WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER

No. 3 • NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 2006

BELGRADE WESTERN BALKANS DPOUFOUT SECURITY OBSERVER Editor’s note ...... 1 Journal of the Belgrade School of SPECIAL FOCUS OF THE ISSUE: KOSOVO Security Studies INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE No. 3 NOVEMBER–DECEMBER Dr Amadeo Watkins 2006 Moving Kosovo Forward: Publisher: Reality V Fiction ...... 2 Centre for Civil- Jelena Petrovi} Military Relations Regularities in the Balkans Editor in chief: – Do They Exist? ...... 5 Miroslav Had`i} Jelena Radoman Editors: Future Kosovo Status Sonja Stojanovi} – Precedent or Universal Solution ...... 14 Filip Ejdus Illustrations: SECURITY OF KOSOVO Marko Milo{evi} Lulzim Peci and Ilir Dugolli Proofreading: Milorad Timoti} Kosovo’s Security Policies: Challenges of Formulation and Implementation...... 21 Computer typesetting: ^aslav Bjelica \or|e Popovi} Should a Kosovo Army be Formed?...... 27 Printed by: GORAGRAF, Beograd THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES Circulation: 200 copies Zorana Atanasovi} Ethnic Tensions - An Obstacle Belgrade School of for Security in Kosovo ...... 33 Security Studies is Marko Milo{evi} established with the Serbia’s Capacities to Reintegrate assistance of the Kosovo and Metohija ...... 38 Kingdom of Norway. Its operation is also ATLANTIC SHORES supported by the Balkan Fund for Marko Savkovi} Democracy. What is the Nature of European Union Power in Kosovo?...... 44 Predrag Petrovi} US Military Commissions Act of 2006...... 48

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS This journal is Jelena Unijat financed by NATO. Anti-coruption Agency in Serbia...... 53 Fejupsjbm!Opuf

he third issue of Western Balkans valuable insight into the Kosovars’ per- TSecurity Observer aims to con- spective on the status and design of a tribute to the ongoing discussion on a possible future system of security for new status for Kosovo and the possible the province. From another perspec- consequences on the security of the tive, a researcher of the Belgrade two conflicting sides, the broader School of Security Studies scrutinises Balkan region and the world. The first the justification of the proposals, as put part of this issue addresses this ques- forward by a few international NGOs, tion from the perspective of interna- for the creation of a Kosovan Army. tional relations. It starts with a report by In the Threats, Risks and a British analyst that has as its intended Challenges column, two authors use audience the decision-makers in world the results from public opinion polls to capitals and considers the possible sce- highlight the possible political, eco- narios for the reactions of Serbia, the nomic and security ‘costs’ of keeping two divided communities in Kosovo Kosovo within Serbia, as well as to and the possibility of conflict spill-over point out the challenges to establishing into the region. It also includes a list of stable and democratic governance in recommendations for the international the event that Kosovo becomes inde- donor community after the final status pendent. The first text in the Atlantic has been adopted. This report is fol- Shores column contributes to the lowed by a comparative analysis of the debate on the nature of EU power formulation of foreign policy positions, through a case-study of new ESDP mis- towards the possible independence of sion that is to take over the Kosovo Kosovo, by other Balkan states and the administration from UN as soon as the factors that contribute to it. This text final status is announced. The second takes into consideration whether their text in this column presents the debate foreign policy views can be attributed to on the desirable limits to the special such factors as their ethnic ties and eco- measures provided for the war on ter- nomic relations with Serbia and Kosovo rorism. It provides an analysis of the Albanians or their own vulnerability to Military Commission Act that has secessionism. The third text in this sec- polarised US public opinion. The last tion studies how significant the resolu- piece in this issue provides policy tion of Kosovo’s final status will be for analysis of the Government’s proposal the system of international relations for the Law on the Anti-corruption through an examination of the grounds Agency which has polarised domestic for comparison between Kosovo, on organisations and experts dealing with the one side, and South-Ossetia and this field. This piece is a fitting intro- Abkhazia, self-proclaimed autonomous duction for the new regular column regions of Georgia, on the other. that will report on the practical policy In the Security of Kosovo column, recommendations in the security sec- researchers from the Kosovar Institute tor. And finally, the Western Balkan for Policy Research and Development Security Observer would like to thank (KIPRED) present the results of our first editor, Jasmina Gli{i}, as she ‘Internal Security Sector Review’ has played a key role in the conception (ISSR), a report that is sponsored by the and creation our magazine – we wish international community and local her lots of success in her new job. political leaders. This text provides Sonja Stojanovi} 3 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE Npwjoh!Lptpwp!Gpsxbse;! Sfbmjuz!W!Gjdujpo! Bnbefp!Xbuljot! UDK 327.5(497.115); 341.231: 327(497.115)

he key request from the interna- based on international law and order Ttional community is for Serbia and (which has not yet appeared) or just a the region to move forward, to start short-term political fix which will thinking about the future and to be cause problems in the mid to long realistic. However, while this require- term. ment has much logic, there is little The sad reality is that there have indication that the same is done in been no negotiations so far, just an Western capitals. attempt at negotiating where two sides The postponement of the Kosovo were brought together under false pre- status decision till early 2007 was a tences. While Belgrade has been too welcome move, as it could finally sig- conservative and naive in terms of nal a positive shift in thinking by the realpolitik, it has offered more on the West and the realisation of Serbia’s table at the strategic level. Pristina has importance within the region. The played on the tactical card by offering whole debate over the date itself small concession to the local Serbs, shows how divided the international while remaining adamant about its community is over this issue, with var- strategic objective: independence and ious viewpoints stretching from the US nothing short of independence. The insistence on 2006, to Ahtisaari’s con- international community has been the stantly changing viewpoints and, the main bluffer in the whole process with most worrying, the UN’s – as the main declaratory statements indicating a de jure actor - long overdue stance on facilitatory approach while not offer- the matter. Furthermore, Russia, as a ing much of substance. key stake holder within the Contact Addressing the future is most rele- Group, is not showing much sign of vant in this context. Three questions shifting its position and there is little are important in this respect: how will reason to expect it will do so. The con- any decision affect the people on the ciliatory gesture also comes as a last ground, how will it affect Serbia as the minute ‘carrot’ to the Serbian ‘demo- most strategic actor and what will cratic’ political scene. However, at the regional implications be? same time it indicates that the details of At the local level, Kosovo has the that decision will not be very potential to become at worst a failed favourable to Belgrade. state and at best a copy and paste of The question is who is serious and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Peace, the who is just playing games. The answer alleged primary objective, will have is in every respect mid-ground. All been achieved, probably temporarily, three sides in this duel need to take at the cost of other stated objectives, matters seriously and a compromise the most important being a multi-eth- should be sought from all. Pristina has nic Kosovo. If this happens, then to realise Serbia does have interests in NATO and the West did go to war for Kosovo; Belgrade has to move away the wrong reasons and they will from the desire to keep Kosovo but appear to have failed in their ultimate without its majority population; while aim. The issue of precedent and inter- the international community has to national order are other debatable decide if it wants a lasting settlement questions, whose only justification lies INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 4 in the political domain. In other words, or another - meaning that coalition the likelihood of Serbs south of the issues will dominate the immediate Ibar river leaving Kosovo is real, while Serbian political scene. No strategic the fate of Mitrovica will hang in the shift on the domestic political scene balance and partition on the ground should be expected, apart from the DS looms over UNMIK’s head. Such confirming its dominance of the ‘dem- developments will preclude any active ocratic’ block. The end result of this participation of Kosovo Serbs in will again be a divergence between a Kosovo’s new institutions in the short de jure constitutional requirement not to medium term. to deal with Kosovo if fully independ- The question of Serbs in Kosovo ent and a de facto EU requirement to is a difficult question to address. The have a constructive approach. The final outcome will depend on the nature of this divergence, which is details of the status deal, on Belgrade’s now codified within the constitution, reaction, on the perceptions this will will depend on the exact power-shar- have in Kosovo itself and the actions ing agreements within the new coali- of the Kosovo Albanian leadership, tion government. and lastly on other factors such as the media and the international presence in the area. Preliminary efforts to address this issue are underway on all fronts, but their success will only be determined if or when a crisis erupts. Pristina for its part will be forced to be content with what the West has on offer. After all it is aware that this is the best deal it is likely to get, consid- ering all the failures in implementing standards, not to mention the tragic events of March 2004. Yes, the delay might test local cohesion, but the fact that the local political leadership has promised something which it does not have within its power is not enough justification to push this issue beyond reason. Their request for an immediate As stated above a negative Kosovo status solution has no logic. After all, if status outcome is almost certain for a future Kosovo under any status Belgrade. However, the key will be wants to become part of the interna- how Belgrade perceives or defines the tional community, political leadership negative outcome. A mildly negative at least should have an understanding status solution will allow the ‘demo- of the way international diplomacy cratic’ block to claim some victory works. against all odds. However, a solution The impact on Serbia is most wor- that does not allow any such interpre- risome as it is unlikely to be positive. tation will play into the hands of the Many in the West are relieved now that opposing radical-nationalist elements, the status issue has been postponed led by the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). and new elections can run with the This immediately calls into question dark clouds from the past pushed the survivability of any newly elected aside for the time being. The general ‘democratic’ government, which assumption is that the ‘democratic could be faced with either a vote of no block’ will form a new government confidence or mass demonstrations some time February 2007 in one form that could lead to new elections. 5 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Hence, for the West the immediate crime is set to become a concern for post-election problem is likely to be all, including Western capitals. damage limitation in Belgrade, South Moving to the medium to long Serbia and among Kosovo Serbs. term, there is no saying that Pristina Discussions between Kostunica will not seek to materialise its long last- and SRS Deputy Head Nikolic have ing dream of Greater Albania. After all, had some result and should not be if two sovereign states decide on this considered a bad policy option in move how can it be stopped? The bor- some limited respects. If the Kosovo ders of Macedonia and Montenegro outcome is negative, but with scope then become questionable in their for de facto partition – which is likely, turn. This matter always rests in the then a new deal with the radical- eyes of the beholder, not Brussels or nationalist elements might postpone Washington. It rests on the often for- any immediate crisis. This scenario gotten truism that the Kosovo might be good for Belgrade but it Albanian battle was ignited long would only add uncertainty for the before Milosevic and his ‘bloody’ Kosovo Serbs and frustration in regime. Pristina and the West – negatively The international actors have to set impacting on overall development. their own agenda right and move from There will be little scope for alternatives the page dominated by political and in the short to medium term, especially lobbies rhetoric to one characterised if the current elections bring little new by logic and legality, with the preser- on the political scene. The role of the vation of international order as the key West in preventing this polarisation common denominator. Furthermore, could be limited. While a violent they should not only demand realpoli- attempt at partition can not be excluded, tik from Belgrade, but be realistic in especially if the SRS do well in the forth- their own expectations and commit- coming elections, it is unlikely – as the ments to the region – especially in end objective can be achieved in more terms of integration and economic subtle ways with little political con- ‘lifelines’ in the form of aid, subsidies frontation with the West. and investments. While the UN should The region? Well, apart from the remain the final status and standards possibility of some incidents, overall it ‘auditing body’, the EU should will remain stable for the short to become the primary actor and as such medium term blessed by the interna- it should get engaged more in Serbia tional presence. However, stable does and Kosovo - including micro-man- not mean prosperous in any sense of agement where necessary. So far this the word. Hopefully, what the OSCE has not been the case, and that gap has likes to term the economic aspects of significantly contributed to the current security will become the main priority situation in this part of the region. After and concern for both domestic and all, the interests of everyone are the international actors – as this is the only same: long-term peace, stability and way forward. In any case the short to development for all. Only such con- medium term scenario will not be far certed and well targeted efforts will from that of weak states characterised carry the region as a whole forward. by low economic activity, low income Amadeo Watkins is employed at families, corruption and personality the Confict Research Centre of the driven politics – where organised Defence Academy of UK.

Disclaimer The views expressed in this paper are entirely and solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official thinking and policy either of Her Majesty’s Government or of the Ministry of Defence. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 6 Sfhvmbsjujft!jo!uif!Cbmlbot!– Ep!Uifz!Fyjtu@ Kfmfob!Qfuspwj~ UDK 341.231(497.115):327(497) “The greatest deterrent to territorial towards the future status of KiM, as revisionism has been the fear of open- illustrated by the statements and releas- ing a Pandora’s box. If any one bound- es of their heads of states and govern- ary is seriously questioned, why not all ments issued in the past two years. the boundaries…”1, William Zartman Although these releases are not a reli- wrote way back in 1966, analyzing able indicator of their foreign policy international relations on the African views, they may still serve to suggest continent. His question is once again their attitudes towards this specific becoming topical with the onset of the issue. Some changes in the foreign final stage of deciding on the status of policies of these countries are possible, Kosovo and Metohija (KiM). The ques- especially after the publication of tion is how strongly the fear of the Ahtisaari’s plan for the final status of ”domino” effect, i.e. the possibility of KiM, when all of them will be expected turning a possible independence of to state their views. Kosovo into a precedent that would encourage secessionist movements, Uifpsfujdbm!gsbnfxpsl! figures in foreign policy decisions of the countries in this region? Does it The article will rely on the theoreti- have a dominant role, or are there per- cal framework presented in the works haps more important factors influenc- of Steven Saideman and Silviu Brucan3 ing the articulation of the Balkan states’ addressing the foreign policy determi- official positions towards the future sta- nants.4 We shall also attempt to tus of the Serbian province? demonstrate whether the foreign poli- The purpose of this text is to cy views of the Balkan states towards analyse the environment with respect the future status of Kosovo can be to factors that (do not) influence the attributed to such factors as their ethnic formulation of foreign policy positions ties with Serbia or Kosovo Albanians, towards the future status of KiM. The economic relations with Serbia or their results may indicate the possible lines own vulnerability to secessionism. of influence Serbia could have on the The first criterion to be addressed process of formulation of its neigh- by the analysis is the existence of eth- bours’ positions. nic ties (racial, ethnic in a narrow The Balkan states covered by this sense, religious and cultural-linguistic) analysis are Greece, Croatia, Romania, between the potential voters of one Turkey, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, state and the population of another. Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania.2 The assumption is that the voters’ pref- We shall try to examine their attitudes erences are influenced by their ethnic

1 Zartman, William. 1966. International Relations in the New Africa. Englewoof Cliffs: NJ Prentice Hall 2 Glenny, Misha. 2001. The Balkans – Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-1999. Penguin Books 3 Brucan, Silviu. 1971. The Dissolution of Power: Sociology of International Relations and Politics. Knopf. 4 Saideman, Stephen M. 1997. Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties. International Organization 51-4 7 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE identities and ethnic ties with the pop- territorial integrity has been endan- ulations of other states, or else by the gered (host state), in opposition to the existing antagonisms. Bearing in mind secessionist movement.6 that politicians seeking to win or retain power must be mindful of the wishes Cbmlbo!tubuft!qptjujpot!upxbset of their voters, we could say that vot- ers’ preferences influence the forma- uif!gvuvsf!Lptpwp!tubuvt! tion of foreign policy positions on a The approaching deadline for the specific issue. It is presumed that in a publication of the UN special represen- secessionist conflict a state will support tative, Martti Ahtisaari’s plan for the the party ethnically linked with its future status of Kosovo has triggered 5 majority population. the debate on the desirable solution in The second criterion we will use is Europe and in the Balkans. There are the level of development of economic two types of indicators that may illus- relations between two states (Brucan). trate the assumption concerning the The stronger the economic rela- Balkan states’ attitudes towards the tions between two states are (especial- future status of KiM. The first relates to ly if they are each other’s major trade statements of high officials of the or investment partners and engage in a Balkan states, and the second to the thriving trade) the larger the possibili- fact that some of these countries recog- ty of their mutual support in interna- tional relations will be. The findings of nize UNMIK passports and registration this analysis would be more accurate if tables and have signed international they took into account the economic agreements with the Provisional gov- relations each of the Balkan countries ernment in KiM. On that basis the has with KiM, bearing in mind that eco- Balkan states may conditionally be nomic relations of all states have to do divided into two groups. The first com- with more than one partner. However, prises the states that tend to support reliable and precise data on these rela- the official interests of the Serbian gov- tions do not exist. ernment: Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, The third criterion, vulnerability to Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina secessionism, according to Steven (BiH). Saideman exist if a particular state had The main argument offered by the a movement which over the past ten Bulgarian prime minister Georgi years showed secessionist ambitions, Parvanov7 and BiH foreign minister8 or if the movement’s members organ- against KiM independence is the possi- ized a group seeking independence of ble destabilization of the region. part of its territory. This argument Romanian foreign minister Razvan assumes that states susceptible to Ungureanu9 as well as the foreign min- secessionism will support those whose ister of Greece Dora Bakoyannis10 also

5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Parvanov’s statement to the Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Washington, October 2005, Danas, 21. 10. 2005, http://www.danas.co.yu/20051021/dogadjajdana1.html. 8Statement by Mladen Ivani}, 13. 11. 2006, Bilten Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije, 13. 11. 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Srpski/Bilteni/Srpski/b131106_s.html#N12 9 Ungueranu’s statement, 2. 12. 2006.godine, RTS, Tanjug, 2. 12. 2006. http://www.rts.co.yu/jedna_vest.asp?belong=&IDNews=169279 10 Dora Bakojanis’ statement, 14. 11. 2006, IRNA, http://www.irna.ir/index2.php?option= com_news&task=popup&code=0611148289151457&pindex=&pfrom=0&no_html=1&lang=sr INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 8 speak in favour of retaining Kosovo in recognized the independent “Kosovo Serbia and emphasize the importance Republic” way back in 1991.12 This of observing the inviolability of state state still displays an obvious tendency borders declared by the Helsinki Final to support the demands of Kosovo Act. Albanians. This may be illustrated by a The position of official Turkey statement in support of KiM independ- towards the future Kosovo status is ence, made by the Albanian president posted on the web site of its foreign Alfred Moisiu at a press conference ministry. Turkish position on the occasioned by the closing of the sum- “Kosovo issue” is even visually placed mit of heads of states and governments in the context of its relations with of South East European states in Serbia. It stresses Turkey’s support to Kara|or|evo on 16 October last year.13 the full implementation of the UN SC Although the Macedonian authori- Resolution 1244 (defining Kosovo as a ties have not made a clear-cut state- component part of Serbia) and ment concerning the future status of expresses Turkey’s concern for the Kosovo, the position of this republic rights of the Turkish minority in KiM. may be perceived from the statements AXIS Information and Analysis (AIA) made last October by Macedonian analyst Can Karpat believes that prime minister Nikola Grujevski and Turkey will support Serbia’s official his deputy Imer Selmani. Namely, the position that Kosovo must remain a prime minister said that “Macedonia part of its territory. Notwithstanding will be prepared to accept independ- Turkey’s agreements on cooperation ence if that turns out to be the final in the field of culture and environmen- decision”, while his deputy Imer tal protection signed with the provi- Selmani visiting the interim Kosovo sional Kosovo government in 2001, government expressed Macedonia’s Karpat believes that Turkey’s support support to the political will of the to Resolution 1244 and persistent non- majority nation in KiM.14 recognition of UNMIK registration The Croatian president Stjepan tables substantiates the assumption Mesi} in an interview to Radio Free that it will back Serbia’s official inter- Europe said that “if the final solution is ests.11 the independence of Kosovo, the The second group includes those European standard of living must be states which are inclined to support the guaranteed in Kosovo”, without preju- Provisional KiM government – Albania dicing Croatia’s preference with and Macedonia. It could also comprise respect to the future status.15 the countries that apparently would However, knowing that Croatia recog- not oppose the independence of KiM, nizes UNMIK passports and registra- such as Croatia and Montenegro. tion tables, and that Agim Ceku, prime The Albanian National Assembly minister of the Provisional Kosovo gov-

