Situation Report
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Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date issued: 10 September 2009 Author: Judy Smith-Höhn* Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Unpacking the Zimbabwe Crisis: A Situation Report In 1998, Zimbabweans paid around 40 Zimbabwean dollars for one loaf of bread. 10 years down the line, and only weeks prior to the signing of a power-sharing arrangement between long-time rivals ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions,1 Zimbabweans had to cough up 7.3 trillion Zimbabwean dollars for that very same loaf.2 How is it that this once prosperous Southern African country had become the basket case of the region? And what are the prospects for bringing Zimbabwe back from the brink? With the inauguration of an Inclusive Government (IG) in February 2009, Zimbabwe appeared to be on the road towards recovery. This situation report focuses on the progress of the IG in fulfilling the terms of the power-sharing agreement signed September 2008, as this is the benchmark by which progress should ultimately be measured. It begins by outlining the political context that led to the signing of the agreement as the conditions that compelled the former archrivals to agree to work together. It then highlights the key issues that have caused disagreements between the various parties to the agreement and consider the extent to which the resolution of these can be regarded as key in effecting long-term and sustainable recovery in the country. The report concludes with recommendations to all stakeholders to the agreement. Introduction The year 2008 witnessed a deepening of the political and economic crisis aggravated by the violence and reported opposition intimidation that ensued in connection with the presidential and parliamentary elections of March and the presidential run-off in June.3 For the first time since independence, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which had ruled the country since the inception of majority rule in 1980, lost its majority in parliament to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).4 With MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai winning 47.9 per cent of the total votes compared with Robert Mugabe’s 43.2 per cent in the first round of the presidential elections in March, the country was geared for a run-off on 27 June 2008. Following the delayed announcement of the March 2008 presidential election results, it appeared as though ZANU-PF was willing to go to great lengths to hold onto power. Zimbabwe’s ruling elite has been known for their resort to oppression and intimidation of the opposition,5 and it appeared that the scene was being set for Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, and his party to steal power, even though the March 2008 elections represented opposition victories. In the forefront of the second round of elections, the army and state employees were * The opinions expressed in this Situation Report do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its Trustees, members of the Council, or donors. Institute research staff and outside contributors write and comment in their personal capacity and their views do not represent a formal position by the ISS. 1 again responsible for administering the elections, and an unprecedented wave of state-orchestrated violence was unleashed upon many rural areas, as the Joint Operations Command (JOC) worked to reduce support for Morgan Tsvangirai. The rural areas were especially targeted because that was where it was thought MDC maintained a stronghold. Emmerson Mnangagwa, former JOC Commander who currently holds the powerful post of Minister of Defence, led Mugabe’s 2008 presidential campaign. He is thought to have been the driving force behind the violence and intimidation that was committed to a large extent by soldiers, the police, intelligence operatives, youth militias and liberation war veterans.6 While Mnangagwa sought to downplay the army’s involvement by claiming that the soldiers involved in election-related violence were not acting on orders, but were, in fact, on leave, Amnesty International pointed out that this was immaterial, given that it was the government’s responsibility to protect its citizens at all times, even against its own army officials.7 On 22 June 2008, Tsvangirai, faced with such repression, announced his withdrawal from the race, claiming that this was the only possible reaction to a “state-sponsored campaign of violence” that had led to the death of some 85 MDC supporters and the displacement of at least 200,000 people.8 The election was held nonetheless, with Robert Mugabe winning a “resounding” 86% of the votes to Tsvangirai’s 9%.9 Practically all observer groups dismissed the run-off elections as a sham.10 The Pan-African Parliament Election Observer Mission noted that, in contrast to the harmonised elections in March, the run-up to the June elections was characterized by violence, intimidation and political intolerance as well as a curtailment of fundamental civil and political rights such as freedom of assembly and freedom of movement.11 Against the backdrop of election-related violence and the subsequent lack of popular participation in the electoral process, the African Union Observer Mission concluded that the run-off elections “fell short of accepted AU standards”.12 After much wrangling, the key stakeholders in the political crisis signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in July 2008, outlining the issues to be addressed in order to reach a negotiated settlement, facilitated by SADC-appointed South African President Thabo Mbeki. This led to the signing of a power-sharing arrangement – now commonly referred to as the Global Political Agreement (GPA) – on 15 September 2008. Six months later, after the adoption of Constitutional Amendment 19,13 the GPA was finally implemented with the formation of the Inclusive Government (IG) on 11 February 2009. Political After gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was initially considered a poster Context Prior child for Africa. President Robert Mugabe implemented successful policies in the to The Power- health and education sectors, which functioned better than many of their African Sharing Deal: counterparts, for example.14 What brought us here? During the course of the 1990s, however, it became apparent that the ruling ZANU-PF, under its charismatic leader, was not prepared to implement necessary reforms. The government was inconsistent in pursuing economic and political reforms, and this limited implementation of agreed policies in addition to problems of prolonged mismanagement, excessive government expenditure and rising corruption led to the further deterioration of the economy and a rise in popular opposition to the president.15 At the turn of the century, Zimbabwe faced an economic and social crisis. Unemployment had risen to over 50%, inflation was at 60%, the government had cut spending on education and health, and an estimated 76% of the population was living in poverty. In response to the rising popular discontent, the main trade union federation, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) formed a political party, the MDC, in September 1999. The MDC, a predominantly urban-based movement led by Morgan Tsvangirai, campaigned for a “no” vote in a national referendum for proposed changes to the constitution that favoured the ruling ZANU-PF.16 In 2000, following the failed attempt by Mugabe and his party to amend the constitution, the regime became increasingly repressive. Mugabe actively encouraged the 2 forcible acquisition of mostly white-owned farms by landless peasants and war veterans, and the fast-track land reform process became increasingly violent. This crippled the economy and led to chronic shortages of basic commodities. The land reform campaign also served as a tool for ZANU-PF to reward its supporters for their loyalty. In the parliamentary elections that followed that same year, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF faced serious competition for the first time since independence (ZANU-PF won 62, MDC won 57 out of the 120 contested seats).17 Later, elections in 2005 were marred by gross manipulation and suppression of dissent, and the MDC split in November 2005 after Tsvangirai overruled senior members who voted to participate in upcoming senate elections.18 The split led to the formation of two factions: the MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai, and the MDC-M led by Arthur Mutambara. Opposition crackdown continued and in March 2007, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mandated the then South African President Thabo Mbeki to mediate between the government and the MDC. The goal was to pave the way to a new constitution and to create the conditions for free and fair elections. However, Mugabe proceeded to unilaterally declare 29 March 2008 as the date for the next elections, although MDC had wanted to postpone the date until a new constitution was adopted. Violence and intimidation of opposition supporters was again expected in the run-up to the March 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections. Some observers claimed that there was a skewed playing field ahead of the elections due to pre-poll manipulation and the accreditation of only “friendly” countries and institutions to observe the polls.19 Such reports notwithstanding, the MDC won the parliamentary elections and its presidential candidate was leading the polls in the presidential elections. The ZANU-PF led government, however, withheld the results of the presidential elections for several weeks, raising suspicions that Tsvangirai may have won an outright victory. As noted above, after finally releasing the results which indicated that a run-off election was to be held since none of the candidates won an absolute majority, election-related violence peaked in the months preceding the run-off. Given the fact that the MDC was able to secure a parliamentary majority, the results of the elections undoubtedly weakened the position of Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF.