A New Awakening*: Colombia’s Recent Foreign Policy shift and its Impact on the Internal Conflict

*Anaphora used by Santos in his inaugural speech as President on August 7th 2010.

Author(s): Diana Carolina Puerto C. Tutor: Manuela Nilsson

Examiner: Anders Nilsson Peace and Development Subject: Peace and Development

Level and semester: Master Thesis, Spring 2011

School of Social Sciences

Master Thesis - D level

A New Awakening*: Colombia’s Recent Foreign Policy Shift and its Impact on the Internal Conflict

* Un nuevo amanecer, anaphora used by Juan Manuel Santos in his inaugural speech as President of Colombia on August 7th 2010.

Diana Carolina Puerto Castro 5th June 2011 Department of Peace and Development Studies Supervisor: Manuela Nilsson PhD

1 ABSTRACT

Title: A New Awakening*: Colombia’s Recent Foreign Policy Shift and its Impact on the Internal Conflict.

Author: Diana Carolina Puerto Castro

Supervisor: Manuela Nilsson

Subject: Peace and Development

Abstract: Colombia’s biggest challenge is to resolve its half-century old armed conflict which began already to affect its neighbours. In this regard, Colombian foreign policy becomes crucial to respond with the internal and external challenges Colombia faces. Colombia has been historically aligned to the United States who has become one of the main destinations of Colombian exports as well as the leading sponsor in the fight against drugs and the guerrilla groups. However, the recent take over of President Juan Manuel Santos in August 2010 seems to have produced a shift in this regard. Santos has tried to increase Colombia’s interaction with other Latin American countries which has triggered several speculations about a move away from Washington, its main ally. Only some months have passed and it is already visible how the existent dynamics between Colombia and other international actors are taking a different shape.

This work investigates the causes and possible impacts of this shift in Colombia’s foreign policy on the internal conflict. Supported by an analytical background on the significance of the external conditions surrounding a conflict, this research was conducted by favouring qualitative methods. Presidential interventions and newspaper articles were analysed by applying discourse analysis. The external perceptions were collected using structured interviews with professors, journalists, diplomats within the Andean region.

The exploratory results suggest that a shift in the Colombian foreign policy indeed took place and was highly perceived by other international actors. It does not respond to a unique cause but to a set of different motives as for example the disappointment with US policies, economic pragmatism, the isolation of Colombia in South America, among others reasons. Furthermore, it is pointed out the way the shift could affect the conflict as well as feasible scenarios for the future.

Keywords: Colombia, conflict, foreign policy, neighbours, Santos, peace.

2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In carrying out this research, there are several people who have contributed in making this study possible and I would like to take this opportunity to give them my gratitude.

For a start, I would like to thank all the Latin American interviewees for their valuable inputs. Without their insights I would not have been able to accomplish this study. I would hence like to show my gratefulness to the University professors, Journalists, diplomats, analysts and the senator who participated in this study. For the time and effort they dedicated to me, Gracias!

I am especially grateful to my Thesis supervisor Prof. Manuela Nilsson. I want to thank her for encouraged me to carry out this research in first place. During times of frustration or confusion she was exceptionally devoted to helped me to overcome some issues found while conducting this research. Her professionalism inspired to reach a higher level of personal development and certainly she became a role model for me.

My last year in Sweden pursuing the Master program in Peace and Development work has been unforgettable and precious time for me and I would therefore like to show my appreciation to the Head of the Program, Prof. Anders Nilsson for allowing me to be part of the splendid prom 2010-2011.

Last but no least, I would like to thank to all the people I became acquainted with in Sweden and who made my stay ‘up here’ more pleasant. For this reason this work is dedicated to all these people who become your family when you are away from home. I will not forget to thank my fantastic Indian roommate, Vivek K.V., for such interesting conversations, his care during times of sickness, his altruist attempts to cook Colombian food to pamper me, and of course, his friendship.

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 7

1.1 Problem and Research Questions...... 8

1.2. Method...... 9

1.3 Limitations and Delimitations...... 10

1.4 Thesis Disposition ...... 10

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...... 12

Literature review ...... 12

Analytical frame...... 13

3. METHODOLOGY ...... 16

3.1 Sources of Data and Interpretation...... 16

3.2 Discourse analysis for foreign policy ...... 17

3.3 Quality standard ...... 18

4. THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT...... 20

4.1 Causes ...... 20

4.2 Actors and Interests ...... 22

4.3 Conception of the Conflict and Attempts for Solution...... 25

4.4 Phases and Development of the conflict...... 26

5. COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY...... 30

5.1 Foreign policy until 1998...... 30

5.2 Foreign policy from 1998 to 2010...... 32

6. COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT ...... 43

6.1 Manifestation of the shift...... 43

6.2 Neighbours’ reactions...... 48

7. POSSIBLE CAUSES...... 51

7.1 Disappointment with US policies...... 51

7.2 Economic pragmatism ...... 52

4 7.3 Other causes ...... 55

8. IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT...... 58

8.1 Scenarios...... 61

9. CONCLUSION...... 65

REFERENCES ...... 67

APPENDIX ...... 75

5 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

U.S.- United States of America

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

ELN – Ejército de Liberación Nacional

AUC - Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

M-19 – Movimiento 19 de Abril

DMZ- Demilitarized zone

UNASUR – Unión de Naciones Suramericanas

APEC- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operationn and Development

CAN – Comunidad Andina de Naciones

FLACSO – Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales

IISS – International Institutes for Strategic Studies

FTA – Free Trade Agreement

EFTA - The European Free Trade Association

FIP – Fundación Ideas para la Paz

OAS – Organisation of American States

6 INTRODUCTION 1. INTRODUCTION

Colombia is a middle-income country on the North-western South America. The country is bordered by Panama on the northwest, Venezuela and Brazil on the east, and Peru and Ecuador on the south. Like many developing countries, Colombia is in need of reducing poverty and inequality, to narrow the disparities among regions, to consolidate the development process, to improve the inadequate infrastructure, and to modernize public administration (World Bank, 2011). But certainly, one of Colombia’s biggest challenges is to resolve its half-century armed conflict which in turn has led to growing tensions with neighbours.

The Colombian conflict is rooted in the political violence of the forties and the lack of space for alternative groups challenging the elite traditional political parties (International crisis group, 2009a). In the 1960s guerrilla organisations emerged linked to the communist ideology and they consolidated themselves as an armed actor against the government, the other armed actor of the conflict (UNDP, 2003:27). Using kidnapping and extortion as source of funding triggered the emergence of private armies to defend themselves against guerrilla organisations (González, 2004). The involvement of paramilitaries as a third armed actor of the conflict and the significance of drugs- trafficking money as source of funding for both guerrilla and paramilitaries increased sharply the complexity of the conflict which began to affect the neighbours (Kurtenbach, 2005:13).

Colombia’s relationship with the neighbours is problematic due to several reasons. First, the presence of armed groups in the borders encourages illegal activities (Ramirez, 2004:145). Second, the degradation of the conflict surpassed the government capacity which was forced to increase its alignment with the U.S. in order to receive support from them (Rojas 2006). Third, the alignment of Colombia with the United States is not welcomed among the mainly left-wing governments of South America (The Economist, 2010, Tickner 2007, Rojas 2006). And Forth, recent events in 2008 and in 2011 proved that President Hugo Chavez from Venezuela and President Rafael Correa from Ecuador have supported Colombian guerrilla groups in different ways (IISS, 2011).

In this regard, Colombian foreign policy becomes crucial to respond with the internal and external challenges Colombia faces. Colombia has been historically aligned with the

7 INTRODUCTION

United States because of different geographical, political and historical reasons therefore its foreign policy is focused mainly towards the United States (Galan 2007, Ardila 2002, Pardo 2004). The U.S. has become one of the main destinations of Colombian exports as well as the leading sponsor in the fight against drugs and the guerrilla groups (Tickner, 2001). Given that the relationship is strongly rooted in political, economic and historical realms, a shift in the same was not expected. However, the recent take over of President Juan Manuel Santos in August 2010 seems to have produced a shift in this regard. Santos has tried to increase Colombia’s interaction with other Latin American countries which has triggered several speculations about a move away from Washington, its main ally (Oppenheimer, 2010). Only some months have passed and it is already visible how the existent dynamics between Colombia and other international actors are taking a different shape. The causes and possible impacts of this shift in Colombia’s foreign policy is the topic this dissertation deals with.

1.1 Problem and Research Questions

Establishing peace in internal conflicts has been the topic of abundant research. This thesis has focused on the literature regarding the influence of the international environment on a conflict. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that some authors have focused on how a country’s foreign policy impacts the internal conflict in other countries. But there is indeed a lack of literature focusing on how a country’s foreign policy influences the development of its own internal conflict.

The literature guiding this study is the one highlighting the influence of the international realm in an internal conflict. Stephen John Stedman’s (2001) argues that the complexity of the implementation of a peace process is exacerbated by conditions related to the international arena. Although his premise refers to the implementation phase of a peace agreement, and therefore to the post-conflict period, it is still useful to test whether the conditions he has pointed out are equally valid as positive or negative determinant factors for the eventual conflict resolution of a conflict - in this case the Colombian conflict. Stedman (2001) outlined the conditions for establishing a good implementation environment surrounding a conflict where the interference of neighbours becomes an impediment for a lasting peace. In the same way, Idean Salehyan (2007) highlights the difficulty of dealing with a guerrilla group organized transnationally and supported by the neighbours, a fact which in turn fosters the prolongation of the conflict. Both thus deem

8 INTRODUCTION peaceful neighbours as a requirement for establishing a good resolution environment as well as a good implementation environment. For this reason, their notions have been used in this thesis as an indicator to bring greater understanding about the shift in foreign policy President Santos is undertaking.

Given what was said before, this thesis aims to bring greater understanding on the relationship between the Colombian foreign policy and its impact in its internal conflict. In this regard, the purpose of this study is to establish whether the shift in foreign policy was designed for and expected to have an impact on the internal conflict. Using current theory not only for improving the implementation of peace agreements but as a source of indicators to prevent negative environments in the future constitute a great contribution for better policy making.

This work will thus avoid taking the common approach of looking at the Colombian conflict as such, but rather to analyze the development of Colombian foreign policy to point out its historical tendency and how it became a tool for internationalizing the conflict. By doing this, the role of the neighbouring countries will be analyzed based on the theory on how determinant is the interference of neighbours in an armed conflict. The current shift of the foreign policy then will be examined as well as the reactions and impact it has generated so far.

In order to come to this understanding the following research questions have been formulated.

1. How does the shift in the Colombian foreign policy manifest itself and how have the neighbouring countries reacted to it?

2. Why has the shift occurred? To what extent is it a “pre-arrangement” for domestic conflict resolution?

3. Under which conditions will the shift have any impact on the ongoing conflict?

1.2. Method

This is a desk study carried out by means of qualitative methods. The information collected has been gathered mainly from primary and secondary sources such as governmental web pages holding presidential interventions as well as newspaper articles

9 INTRODUCTION from Colombia and the international media. The abovementioned material was analysed by applying discourse analysis with the purpose of revealing a reality which is embedded in the discourse (Mikkelsen, 2009:186). In addition, some primary sources were also collected by means of interviews with relevant respondents in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. This material on the policy shift will be looked from the angle of Stedman’s implementation environment concept.

1.3 Limitations and Delimitations

The limitations of this study derive from the time frame established to conduct the research as well as the geographical distance from the country used as a case study. In the same way, additional limitations arise due to the shift in the Colombian foreign policy is rather recent, starting in 2010. Carrying out a study on an ongoing transformation process entails several difficulties. Firstly, the event has been registered by the press but it has not been studied by the academic realm. This implies that the available literature on the current conjuncture is rather limited. Another difficulty is that the assumed shift has not been entirely completed yet; thus, its effects cannot be pronounced with certainty. However, this limitation is at the same time the greatest strength of this study once it provides an innovative contribution to the field. Using current theory not only for improving the implementation of peace agreements but as a source of indicators to prevent negative environments in the future constitute a great contribution for better policy making. Regarding the data collection, getting interviews with the public officers was extremely difficult since some declared they were not authorised to offer their personal opinion.

1.4 Thesis Disposition

The thesis is divided into nine sections beginning with an introduction. This is followed by a theoretical chapter that discusses the literature dealing with on the influence of the international environment on a conflict as a point of departure for the forthcoming results and discussions.

Chapter 3 provides the reasoning behind the methodological choices for this study. Chapter 4 presents a brief background to place the issue within the Colombian armed conflict to provide the reader with the relevant context. In the same way chapter 5 reviews the historical development of Colombian foreign policy and its tendencies. Chapter 6

10 INTRODUCTION deals with the research findings concerning Colombia’s foreign policy shift and the neighbours’ reaction. This is followed in chapter 7 by the analysis about the possible causes that could have led to the shift as well as impact of the shift on the conflict. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with reflections about the utility of the analytical framework and the predictions for Colombia and the conflict development.

11 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Before exploring the Colombian case it would be wise to examine the literature regarding to what contributes to establishing peace in internal conflicts and more precisely concerning the influence of the international environment on those conflicts as well as the influence of neighbouring countries.

2.1 Literature review

A majority of the literature on conflict resolution regards the peace implementation success as the result of not only a single effort but the product of a combination of several factors determining the resolution of conflict. A disagreement is evident, however, in relation to key factors influencing the failure or success of a peace process. During the last two decades a progress in questioning the failures of peace processes is evident. Identification of potential causes leading to peace implementation failures have enriched the literature. The first studies in the nineties started the analysis on the room for improvement in a general level. They pointed out the need of more attention, resources and guarantees regardless the type of civil war. However, the international environment had not been examined in detail.

A more specific contribution was done by Fen Osler Hampson (1996 cited in Stedman et al, 2002:4) who was one of the first scholars examining why some peace processes fail and others succeed. Hampson distinguished four factors determining the realization of peace: the ripeness of the conflict understood as the willingness of the parties in conflict, the quality of the peace agreement itself, the extent of international nurturance of peace process and the regional power balances favouring the peace (Hampson, 1996). This notion though, including two external factors can be regarded as one of the first contributions embracing the international realm. Hampson places great importance to the environment in which the conflict is located when emphasizing the significance of the quality and level of the support offered by a third party and the extent in which regional powers can be hostiles or supporters of the peace process. In acknowledging the role of the outside actors Hampson contributed to reach greater awareness on the diversity and number of factors that could shape a conflict. Hampson has been however criticized since he failed in considering the variability in the types of conflict and therefore the variability of strategies for them.

12 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Another approach was then provided by Stedman & Rothchild (1996 cited in Stedman et al, 2002:8). A first distinction between the problematic factors that make the peace implementation to fail is made by these two authors. They argue that those issues are: a vague peace agreement, lack of coordination between mediators and implementers, lack of coordination among the implementing agencies, incomplete fulfilment of mandate tasks, short time horizons and limited commitment of implementers and the presence of spoilers. Despite the fact that they are criticized for exclusively focusing in organizational impediments, they made a great contribution when introducing the notion of spoilers: “the leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman & Rothchild 1996 cited in Stedman et al, 2002:9).

2.2 Analytical frame

Stedman (2001) later develops the significance of the international actors and neighbouring countries for the successful implementation of a peace agreement. He considers that the difficulty of the peace process is exacerbated among others by several conditions which are related to the international arena. His study created a score for peace implementation based on several variables: the number of warring parties; the lack of either a peace agreement before intervention or a coerced peace agreement; the likelihood of spoilers; the number of soldiers; a collapsed state; the presence of disposable natural resources; the presence of hostile neighbours or networks and demands for secession; major or regional power interest, resource commitment, acceptance of risk to soldiers (2002:10). His analysis found that only four of the variables studied were significant to explain failure or implementation of a peace agreement (2001:12). He thus grouped them and he pointed out those as major determinants: a third actor commitment and a positive environment.

The first one, the third actor commitment is the most important variable concerning willingness insofar it measures the real commitment of international actors. Stedman argues that regional powers will only assist the affected country if it is related to their national interests. This commitment can be represented as additional resources or risk troops, among others. The lack of support from regional powers turns the environment into a complex one and decreases the likelihood of success in the peace implementation

13 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK process. According to Stedman et al. (2002:667) this would imply that United Nations should only implement those cases holding great or regional power interests. Otherwise UN would have few possibilities of succeeding.

