: CALAMITY IN THE CAUCASUS INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS DE WAAL

BY MASHA UDENSIVA-BRENNER

everal years ago, the journalist and Carnegie Europe agreed, and we embarked on the process of bringing the senior fellow Thomas de Waal approached the Har- project to fruition—digitizing, transcribing, dealing with S riman Institute with a proposal. In between house legal considerations. This year the Thomas de Waal Inter- moves, he had discovered a box of tapes collecting dust in views Collection became available at Columbia Libraries. his attic. It contained all the interviews he had conducted I spoke with de Waal over Skype about both books last for his first two books—Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus spring—an interview that will be published in two parts. (New York University Press, 1998) and Black Garden: Armenia What follows is an edited transcript of our conversation on and Through Peace and War (New York University Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus. The book, coauthored Press, 2003). De Waal had only used a fraction of each with de Waal’s former Times colleague Carlotta interview in the books, and he thought the tapes would be Gall, was the first ever to be published about the 1994–96 a valuable resource to scholars and journalists. Would the conflict in Chechnya. The authors’ in-depth investigation Harriman Institute be interested in housing the collection? of the conflict and its roots is crucial to understanding the Timothy Frye, director of the Institute at the time, eagerly Chechnya we see in the news today.

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to Moscow and strayed off script when asked about Chechnya. He hadn’t been prepped on this and said that Abraham Lincoln fought a war to keep this country together, and so he understood Yeltsin’s point of view. But there are many different ways of achieving territorial integrity by peaceful means; you don’t have to go to war. And the terrible paradox is—though this was supposedly a war to prove that Chechnya was part of —the way the Russian army behaved was as though it was conquered enemy territory. Everything they did drove Chechnya away from Russia and Chechens away from . If something like this had happened in the Balkans, everyone responsible would have been facing trial in The Hague. But because it was Russia, they got off. So Gaidar’s point was that if the Fight for Life, a drawing West had dealt more clearly, more by ten-year-old Polina forcefully, with Yeltsin just before Zherebtsova from the conflict started, and even at the Chechen Diary (1995). beginning of the conflict, they could have reined him in, and the worst of this tragedy could have been avoided.

Udensiva-Brenner: Because Yeltsin still cared quite a bit about the West’s opinion. Masha Udensiva-Brenner: The late dominates, that could be an Russian economist and politician incubator of terrorism, has been an De Waal: He was still totally Yegor Gaidar, whom you quote in the incubator of terrorism. And yet the dependent on the West, on IMF book, contended that, had the West trigger for all that was the military [International Monetary Fund] intervened or put pressure on Russia intervention in December 1994. credits; there was massive Western in some way, the And the West’s reaction was pretty leverage with Yeltsin. wouldn’t have happened. What are limp, considering that this was a your thoughts? massive war crime. The Western Udensiva-Brenner: Your book narrative at the time was all about left me with the impression that a Thomas de Waal: I think that’s the supporting Yeltsin, supporting a realignment in the Kremlin, after case. Now we’re used to thinking pro-Western government. And, of the more liberal politicians criticized of Chechnya as this frightening course, supporting Russia’s territorial Yeltsin for his drinking, indirectly led zone, a place [Ramzan] Kadyrov integrity. famously came to this conflict.

HARRIMAN | 33 ­­ Jokhar Dudayev mural on the fence of the Raszynska Social Gymnasium in Warsaw.

