'A Tale of Two Parties: Contrasting Performances of Annastacia

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‘A tale of two parties: Contrasting performances of Annastacia Palaszczuk’s Labor and the post-Newman LNP in Queensland’

Chris Salisbury [email protected]

Abstract Queensland’s 2017 state election resulted in Annastacia Palaszczuk’s Labor government being returned with a slim majority. While not a resounding victory, the result seemingly vindicated the premier’s decision to head to an early election, and reinforced her standing in a succession of opinion polls as ‘preferred premier’ for most voters. The result also halted the short sequence of Queensland governments being voted out of ofﬁce in no uncertain terms by a supposedly volatile electorate. The extent to which Labor’s recent electoral success in Queensland — and the quelling of that volatility — can be attributed to Palaszczuk’s leadership is still open to debate. It is instructive, though, to note the differences in leadership and campaigning styles between Palaszczuk and her opponents, which saw her drag a decimated Labor Party back to ofﬁce after a single term in opposition, then saw it returned with a working parliamentary majority. This article highlights those differences over the last term of government, contrasting the performance of the two major parties in Queensland in terms of their leadership and election campaign approaches. The analysis helps to explain some of the reasons for the respective parties’ recent electoral showings.

Introduction After Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk called an early state election for 25 November 2017, pundits in Queensland suggested that the result would be close and difﬁcult to predict.1 This was partly due to several novel factors in play at the election, among them redrawn electoral boundaries, the addition of four new seats and the reintroduction of compulsory preferential voting. On top of this, the ‘wildcard’ element of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) — stubbornly popular, particularly in the state’s regions — as well as prominent support in Brisbane for The Greens contributed to persistently close and uncertain opinion poll positions for the two major parties, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal National Party (LNP).2 While Palaszczuk had mostly enjoyed higher personal ratings than

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her direct opponent in those same polls, it seemed that voters weren’t overly enam- oured of either major party, or their leaders, at times lending an almost ambivalent air to the election.3 What the 2017 election ultimately delivered, to quote Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, was both ‘continuity and change’.4 Palaszczuk’s Labor administration, previously governing in minority, was returned to office with a very slim majority, delivering the Premier something of the ‘stability’ she desired. After successive election defeats for the LNP, change came when Tim Nicholls gave up the party leadership, paving the way for his deputy, Deb Frecklington, to become that party’s first female leader. While opposition leaders in Queensland have not always auto- matically resigned following an election defeat — Lawrence Springborg was the last to do so in 2009 — Nicholls’ resignation suggested that he shouldered the blame for the loss, accepting his party’s dissatisfaction at a failure to oust what some had depicted as an under-performing government. Conversely, Labor supporters were quick to celebrate Palaszczuk’s performance as again delivering victory against the odds. In terms of the next period of government, the longer significance of Palaszczuk’s and Nicholls’ leadership and campaign efforts is still undecided. Their respective performances, however, are examined here in the context of the state’s most recent electoral and party dynamics, as a means by which both parties’ electoral results and public standing might be analysed and explained. In this context, it is also worth considering Queensland’s long-held reputation for populist and authoritarian (and, until fairly recently, exclusively male) leaders in a polity argued to be readily accepting of domineering leadership.5 This aspect of the state’s political culture, long viewed by many local and interstate observers as singularly ‘different’, evolved in response to frontier-like conditions and fluctuating political allegiances, which prevailed from the colonial era onwards, witnessing such notably strong-willed premiers as Sir Thomas McIlwraith and William Forgan Smith.6 In the past half-century, Queensland has produced conspicuously populist or authoritarian leaders (or both), such as Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, Peter Beattie and Campbell Newman. Yet the surprising result of the 2015 state election — when Newman lost his own seat and his LNP government lost office — seemingly indicated that the ‘strong man’ figure might be no longer so ‘naturally’ palatable to Queensland’s voting populace, despite this long background.7 When Anna Bligh’s Labor government was re-elected in Queensland in 2009, she set a precedent as the first female premier to win a state election, establishing Queensland (150 years after its separation from New South Wales) as something of a pioneer8 in a possibly more egalitarian modern body politic. It has been argued since that the 2015 state election signalled a continued shift in voter attitudes in Queensland towards a more consultative and approachable style of leadership,9 a change manifested in rejecting the action-oriented ‘strong man’ for an emotionally attuned ‘everyman’ (or woman) as leader. This was a space into which Annastacia Palaszczuk strode comfortably, if initially perhaps by circumstance.

Party leadership in the ALP Palaszczuk as opposition leader The travails that beset the ALP in Queensland after the battering the party sus- tained at the 2012 state election have been well documented.10 Ostensibly a

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backlash (though by no means voters’ only grievance) against Anna Bligh’s government for its ‘breach of trust’ in selling off state-owned assets without forewarning, the landmark election result delivered Campbell Newman’s LNP a record parliamentary majority and reduced Labor’s representation to a miniscule seven members. As the most experienced among the tiny caucus (bar her new deputy, party veteran Tim Mulherin), the job was left to Palaszczuk as new leader to rebuild the party’s stocks — and voters’ trust in it. But expectations of Palaszczuk’s tenure as opposition leader were low, given Newman’s overwhelming command of numbers in parliament. Once settled into the role, however, it is fair to say she exceeded those expectations. While winning admirers for calling attention to some of the Newman administration’s ill-judged policy overreach, Palaszczuk trailed the premier’s personal popularity ratings in opinion polling throughout the year leading to the 2015 state election, barely narrowing that gap in the months beforehand.11 Despite this short- coming, Palaszczuk’s grasp on the party leadership, and positive personal regard among party supporters, were such that there was barely a mention of replacing her with a potentially more electable contender. Still, when Newman caught most observers off guard in calling an early election for 31 January 2015, even Palaszczuk reminded voters that she had likened the task of bouncing back from the 2012 state election defeat to ‘climbing Mount Everest’.12 When the 2015 state election produced a huge two party-preferred swing that unseated Newman’s government, it came as a surprise — and a concern to some — that Palaszczuk should have beneﬁted so much and so quickly from the palpable anti-Newman sentiment expressed at the ballot box. Some past Labor ﬁgures even opined that Palaszczuk’s bolstered caucus was ‘unprepared for government’, despite containing more ministerial experience than Newman’s party room in 2012; voters may be more willing presently to take a punt on ‘untried talent’ rather than reward unpopular incumbents.13 But the manner of Palaszczuk’s becoming premier in a hung parliament, after her unexpected rise to lead the ALP opposition, saw her labelled an ‘accidental premier’, a largely unfair epithet that the LNP opposition and critical local media put to frequent use.14

Palaszczuk as premier As leader of a minority government, Palaszczuk promptly adopted a more mod- erate, collaborative and ‘engaged’ style than her predecessor — willing to listen to stakeholders, and communicate with voters and party colleagues through such mechanisms as community cabinets and policy forums. Her government largely avoided picking fights with ‘easy’ targets, and sought to mend fences with groups across the public, judicial and business sectors (including previously sidelined union groups). She also sought to accommodate some policy wishes of the Katter’s Aus- tralian Party (KAP) crossbenchers, in stark contrast to Newman — though not without disagreements (and a few lost votes on the floor of parliament) over cer- tain areas of regional and energy policy.15 From its first budget in mid-2015, Palaszczuk’s government commenced some important and well-received initiatives, the most prominent being the ‘Advance Queensland’ grants program. With its focus on entrepreneurialism, research, science and technology, and ‘industries of the future’, the initiative echoes strains (heard less often) from Prime Minister Turnbull about the importance of

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embracing innovation. Advance Queensland also — and quite deliberately — harks back to the signature ‘Smart State’ agenda of Peter Beattie’s government, giving the premier a proactive agenda upon which to hang her hat. Disappointingly for some, though, Palaszczuk’s government has been conservative in its overall economic approach — probably reﬂecting the state’s still heavily indebted ﬁnancial position — and criticised from various quarters over its ‘Jekyll & Hyde’ handling of the Adani Carmichael coal mine proposal for the Galilee Basin.16 This has provided the opposition with opportunities to question Palaszczuk’s commitment to ‘job-creating investment’ amid accusations of worrying more about a supposed leadership threat from deputy premier (and left faction leader) Jackie Trad, and negative reaction from Greens supporters in Brisbane seats. Repeated opposition depictions of the premier leading an overly cautious ‘do nothing’ government gained traction in the public arena, reinforced by numerous government-instigated inquiries and reviews (such as of the long-delayed cross-river rail proposal), giving Palaszczuk’s leadership an appearance of ‘indecision’. This was compounded by regular criticisms of the Labor government being ‘beholden’ to the union movement, after its active campaign to remove Newman’s LNP at the 2015 election.17 Besides these barbs, the premier and a few cabinet colleagues have had to wear the fallout from occasional blunders, perhaps the worst of which were ongoing train system failures in the public transport-dependent capital (somewhat galling for Palaszczuk as former Bligh government transport minister). The premier managed her way more or less successfully through these and other administrative hurdles, but did lose a measure of public trust when in 2016 she oversaw late-night amendments to the state’s voting rules without warning or consultation.18

Party leadership in the LNP The ‘strong’ leader undone Whereas the ALP has enjoyed the stability of unbroken leadership for six years, the LNP has endured something of a ‘revolving door’ leadership, with Deb Frecklington the party’s fourth leader in three years. With Campbell Newman as premier (2012– 15), the LNP suffered a dramatic and costly loss of public support, in large part because of a failure to heed expert advice from public service officials or seek consultation with key institution leaders and stakeholders.19 In the fervour to adopt Newman’s ‘Can Do’ approach to government, the party failed to demonstrate in its single term that it was governing for more than just its ‘core constituencies’ and chief party allies. As premier, Newman discovered too late that relentlessly portraying an image of strength would not in and of itself deliver popularity or electability; rather, Newman’s ‘Can Do’ reputation was found wanting, and the party’s next tier of senior figures were tarnished as a result.20 Perhaps as a salve to these wounds after the bruising 2015 state election result, the leadership was passed to Lawrence Springborg, the party’s most experienced member — and with a profile that predated the Newman-led years. As a healing gesture, it was symbolic that the task of repair should fall to one of the chief architects of the Liberal and National Parties’ 2008 merger to form the LNP. Yet, in his fifteen months as leader, Springborg struggled to land telling blows on Palaszczuk or her ‘inexperienced’ minority government, and could not avoid characterisation as a ‘nice-guy farm boy’ (an image dating from his 1989 entry to

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parliament as the state’s youngest elected member) whose manner often sat uneasily with urban voters.21 The ‘taint’ of the fallen Newman government followed him too, in the shape of troubling revelations at the 2015–16 inquiry into the closure of the Barrett Adolescent Centre while he was health minister.

Changing horses and courses Agitation within the party for leadership change became public in early 2016, when Everton MP and former housing minister Tim Mander was revealed as head of an attempted but ultimately aborted challenge to Springborg. The ensuing calm lasted only a few months, however, before change swept through and installed Tim Nicholls and Deb Frecklington as leader and deputy, replacing a discarded Spring- borg as well as his deputy, John-Paul Langbroek (himself a former LNP leader, deposed in favour of Campbell Newman — then not even an elected member of parliament — in 2011). At the time, former Newman government treasurer Nicholls appeared to LNP MPs to be a preferable alternative to the supposedly ‘plodding’ and ‘unelectable’ Springborg. This reverted to the pre-eminence of ‘urban Liberals’ over the merged party’s rural and regional representatives and constituents. For the next eighteen months, Nicholls would attempt to rise above his past as a senior member of the Newman administration, and the public face of its roundly rejected asset privatisation agenda.22 More than rumblings over sliding polls for ‘preferred premier’,23 the LNP leadership spill indicated continuing disquiet over which ‘partner’ should dominate the party, and which ‘personality’ should lead (it possibly also indicated a lack of new ‘talent’ with leadership potential coming through its ranks). This disquiet also reﬂected an ongoing tendency in Queensland, as in other state and federal jurisdictions, for parties to be reactive to negative poll results focused on the leader. Ultimately, though, the move against Springborg revealed an inherent tension in Queensland’s conservative politics, where the ‘city–country divide’ has been a prob- lematic issue for both major parties, but particularly so for the LNP and its predecessor parties.24 This was witnessed in the recent re-emergence of the ‘separate statehood’ proposition in northern and rural parts of Queensland, with state and federal LNP MPs coming down on either side of arguments for or against the idea.25 It was also reﬂected in the Newman administration’s pitch to the regional conservative electorate, with an oft-repeated dedication to support the traditional primary and service-based industries (mining, agriculture, tourism, and construction) repre- sented in its ‘four pillars’ economic mantra. Springborg and then Nicholls — who, as Newman’s treasurer, oversaw development of this economic agenda — followed suit from 2015 onwards, though saw the wisdom in expanding that platform to include a broader range of economic sectors (rebadged from ‘pillars’ to ‘key drivers’) – namely, manufacturing, education services, and science and technology. Given that, by the time of Nicholls’ challenge, the LNP had maintained poll leads ahead of La- bor in primary vote terms as often as not,26 it seemed that the party’s policy messaging still appealed to a good portion of the electorate, despite its leadership woes. The question was whether Nicholls — an ‘urbane’, former Liberal MP and Brisbane City councillor — could sell the message to the party’s diverse and dis- parate supporter base, when in the regions he sometimes struggled to achieve public recognition or credibility.