Secondly, Stedman establishes that an environment is no longer positive when it holds first, internal spoilers; second, neighbouring states opposing to the peace agreement and supporting the internal spoilers; and third, the presence of easy marketable commodities as spoils such as gems, timber, etc. Those provide the rebels with a mean for continued fighting but also the reward against which they weigh the benefits of peace. These features certainly make the environment more complex decreasing the chances of resolving the conflict (Stedman, 2001:2).

In this regard, Stedman establishes the implications of them in terms of policies when he pointed out the urge for improving the United Nations capacities for assessing the implementation environment. He suggests also that in countries where there are spoils, the international implementers should have strategic coordination, coercive strategies, the resources and the commitment to counter those who profit from war (Stedman et al, 2002:666). Although Stedman contribution includes the four abovementioned variables as determinants of success of implementation, only the one regarding neighbouring states supporting internal spoilers will be taken into consideration for the further analysis.

On the other hand, regarding neighbouring countries, Idean Salehyan (2007) states that in recent years scholars are focusing more on the international dimension of civil wars. Salehyan also explores the extent in which international factors affect domestic conflict processes. Salehyan states that rebel groups often organize transnationally to avoid the repression taking advantage of the limited state strength across international boundaries. His study point out that external bases in rival countries, refugees communities, and some specific behaviours from neighbouring states are expected to increase of conflict onset and prolongation. For this reason Salehyan (2007:241) concludes that regional conditions are important for understanding how civil wars develop. He points out that a broader analysis is needed to consider the neighbourhood in which states are located instead of treating the states in isolation. Furthermore, he claims for paying greater attention to transnational social actors that affect domestic policies and most importantly, that the fact of having external bases was shown to have a significant effect on the prolongation of the

14 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK conflict. In his practical implication he suggests that counter cross-border groups are best handled through the cooperation with other countries to develop joint strategies for combating transnational violence. Otherwise, the unilateral military means are not effective (Salehyan, 2007:241).

In this paper, Stedman and Salehyan’s notions will be used in order to bring better understanding and interpretation of the possible intentions of the shift in Colombian foreign policy and its further implications on the surrounding relations among the Andean region. As such, the concepts of Stedman and Salehyan will be applied to explain the complications of solving the Colombian conflict due to the external support that the Colombian guerrillas are receiving from neighbouring countries. Although Stedman’s premise refers to the implementation phase, it is still useful to test whether the conditions he has pointed out are present for the possible conflict resolution of the Colombian case. To do this, a brief analysis on the Colombian conflict and the history of its foreign policy will be offered.

15 METHODOLOGY 3. METHODOLOGY

Qualitative methods have been chosen to conduct the current study. Unlike quantitative methods which seek to condense data, qualitative methods aim to enhance the data in order to make the key aspects more evident (Neuman 2003, cited in Mikkelsen). This method is context dependent, it focuses on interactive processes, and it favours thematic analysis over statistical analysis (Mikkelsen, 2009:142). According to Bryman and Bell (2007) qualitative methods value words more than quantifiable data and it is hence more suitable when researching for meaning rather than pure facts. Thus, the focus of this kind of research is to describe and interpret events and interventions in the search for the underlying reasons fostering the shift in the Colombian foreign policy.

3.1 Sources of Data and Interpretation

The Data collection process within a research is crucial for the quality standard of any study (Yin, 2003). The information collected for the present study was mainly gathered through primary sources. Most of the material analyzed in this study was collected from the official web page of the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia where press releases and speeches are uploaded as well as from Colombian journals of political analysis as well as regular newspapers mainly from Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Given that this study about Colombia was done in Sweden, this seems to be most fitting methodology for conducting distance research. Besides, this seems to be a useful method since the investigations carried out through documents are helpful because the information easily can be accessed and compared (Gillham, 2000).

The collection process was enriched by structured interviews conducted with three Colombian diplomats, one Colombian senator, one Colombian Proexport officer abroad, two Colombian professors, one Colombian researcher in a NGO, two Ecuadorian journalists, two Ecuadorian university professors, and four Venezuelan professors. Interviews were structured since there was not the possibility to engage in a dialogue as the questions were written and sent by email.

Although the phenomenon studied has been registered by the media, there are not enough analyses on the topic since it is currently occurring. Moreover, getting interviews with the protagonists of the shift in foreign policy as diplomats and officers from the Colombian foreign ministry or the Presidency was extremely difficult since some declared

16 METHODOLOGY themselves unauthorised to offer their opinions. Confidentiality was then asserted to the diplomats participating in this study. Therefore, their names remain exclusive.

The abovementioned material was analyzed by using two of the qualitative methods namely Text analysis and Discourse Analysis. They deal with the interpretation of human action based mainly on text and talk analysis. Those challenge the assumption embedded in the traditional literature that language is just a transparent medium which conveys meanings (Larsen, 1997:9). This type of reflection aims to reveal a reality which is hidden behind the discourse (Mikkelsen, 2009:186). It implies that terms and arguments used in texts are studied and favoured over stances taken or what is actually said. It is an attempt for identifying features, traits and patterns as discourses holding particular themes which reiterates an opinion or claims regarding a specific point of view.

3.2 Discourse analysis for foreign policy

Larsen (1997:16) regards the discursive practice as a way in which the discourse is projected onto society meaning and by this, the way in which it affects the social world - such as the arguments of social actors for example, political parties or the action or believes emanating from societal institutions. Within the discourse, Foucault (1989 cited in Larsen 1997:16) distinguishes several hierarchies within the discourse structure: interior hierarchies within enunciative regularities. Foucault states that central elements within a discourse may remain. It is important to notice that an important theoretical point hence highlighted by Larsen (1997:17) is that a change in the discourse is not a complete change of discourse. For instance a change in the discourse can be carried out only in a concrete level as one of the branches of the hierarchies. Another significant theoretical point identified by Larsen is that changes impact the discourse at different levels of depth. As he states: “only if the governing statements are altered would we see the complete disappearance of a given discourse” (Larsen 1997:17). Flexibility and adaptability of the discourse are hence involved in the analysis. In the same way, it is pointed out that antagonisms between discourses are central. Struggles occur between discourses. Although this is certainly the case within a country the question is whether if this is also visible at the international level. Anyhow, Larsen (1997:21) states that discourses can show both change and continuity, which is a very useful theoretical point for the current research. He points out that when saying that a specific political discourse is present in the domestic environment of a certain country, it entails a constraint that shapes the

17 METHODOLOGY foreign policy of that state and which provides a limited framework. It is worth mentioning that several specific foreign policy decisions cannot be explained by political discourse since the level of abstraction is too high and which could be better understood by using middle range theories. Political discourse become useful due to it provides a framework for the general foreign policy line. It also contributes to an analysis of interest formation in which international impulses are translated via the discourse (Larsen 1997:22).

Bauer and Gaskell (2000:188 cited in Mikkelsen) recommend to follow a series of steps to succeed in the analysis: selecting carefully the pieces of text; sceptically reading and interrogating the text; Coding –as inclusive as possible; examining regularity and variability: checking reliability and validity through and, finally, writing up.

3.3 Quality standard

Searching quality in qualitative research is essential. Mikkelsen states that the most common indicators for ensuring quality standards are validity and reliability. Validity represents the extent to which the data collection strategies measure what they are supposed to measure during the research (Mikkelsen, 2009:349). In this regards, the concept of triangulation has been applied to this work. It embodies a multi-angle, multi- source of data and multiple methods to confirm emerging findings. For this reason diversity was an important notion when choosing the sources. By checking how different newspapers in different countries are portraying the same event, a broader comprehension of the phenomena is attained. In the same way, getting the perceptions of different actors also enriches the process. In this regard, perceptions of academics, analysts, journalist, and public officers were collected as a mean for drawing insights of different sectors of the society in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. As to the diplomats one might think their opinion could be biased since their work is to express the official version of the government. Few declined the invitation to participate in this study because they did not feel comfortable providing a personal opinion beyond the official statements. Other diplomats participating in this study offered their personal opinions once confidentiality was asserted. This helped to obtain a more personal approach and thereby increasing the reliability of the information. However, this study is aware of the fact that diplomats have to say what their government tells them to. They are never unbiased, but essentially speakers of the government.

