WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER No. 3 • NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 2006 BELGRADE WESTERN BALKANS DPOUFOUT SECURITY OBSERVER Editor’s note . 1 Journal of the Belgrade School of SPECIAL FOCUS OF THE ISSUE: KOSOVO Security Studies INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE No. 3 NOVEMBER–DECEMBER Dr Amadeo Watkins 2006 Moving Kosovo Forward: Publisher: Reality V Fiction . 2 Centre for Civil- Jelena Petrovi} Military Relations Regularities in the Balkans Editor in chief: – Do They Exist? . 5 Miroslav Had`i} Jelena Radoman Editors: Future Kosovo Status Sonja Stojanovi} – Precedent or Universal Solution . 14 Filip Ejdus Illustrations: SECURITY OF KOSOVO Marko Milo{evi} Lulzim Peci and Ilir Dugolli Proofreading: Milorad Timoti} Kosovo’s Security Policies: Challenges of Formulation and Implementation. 21 Computer typesetting: ^aslav Bjelica \or|e Popovi} Should a Kosovo Army be Formed?. 27 Printed by: GORAGRAF, Beograd THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES Circulation: 200 copies Zorana Atanasovi} Ethnic Tensions - An Obstacle Belgrade School of for Security in Kosovo . 33 Security Studies is Marko Milo{evi} established with the Serbia’s Capacities to Reintegrate assistance of the Kosovo and Metohija . 38 Kingdom of Norway. Its operation is also ATLANTIC SHORES supported by the Balkan Fund for Marko Savkovi} Democracy. What is the Nature of European Union Power in Kosovo?. 44 Predrag Petrovi} US Military Commissions Act of 2006. 48 PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS This journal is Jelena Unijat financed by NATO. Anti-coruption Agency in Serbia. 53 Fejupsjbm!Opuf he third issue of Western Balkans valuable insight into the Kosovars’ per- TSecurity Observer aims to con- spective on the status and design of a tribute to the ongoing discussion on a possible future system of security for new status for Kosovo and the possible the province. From another perspec- consequences on the security of the tive, a researcher of the Belgrade two conflicting sides, the broader School of Security Studies scrutinises Balkan region and the world. The first the justification of the proposals, as put part of this issue addresses this ques- forward by a few international NGOs, tion from the perspective of interna- for the creation of a Kosovan Army. tional relations. It starts with a report by In the Threats, Risks and a British analyst that has as its intended Challenges column, two authors use audience the decision-makers in world the results from public opinion polls to capitals and considers the possible sce- highlight the possible political, eco- narios for the reactions of Serbia, the nomic and security ‘costs’ of keeping two divided communities in Kosovo Kosovo within Serbia, as well as to and the possibility of conflict spill-over point out the challenges to establishing into the region. It also includes a list of stable and democratic governance in recommendations for the international the event that Kosovo becomes inde- donor community after the final status pendent. The first text in the Atlantic has been adopted. This report is fol- Shores column contributes to the lowed by a comparative analysis of the debate on the nature of EU power formulation of foreign policy positions, through a case-study of new ESDP mis- towards the possible independence of sion that is to take over the Kosovo Kosovo, by other Balkan states and the administration from UN as soon as the factors that contribute to it. This text final status is announced. The second takes into consideration whether their text in this column presents the debate foreign policy views can be attributed to on the desirable limits to the special such factors as their ethnic ties and eco- measures provided for the war on ter- nomic relations with Serbia and Kosovo rorism. It provides an analysis of the Albanians or their own vulnerability to Military Commission Act that has secessionism. The third text in this sec- polarised US public opinion. The last tion studies how significant the resolu- piece in this issue provides policy tion of Kosovo’s final status will be for analysis of the Government’s proposal the system of international relations for the Law on the Anti-corruption through an examination of the grounds Agency which has polarised domestic for comparison between Kosovo, on organisations and experts dealing with the one side, and South-Ossetia and this field. This piece is a fitting intro- Abkhazia, self-proclaimed autonomous duction for the new regular column regions of Georgia, on the other. that will report on the practical policy In the Security of Kosovo column, recommendations in the security sec- researchers from the Kosovar Institute tor. And finally, the Western Balkan for Policy Research and Development Security Observer would like to thank (KIPRED) present the results of our first editor, Jasmina Gli{i}, as she ‘Internal Security Sector Review’ has played a key role in the conception (ISSR), a report that is sponsored by the and creation our magazine – we wish international community and local her lots of success in her new job. political leaders. This text provides Sonja Stojanovi} 3 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE Npwjoh!Lptpwp!Gpsxbse;! Sfbmjuz!W!Gjdujpo! Bnbefp!Xbuljot! UDK 327.5(497.115); 341.231: 327(497.115) he key request from the interna- based on international law and order Ttional community is for Serbia and (which has not yet appeared) or just a the region to move forward, to start short-term political fix which will thinking about the future and to be cause problems in the mid to long realistic. However, while this require- term. ment has much logic, there is little The sad reality is that there have indication that the same is done in been no negotiations so far, just an Western capitals. attempt at negotiating where two sides The postponement of the Kosovo were brought together under false pre- status decision till early 2007 was a tences. While Belgrade has been too welcome move, as it could finally sig- conservative and naive in terms of nal a positive shift in thinking by the realpolitik, it has offered more on the West and the realisation of Serbia’s table at the strategic level. Pristina has importance within the region. The played on the tactical card by offering whole debate over the date itself small concession to the local Serbs, shows how divided the international while remaining adamant about its community is over this issue, with var- strategic objective: independence and ious viewpoints stretching from the US nothing short of independence. The insistence on 2006, to Ahtisaari’s con- international community has been the stantly changing viewpoints and, the main bluffer in the whole process with most worrying, the UN’s – as the main declaratory statements indicating a de jure actor - long overdue stance on facilitatory approach while not offer- the matter. Furthermore, Russia, as a ing much of substance. key stake holder within the Contact Addressing the future is most rele- Group, is not showing much sign of vant in this context. Three questions shifting its position and there is little are important in this respect: how will reason to expect it will do so. The con- any decision affect the people on the ciliatory gesture also comes as a last ground, how will it affect Serbia as the minute ‘carrot’ to the Serbian ‘demo- most strategic actor and what will cratic’ political scene. However, at the regional implications be? same time it indicates that the details of At the local level, Kosovo has the that decision will not be very potential to become at worst a failed favourable to Belgrade. state and at best a copy and paste of The question is who is serious and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Peace, the who is just playing games. The answer alleged primary objective, will have is in every respect mid-ground. All been achieved, probably temporarily, three sides in this duel need to take at the cost of other stated objectives, matters seriously and a compromise the most important being a multi-eth- should be sought from all. Pristina has nic Kosovo. If this happens, then to realise Serbia does have interests in NATO and the West did go to war for Kosovo; Belgrade has to move away the wrong reasons and they will from the desire to keep Kosovo but appear to have failed in their ultimate without its majority population; while aim. The issue of precedent and inter- the international community has to national order are other debatable decide if it wants a lasting settlement questions, whose only justification lies INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 4 in the political domain. In other words, or another - meaning that coalition the likelihood of Serbs south of the issues will dominate the immediate Ibar river leaving Kosovo is real, while Serbian political scene. No strategic the fate of Mitrovica will hang in the shift on the domestic political scene balance and partition on the ground should be expected, apart from the DS looms over UNMIK’s head. Such confirming its dominance of the ‘dem- developments will preclude any active ocratic’ block. The end result of this participation of Kosovo Serbs in will again be a divergence between a Kosovo’s new institutions in the short de jure constitutional requirement not to medium term. to deal with Kosovo if fully independ- The question of Serbs in Kosovo ent and a de facto EU requirement to is a difficult question to address. The have a constructive approach. The final outcome will depend on the nature of this divergence, which is details of the status deal, on Belgrade’s now codified within the constitution, reaction, on the perceptions this will will depend on the exact power-shar- have in Kosovo itself and the actions ing agreements within the new coali- of the Kosovo Albanian leadership, tion government. and lastly on other factors such as the media and the international presence in the area.