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Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus Interview with Thomas De Waal

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Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus Interview with Thomas De Waal CHECHNYA: CALAMITY IN THE CAUCASUS INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS DE WAAL BY MASHA UDENSIVA-BRENNER everal years ago, the journalist and Carnegie Europe agreed, and we embarked on the process of bringing the senior fellow Thomas de Waal approached the Har- project to fruition—digitizing, transcribing, dealing with S riman Institute with a proposal. In between house legal considerations. This year the Thomas de Waal Inter- moves, he had discovered a box of tapes collecting dust in views Collection became available at Columbia Libraries. his attic. It contained all the interviews he had conducted I spoke with de Waal over Skype about both books last for his first two books—Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus spring—an interview that will be published in two parts. (New York University Press, 1998) and Black Garden: Armenia What follows is an edited transcript of our conversation on and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York University Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus. The book, coauthored Press, 2003). De Waal had only used a fraction of each with de Waal’s former Moscow Times colleague Carlotta interview in the books, and he thought the tapes would be Gall, was the first ever to be published about the 1994–96 a valuable resource to scholars and journalists. Would the conflict in Chechnya. The authors’ in-depth investigation Harriman Institute be interested in housing the collection? of the conflict and its roots is crucial to understanding the Timothy Frye, director of the Institute at the time, eagerly Chechnya we see in the news today. 32 | HARRIMAN INTERVIEWS to Moscow and strayed off script when asked about Chechnya. He hadn’t been prepped on this and said that Abraham Lincoln fought a war to keep this country together, and so he understood Yeltsin’s point of view. But there are many different ways of achieving territorial integrity by peaceful means; you don’t have to go to war. And the terrible paradox is—though this was supposedly a war to prove that Chechnya was part of Russia—the way the Russian army behaved was as though it was conquered enemy territory. Everything they did drove Chechnya away from Russia and Chechens away from Russians. If something like this had happened in the Balkans, everyone responsible would have been facing trial in The Hague. But because it was Russia, they got off. So Gaidar’s point was that if the Fight for Life, a drawing West had dealt more clearly, more by ten-year-old Polina forcefully, with Yeltsin just before Zherebtsova from the conflict started, and even at the Chechen Diary (1995). beginning of the conflict, they could have reined him in, and the worst of this tragedy could have been avoided. Udensiva-Brenner: Because Yeltsin still cared quite a bit about the West’s opinion. Masha Udensiva-Brenner: The late dominates, that could be an Russian economist and politician incubator of terrorism, has been an De Waal: He was still totally Yegor Gaidar, whom you quote in the incubator of terrorism. And yet the dependent on the West, on IMF book, contended that, had the West trigger for all that was the military [International Monetary Fund] intervened or put pressure on Russia intervention in December 1994. credits; there was massive Western in some way, the first Chechen war And the West’s reaction was pretty leverage with Yeltsin. wouldn’t have happened. What are limp, considering that this was a your thoughts? massive war crime. The Western Udensiva-Brenner: Your book narrative at the time was all about left me with the impression that a Thomas de Waal: I think that’s the supporting Yeltsin, supporting a realignment in the Kremlin, after case. Now we’re used to thinking pro-Western government. And, of the more liberal politicians criticized of Chechnya as this frightening course, supporting Russia’s territorial Yeltsin for his drinking, indirectly led zone, a place [Ramzan] Kadyrov integrity. Bill Clinton famously came to this conflict. HARRIMAN | 33 Jokhar Dudayev mural on the fence of the Raszynska Social Gymnasium in Warsaw. De Waal: That’s right, and you could De Waal: I did a lot of interviews to De Waal: At the time, Yeltsin was make an argument in that direction; try to reconstruct a chronology of looking for new ways of boosting it’s slightly exaggerated, but you the decision and what followed. I his own popularity, of legitimizing could make the argument. There was interviewed Yuri Kalmykov, the one himself. [Vladimir] Zhirinovsky, the a famous incident where Yeltsin was man at the Security Council meeting far-right extremist, had done well in in Berlin for a ceremony [in August who spoke out against the conflict. the Duma elections of December ’93. 1994], when he was clearly drunk—a The only person in the room who So I guess Yeltsin wanted to rebrand military band was playing, and he actually supported him was Yevgeny himself. Or, to be precise, people picked up the baton and started Primakov, which was interesting. He in the Kremlin, one group in the conducting the band. A group of subsequently became Russian prime Kremlin, wanted to rebrand Yeltsin as his liberal advisers wrote to him minister and is someone who was the tough guy, the Russian nationalist. afterward saying they disapproved never really very popular in the West. These people were constantly of his behavior, a rather courageous When I was presenting the book, bouncing the idea of a quick solution thing for them to do. But it had and said that Primakov opposed the to the Chechen problem—a quick the opposite effect from what they war and the supposedly pro-Western crushing of the Dudayev regime, intended. Yeltsin was offended and Foreign Minister Kozyrev actively which would successfully rebrand shifted toward the more hawkish supported it, I confused a few Western Yeltsin. And, hence, the title of our advisers, people like [Alexander] audiences. So these categories of hawk book in the original British version Korzhakov; and that group became and dove in Russia are not so clear cut. was A Small Victorious War. This dominant, and their views therefore There was a lot of maneuvering within is a phrase that goes back to the influenced Yeltsin to go to war in the Kremlin—hard-line advisers trying Russian-Japanese war of 1904, but Chechnya. So one could draw a kind of to persuade Yeltsin to go in, liberal was used by one of Yeltsin’s advisers, direct line between Yeltsin conducting advisers being much more cautious. Oleg Lobov, in a conversation I the band drunkenly in Berlin and the But it wasn’t a case of the good czar quote in the book. [“We need a decision to go to war in Chechnya. and the bad advisers; I think Yeltsin small, victorious war to boost the himself ultimately made the decision President’s ratings.”] And they Udensiva-Brenner: What were the to start the war. thought it would be over in a couple machinations inside the Kremlin of days or a week—that the Dudayev during the period leading up to Udensiva-Brenner: What did he want regime would crumble and Yeltsin the invasion? to get out of it? would score this political victory. 34 | HARRIMAN Crazy as it sounds, people at the De Waal: It was definitely not thought Kremlin meeting, discussing this through. This was a classic issue of issue, brought up the example of the Yeltsin period, when Russia was Bill Clinton in Haiti: Bill Clinton basically a democracy with this very had gone into Haiti, overthrown a dysfunctional government. So, on military regime, and it all happened the one hand you had the Russian very quickly and had been a political army going in, supposedly to restore success for him. Where do we begin? order; on the other hand you had huge Chechnya isn’t Haiti; it has all these unhappiness within the army about historical grievances. Also, the one what was going on, some generals thing that was guaranteed to unite refusing to fight. Thomas de Waal Chechens under [Jokhar] Dudayev was a Russian military invasion. Udensiva-Brenner: And Russian Particularly when you consider the troops, desperate for water and Zherebtsova (Chechen state of the Russian army, which was provisions, were actually prolonging Diary, 1995). totally unprepared. It was not going the conflict by selling arms to the to go into Chechnya in a disciplined Chechen fighters . way, enforcing law and order. On the contrary, it was a force of disorder De Waal: That’s right. It was a reporter’s and lawlessness. dream reporting from Chechnya because pretty much every day— Udensiva-Brenner: Why didn’t the without even trying too hard, just by Kremlin wait a little while in order to being around and talking to lots of prepare the army for the invasion, to people—you would come across the organize their efforts? most extraordinary stories. One day in a village I met this guy; he said, “Let me De Waal: I don’t think you could show you something,” and he took me have done anything with the Russian into his house and showed me some army back in 1994. It was a conscript weapons he’d bought off the Russians army. The economy had collapsed; and a huge stack of dollars that he the soldiers were underfed, badly was going off with to buy some more clothed, badly equipped, poorly weapons from the Russians. So one trained, no morale. One had to feel combatant in the conflict was actually sorry for them being sent off to this selling its weapons to the enemy it was region in the south.
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