18 METHODOLOGY

As to reliability, it is been said that if the same research process arrives at the same findings the reliability can be said to be satisfactory (Mikkelsen, 2009:349). However, since this is a qualitative study on international conjecture this does not aim at creating a chain of evidence as the data is highly contextual and subjective. This study instead gathered data from several documents and opinions from different sectors and countries to find connections and in that sense tried to increase the reliability of the findings. Statistical information embedded in answers provided by the interviewees has been confirmed and verified by official sources as to ascertain its correctness.

19 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT 4. THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT

Although the Colombian conflict is not related to ethnicity or religion it has been included among the long-violent conflict of higher complexity to solve (Kurtenbach, 2005:11). Its complexity lies in the fact that Colombia is a stable electoral and pluralistic democracy next to a violent and persistent conflict (UNDP, 2003:32). Besides the fact that it has lasted for 40 years its main features are the diversity of armed actors from the state and non-state (armed forces, two guerrilla organizations, paramilitary groups), different forms of interconnected violence (political, social, criminal), and the significance of income from drug trafficking or military and economical aid as a source of funding for armed actors (Kurtenbach, 2005:13; Rivas & Rey, 2008:49).

4.1 Causes

The causes of violence in Colombia have been discussed extensively in Colombia although not always a consensus has been reached. According to Fernán González (2004) two historical conditions are crucial to understanding the background of the Colombian conflict. On the one hand, the lack of a land reform to redistribute the land ownership among the peasants as well as unequal access to other natural resources such as oil and emeralds -some authors include also the drug trafficking (Kurtenbach, 2005:16). On the other hand, Colombia's rugged geography characterized by high mountains, deep valleys, rainforests and long rivers troubled the communication among regions and the arrival of the state. The irregular state building process led to an uneven state presence in the regions. The weakness of the Colombian state favoured the violence since the central state had no capacity to control or suppress the violence caused by private armies and thus to exercise a monopoly on the use of force (González, 2004; Kurtenbach, 2005:15; UNDP, 2003:21). Both circumstances have their roots in the dynamics of the patterns of settlement of the country throughout the colony and later as an independent state. In light of that, since the beginning of the sixteenth century the most remote and inaccessible territories were settled by marginalized group such as poor whites, mestizos1, afro- colombians and mulattos2 where state lacked the monopoly on the use of force as was

1 Mestizo is a term traditionally used in Latin America for people of mixed European (Spain) and Native American (indigenous) heritage or descent. 2 Mulatto denotes a person with one white parent and one black parent.

20 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT said before. Instead, the power and control were hence exercised by local elites (González, 2004).

Another important cause is the lack of opportunities for political participation of the population. This is intrinsically related to the political culture of violence as well as the weakness of the Colombian state. The recurrent violent confrontation between the Liberal and Conservative Parties dominated political life during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. These partisan confrontations were about the extent and pace of economic and social modernization and the role of the Catholic Church (González, 2004). However, elites within the two traditional political parties (conservative and liberal) did not allow new forces to get into the political landscape which found in the weapons a way to influence (Kurtenbach, 2005:15, UNDP, 2003:21).

The abovementioned causes are those that gave rise to the conflict. However, the motivations have been altered with the passing of the years due to the failure of every single actor the war. FARC and ELN have failed when fighting forty years and being still far from power. In the same way, the paramilitary forces have failed insofar they could not eliminate guerrilla groups after twenty years. The Colombian government failed also since it has not been able to defeat the insurgents neither holding the paramilitaries nor remove the original causes of the armed conflict (UNDP, 2003:81).

Over this failure the war had lost the sense that it perhaps once had. The intense degradation of the Colombian conflict is due to the actions of the armed groups are no longer adhered to a political logic. Instead, the over militarization of the conflict occurred, meaning by this the lack of political progress over half a century. There were not reforms attained by the insurgency, nor an increased legitimacy of the state, a significant variation in the citizen support to each actor or political transactions (Ibid, 2003:81). This was replaced by the excessive growth of every army. According to the Presidency of Colombia (2003:17), during 1993-2003 the growth of the illegal actors of the conflict has been around 157% while the population has grown by 1,9% annually. The size of the armed groups resulted in the tendency to change the political war by the economical war and to the shift of convictions for profit. And this is the logic where the drug-trafficking fits into the Colombian conflict as a source of funding and extension of the conflict (Ibid, 2003:84).

21 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT

4.2 Actors and Interests

Government

According to Sabine Kurtenbach (2005:28) the government perceives itself as the only actor of the conflict with democratic legitimacy due to the fact that it was elected by democratic elections. This also provides it with the legitimacy to hold the right for demanding the abandonment of armed struggle and violent means. Across the years some of the representatives of the government have neglected any type of political motivation coming from guerrilla groups and therefore the legitimacy of their battle. Some other officers, fewer, acknowledge the social and political causes of the armed struggle but without agreeing upon the means they use as an acceptable way to address problems. In this regard, the UNDP (2003:21) argues that the state has failed in not being able to prevent or solve the conflict given the fragmentation of the ‘ruling elite’ which did not manage to formulate a strategy corresponding to the complexity and persistence of the problem and hence place it in the core of politics.

After the failed peace process in 2002 with president Pastrana, the government under President Uribe has taken a hard-line approach to impose the monopoly of the state in the use of force. This is due to the large amounts of money from American aid that has strengthened the institutional capacity of the governmental military forces. (Kurtenbach, 2005:28). Since the government has not been deeply interested in promoting social reforms it could be said that their interest is the continuity.

Guerrilla groups3

‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’ (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) link their identity to the peasant self-defence groups that emerged around 1950 and the communist party that could find space in the two-part system dominated by the elites (UNDP, 2003:28). In 1964, they became a guerrilla group as it is today with the goal of improving the living condition of the rural population by means of a ‘revolutionary land reform’, meaning by this, removing the existing authorities from power and taking control of the state (Ibid, 2003:30). From the military perspective,

3 Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular combat and refers to conflicts in which a small group of combatants including, but not limited to, armed civilians use military tactics, such as surprise attacks, sabotage, raids and great mobility to hassle a larger and less-mobile traditional army, or strike a vulnerable target and withdraw almost instantaneously.

22 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT

FARC is still the most powerful guerrilla group since they began an offensive strategy in the mid-eighties which turned their troops from 1.000 to 15.000. For this reason they added ‘Popular Army’ (Ejército Popular) to their name (FARC-EP). Despite the fact FARC has managed to penetrate into the rural areas it has failed to find resources and political support in the cities (Kurtenbach, 2005:29).

According to UNDP (2003,28) the second largest guerrilla organization The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) did not emerge as a peasant self-defence group but as a decidedly revolutionary guerrilla. It was created in the mid- sixties in the student protests against the National Front (Frente Nacional), a period of Colombian history where both liberal and conservative political parties alternated in power excluding other political forces. This guerrilla group was created inspired by the Cuban revolution by a group of activists from the communist party, liberal left, liberation theology and syndicalism. It has been deemed as the ‘intellectual’ guerrilla group which is oriented by communist and socialist theories. From military point of view, ELN has been weakened due to the massive attacks from the paramilitary groups (Kurtenbach, 2005:30).

As a funding source both guerrillas conduct extortion and kidnapping of civilians. Likewise, the large profits of drug-trafficking have allowed guerrillas to operate with a substantial budget (Kurtenbach, 2005:22). Perhaps for this reason and because of their geographical and political marginalization FARC and ELN have never obtained more than 2 or 3% of favourability in the polls (UNDP, 2003:28)

Attempts intended to unify the two guerrilla groups have failed. For instance, in the late eighties there was an effort to create a merge between guerrillas groups called Coordinadora guerrillera Simón Bolivar but it did not work out. In the same way, in 2004 both groups FARC and ELN did a strategic alliance to resist the enormous military pressure from the state forces since the Colombian government got the American military support (Kurtenbach, 2005:30).

In the study UNDP did on the Colombian conflict is stated that after 40 years of guerrilla in Colombia, the insurgence project seems to have failed (UNDP, 2003:30). It argues that by reviewing different analysis on the success factors of the revolutions around the world, it is possible to establish that “Colombia did not –or does not- have the conditions for a

23 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT successful armed insurgency” (UNDP, 2003:30) insofar it has not been a dictatorship and there is not a particular culture of political resistance. Besides, the abovementioned features have not been combined with conjunctures of severe economical recession and a let-up from the American support. As Theda Skocpol argues “the revolutions are not made, they come” meaning that is not only the actions of the rebels but the social and political context that decides the fate of the movement (cited in UNDP, 2003:30). However, it also argues that “the essentially rural nature of the guerrilla in a mainly urban country and its lack of support does not mean that the armed groups have no political projects” (Ibid, 2003:39). The evolution of their discourse has focused on the land issues in the sixties, the Marxism-Leninism until the end of the eighties, and nowadays the core of the ideology is based upon the ‘Bolivarianism’4 which emphasizes the Latin American ideals of independence (Ibid, 2003:41).

Paramilitary groups

The emergence of paramilitary groups is intrinsically related with the weakness of the Colombian State (González, 2004; Rivas & Rey, 2008:44; Mauceri, 2001). Regional elites developed their own private military groups to face the opposition groups. In other areas self-defence groups emerged with the purpose of defence landowners and drug lords from kidnapping and other practices used by guerrilla groups as a source of funding (González, 2004). In the nineties, a process of politicization and centralization of different paramilitaries groups took place. They declared themselves as self-defence groups against guerrilla organisations but not in opposition to the Colombian state neither the political and economical system. Several accusations suggest some linkages between the paramilitaries and the state in fighting the guerrilla although those have been denied by the government. However, the government adopted a passive attitude regarding the dramatic growth of this group and even in some periods the government authorised the creation of private security groups, which legitimized the privatization of security.5 (Mauceri, 2001). In 1995, several paramilitary groups formed the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC). In 2003, during President

4 Refers to Simón Bolívar (1783 – 1830) who was a military and political leader who played a key role in leading Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela to independence from the Spanish Empire. He is regarded in Hispanic America as ‘The liberator’. 5 For instance, between 1993 and 1994, the President Gaviria authorized the establishment of a security group known as "Convivir" (Law 62, Act 356). The government claimed that this measure simply responding to the security needs of citizens and it is not intended to support paramilitary organizations (Mauceri, 2001)

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Uribe’s tenure peace process with the paramilitaries was carried out and as a result their demobilisation (Kurtenbach, 2005:34).

4.3 Conception of the Conflict and Attempts for Solution

The fact that the State has been unable to resolve the conflict does not mean that they lacked the efforts and achievements. According to Chernick (1996:4) a review of the history of attempts of negotiations between guerrilla groups and the government would include the following efforts:

1982- President Belisario Betancourt Amnesty negotiations. Armed opposition was recognized as a 1986 political actor as well as the need to open peace talks. Cease- fire was agreed upon and open round tables on land, urban, legislative reforms were set. No definite agreements were reached in any field. 1986- President Virgilio Barco Instead of negotiating an agenda only steps for disarmament 1990 were included in the topics. The main objective was not to negotiate a solution to the conflict, but to legitimize the state and delegitimize the guerrillas. Cease-fire agreement with FARC agreed on Betancourt’s tenure was broken. Peace talks were staked and retaken including other groups such as ELN and M-19.It was an incomplete peace since it left the principal groups out. Chernick deems it as a maquiavelic strategy. 1990- President César Gaviria Government proposals sought to talk about the national 1994 problems of Colombia once the guerrilla has accepted the disarmament and reincorporation. On the contrary, it seems that guerrilla wanted to talk about the problems affecting the Colombian population but they were not interested in a resolution of the conflict. Gaviria conceives them as bandits with no political nature. 1994- President Ernesto Samper Samper restored the political conception of the Colombian 1998 armed conflict. He argued that guerrilla groups are political actors and it is possible to negotiate with them. The huge presidential crisis due to the drug-trafficking money in his presidential campaign diverted any possibility of progress in this field. 1998- President Andrés Pastrana Peace process which lasted 3 ½ years with the participation of 2002 international community (Canada, Cuba, Spain, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Venezuela) took place. It included a demilitarized zone –DMZ- for the peace talks. While the peace talks occurred, FARC took advantage of the DMZ for criminal actions and get military stronger. The government on the other hand modernized Colombia’s armed forces with the American aid. Peace process was broken on February 2002 where both parties were convinced of the possibility of a military victory or at least, a substantial improvement in the correlation of forces that would force the other to negotiate seriously. The negotiation as a mean of conflict resolution lost popularity. 2002- President Álvaro Úribe Military offensive. Denial of the existence of an armed 2010 conflict as well as the political nature of guerrilla groups. Conflict was conceived as a circumstance given that the lack of the state capacity and guerrilla groups were denominated as

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simple terrorists. On the other hand, AUC paramilitary group entered into a peace agreement with the government that led to demobilization of over 31,000 AUC members.

4.4 Phases and Development of the conflict

During the second half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth, Colombian politics were dominated by a struggle between the two traditional parties, the liberal party and the conservative party. “The violence” was a turbulent period from 1946-1965 were the confrontations between parties were exacerbated. This triggered several violent periods between the groups supporting each party followed by the assassination of a very popular presidency candidate from liberal party, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán (International crisis group, 2009a). Gaitán’s murder produced an explosion of political violence in Bogotá as which did not remove the government from power but fed the social violence on the peasantry. The rural confrontations were a mix between political loyalties and land issues. Bogotá returned to normal but the rural violence kept alive. This is where the rural armed struggle reinvented itself as a vehicle for socialist revolution and therefore as a guerrilla group (UNDP, 2003:27).

To overcome this situation, in 1957 a power-sharing agreement namely the ‘National front’ (Frente Nacional) was established in order to finish the exacerbated violence between the two traditional political parties which successfully guaranteed the alternation of power between the two groups of the Colombian elite from 1958 to 1974. Although this accord reduced the dramatic level of violence at the time it also excluded any other political option from the political landscape. Alternative options, including communist groups, were repressed leading hence to the transformation of the peasant communities into mobile guerrillas inspired by the Cuba revolution in 1959 (Insight on conflict, 2011; González, 2004).

The mid-sixties is the period of the foundation of guerrilla organisations. Several guerrilla movements emerged as a merge where peasant self-defence groups, grassroots and popular movements, as well as some communist militants converged (International crisis group, 2009a). Some of those such as the ‘M-19 movement’ and the Marxist guerrilla groups still present in the conflict: the ‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’ (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN). In the late seventies, an initial phase of

26 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT expansion of the guerrilla took place and later the territorial expansion of the war occurred (Mauceri, 2001).

During the eighties amnesty negotiations and peace agreement of 1984 seemed to be a development toward the resolution but the situation became progressively more complex by the growth of drug-trafficking organisations and the materialization of right-wing paramilitary groups: United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) (González, 2004). On the one hand, the decline of coca-leaf plantations in Bolivia and Peru led to an increase of those crops in the south of Colombia. The presence of poor peasants as a social base combined with the weak presence the state became the ideal scenario for the consolidation of the drug trade on those areas and the subsequent development of powerful cartels which fought a war against the state during the eighties and the nineties (Ibid, 2004). They were finally defeated by the Colombian government due to the American military support although smaller groups still subsist. U.S aid focused particularly on drug issues and led to the implementation of its counter- drug strategy namely Plan Colombia in 1999 to date (Ibid, 2004).

On the other hand, guerrilla groups increased the use of extortion and kidnapping of civilians as a funding source (Mauceri, 2001) which in turn led to a shift in the society’s perception about the violence (González, 2004). In 1982 drug-traffickers, who slowly became landowners, as well as traditional landowners, politicians, military staff and even an oil-company supported the idea of self-defence. This triggered the emergence of paramilitary forces (AUC) in 1997 and in some extent some kind of sympathy among public opinion regarding the need of applying authoritarian solutions (González, 2004). AUC sought to protect landowners, drug lords and local business man from the kidnapping carried out by guerrilla groups although they became involved in narcotics trade too (International crisis group, 2009, Rivas & Rey, 2008:49). Progressively, both guerrillas as well as paramilitaries became increasingly involved in drug-trafficking which in turn has given a new dimension to the narco-traffic issue (Insight on conflict, 2011; Rivas & Rey, 2008:49).

Given that at the beginning of the nineties the violence increased sharply (Mauceri, 2001), in 1998, President Pastrana created a demilitarized zone for beginning peace talks with FARC. However, after three years and a half of negotiations the process was broken (International crisis group 2009a, Rojas, 2006).

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FARC’s attacks hurting the civil population have led to a loss of the legitimacy of their fight. President Uribe was elected in 2002 on a platform to restore the security to the country and cracking down on FARC thus he obtained one of the largest votes in presidential elections so far. The government hence launched a military offensive against FARC which had, on that time around 17.000 men-at-arms and ELN 4.500. (Mauceri, 2001; International crisis group, 2009b).

Substantial decrease in violence took place from second half of 2003 (International crisis group, 2009b). During his term, the (AUC) paramilitary group entered into a peace agreement with the government that led to demobilization of over 31,000 AUC members. Furthermore, more than 20,000 members of the FARC, AUC, ELN, have individually surrendered their arms. This was framed on the “Justice and Peace Law” which provided reduced punishments for the demobilized if they abandon violence and return illegal possessions which are used to repair victims (Flashpoints, 2011).

Uribe’s security strategy to consolidate state presence and the rule of law throughout the country with the military support of the U.S. has put the FARC under severe stress (International crisis group, 2009b). Uribe was hence re-elected for other four more year where several top guerrilla commanders even some of the founders were captured, killed in combat or assassinated by their own men. The guerrilla organisation used to count in 2001 with approximately 17.000 men-at-arms and nowadays its troops has been reduced to 8.000-10.000 men (International crisis group, 2009b; Flashpoints, 2011). In fact, in 2008, the first pacific demonstration organized by citizens without political affiliation using Facebook brought more than 10 million of Colombians on February 4th 2008 to reject the kidnapping and other strategies used by FARC. Colombian living abroad organized parallel demonstrations on the same day which turned this into an international massive mobilisation (Pachón, 2009:330).

Colombia has been the closest U.S. ally in South America which has led to intensify the friction between Colombia and neighbouring countries Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Tensions increased dramatically during 2010 due to a Colombia-U.S. agreement which grants the U.S. accesses up to seven military bases within Colombian territory for joint anti-narcotics activities in Colombia (Insight on conflict, 2011). Uribe’s former Defence Minister, Juan Manuel Santos was elected as new president on August 2010. He obtained more than 9 million votes, the highest amount attained by any candidate in the history of

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Colombian democracy (Presidency of the Republic, 2011). During his campaign he promised to continue the same hard-line approach against FARC and carry out the transition from Democratic Security to Democratic Prosperity.

This chapter has expressed the level of complexity in the ongoing Colombian conflict. This understanding will be useful to see how the changes in the conflict have impacted the foreign policy.

29 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY 5. COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY

In order to bring a greater understanding about the dynamics of the Colombian foreign policy it has been divided into three moments: a first period since its origin as a independent country until 1998, a second period initiating from 1998 when the internal conflict got internationalized and the alignment with the U.S increased, and a third moment concerning the current situation which is the object of the present study.

5.1 Foreign policy until 1998

Diana Rojas (2006:85) states that the foreign policy of any country is in function of the national interests. The question lies, according to her, in agreeing upon such interests, establishing which ones are priorities and determining the best way to achieve them. One of the most outstanding traits of the Colombian foreign policy throughout its history has been its proximity to the United States. It has been observable for several authors and it is referred to as respice polum, meaning by this: looking at the north star- (Ardila 2002; Pardo, 2004; Drekonja 1983; Pardo y Tokatlian 1989, Tickner 2007, Galan 2007, Juan Manuel Galan 27-05-11). Such a proximity to the United States as a desirable strategy to defend the national interests has been a long-held belief among Colombian elites to the point of becoming the national doctrine (Drekonja 1983; Pardo y Tokatlian 1989, Tickener 2007). Despite the fact that some authors believe that there has been periods of respice similia (looking at your similar ones) where Colombia showed more interest in getting closer to other developing countries those have been transitory moments in which Colombia has not been far from the American’s side (Tickner 2007, Galan 2007).

According to Borja Díaz (2002:150) during most of the twentieth century Colombia and the U.S. enjoyed close and friendly relations marred only by the Panama Canal conflict6. As was one of the major U.S. supporters for the Kennedy’s program “Alliance for progress” Colombia became an exemplar ally against communism and a good business partner. The friendly relations began to deteriorate with the rise of drug trafficking in the mid-seventies (Ibid, 2002:150). The drug trade began to flourish as a result of high prices and transportation costs of the drugs produced in the Middle East. Most of the coca leaf plantations took place as a result of displacement of peasants affected by armed conflicts

6 The United States supported the rebellion of independence groups in exchange for obtaining the license of the canal. As a result, Colombia has lost the territory where today is located Panama (Díaz 2002:150).

30 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY in areas where the presence of the state was weak or non-existent (Thoumi, 2001). In the mid-nineties, Colombia overtook Peru and Bolivia and it became the largest worldwide producer and supplier to the United States (Diaz, 2002:151). This was due to first, an aggressive campaigns of flight interception made by President Fujimori in Peru; second, guerrillas and paramilitary promoted illegal crops (coca leaf) to gain the support of the peasants in areas under their control and, third, the end of the Cold War left guerrillas without Soviet financial support whereby the search for alternative sources of funding became pressing (Thoumi, 2001).

On the other hand, the drugs consumption and the crime related to it increased significantly in the United States during the eighties. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan, through a National Security Decision Directive 221, established that illicit drugs represented a lethal threat to U.S. national security, which in turn led to a growing participation of American armed forces in the "war on drugs" and the militarization of the U.S. drug strategy (Pardo and Tickner, 2000). Despite minor variations in the drug policies adopted during Reagan (1980-1988), Bush (1988-1992) and Clinton (1992-2000) tenures the reasoning behind them has prevailed and it led to a ‘narcotisation’ of the agenda between the U.S. & Colombia (Tokatlian, 1995:119). The drugs problem hence has been considered in the U.S. as an external threat to national security rather than a domestic issue. It implies that, on the one hand, the U. S. has favoured strategies based upon combating the supply instead of the demand side and, on the other hand, the prominent place of drugs within the high agenda of the American foreign policy make itself a priority over other objectives as strengthening democracy, human rights, reducing poverty and the preservation of the environment (Tickner, 2001).

In light of that, the Colombian approach regarding the drug trafficking has been in a greater extent the result of bilateral agreements with the United States, or the unilateral imposition of specific strategies designed in Washington. (Tickner, 2001). However, regarding the internal conflict the Colombian governments believed that it required a domestic solution which was possible to reach without the assistance of other countries or international actors. This entailed a strong position regarding external interference but it did not prevent the Colombian government from accepting the kind offer from the friendly neighbours of using their neutral territory so as to facilitate some dialogues with

31 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY the guerrilla. The armed conflict as a theme was not hence part of the international agenda within the Colombian foreign policy (Rojas 2006).

Regarding Colombia’s relations with other countries in South America, Socorro Ramirez (2004:144) argues that between the sixties and the eighties Colombia’s neighbours were not affected by the incipient conflict in Colombia. Colombia managed to maintain its alignment with the United States while supporting the institutions from regional initiatives such as the Andean community. Colombia was an example for peaceful resolutions with its neighbours as well as for economic and democratic stability in a continent that has suffered several dictatorships (Rojas, 2006).

5.2 Foreign policy from 1998 to 2010

President Pastrana “Diplomacy for peace” and Narcoguerrillas

This new moment in the Colombian foreign policy corresponds to the exacerbation of the internal conflict and hence the deterioration of the relations with its neighbours. Although the alignment with the U.S. did not change -instead it sharply increased- there was a variation in the way how the conflict was conceived since it internationalized (Tickner, 2001).

Understanding the conflict as a domestic issue is a belief that changed in a greater extent during the mid-nineties. This is due to the change in the international environment and the escalation of the internal conflict which led to a national crisis. A growing presence of illegal armed actors in the borders especially close to Venezuela begins to have an impact on the population of both sides of the border. This is due to the disputes between guerrillas and paramilitaries in order to control strategic corridors as well as due to the weakness of the state in the borders (Ramirez, 2004:145). The humanitarian situation and the lack of governability produced the international perception that first, the whole country was involved in drug trafficking; and second, Colombia had become a failed state and last, a more direct intervention was needed since Colombia was a thread for the international context (Rojas, 2006).

