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Home , Constructive empiricism, Philosophical analysis

Online ISSN 2424-6158. PROBLEMOS 2017 91 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.2017.91.10498

Constructive without the Epistemic Community

Justas Bujokas Vilnius University Department of and History of Universiteto str. 3, LT-01513 Vilnius, Lithuania E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract. (CE), a widely debated anti-realist philosophy of by , offers a philosophical interpretation of scientific practice. The agent of the scientific practice, according to CE, is what Bas van Fraassen himself calls the “epistemic community”. However, William Seager argued that by appealing to the epistemic community constructive empiricists warrant scientists’ in . Moreover, Simone Bahrenberg et al. maintained that if what is observable is defined in terms of whom a particular epistemic community consists of, then observability cannot be an objective property, while CE needs observability to be objective. In this paper, based on four thought experiments, I consider a special hypothetical case of the epis- temic community consisting of only one person and notice that in this hypothetical case the objections by Seager and Bahrenberg et al. dissolve: Seager’s requirement to treat the reports of other members of epistemic community as an for the epistemic belief collapses; and, contra Bahrenberg et al., ob- servability for a single person is unproblematically objective in CE. Based on this I argue that constructive empiricists would be better off reformulating their main thesis in terms of a single cognitive agent (person, scientist), because (i) this would not only allow CE to render all the objections appealing to the of epistemic community ineffectual once and for all, but also (ii) using the proposed mo- dification constructive empiricists could straightforwardly account for some cases of possible scientific practice, for which their original thesis cannot account in an obvious manner. The above change in the policy of CE (iii) would still allow to retain the key features of the empiricist position—the observable/ distinction, the distinction between acceptance and belief, the principles of epistemic mo- desty and the principle of scientific rationality—at least on an equal footing to the original thesis by van Fraassen. Keywords: constructive empiricism, epistemic community, observability,

Constructive empiricism (CE) is probably agent of the scientific practice is: according one of the most debated antirealist concep- to CE, looking at our science, it is obviously tions of science. The main of CE, as our “epistemic community” or just us as a expressed by Bas van Fraassen in his semi- group of scientists. One of the many issues nal work Scientific Image (1980a), is that surrounding CE, as an influential empiricist science seeks not true but rather empirically alternative to the realist approach to science, adequate theories. is the question whether CE correctly bases Van Fraassen is straightforward in an- its philosophy on the concept of epistemic swering the question of who or what the community.

17 Besides the general puzzlement about temic belief seems unavailing. Also, contra how we can ascribe the epistemic belief Bahrenberg et al., in the case of a single to a society of scientists without getting person the observability (for that person) into sociological debates (Rosen 1994, van is unproblematically objective in CE, be- Fraassen 1994, Mizrahi 2014), and despite cause what a single person observes is just van Fraassen’s effort to define the epis- a function of how she as a sort of measuring temic community, to describe its change, apparatus interacts with the outside world, and to draw its boundaries (van Fraassen and not a function of the problematic moral 1980a, 2006), there are at least two direct and ideological criteria. against the attempt to treat the Based on the above I, furthermore, sug- “epistemic community” as a basis for the gest that constructive empiricists would be CE view on science. better off reformulating their main thesis in William Seager (1988) argued that by terms of a single cognitive agent (person, appealing to the epistemic community CE scientist, or anyone capable of acting and warrants scientists’ belief in unobservables, creating what we would consider to be the because if the epistemic community is re- features of science as an epistemic activity) ally “epistemic”, ideally every member of instead of the whole epistemic community. it should believe what every other member First of all, this would allow CE to rebuke , even though in principle the per- all the objections appealing to the concept ceptual capabilities of different members of epistemic community, because if CE of the same epistemic community can be interpreted the essentially epistemic different to the extreme. of the endeavour of knowing the observ- Bahrenberg et al. (2006) maintained able phenomena without the concept of that if what is observable is defined in epistemic community (the community be- terms of whom particular epistemic com- ing epistemically contingent or pragmatic munity consists of, which in turn depends feature of science), there just would be noth- on non-scientific criteria like moral choice, ing to attack. Secondly, using the proposed ideology, etc., then observability cannot modification CE can straightforwardly ac- be an objective property, while CE claims count for some cases of possible scientific observability to be objective. practice (for example, for those described In this paper using four thought experi- in this paper), for which its original thesis ments I consider a special hypothetical case cannot account in an obvious manner. of the epistemic community consisting of Third, I will argue that the proposed only one person (human or non-human). change in the policy of CE still allows One can immediately notice that in this constructive empiricists to retain the key hypothetical case the objections raised by features of their philosophy and to hold CE Seager and Bahrenberg et al. simply do not ground in other well known CE debates, work. If we agree that a single person can at least as well as using the original CE conduct epistemically full-fledged scientific thesis. Here I take the most salient features activity, Seager’s requirement to treat the of the CE philosophy to be the observable/ reports of other members of the epistemic unobservable distinction, the distinction community as an evidence for the epis- between the pragmatic acceptance and the