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Election campaign approaches, 2015 and 2017 The last two election campaigns in Queensland took place in differing contexts and featured very different electoral dynamics. In January 2015, the LNP government sought to maintain much of its overwhelming parliamentary majority; almost three years later, the minority ALP government sought to gain majority status. Both campaigns, however, saw the government and the opposition at the time take, for the most part, comparable and predictable approaches to their campaigning. Typical of incumbent governments, both Newman and later Palaszczuk adopted a negative tone to some campaign messages, warning of the ‘perils’ of change, and offering the reassurance and ‘stability’ that their respective re-elections would bring for voters. Similarly, both major parties in opposition at the last two elections presented messaging that was comparatively more positive and hopeful about the state’s prospects, if only voters would opt for changing governments.

Newman back to earth; Labor back from the brink Where Newman’s earlier campaign strayed from the script, though, was his re- verting to traditional ‘type’ as seemingly a populist bestowing largesse, simulta- neously provoking confrontation with various public figures and interest groups, and parroting his ‘strong’ catchphrase to the point of media ridicule. The largely negative public response to this approach, and mocking media portrayal of it, underline the influential role that party leaders play in setting the campaign tone and potentially swaying the election result.27 The LNP’s 2015 state election campaign and advertising unsurprisingly highlighted what were seen as the government’s positives — having a ‘strong’ plan for a ‘strong’ economy; enforcing ‘strong’ laws for safer communities; and creating a less regulated operating environment for business and industry to be more productive. All of this was safe territory in which the government could contrast itself favourably with an understrength opposition. In the absence of a similarly detailed economic strategy, the ALP’s 2015 campaign slogan, ‘A Better Way for Queensland’ (not unlike the LNP’s 2017 slogan, ‘Build a Better Queensland’), succinctly captured its aspirational campaign promise. An emotional offering, this conjured visions of a ‘better’ life, of ‘better’ governance, and presented the party leader in particular as positive and trustworthy. The campaign approach fitted well with Palaszczuk’s personable, consultative, down-to- earth image. This was highlighted especially when the Australia Day holiday fell on the last Monday of the 2015 election campaign. Palaszczuk tapped into the day’s emotion by attending a citizenship ceremony in her Inala electorate before playing cricket barefoot in a park. She also fielded policy questions but, importantly, received positive media coverage with images of her looking relaxed and approachable.28

2017: Shadow boxing and the One Nation ‘stalking horse’ This was an image that Palaszczuk and the ALP attempted to revive heading into the 2017 state election campaign. Unlike her last outing, though, she carried the baggage of having been in ofﬁce for almost three years, leading a government some depicted as listless and under-achieving.29 When the premier called an early election for 25 November, this appeared to go against a promise to see out her full

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term, unless ‘extraordinary’ circumstances intervened. This immediately offered her opponents a point upon which to criticise the premier, and depict her as ‘untrust- worthy’ and ‘opportunistic’, in contrast to the open and honest image portrayed during the prior campaign. Either way, the point didn’t linger and was overtaken by other hurdles for Palaszczuk to overcome. Throughout the four-week election campaign, a shift was evident from both parties’ 2015 election campaigns, with Palaszczuk’s ALP adopting a cautionary, more negative tone — urging voters to avoid another hung parliament in return for Labor ‘stability’ (echoing Newman’s 2015 message) — while Nicholls’ LNP abandoned ‘strong’ terminology, instead offering the positive promise of something ‘better’. Regardless of these differences, both leaders were keenly aware of rising anti-major party sentiment in the electorate, threatening to block out campaign messages to reportedly disaffected voters. This appeared inescapable when the leaders were seemingly tailed for much of the campaign by Pauline Hanson — despite not being a candidate at the election — and One Nation’s ‘Battler Bus’, drawing attention to voter discontent in regions hit by high unemployment and associated social ills. In response, Palaszczuk and Nicholls campaigned energetically but, to some observers, delivered an uninspiring campaign. Requisite attention was paid to ‘bread and butter’ issues such as cost of living pressures but, worryingly, little was offered in the way of policy ‘vision’ or plans to improve the state’s ﬁnances.30 Both leaders made themselves ‘small’ and mobile targets, which for Palaszczuk meant trying to avoid campaign stops being hijacked by protestors opposed to the Adani coal mine. In this she largely succeeded when, partway through the campaign, she abruptly vowed to veto any federal infrastructure loan to Adani — a move seen as cyni- cally opportunistic, but which seemed to have the desired effect. Facing criticism from regional federal MPs, state Labor unsurprisingly drew attention to the federal Coalition government’s own woes, such as the ongoing High Court citizenship drama.31 Palaszczuk had earlier taken the stance (‘arrogant’, according to her detractors)32 of ruling out dealing with minor parties over preferencing arrangements or post- election haggling with the likes of One Nation. This allowed Palaszczuk a stark point of difference to the LNP, a strategy also used against Newman and the Palmer United Party presence in the 2015 election campaign. The premier made a last-ditch appeal on election eve for wavering LNP supporters to vote for Labor — ‘just this time’ — but it is questionable whether her call was heeded.33 What might have cut through to undecided voters in the hours prior to polling day were Labor advertisements focused on Nicholls’ apparent readiness to form government with One Nation’s support, and also — critically, in the capital — reminding voters of his role as treasurer in the Newman government.

Nicholls ‘straddling a barbed-wire fence’ Throughout the campaign, Nicholls faced awkward questions about LNP plans to ‘swap’ preferences with One Nation, or to form minority government with that party’s support. The media’s pursuit of these questions, to which Nicholls had played a straight bat for much of the year, built to the point where he ﬁnally (and realistically) admitted these as possibilities, after an unconvincing explanation at a media-staged debate in the campaign’s ﬁnal week. While during the year the

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LNP organisational wing and its MPs had presented a mostly disciplined front behind Nicholls and his deputy, the leader’s stumble on this issue might have proved a campaign turning point to some extent — then accentuated on election eve by Nicholl’s fumbling television appearances over the same questions. These episodes put a dent in the smile that Nicholls had worn stubbornly for the four- week campaign, as part of his effort to appear positive and approachable (even while engaging in the kind of for-the-camera campaign stunts for which Peter Beattie was renowned). Nicholls’ decision to tread a fine line between courting and snubbing One Nation supporters ultimately cost the LNP votes in the state’s south-east corner, while his ‘urban Liberal’ image likely lost support in the regions. With a 7.6 per cent statewide swing away from the LNP, his position as party leader was undoubtedly under pressure. Nicholls acknowledged on election night that Queenslanders had voted to ‘shake things up’, but for several days refused to concede defeat in the election, instead waiting until final seat results were declared.34 Eventually, with the outcome all but confirmed, Nicholls headed off any move against him from disgruntled party colleagues by standing down as leader in the wake of the LNP’s disappointing election result and voters’ rejection of his vision for a ‘better Queensland’.

Conclusion Despite the potential for surprise, or even stalemate, the 2017 state election campaign ended with Queenslanders returning Annastacia Palaszczuk’s Labor government. The Premier overcame a confident and determined LNP opposition and supposed ‘groundswell’ challenge from One Nation, becoming the first female leader at state or federal level to win back-to-back elections. The protracted process of counting postal and pre-poll votes took a fortnight after the polls had closed — as it had after the 2015 state election — leaving many pondering in the interim the supposed ‘instability’ of a hung parliament, and wondering who would best be placed to lead a newly formed government. In the end, Palaszczuk’s message of ‘stability’ resonated with enough voters — perhaps more so than the ‘chaos’ voters had been warned to expect from an LNP victory with potential One Nation support. All told, it was a lack-lustre and underwhelming campaign in terms of ‘big issues’ and ‘big ideas’, after which Queenslanders were largely back where they started, with little change in the relative positions of the major parties. The obvious exception is a change in leadership dynamics after LNP MPs opted clearly for former deputy leader Deb Frecklington in a party-room ballot. The task has been set for her to drag the party’s stocks back up, especially in the regions, after successive election setbacks. The LNP importantly sees her as palatable to voters and party supporters in the state’s urban centres as well as in the regional/rural ‘heartland’ from where she hails. Significantly for the party, she is a female leader with perhaps a similar down-to-earth and approachable manner to that of the premier. In the wake of this result, Queensland’s recent electoral experience casts political leadership in a different light — showing that it is as much a matter of voter ‘attachment’ as it is of policy substance and able governance. This has seen a change from the ‘strong man’ to the attuned ‘everyman’ (or woman) as leader: a shift in voters’ preferences, from which Newman was rejected in 2015 as a transitory