Given this situation, President Pastrana (1998-2002) decided to make use of the international concern for obtaining additional support. He designed the “Diplomacy for peace” as the corner stone of his negotiation strategy with the guerrillas. It was a very

32 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY pragmatic foreign policy intended to obtain international political and financial support for a peace process. The idea of initiating a peace process was well-received by the international community which later played an active role between the parties (Tickner, 2001). Government opened then a peace process with the guerrilla group FARC which remained for the next three and a half years, it means, most of Pastrana presidential term (Ibid, 2001).

According to Diego Cardona (2001) Pastrana’s foreign policy stands out insofar it is the first conscious effort to obtain bilateral and multilateral international involvement to solve the internal conflict, meaning by this, a desired intervention. His foreign policy was initially conceived from a multilateral perspective. In fact, his international strategy was focused on the U.S., European countries, neighbouring countries and some Asian countries. This was an attempt to break with the traditional alignment of Colombia exclusively with the U.S. Although Colombia did manage to involve 10 friend countries as facilitators of the peace process the rest of the foreign policy got narrowed and the U.S. became the main counterpart and financier of the Colombian strategy (Tickner, 2001).

In the same way, Pastrana initially tried to distinguish between the domestic crisis of Colombia focusing on the conflict, and the major problems of Colombia at the international level, which were primarily issues related to drug trade. Indeed, one of his main purposes was to broaden the bilateral agenda with the United States so as to overcome the drugs issue and make the peace process the priority. Yet, his discourse got modified gradually insofar he was discovering that the U.S. would provide more resources and support for the war on drugs than for the peace process (Tickner, 2001). The two topics hence became progressively blended in his strategy: the version presented to other countries was a broad explanation on the Colombian crisis where narcotics were just one element among other triggers. In contrast, the version for the U.S. stressed a more direct link between drug trafficking and the armed conflict. In this moment the concept of narcoguerrilla appeared (Rojas 2006). U.S. government officials estimated that about two-thirds of FARC and a ELN third have some type of link to narcotrafficking. Their participation is based on the taxes paid by drug traffickers to guerrilla for protection of crops, laboratories, storage facilities and airstrips. The General Accounting office (1999) calculated the benefits of armed groups from these activities between 500 million and 600 million dollars.

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The attempt for reaching a multilateral foreign policy and the return to a bilateral one based mainly on the U.S. returned Colombia to its traditional docile attitude that has been predominant across the history of the relationship Colombia-United States (Tickner, 2001). This time however, the Colombian subordination was justified not only on the American financial assistance but also on the gaining of military strength. According to Bagley (2000:27) the tacit logic of the new U.S. strategy was to force the guerrilla (FARC) to negotiate with the government since they will gain more from a peace agreement than on the battlefield.

Despite the fact that already in 1999 Colombia was receiving US$289 millions which made the country the third largest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel and Egypt, Clinton’s government let Pastrana know that if he could manage to design a comprehensive plan to combat drug trafficking the U.S. would be willing to afford it (Tickener, 2001). In light of this, the Plan Colombia: Plan for peace, prosperity and the strengthening of the State better known as “Plan Colombia” was created. Such a plan incorporated a wide range of issues considered crucial to the government's peace effort, including economic recovery, reform of the judicial system, development social, democratization and human right. However, the war against counter-drug strategy was declared explicitly as the "core" of the Colombian strategy (Presidency of the Republic, 1999:9). Furthermore, along with the abovementioned plan, Washington continued offering a reduction on the protective tariffs for Colombian products in the American market as an incentive for the legal production of the country7(Tickener, 2001).

Once it was approved, the U.S. and Colombia made several efforts to gain the support for Plan Colombia within the Andean region but the relations were already complicated. Despite several governments of neighbouring countries have made statements in favour of peace and have offered their good offices to Colombia, they have taken a more individual and reactive attitude. Most of them have simply repeated that Colombia is a threat to regional security and they have created a line of security and isolation around Colombia

7 The program is namely Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) which was enacted in December 1991 to help four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador) in their fight against drug production. In 2002, ATPA became ATPDEA (Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act) to provide duty-free treatment for certain products previously excluded under the ATPA. It expired on February 15th 2011. This was a very important for Colombia since, according to the National Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism, in 2009 50% of the Colombian exports to the U.S. were done under ATPDEA program. In 2010 the percentage increased to 61%. (Minister of Commerce, Industry and tourism, 2011)

34 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY

(Ramirez, 2004:151). Some of them have often avoided their own responsibility in controlling the mobilisation of military equipment, illegal drugs and money which feed the Colombian conflict. Furthermore, some foreign governments have adopted even more pragmatic attitudes in order to solve the Colombian situation by themselves by taking their own initiatives for dialogue with guerrilla groups, ignoring or going in the opposite direction from the strategy adopted by the Colombian government (Ramirez, 2004:151). In fact, the greater tensions have occurred with Venezuela. At the same time Venezuela has offered its good offices for solving the conflict it declared itself neutral in the conflict granting hence the same international legitimacy to the Colombian government and the guerrilla. It also established direct communication with FARC without Colombian government authorization (Ramirez, 2004:152).

Regarding Ecuador, its government increased the military presence in the border since transnational activities related with the conflict between both populations took place there. In fact, Ecuador is involved in the U.S. drug strategy because of the participation of Ecuadorians in the coca-leaf crops in Colombia as well as money laundering which is facilitated by the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy. Displacement, refuge, and voluntary migration toward Ecuador have triggered the expulsion of aliens and the imposition of visas. This has affected considerably the integration process within the Andean community (Ramirez, 2004:153).

Regarding Plan Colombia, South American nations manifested that they were unhappy having the U.S. military involvement in the region, and countries such as Venezuela, Peru and Brazil explicitly expressed their rejection to the Plan arguing that it can increase the insecurity in the region (Rojas, 2006). Within Colombia, the Plan also had some opponents. Although it is true that the plan brought a considerable amount of resources to Colombia, it is also true that it had some negative impacts: destruction of legal crops in areas where the fumigation campaign occurred, the increase of violence in the south of the country and therefore an increase in the number of displaced people, the movement of illicit crops and coca leaf labs to other areas of the country including the border with Ecuador (Rojas, 2006). On the other hand, the European countries did not commit fully with the Plan Colombia since they felt it was an American initiative and it placed too much emphasis on the military aspect (Tickner 2001). For this reason, the financial support Colombia gain from Europe was considerably low of what was expected.

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Nevertheless the implementation of Plan Colombia was carried out during Pastrana tenure and also prolonged during the next presidential term (Rojas, 2006).

The more tangible results of the Diplomacy for Peace comprise the Plan Colombia as well as the international involvement in the peace process: the group of four European countries, six American countries as well as United Nations embodied by two representatives of the Secretary-General (Cardona, 2001). However, Pastrana’s foreign policy also showed that the international intervention is not guarantee of a successful peace process since it was broken on February of 2002, few months before the presidential takeover. He was also criticized for a lack of coherence when encouraging a peace process and the military aid from the U.S. at the same time. Moreover, it made evident that the international actors operate according to their own agendas and interests which often have a collision with the national government’s vision (Rojas, 2006).

Some authors have identified Pastrana term as a turning point where the internationalisation process of the Colombian conflict occurred due to its regional effects as well as the increased of American presence in the national territory (Borda, 2007; Cardona, 2001; Rojas, 2006; Tickner, 2001; Tickner 2006). It triggered the visibility of the national crisis in the international realm and therefore an expressed concern from international actors about what was going on in Colombia and its effects on the regional stability and the international security. (Rojas 2006, Tickner, 2007). Despite the process of internationalization of the conflict that was also pursued by the next President, Álvaro Uribe, two major events at the end of Pastrana’s term changed dramatically the environment: the attacks of September 11 2001 and the end of the negotiations with the guerrilla on February 2002 (Rojas, 2006).

President Uribe: “Democratic Security” and Narco-Terrorism Pastrana’s last discourse emphasizing the fight against the “narco-guerrilla” (instead of guerrilla) was well received by the Bush’s government since it fitted into the American priorities where drugs were regarded as the number one threat to the national security. However, this changed after the attacks of September 11 as terrorism moved to the first place among international threats to American security (Cardona, 2001). Besides manifesting the absolutely and unconditional solidarity with the U.S., Pastrana tried to increase the empathy between the two countries by comparing the frustration and anger

36 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY the American population was experiencing the feelings that Colombians feel when attacks on the civil population occur almost in daily basis (Tickner, 2007).

