Dossier of Information of a False Allegation of Tamil Genocide

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Dossier of Information of a False Allegation of Tamil Genocide Dossier of Information of a false allegation of Tamil Genocide: 1. Letter of Protest against BILL 104 presented in the Ontario Legislative Assembly by Sri Lankans 2. Prabakeran should be held responsible for the deaths of over 70,0000 people in Sri Lanka – V Anandasagaree (Father of MP Gary Anandasagaree) 3. What is Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) doing in Toronto? 4. Genocide Claims, number games and margin of error – Dr. Chandre Dharmawardana 5. Blatant lies about Tamil Genocide as per Sri Lankan Stats – Dr. Dhammika Herath 6. “Two of us fled. 75 other women killed themselves with grenades”, says Tamil Tiger 7. Plea of a former Tigress for peace in Sri Lanka 8. UNHCR 25th February 2019- A/HRC/40/NGO/110 – OISL Report 30/1, more precisely, A/HRC/30/61, is seriously flawed. There was no UNLAWFUL KILLINGS 9. UNHCR 25th February 2019- A/HRC/40/NGO/111 – OISL Report 30/1, more precisely, A/HRC/30/61, is seriously flawed. There was no UNLAWFUL KILLINGS 10. UNHCR 25th February 2019- A/HRC/40/NGO/112 – OISL Report 30/1, more precisely, A/HRC/30/61, is seriously flawed. There was no UNLAWFUL KILLINGS 11. UNHCR 25th February 2019- A/HRC/40/NGO/230 – On Fairness to All Parties: An Appeal from Sri Lanka 12. When to refer to a situation as “Genocide” as per UNHCR 13. Sri lanka – Questions for short debate by Lord Naseby 14. LTTE Atrocities presentation A Letter of Protest against the BILL 104 presented to the Ontario Legislative Assembly As Immigrant Canadians we are very conscious that immigrant communities must not import into Canada their divisive and hateful political and ethnic battles of their home countries. Therefore we respectfully submit our objections to the proposed Bill 104 on the following grounds. 1. Issue of Jurisdiction of Provincial Government to declare Genocide occurred in Sri Lanka Although Bill 104 does not expressly call for a finding of genocide committed by Sri Lankan Government against Tamil people, its premise is based upon the foundation that genocide in Sri Lanka is a pre-determined factor. Therefore’ we respectfully submit that Bill 104 is fundamentally flawed in its attempt to establish a certain process based on facts that are not established. We further submit the Bill comprises of an attempt to persuade Provincial Government to bestow implied recognition that Genocide occurred in Sri Lanka. For purposes of establishing the crime of genocide committed by a sovereign nation, Genocide Convention is the accepted authority providing parameters and guidelines to establish genocide. Genocide Convention clearly provides that determining culpability for alleged genocide committed by another country clearly falls within the parameters of international law and therefore jurisdiction lies with International Court of Justice (ICJ). • “ Use of the term “genocide”: The legal definition of genocide is precise and includes an element that is often hard to prove, the element of “intent”. The determination as to whether a situation constitutes genocide is thus factually and legally complex and should only be made following a careful and detailed examination of the facts against relevant legislation. This examination is carried out for the purpose of establishing State responsibility or individual criminal responsibility for the crime of genocide and must be done by a competent international or national court of law with the jurisdiction to try such cases, after an investigation that meets appropriate due process standards. According to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, disputes related to its interpretation, application and fulfilment, including State responsibility, should be addressed to the ICJ. With regards to individual criminal responsibility, Article VI determines that persons charged with genocide shall be tried by a competent national court in the territory where the act was committed or by a competent international penal tribunal whose jurisdiction is accepted by the State Parties.” United Nations Office on Genocide prevention and responsibility to prevent: When to refer to a situation as Genocide: Guidance Note1 (full article attached; Attachment #1) • If a provincial recognition of genocide is to take place, a UN declaration of genocide and a breach of the Genocide Convention, or conviction “ by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction” is required. 1 | P a g e • We submit in this matter neither of the above findings has taken place, and therefore Provincial legislature has no jurisdiction to recognize or establish a finding of genocide without adhering to the recognized procedures put in place with consent of member nations by the UN in which Canada is a member that ratified the Genocide Convention . 