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departure. While Queenslanders have been seen to be harsh markers of government performance, they’re clearly sensitive to the way their government is led. In this regard, the role of the government’s (and the party’s) leader is important, as voters seem wary of a return to a brash, ‘Newman-style’ leadership. The perception is that Palaszczuk still presents as more of an authentic, communicative and reasonable leader — valuable commodities when negotiating the government’s way through a ﬁnely poised parliament. Whether the term ahead delivers ‘stability’ or ‘stagnation’ remains to be seen, but Palaszczuk’s majority Labor government would be keen to avoid further characterisation as ‘do nothing’, and rather elicit plaudits as an ‘action’ administration.

Acknowledgement I would like to express my gratitude to Dr Lorann Downer for her permission to incorporate elements of our earlier joint research on the 2015 Queensland state election into this article.

Endnotes 1 P. Brent, ‘Perplexing the poll-watchers’, Inside Story, 30 October 2017, http://insidestory. org.au/perplexing-the-poll-watchers, accessed 20 February 2018; B. Raue, ‘One Nation and preference rules make this Queensland election hard to predict’, The Guardian, 29 October 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/oct/29/ one-nation-and-preference-rules-make-this-queensland-election-hard-to-predict,accessed 20 February 2018; and C. Salisbury, ‘Palaszczuk must grapple with One Nation, and history, in unpredictable Queensland election’, The Conversation, 29 October 2017, https://theconversation.com/palaszczuk-must-grapple-with-one-nation-and-history-in- unpredictable-queensland-election-86389, accessed 20 February 2018. 2 Galaxy Research, ‘Newspoll QLD election 2017’, http://www.galaxyresearch.com.au/ newspoll-qld-election-2017, accessed 20 February 2018. See S. Wardill, ‘Battle down to asplitdecision’,Courier-Mail, 24 November 2017, 9. 3 Galaxy Research, ‘Newspoll’. See J. Walker, ‘Parties told: “You don’t deserve our vote”’, The Australian, 14 November 2017, 6. 4 Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, quoted in A. Henderson, ‘Malcolm Turnbull shares “continuity and change” slogan with US political comedy Veep’, ABC News, 22 May 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-22/turnbull-shares-continuity-and-change-slogan- with-veep/7265992, accessed 20 February 2018. 5 P.Charlton, State of mind: Why Queensland is different (rev. ed.) (Sydney: Methuen Haynes, 1987), 12–23; H. McQueen, ‘Queensland: A state of mind’, Meanjin, 38(1) (1989): 41–51. 6 C. Bean, ‘Conservative cynicism: Political culture in Australia’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 5(1) (1993): 58–77; R. Wear, ‘Queensland premiers’.In B. Galligan and W. Roberts (eds), The Oxford companion to Australian politics (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 488–90; P. D. Williams, ‘Leaders and political culture: The development of the Queensland premiership, 1859–2009’, Queensland Review, 16(1) (2009): 15–34. 7 R. Scott, ‘The declining attraction of authoritarian leaders?’ TJ Ryan Foundation, 7 September 2015, http://www.tjryanfoundation.org.au/_dbase_upl/Declining_attraction_ of_authoritarian_leaders.pdf, accessed 20 February 2018; T. Winther, ‘Campbell New- man and the weaknesses of the “strong leader”’, Social Alternatives, 34(3) (2015): 6–11. See also OpEd, ‘Election result a wake-up call to both the LNP and Abbott’,