De Waal: That’s right, and you could De Waal: I did a lot of interviews to De Waal: At the time, Yeltsin was make an argument in that direction; try to reconstruct a chronology of looking for new ways of boosting it’s slightly exaggerated, but you the decision and what followed. I his own popularity, of legitimizing could make the argument. There was interviewed Yuri Kalmykov, the one himself. [Vladimir] Zhirinovsky, the a famous incident where Yeltsin was man at the Security Council meeting far-right extremist, had done well in in Berlin for a ceremony [in August who spoke out against the conflict. the Duma elections of December ’93. 1994], when he was clearly drunk—a The only person in the room who So I guess Yeltsin wanted to rebrand military band was playing, and he actually supported him was Yevgeny himself. Or, to be precise, people picked up the baton and started Primakov, which was interesting. He in the Kremlin, one group in the conducting the band. A group of subsequently became Russian prime Kremlin, wanted to rebrand Yeltsin as his liberal advisers wrote to him minister and is someone who was the tough guy, the Russian nationalist. afterward saying they disapproved never really very popular in the West. These people were constantly of his behavior, a rather courageous When I was presenting the book, bouncing the idea of a quick solution thing for them to do. But it had and said that Primakov opposed the to the Chechen problem—a quick the opposite effect from what they war and the supposedly pro-Western crushing of the Dudayev regime, intended. Yeltsin was offended and Foreign Minister Kozyrev actively which would successfully rebrand shifted toward the more hawkish supported it, I confused a few Western Yeltsin. And, hence, the title of our advisers, people like [Alexander] audiences. So these categories of hawk book in the original British version Korzhakov; and that group became and dove in Russia are not so clear cut. was A Small Victorious War. This dominant, and their views therefore There was a lot of maneuvering within is a phrase that goes back to the influenced Yeltsin to go to war in the Kremlin—hard-line advisers trying Russian-Japanese war of 1904, but Chechnya. So one could draw a kind of to persuade Yeltsin to go in, liberal was used by one of Yeltsin’s advisers, direct line between Yeltsin conducting advisers being much more cautious. , in a conversation I the band drunkenly in Berlin and the But it wasn’t a case of the good czar quote in the book. [“We need a decision to go to war in Chechnya. and the bad advisers; I think Yeltsin small, victorious war to boost the himself ultimately made the decision President’s ratings.”] And they Udensiva-Brenner: What were the to start the war. thought it would be over in a couple machinations inside the Kremlin of days or a week—that the Dudayev during the period leading up to Udensiva-Brenner: What did he want regime would crumble and Yeltsin the invasion? to get out of it? would score this political victory.

34 | HARRIMAN Crazy as it sounds, people at the De Waal: It was definitely not thought Kremlin meeting, discussing this through. This was a classic issue of issue, brought up the example of the Yeltsin period, when Russia was Bill Clinton in Haiti: Bill Clinton basically a democracy with this very had gone into Haiti, overthrown a dysfunctional government. So, on military regime, and it all happened the one hand you had the Russian very quickly and had been a political army going in, supposedly to restore success for him. Where do we begin? order; on the other hand you had huge Chechnya isn’t Haiti; it has all these unhappiness within the army about historical grievances. Also, the one what was going on, some generals thing that was guaranteed to unite refusing to fight. Thomas de Waal Chechens under [Jokhar] Dudayev was a Russian military invasion. Udensiva-Brenner: And Russian Particularly when you consider the troops, desperate for water and Zherebtsova (Chechen state of the Russian army, which was provisions, were actually prolonging Diary, 1995). totally unprepared. It was not going the conflict by selling arms to the to go into Chechnya in a disciplined Chechen fighters . . . way, enforcing law and order. On the contrary, it was a force of disorder De Waal: That’s right. It was a reporter’s and lawlessness. dream reporting from Chechnya because pretty much every day— Udensiva-Brenner: Why didn’t the without even trying too hard, just by Kremlin wait a little while in order to being around and talking to lots of prepare the army for the invasion, to people—you would come across the organize their efforts? most extraordinary stories. One day in a village I met this guy; he said, “Let me De Waal: I don’t think you could show you something,” and he took me have done anything with the Russian into his house and showed me some army back in 1994. It was a conscript weapons he’d bought off the Russians army. The economy had collapsed; and a huge stack of dollars that he the soldiers were underfed, badly was going off with to buy some more clothed, badly equipped, poorly weapons from the Russians. So one trained, no morale. One had to feel combatant in the conflict was actually sorry for them being sent off to this selling its weapons to the enemy it was region in the south. There were supposed to be fighting against. appalling levels of indiscipline, and let’s not even talk about human rights Udensiva-Brenner: How pervasive abuses—just the looting. You saw was this? these trucks heading out of full of furniture and possessions that De Waal: Very pervasive. Chechens Russian soldiers had been looting would joke, “If you give me enough from supposedly Russian homes. vodka, I can buy a tank.” The morale was so much higher on the Chechen Udensiva-Brenner: And although side; and most of the Russian army Chechnya was technically Russian just didn’t want to be there, didn’t territory, no state of emergency want to fight, and were doing things was declared. like selling their weapons.