2. Preamble of the /bill provides incorrect and/or embellished information as facts. (i) “ Acts of genocide against the Tamils started in 1948 after Sri Lanka” The population of Ceylon Tamils in Sri Lanka which was 732,000 according to the 1946 census has grown to 2,443,000 according to the 2012 census, even after the emigration of nearly a million Tamils, showing that the ethnic Tamil population has grown by a factor of 3.3 and prospered like the Sinhalese population which had grown by a factor of 3.3 but suffered little emigration. According to the table 1 below, it is evident that Sri Lankan Tamils thrived in all the Sinhala dominating provinces both before war (1911-1981) and during the war (1981-2012). Sources: Census of Ceylon, 1911 and Census, Sri Lanka 1981 and 2012 See table Attached. (Attachment #2) • We respectfully submit that: • The growth of Tamil population can be compared between the relatively peaceful periods (1911-1981) in the North and East provinces and in the outside of North and the East where the majority (about 90%) are Sinhalese. • The fact that Tamil population indicate a growth 2.7% in Sinhalese dominated areas contradicts the assertion that genocide occurred in Sri Lanka since 1948 as opposed 1.44% per annum in Tamil dominant areas . During the Civil war in Sri Lanka (1981 to 2009), the Sri Lankan Tamil population increased in almost all the Sinhala dominating areas. The growth is particularly dominant in the Western province where about 60% of the national GDP is generated, the Tamil population grew by 1.32% per annum from 228,516 to 339,370 while the Majority population grew at a lower rate -1.30% per annum. • The response to the allegation that genocide has occurred when the alleged victimized population has grown seven-fold is quite simply self explanatory. (ii) “The United Nations Organization estimates that in May 2009 alone about 40,000 to 75,000 Tamil civilians were killed ” • There is ample evidence that several International administrators, experts and organizations have declared as to the number of deaths that occurred in Sri Lanka during the period in question. For instance: o The UN resident representative in Colombo reporting a total of 7721 killings between end of August 2008 and May 13, 2009. o The report submitted to the British Parliament in 2019 by Lord Naseby outlines with supportive evidence the actual civilian casualties during the last month of civil War in Sri Lanka . 2 | P a g e o Although it was true that there were several resolutions presented to UN agencies, meticulously drafted by LTTE supporters but none of them has been accepted or proven legally. o The Maxwell Paranagama Commission on missing persons in Sri Lanka was assisted by a team of international legal and military experts. They include Right Honourable Sir Desmond de Silva (UK)Professor Geoffrey Nice (UK), Professor David Crane (USA), Mr. Rodney Dixon, QC, (UK/South Africa), William Fenrick (Canada), Professor Nina Jorgensen of Harvard University and Major General Sir John Holmes (UK). They all concluded that the Sri Lankan forces had not violate international HR or committed war crimes. We attach the following reports for your review in support of the fact that inflation of the number of deaths were orchestrated by external considerations other than a need to establish the actual number of casualties. o Written statements to UN (Attachment #3) o Report by Lord Naseby (Attachment #4) At this juncture, it is logical for us to spell out certain atrocities inflicted upon civilians by the LTTE during the 30 years in question. The LTTE killed so many unarmed civilians in 107 villages bordering to their rebel control areas. They bombed the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in 1996 and killed innocent office workers in that huge building in Colombo. They attacked the Colombo international Airport and destroyed six big commercial aircrafts and killed foreign nationals. They attacked Petroleum Storage Facilities. They attacked the two of the most sacred Buddhist temples and a Muslim mosque killing more than 300 devotees while in prayer (much like the Easter bombings that took place in Sri Lanka). The political leaders who were assassinated by the LTTE included Sri Lankan president and prime minister and several Cabinet Ministers, Prime Minister of India and many prominent Tamil Political leaders who were vocal in their criticism of the Proscribed Terrorist Group. We attach herewith detailed list of atrocities committed by the proscribed terrorist group against Sri Lankan Citizens indiscriminately massacring thousands and thousands of civilians. (Attachment #5) • The forgotten or willfully overlooked aspect of the issue is the fact that there were 295,873 civilians who were kept by the LTTE as human shields and later rescued by the Sri Lankan army. Nearly 12,000 LTTE fighting carders who surrendered to the Sri Lankan military were treated well and rehabilitated with trade skills released to the society.
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