11 Karpat, Can. 2006. Turkey’s KiM Policy: Inexistent, Hesitant or Prudent?, AIA Balkanian section. 12 The Library of the American Congress. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+al0012) 13 Tanjug, B92, 16. 10. 2006. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=16&nav_category=167 14 Bilten Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije, 16. 10. 2006. , http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Srpski/Bilteni/Srpski/b171006_s.html#N10 15 Radio “Slobodna Evropa”, 14. 11. 2006. , http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/arti- cle/2006/11/14/be42b2b4-f15b-4544-876d-02182e59f4b5.html 9 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ernment visited Croatia in early Cbmlbo!fuiojd!ofuxpsl December and was received as a state official, it would be safe to assume that We shall first analyse the existence Croatia would not oppose Martti of ethnic ties and/or antagonisms Ahtisaari’s solution for the future KiM between the majority population of a status, if it proposed the independence state in this region and Serbia, or of the Serbian province. Albanian population in Kosovo. For Montenegrin attitude towards this that purpose we shall use Saideman’s issue is similar, judging by the events understanding of the existing ethnic that marked the beginning of ties and animosities in the regions, November 2006, when Agim Ceku vis- offered in the analysis of the Balkan ited Podgorica and met the states’ attitudes towards the disintegra- Montenegrin prime minister Milo tion of the SFRY (Table 1). Djukanovi}.16 Speaking about this visit Based on the assumption that in a Djukanovi} pointed out that any solu- secessionist conflict states tend to sup- tion for the Kosovo status Belgrade and port the side they have ethnic ties with, Pri{tina may reach with the assistance it would seem justified to assume that of the international community would Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey will sup- be acceptable to Montenegro. The visit port the wishes of Kosovo Albanians; elicited protests in Serbia and that Greece, Romania, Macedonia and Montenegro, but the former prime Montenegro will uphold the official minister referred to them as “xenopho- interests of Serbia, while the ambiva- bic and autistic”. We believe that these lence of Croatia and BiH will make events confirm the assumption that them neutral. although Montenegro may not directly support the idea of Kosovo’s inde- However, even two states which, in pendence, neither will it support theory, should oppose the policy of Serbian efforts to retain the province Serbian authorities (Turkey and within its borders. Bulgaria) unambiguously support the

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16 BBC Serbian, 3. 11. 2006. , http://www.bbc.co.uk/serbian/news/2006/11/print- able/061103_ceku_djukanovic.shtml *Bearing in mind that at the time when Saideman’s analysis was written Montenegro was not an independent state while his research included Macedonia and BiH, this author has supple- mented the table on the basis of data on the origin of the majority nation, dominant religion , time distance from the last registered armed conflict and ethnicity of conflicting parties. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE : request to keep Kosovo in Serbia’s while its economic links with Albania borders, while Macedonia, although are the least developed. theoretically expected to join the Assuming that economic relations “Serbian camp”, supports the between states influence their foreign demands of Kosovo Albanians. policy, it would be logical for the Departure from the theoretical frame- Serbian authorities to count on the sup- works is also registered in the case of port of Macedonia, BiH and Montenegro. Although it does not Montenegro. The only state whose offer a clear and positive support to opposition could be expected is provisional Kosovo authorities, it is Albania. still too far from supporting Serbia. However, the reality is different. Departures noted in these four states The only two states whose foreign pol- are drastic and indicate that ethnic ties icy positions match the expectations cannot explain the formulation of are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Balkan countries’ foreign policy posi- Albania, which tells us that the factor tions with respect to the future status of economic relations with Serbia can- of Kosovo. not completely explain the Balkan states’ positions towards the “Kosovo Fdpopnjd!sfmbujpot!cfuxffo issue”. However, these results are not Tfscjb!boe!jut!ofjhicpvst entirely accurate. We lack the data on economic relations between Balkan Economic relations between Serbia states in general, and specifically with and its neighbours are the second crite- KiM, and therefore cannot conclude rion to be analysed here. According to whether these states stand to lose or the Serbian Chamber of Commerce benefit more from their respective data for 200517 (Table 2), Serbia is an choices. exceptionally important trade partner (ranked among the first five) to BiH, Bsf!Cbmlbo!tubuft!wvmofsbcmf!up Macedonia and Montenegro, while tfdfttjpojtn@ Bulgaria and Turkey have a very high surplus in their trade with Serbia. Secessionist movements still exist is Serbia has developed economic rela- some of the Balkan states and mostly tions with Romania, Croatia and represent the movements of ethnic Greece, which show an upward trend, minorities. The vulnerability of Balkan Ubcmf!3

17 Privredna komora Srbije (Serbian Chamber of Commerce), http://portal.komora.net/pksweb/servlet/pksweb.XMLProcesor?i_sys=pks&i_xml=a10007&i_xsl =s1000&i_pagenumber=1&i_numberrecords=10000&i_param=id|19|id2||kategorija|| 21 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE states to secessionism may be meas- pension of hostilities to the Turkish ured on the basis of several factors: authorities but the country’s prime time distance from the conflict (if there minister Recep Erdogan refused to were any), intensity of conflicts (armed negotiate with the Kurdish leaders, and conflicts, terrorist attacks, their called them terrorists. Armed conflicts absence) and prominence of objectives between Turkish authorities and the declared by separatist and/or territorial Kurdish movement rank Turkey autonomist movements. Although ter- among the states vulnerable to seces- ritorial autonomist movements to not sionism. demand independence of part of a From the proclamation of its inde- state territory, their requests to transfer pendence in 1991, Macedonia has a large number of authorities to the registered several conflicts between local government weaken the central state authorities and its Albanian power of the state. minority (accounting for 22.9% of the The states which over the past total population). Armed conflicts years registered armed conflicts and/or between the Macedonian authorities continuing terrorist activity of groups and the National liberation Army, an with remarkably separatist objectives armed group of Macedonian will be classified as highly vulnerable Albanians, in 2001 was ended with to secessionism. The group of coun- the conclusion of the Ohrid tries defined on the basis of this criteri- Agreement. Under this agreement on would include Turkey, Macedonia Macedonia agreed to give up its con- and BiH. stitutional definition as a state of Turkey has been having problems Macedonians and include the with the Kurdish secessionist move- Albanian nationality into the text of ment for almost thirty years now. The the constitution, i.e. definition of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PPK) state. The Albanian side, on its part, emerged in the 1980s aiming to create agreed to continue its fight for minor- an independent Kurdish state on the ity rights through legal channels. south east of Turkey. This state was The signing of the Dayton Peace also expected to annex parts of neigh- Accords (1995), following a four-year bouring countries’ territories inhabited armed conflict marked the establish- by Kurds. The conflict between the ment of two semi-autonomous entities Turkish authorities and Kurds escalat- in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Republika ed in the 1990s, to be abruptly discon- Srpska and the BiH Federation. The tinued after the arrest of the party’s nature of the conflict shows that BiH leader Abdullah Ocalan in the 1999, ranks among countries highly vulnera- and the party was transformed into a ble to secessionism, especially in view political faction.18 However, the of the fact that secessionist danger per- Turkish authorities do not recognize sists despite the international commu- the PPK and treat it as a terrorist group, nity’s efforts to preserve their Dayton and the Kurds are still denied the status construct. This situation is illustrated by of a minority. This was the cause to a statement of Republika Srpska Prime reopen the conflict, briefly suspended Minister Milorad Dodik wherein he in 2004, when an increase in terrorist advocates a referendum on independ- activities was registered. In September ence of this entity “if its authorities kept 2006 the PPK once again offered a sus- diminishing”.19

18 Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/ 19 Dodik’s statement, 13. 6. 2006, http://www.danas.co.yu/20060613/hronika2.html. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 22

The group of countries that are not with territorial autonomist demands of highly vulnerable to secessionism politically organized groups (Romania, comprises those which over the past Bulgaria, Croatia and Greece). ten years registered terrorist activities According to the 2002 census23 the and have separatist and/or autonomist population of Romania included movements of ethnic groups account- approximately 1.4 million Hungarians ing for a substantial minority in the (6.6% of the country’s total popula- ethnic structure of state (Albania and tion) predominantly located in Montenegro). Transylvania where they account for More than a decade ago (1994) about 20% of the population. Albania for the first time registered the Transylvania was given to Romania existence of an armed group of Greek after World War I and comprises sever- separatists called North Epirus al counties with the majority Liberation Front20. The group has car- Hungarian population (Harghita ried out several terrorist attacks seek- 84.61% and Kovszna 73.81%). The ing independence for North Epirus, Hungarian minority in Romania is largely populated by the Greek minor- politically represented by the ity (precise data on the population are Democratic Union of Hungarians in not available). That is why Albania is Romania, an organization that strongly classified as a state which may be vul- advocates autonomy (for the minori- nerable to secessionism. In addition, ties living in “blocks” on a specific ter- Omonia political party21 advocating ritory). The political influence of this the annexation of North Epirus to organization is quite substantial, and it Greece has been active in this same is represented in both the Parliament area ever since 1992. and the Government. The Romanian Montenegro became an independ- vice premier in charge of education, ent state following the May 2006 refer- culture and European integrations endum. Its population (according to Marko Bela is the Union’s president. the 2003 census) comprises 43.26% of Due to territorial decentralist aspira- Montenegrins, 31.99% Serbs, 7.77% tions on its territory and the absence of Bosniaks, 5.03% Albanians and 5.53% conflicts Romania is classified among other minorities. Already in 2004 the the states whose vulnerability to seces- existence of a terrorist National Army sionism is low. of Montenegro22 was uncovered. It The process of assimilation of the seeks independence for the territory Turkish minority, accounting for 9% of of Montenegro with the majority the Bulgarian population, lasted until Albanian population. Separatist ten- 1989. The restoration of rights to this sions still exist in the area of Ulcinj and minority that started towards the end in the north of Montenegro. of 1989 triggered the rising of The group of countries with lowest Bulgarian neo-nationalist movements. vulnerability to secessionism includes These movements’ (e.g. the National the states which, in the past decade, Union Attack) denial of the existence did not have conflicts on their respec- of any ethnic minorities in Bulgaria tive territories, or else were faced only additionally intensifies the social and

20 http://members.cox.net/epirus//report_on_epirus.htm 21 http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/al%7Dgk.html#omo 22 “Danas“, 12. 1. 2004, http://www.danas.co.yu/20040112/dezurna1.html. 23 Hungarian Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad. 2006. The Situation of Hungarians in Romania in 2006. Report 23 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE religious dissent in the country. tious approach to the areas where the According to Rossen Vassilev24 the Muslim population is in the majority. A events in KiM encouraged the Turkish substantial Muslim minority (120 thou- minority to take a more aggressive sand) lives in Greece, more precisely stand in opposing the majority popula- in Thrace and on the Dodecanese, tion. This author stresses that despite island located on the far east of the legal recognition and influence of Greece, near the south-western coast the Movement for Rights and of Turkey. In addition to that, Greece Freedoms - the largest political party and Turkey are both, as countries of championing the minority rights, with origin, involved in the Cypriot conflict the majority Turkish membership – the and concerned with the attainment of Turkish minority in Bulgaria still nour- interests of the parties that enjoy their ishes its irredentist aspirations. support. The existing tensions aside, However, since no armed conflicts or no armed conflicts or terrorist attacks terrorists attacks have been registered of groups with secessionist and/or ter- over the past decade, Bulgaria is ritorial autonomist objectives were ranked as a country with low vulnera- registered in Greece in the past bility to secessionism. decade, which ranks this country’s The Serbian ethnic minority in vulnerability to secessionism as low. Croatia accounts for 4. 94 % of the total According to Saideman’s argu- population. The last decade of the past ments the states highly vulnerable and century was marked by the Croatian susceptible to secessionism should proclamation of independence and support the official policy of Serbia, conflicts on the territory of this state. while those with low vulnerability to One of the most important causes of secessionism could be expected to be these conflicts was the aspiration of neutral. the Serbian minority (accounting to Judging by the time distance of 12.2 per cent of Croatia’s population in conflicts (if any), organization of 1991) to join the territories wherein it groups and the nature of their constituted the majority population to demands, we think that Turkey, its kin state. Still, from that time Macedonia and Bosnia and onwards there have been no conflicts Herzegovina could be classified as or terrorists attacks on that soil. The highly vulnerable, while Romania, return of Serbian refugees and exiles Bulgaria, Albania and Montenegro to Croatia is under way, aggravated by would fit into the medium-vulnerable the profound resistance of the majority group. Theoretically, these states Croatian population. The underdevel- should support the official policy of oped interethnic tolerance and inade- Serbia, while Croatia and Greece as quate application of national minority low vulnerability countries would be rights leave room for outbreak of new expected to take a neutral stand. conflicts in Croatia.25 Departures from the initial Although Greece has no problems assumption are also revealed in the with secessionist movements ever analysis of influence of vulnerability to since the signing of the Treaties of secessionism on the formation of for- Lausanne (1923) its tense relations eign policy views. Namely, drastic with Turkey make it take a more cau- departures are noted with Macedonia

24 Vassilev, Rossen. 2002. Bulgaria’s ethnic problems. East European Quarterly 25 Daskalovi}, Zoran. 2004. Withering Away of Ethnic Minorities in Croatia. Dossier on the Rights and Protection of Ethnic Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 24 and Albania which are the most vul- Bulgaria could oppose its efforts, nerable to secessionism and some- while neutrality may be forthcoming what less with Greece, Bulgaria, from Turkey and Greece. Romania and Montenegro. The exis- But, the combination of all three tence of drastic departures indicates factors suffices only to explain BiH that vulnerability to secessionism can- and Albania’s attitudes towards the not be a sufficiently valid criterion to future status of KiM. prognosticate the support of seces- These findings indicate that regu- sionist tendencies. The discrepancy larities in formulating foreign policy between historical facts and state- positions towards the future of KiM ments of some Balkan states’ officials in the Balkans do not exist with (e.g. Romania) suggests that the respect to ethnic ties, economic rela- response could be sought in the analy- tions and vulnerability to secession- sis of influence of vulnerability to ism. The answer should, therefore, secessionism to the formulation of for- be sought in certain other factors. eign policy positions. Historical facts One of them could be the states’ per- can help us create a more objective ception of secessionist threats on picture of the situation in each of these states. However, if we analyse vulner- their respective territories. In addi- ability to secessionism we will see to tion, an important role in this context what extent the Balkan states feel may be the one of the policy of endangered by the secessionist and/or adjustment to the positions and views autonomist movements existing on of the key actors of Euro-Atlantic their respective territories. integrations (U.S.A., Germany, UK, France, Italy). Foreign policy adjust- Xibu!qsfwbjmt@ ments of some Balkan states with the main proponents of integration The analysis of all three factors processes may account for their wish lead to the conclusion that, theoreti- to score political points or secure cally speaking, the Serbian govern- support for their integration into ment could expect support from Euro-Atlantic structures. Macedonia, BiH, Montenegro and The author works as a Research Fellow Romania. Albania, Croatia and in the Belgrade School of Security Studies Ubcmf!4/

* Conditionally. 25 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE Gvuvsf!Lptpwp!Tubuvt! .!Qsfdfefou!ps!Vojwfstbm!Tpmvujpo Kfmfob!Sbepnbo UDK 341.223(4); 341.231(497.115)

here is no doubt that the final sta- of Kosovo, or rather its future, and Ttus decision for Kosovo and the position and future of these Metohija will substantially influence regions. Our intention is to look into the security situation in the whole of the grounds for the claim that a pos- South East Europe. One of the argu- sible independence of Kosovo ments invoked by the Serbian team in would not influence the status issue the status negotiations is that a possi- of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We ble independence of Kosovo would shall first examine the similarities have far-reaching (negative) conse- between the de jure and de facto quences. The Serbian prime minister status of Kosovo and these areas warns that the status decision that is and then demonstrate that aspira- not acceptable to all parties threatens tions towards independence are in to “create a precedent for changing all three cases substantiated by the the borders, which the ethnic minori- same arguments. Still, in the case of ties with territorial pretensions could South Ossetia and Abkhazia the UN invoke in future”.1 The Russian presi- Security Council, European Union dent Vladimir Putin opposing the and NATO firmly support the imposition of a solution to either of preservation of territorial integrity the conflicting parties simultaneously and sovereignty of Georgia and pro- stresses that Russia insists on a uni- pose to solve the conflicts on its ter- versal answer applicable to all similar ritory by means of power decentral- situations. “If someone thinks that ization, granting a wide autonomy Kosovo can be granted full inde- to disputable regions. If this posi- pendence as a state, then why should tion remains unchanged even after the Abkhaz or the South-Ossetian the possible declaration of Kosovo’s peoples not also have the right to independence, we believe that the statehood?”2 This question is often reasons for that should not be used by Russian officials to justify sought in the application of provi- their support to the independence of sions of international law, but rather these regions. At the same time, in the ethical argument invoked by NATO, the EU and the U.S.A. deny these actors in international rela- any similarities between the position tions.