18 epistemic belief, the principle of epistemic sidering the life of Jane Doe for a while they (or “ontological”) modesty and the commit- describe what Jane Doe is doing, or rather ment to make sense of science as a practical what the purpose of Jane Doe’s activity is, rational activity. in the usual manner as per famous thesis (let’s call it OCE - the original CE) by Bas A Lonely Scientist van Fraassen: Thought Experiment Science aims to give us theories which are Imagine a post-apocalyptic world in which empirically adequate; and acceptance of a all human-beings had been wiped out from theory involves as a belief only that it is em- the face of Earth with the exception of a pirically adequate. (van Fraassen 1980a: 12) single person, Jane Doe, a capable yet evil Note that, if constructive empiricists nuclear physicist, who happened to know are able to interpret science in terms of about the upcoming global disaster (not that the above thesis in the case of scientific she had anything to do with it) but failed to community which consists of millions of inform about it her beloved ones1 (not that people, they should be able to do so in she had many), let alone anyone else in the the case of single Jane Doe as well. After doomed world. all, Jane’s science is not so much differ- There is not much to do in an empty ent from the science as we know it. The planet, so Jane Doe continues doing what former is just slower and less diverse, but she likes and knows best, namely, science. constructive empiricists would be reluctant As World Wide Web is still working, she has to admit that their thesis is about financial access to all the automated experimental fa- and human resources in science rather than cilities, including the Large Hadron Collider an interpretation of the most salient (if not (LHE), gravitational-waves observatories, essential) features of the epistemic activ- neutrino detectors, plethora of space and ity they happen to admire so much (van ground telescopes, etc. Also, she possesses Fraassen 1994: 191). superior mathematical skills to Moreover, when describing Jane Doe’s new theories and to test them using the activity, constructive empiricists have aforementioned scientific instrumentation. no business in trying to define epistemic Jane Doe’s scientific activity might last not community and draw its boundaries as van for too long, as the scientific infrastructure Fraassen himself had taken pains to on at is subject to wear and tear. This, however, least a couple of occasions (van Fraassen need not to be of big concern for the phi- 1980a: 18; 2006: 128-130). After all, in losophers of science who might decide to this case the epistemic community is just describe (or to interpret) Jane Doe’s scien- the lucky Jane Doe. Unsurprisingly, some tific practice at that particular period in the critical arguments against CE, appealing to human history. the concept of epistemic community, just Now suppose typical constructive em- dissolve in the case of Jane Doe, because piricists decide to do just that and after con- in this case an epistemic community or a

1 Some say she was the little sister of Mary, the set of scientists is just equivalent to a single color scientist (see Jackson 1982). scientist.

19 For example, based on the CE claim that P, or just to seek evidence for P. However, science could be interpreted as if scientists as long as CE includes the concept of did not believe in what their accepted theo- epistemic community to its conception of ries told us about the unobservable part of science, Seager’s contention that the mem- the world, William Seager argued that the bers of the epistemic community have to belief in unobservables, on the contrary, is be epistemically significant to each other warranted by the principle “believe now in some way has to be answered in detail. what you would believe if you accepted Nothing of the clash between CE and as evidence what is unavailable only by Seager, however, is of concern in the case accident” (Seager 1988: 186), where the of the lonely Jane Doe. If we admit that evidence for the scientist’s beliefs, among a single person can go about doing epis- other things, includes the stated beliefs of temically full-fledged science, Seager’s other members of the epistemic community. epistemic reliance requirement for science According to Seager, in an ideal case, if a collapses. Jane Doe’s epistemic activity member X of some epistemic community can in principle be as successful as normal believes that another member Y of the same science despite her not believing that there scientific community believes some propo- are any intelligent beings left in the whole sition P, then X also believes P (Seager universe, and her not necessarily relying 1988: 183 eq. P2). Let’s call this principle on anyone but herself. Thus no epistemic the epistemic reliance principle. As a lot community (consisting of more than one of possible sentient beings (like intelligent sentient being) and, in turn, no epistemic robots or Martians) of advanced sensory reliance on any other sentient being is nec- capabilities are the potential members of our essary for doing science. scientific community and their beliefs are Simone Bahrenberg et al. (2006) simi- potentially epistemically relevant, in princi- larly based their critique of CE on van ple everything is observable, and there can Fraassen’s willingness to discuss aspects be no significant distinction between van of epistemic community: Fraassen’s CE thesis and his formulation of the observability of a phenomenon depends (van Fraassen 1980a: 8). on who is a member of the epistemic commu- Seager’s epistemic reliance principle, nity and we have seen that membership in the on its own, seems to be extremely strong. epistemic community depends on moral and One might argue that, even in an ideal case, ideological criteria. [...] But whatever these something like a weak principle of reliance criteria are, it seems doubtful that they are (and not Seager’s principle) is at work in objective in the sense in which findings of the science. For example, if a member X of natural are objective. (Bahrenberg et al. 2006: 40) some epistemic community believes that another member Y of the same epistemic With this Bahrenberg et al. community believes some P, challenge the CE contention that empiricism then X might not immediately believe P, can do both: (a) base its philosophy on the but rather might believe that it is worthy concept of epistemic community, and (b) (on pragmatic and not epistemic grounds) maintain that observability is an objective to form belief in P or come to disbelief in property of things, states of affairs or fea-

20 tures of our world. In simple terms, the point cally interact with the world, regardless of of critique by Bahrenberg et al. is as follows: whether there is just one scientist or many. if we, based on our good will, accepted an The latter complications in the debates artificially intelligent robot with the X-ray the latter complications in the debates of CE detection capability to our epistemic com- are easily avoided in the case of Jane Doe. munity, our concept of observability would The lonely scientist does not have to share all of a sudden refer to X-rays, which in her concept of observability with any other general are treated as unobservables. Thus, being. Though we still might be struggling to X-rays are observable for the good-natured. give a perfect definition of what it is to be an In a complicated answer, van Fraassen objective property (for CE objectivity is an (2006), if I understand him correctly, con- intra-scientific notion (van Fraassen 1980a: tradicts that the argument of Bahrenberg et 82), and thus, one cannot easily reflect on al. fails to distinguish between the matters the “essence” of objectivity by means of of and how those matters of fact are de- armchair philosophy), in the case of Jane scribed. The matters of fact are, in this case, Doe we at least can easily describe what how members of the scientific community we mean when we say that observability is interact with the outside world to be capable objective. We mean exactly the same thing of perceiving it, and at any given time those as when we say that Jane Doe is objectively are objective (factual), determined purely seeing a particle accelerator, when she is in by the physical state of the world and the front of it. When there are no other actual or physical state of the creatures perceiving it. potential members of scientific community While it is true that many additional con- around (including those having no capabil- siderations will be involved in describing ity to observe the optical spectra), what Jane those matters of fact, this still allows CE to Doe is capable of observing depends just on claim that observability is indeed a physical her interactions with the world (not on the property determined by the interactions of problematic ideological criteria), and those scientists, as a sort of measuring apparatus, are unproblematically objective in CE. with an outside world. We could even try to cash out the concept of observability in Scrutinizing the Case purely scientific terms (for an example of of a Lonely Scientist such an attempt see Muller 2005: 83). In CE the question of how sentient beings come The point of the above hypothetical case was to finally name some things observable to emphasize that as soon as empiricists shift and others unobservable is just a curiosity their attention to a single scientist instead of rather than a necessary part of the empiricist the whole scientific community, the critical conception of science (van Fraassen 2006: arguments based on the alleged over-reliance 131-132). And any actual process of naming of CE on the concept of epistemic commu- of different sorts of factual physical states nity collapse. Thus, instead of the original of affairs in different sorts of communities thesis by Bas van Fraassen (OCE), I suggest would be of similar status for CE. What is stating constructive empiricist philosophy of important, however, is that we predicate science along the following lines (let’s call observability based on how we physi- this thesis RCE – the reduced CE):