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Sunday Mail, 31 January 2015, http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland-state- election-2015/editorial-election-result-a-wakeup-call-to-both-the-lnp-and-abbott/news- story/b74e30adc0750219e48c05946bc6b467, accessed 20 February 2018. 8 It is acknowledged, of course, that other jurisdictions in Australia featured female leaders ahead of Queensland: Chief Ministers Rosemary Follet and Kate Carnell won Australian Capital Territory elections in 1989–92 and 1995 respectively; Western Australia’s Carmen Lawrence (1990–93), Victoria’s Joan Kirner (1990–92) and the Northern Territory’s Clare Martin (2001–07) all held ofﬁce prior to Anna Bligh (2007–12). See J. McCann, Australia’s female political leaders: A quick guide (Canberra: Australian Parliamentary Library, 2014), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_ Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/QG/FemalePolLeaders, accessed 20 February 2018. 9 L. Downer and C. Salisbury, ‘Queensland political leadership: From the functional strong man to emotional every(wo)man’, paper presented to Australian Political Studies Associa- tion National Conference, University of Canberra, 28–30 September 2015. 10 See C. Salisbury, ‘High water mark — the shifting electoral landscape 2001–12’, Queens- land Historical Atlas, 21 January 2013, http://www.qhatlas.com.au/high-water-mark- shifting-electoral-landscape-2001-12, accessed 20 February 2018; R. Scott, ‘Political tsunami — the 2012 Queensland election and its aftermath in parliament’, Aus- tralasian Parliamentary Review, 27(2) (2012): 89–98 and P. D. Williams, ‘Where Queensland sits on the political Richter scale’, Online Opinion, 4 April 2012, http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=13461, accessed 20 February 2018. 11 Newspoll, ‘Quarterly reading of Queensland voting intention and leaders’ ratings’ (2015), http://polling.newspoll.com.au/image_uploads/141204%20QLD%20Voting% 20Intention%20&%20Leaders%20Ratings%20Oct%20-%20Dec.pdf, accessed 20 Febru- ary 2018. 12 Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk, quoted in L. Mellor and E. Ford, ‘Queensland election 2015: Who is new Labor premier Annastacia Palaszczuk?’ ABC News,13Febru- ary 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-13/who-is-qld-new-premier-annastacia- palaszczuk/6090968, accessed 20 February 2018. 13 Keith De Lacy, quoted in M. Eaton and M. Watson, ‘Queensland election 2015: Former treasurer Keith De Lacy says Labor not ready to govern after shock result’, ABC News, 3 February 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-03/queensland- election-labor-not-ready-to-govern-former-treasurer/6066594, accessed 20 February 2018. See also D. Fagan, ‘Queenslanders deserve a government they can trust’, The Conversation, 2 February 2015, https://theconversation.com/queenslanders-deserve-a- government-they-can-trust-37025, accessed 20 February 2018. 14 See M. King, ‘Annastacia Palaszczuk: Queensland’s accidental premier’, Brisbane Times, 3 April 2015, https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/lifestyle/annastacia-palaszczuk- queenslands-accidental-premier-20150402-1mdq2e.html, accessed 20 February 2018; and M. Ludlow, ‘Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk on her pragmatic approach to politics’, Australian Financial Review, 20 October 2016, http://www.afr.com/leadership/ annastacia-palaszczuk–the-cautious-reformer-20161010-grz5si, accessed 20 February 2018. 15 P.D. Williams, ‘Political chronicles: Queensland, July to December 2015’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 62(2) (2016): 307. 16 See C. Chang, ‘The hunt for Adani’s 10,000 jobs brings up “zero results”’,News.com.au, 27 September 2017, http://www.news.com.au/ﬁnance/business/mining/the-hunt-for-adanis- 10000-jobs-brings-up-zero-results/news-story/7532705440f71254b658b320d91ed02e, accessed 20 February 2018; D. Crowe, ‘Greens to target Jackie Trad’s seat over Adani