1 Ahtisaari, Ko{tunica and Sejdiju address the UN Security Council on the issue of Kosovo sta- tus, Voice of America, 13.07.2006. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/Serbian/archive/2006-07/2006-07-13-voa3.cfm [accessed November 29, 2006]. 2 Vladimir Putin, transcript pres conference for Russian and foreign media, the Kremlin, Moscow, 31.01.2006. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/ 2006/01/31/0953_type82915type82917_100901.shtml [accessed November 29,2006]. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 26

Sfevdfe!bvupopnz!dbvtf to confirm that the majority of their pg!dpogmjdu population supported secession from Georgia. Something similar hap- Kosovo and the disputable pened in Kosovo. In March 1989 regions in Georgia in the past amendments to the FRY 1974 consti- enjoyed a certain degree of autono- tution were adopted reducing the my within their federal states. By autonomy of the province which, on contrast from the federal units, the basis of the previous Constitution autonomous regions South Ossetia “formally and practically became the and Abkhazia and the autonomous constituent elements of the federa- province of Kosovo did not have a tion and the federal system in gener- status implying the rights to secession al”.3 In September 1991, Kosovo or exit from the federation. The Albanians organized a referendum majority population in all three unrecognized by the authorities in regions invokes the right to self- Serbia and with an overwhelming determination in order to secede majority opted for independence. from their respective states and Aspirations to obtain independ- obtain independence. Minority rights ence were in all three areas accompa- in all three cases have to be protect- nied by armed conflicts and violence. ed and are a matter of concern for Ceasefires in 1992 and 1994 enabled international organizations which the formation of self-proclaimed and seek to find the status solution for internationally unrecognized states – these territories. the Republics of South Ossetia and Conflicts in Kosovo and in Abkhazia. After the NATO 1999 inter- Georgia (as well as in Moldova and vention in Kosovo and the Azerbaijan) are often viewed as relics Kumanovo Agreement a UN protec- of formerly socialist states – the SFRY torate in Kosovo was established and the USSR. Tensions in all three within the internationally recognized regions intensified with the disinte- borders of the Republic of Serbia. gration of their federations (1989/90). The immediate cause for the conflicts Tbnf!bshvnfout was the constriction of autonomous gps!joefqfoefodf powers vested in ethnic groups with- in their federations. Having pro- There are several basic arguments claimed its independence in April explaining the demands of ethnic 1992 Georgia substituted its Soviet groups for secession from states within Constitution with the Constitution of the borders of which they are located in the Democratic Republic of Georgia order to become independent. The adopted in 1922. The Abkhazians main legal argument is the right to self- and Ossetians saw that as endanger- determination established by interna- ing the autonomy they had been tional law. Ethnic cohesion of the pop- guaranteed under the Soviet ulation, control of territories and estab- Constitution. That same year each of lishment of a power structure are de the groups organized a referendum facto arguments.

3 Nikoli}, Pavle. Pogubno istorijsko iskustvo. (Disastrous historical experience), Glas javnos- ti, 24. 8. 2001. Available at: http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2001/08/25/srpski/ X01082404.shtml [accessed November 25, 2006]. 27 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The right to self-determination series of international legal docu- has been confirmed by a series of ments. There is no generally accept- international agreements, declara- ed principle to solve the conflict of tions and resolutions, the most these principles in practice, which important of which is the UN allows for politically based ad hoc Charter.4 It implies the right of groups solutions. If such a conflict of princi- that share a common racial back- ples creates a situation qualified by ground, ethnicity, language, religion, the Security Council as a “threat to history and cultural heritage, and peace, violation of peace or aggres- populate s specific territory to deter- sion”6 the Council’s authorities to mine their political status, economic solve it are activated. and cultural development. In order to The population and political exercise that right the group con- elites in Kosovo and in Georgian cerned should possess self-con- regions offer several arguments in sciousness of its identity as distinct favour their right to self-determina- from the majority population of the tion. The main de facto argument is state it lives in and be capable of that these areas are ethnically forming its political identity.5 This homogenous. Conflicts have right may essentially be realized in changed the demographic picture in two forms. The first implies the status Georgia7 as well as in Kosovo.8 of autonomy within a unitary state, Demographic indicators for all three federal unit in a federation or a mem- areas after the conflicts reveal the ber of a confederation. The second is existence of ethnically pure or at least declaration of independence and the “more pure” areas. establishment of a separate state. An additional argument in favour This right may, thus, be in conflict of South Ossetian and Abkhaz right with the territorial integrity and sov- to secession is that their authorities ereignty of the state, which is anoth- de facto control the disputed territo- er basic principle of international ries. Immediately following the law, confirmed and guaranteed by a ceasefire, armed forces were formed

4 UN Charter, 26. 6. 1945, San Francisco, Chapter 1, Article 1. Available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ [accessed December 18, 2006]. 5 New England Center for International Law & Policy. Public International Law and Policy Group. 2000. The Nagorno-Karabah Crisis: A Blueprint for Resolution. 18-21. Available at: http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/htms/blueprint.html [accessed November 23, 2006] 6 UN Charter, 26 June 1945, San Francisco, Chapter 7, Article 39. 7 The conflict in South Ossetia caused the death of 50,000 people. According to the last pop- ulation census in the USSR the population of Abkhazia numbered 500,000, 45% of whom were Georgians and 17% Abkhaz. OSCE claims that in the 1991-93 war an ethnic cleansing was car- ried out, wherein between 10 and 30 thousand people were killed, while the majority of 250 thousand exiled Georgians still wait to. Abkhaz account for 45% of Abkhazia’s population today. Wikipedia, Abkhazia, Demographics Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhazia [accessed December 4, 2006]. 8 In 1981, of the total population of Kosovo of approximately 1,585,000, (77% were Albanians and 13% Serbs. According to current estimates Kosovo has a population of 1.8 to 2.1 million of whom approximately 85-90% are Kosovo Albanians and 5-10% Serbs. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 28 to counterbalance any attempt of the independent exercise of power. The main state to restore its exclusive process of transferring UNMIK’s right to use force, inherent in a sover- authorities to provisional provincial eign state. Abkhazian armed forces institutions is under way. number 2 thousand men with four That is where the similarities times higher mobilization capacities, enabling us to compare the efforts of while those of South Ossetia have Kosovo Albanians with those of 1,500 members.9 These regions have Ossetians and Abkhaz to obtain inde- also established their institutions of pendence end. The differences are (legislative, executive and judicial) revealed in the type and degree of power. The political elites of South international support to independ- Ossetia and Abkhazia refer to the ence aspirations of these regions. functioning of these institutions to substantiate their claims that they are Ejggfsfou!wjfxt capable of surviving and functioning pg!joufsobujpobm!pggjdjbmt outside the state jurisdiction of Georgia (as has been the case in the Serbia and Georgia propose to previous 10-15 years). They maintain solve the status of disputable areas by that the recognition of these areas as granting them the widest possible independent states would merely autonomy. The Georgian authorities legalize the status quo. In this way propose a constitutionally guaran- both the rebels and secessionists teed autonomy (legal, political, seek to obtain the legitimacy of state social, territorial, cultural and eco- creators. For the time being this legit- nomic) for the secessionist regions.10 imacy of South Ossetian or Georgian officials simultaneously Abkhazian authorities has not been stress their readiness to apply the recognized by a single state, includ- widest form of autonomy known to ing Russia. European standards and practice in The situation in Kosovo is some- both these cases.11 However, the what different. Although it is still for- Abkhazian authorities turned down mally under the sovereignty of the the plan proposed by Georgia Republic of Serbia, it is in fact a UN authorities on 9 June last year. It protectorate. Institutions of provi- anticipated the establishment of a sional provincial government have federal setup in Georgia where been established in Kosovo and the Abkhazia would be given wide international community makes autonomy and assistance for eco- efforts to develop their capacities for nomic recovery. In a similar manner,

9 Lynch, Dov. 2001. Managing Separatist States: A Eurasian Case Study. Institute for Securitry Studies of WEU. 10 Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/707/02/occ32e.html [accessed November 23,2006] 10 President of Georgia. 2005. Understending South Ossetia – A Primer for Peace, Executive Summary. http:/ www.president.gov.others/presskits.php?&id=106 [accessed November 28,2006] 11 Georgia’s ambassador to the EU, Salome Samadashvili, in an interview to Radio Free Europe. 2006. EU/Georgia: ‘No Time to Send Ambiguous Messages’ In Russia Row. Radio Free Europe. Access at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/10/cc766e95-be56-4420-81d4- 6db6b4f7254d.html [accessed December 4, 2006] 29 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Kosovo Albanians dismiss the sub- compare their approach to Kosovo with stantive autonomy for Kosovo within that towards the Georgian regions. One internationally recognized borders of of the reasons they invoke to justify their Serbia offered by official Belgrade. different attitude towards these issues is Despite the similarity of solutions that under the SFRY 1974 constitution proposed by Serbia and Georgia, the Kosovo enjoyed a wider degree of international support they receive is autonomy than the two Georgian largely different. Representatives of regions. However, even so wide a con- international organizations offer diverse cept of autonomy did not anticipate the proposals for the statues of these three possibility of secession or exit from the areas. NATO, the European Union and federation. Another argument refers to the United States support Georgia’s the problem of self-sustainability of efforts to solve the status problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of South Ossetia and Abkhazia without which are reportedly dependent on the impairing its own territorial integrity and Russian military, economic and admin- sovereignty. Serbia, however, does not istrative support. But, self-sustainability receive undivided international support also presents an obstacle for the inde- for the preservation of its territorial pendence of Kosovo. Once the status integrity, as revealed by Kosovo status decision is made Kosovo will, for a cer- negotiations. One of the possible out- tain period of time, need the presence comes of these negotiations is the of international peace forces, as well as proclamation of the province’s inde- international economic and political pendence. The situation in the two support, which is a fact confirmed in countries differs with respect to the type numerous statements of international and degree of foreign involvement and community representatives. This means mediation in conflict resolution. The that the independence of Kosovo presence of international civilian and would be an internationally sponsored military missions in Georgia is limited to project. an OSCE observer mission in South Ossetia and a UN observer mission in Fuijdbm!bshvnfou Abkhazia, while trilateral peace forces responsible for peace keeping comprise The answer to the question why the Russian soldiers and those of the con- independence of Kosovo would not flicting parties. In contrast with Serbia, provide a universally applicable princi- which reluctantly and forcibly accepted ple may be obtained if we examined the the participation of the international scope of international engagement and community in conflict resolution on its military and civilian presence in territory, Georgia desires and demands Kosovo. NATO’s 1999 intervention cre- a higher degree of international involve- ated a precedent in international rela- ment in solving the conflicts within its tions and opened numerous debates borders.12 among political scientists as well as Foreign officials offer brief and those concerned with its legal aspects. It vague explanations of their refusal to definitely marked the turning point in

12 President of Georgia – official website, Understanding South Ossetia – A Primer for Peace, Executive Summary, 11. March 2005, access: http:/ www.president.gov.others/presskits. php?&id=106, access: [28. 11. 2006]. 13 ICTY Indictment of Slobodan Milo{evi}. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2: the efforts of Kosovo Albanians to precedent. It established a UN protec- obtain full independence. The ethical torate over the province and gave argument used to justify the NATO UNMIK the authorities held by a sover- action retained validity in the Kosovo eign state within its borders. Comments status negotiations. on the current stage of status negotia- The first “humanitarian intervention” tions include e.g. those that with the res- was justified by efforts to prevent further olution 1244 Serbia, in all important violation of human rights in Kosovo. respects, actually gave Kosovo to the References to norms of ethnical conduct UN, which is now deciding on its 16 in international relations provided legit- future . This confirms the claims that imacy to this action. The use of radical measures, such as military intervention, was partly due to Serbia’s reputation marred by its involvement in the wars on the territories of the former Yugoslavia. It was claimed that Serbia lost legitimacy to govern the province bearing in mind that “by 20 May 1999, over 740,000 Kosovo Albanians were expelled from Kosovo and an unknown number have been killed in the opera- tions by forces of the FRY and Serbia”.13 “Should we protect the territorial integri- ty of every regime that chooses to kill its own citizens?”14 That question preju- dices the interpretation that the norm of Serbia has lost the legitimate right to international law (inviolability of territo- govern a part of its territory by accepting rial integrity) is suspended when it to transfer part of its authorities to an clashes with the ethical argument, and international mission. provides subsequent legitimacy to the Serbia and Georgia enter the strug- controversial 1999 intervention. gle to preserve their territorial integrity Resolution 1244, which comprises with different starting position, at least several mutually opposed principles as far as their reputation and the degree (preservation of state sovereignty, self- of international support are concerned. government in the province and By contrast from Serbia, Georgia does enforcement of international adminis- not have to face accusations of genocide tration’s authorities)15 created a legal or demands for extradition of suspects

13 ICTY Indictment of Slobodan Milo{evi}. Available at: http://www.b92.net/doc/tribunal/01.php [accessed November 20, 2006]. 14 Polt, Michael, US ambassador in Belgrade, Ka`iprst, B92, 21. 11. 2006, http://www.freeb92.net/info/emisije/kaziprst.php?yyyy=2006&mm=11&nav_id=220995 . 15 Stahn, Carsten. 2001. Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Goverment. Leiden Journal of International Law 14 : 542 16 Bilt, Carl “Status bez standarda , Balkan i Kosovo nisu visoko na dnevnom redu u Va{ing- tonu”(Status without standards – The Balkans and Kosovo not high up on Washington’s agen- da), interview to daily Politika, 17. 11. 2006, http://www.politika.co.yu/detaljno.php?nid=12298 [accessed November 17, 2006]. 31 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE in war crimes and crimes against considered ad hoc. The system of inter- humanity. Not one part of Georgian ter- national law should enable predictabili- ritory is under the international commu- ty and stability in international relations. nity’s protectorate. The proposed solu- But its norms cannot keep up with the tion of internationally mediated negotia- dynamics and numbers of factors in tions on the status of disputable areas international relations. Humanitarian will not violate its territorial integrity. interventionism is legitimized with ethi- Georgia’s right to exercise its sovereign- cal arguments, and the case of Kosovo ty on the entire territory of the state has shows that aspirations towards inde- not been denied. Conversely, Serbia’s pendence may be justified by argu- legitimacy has been challenged and that ments of the same type. Kosovo represents an additional argument in Albanians invoke these arguments in favour of establishing a sovereign state favour of their right to self-determina- of Kosovo Albanians. tion, while Georgia uses the same The decision on the final status of claims to preserve the integrity of its Kosovo will certainly influence the state territory. A possible recognition of expectations and hopes of ethnic Kosovo’s independence, while simulta- groups invoking their right to self-deter- neously denying the same right to the mination. The outcome of the negotia- population of South Ossetia and tions concerning the status of the south- Abkhazia would usher ethical argu- ern Serbian province will most probably ments as a means to change and/or sup- confirm that independence requires plement the norms of international law. more than claims to the right to self- The author works as a Research Fellow determination and that each case will be in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

Other useful sources: 1. Hakala, Terhi. 1998. The OSCE Minsk Process: A balance after five years. Helsinki Monitor 1. 2. Kemp, Walter A. 2004. The Business of Ethnic Conflict. Security Dialoge 1(35) : 43-59. 3. Malek, Marin. 2006. State Failure in the South Causasus: Proposal for an Analytical Framework, Transition Stidies Review 13 : 441-460. 4. Popescu, Nicu. 2006. ‘Outsourcing’ de facto Statehood, Russia and the Secessionist Entities in Georgia and Moldova. CEPS Policy Brief 109. 5. Rywkin, Michael. 2006. The Phenomenon of Quasi – states. Diogenes 53(2) : 23-28. Available at: http://dio.sagepub.com.nainfo.nbs.bg.ac.yu:2048/cgi/reprint/53/2/23 [accessed November 23, 2006] 6. Tarkhan-Mouravi, George. 2002. A “Realistic“ Approach to Regional Security in the South Caucaus. Central European University, Centre for Policy Studies. Available at: http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00001817/01/Tarkhan-Mouravi.pdf [accessed November 23, 2006] 7. Treninl, Dmitri. 2000. Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union: Lessons for Africa. Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium, Monograph No 46 : 42-49. Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Trenini.pdf [accessed November 23, 2006] 8. UN Resolution 1244, Security Council 4011th meeting, 1999, Available at: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm [accessed November 23, 2006]. SECURITY OF KOSOVO 32 Lptpwp’t Tfdvsjuz!Qpmjdjft;!Dibmmfohft pg!gpsnvmbujpo!boe!jnqmfnfoubujpo Mvm{jn!Qfdj!boe!Jmjs!Evhpmmj UDK 327.56(497); 327.7/.8(497.115); 341.231(497.115)

Jouspevdujpo rity and prevents normal relations in the region, first of all between Most of the countries of Central Kosovo and Serbia but in different and Eastern Europe have radically ways, the Kosovo knot affects also transformed in a positive direction in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia recent decades. The former East- and Albania. West boundary has disappeared and In 2007 we are likely to witness the Euro-Atlantic democratic space the last chapter in the disintegration has spread throughout Europe. of the former Yugoslav federation. Several Western Balkan countries are While contributing to the regional already credible aspirants for NATO stability, the resolution of Kosovo’s membership, and some of them have status (assuming a stable transition of signed Stabilization and Association Serbia), will result with closer Agreement. The rest have strongly regional cooperation. It is worth not- committed to follow suit. Due to ing that these challenges are not like- direct involvement of NATO and EU, ly to lead to anything more than internal changes and processes that political turmoil, but given ripe cir- led to these memberships as well as cumstances, they may. obligations that keep them inside, Other significant consequences this part of Europe has never been of the recent conflicts are present in more secure in its memorable histo- the form of thousands of refugees, ry. Although internal driving forces unresolved property issues, organ- for reform in the countries of the SEE ized crime and related. In addition, remain weak, it is worth noting that political and economic situation in these countries have made vivid irre- general has not sufficiently recov- versible steps and commitment on ered years after the end of armed their paths toward the EU, and for conflicts and presents fertile ground those that have not, it is much more for widespread social dissatisfaction, a question of ‘how’, and not renewed radicalism, and potential ‘whether’. extremism. The danger of large-scale war in The main difficulty in Kosovo’s the Western Balkans has largely dis- quest to democracy, rule of law and appeared. Nonetheless, a number of market economy has been its vague consequences from the wars of the temporary status since 1999. The last decade remain. Most notably, parallel establishment of a de facto Kosovo’s unresolved status and the protectorate, while at the same time persistence of northern Kosovo as a recognizing FRY’s sovereignty over renegade province after the solution the territory, left a number of issues of the status of Kosovo feeds insecu- pending. International community’s 33 SECURITY OF KOSOVO nebulous approach towards the of Kosovo. The resolution “identifies overall legal framework in Kosovo, the international community as the poor identification of citizenry with sole legitimate entity with a mandate existing institutions and applicable to law enforcement and the use of laws and unresolved property issues force in the region.”2 Along the 2001 (private as well as over socially owned Constitutional Framework for enterprises) caused overwhelming Kosovo, Resolution 1244 designates impediments in establishing democra- the entire public security apparatus, cy, rule of law and market economy. including the judiciary, police servic- In addition to NATO led peace- es, prison system and emergency keeping operation in Kosovo, EU keeps services as reserved functions within a heavy and visible presence too. With executive powers of the United the establishment of UNMIK in 1999, Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). one of its four pillars in charge of eco- In February 2005 the then SRSG nomic reconstruction and development, Søren Jessen-Petersen signaled a including privatisation, was assigned to clear change of direction to local the EU. With the resolution of Kosovo’s ownership by commissioning a status, EU is expected to inherit UNMIK ground-breaking ‘Internal Security and lead the international presence in Sector Review’ (ISSR) by a UK the form of International Civilian Office. Government’s Security Sector Furthermore, EU is establishing in Development Advisory Team.3 The Kosovo its largest European Security stated purpose of the review was to and Defense Policy Mission. The ESPD “engage stakeholders in a process Mission in Kosovo will have specific that will deliver a security sector competencies in the filed of police and architecture that serves the legitimate justice.1 security concerns of all in Kosovo”, providing a framework for the devel- Joufsobm!Tfdvsjuz!Tfdups!Sfwjfx; opment of the sector, including secu- Hfofsbm!Dpotjefsbujpot! rity strategy within the chapter of Internal Security Policy Framework.4 The Security Council Resolution The ISSR process is almost complet- 1244 (1999), invoking Chapter VII of ed. Its final shape has moved beyond the UN Charter, lays out the legal internal security and is similar with framework for security management the classical Security Sector Reviews.