21 [Scientist qua scientist aims – J. B.] to give philosophical position, possibly susceptible us theories which are empirically adequate; to other kinds of criticism to which the and acceptance of a theory involves as a original CE was not susceptible. First, I will belief only that it is empirically adequate. defend the RCE against the first challenge, (van Fraassen 1980a: 12) and I will address the second challenge in The actual wording need not to be of a the next section. big concern here, the point being, that the As the first challenge I propose to con- CE thesis might be reinterpreted as saying sider two arguments against RCE. that a sentient being or a person, or just anyone, abstractly speaking, is a scientist A. Though at first sight the thought experi- or is acting like a scientist as long as her ment of Jane Doe might seem compelling, activity may be understood and interpreted thought experiments in general are quite a as seeking theories that are empirically species of philosophical methodology on adequate. This way we separate the phi- their own and are notorious for being sus- losophy of science and the question of what ceptible to various flaws (Sorensen 1998: science is from other possible sociological 21-50, 256-274). And the easiest way to and anthropological questions (arguably claim that the of science as a factual): what does it take for a group of one-person activity makes no sense is to scientists to work together, what differences argue that the description of Jane Doe’s they have to overcome and what fractures in is not full: while it is true, their communities might occur when they that at the given moment Jane Doe is doing start doing science together. On the surface science on her own, but, abstractly speaking of it, this change is minor, but by using it (both OCE and RCE should be interpreted CE becomes immune to the critique based as abstract2 and even reconstructable by on the not so clear concept of epistemic the means of formal logic (Muller 2004)), community in the OCE. she is still a part of her vanished epistemic There are two ways for the opponents of community and she still treats her activity CE to try to maintain the original thesis thus as if she was communicating with other keeping CE exposed to the arguments based scientists. Thus, Jane Doe’s science is the on the concept of epistemic community. The same science of the epistemic community as first challenge is to focus on theR CE itself a whole. In order to answer this objection I and to claim that the modified RCE has propose three other more clear-cut cases of a something seriously amiss. Namely, that single sentient being epistemic community. the new CE fails to reflect on some essential Imagine a primitive human being who features of science, because science is es- happened to be the first of his kind to start sentially (and epistemically) a collaborative doing something which CE would be will- effort. Or one could claim that the RCE is ing to call science. For example, he starts incoherent in the way the OCE is not. The imagining unobservable forces of nature second way to challenge the proposed modi- and using their supposed regularities to fication of constructive empiricist policy is predict the periodic movement of heavenly to claim that the modification changes the nature of CE thus expressing quite another 2 As opposed to chronological, for example.

22 bodies (those he constantly observes). Also, for all we know it was, is, and will be the suppose this Cro-Magnon uses some primi- only member of its scientific community. tive sign system to write down his findings. There is nothing logically or nomologically But just about the time this early homo sa- impossible about such case. piens starts investigating the unobservable Furthermore, let’s investigate another nature of the observable four seasons, a gi- possible case. once wrote ant asteroid, similar to the one which wiped about possible situations, where some out the dinosaurs, hits the Earth and this person feels other person’s pain (Schlick time kills off every human being including 1963: 485-487). In the spirit of Schlick’s the primitive scientist. Are we supposed to example, imagine another alien life-form treat this case as if nothing what we would which is somewhat similar to a big tree with like to interpret as primitive science ever multiple nerve centers on its branches and happened, just because there had been only a couple of partially overlapping sensory one scientist during the whole history of the organ complexes, which would mean that, humankind, and he tried to grasp the empiri- for all constructive empiricists know, the cal phenomena of this world possibly just different brains of this intelligent plant can for his own personal sake disregarding the feel the pain of other brains, can be directly and utility of his fellow cave- aware of parts of its neighboring brains’ men? I think not. sensory information, etc. Suppose, again, Opponents of RCE might still insist that that we encounter this plant and observe the contemporary science is quite another that, being mobile, it repeatedly creates thing than the scribbles of primitive Cro- some phenomena and has something like a Magnon, even if we could imagine the con- written language to register the results of its tinuous development from the latter to the experiments. We could interpret its activity former, and CE is not committed to explain as some sort of alien science, because it anthropological curiosities. In order not to is, exactly, a very complex scientist going get trapped in some version of continuum about its research. Someone might object , I would like to use the common that different brains should be treated as weapon of choice in the scientific realism- separate scientists. Should this possible antirealism controversy and investigate the misunderstanding have any bearing on CE? possible case of a single extraterrestrial No. Our philosophical reflection on science scientist. should not depend on the considerations Imagine an intelligent giant creature of neuroscience and on the answers to the with thousands of tentacles, living in the very tough questions from the books of planet far far away, capable of manipulat- philosophy of personal identity or philoso- ing its environment, create phenomena it phy of mind. is interested in, and able to systematize its Note that here I am not trying to tell what knowledge using some form of sign system. exactly these possible creatures should do to This creature is the one and only scientist be dubbed “scientists”, which is obviously of its species. We could speculate, that its an interesting question in the philosophy of giant body constantly regenerates, thus it CE on its own as CE claims to be a success- lost its (unnecessary) ability to breed and ful interpretation of the scientific activity.