HARRIMAN | 35 ­­ Udensiva-Brenner: And not only Russians had nowhere to go. A lot was the army selling its weapons, but of them were pensioners, so they there were also high-level informers were disproportionally victimized within the Russian government by the artillery and the bombing selling top secret information of the Russian air force and died to Jokhar Dudayev, president of in great numbers. I would say that, Chechnya at the time. when the war finally ended, it was largely because the Kremlin failed to De Waal: That’s right. Dudayev would control the narrative and the Russian enjoy telling Russians all the gossip population as a whole had stopped he’d heard from inside the Kremlin. supporting it. I never got to the bottom of that, but it was indicative of the state of Udensiva-Brenner: Why didn’t the Russia at the time. Our book is about Kremlin try to limit the press in Chechnya, but on a bigger level it’s some way? also about Yeltsin’s Russia. You read these stories about it that describe De Waal: This was a Russia of market reforms, and [privatization lawlessness and freedom in which minister Anatoly] Chubais, and so on, they didn’t really have the tools, and, but in fact you had to get out to the to be fair, even the will, to censor edges of Russia to find out how dire and suppress the press. Maybe they the situation was in the ’90s. And we tried, but as I said, Russian NTV in don’t necessarily blame Yeltsin; we particular, and some other TV and Top to bottom: Chechen blame the legacy of the , radio as well, were broadcasting pretty man prays during battle a collapsing state. But the corruption, frequently. And as foreign press you for Grozny (January 1995), the collapse of infrastructure, the could go down there and do whatever photo by Mikhail Estafiev; low morale, the lack of belief in the the hell you wanted. There wasn’t during his state—that’s basically what happened really a front line, so you could pretty inauguration (1991); Zherebtsova (Chechen in Chechnya, too, to the most easily go back and forth between Diary, 1995). extreme degree. the Russian-controlled side and the Chechen rebel–controlled side on the Udensiva-Brenner: What role did the same day. Chechnya’s pretty small. media play throughout the conflict? You could go into the mountains and meet the Chechen rebels and the De Waal: This was an extraordinary same evening be back on the Russian aspect of it. While the Kremlin was side. We roamed around pretty freely. saying, “The operation is going It was a bit scary; sometimes you smoothly to restore law and order,” didn’t know where you were. But it the new NTV channel was reporting was amazing access. And the Chechen from the ground, from Grozny, and rebel side was incredibly good at PR. showing these scenes of devastation, They wanted to use us, the foreign and lawlessness, and bombing, press, to get across their side of the and the killing of ethnic Russians, story, and they were much more open which particularly enraged the than the Russian military were about Russian viewing public. You see, the talking to us—which of course meant Chechens who lived in Grozny could that the reporting reflected their side flee to their home villages, but the of the story pretty well.

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Udensiva-Brenner: And what was cannot be fully understood without The history of Russia and that story? What was happening in understanding the background. What’s Grozny during the war? the historical context? Chechnya is mainly one of conflict, starting at the end De Waal: All I can say is that when I De Waal: The history of Russia and of the eighteenth century. finally saw the city in 1995 it looked like Chechnya is mainly one of conflict, pictures of Stalingrad. Just appalling starting at the end of the eighteenth levels of destruction. Whole streets century. While the South Caucasus and neighborhoods had been leveled. were basically incorporated into the High-rise blocks in the center of the Russian Empire by the beginning the Civil War, but of course once city, which had been full of ethnic of the nineteenth century—there the Bolsheviks established the state, Russians, completely destroyed. was fighting, there was violence, Chechens became problematic Sometimes one got the impression but by the 1820s they were basically again. In 1944, they were deported en that the Russians were trying to part of the Russian Empire—the masse by Stalin, one of the so-called refight the Second World War, trying North Caucasus, even though they punished peoples. to take Berlin in 1945. The stain of this were closer on the Russian side of must lie on the conscience of Pavel the mountains, had this very, very Udensiva-Brenner: Tell me about Grachev, Yeltsin’s defense minister, bloody conflict with Russia, which the deportations. who, first of all, tried to storm the city some people have called the longest with tanks, which was a crazy thing war of the nineteenth century. It De Waal: This is a very, very to do. The tanks got trapped in the continued right up until the 1860s, important story. And it applies to streets and burned, and there was and some of the fiercest resistance many Soviet peoples—Germans, a horrific massacre by the Chechen came from the Chechens. They Crimean Tatars, Koreans, and, fighters of these Russian soldiers. This were very well organized, they various nationalities in the Caucasus, story is told in the first chapter of the fought very hard, and they had a all of whom were deemed to be liable book by Carlotta [Gall], who went kind of collective leadership, which to treachery in the paranoid world and interviewed the survivors from meant it was harder to buy them of Stalin’s Soviet Union. This was the Maikop tank regiment. Having off or co-opt them. In the end, either because they were directly suffered this defeat, Grachev basically they were conquered and they did affiliated with foreign powers, turned to the air force and ordered accommodate; they did start to speak like the Germans, or because they them to bomb the city with planes Russian; they did become part of the were Turkic, or, in the case of the and heavy artillery—which should be Russian nation state. But they were Chechens, because they had a history a war crime under any definition. always pretty much on the lowest of resistance. During the Second And, of course, this was the great rung of the ladder, as a Muslim World War, when Russia was fighting turning point. The point at which a people, as a militant people. the Germans, the NKVD—the secret Chechnya that had been part of Russia— police led by [secret police chief part of the Soviet Union—was basically Udensiva-Brenner: And then when Lavrenty] Beria—also devoted huge destroyed, including its professional the Communists came into the amounts of resources to deporting class, and forced back into the more picture, the Chechens thought they these people, every last babe in archaic, antimodern, anti-Russian would improve their lot and fought on arms. So you could just imagine the Chechnya that we see today. The city of their side against the Imperial army. logistics. Thousands and thousands Grozny may have been rebuilt, but the of railcars being deployed for Chechnya we have today is the result of De Waal: The Bolsheviks were very deportations to Kazakhstan, all done the bombings of 1994, 1995. good at speaking the language of by surprise overnight, in order to national liberation. People like the minimize resistance. Everyone was Udensiva-Brenner: You write in the Chechens definitely fought more crowded into these railcars and sent beginning of your book that the conflict with the Reds against the Whites in to Kazakhstan. The death rates were