1 Javier Solana and Oli Rehn, The Future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo, Brussels, December 6th, 2005 2 Muharremi R, Peci L, Malazogu L, Knaus V and Murati T, Administration and Governance in Kosovo, (KIPRED, 2nd edition, 2005), p.15. See also S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement. 3 The final report by the assessment team was approved by the SRSG’s office, DPKO and launched on 1 July 2005. It proposed the following generic stages for a security sector review in Kosovo: 1. Conduct Strategic Environment Review; 2. Determine Threats; 3. Develop Internal Security Policy Framework; 4. Develop Individual Institutions/Agencies Policy Framework; 5. Conduct Gap Analysis; 6. Establish Developmental Strategies; 7. Cost and Confirm Affordability; 8. Implement Security Sector Development Strategies. See ‘Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review Concept: Scoping Study’, May 2005, D/SSDAT/20/1/1/1. 4 SSDAT report, p.9. SECURITY OF KOSOVO 34

The role of Kosovo’s governmen- law, corruption and organized tal institutions5 is primarily limited to crime.7 their representation in the ISSR One of the underpinning ele- Steering Committee. The Committee ments of the ISSR process has been is the supreme body in charge of consultations with citizens. As part of oversight and principled decision- the two first stages of the ISSR making of this process and validates (Strategic Environment Review and documents prepared and proposed Security Threats Analysis), a series of during the ISSR process. It is com- consultative meetings were carried prised by main UNMIK representa- out. Community representatives in 30 tives, institutional and party leaders municipalities and two pilot-munici- as well as community representa- palities were given an opportunity to tives.6 voice their views on issues related to There has been a substantial their safety and security. involvement of the civil society in the A very high degree of transparen- ISSR process. Two first stages of the cy towards neighboring states has ISSR were conducted by the Kosovar been present, primarily due to the Institute for Policy Research and fact that the ISSR, like most other important responsibilities in the secu- Development (KIPRED) and the rity field, is ultimately carried out by Geneva Center for Democratic the international administration. Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), There have been ongoing exchanges which makes it the first case in the about the ISSR process in Kosovo region with such an involvement of with most of UNMIK’s interlocutors, civil society in shaping security poli- including Belgrade. cies. Kosovo is moving towards the creation of a full-fledged security sec- Lptpwp’t!Tfdvsjuz!!Lfzt tor that will be implemented once the The framework for the develop- final status is resolved. The ongoing ment of the security strategy of ISSR process is expected, among oth- Kosovo has been put in place by the ers, to provide recommendations on ISSR. Specifically, the framework has division of main responsibilities been laid out by the Strategic among Kosovo’s institution in imple- Environment Review and Security menting of the security strategy. Threats Analysis, two first stages of The perception of the security at the ISSR.8 But, due to its predomi- the civil society level is strongly influ- nantly internal character, ISSR falls enced by non-traditional threats. short of comprehensively defining Economic and political instability are national security interests. at the top of the list of threats, fol- Security Threats Analysis has lowed by unemployment, rule of revealed the following short term

5 Officially referred to as the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). See the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government (UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 of 21 May 2001) 6 SRSG (chair) 7 Inputs from ISSR (stages I & II) consultative process. 8 To review these documents see: ISSR - Strategic Environment Review and Security Threats Analysis, http://mirror.undp.org/kosovo/issr/Reports/English/F1_KIPRED_Initial_Findings.pdf 35 SECURITY OF KOSOVO threats: political extremism and ter- signing of the Stabilization and rorist organizations related to the Association Agreement and prepar- ongoing final status talks and their ing the country for candidacy and aftermath; parallel security structures accession. and political subversion exercised by Serbia; and ethnic non-integration. Uif!bobmztjt!pg!uif!sjtl!gbdupst Identified long term threats include: uisfbufojoh!uif!Lptpwpt unemployment; economic underde- tfdvsjuz! velopment; organized crime and cor- ruption; and international terrorism. Kosovo faces a number of imme- The main factors towards national diate external threats, such as organ- security will be determined by ISSR ized crime, terrorism and illegal traf- security sector development plan. In ficking. Kosovo’s relations with its order to deal with the above-men- immediate neighbors in terms of tioned threats cooperation within the cross-border military threats have region becomes necessary. Kosovo improved over the recent years. It is already has good relations with worth bearing in mind that the exter- Albania, Macedonia and nal military threat weighs little in the Montenegro. Preserving and eyes of Kosovo’s citizens, mainly strengthening cooperation with these due to widespread belief that NATO countries is a precondition for military presence will remain pres- addressing trans-regional security ent for some time in the future. The threats. Also, a special focus should region remains volatile as long as be given to building good relations Kosovo’s fate remains in limbo and and cooperation with Serbia. its future status is not recognized by Kosovo aims to become a full- Serbia. fledged partner in regional security The status of a fledgling econo- confidence building and cooperation my undergoing transition implies initiatives under the framework of difficult economic conditions. Social EU, NATO, Stability Pact and OSCE. and economic pessimism, triggered Ultimately, Kosovo aspires full mem- under poor economic conditions, bership in NATO and EU. present a structural security chal- Mid-term priorities in Kosovo’s lenge to the region. “The region also aspiration towards NATO member- faces serious threats from epi- ship are the undertaking of all neces- demics, industrial accidents, and sary reforms required to achieve PfP natural and environmental disasters. and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Whether the countries of the region Council Membership and preparation would be faced with a bird flue pan- for NATO membership. The PfP demic, a flood or an earthquake, membership will boost Kosovo’s they will have to rely heavily on the external security and transform it crisis response and support of their from security consumer to security neighbors.”9 Events of March 2004 provider. brought to the surface the total lack In terms of integration into EU, of crisis management capacities and Kosovo’s mid-term priorities are coordination among international

9 Ibid, p.4 SECURITY OF KOSOVO 36 civilian and military presence and Xbzt!up!hp!jo!uif the local institutions. In fact, this tfdvsjuz!qpmjdz made obvious the absence of essen- Under Kosovo’s Constitutional tial information sharing between the Framework for Provisional Self- international presence and the Government10, a number of responsi- Kosovo’s leaders. Among many bilities are “reserved” for the Special reactions to the failures of March Representative of the Secretary 2004, the Kosovo Government com- General (SRSG). The most significant menced the creation of crisis man- area from which the PISG are exclud- agement institutions. These institu- ed, with exception of some limited tions are at their very inception and responsibilities, has to do with secu- as such remain highly fragile. rity. According to the formula of International terrorism is consid- “reserved responsibilities” the SRSG ered a threat by all states of the is charged, in coordination with region. Most stakeholders agree that Kosovo Force (KFOR), with responsi- international terrorist networks have bility for all functions that may be not managed so far to establish attributed to the domain of defense themselves within the region. and security preparedness. From However, the ground remains fertile 2002 onwards we have witnessed for such and other networks to fill capacity-building activities in the the gaps of poor performance of area of parliamentary oversight of public institutions and recruit governing institutions and principles among the most vulnerable social of democratic governance have groups. Vivid pro-American senti- begun to be established as funda- ments in the region (such as in mental precondition for an adequate Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia) and transfer of security structures to significant presence of US forces can Kosovo once the final status is turn the area into a target of interna- resolved. tional terrorism. A combination of The post – status legislation on weak institutions and strong pro-US democratic control of the security sentiments present a potentially and defense forces will need to be combustible environment. harmonized with the international Many countries of the region still regulations and EU, NATO and OSCE suffer from weak state institutions standards. The new framework that are making them vulnerable to should also reflect clear division of corruption and organized crime. responsibilities between civilian and Increasing capacities of the over- security authorities as well contain sight mechanisms of the legislative provisions for participation of the and executive government as well as police and defense forces in interna- ensuring a functional and credible tional missions. justice and security institutions will Lack of a sustainable economy diminish internal vulnerabilities and undermines Kosovo’s prospects for improve good governance. development and is reflected with

10 UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 of 21 May 2001 37 SECURITY OF KOSOVO high unemployment, perhaps the sin- Foreign policy has a twofold character gle most dangerous long-term threat. for governing institutions. First of all it A continuation of the current econom- is seen as one of the tests that Kosovo ic situation may result with a reduction has to pass in order to gain the status it of Kosovo’s opportunities to respond aspires to, and secondly foreign policy to security threats. Until Kosovo is eco- is genuinely seen as a tool for enhanc- nomically and politically stabilized it ing Kosovo’s security. will have to rely on substantial donor support for security sector. Dpodmvtjpot!! The creation of Kosovo’s Defense Force (KDF) is dependent on the final Kosovo’s unresolved status feeds unraveling of the status process. insecurity and restrains normal rela- However, discussions among NATO tions in the region, primarily between and local actors are taking place on Kosovo and Serbia. With political this issue and the format of the future security of the region affected by ’ defense force. Kosovo s status, once the latter is resolved the region can finally move KDF will most probably have to be from confrontation to cooperation and created from scratch and reach a num- partnership. ber of 2500 personnel. Its mandate will The involvement of international likely be limited to non-offensive and community is decisive in shaping rela- peace support operations as well as tions in the region. It will take time and disaster response. Until KDF gets fully assistance by the international com- operational, it will be under NATO’s munity until the states of the region command and is expected to reach its develop own and sustainable capabili- full interoperability with NATO ties to resolve their disputes and con- Same as security powers, foreign duct normal relations amongst them- policy falls within “reserved responsi- selves. In this regard, completing the bilities” of the SRSG. He may however security architecture of Kosovo with involve elected officials in the exercise the support of NATO and EU is crucial of these responsibilities, as has been for the security of Kosovo and the the practice. With sovereignty over the region territory suspended and UNMIK pri- On the other side, with all of the marily focused in exercising internal states of the region aiming to join EU governing responsibilities, Kosovo and NATO they naturally become lim- does not have an official foreign poli- ited within the framework of CFSP and cy. This did not prevent governing NATO security and defense policies. institutions to advocate and, within This political trend ultimately reduces their limited responsibilities, pursue the possibilities for countries of the efforts for good neighborly relations region to end up with unpredictable with countries of the region. policies outside the abovementioned Furthermore, there is widespread frameworks of NATO and EU. consensus amongst governing institu- Mr Lulzim Peci is the Executive tions and political parties over the high Director and Mr Ilir Dugolli is the Head of Special Research Projects of the priority that close relations with Kosovar Institute for Policy Research NATO, EU and USA should have. and Development (KIPRED) SECURITY OF KOSOVO 38 Tipvme!b!Lptpwp!Bsnz!cf!Gpsnfe@ ]ps}f!Qpqpwj~ UDK 327.56(497); 355.357(497.115); 323.1 (497.115)

equests to form an army in come of negotiations on the final sta- RKosovo, voiced with increasing tus of this area, i.e. on whether frequency by Kosovo officials as well Kosovo will become independent, or as certain foreign analysts, have for remain under the international protec- some time already elicited conflicting torate, or else perhaps be retained public reactions in both Serbia and within the composition of Serbia. Kosovo. These requests should be Without going into this complex topic, viewed against the backdrop of status this article shall first present the pro- negotiations and the perception of the posals of the relevant international army as proof and bearer of state sov- organizations for the possible forma- ereignty. Many people, primarily in tion of a Kosovo army, and then look Pri{tina, believe that if Kosovo into the existing units this army could became independent after the status comprise, and the largest challenges it negotiations, there would be no rea- would have to face. son not to form its armed forces. However, in view of the history of Bshvnfout!vtfe!up!efnpotusbuf conflicts in this area, as well as the uif!ofdfttjuz!pg!gpsnjoh possible instability following the con- b!Lptpwp!Bsnz clusion of negotiations, the question is whether an armed force of this kind The debate on the Kosovo army should be formed or whether interna- was launched with the International tional forces should be entrusted with Crisis Group’s Report presented in the job of Kosovo’s defence. July this year. The authors of the Albanian leaders in Kosovo unani- report, assuming an impending inde- mously demand a full-fledged state, pendence of Kosovo, offered certain and thereby also the creation of its instructions to Kosovo institutions and army. On the other hand, Serbian also to international factors, about the politicians in Belgrade and the leaders establishment of a Kosovo army. The of Kosovo Serbs do not even consider report precisely defined all stages of the possibility of establishing a this process - from international com- Kosovo army. This attitude of Serbian munity’s preparations, to the creation politicians results from the lack of any of interim capacities for the KPC trans- analysis of the need to form an army formation into a Kosovo army, its in the southern, officially still Serbian, actual formation and accession to the province. This absence of discussion “Partnership for Peace”.1 on this topic is, in the view of this A similar recommendation is given author, very unfortunate and is pre- in a document entitled “The Internal cisely the reason why this matter Security Sector Review”, financed by should receive greater attention. the United Nations Development The establishment of an army in Program (UNDP). Although the report Kosovo primarily depends on the out- has not been officially published yet,

1 See: Vojska za Kosovo?. Izve{taj Me|unarodne krizne grupe br.174, jul 2006 (An Army for Kosovo?. ICG Report no.174, July 2006). http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.cfm?id=4290&l=1. (accessed November 17, 2006). 39 SECURITY OF KOSOVO its results have already been present- members. In view of the anticipated ed to the professional public. The numerical composition and type of starting position of its author, British armament we could say that a future general Anthony Welch, is that Kosovo army would not pose as a Kosovo should have its own profes- major threat to the neighbouring sional defence forces. countries. Both reports argue that the estab- The two reports also converge on lishment of an army in Kosovo would the proposal to entrust the training of add to the internal stability of the the Kosovo army to NATO forces. The province and result in a long-term ICG recommendations emphasize that demilitarization and security of the “upon the request of Kosovo’s gov- area. It would satisfy the aspirations of ernment, and guided by the proposed the majority population in Kosovo to final status, NATO should establish a have the symbols of its sovereignty dedicated military training mission, and thus help the relaxation of ten- attaching it to the KPC coordinator’s3 sions. The placing of all armed forces office: that office should be renamed under the joint control of new demo- and report to the KFOR commander cratic government institutions would (COMKFOR) after the UN Mission ensure the lasting stability of the (UNMIK) leaves.”4 The ICG also sug- region and the demilitarization of the gests that the KPC staff, the region by establishing a monopoly Coordinator’s Office and NATO over the right to the use of arms and should jointly select the members of outlaw all other armed groups. This the future army. Although NATO would prevent the creation of another weak state after the end of the war should have the final say on all candi- conflict.2 dates, their evaluation must be based on their test results, accumulated pro- fessional development, and personal Qspqptbm!gps!uif!gvuvsf files. Lptpwp!Bsnz The authors of both reports also Both reports propose that the recommend the setting up of a future Kosovo army should comprise Kosovo defence ministry, but in sever- members of the Kosovo Protection al years time and under the oversight Corps. Estimates of its desirable and of the international community. This acceptable numerical composition should be preceded by the adoption vary, ranging between two and three of a Kosovo security strategy and a thousand men, without tanks, heavy budget that could finance a ministry of artillery, ground to ground missiles or this kind. The main task of a future air force. The size of the future army Kosovo army should be participation will not exceed the current number of in international peace missions. That KPC troops of three thousand active would avoid the duplication of the and another two thousand reserve functions of the army and Kosovo

2 Ibid. 3KPC coordinator is appointed by the international representative. He should be the main person to advise on the KPC policy and practical issues in relation to military and disciplinary aspects, as well as the contact person for KPC and KFOR coordination. See: http://www.iomkosovo.org/Photo-News/PI/KPCT_Book_Serbian/KPC_Serbian%20.pdf. (accessed November 17, 2006). 4 Ibid. SECURITY OF KOSOVO 3:

Police Service, which is concerned bers of this formation under the over- with the province’s internal security sight of the international administra- and public order. Within the frame- tion, to reduce the number of armed work of regional cooperation and par- persons on the territory of the ticipation in peace missions the mem- province and to see that those who bers of this army could, in the first remained under arms would undergo place, engage in such operations as the necessary training. Out of the total demining. This function of the Kosovo of the assumed 27 thousand KLA army will naturally go missing unless members, 17 thousand responded to it fulfils all standards required for the this invitation and three thousand of PfP membership. The ICG believes them were admitted. After the 1999 conflict a part of the that the internal security tasks of the Kosovo army should be severely limit- ed. They should not go much beyond the present KPC duties including civil Kpjoumz!jo!qfbdf!njttjpot protection, engineering and recon- struction. These assignments suggest In a few years Serbian and that the mandate of a possible Kosovo Kosovo soldiers may find them- army would not be much different selves side by side on a same from that of the KPC. Actually, the peace mission somewhere in only difference is revealed in the fact the world. Inconceivable? that the Kosovo army will participate Perhaps, but a piece of news – in peace operations. This fact is used that the Croatian military by Kosovo officials as an additional police contingent joined the argument to convince the internation- peace-keeping forces in Kosovo al actors of the necessity to form this - which would have caused a army. fierce Serbian reaction not long ago, has this Tuesday went entirely unnoticed. Lptpwp!Qspufdujpo!Dpsqt Dejan Anastasijevi}, Both above-mentioned reports Forsiranje vojske, Vreme, state that the new Kosovo Army Beograd, 24. avgust 2006. should evolve from the KPC. That is the main reason why the war heritage, the mandate and organizational struc- Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was ture of this organization should be transformed into a Kosovo Protection examined. Corps emulating securité civile, the The establishment of the Kosovo French civil security service.6 The Protection Corpse in many ways Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, served the purpose of the demilita- adopted by the Kosovo parliament in rization, disarmament and reintegra- 2001, describes the Corps as a “civilian tion of the KLA.5 KLA combatants emergency organization, established were encouraged to apply for the under the law, which carries out in KPC. The idea was to place the mem- Kosovo rapid disaster response tasks

5 See: Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas and Paes, Wolf-Chrisitian.2001. Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of Kosovo Liberation Army. Brief 20. Bonn International Center for Conversion. http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief20/content.php. (accessed October 27, 2006). 6 Ibid. 41 SECURITY OF KOSOVO for public safety in times of emer- on the territorial defence doctrine.9 gency and humanitarian assistance.”7 The KPC, and the KLA before it, inher- The idea of the Kosovo Army is ited this doctrine since some of their just as old as that of independence. commanders were active officers of KPC members, and especially its first the Yugoslav People’s Army. commander and current Kosovo However, this doctrine is not appro- prime minister Agim Ceku, have never priate for a modern army of the pres- concealed their aspirations to use it for ent day, primarily due to the changed the development of a future army of security challenges, risks and threats an independent Kosovo. Although the in the region, and has therefore also Constitutional Framework refers to been rejected by the Serbian Army. In the KPC as civil defence of sorts, addition to that, the command staff of another document places it into the the present KPC lack the knowledge context of the future Kosovo army. of modern military management, The document entitled “Undertaking which makes them dependent on of Demilitarization and international assistance. Transformation by the UCK” submit- Yet another problem of the exist- ted to the KFOR by KLA commanders ing KPC that will have to be addressed a few days after the end of the war, before a Kosovo Army is established has to do with the so-called inverted was accepted without objections. The command pyramid. Namely, the KPC document anticipates a possibility of is characterized by a large number of establishing a Kosovo army according high ranking officers and an insuffi- to the American National Guard 8 cient number of middle and low-rank- model. This could perhaps explain ing commanders. The existence of too the Albanian name for the KPC - few subordinates and too many com- Trupat Mbrojtese te Kosoves, which manders could prevent the efficient may be translated as Kosovo Defence functioning of the army. Corps. A major problem in commanding this hypothetical army may also Xibu!bxbjut!b!gvuvsf!Lptpwp emerge from the tribal affiliation of its Bsnz@ members, which has an important role in Kosovo.10 As long as obedi- The following paragraphs will ence to a tribal leader is given prece- address the problems that will repre- dence over a single military com- sent the main challenges to a future mand, there can be no talk of an effi- Kosovo army. The first set of prob- cient and organized army. Another lems is of purely organizational specific problem is also found in con- nature. The command structure flicts between certain tribal communi- would have to be different from that ties that exclude any form of coordi- of the current KPC, which is still based nated cooperation and the establish-

7 Ustavni okvir za Kosovo iz 2001. godine (The Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, 2001) http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/FrameworkPocket_SRB_Dec2002.pdf. (accessed November 17, 2006). 8 Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK, Art. 25a, June 1999. www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/documents/uck.htm, (accessed November 17, 2006). 9 See: Petersen, Erik. 2005. The Kosovo Protection Corps in Search of a Future. Field Notes. Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies. http://www.cess.org/publications/occasionals/pdfs/occasionals1.pdf. (accessed November 7, 2006). 10 Ibid. SECURITY OF KOSOVO 42 ment of a firm chain of command, as Kosovo. Bodies of the Kosovo interim well as responsibility. administration do not have formal Closely related to the problem of authorities to exercise control over the clannish divisions is the one of large KPC. Moreover, both the provisional numbers of illegal weapons on the ter- Kosovo government and the KPC are ritory of Kosovo. Albanian sources refer to the struggle against Serbian under the supervision of the UN oppression as the reason for the exis- Secretary General’s special represen- tence of large numbers of unregis- tative. Parliamentary oversight - yet tered weapons, the origins of which another lever of the democratic civil are impossible to establish. However, control – is also inoperational. The seven years after the last member of Parliamentary Committee for the Serbian armed forces left the Emergency Preparedness does over- province the problem of illegal arms see the KPC to some degree but has still remains unsolved. According to a no formal competences in that SEESAC small arms and light weapons report, illegal arms possessed by civil- respect. Its role is reduced to supervis- ians in Kosovo in June this year num- ing the KPC action plan and tasks. If bered 317 thousand.11 Campaigns to Kosovo obtained independence this collect illegal arms have thus far failed problem would probably be solved. to yield any substantial results. In Elected government bodies would be order to set up armed forces with a established with competences to con- monopoly over the use of force, it trol and command the army. In addi- would be necessary to deal with this tion to these reasons the international problem as soon as possible, i.e. to reduce the number of illegal weapons officials are sceptical of the Kosovo to a socially acceptable level. The interim authorities’ intentions to con- above mentioned reports, arguing in trol the KPC in view of the rivalry of favour of establishing a Kosovo army, political parties attempting to place point to the fact that the armed forces the Corps under their own control and would probably contribute to the dis- use it in their internal contentions. armament of the Kosovo population. That is also why they seem reluctant The truth is, however, that this will to transfer the bulk of authorities to only become possible after the end of the provisional government bodies.12 status negotiations since the former KLA combatants will not be willing to In addition to the lack of authori- surrender their weapons unless they ties for the democratic civil control of are convinced that no further struggle the armed forces, Kosovo today does for independence is required. not have the capacities to successfully fulfil that task either. Another related Mbdl!pg!dpouspm problem is the incompetence of par- liamentary committee members who Another, still outstanding, major lack the knowledge required to effi- problem is the lack of democratic civil ciently control the KPC.13 The control over the armed forces in province still does not have a suffi-

11 SALW Survey of Kosovo, SEESAC, September 2006, http://www.seesac.org/reports/KOSO- VO.pdf (accessed November 7, 2006). 12 See: Petersen, Erik. 2005. The Kosovo Protection Corps in Search of a Future. Field Notes. Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies. http://www.cess.org/publications/occasionals/pdfs/occasionals1.pdf. (accessed November 7, 2006). 13 Ibid. 43 SECURITY OF KOSOVO ciently developed professional public tain this view by claiming that KPC that could address the security prob- members maintain close contacts with lems. The debate on the issue is rebelling groups on the Serbian south almost non-existent, while the media and in Macedonia, thereby reinforcing lack the professional abilities to tackle the impression that the Serbian popu- it and are moreover exposed to pow- lation cannot trust in the protection of 16 erful political influences. Expert the official Kosovo institutions. groups like KIPRED, capable of The above-mentioned Internal actively participating in the relevant Security Sector Review, which is con- debate, are precious few. Further sidered pivotal for the further devel- opment of the security sector in development of the NGO sector Kosovo recommended the formation would create the possibility to expand of the Kosovo Army. Bearing in mind the debate on security issues and that Resolution 1244 does not allow ensure its active participation in artic- 14 for the establishment of the army, it ulating the security policy. may be assumed that it will immedi- There is no doubt that a future ately follow the status decision, natu- Kosovo army would be hard-pressed rally if it implied the proclamation of to preserve at least a semblance of its independence. Another certainty is multiethnicity. In the first place, the the fact that this army will be under KPC failed to fulfil the prescribed the strict oversight of NATO forces, requirement of employing at least ten primarily due to the cautious percent of national minority members. approach of international officials, Out of three thousand active members fully aware of the weight of the prob- of the Crops only 36 are of Serbian lems concerned. Knowing that the for- 15 nationality. Secondly, a fair number mation of the Kosovo army is unac- of the remaining Serbs would proba- ceptable to the Serbian side the future bly leave the territory of Kosovo if its armed force may not be called an independence is proclaimed. The army, but will definitively have the KPC has failed to change the view that mandate of one. But, as Erik Petersen it is, in fact, the KLA in other uniforms, has put it, it is not the label that which will probably be inherited by counts, but the assigned mandate.17 the Kosovo army. Officials of certain The author works as a Research Fellow international organizations help sus- in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 See: Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas and Paes, Wolf-Chrisitian.2001. Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of Kosovo Liberation Army. Brief 20. Bonn International Center for Conversion. http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief20/content.php. (accessed October 27, 2006). 17 See: Petersen, Erik. 2005. The Kosovo Protection Corps in Search of a Future. Field Notes. Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies. http://www.cess.org/publications/occasionals/pdfs/occasionals1.pdf. (accessed November 7, 2006).

Additional useful links: KFOR official web-site: http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kpc/stmt_principles.htm UNMIK official web-site: : http://www.unmikonline.org/1styear/kpcorps.htm THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES 44 Fuiojd!Ufotjpot!.!Bo!Pctubdmf! gps!Tfdvsjuz!jo!Lptpwp [psbob!Bubobtpwj~ UDK 316.356.4: 316.647.8(497.115)

ow do you envision your average ings of researches into the stereotypes Hpeer among the Kosovo popula- in Kosovo and Serbia and then show tion of Albanian nationality? Do you how they influence the differences in see him/her as a nice, intelligent, truth- the perceptions of personal security of ful, pleasant and peaceful person with Kosovo Serbs and Albanians. the same hobbies? Do you think it pos- sible for Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo to work in the same firms, Fuiojd!tufsfpuzqft receive treatment from the same physi- pg!Lptpwpt!djuj{fot cians, frequent the same cafés and take their children to the same nurseries or Ethnic stereotypes amount to a rel- atively simplified and rigid understand- schools? Would you trust an armed 3 forces’ member of Albanian nationali- ing of other nations’ characteristics. ty? They are formed regardless of whether Answers to some of these questions communication with these other may be found through the research nations exists or not. Ethnic stereotypes into ethnic stereotypes. Over the past can be more or less defined, i.e. struc- ten years or so there have been a num- tured, and more or less prevalent. To ber of studies into interethnic relations this we should add that, being saturat- as reflected in ethnic stereotypes, but ed with emotions, they are difficult to these stereotypes were not correlated change. Investigations into the con- with the perception of security. That is tents, forms and spread of ethnic why we shall use the findings of sever- stereotypes may provide a more com- al surveys carried out on the sample of plete insight into tensions existing Serbian and Kosovo citizens in order to among nations. There are several theo- learn whether the ethnic stereotypes retical explanations of the functioning influence the security perception of of stereotypes. One of them defines Kosovo’s citizens, and if so in which stereotypes are generalizations useful way? Our focus will be limited to the for the evaluation of different phenom- relations between Serbs and Albanians ena in a complex and ever changing since most other ethnic communities environment, while another suggests become easily integrated into the that they justify our hostile attitude majority Albanian society.1 In addition towards certain groups.4 to Serbs, the Roma are also exposed to According to a public opinion sur- intolerant reactions of the local com- vey in Kosovo and Metohija conducted munity,2 but their position will not be in 1997 by the Belgrade Forum for tackled here due to the limited space Ethnic Relations in cooperation with for this analysis? We will, thus, first the Institute for Philosophy and present and briefly comment the find- Sociology in Pri{tina, Serbs and

1 Krasniqi, Genc. 2006. Security and Democracy in South Eastern Europe: National Assessment for Kosovo. KIPRED, http//: kipred.net (accessed November 09, 2006). 2 Ibid. 3 Rot, Nikola 1994. Osnovi socijalne psihologije (Basics of social psychology), deveto izdanje. Beograd: Zavod za ud`benike i nastavna sredstva., p. 400. 4 Ibid, p. 401. 45 THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES

Albanians in Kosovo attribute to their Albanians consider Serbs dangerous, respective nations only the positive compared with 67% of Serbs who think (desirable) characteristics, as opposed the same of Kosovo Albanians.8 to the members of the other nation, who are characterized only in negative Qfsdfqujpo!pg!tfdvsjuz!pg!Tfsct (undesirable) terms.5 What both groups have in common is that they boe!Bmcbojbot!jo!Lptpwp think about each other in simplified The ethnic division of Kosovo soci- categories, of the kind they certainly ety and stereotypes reflecting this divi- would not like to be thought of by oth- sion shape the different perceptions of ers. Stereotypes reflect ethnic tensions security of Kosovo Serbs and among Serbs and Albanians. Albanians. The prevailing majority of Describing the Serbs in this survey, Serbs in Kosovo – 90.8% feel insecure Albanians used only 7% positive and outside their homes, compared with 93% negative characteristics, while the 32.1% of Albanians.9 According to the Serbs assigned Albanians 32% positive findings of the “Internal Security Sector and 68% negative characteristics. Review in Kosovo”10 ethnic violence is Stereotypes characteristically sur- perceived as a threat by 20% of Serbs vive despite the information or facts and five times less Kosovo Albanians.11 countering their contents. The lasting Interpretation of these data must nature of stereotypes is substantiated take into account the fact that accord- by the findings of a 2005 survey a “Joint ing to the traditional understanding of European Vision: Free movement for security, groups which are in the Goods and People in Kosovo and minority on a specific territory tend to Serbia” conducted by EPUS (in Serbia feel less safe than those in the majority. proper) and KIPRED (in Kosovo). The existence of negative stereotypes, They indicate that 84% of Kosovo in this case of Serbs towards the

Ubcmf!2;!Tfsc!tufsfpuzqft!pg Ubcmf!3;!Bmcbojbo!tufsfpuzqft Bmcbojbot/7 pg!Tfsct/8

Ethnic characteristics %

5 Mihajlovi}, Sre}ko. 1998. Etni~ki stereotipi i heterostereotipi na Kosovu (Ethnic stereotypes and heterostereotypes in Kosovo and Serbia), Sociologija. LX, 3: 411-426. 6 Ibid, p. 420. 7 Ibid, p. 420. 8 Zajedni~ka evropska vizija: slobodno kretanje roba i ljudi na Kosovu i u Srbiji (A Joint European Vision: Free Movement for Goods and People in Kosovo and Serbia). 2005. Freedom House, EPuS, KIPRED, http://www.emins.org/projekti/istrazivacki/sloboda/index.htm (accessed November 09, 2006). 9 Izve{taj ranog upozoravanja, Kosovo (Early Warning Report – Kosovo), Izve{taj br.13, jan- uar-jun 2006, UNDP na Kosovu, str. 27, www.kosovo.undp.org/publications/ ews13/ewr13_srb.pdf , p. 39 (accessed November 09, 2006). 10“Internal Security Sector Review in Kosovo” is an ongoing process je proces aimed at obtaining an insight into the needs of all the parties concerned in Kosovo as a basis for a plan for security sector development to guarantee security of all Kosovo citizens. 11 Internal Security Sector Review in Kosovo, ppt presentation. THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES 46

Albanians, adds to their perception of sions in inter-ethnic relations (Table Albanians as a threat to their personal 3).12 We will therefore elaborate on the and public security. Accounting for less role of the Serbian and Albanian politi- than a tenth of the total population, cal elites in the politicization of nega- and harbouring negative stereotypes tive stereotypes in greater detail. towards the Albanian majority, Serbs The political elite in Serbia places feel insecure. Non-integration into the almost all political events in the politi- political life in Kosovo probably addi- cal life of Serbia (e.g. adoption of the tionally enhances the feeling of insecu- Serbian constitution, admission to the rity of Serbs in Kosovo. Both nations apparently still have fresh memories of violence, which rep- resented the main characteristic of their mutual relations in the most recent decades. Tensions among Serbs and Albanians, reflected in stereotypes, may lead the Serbs to look for greater security in self-defence and further arming, which would additionally threaten the overall security in Kosovo. Another threat to of this kind is the fact that Kosovo institutions lack the capac- ity to cope with ethnic tensions that have developed for decades.

Ebohfspvt!qpmjujdj{joh pg!tufsfpuzqft Political elite may influence the Partnership for Peace, etc.) in the con- deepening of ethnic tensions through text of the status solution sending a the politicization of ethnic stereotypes. powerful message about the territorial The main actors influencing the shap- indivisibility of Serbia. Statements con- ing or relations between Serbs and cerning the Kosovo status made by Albanians in Kosovo are the political politicians in Serbia over the past year elites of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo include extreme views that the procla- as well as the political elite in Serbia mation of Kosovo independence proper. The representatives of the would mean an occupation of part of Serbian minority do not actively partic- the Serbian territory and even allow for ipate in the political life of Kosovo, the defence of Kosovo using all avail- while ethnic tensions between Serbs able means, including the military.13 and Albanians develop between The anxiety of Serbian citizens and the Belgrade and Albanians in Pri{tina. spread of prejudices and stereotypes Findings of a public opinion survey are additionally encouraged by the conducted within the UNDP “Early views of Serbian Government mem- Warning Report Kosovo No. 13” con- bers who disparage the Albanian side firm that the positions of Serbian lead- and the UN special envoy in the final ers in Kosovo do not influence the ten- status negotiations.14 Speaking about

12 Early Warning Report, op. cit., p. 27. 13 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti. 14 For more details see: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm= 11&dd=12&nav_category=11&nav_id=219626&fs=1,http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?y yyy=2006&mm=03&dd=22&nav_category=11&nav_id=192328&fs=1. 47 THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES the negotiating parties the Serbian and feelings of being endangered are political elite fails to address their also enhanced by the statements of needs, interests and problems, and in political decision makers who suggest its communications frequently resorts a possibility for unilateral proclamation to emotionally coloured opinions. In of independence by the Kosovo parlia- this way the elite helps create a black- ment, if the proposal of the UN special and-white image of the other side and representative falls short of the Albanian deepens the stereotypes. The influence majority’s aspirations. Bearing in mind of Belgrade, as perceived by the that the representatives of the Kosovo respondents of Albanian nationality, Serbs do not participate in the work of provisional institutions in Kosovo, uni- ranks first among the factors causing lateral proclamation would completely tensions between Serbs and Albanians 15 remove their voice from the process of in Kosovo (Table3). defining the future Kosovo status. The attitude of Kosovo’s political Statements of the Albanian political elite elite may be summarized in a statement referring to unilateral actions send a of the Kosovo government, “Serbs in message to the Serbs in Kosovo, as well Kosovo - yes, Kosovo in Serbia – as in Serbia, that their needs, interests never”. The political elite in Kosovo and problems are not appreciated, considers the institutions in Serbia which additionally deepens the mistrust incompetent to decide on the destiny and stereotypes of Albanians as a of Kosovo citizens. The local Serbian nation. The position of Albanian leaders population has felt scant improvement was most often cited as the obstacle of in the conditions of its everyday life greatest importance by Serbian national- attributable to the establishment of pro- ity respondents in Kosovo in the 2004 visional Kosovo institutions. That is and 2006 surveys (Table 3).17 why Albanian elite’s statements of readiness to work towards a better communication with the Serbian Qsptqfdut!gps!sfevdjoh!fuiojd minority and higher quality of its every- ufotjpot day life remain declarative. The A lower percentage of respondents Albanian political elite speaks of who believe that interethnic relations Kosovo as a democratic and tolerant in Kosovo are tense suggest a potential society that will guarantee freedom, for the change of stereotypes, as well equality and economic development as tensions among Serbs and for all. The minorities’ apprehension Albanians. Respondents of Albanian Ubcmf!4;!!!Gbdupst!dbvtjoh!ufotjpot!cfuxffo!Tfsct!boe!Bmcbojbot/27