23 Rather, I insist that it is hard, if not impossi- our humanly world, language is a commu- ble, to show that in principle single-scientist nication device, but again it seems not at all (whomever or whatever we choose to call unreasonable to think that in the aforemen- it) science cannot exist. And if CE chooses tioned hypothetical “communities” it can to account for those cases, it should do so act as just a device of thought economy or, unambiguously with RCE and without rais- put bluntly, as a device for a single scientist ing the suspicion that community (Schlick’s to communicate with itself. Van Fraassen plant is almost definitely a scientist, but himself is quite strict about what questions it is not clear at all whether we can call the of science can ask about the it a “community”, which would seriously . At least in the analytical complicate matters for the OCE) plays an those are the ques- essential part in how CE (or tions about the structure and the content axiology, to be precise) portrays science. of the theory, also the questions about the relation between the theory and the data B. Another possible objection to the pro- (van Fraassen 1980b: 664−665). And those posed modification of CE appeals not to our questions definitely do not include anything contingent and, as I was arguing, unjusti- about how and if theories have to be com- fied discrimination in favor of human-like municated among social beings. conglomerates of scientists, but rather to One could suspect that here we are start- the coherence of the RCE. Besides trying ing to talk about something like “private to grasp the scientific activity in terms of science” (analogous to the “private lan- the aims of one scientist, RCE also appeals guage”), but this would be a false analogy. to the scientific theories that are usually I am talking rather about a sign system used analyzed as linguistic or mathematical- by a single scientist to systematize his or linguistic entities. One might argue that her scientific findings, for example, about though a single sentient being is capable of a language consisting purely of written some sort of cognitive activity and it is pos- mathematical formulae. This sign system, sible to formulate a philosophical position with sufficient effort, could in principle be according to which this activity is science, deciphered even by other scientifically com- this philosophical position is definitely not petent communities, while private language OCE nor RCE, because a single cognitive (if it is logically possible at all) would be a agent cannot aim for linguistic entities as language in principle unintelligible to any- nothing we could legitimately call language one else except its “native” speaker. can, from the logical or nomological point Going back to our Jane Doe, one might of view, be ascribed to an agent without past still be tempted to try to describe on what or present community. conditions this small single-person com- This objection is, however, misguided. munity might change. For example, on what Again we should distinguish between what conditions Jane Doe would accept into her we are trying to say about the language as epistemic community the artificially intel- the of science and what can ligent robot she had created. However, it be said about the language by the scholars is not clear why CE philosophers capable of the other legitimate fields of research. In of interpreting the enterprise of being a

24 scientist qua scientist, based on their now is not to defend CE against its critics, but modified thesis, would want to get into just to check if the CE is invariant under the anthropological and social aspects of when transformation from OCE to RCE. and where scientists decide to coordinate I take the main tenets of CE to be as fol- their endeavor to investigate the empirical lows: (i) effort to interpret practical activi- world. Why would CE want to claim that ties of scientists; (ii) claim that the science “science is N sentient beings (or just hu- is rational; (iii) commitment to epistemic mans, if we decide to apply CE only to our modesty (“ontological” economy); (iv) spe- scientific community) working together”, cific construal of the distinction between the where N is supposed to be what number? observables and unobservables; (v) distinc- The cooperation of Jane Doe and her robot tion between the pragmatic acceptance and is up to them and up to the anthropologist, epistemic belief. but not up to the empiricist epistemology I have already made considerations re- or axiology of science. garding (i), and concluded that if we agree that the single scientist science is possible, Appeal to the Epistemic there is just no why CE should Community is Unnecessary not account for that scientific practice. for Constructive Empiricism Constructive empiricists, looking at the sci- ence of some community, should be equally Admittedly, there are some direct indica- able (or unable) to interpret the activities of tions in the work of Bas van Fraassen, the parts of that community as well. that he would prefer to somehow include On multiple occasions van Fraassen the concept of epistemic community to suggested that his CE is intended as an inter- the philosophy of CE. For example, van pretation of science as rational activity (van Fraassen notes that science is a “cultural Fraassen 1980a: 19, 1984: 235, 2003: 180). phenomenon” (van Fraassen 1980b: 663). It is usually taken for granted, that CE bases His work as a whole, however, seems to its philosophy on the so called voluntaristic indicate otherwise. In this section I argue conception of rationality (Okruhlik 2014, that, besides immediately dissolving one Dicken 2009a, 2010), largely due to van of the headaches of CE (critical arguments Fraassen’s epistemological-psychological based on the concept of epistemic com- conception of rational belief, according munity) and allowing CE to make sense to which epistemic judgement might be of possible cases of scientific practice de- rational even without sufficient evidence scribed in the thought experiments above, to warrant its certainty, because the epis- the shift from OCE to RCE is negligibly temic judgement is “a matter of cognitive minor. I will argue that the main commitment, intention, engagement” (van and the main debates of CE are unaffected Fraassen 1984: 256). The consequence of by the proposed modification in no relevant this conception for CE is that van Fraassen way. Thus, a change from OCE to RCE uses minimal criteria for scientists to be is indeed just a small change in wording rational (thus minimal criteria for his thesis yielding considerable results. I would like in this respect). As long as scientists are to emphasize that the purpose of this section capable of acting on their set of beliefs in

25 committal, practical, intentional way, they OCE is more modest than the realist the- can be treated as rational cognitive agents. sis above just because the former appeals to This boils down to the principle that as long the empirical adequacy of scientific theories as scientists are coherent in their actions rather than the of those same theories. (they are capable of acting in a way that And this point is not at stake whether we can be interpreted logically coherently), would choose to use OCE or RCE. whatever judgment they are following in Secondly, James Ladyman challenged those actions can be evaluated as rational. CE claims to epistemic modesty by arguing, Whether this minimal requirement for that constructive empiricism is committed scientific rationality is plausible is not at to epistemic (Ladyman 2000: issue in this paper. The issue is: does the 855). This lively debated issue, however, question of scientific rationality change in again depends on the concept of observ- some important way under the transforma- ability and the belief in observability, but tion from OCE to RCE? I believe not, be- not on the nature of the agent of belief. cause whether the complex of one’s beliefs Third, as was suggested before, with is rational or not is usually discussed in regard to the dispute between van Fraassen terms of contents of beliefs and not in terms and Rosen, appeal to the epistemic com- of the agent having these beliefs. Moreover, munity might be understood as an implicit discussion between Gideon Rosen (1994) appeal to some form of social ontology: because constructive empiricists use the and van Fraassen (1994) about the inter- concept of epistemic community, they are pretation of CE in general and about what expected to explain on what basis scientific it means for a group of people to have a community is treated as a social entity and belief in particular (Rosen 1994: 145-147) how one should apply, for example, the suggests that, in terms of the second (ii) concept of belief (which is more readily and aspect of CE we are considering here, RCE naturally applicable to a single cognitive might be even preferable to OCE. Thus, the agent) to a group of believers. question of scientific rationality in CE is in- In conclusion, with regard to (iii), RCE variant under the transformation from OCE can do at least as well as OCE. to RCE, and RCE may even be preferable. Probably the most widely debated aspect What weight does the transformation of CE is the distinction between the ob- from OCE to RCE have in debates of CE, servables and the unobservables. According regarding the epistemic or ontological com- to CE, this distinction cannot be suitably mitments (iii)? defined using only armchair philosophy, First of all, van Fraassen suggests that rather, “if there are limits to observation, his thesis is a modest alternative to what these are a subject for empirical science, he thinks would be a reasonable scientific and not for philosophical ” (van realist thesis: Fraassen 1980a: 57). If, however, a single Science aims to give us, in its theories, a lite- person can engage in the legitimate sci- rally true story of what the world is like; and entific activity and we choose to interpret acceptance of a scientific theory involves the this activity by proposing RCE, the ques- belief that it is true. (van Fraassen 1980a: 8) tion whether constructive empiricists can

26 coherently maintain both their thesis and Again, it seems that CE has a way out of van Fraassen’s contention that scientific this problem (Kukla 1998: 107-108; Dudau theories are themselves the only source we 2002: 81-86). In this paper, however, what can hope for to acquire information about is important is that it is not the agent of be- what is observable, will depend purely on lief or acceptance who is at issue here, but considerations relating to how we treat rather the content of the particular belief and OCE (or RCE) as theses about scientific the possibility to recognize it. Actually, the theories and not about agents who propose problem of this distinction is often argued those theories. exactly as if belief and acceptance of one For example, Fred A. Muller in his scientist would be involved. Thus OCE and philosophical-scientific definition of ob- RCE is on equal footing here as well. servability (Muller 2005: 83) suggests treat- Can there in principle be some other ing the term “observable” as a three-place issue, where it would appear that RCE is in predicate which is a function of the object to some relevant sense different from OCE? which the predicate is applied, the scientific Perhaps, but I do not think it is easy to community which has the theory about this find one. If anything, RCE appears to be object, and the theory on account of which preferable to OCE not only because it dis- we try to understand whether the object in solves all problems related to the concept consideration is observable. This definition of epistemic community, but also because can be easily recast in terms of a single in multiple instances it seems to be easier person, just by interpreting one variable to talk about the beliefs and actions of a not as meaning the epistemic community single scientist rather than about those of but simply a single scientist. And this in no the whole community. way impedes any considerations regarding the concept of observability in the discus- Conclusion sions that follow (Dicken and Lipton 2006; In this paper I have presented four thought Muller and van Fraassen 2008; Dicken experiments or four cases of possible epis- 2009b). Thus, (iv) is invariant under the temic practices: the case of Jane Doe, a transformation from OCE to RCE. lonely scientist who continues to pursue the The distinction between the pragmatic scientific activity after every other member acceptance and the epistemic belief (v) also of her epistemic community had been de- should equally well work (or not work) for stroyed; the case of Cro-Magnon scientist, both OCE and RCE. It has been argued that who just started doing primitive science CE cannot maintain meaningful distinction without any pretense of communicating his between acceptance of the whole theory findings to anyone else; and two cases of and the belief that the theory is empirically complex extraterrestrial life forms, to one adequate, because if scientists did every- of which even the concept of personhood is thing as if they believed the whole theory, not readily applicable. I noted, that in those it means exactly that scientists believe the cases arguments appealing to the concept of whole theory. That is why Paul Horwich “epistemic community” collapse. calls belief/acceptance the “distinction Moreover, I have argued that despite without a difference” (Horwich 1991: 3). possible contradictions (namely, the argu-

27 ment that Jane Doe acts as a member of “vir- This reformulation does not change the tual” scientific community and the argument nature of constructive empiricism and is that language, and thus scientific theories, well fit to replaceO CE in the familiar con- are impossible without a rich community of structive empiricism debates: about observ- science), these cases are legitimate possible able/unobservable distinction, distinction cases of scientific activity. Thus, constructive between epistemic belief and pragmatic ac- empiricism should account for these cases ceptance, rationality of science as depicted and the easiest way to do so is by reformulat- by constructive empiricism, about ontologi- ing the main thesis of constructive empiri- cal (or epistemic) modesty of empiricism as cism (OCE) into the simplified thesis (RCE), compared to scientific realism.3 which states that simply a scientist (and not science as such or epistemic community) is the one who seeks empirically adequate theories. This reformulation (from OCE to 3 The first draft of this paper was prepared asa RCE) would destroy any argument appeal- presentation for the conference Philosophy of Science in ing to the concept of epistemic community the Forest 2016, organized by the Dutch Society for the against CE in a decisive manner and would Philosophy of Science. I express my sincere thanks to Marcel J. Boumans, Fred A. Muller, and Sander Beckers straightforwardly account for the possible for drawing my attention to some possible counter-argu- single-scientist scientific practices. ments against the expressed above.

