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Constructive Empiricism Without the Epistemic Community

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Constructive Empiricism Without the Epistemic Community Online ISSN 2424-6158. PROBLEMOS 2017 91 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.2017.91.10498 Constructive EMPIRICISM WITHOUT THE EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY Justas Bujokas Vilnius University Department of Logic and History of Philosophy Universiteto str. 3, LT-01513 Vilnius, Lithuania E-mail: [email protected] Abstract. Constructive empiricism (CE), a widely debated anti-realist philosophy of science by Bas van Fraassen, offers a philosophical interpretation of scientific practice. The agent of the scientific practice, according to CE, is what Bas van Fraassen himself calls the “epistemic community”. However, William Seager argued that by appealing to the epistemic community constructive empiricists warrant scientists’ belief in unobservables. Moreover, Simone Bahrenberg et al. maintained that if what is observable is defined in terms of whom a particular epistemic community consists of, then observability cannot be an objective property, while CE needs observability to be objective. In this paper, based on four thought experiments, I consider a special hypothetical case of the epis- temic community consisting of only one person and notice that in this hypothetical case the objections by Seager and Bahrenberg et al. dissolve: Seager’s requirement to treat the reports of other members of epistemic community as an evidence for the epistemic belief collapses; and, contra Bahrenberg et al., ob- servability for a single person is unproblematically objective in CE. Based on this observation I argue that constructive empiricists would be better off reformulating their main thesis in terms of a single cognitive agent (person, scientist), because (i) this would not only allow CE to render all the objections appealing to the concept of epistemic community ineffectual once and for all, but also (ii) using the proposed mo- dification constructive empiricists could straightforwardly account for some cases of possible scientific practice, for which their original thesis cannot account in an obvious manner. The above change in the policy of CE (iii) would still allow to retain the key features of the empiricist position—the observable/ unobservable distinction, the distinction between acceptance and belief, the principles of epistemic mo- desty and the principle of scientific rationality—at least on an equal footing to the original thesis by van Fraassen. Keywords: constructive empiricism, epistemic community, observability, objectivity Constructive empiricism (CE) is probably agent of the scientific practice is: according one of the most debated antirealist concep- to CE, looking at our science, it is obviously tions of science. The main idea of CE, as our “epistemic community” or just us as a expressed by Bas van Fraassen in his semi- group of scientists. One of the many issues nal work Scientific Image (1980a), is that surrounding CE, as an influential empiricist science seeks not true but rather empirically alternative to the realist approach to science, adequate theories. is the question whether CE correctly bases Van Fraassen is straightforward in an- its philosophy on the concept of epistemic swering the question of who or what the community. 17 Besides the general puzzlement about temic belief seems unavailing. Also, contra how we can ascribe the epistemic belief Bahrenberg et al., in the case of a single to a society of scientists without getting person the observability (for that person) into sociological debates (Rosen 1994, van is unproblematically objective in CE, be- Fraassen 1994, Mizrahi 2014), and despite cause what a single person observes is just van Fraassen’s effort to define the epis- a function of how she as a sort of measuring temic community, to describe its change, apparatus interacts with the outside world, and to draw its boundaries (van Fraassen and not a function of the problematic moral 1980a, 2006), there are at least two direct and ideological criteria. arguments against the attempt to treat the Based on the above I, furthermore, sug- “epistemic community” as a basis for the gest that constructive empiricists would be CE view on science. better off reformulating their main thesis in William Seager (1988) argued that by terms of a single cognitive agent (person, appealing to the epistemic community CE scientist, or anyone capable of acting and warrants scientists’ belief in unobservables, creating what we would consider to be the because if the epistemic community is re- features of science as an epistemic activity) ally “epistemic”, ideally every member of instead of the whole epistemic community. it should believe what every other member First of all, this would allow CE to rebuke believes, even though in principle the per- all the objections appealing to the concept ceptual capabilities of different members of epistemic community, because if CE of the same epistemic community can be interpreted the essentially epistemic nature different to the extreme. of the endeavour of knowing the observ- Bahrenberg et al. (2006) maintained able phenomena without the concept of that if what is observable is defined in epistemic community (the community be- terms of whom particular epistemic com- ing epistemically contingent or pragmatic munity consists of, which in turn depends feature of science), there just would be noth- on non-scientific criteria like moral choice, ing to attack. Secondly, using the proposed ideology, etc., then observability cannot modification CE can straightforwardly ac- be an objective property, while CE claims count for some cases of possible scientific observability to be objective. practice (for example, for those described In this paper using four thought experi- in this paper), for which its original thesis ments I consider a special hypothetical case cannot account in an obvious manner. of the epistemic community consisting of Third, I will argue that the proposed only one person (human or non-human). change in the policy of CE still allows One can immediately notice that in this constructive empiricists to retain the key hypothetical case the objections raised by features of their philosophy and to hold CE Seager and Bahrenberg et al. simply do not ground in other well known CE debates, work. If we agree that a single person can at least as well as using the original CE conduct epistemically full-fledged scientific thesis. Here I take the most salient features activity, Seager’s requirement to treat the of the CE philosophy to be the observable/ reports of other members of the epistemic unobservable distinction, the distinction community as an evidence for the epis- between the pragmatic acceptance and the 18 epistemic belief, the principle of epistemic sidering the life of Jane Doe for a while they (or “ontological”) modesty and the commit- describe what Jane Doe is doing, or rather ment to make sense of science as a practical what the purpose of Jane Doe’s activity is, rational activity. in the usual manner as per famous thesis (let’s call it OCE - the original CE) by Bas A Lonely Scientist van Fraassen: Thought Experiment Science aims to give us theories which are Imagine a post-apocalyptic world in which empirically adequate; and acceptance of a all human-beings had been wiped out from theory involves as a belief only that it is em- the face of Earth with the exception of a pirically adequate. (van Fraassen 1980a: 12) single person, Jane Doe, a capable yet evil Note that, if constructive empiricists nuclear physicist, who happened to know are able to interpret science in terms of about the upcoming global disaster (not that the above thesis in the case of scientific she had anything to do with it) but failed to community which consists of millions of inform about it her beloved ones1 (not that people, they should be able to do so in she had many), let alone anyone else in the the case of single Jane Doe as well. After doomed world. all, Jane’s science is not so much differ- There is not much to do in an empty ent from the science as we know it. The planet, so Jane Doe continues doing what former is just slower and less diverse, but she likes and knows best, namely, science. constructive empiricists would be reluctant As World Wide Web is still working, she has to admit that their thesis is about financial access to all the automated experimental fa- and human resources in science rather than cilities, including the Large Hadron Collider an interpretation of the most salient (if not (LHE), gravitational-waves observatories, essential) features of the epistemic activ- neutrino detectors, plethora of space and ity they happen to admire so much (van ground telescopes, etc. Also, she possesses Fraassen 1994: 191). superior mathematical skills to construct Moreover, when describing Jane Doe’s new theories and to test them using the activity, constructive empiricists have aforementioned scientific instrumentation. no business in trying to define epistemic Jane Doe’s scientific activity might last not community and draw its boundaries as van for too long, as the scientific infrastructure Fraassen himself had taken pains to on at is subject to wear and tear. This, however, least a couple of occasions (van Fraassen need not to be of big concern for the phi- 1980a: 18; 2006: 128-130). After all, in losophers of science who might decide to this case the epistemic community is just describe (or to interpret) Jane Doe’s scien- the lucky Jane Doe. Unsurprisingly, some tific practice at that particular period in the critical arguments against CE, appealing to human history. the concept of epistemic community, just Now suppose typical constructive em- dissolve in the case of Jane Doe, because piricists decide to do just that and after con- in this case an epistemic community or a 1 Some say she was the little sister of Mary, the set of scientists is just equivalent to a single color scientist (see Jackson 1982).
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