairobi , After the announcement results on 30 December 2007, Rift Valley Province and Western Kenya (Nyanza and Western Provinces) experienced the most serious forms of violence. with spontaneous protest accompanied by opportunistic crime, violent repression by security forces and – especially in the Rift Valley – widespread organized attacks on non-indigenous communities Taken altogether, the violence led to more than one thousand people being killed, and made several byhundred ethnic of thousands becoming refugees in their own country. The violence persisted and even escalated until until end 28 ofth January 2008, by which time the conflict – with attacks and counter-attacks militias – showed features of outright inter-ethnic warfare. Severe tension continued in”, many areas February 2008, when the Party of National Unity (PNU) under Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) under Raila Odinga agreed on the “National Accord mediated under the leadership of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, resulting in the formation of a Grand Coalition government in April 2008. of Inquiry Compared to what happened in much of Nairobi, the Rift Valley and Nyanza (and, to a lesser extent) Western Provinces, the country’s Coast Province remained relatively calm. The Commission into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV.1 , popularly known as “Waki Commission”) documented altogether 27 cases of post-election violence-related killings in Coast Province, i.e. 2.4 per cent of the thKenya-wide overall total of 1,133 victims Violent attacks in Coast Province were of ethnic limited largely to Mombasa and a few localities especially on the South Coast; and they ended within a few days after 30 December 2007. Coast Province was largely spared the violent escalation conflict which harrowed other parts of Kenya in January 2008. - 1 See CIPEV (2008: 313). Due to the extensive nature of the Commission’s inquiry and the substantial public attention and input it received, the Commis sion’s figures are widely regarded as the most reliable account of the impact of the post-election violence; still, it is likely that a number of deaths resulting from the post-election violence – perhaps another 10-15 per cent – have remained unrecorded. Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province vi USIPOZIBA UFA UTAJENGA UKUTA The – relative – calm in Coast Province in Kenya’s 2007-08 , post-electionthe Likoni crisis forms a remarkable contrast not only to other parts of the country, but also to the province’s own history of conflict. About ten years earlier, just a few months before the 1997 elections area in the south of Mombasa experienced serious unrest, starting with an attack on Likoni police station, and resulting in about 80 people being killed and 100,000 becoming displaced. Much of the violence in 1997 was directed against “up-country” people, and later inquiries have shown that the violence was2 instigated by local political operators trying to reduce the voting potential for the opposition against the then governing in Kenya African National Union (KANU) party under President Daniel Arap Moi. Patterns of violence after experienced in the Coast Province in 1997 were very similar to those observed in the Rift Valley 1992 and later on – all of them taking place in the context of KANU attempts to retain power Kenya’s return to multi-party democracy in 1991. Not only does Coast Province have its own record of political violence. At least among those who bother to take note, the Province is also known for a range of socio-political and economic problems that • have high potential for conflict. They include, naming just a few keywords: • widespread poverty, combined with a very high degree of inequality; extensive alienation of land that makes it difficult or even impossible for considerable parts • of the local population to