15Early Warning Report, op.cit, p. 27. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES 48 nationality display a gradual decrease, addressing the issue of the Kosovo sta- while the relevant percentage of tus, and by attempting to see the prob- Serbian nationality respondents was lems from the other side’s point of halved in the past year (Chart 1)18. The view. Work along this line should start thesis that the work towards the reduc- with the harmonization of the different tion of ethnic tensions should be one views about the everyday functioning of the priorities in Kosovo is also sub- of Kosovo’s citizens. A compromise on stantiated by the fact that almost half matters less weighty than the issue of the Serbs in Kosovo still perceive fur- the future Kosovo status will certainly ther deterioration of interethnic rela- increase mutual trust and add to the tions as the largest threat to stability.19 success of dealing with more complex Research findings show that the issues. Empirical research provides change in stereotypes is also influ- additional proof that the change of enced by changes in the socio-political inter-national relations, i.e. the and inter-group relations. According to improvement, or aggravation of rela- the results obtained by the researchers tions among groups may influence the of the universities in Belgrade and Novi change of ethnic stereotypes.22 The Sad democratic changes in Serbia after change of stereotypes, i.e. the attitude 2000 brought about a reduction in eth- that “we” are good, while “they” are nocentrism, but there is a question bad, will certainly help the Serbs and whether this reflects a substantial Albanians to stop seeing each other as change in the value system or an a threat for the survival of their respec- expression of desirable views.21 tive nations. In that case it will be pos- Regardless of certain limitations, these sible to increase the feeling of personal findings indicate that by changing the security of both Serbs and Albanians in discourse, the political elite may trigger Kosovo, as well as Serbs and Albanians the change of negative ethnic stereo- in Serbia. Failing that, if certain groups types. Specifically, where the relations continue feeling unsafe, it will be between Serbs and Albanians in impossible to improve the overall secu- Kosovo are concerned, the political rity of Kosovo citizens. elite may influence the change in neg- The author works as research fellow ative stereotypes by abandoning the in the Belgrade School of Security Studies rationale of losers and winners in

Gjhvsf!2/!Sftqpoefout!bhsffnfou!xjui!uif!tubufnfou;! Sfmbujpot!cfuxffo Tfsct!boe!Bmcbojbot!bsf!boe!xjmm!dpoujovf!up!cf!ufotf/ 31

18 Early Warning Report, op.cit, p. 27. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Biro, M., Mihi}, V., Milin, P., Logar S. 2002. Did socio-political changes in Serbia change the level of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism of citizens? Psihologija. Vol. 35, No 1-2, pp. 37-47. 22 Rot, Nikola, op.cit. p. 405 49 THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES Tfscjb’t Dbqbdjujft!up!Sfjoufhsbuf Lptpwp!boe!Nfupijkb Nbslp!Njmp|fwj~ UDK 323.174 (497.115); 32.019.52(497.11) erbian defence minister Agim Ceku Cfuxffo!eftjsft Shas today laid a wreath at the Tomb boe!qpttjcjmjujft of the Unknown Soldier.” Can you imagine seeing headlines of this kind? The solution to the Kosovo status Judging by a CeSID’s public opinion issue is today sought by the domestic and international institutions, or rather survey the citizens of Serbia are not through the negotiations between inclined to accept this outcome. political elites, while the citizens’ views Do the Serbian citizens care for may only partly influence their course. Kosovo, and if so to what extent? What Looking at the findings of a number of is, at best, implied by reverting Kosovo surveys whether directly or indirectly to Serbia? Is Serbia aware of the conse- linked with the Kosovo problem, one quences of this reintegration and if so, may conclude that Serbia’s capacities what is it capable of doing to forestall for the reintegration of Kosovo are them? The following analysis will not rather modest. Some of these surveys deal with the war in Kosovo, or the were carried out by CeSID2 in August crimes both sides committed at that and September 2006. The analysis of time, or even with the legal status of public attitudes, especially of ethnic Kosovo and Metohija. Its purpose is to distance, allows us to perceive and, to point to the consequences that will a degree, also forecast the action arise if Kosovo remains within Serbia. potential of Serbian citizens. In this par- The Serbian government does not have ticular case we will define the action a long term strategy related to Kosovo. potential as the possibility for collective The talk of Kosovo in Serbia uses action aimed at creating the precondi- diverse metaphors, e.g. “the most tions for a joint life. The questionnaire intended for the expensive Serbian word”, all the while citizens included several questions thinking about the territory, rather than concerning the desired and expected the people living on it. In other words, status of Kosovo. The figure shows that no one speaks about the things that the respondents’ wishes and expecta- make up life in Kosovo. Findings of tions are far apart. The largest differ- 1 several different surveys indicate the ences are found between the most rad- political, economic and security conse- ical solutions, i.e. independent Kosovo quences of keeping Kosovo and and Kosovo as an autonomous region Metohija within the composition of in Serbia. The smallest differences Serbia. These problems are not dis- between desires and expectations (4-5 cussed in the Serbian society. per cent) are registered among citizens

1 See the sources listed below. 2 CeSID. Beograd. septembar 2006. Istra`ivanje javnog mnjenja Srbije (Serbian pub- lic opinion survey). http://www.cesid.org/articles/download/files/Izvestaj,%20istrazi- vanje%20javnogmnjenja,%20septembar%2006..doc?id=28 (November 15th 2006.) The survey was done on the territory of Serbia, excluding Kosovo and Metohija, on a sample of 1,634 adult respondents. THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES 4: who support the status quo or the divi- quently refer to the return of Kosovo sion of Kosovo into Serbian and under Serbia’s wing, it is clear that Albanian parts. The international pro- manipulation with the Kosovo issues is tectorate is a temporary solution and still considered an efficient means to the perpetuation of the present situa- score political points in Serbia. tion, therefore, does not seem to be a Serbian citizens’ attitudes towards realistic option. The largest number of the Kosovo problem may be seen on citizens, as many as 58%, would like to the example of the referendum to con- see Kosovo as a region in Serbia, but firm the new constitution of the only 12% actually expect this outcome. Republic of Serbia. The constitution’s Similar discrepancies are also regis- preamble defines Kosovo as a part of tered on the other end of the scale. The Serbia. This preamble is politically respondents’ statements concerning motivated by the ongoing negotiations the independence of Kosovo reveal a on the Kosovo status and serves to 30% difference between their wishes reinforce the Serbian party’s arguments and expectations. The citizens are in favour of keeping Kosovo under the aware that the most probable outcome sovereignty and within the territorial of the negotiations would be the deci- framework of Serbia. Namely, ever sion on the independence of Kosovo. since June 1999 the Serbian govern- However, their wishes, diametrically ment has had no competences in opposed to the perception of the Kosovo. expected outcome, may nevertheless In a Serbian public opinion survey3 be used by political actors to mobilize conducted in October 2006, on the eve the citizens for the purposes of their of the constitutional referendum, political ends. Namely, knowing that at CeSID included a question on the the height of election campaigns prom- importance of the preamble on the ises of certain political parties not infre- vote to endorse the constitution. Only

Gjhvsf!2/!!Xibu!ljoe!pg!b!tpmvujpo!gps!uif!Lptpwp!qspcmfn ep!zpv!xjti!boe!fyqfdu@

Source: CeSID, 2006.

3 CeSID. Beograd. oktobar 2006. Istra`ivanje javnog mnjenja Srbije. http://www.cesid.org/articles/download/files/Saopstenje%20za%20stampu.doc?id =34 .(November 15th 2006.) 51 THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES

10 per cent of respondents said the sta- whom the ethnic distance is the largest. tus of Kosovo was their primary reason Only 26 per cent of respondents find for going to the vote. This more or less Croats undesirable as Serbian citizens, corresponds with the results of a previ- compared with twice as many in the ous survey4 wherein 12 per cent of citi- case of to the Albanians (42%). zens expected Kosovo to become an These figures show that the Serbian autonomous region of Serbia. A look at citizens are, at best, amenable to coexis- the citizens’ reactions to the statement, tence with the Kosovo Albanians, but “No matter whether we voted or not, that the prospect for the reintegration of Kosovo is already lost” reveals a fairly the two nations are small. In view of the even distribution of responses on the experience of conflicts and ethnic opposite ends with 36.5 and 32 per cent cleansing on both sides, these indicators of those who agree and disagree respec- give scant hope that the stability in the tively. This may be partly attributed to region will be attained. Examples of the absence of a Serbian government’s divided regions in Europe, such as clear strategy to resolve the Kosovo sta- Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or tus, as well as the different signals con- Macedonia, confirm that solutions of cerning the possible solution emitted by this kind are not lasting and that a long the international community. term strategy is required to establish sta- bility and overcome ethnic tensions. Fuiojd!ejtubodf!bt!bo!pctubdmf Qpmjujdbm!qbsujdjqbujpo CeSID’s survey also addressed the ethnic distance between Serbs and During the campaign for the other Serbian citizens. The distance was plebiscitary confirmation of the Serbian measured in relation to Albanians, constitution, the citizens were not Croats, Montenegrins and the Roma. advised on the political, economic and The largest distance was registered security implications of keeping Kosovo towards the Albanians, on all points of within Serbia. The new Serbian constitu- the Bogardus’ scale. Interesting in this tion has lowered the election threshold context is a comparison of two cate- for parties representing minority com- gories – Croats and Albanians – towards munities to 2%, compared with 5% for

Gjhvsf!3;!Fuiojd!ejtubodf!upxbset!Bmcbojbot-!Spnb!boe!Npoufofhsjot!)jo!&*!!

Source: CeSID, 2006.

4 CeSID. septembar 2006. Istra`ivanje javnog mnjenja Srbije. THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES 52 the parties representing the majority bear in mind that one of the burning nation. Serbia has approximately to six problems in Kosovo is its remarkably and a half million registered voters, high unemployment, resulting from a about three and a half of whom turned long-drawn-out economic underdevel- out at the referendum to endorse the opment, war-time devastation of its constitution (supported by all parlia- economy and a rampant grey economy. mentary parties). The number of regis- UNDP coordinated studies in the tered voters for Kosovo 2001 election 2005-2006 period looked into the prob- was 1.2 million, including 130,000 lem of unemployment in Kosovo Serbs. Assuming that Kosovo is de facto (“Early Warning Report”, 2006) and in a part of Serbia and that Albanians Serbia (“Report on Human actively participate in the political life of Development in Serbia”, 2005). The the state, there would be a large possi- data on unemployment in Kosovo are bility for Albanians to take some of the rather interesting.6 The World Bank esti- leading positions in Serbia. This sce- mates refer to 23% of unemployed in nario would only be possible if the this area, excluding seasonal and infor- Albanians had a single ticket, and, in mal jobs in the agricultural sector, while view of their numbers, represented a the Kosovo ministry of labour and social fairly strong group in Serbia. This condi- tional electoral calculation could imply a potential coalition of parties of the WHO WAS A democratic block with one of Albanian NICE GUY parties or a coalition thereof. This coali- LAST YEAR? tion would probably have a low rating among the citizens of Serbia, but, on the other hand, (due to the marked ethnic distance towards the Albanians) it would send more favourable signals to the international community. In a gov- ernment of that kind representatives of Albanian parties would have to hold some offices. However, we must note that 72 per cent of citizens would not like to see an Albanian as their states- man.5 This conclusion is substantiated by the fact that 73% of Serbian citizens consider Albanians disloyal citizens, which may have further influence on welfare registers unemployment among the future of inter-ethnic relations 40 per cent of its active population between Serbs and Albanians. (323,201) with an upward trend. A part of the “Human Development Fdpopnjd!ejnfotjpo Report” addresses the situation in the Serbian south, in Pre{evo and In addition to Albanians’ participa- Bujanovac municipalities. This region tion in the political life of Serbia, retain- may be taken as an example to demon- ing Kosovo within the composition of strate the willingness of Serbian institu- Serbia also has certain implication in the tions to deal with economic problems in economic sphere. Namely, we must an area with a majority Albanian popu-

5 See Figure 2. 6 UNDP. 2006. Izve{taj ranog upozoravanja – Kosovo (Early Warning report Kosovo), izve{taj br. 13, januar-jun. str 21-22 http://www.kosovo.undp.org/reposito- ry/docs/ewr_7srb.pdf. (November 24th 2006) 53 THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES lation. It is a part of Serbia with the high- lenges. Several questions were est unemployment rate: in Pre{evo it designed to test the citizens’ attitudes reaches 60% while in Bujanovac, only towards Kosovo as a security problem 6000 of the local population of 43000 and their readiness to react to the relat- have jobs. The “Human Development ed challenges. In the seven survey Report” shows that large difficulties in rounds, covering the period from this respect are due to the citizens’ mis- February 2004 until May 2005 about 60 trust of the institutions, the language per cent of respondents though that barrier and an underdeveloped civil security was threatened by potential society.7 Other drawbacks include the conflicts in multiethnic environments outflow of labour and the lack of pri- (with emphasis on Kosovo and vate entrepreneurship. A specific prob- Metohija). On the other hand, asked lem also arises from weapons stock- how the army could best contribute to piled by the Albanians living in Pre{evo establishing the peace and security in and Bujanovac. Kosovo and Metohija, 13.3 per cent of Kosovo and south of Serbia share respondents said it should intervene if similar problems: a high rate of unem- violence escalated. The remaining three ployment, non-integration of their citi- answers (see the Table) were in line zens into the institutions of the system with the UN SC Resolution 1244. This and inferior interethnic relations. distribution of responses reveals the However, we must note that the situa- absence of a consensus about the desir- tion in Serbia is not much better either. able reaction to a threat from Kosovo, Judging by the data of August 2006, the and therefore also the formalization of unemployment rate was 27.9 per cent, that consensus within a strategy of the or 1,001,408 jobless.8 A hypothetical state. integration of Kosovo would increase The analysis of responses given by this number by a third. Knowing that respondents who declared their party unemployment leads to weaker inte- affiliation is rather interesting. It allows gration of citizens into the social sys- us to establish the correlation between tem, the high unemployment rate party orientation of the respondents appears to be a security problem also. and their choice of the solution for the Namely, income that cannot be attained crisis in Kosovo. By comparing these in a legal way may be obtained semi- two indicators we have noted that mili- legally or illegally. Bearing in mind that tary intervention in Kosovo (which the Serbian government has no eco- clashes with the UN SC resolution 1244) nomic strategy in relation to Kosovo, registers the largest support among the we could say that the restoration of its members and sympathizers of the competences over the former province Serbian Radical Party (28.2%), followed could act as “social time bomb”. by the Socialist Party of Serbia (19.6%), while the support of the membership of Tfdvsjuz parties with a democratic orientation is below 10% (7.9% for the Democratic A survey entitled “Public opinion Party and 9.5% for the Democratic Party on the Reform of the Serbian and of Serbia). Agreement to use the army Montenegrin Army” carried out by the in contravention of Resolution 1244 is Belgrade Centre for Civil-Military the most pronounced among the sup- Relations looked into the Serbian citi- porters of the extreme left and right, i.e. zens’ perceptions of security chal- those who had the power at the time

7 UNDP. Belgrade. 2005. Human development report Serbia 2005. The Strenght of Diversity. pp. 72 http://www.undp.org.yu/nhdr/2005/NHDR_Serbia_2005_ser.pdf. (November 17th 2006) 8 Nacionalna slu`ba za zapo{ljavanje. avgust 2006. Mese~ni statisti~ki izve{taj (National Employment Bureau – monthly statistical report). broj 48. THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES 54 when the international administration possible use of the army in Kosovo took over in Kosovo. This indicates does not exist. The disarmament and these parties’ reluctance to give up the dissolution of Albanian armed forma- policy that brought about the war and tions has been achieved in the munic- the loss of Kosovo. However, one may ipalities on the Serbian south, but this wonder whether this is a mere dema- area remains unintegrated in Serbia gogy to appeal to the voters, or an and a potential source of instability. established strategy. On the other hand, Kosovo’s integration into Serbia is not the percentage of respondents without impossible, but would require a long political affiliation who support such term strategy that does not exist. A views is lower, although they do see strategy of that kind would have to Kosovo as a potential security problem. reckon with the political participation The question is what will become of all Kosovo citizens, and take into of Kosovo? The Serbian government account the economic problems of a does not have a clear strategy for transition country, along with the Kosovo and Metohija, but only a plat- security challenges specific to that form for the negotiations which offers area. In brief, the price of the “most no solutions for systemic problems. The expensive Serbian word” would have Serbian citizens have different wishes to be calculated with the understand- and expectations with respect to the ing that it could also be spoken in status of Kosovo. Their views concern- another language.9 ing military engagement in the region The author works as a Research Fellow also vary and the official position on the in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

Serbia 2004 – 2005 Fourth Fifth Sixth round round round 1647 1617 1637 Return of up to 1000 soldiers as anticipated by UN 22.0% 20.1% 21.9% Resolution 1244 Incorporation of SMAF units into the KFOR 27.1% 24.8% 25.3% Direct intervention of SMAF in case of a repeated 16.2% 12.7% 13.3% escalation of violence SMAF should not be included – political solution is 22.3% 32.4% 29% required I cannot say 12.4% 10% 9.6%

Source: CCMR

9 Other sources: 1. M. Lazi}. 1996 “Delatni potencijal dru{tvenih grupa” (Action potential of social groups), Sociologija, Vol XXXVIII, br. 2. str. 259–28. Beograd. 2. Strategic marketing research, KIPRED. 19. 7. 2006. Proces odre|ivanja budu}eg statusa Kosova, saznanja, stavovi, praksa, KAP anketa – finalni izve{taj,. http://www.smmri.co.yu/downloads/Proces%20odredjivanja%20buduceg%20sta- tusa%20Kosova%20-%20Finalni%20izvestaj.pdf. (November 6th 2006.) 3. Mirjana Vasovi}, Karakteristike grupnih identiteta i odnos prema dru{tvenim prome- nama, u: „Javno mnjenje Srbije“, CPA 2000, Beograd http://www.cedet.org.yu/istrazi- vanja/grupni_identiteti.zip. (november 6th 2006.) 4. CCMR. Belgrade 2004–2005. The Serbian and Montenegrin Public on Reform of the Army,survey results, rounds II–VII. 55 ATLANTIC SHORES Xibu!jt!uif!obuvsf!pg!Fvspqfbo Vojpo!qpxfs!jo!Lptpwp@ Nbslp!Tbwlpwj~! UDK 327(4-672EU: 497.115) he European Union has decided that Uif!FV;!B!Djwjmjbo!boe!Opsnbujwf Tduring 2007 it would launch a special Qpxfs mission in Kosovo within the frame- work of European Security and Defence The debate about the nature of power Policy (ESDP). In the exposition of the at the EU’s disposal in international rela- Council decision (of 10 April 2006), by tions has, in academic circles, lasted longer than three decades. Francois which was founded the “Planning Duchene, in his book “Europe’s Role in Team” (EUPT) of the coming mission it World Peace” (1972), was the first to is stated that “the European Union is speak of the European Community (EC) preparing to increase its role in as a “civilian” power. He considered the Kosovo”. Therefore, in the first report source of European power to be in the on “the future EU Role and Contribution ability to expand the model of guarantee- in Kosovo” Havier Solana and Olli Rehn ing stability and security primarily using have stressed that UNMIK will not be economic and political, and not military, replaced by some sort of EUMIK. They means. Thirty years later, those economic also announced that NATO units will and political means form the “appropriate continue to form the only military com- policy instruments, including trade, coop- ponent of the Kosovo mission.1 eration, or association agreements; aid; The question then arises, what is it soft loans; institutionalised dialogue; and the promise of EU membership (for that the European Union will actually 2 do? We’ll place this question in the European states)”. All these factors com- wider context of the academic debate bined make the EU a “civilian power”. on the nature of power applied by the At the start of the eighties, in condi- EU in its foreign policy. The principal tions of slowing integration, namely dur- ing a state of so-called “euro-sclerosis”, argument of this text will be that cur- but also during a period of fresh “cooling” rently the EU is applying a normative in East-West relations, Hedley Bull criti- and civilian form of power and that, cised Duchene’s ideas. Because the according to all indications, this state of power that the European Community affairs is expected to continue. It is, wields “was conditional upon a strategic therefore, our intention to summarise environment provided by the military the academic debate and to apply the power of states, which they did not con- ideas it has arrived at to the case of trol”, Bull advocates the development of Kosovo. European military capabilities.3