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28 Rosen, G., 1994. What is Constructive Empi­ and Experiment: An Empiricist View. In PSA: ricism? Philosophical Studies: An International Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 74: of Science Association, vol. II: Symposia and Invited 143–178. Papers (1980), p. 663–678. Schlick, M., 1963. Meaning and Verification. Van Fraassen, B. C., 1984. Belief and the Will. In P. Edwards (ed.), Readings in Twentieth-Century The Journal of Philosophy 81 (5): 235–256. Philosophy. New York: The Free Press, p. 468–492. Van Fraassen, B. C., 1994. Gideon Rosen on Seager, W., 1988. Scientific Anti-Realism and the Constructive Empiricism. Philosophical Studies: An Epistemic Community. In PSA: Proceedings of the International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Asso­ Tradition 74 (2): 179–192. ciation, vol. I: Contributed Papers (1988), p. 181–187. Van Fraassen, B. C., 2003. Laws and Symmetry. Sorensen, R. A., 1998. Thought Experiments. New Oxford: Clarendon Press. York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Fraassen, B. C., 2006. Replies to the Papers. Van Fraassen, B. C., 1980. The Scientific Image. In A. Berg-Hildebrand and C. Suhm (eds.), Bas van Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fraassen: The Fortunes of Empiricism. Frankfurt: Van Fraassen, B. C., 1980. Theory Construction Ontos Verlag, p. 35–43.

Konstruktyvusis empirizmas be episteminės bendruomenės Justas Bujokas

Santrauka. Konstruktyvusis empirizmas (KE), plačiai nagrinėta ir nagrinėjama Baso van Fraasseno antirealistinė mokslo koncepcija, siūlo filosofinę mokslo praktikos interpretaciją. KE filosofijoje mokslo prak- tikos subjektas yra, kaip nurodo pats van Fraassenas, vadinamoji episteminė bendruomenė. Tačiau Williamas Seageris prieštarauja, kad jeigu KE šalininkai remiasi episteminės bendruomenės sąvoka, tai KE filosofija neišvengiamai numato, jog mokslininkai tiki nestebimaisiais esiniais. Maža to, Simone Bahrenberg ir kt. teigia, kad nuo to, iš ko sudaryta episteminė bendruomenė, priklauso, kurie esiniai yra stebimieji, todėl stebimumas negali būti objektyvi savybė, o KE laikosi nuostatos, kad stebimumas yra objektyvi savybė. Straipsnyje, remiantis keturiais mintiniais eksperimentais, aptariamas atskiras hipotetinis episteminės bendruomenės, kurioje tėra vienas asmuo, atvejis ir teigiama, kad šiuo hipotetiniu atveju Seagerio bei Bahrenberg ir kt. kontrargumentai nepagrįsti: Seagerio reikalavimas kitų episteminės bendruomenės narių liudijimus laikyti episteminius įsitikinimus grindžiančiais duomenimis tiesiog neveikia; o, contra Bahrenberg ir kt., tai, kas stebima vienam asmeniui, KE filosofijoje yra neproblemiškai objektyvu. Remiantis šia įžvalga teigiama, kad konstruktyvusis empirizmas būtų stipresnė filosofinė pozicija, jeigu performuluotų savo tezę taip, lyg ši aprašytų vieną pažįstantįjį subjektą (asmenį, mokslininką), nes i) taip ne tik kartą ir visiems laikams atremtų visus episteminės bendruomenės sąvoka besikliaujančius prieštaravimus, bet ir ii) šiuo pakeitimu tiesiogiai atsižvelgtų į kai kuriuos mokslo praktikos atvejus, į kuriuos nemodifikuota KE tezė taip akivaizdžiai atsižvelgti negali. Siūlomas KE nuostatos pakeitimas iii) išlaiko pagrindinius KE pozicijos aspektus, − skirtį tarp stebimųjų ir nestebimųjų esinių, skirtį tarp priėmimo ir įsitikinimo, episteminės ekonomijos principą ir mokslo racionalumo principą, − bent tiek pat pagrįstus, kiek ir naudojant originaliąją van Fraasseno tezę. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: konstruktyvusis empirizmas, episteminė bendruomenė, stebimumas, objektyvumas

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