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mine’, The Australian, 31 May 2017, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national- affairs/state-politics/greens-to-target-jackie-trads-seat-over-adani-mine/news-story/ 5ed5aec6ccf74ade764c18295daefb69, accessed 20 February 2018; and J. Robert- son, ‘Adani mine: Palaszczuk faces factional fight to seal new royalties deal’, The Guardian, 24 May 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/may/24/ adani-mine-palaszczuk-faces-factional-fight-to-seal-new-royalties-deal, accessed 20 February 2018. 17 Williams, ‘Political chronicles: Queensland, July to December 2015’, 304. 18 S. Wardill, ‘Cunning vote move open to scorn’, Courier-Mail, 22 April 2016, 13. 19 J. Harrison, ‘Asset sales did not bring the end of the Newman LNP government’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/comment/asset-sales-did-not- bring-the-end-of-the-newman-lnp-government-20161016-gs3ni5.html, accessed 20 February 2018; S. Wardill, ‘Queensland politics: Why the LNP lost the 2015 Queensland election’, Courier-Mail, 29 May 2016, http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/ queensland-government/queensland-politics-why-the-lnp-lost-the-2015-queensland- election/news-story/8a0997d637df254b437d44463c179f41, accessed 20 February 2018; and M. Wordsworth, ‘LNP review blames “leadership” for surprise 2015 election loss’, ABC News, 29 May 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-29/lnp-hands-down- report-into-newman-government-election-loss/6506820, accessed 20 February 2018. 20 See L. Downer, ‘“Can Do” has been canned . . . and other political brand- ing tales from the 2015 Queensland election’, TJ Ryan Foundation, 16 February 2015, http://www.tjryanfoundation.org.au/_dbase_upl/Can_Do_brand_is_Canned_.pdf, accessed 20 February 2018; P. D. Williams, ‘Political chronicles: Queensland, Jan- uary to June 2015’; Australian Journal of Politics & History, 61(4) (2015), 639– 40; T. Winther, ‘Queensland’s early election hinges on a test of Newman’s strength’, The Conversation, 6 January 2015, https://theconversation.com/queenslands- early-election-hinges-on-a-test-of-newmans-strength-35893, accessed 20 February 2018. 21 P. D. Williams, ‘Political chronicles: Queensland, January to June 2016’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 62(4) (2016): 628–9. 22 This would include a well-publicised ‘charm offensive’ where Nicholls was photographed in ‘relaxed’ mode with family members, describing his affinity for ‘everyday’ outdoor pursuits such as boating and trail bike riding. See F. Whiting, ‘The test of Tim’, Courier-Mail QWeekend, 28 January 2017, 8. 23 Galaxy Research, ‘Newspoll’. 24 C. Salisbury, ‘Nicholls toppling Springborg lays bare the still-uneasy marriage of Queensland’s Liberals and Nationals’, The Conversation, 6 May 2016, https://theconversation.com/nicholls-toppling-springborg-lays-bare-the-still-uneasy- marriage-of-queenslands-liberals-and-nationals-58993, accessed 20 February 2018. 25 D. Passmore, ‘Referendum Queensland: MPs will force referendum to split Queensland in two’, Courier-Mail, 27 March 2016, http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/ queensland-government/referendum-queensland-mps-will-force-referendum-to-split- queensland-in-two/news-story/db33f9f3103008531585777eeb6e8e59, accessed 20 Febru- ary 2018. 26 Galaxy Research, ‘Newspoll’. 27 Williams, ‘Political chronicles: Queensland, January to June 2015’, 637–8. See also B. Jabour, ‘Campbell Newman uses “strong” 23 times in election soundbite overdose,’ The Guardian, 13 January 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/13/campell- newman-uses-strong-phrase-21-times-in-election-soundbite-overdose, accessed 20 February 2018.

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28 Williams, ‘Political chronicles: Queensland, January to June 2015’, 641. 29 OpEd, ‘Voters need more than this to ensure better days for Queensland’, Courier-Mail,30 October 2017, 22. 30 See comments by Professor John Wanna, quoted in T. Moore, ‘Experts lament the lack of vision in Queensland election campaign’, Brisbane Times, 17 November 2017, https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland-election-2017/experts-lament-the-lack- of-campaign-vision-20171116-p4yx1r.html, accessed 20 February 2018. 31 J. Marszalek and M. Killoran, ‘Premier accuses Canavan of smear’, Courier-Mail,7Novem- ber 2017, 5. 32 L. Hamilton-Smith, ‘Queensland election: What the leaders should do if there is a hung parliament’, ABC News, 19 November 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017- 11-19/qld-election-how-the-leaders-should-deal-with-one-nation/9163654, accessed 20 February 2018. 33 Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk, quoted in N. Wiggins, ‘Queensland election: Po- litical leaders make ﬁnal push to persuade voters’, ABC News,25November, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-24/queensland-election-leaders-ﬁnal-pitches-to- voters/9190038. 34 Opposition Leader Tim Nicholls, quoted in S. Vogler, ‘ALP leads by seat of pants’, Courier- Mail, 26 November 2017, 2.

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