1 More precisely: “The future international civilian presence could take the form of an inter- national office with an important EU component but cannot be EUMIK”, accordingly, “The future military presence should continue to be entrusted to NATO”. Summary note on the joint report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, and Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo. June 2005. Spokesperson of the Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP, Brussels. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/85228.pdf (accessed November 24, 2006) 2 Smith, K. 2003. The EU as a Distinctive Actor in International Relations. The Brown Journal of World Affairs IX, No. 2: 103-113. 3 Bull, H. 1982. Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2: 151 – 152. At the time, the author believed that the best way to realise such a policy was through an alliance within an alliance which will retain the wider NATO structures. ATLANTIC SHORES 56

The question of whether European which is defined as a ‘capabilities gap’ in foreign policy exists at all has been left relation to the United States, has not been behind by the development of common overcome. However, the development of foreign and security policies; the question the ESDP has created a crisis response now is what characterises European for- mechanism that regards military interven- eign policy.4 Meanwhile, the debate had tion as just one of many forms and means gone one step further than the differentia- of involvement. In order to create an tion of civilian and military power. One of acceptable security environment in post- the modern methods of defining the influ- conflict societies, the EU aids the forma- ence that is realised by the EU and which, tion of institutions that enforce the rule of we believe, is applicable to its policies in law. The application of this approach is a the western Balkans, is offered by Ian manifestation of the EU’s civilian power. Manners. Playing around with Hedley That is to say, when the international Bull’s title, Manners considers the possi- presence in Kosovo was established, the bility of Europe as a “normative power”, EU was entrusted with what came to be called the “fourth pillar or EU pillar” of the notion “located in the discussion of UNMIK administration. EU representa- ‘power over opinion’, idée force, or the 5 tives called upon to transform Kosovo’s ideological power”. economy into a market economy have, in the past few years, managed the privatisa- Uif!FV!jo!Lptpwp tion of state companies and the reform of the public sector, participated in the cre- The war in Kosovo initiated signifi- ation of financial markets and in the cant changes in the common foreign and reform of the customs service.7 The security policies of the European Union. It European Development Agency has, for became clear that, without its own example, had at its disposal more than 1.6 advanced military capabilities, the EU was billion euros intended for the financing of unable to meaningfully influence events.6 EU projects in Kosovo. The institutional Just like in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Europe jigsaw puzzle of the EU presence in was left by the wayside in the solving of Kosovo is completed by the EU Monitoring Mission, the EC Liaison Office the 1999 crisis and handed the initiative to for Kosovo and the Personal the US. The ESDP, thus, came about in Representative of the EU foreign policy part due to the frustrations of certain EU chief Javier Solana. The latter is employed member states, lead by Great Britain, at to put into operation the “International the unsuccessful handling of the Kosovo Civilian Office”, which will, when the final crisis. status of Kosovo is resolved, oversee its The conditions in which the implementation.8 European Union is currently launching Damien Helly and Nicoletta Pirozzi operations in Kosovo are significantly dif- have postulated on who (and what) ferent. The deficiency in military capacity, should form the ESDP operation.9

4 Sjursen, H. 2004. From Civilian to Military Power: The European Union at a Crossroads? Outline of Core Theme and Research Questions, CIDEL Workshop, Oslo. 5 Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms. Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 40, No. 2: 239 6 Van Eekelen, Willem. 2006. From Words to Deeds: the Continuing Debate on European Security. Brussels and Geneva: CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) and DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces) 7 http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_pillar.php (accessed November 27, 2006) 8 Kosovo’s Long-term European Perspective. European Union in Kosovo and UNMIK. 2006. http://www.euinkosovo.org/upload/European%20future%20brohure%20ENGLISH%20FINAL% 2013%20December%202006.pdf (accessed December 6, 2006) 9 Helly, D. and N. Pirozzi. 2006. The EU’s Changing Role in Kosovo: What Next? In: European Security Review – Special Kosovo Edition. Brussels: ISIS (Institute for International and Strategic Studies): 2. 57 ATLANTIC SHORES

Members of the European gen- SAP is currently unfolding according to darmerie,10 i.e. EU citizens given appro- a mechanism of “monitoring”, and it is priate duties in the UNMIK administra- made up of dialogues in which experts tion will be employed in the police mis- from the European Commission and sion. The second part of the ESDP oper- representatives of Provisional ation, devoted to reform of the judicial Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) system, will be carried out by the take part. The process is based on the European Commission. The existing “European Partnership” with Serbia & programme, the aim of which is the Montenegro. The “European improvement of the competence of the Partnerships” programme represents a judiciary in Kosovo, will continue in the specific arrangement which the EU con- same fashion; within this framework the cludes with a country that has started assessment and replacement of the SAP, in other words, with a country Kosovo’s 308 judges and 89 prosecutors whose goal it is to initiate reforms is performed. aimed at adopting the solutions and The normative power of the “good practice” to be found in the European Union in Kosovo can be “acqui communitaire” or “achieve- identified by the administration of the ments of the union”. In that sense, it is Stabilisation and Association Process. expected of the government of that By offering a candidate country eco- country to adopt an appropriate “Action nomic advantages from the process of Plan”, that is related to the dynamic association, the EU is in a position to adoption of standards that are pre- enforce standards according to which scribed by the European Commission, the economic and political transforma- or in short, “European standards”. tion of said country will occur. In this Kosovo is governed by a United Nations way the EU is implementing the administration but also by PISG, which advancement of security in its own demonstrates the importance placed on neighbourhood – one of the strategic a regime of “European partnership”.13 aims announced in the European At the beginning of 2006 PISG and Security Strategy of 2003.11 UMNIK reached an agreement that This year’s report on the “EU’s combined the “Standards for Kosovo”14 future role” announced that Kosovo is and the “Copenhagen Criteria” because also guaranteed “European prospects” they are based on the same principles. and access to all the instruments which, That represents a significant and quali- according to the SAP, are available to tative widening of the jurisdiction of EU the states of the Western Balkans.12 The institutions in Kosovo. In this way the

10 http://www.eurogendfor.org/home.htm and http://www.eurogendfor.org/mission_ tasks.htm (accessed December 6, 2006) 11 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. 2003. Brussels: European Union, page 8. 12 Summary note on the joint report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, and Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo, July 2006. Brussels: Spokesperson of the Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP. http://www.europa-euun.org/articles/en/article_4809_en.htm (accessed November 24, 2006) 13 Council Decision of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions con- tained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 199 and repealing Decision 2004/520/EC. Council of the European Union. http://www.delprn.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_ and_kosovo/key_documents/Partnership2006.pdf (accessed December 7, 2006) 14 Standards for Kosovo. Pri{tina: UNMIK, PISG. 2004. http://www.euinkosovo.org/upload/ Standards%20for%20Kosovo%20booklet_ENG.pdf (accessed December 6, 2006) ATLANTIC SHORES 58

EU becomes the actor that will, in sion. On the basis of recommendations future, evaluate whether Kosovo socie- made in the EUPT report, the mission ty has achieved the ideals of democracy when it is finally established, will be and rule of law. made up of at least 1,000 policemen, In this manner the manifestation judges and other officials tasked with process of the EU’s normative power is law-enforcement. Even in April Javier completed. Solana and Olli Rehn warned the mem- ber states that the mission in Kosovo will be the most financially demanding Kvtu!mjlf!Cptojb ESDP mission that the EU has ever boe!Ifs{fhpwjob!ps!tvj!hfofsjt undertaken because the EU may have to finance, not only its own, but the On the 10th of December Serbian whole international presence in media made an announcement, based Kosovo.17 on a report that Torbjorn Solstrem the In spite of the nature of the future chief of the EUPT in Kosovo submitted engagement of the EU in Kosovo, there to Brussels, that the special representa- will remain a need for a further NATO tive of European Union in Kosovo will have powers similar to those of his presence in the province. The situation in opposite number in Bosnia and Kosovo, in the near future, will continue Herzegovina. Therefore, he will be in a to require the presence of NATO troops position to suspend local legislation that as a result of the following factors: the is in opposition to European standards, unresolved status of the province, public opinion that is polarised on the question but also to request the replacement of 18 local officials whose behaviour falls out- of the eventual outcome of the talks, side of these standards.15 Effectively and also because of the existence of independent Kosovo would, as a conse- „criminal networks that are expanding quence, find itself under the protec- their influence into various socio-eco- torate of the European Union. nomic fields and into political life“.19 The A week later Solstrem denied these policies of the European Union will, in claims with the words that “the new this sense, be complimentary. In its mission in Kosovo will be significantly behaviour the EU will be dependent on smaller than the one in Bosnia and non-military means, in other words, on Herzegovina [and] organised in accor- resources that are civilian and normative dance with the resolution of the in relation to the nature of the power they province’s status“.16 Even during the display. planning stage, however, the EU has The author works as a Research Fellow faced problems in financing the mis- in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

15 B92, Beta, Ve~ernje novosti. 2006. EU will head future Kosovo authority. December 10. http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2006&mm=12&dd=10&nav_ id=38520&fs=1 (accessed December 10, 2006) 16 Radio Serbia internet news, http://www.radioyu.org/index.php3?language=Serbian (accessed December 10, 2006). 17 Krasniqi, Ekrem. 2006. EU prepares for Police Mission in Kosovo. EU Observer, April 10. http://euobserver.com/15/21349 (accessed December 10, 2006) 18 “Public opinion on the future status between Kosovar Albanians is relatively uncompro- mising […] this group has an overwhelming majority for the complete independence of Kosovo and believes that the alternative options are unacceptable. On the Serbian side, public opinion varies, […] almost 80% of Serbs from Kosovo, 67% of Serbs internally displaced and 60% of Serbs in Serbia declare that for agreement to be reached on the future status it is ‘critical’ that Kosovo remain a part of Serbia as a province with very wide-reaching autonomy”. The Process of Determining the Future Status of Kosovo, Strategic Marketing Research/KIPRED, 19 July 2006, http://www.smmri.co.yu/downloads/Proces%20odredjivanja%20buduceg%20statusa%20Kosov a%20-%20Finalni%20izvestaj.pdf (accessed December 8, 2006) 19 Kosovo (under SCR 1244) Progress Report. 2006. Brussels: European Commission: 38. 59 ATLANTIC SHORES Njmjubsz!Dpnnjttjpot!Bdu!pg!3117 Qsfesbh!Qfuspwj~ UDK 340.134:344.3(73)

he Military Commissions Act passed shall indicate the disputable provisions Tby the US Congress in late that have triggered so bitter a debate. September last year was endorsed and We shall first show how the Act defines signed by the US president George the persons it applies to, followed by Bush on 17 October 2006. The adoption how it relates to habeas corpus princi- of the Act was preceded by the ruling of ples and, finally, how it treats the meth- the US Supreme Court (in the case of ods of interrogation violating the human “Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld") in June 2006. rights. The ruling actually abolished the system of military tribunals instituted by President Bush in November 2001. The Xip!jt!Bnfsjdb’t fofnz@ “Hamdan” decision stipulates that in The international humanitarian law order to establish this kind of tribunals and the Geneva Convention distinguish the president required an explicit between combatants – lawful combat- authorization of the Congress and that ants and civilians who do not take part the court procedure was in contraven- tion of the Geneva Convention. In order in war conflicts. A civilian who partici- to fill the resulting legal limbo, the Bush pates in armed conflicts is treated as a administration proposed the adoption lawful combatant. By contrast, persons of the Military Commissions Act and who violate the laws and customs of managed to ensure the congressional war (e.g. mercenaries and spies) cannot majority in its favour. have the status of combatants and, The importance of this document is therefore, if arrested, do not enjoy the also reflected in the emotional state- status of prisoners of war. Military ments of its supporters, as well as Commissions Act enables trials of per- staunch opponents. Thus, having sons belong to the latter category, i.e. signed the Act president Bush said that suspected terrorists, referred to as “It is a rare occasion when a President “unlawful enemy combatants”. can sign a bill he knows will save The Act anticipates two criteria that American lives” and that with it may make a person subject to military “America reaffirms our determination to commissions. The first defines an win the war on terror”. Immediately “unlawful enemy combatant” is a person after the law had been signed the repub- “who has engaged in hostilities, or who licans issued a press release titled has purposefully and materially support- “Democrats would let terrorists go ed hostilities against the United States”. unpunished” including a list of most This broad provision practically cancels democrats who opposed its adoption in the difference between combatants and the Congress (Reuters). On the other civilians that represents one of the pillars hand, opponents of the Act, among of the Geneva Convention. The Center other things said, “This is not just a bad for Constitutional Rights points out that bill, this is a dangerous bill (Patrick this category of enemies may include Leahy, democratic party’s senator) and even a “person who has given 5 dollars that with it America sinks into dictator- to a charity working with orphans in ship since it allows the administration to Afghanistan that turns out to be associat- declare even an American citizen an ed in some fashion with someone who enemy and detain him for ever. may be a member of the Taliban”. One may rightly wonder why is the This definition, furthermore, rela- American public so sharply polarized, tivizes the next provision of the Act almost along the lines of Schmitt’s which clearly prescribes that the pur- friends and enemies. The following text pose of these tribunals is to try persons ATLANTIC SHORES 5: who do not have American citizenships, jus belli. This implies ‘’...more or less i.e. aliens. Namely, the definition of the strict, ipso facto forthcoming forms of concept of “unlawful enemy combat- persecution, restraint, proscription, ant” does not use the word alien, but a exclusion, based on specific laws, legal- more general concept of a person. This kind of a legal solution has caused con- cern of many US citizens, since every person, whether an alien or US citizen, Xibu!bsf!Njmjubsz!Dpnnjttjpot@ may thus become America’s enemy. Military commissions are crimi- The second criterion gives the pres- nal tribunals within the compe- ident, i.e. the administration a major role tence of the US armed forces. They in designating the enemy. Namely, an traditionally try person in violation of the laws and customs of war who “unlawful enemy combatant”: is also “a therefore cannot enjoy the same person who, before, on, or after the date rights as combatants of armed of the enactment of the Military forces whose status is clearly Commissions Act of 2006, has been defined by the laws of war and the determined to be an unlawful enemy Geneva Conventions. Historically combatant by a Combatant Status speaking, numerous military com- Review Tribunal or another competent missions were formed during the tribunal established under the authority Civil War and the Revolution, as of the President or the Secretary of well as World War II. The best Defense”. known example is the 1942 Quirin case. The decision of the Supreme The fact that US citizens may be des- Court in this case confirmed the ignated as enemies and that the admin- jurisdiction of military commis- istration has a major role in that is con- sions to try German saboteurs. This firmed by the case of Jose Padilla. ruling makes the distinction Padilla is an American citizen who was between unlawful and lawful com- detained for more than three years with- batants, which has to this date pro- out being indicted. The grounds for his vided the basis for the competence three-year arrest was only president of military tribunals over “unlawful Bush’s instruction to the defence secre- enemy combatants”. The establishment of the pres- tary Rumsfled to detain him as an ent day system of military commis- “unlawful enemy combatant” (Ronald sions comes in direct consequence Dworkin, The New York Review of of terrorists attacks of September Books). 11, 2001. The president took an Some critics of the US system of mil- executive order (Detention, itary commissions are even more Treatment, and Trial of Certain severe. An Italian philosopher Giorgio Non-Citizens in the War Against Agamben thus stressed that the concept Terrorism) to the effect that terror- of the “unlawful enemy combatant” is ists will be tried by military com- largely similar to the one of homo sacer, missions. However, the system of known in the Roman law. It was used to tribunals so established was brought down with the ruling of the designate the persons deprived of all cit- US Supreme Court in the case of izens rights they would have otherwise “Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld”, where- been entitled to as citizens of a specific upon the Executive Branch initiated country. These persons were not pro- the enactment of the Military tected by the laws of the state and could Commissions Act of 2006 enabling be subjected to all kinds of violence. the continuing existence and oper- Another parallel may be drawn with ation of the military judiciary. Carl Schmitt’s understanding of politics. Namely, he saw its substance in distin- guishing between friends and enemies ly effective overt or hidden in general and in the conflict and persecution of descriptions…” the internal enemy. To the state as an Notwithstanding the above-men- essentially political entity belongs the tioned vagueness of the Act, we do not 61 ATLANTIC SHORES think that it will lead to a wide abuse of there is no legal obligation to start a the US citizens or a Schmittean division trial within a specific period of time, into friends and foes. The American they may be deprived of their freedom society has firmly embedded liberal and for an unlimited period of time. Major democratic values and lower tolerance Tom Fleener, a military defence of drastic violations of human rights of lawyer in his statement for The New its citizens. Strong criticism and opposi- York Times explicitly said that a tion to this Act only support this claim. “detainee who isn’t charged with any- thing, he sits (in detention) forever”. Ibcfbt!Dpsqvt Referring to a possibility for US cit- izens to be designated as “unlawful ps!Ibcfbt!Dpsqtft enemy combatants” a part of the US Habeas corpus is one of the oldest public expressed its concern that per- legal institutes aimed at protecting sons holding American citizens could individuals from the arbitrariness of be deprived of the right to petition for executive power. It “implies an habeas corpus and kept indefinitely instruction to a state body or official detained. However, it seems that most who has detained someone to bring legal experts interpret this provision as that person before the court and justi- denying this rights only to aliens. fy not only the legal grounds but also However, opponents of the Act reasons for his detention” (Political point out that no one, whether an alien Encyclopaedia). Although its initial or a citizen, should be deprived of the purpose was to protect individuals right to have the grounds for his deten- from arbitrary arrest this institute today tion re-examined by an independent extends to the prevention of diverse court. Thomas Jefferson, one of the pressures of the police, such as e.g. founding fathers, himself supported unexpected “night” visits. Habeas cor- that saying, “The Habeas Corpus pus among other things demands the secures every man here, alien or citi- release of every person if it is estab- zen, against everything which is not lished that he/she has been illegally law…” and unjustifiably arrested. The Finally, as the explanation of the American constitution makers were Act points out, its purpose is to “bring aware of the importance of this institu- to justice terrorists and other ‘unlawful tion and have built it into the very enemy combatants’ through full and foundations of the US political system. fair trials by military commissions”. If Namely, Article 1, section 9 of the US there is no legal obligation to institute constitutions reads that the, “The a legal process against detainees and if Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus the Act deprives them of the habeas shall not be suspended, unless when corpus rights, it is not clear just how it in cases of rebellion or invasion the may fulfil its basic purpose. public safety may require it”. In conclusion, let us take a look at Despite this constitutional provi- the provisions that are not directly sion, the newly adopted Act prohibits related to the habeas corpus rights but the detainees who have the status of influence the justice of trials. Namely, “unlawful enemy combatants” or are the Act permits the use of hearsay evi- awaiting such determination and are dence and the military tribunal, having not American citizens to appeal the decided that it is “reliable” and “proba- legality of their arrest or treatment dur- tive”, may declare it admissible. The ing imprisonment. The Act also burden of proof is on the accused, i.e. applies to long-time residents of the he must show that the presented evi- United States without American citi- dence is unreliable. This practically zenship. The right to petition for abolishes the presumption of inno- habeas corpus is granted only to cence, one of the principal institutions detainees on trial before the military of a fair trial. Furthermore, it is not commissions. Bearing in mind that entirely clear how the accused may ATLANTIC SHORES 62 show that the evidence is unreliable, is defined as an act inflicting serious bearing in mind that the prosecution is physical or metal pain or suffering and permitted to keep the sources and serious physical pain exists only when it methods of investigation secret and becomes “extreme” or when an withhold them from the accused and extreme physical injury is sustained. his legal counsel. Critics therefore ask whether hypother- mia or protracted, hours long standing cause extreme pain or just pain. Up!upsuvsf!ps!opu!up!upsuvsf/// Moreover, the Act gives two defini- Pictures and accounts of the torture tions of “cruel and inhuman treatment” of detainees suspected of terrorism have – one for the period before the enact- shaken the American as well as the ment of the Act and another to be world public. The “infamous” water applied after. According to the first defi- boarding, exposure to extreme cold and nition, if an interrogation procedure days-long deprivation of sleep are some applied to a suspected terrorist is quali- of the best known methods in the fied as “cruel and inhuman”, if he is “enhanced” arsenal of interrogation made to suffer protracted mental pain. techniques used within CIA programs. Thus, e.g. if an agent threatened to kill a In addition to human and legal argu- detainee, he did not violate the Act, ments opposing this practice, seasoned because the mental pain was brief. operatives of security and intelligence According to the other definition appli- services are known to say that informa- cable after the adoption of the Act, any tion obtained by means of torture is mental pain, regardless of its duration is unreliable since the interrogated person treated as “cruel and inhuman”. It is is likely to admit anything only to stop obvious that by making this distinction the torture. Both the “humanitarians” the lawgivers amnestied those who and “security men” demanded the end resorted to “enhanced” interrogation of prisoners’ torture and the punish- methods in the previous period. ment of those responsible. The attention Not only has the Act amnestied the of the public was initially aimed precise- persons responsible for torture, but the ly on the legal regulation of the use of information obtained in this way has not enhanced methods of interrogation, been dismissed altogether. According to while other provisions became subject President Bush, ” information we have to criticism of the professional public learned from the (CIA) program has somewhat later. helped save lives at home and abroad”. That is why the principal authors of The Act thus permits the admission of the Act, senators John McCain and John testimonies obtained with aggressive Warner, pointed out that the main pur- interrogation methods used before the pose of the newly adopted Act was pre- adoption of the Detainee Treatment Act cisely to criminalize the use of interroga- in December 2005. It is up to the military tion methods violating the human rights tribunal to decide whether the data so of detainees. The supporters of the Act obtained are reliable and relevant and say that it explicitly prohibits torture of should be given in evidence. Although suspected terrorists and anticipates strict in this case the court has the final say sanctions for those who violate its provi- analysts warn that the very possibility sions. But, legal experts and opponents that this kind of probably enforced testi- claim contrary. The Act provides a list of monies may be used is a cause for grave nine grave breaches of the Third concern. Geneva Convention that will be triable The fact that it is not entirely clear as war crimes. In addition to torture, the which interrogation methods are per- list includes “cruel and inhuman treat- missible is also indicated by the support- ment”, which they say is insufficiently ers of this Act. Authors of the paper clearly defined and legalizes the use of “Military Commissions Act of 2006: so-called enhanced interrogation tech- Striking the Right Balance”, The niques. “Cruel and inhuman treatment” Federalist Society for Law and Public 63 ATLANTIC SHORES