HARRIMAN | 37 ­­ This is a classic case he was given to understand that anniversary, which shows the incredible he should shut up or he would risk kind of amnesia and indifference to this of Russian leadership, being arrested. Then Stalin fell and in Russia as a whole. where the left hand Khrushchev went to return everyone didn’t know what the from deportation. Suddenly this story Udensiva-Brenner: And what became rather useful to Khrushchev, effect did the deportations have on right hand was doing. and Khrushchev received Malsagov Chechen identity? in the opera house in Almaty. As far as Khrushchev was concerned, this was a De Waal: A huge effect. For one thing, denunciation of several of the Stalinist Chechnya before the deportations absolutely appalling, from typhus, figures who had been responsible for was quite dispersed, quite regional, from hunger; and then when the the deportations—who were still in with low rates of Russian usage. And, Chechens arrived in Kazakhstan, office—and it was an additional reason in a funny way, the deportations made there were very few facilities to deal to get them fired. Malsagov carried it more Soviet, because the people with them. on protesting and he was arrested, were taken away from their homeland The deported became second-class spending time in a Soviet prison. and forced into another part of the citizens who couldn’t travel; they When I met him in ’94, he was old and Soviet Union. But they also made it were incredibly restricted in their frail, and he couldn’t really talk. In more Chechen; they made the people rights and were really the bottom of 1996, Carlotta and I actually went up into a collective—it suddenly didn’t the pile. This incidentally explains into the mountains to see the village, matter which village you were from; why during the Soviet period the which was completely ruined and you were branded a Chechen by the Chechens had a reputation as black deserted and hadn’t been lived in since mere fact of the deportation. And the marketeers. One of the reasons that the 1940s. And there’s a brief coda fact that they were allowed home was a large number of them joined the to the story: A film was made about miraculous, but the subject was never criminal underworld is because they this massacre and met with a denial talked about in public, in schools; it were an underclass for whom career campaign saying that this was all made was a kind of family secret that you advancement and the normal ways of up, that this never happened. were supposed to bottle up. And that getting jobs were blocked. all burst to the surface during the There was a lot of trauma. I met a Udensiva-Brenner: When? Gorbachev period when the Chechens man, a Chechen commissar, who was wanted justice, recognition for what witness to a massacre in Khaibakh, De Waal: In the past few years, in had happened. So this was definitely a village high in the mountains Putin’s Russia. The horrors of the a driving force for the independence where the roads were so bad that, deportations are still something movement in the Soviet period. when the NKVD came up there to that isn’t really acknowledged in deport the residents, they decided Russia as a whole. In fact, there’s Udensiva-Brenner: And then the to just massacre the old people, the incredible insensitivity about it, movement really took off with Jokhar sick people, because they couldn’t including, amazingly, that the Putin Dudayev, who was a somewhat get them down to the valley in time. administration and the Russian unlikely figure to lead Chechen They rounded up several hundred of Olympic Committee decided to have independence. Tell me about him. the weakest people in a barn and set the closing ceremony of the Sochi it on fire. And this man, Dziayudin Olympics on the 70th anniversary De Waal: Dudayev was a man of Malsagov, a young Communist, of the Chechen deportations. An many amazing contradictions. A witnessed this massacre and was event in the North Caucasus, usually man who was born in a Chechen absolutely horrified. He very doggedly a tragic day for Chechens, and yet mountain village, but was deported tried to report on it, until he was they couldn’t even have that closing to Kazakhstan in 1944, basically himself deported. He thought it was ceremony one day before or one day as a baby. He grew up completely all a mistake; he wrote letters, until after; they chose to have it on that very outside of Chechnya, first in exile in

38 | HARRIMAN Kazakhstan, and then in Estonia, after De Waal: There were some he joined the Soviet air force. He had to negotiations. But, in my view, they lie on his application form and pretend weren’t serious. I think Dudayev to be an Ossetian, because Chechnya was always craving a one-on-one was very much considered a subgrade meeting with Yeltsin, and some nation at that point. He rose to become people thought he should have it—but the Chechens’ first air force general in Yeltsin denied him that meeting, even Estonia. He married a Russian poet, the though, by the end of ’94, Chechen daughter of a Soviet officer. So he was independence was more of a a Soviet patriot, a Chechen romantic, a symbolic project. They were still using slightly crazy guy who spoke incredibly the ruble, there were flights to and Top to bottom: Postcard depicting passionately about everything and from Moscow, the borders were open. the Memorial of the Martyrs of the would make these wild threats. Had Yeltsin shown Dudayev a little bit Deportation of 1944, in Grozny, An extraordinary personality of respect and used a bit of political and the ruins of Grozny after the whom I met during my second visit to capital to have a meeting with him, I war of 1994–1996; Zherebtsova Chechnya. That said, he was someone think Dudayev would have been more (Chechen Diary, 1995). who bears great responsibility for the inclined to compromise, as strange start of that conflict because of his and ridiculous as that sounds. military, romantic demeanor. He was someone who was not good at making Udensiva-Brenner: There was a point deals and compromises. in ’96 when Yeltsin had finally agreed to meet with Dudayev, but Dudayev Udensiva-Brenner: What did was assassinated before the meeting Dudayev’s Chechnya look like? could take place. What happened?

De Waal: The republic was a kind of a De Waal: This is a classic case of black hole within the Russian state— Russian leadership, where the left it was criminalized; there was a lot hand didn’t know what the right hand of black marketeering. But I would was doing. They were simultaneously argue it was only in the most extreme planning a meeting between Dudayev example of the whole of Russia during and Yeltsin, and they were also that time. If you went to Vladivostok, planning to kill him, and I don’t if you went to a lot of places in Russia, believe one effort was more sincere they were also criminalized. There was than the other. I think they were doing also a huge black market; Chechnya was both tracks at the same time, and the just the most extreme example. But, meeting never happened because of course, because of the self-declared Dudayev was on his satellite phone independence, because of the ethnic and a guided missile tracked the signal nature of the Chechens, and because and killed him. It was, in a way, an they had constituted a strong mafia in obvious blow to the Chechen cause; Soviet times, they were identified as but in another way, it basically gave the “other,” and so Chechnya became a the leadership to [Aslan] Maskhadov, problem Yeltsin wanted to resolve. who was a much more moderate leader and with whom it was easier Udensiva-Brenner: Did Yeltsin take for the Russians to make peace. any steps to resolve it before deciding I should tell you a good personal to invade? story, that makes it into the book,

HARRIMAN | 39 ­­ about that agreement. This, I think, able to file a couple of hours before, independent Chechnya, and as far as was the most extraordinary story I did we would have gotten our exclusive. the Russians were concerned, he was during my reporting in Chechnya. We still had the story pretty much the president of a Chechnya that was It was spring, probably May of 1996, better than anyone else, but we didn’t part of Russia. Lebed did the deal, and I went down to Chechnya with quite have the scoop. Anyway, it was but unfortunately Chechnya was two French reporter friends and a still an amazing story, and we got so devastated that the whole place Norwegian, Åsne Seierstad, who’s Maskhadov’s version of it and this had collapsed into lawlessness and now quite a famous author. The four extraordinary interview with him. the Russians did absolutely nothing of us drove into eastern Chechnya to financially support it. In this looking for Maskhadov. Dudayev Udensiva-Brenner: That’s incredible. vacuum, Chechnya became the most had been killed about a month In the end, Maskhadov worked out frightening and horrible place to be, before, and Maskahdov was someone a peace deal with Yeltsin’s national and Maskhadov basically didn’t have we respected. He was the rebel security adviser, Alexander Lebed, in the authority to run the place. commander but a very thoughtful, August ’96. What happened there? quiet person—not a radical. He was Udensiva-Brenner: And that’s what someone you could talk to and the De Waal: Speaking of left hand and eventually led to the second war. Russians could potentially talk to. right hand, there was an attempt by We went to his home village and Russia to militarily win the conflict De Waal: Yes, with many, many spoke to some people we knew, and [in August 1996]. And this went twists and turns. Chechnya during they took us outside the village in a disastrously wrong, and the Chechen Independence Part Two was really a jeep and walked us into the middle rebels recaptured Grozny basically frightening place, a black hole. And of this ancient beech forest. They as Yeltsin was being inaugurated. A who bears responsibility there? Well, told us to wait and left us there. A huge humiliation for the Kremlin. the Chechens, for sure, because maybe little while later they came back led the operation into they should have tried to get a better with Maskhadov, who was in his Grozny, took the Russians by surprise, deal with Moscow. But, certainly, camouflage fatigues. He just sat down and reclaimed the center of the city. Moscow because they basically watched on a tree stump and gave us the At which point the option was either as the whole place collapsed and did interview right there in the forest. In to have another battle to retake the nothing to support the reconstruction fact, on the tape, which you have now city or to sign a peace agreement. And of Grozny. They created the conditions at the Harriman, there should be Lebed, the tough-talking general who for the second military intervention some birdsong in the background. ended the Transdniestria conflict in under Putin in 1999. Maskhadov was in a very good 1992, flew down to the region and met mood because basically he’d just with the Chechens and signed a peace Udensiva-Brenner: While writing gotten word that the negotiations deal stipulating that there would be the book, did you ever imagine that, with the OSCE had borne fruit and elections in Chechnya, the issue of after the temporary peace agreement he was going to go to Moscow to status was going to be postponed for that Russia and Chechnya had signed, meet Yeltsin and hopefully sign a five years, and the Russians would Russia would invade again, knowing peace deal in the Kremlin. This was withdraw. Some of these things how misguided the war had been and incredible news, and we were the happened, but other things didn’t. how difficult it had been to achieve first people to hear of it. We had The Russians did withdraw their some sort of peace? a massive exclusive. The trouble troops from Chechnya; there were was, journalistically speaking, that indeed elections, which the OSCE De Waal: I must admit I didn’t we were in the middle of eastern monitored; and Maskhadov was anticipate it back in ’96 and ’97 when Chechnya in the days before mobile recognized as the elected president we were finishing the book. This phones, and by the time we got back of Chechnya. But the status was not was a hugely traumatic conflict, and to Grozny and filed our story, word defined—as far the Chechens were I figured it would take Russia, as a had already gotten out. If we’d been concerned, he was the president of whole, and Chechnya, in particular,

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War, a drawing by ten-year-old Polina Zherebtsova from Chechen Diary (1995).

a long time to get over it. I guess I When you interview someone and written record, but I don’t believe didn’t anticipate how bad things use it for a book, you’re probably that is the case. Archival record is would get in Chechnya. The complete using at best 5 percent or just also based on the subjective view internal collapse. In particular, the choosing some nice quotations. of the person writing whatever kidnappings that happened there. Probably a good half of the people document it is at the time. And the And, during the Yeltsin era, I had not interviewed are now dead. A lot of oral testimony of someone who is anticipated the rise of Putin, who the Chechens died in the conflict, telling you what they saw—they’re came to power using that conflict. and some of the Russians have obviously putting a personal spin died of old age. I interviewed many on it, and in a lot of cases, trying to Udensiva-Brenner: Your book, and Chechens, obviously—people like put themselves in a good light. But I now these tapes, is an incredible , the military leader think a sensitive reader/listener can resource. What is your hope for who became the Chechen president; form his or her own judgment about the tapes? there was a chief negotiator called the authenticity of what people are Usman Imaev who worked in the first saying, and I think most of it has to be De Waal: I’ve passed from being the Dudayev government who gave me taken very seriously. The stories that guy who was out there on the front an incredible interview both about people tell, particularly if they are lines seeing the bombs fall and getting the preindependence period and the corroborated by a few sources, are my boots muddy—although I do still negotiations. On the Russian side, very valuable firsthand testimony of sometimes get my boots muddy— people like Yegor Gaidar, Galina what happened. And, of course, in a to being the guy who sits at the Starovoitova, Sergei Yushenkov, war, a lot of it is never written down; computer in my comfortable Western Arkady Volsky—all of those people a lot of it is who is in the room, who is capsule and analyzes. But somewhere have died; some of them were out there, what was happening. in me is that person who got out there assassinated, unfortunately. They I want to say how grateful I am that and got all that empirical experience all had important stories to tell. So I these interviews are being preserved. and believes that you can’t really think it’s an important resource. I think they not only convey understand places as complex as the Some people are a bit sniffy about information but they also convey a Caucasus unless you’ve been out there the technique of writing a book kind of mood and aura from that era, and talked to people on the ground relying on oral testimony, and they which was very turbulent. I hope they and heard what they have to say. would say that the only record is the are used wisely.

HARRIMAN | 41 ­­