Policy Studies, say: “There is a broad gic documents and ensures the prison- belief, both within the Executive Branch ers’ “human dignity”. The fact that sus- and among the American people, that pected terrorists are denied the elemen- while torture, cruel or inhuman treat- tary human right to a review of legal ment ought not to be deployed, some grounds for their arrest before an inde- use of intense interrogation techniques pendent court of law is certainly no alter- should be continued”. Further on in their native to the terrorist vision of oppres- article they continue to use the terms sion and totalitarian rule. At the time of “intense interrogation techniques” and aggravating security situation in Iraq and “aggressive interrogation techniques” as Afghanistan, when the “struggle with interchangeable, without explaining arms” does not seem victorious, the either. One may rightly wonder about United States should have enacted a law the limit between torture and intensive, that ensures a completely fair trial and i.e. aggressive methods, or rather guarantees the elementary human rights between the permissible and impermis- to all suspected terrorists. It would thus sible. win an important victory in the “battle of ideas”. The Military Commissions Acts +++ amounts to the legalization of the less than glorious practice of the hitherto sys- As of September 11, 2001 the United tem of military commissions. States of America has been at war with The author works as a Research Fellow terrorism. The five-year long war proved in the Belgrade School of Security Studies that a fast victory is impossible and that terrorism cannot be defeated with armed force alone. This has been acknowl- DOCUMENTS edged by the recently adopted Long War · Authorization for the Use of Military doctrine, which stipulates that “the Force United States is a nation engaged in what · Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 will be a long war (...) Unlike the image · Military Commissions Act of 2006 many have of war, this struggle cannot · Military Order on Detention, Treatment be won by military force alone” and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror (Quadrennial Defense Review Report, · National Security Strategy 2006 February 6, 2006). Furthermore, the · Quadrennial Defense Review Report National Strategy for Combating 2006 Terrorism admits that “the War on Terror · War Powers Resolution is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of LITERATURE arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do · Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: we fight our terrorist enemies on the bat- Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Press tlefield, we promote freedom and · Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. State of human dignity as alternatives to the ter- Exception. Chicago: University of rorists’ perverse vision of oppression Chicago Press and totalitarian rule” (The White House). · Samard`i} Slobodan, ed. 2001. Norma i Finally, the promotion of human free- odluka: Karl [mit i njegovi kriti~ari dom and dignity, as well as justice and (Norm and Decision - Carl Schmitt and democracy is the first pillar of the US his Critics). Beograd: Filip Vi{nji}. National Security Strategy (March 2006). INTERNET SOURCES Therefore, the United States admits http://www.aclu.com that the liberal democratic values at the http://www.ccr-ny.org basis of the American political system http://www.congress.org/congressorg/home/ are an equally powerful weapon in com- http://www.democrats.org/ bating terrorism as bombs and cruising http://www.fed-soc.org/ missiles. It is therefore not clear why the http://www.globalissues.org/ http://www.govtrack.us/ newly adopted US Act to combat terror- http://hrw.org/doc/?t=usa ism does not fully observe the basic prin- http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ ciples proclaimed in the country’s strate- http://www.whitehouse.gov PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 64 Bouj.dpssvqujpo!Bhfodz!jo!Tfscjb Kfmfob!Vojkbu UDK 351:[343.85:343.352(497.11)

ccording to the most recent, 2006, The government is trying to deal with Asurvey1 of the international NGO this problem by establishing an Anti- Transparency International (TI) out of coruption Agency (hereinafter the the total of 163 surveyed countries Agency). In view of the high expecta- Serbia ranks ninetieth on the tions placed in this Agency, this text Corruption Perceptions Index, same as will try to review the functioning of Gabon and Suriname. The good news bodies whose authorities it would is that its score has increased (from 2.8 assume, as well as the reasons pro et last year) to 3.0, but corruption still contra its establishment. remains a systemic problem in Serbia. On a scale of 1 to 10, only 5 is a score Sfwjfx!pg!jotujuvujpobm indicating that corruption has been bouj.dpssvqujpo!fggpsut reduced to a tolerable level. This situation obviously results in The Draft Law on the Agency3 has the lack of confidence in the official entered the parliament on 20 October institutions and their inferior function- 2006. According to this legal proposal ing. In addition to these internal conse- the Agency is an independent and quences, there are also some that could autonomous state body, accountable be called external. Namely, these rat- to the National Assembly to which it ings influence the decisions of foreign submits annual operational reports. investors to place their capital, badly The Agency oversees the implementa- needed for the economic recovery of tion of the National Strategy, Action Serbia. International companies that Plan and sectoral action plans. It have already invested in Serbia speak arranges and coordinates the work of of informal taxes of 18 to 20 per cent state bodies fighting corruption, paid in addition to their regular obliga- resolves the conflicts of interest and tions. This reveals the urgency of deal- keeps the registry of officials and their ing with this problem and improving property. It also oversees the adoption the efficiency of measures taken thus and implementation of the integrity far. plan. With the entry into force of this After the 5 October change, the Law, the legislation governing the pre- authorities made anti-corruption strug- vention of the conflicts of interests gle one of their priorities. A lot has would cease to apply and the proceed- been done in terms of developing the ings instituted before the Republic institutions and the legal framework to Board for Resolving the Conflicts of combat corruption. Numerous legal Interest would be taken over by the regulations have been passed and Agency. The Agency would also take many bodies that could join the strug- over the competences of the Republic gle against this damaging practice have Electoral Commission and the been formed. Furthermore, a National Parliamentary Committee for Finance, Strategy to Fight Corruption was adopt- meaning that the political parties ed in December 2005.2 All this notwith- would then submit their financial standing, corruption is still substantial. reports and account for the spending

1 Transparency Serbia, www.transparentnost.org.yu. (accessed Nov. 6, 2006) 2 National Strategy to Combat Corruption, www.korupcija.org (accessed Nov. 10, 2006) 3 Proposed Law on the Agency to Combat Corruption, www.parlament.sr.gov.yu /content/cir/akta/predzakoni.asp. (accessed Nov. 1, 2006) 65 PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS of their budgetary appropriations to the conflicts of interest was passed in this anti-corruption body. We shall 2004 and the Committee was constitut- therefore review the work of the bod- ed on 18 January 2005. Its competencies ies whose authorities will be trans- are to keep the registry of the officials’ ferred to the Agency in order to see property, decide whether they have vio- whether it will be able to redress their lated the Law and if so pronounce deficiencies. appropriate measures. During the first We shall first briefly review the work nine months of 2005 the Committee of the Committee for Finance of the examined the total of 54 denunciations National Assembly. 4 The Committee related to potential conflicts of interest, should receive obligatory annual finan- in consequence of which three officials cial reports of political parties with were relieved of their duties. The largest details of their property, contributions in shortcoming in the work of this excess of 6000 dinars (complete with Committee is that it is authorized to react the names of donors and the amounts only to the reports on property and citi- concerned) and their final accounts zens denunciations. The first problem in accompanied by the opinion of an this respect is related to the accuracy of authorized auditor. Out of the total of the submitted property reports, and 421 registered political parties bound by then the possibility that the citizens may this requirement, only three have sub- be afraid to denounce the officials or mitted complete documentation as lack the knowledge about their proper- required (Bosniak Democratic Party of ty, or even of the workings of the Sand`ak, Democratic Party of Serbia Committee. There is a danger that the and the Social Liberal Party of Sand`ak). work of this body may be paralysed, Bearing in mind that the Committee is especially since it has a staff of only 12, not authorized to institute a relevant as opposed to 13,000 officials. Out of legal procedure, the Law on financing of this number 4,000 failed to report their political parties could not be enforced in property and suffered no consequences its three year-existence and the number for this omission. of non-complying parties keeps increas- One of the ways to remove the ing. Another deficiency of this body is above mentioned deficiencies in the that it consists of MPs who thus actually functioning of these bodies is to set the control themselves. However, it is fines for the defaulting officials. They all expected that at the next elections finan- prescribed by the proposed Law on the cial malversations of political parties will Agency. In case of violation of the Laws’ be prevented, or at least made more dif- provisions the Agency may institute ficult. Namely, a new form for reporting appropriate legal proceedings. This leg- on the cost of election campaigns has islation reinforces the position of the recently been prescribed. It requires Agency and provides concrete frame- from the parties to state the precise works for the anti-corruption struggle. amounts of the funds they have raised The main advantage of this solution is and details of their spending. For that that if the Law is violated the Agency purpose all funds are broken down into institutes the relevant proceedings ex public and private. officio. Furthermore, the control of Another important body the compe- political parties and their officials will be tencies of which would be passed on to within the competence of a body out- the Agency is the parliamentary side the parliament, thus enabling more Committee for Resolving the Conflicts of efficient control. Interest.5 The Law on the prevention of Thirdly, the Agency would super-

4 Committee for Finance, www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/sastav/odbori_ detalji.asp?id=42. (accessed Nov. 18, 2006) 5 Board for Resolving the Conflict of Interest, www.sukobinteresa.sr.gov. (accessed Nov. 18, 2006) PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 66 vise the adoption and implementation Dpvodjm!wt/!Bhfodz of the integrity plan. The plan compris- es legal and practical measures prevent- The establishment of the Agency ing and removing the possibilities for will directly endanger the existence of the Anti-corruption Council (referred the development of corruption. Plans of 6 this kind are adopted by state bodies, to hereinafter as the Council). That is bodies of territorial autonomies and why it will be necessary to state its local government, public services and competences and results. The Council public enterprises. These plans should, was set up by the Government in 2001 among other things, include the but it took two years to actually start description of the work process, man- operating. It has an advisory role and ner of decision making and identifica- should assist the government in sup- tion of operations particularly suscepti- pressing the corruption. In the period ble to corruption. A special category of from August 2003 until December such operations that may result in sub- 2005, the Council received the total of stantial financial losses for the state has 1050 requests – mostly related to priva- to do with public procurement. The tization (40.7%), the judiciary (20.5%) Agency may encounter difficulties in and unlicensed construction (16%). trying to oversee procurements for They predominantly had to do with security structures. Bearing in mind that Belgrade and the petitioners were these procurement deals are insuffi- mostly citizens (30.7%), employee and ciently transparent, it is difficult to super- citizens groups (20.5% and 14.2% respectively). These figures indicate a vise the adoption and implementation ’ of relevant integrity plans. The entire high degree of citizens confidence in the Council, probably because its Ministry of the Interior has been exclud- members are independent experts. ed from the Public Procurement Act by The work of this body elicits a decree on funds for special purposed diverse comments. Some believe that adopted by the Government in 2005. the Council should exist since its advi- Speaking about the army let us only sory role is definitely not unimportant recall the "flack jacket" affair. Namely, and it should serve as a springboard for the defence ministry concluded a dam- the establishment of the Anti-corrup- aging contract for the purchase of mili- tion Agency. Others claim that the tary equipment with a private company Council has generally focused on criti- „Mile Dragi}”. The lawsuit is still under cizing the government and that com- way and there are facts indicating a con- bating corruption through the Council flict of interest and the abuse of public is utopian. Still, we cannot disregard office. The establishment of the Agency the important role it had in uncovering cannot reduce corruption in the sphere major incidents and in publicly of public procurement unless the rele- addressing the issue of corruption. But, vant regulations are changed. in addition to certain advantages, there

Qfujujpot!cz!tqifsft Qfujujpofst

6 Anti-corruption council, www.antikorupcija-savet.sr.gov.yu. (accessed Nov. 12, 2006) 67 PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS are also several major deficiencies with establish an Agency with executive respect to the Council’s competences. authorities, but essentially not inde- The futility of the Council’s work pendent membership. viewed against the formally endorsed solutions is best revealed in its 2005 Xibu!ofyu@ report.7 Namely, out of eleven reports submitted to the Government in the Having said all this, it appears that course of that year not a single one was the relevant institutions are for the most adopted. The Government, moreover, part already established but the ques- ignored the Council’s proposals, and tion is what else has to be done to offered no feedback or explanation. reduce corruption in Serbia to a tolera- The im(potence) of the Council is also ble level. In order to score at least 5 on seen in its capacity to react to the citi- the TI index – a point that marks a rea- zens’ petitions. All petitions received sonable level of corruption - we should by the Council are sent on to compe- take the steps anticipated by the tent state institutions, which have a 30- National Strategy. It is therefore neces- day deadline to respond. In practice it sary to urgently pass the Action Plan for sometimes took up to a year and a half, its implementation and establish the while 10 per cent of its submissions Agency. However, the composition of went unanswered. The Council’s work the Agency’s Managing Board ought to was additionally hampered by the lack be changed, or else the strategy will of finance, which the government remain but a dead letter. This body needs to be really independent so as to failed to provide. be able to objectively monitor and Bearing in mind that the establish- coordinate the work of other state ment of the Agency directly endangers agencies combating corruption. the existence of the Council, its mem- Furthermore, in order to prevent possi- bers severely criticize the Government’s ble abuses in the state security struc- proposal. They believe that the motion tures it will be necessary to establish to establish the Agency amounts to the mechanisms to oversee procure- unnecessary spending of budgetary ments for the police and the army. But, funds. They also say that it cannot oper- the most important precondition is a ate independently, since the institutions consensus about the establishment of it should regularly oversee are the ones bodies that would operate independ- that propose the candidates for its man- ently and have sufficient financial agement board and thus indirectly influ- assets and specific authorities in fight- ence its work. This leads to the conclu- ing the corruption. Failing that every- sion that the situation is far from being thing will remain but a formality and simple. On the one hand, we have the the role of numerous bodies will Council without executive authorities remain strictly ornamental.8 but with independent membership The author works as a Research Fellow and, on the other, the possibility to in the Belgrade School of Security Studies

7 Report of the anti-corruption council for 2005, 30. 12. 2005. www.antikorupcija- savet.sr.gov.yu. (accessed Nov. 21, 2006) 8 Other useful sources: - Clean Hands, www.korupcija.org. - Financial audit of political parties’ reports for 2005, National Assembly, Committee for Finance, 5. 6. 2006. (accessed Nov. 5, 2006) - World Bank and EBRD research, 2004, ssla.oneworld.net/article/view/94904/1/. (accessed Nov. 5, 2006) - Council of Europe, www.coe.int. - Transparency International Global Barometer, 2005., www.transparentnost.org.yu. (accessed Nov. 6, 2006) - Directorate for Public Procurement, www.ujn.sr.gov.yu. Dbmm!gps!Dpousjcvujpot

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