As a consequence, between September 11th 2001 and February 20th 2002, the day that the peace negotiation with the FARC was broken, the discourse of Pastrana changed significantly. When the president decided to break the peace talks he argued that “... now no one can doubt that, between politics and terrorism, the FARC chose terrorism”8 (Pastrana, 2002). The shift of wording was intended to escalate again into Washington’s priorities (Tickner, 2007). In the same way, the Department of State included both Colombian guerrillas groups FARC and ELN as well as the paramilitary group AUC in the list of terrorist organizations. When Uribe (2002-2010) took office in August of 2002 his government hence insisted on a reinterpretation of the armed conflict. During Uribe’s two presidential terms the presidency as well as all the ministries and governmental agencies neglected the existence of an internal conflict in Colombia and therefore the nature of guerrilla groups as political actors. Instead, it was defined in terms of a terrorist threat and not as a political confrontation (Gaviria, 2005).

Uribe’s foreign policy was hence to a greater extent a continuation of the international strategy that the previous President Pastrana pursued. Sandra Borda (2007:96) defines the internationalisation policy as an explicit and conscious decision for including external agents in the development of Colombian war. Both Presidents used the Colombian foreign policy as a tool to support their own strategy towards the conflict. Although both increased the alignment with the United States each President conceived different means (Rojas 2006). While Pastrana announced a peace process at the beginning of his mandate Uribe brought a drastic shift within the Colombian domestic policy when announcing direct war against illegal armed actors. This was based on the statement that Colombia does not have an armed conflict but a scenario for narco-terrorist activities, meaning by this, the combination of narcotics traffic and insurgent activitiy. Thus, the language of peace was abandoned replaced with a strong speech against terrorism (Tickner, 2007).

President Uribe had the advantage that his military discourse was coherent with the Plan Colombia as well as with the objectives and strategies of the American war again terrorism worldwide. This triggered one of the most intense periods of alignment between

8 Translations made by the author.

37 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Colombia and the U.S. and a continuation in the process of internationalization of the Colombian conflict (Borda, 2007:67, Rojas, 2006, Tickner, 2007)

As a consequence of Uribe’s foreign policy his government was able to maintain the American financial aid by means of the Plan Colombia. Thanks to this, Uribe could afford his leading policy Democratic Security which was based upon the encouragement the rule of law throughout the country as a precondition to be able to protect every single Colombian citizen. It entailed the strengthening of the state authority and the presence of the government in the entire country including remote areas in order to protect the democratic institutions and their values (Presidency of the Republic & Ministry of Defence 2003).

One of the most evident expressions of the Democratic Security policy was the “Plan Patriota” (Patriot Plan), a major Colombian military offensive which counted with the logistic, technical and strategic support from the U.S. Its main purpose was to recover the remote areas of Colombian territory which have been under the FARC’s control for decades. The U.S. provided around 100 million dollars in training, weapons, supplies, intelligence, and transportation and communications equipment. Furthermore, the American congress increased the number of American military staff allowed in Colombia from 400 to 800. The number of troops involved the Plan Patriota was around 18.000 (Rojas, 2006; Tickner 2007).

The overall Plan Colombia from 1997 to date has provided the Colombian government with more than 7.000 millions of dollars of which about 85% has been allocated for Military and police programs and 15% has been allocated to social and economical programs (Center for International Programs, 2011). Uribe’s security measures during two continuous presidential periods have triggered the decline in homicides, attacks by the FARC and ELN, and a reduction of 90% in the kidnappings between 2002-2009 (Fondelibertad, 2011). In fact, 2008 was the year of impressive military achievements.

On 1 March 2008, the government announced the National Army had killed Raul Reyes, second-in-charge of the FARC’s central command (the Secretariat) who was responsible for maintaining international contacts, visible head during the failed peace process and a very difficult military target. The military operation occurred at 1,800 meters from the border between Ecuador and Colombia (in Ecuadorian territory) in Reyes’ military

38 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY camps. Reyes' death led to strong questioning by Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa and President of Venezuela Hugo Chávez, who considered the Colombian military incursion into Ecuadorian territory as a violation of its sovereignty (Pachón, 2009:332). By the same token, President Uribe questioned the two presidents for supporting and hiding guerrilla organizations listed internationally as terrorists and he even threatened with denouncing them to the International Criminal Court for financing terrorism. This support was confirmed due to the guerrilla’s computers founded in Reyes’ camp in Ecuador and examined by Interpol (Rueda, 2008, Pachón, 2009:341). Despite the international criticism and the breaking of diplomatic relations with Ecuador, 83% of the Colombian population approved the operation (Pachón, 2009:332).

Two months later the founder and main leader of FARC, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, alias ‘Tirojifo’ also died although there are different versions about the causes of his death (Rueda, 2008). Anyhow, the most impressive military operation namely ‘Operación Jaque’ (Check operation) was carried out on July 2nd 2008 where 15 kidnapped citizens were rescued including the most ‘valuable’ hostages for FARC: the three American citizens who had kidnapped for more than four years and Ingrid Betancourt, Colombian- French citizen who was a Colombian presidential candidate in 2002 and who was kidnapped for six years. The intelligent forces managed to fool those guerrilla people who were responsible for the hostages. The operation was successfully completed without shooting and it consolidated the leadership of President Alvaro Uribe raising his popularity to 85% (Pachón, 2009:333). On September 2010, Jorge Briceño alias ‘Mono jojoy’, the second more important guerrilla chief and responsible for terrorist attacks was found and killed due to a chip GPS locator put on his boots. Santos defined this event as “the hardest blow given to the FARC in history” (Revista Semana, 2010a).

These military achievements of Colombian government made evident vulnerability of the guerrilla organization although they are not defeated (Rueda, 2008). This has consolidated Alvaro Uribe as one of the most accepted presidents in Colombian history with popularity ratings of 78% in average, one of the highest in Latin America (Pachón, 2009:337). It is important to remember that those military operations were led by who were then Minister of Defence and current President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos.

On the other hand, having the American financial support, President Uribe correspondingly had to act in function of his explicit and tacit obligations with the U.S.

39 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The war on drugs was hence intensified by means of increasing the number of fumigations of illicit drugs even with the dissatisfaction of some Colombian sectors who argued that not even Afghanistan has accepted the fumigations and Colombia is the only country applying such fumigation program (Rojas, 2006).

The alignment with Bush turned more evident: Colombia became an unconditional ally for the U.S. when offering unrestricted support for the Irak war against the Colombian diplomatic tradition of respect to international law and peaceful resolution held for years. In fact, this controversial presidential decision showed a contradiction with the work the Colombian diplomatic mission in United Nations had done to defend the principles of the international law (Tickner 2007). A very polemic decision was Uribe’s approval for setting seven American military bases in Colombian territory although it has not been ratified by the congress yet. In the same line, it is possible to deduce the importance of the Colombia-U.S. relationship in terms of the size of their diplomatic missions. The American embassy in Bogotá is the second largest American embassy in the world after Irak and there are 25 American agencies present in Colombia (Rojas, 2006). In the same way, the Colombian diplomatic mission in the U.S. is considerable bigger that Colombian missions in other countries. Indeed, Uribe’s foreign policy favoured the U.S. relation over other countries when in 2002 President Uribe decided to close 14 Colombian embassies and 10 consulates around the world but any of those located in the U.S. (Office of the President of the Republic, 2002).

Although Uribe’s international strategy associated to the U.S. brought benefits it also involved some significant costs due to the obvious asymmetry (Tickner, 2007). Such an unconditional alignment with Bush generated distrusts from other international actors and made Colombia lose some room of manoeuvre to interact with other countries (Rojas, 2006). In fact, this position contrasts with most of the South American countries which have sought to distance themselves from the U.S. terrorism and security policies and that is why the multilateral organization UNASUR9 expressed its discontent to President Uribe. He tried to lead regional initiatives to fight against terrorism and an agreement in this regard was signed by Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela and Brazil on March 12th 2003. However, it was not possible for Uribe to convince Venezuela, Ecuador

9 UNASUR: Unión de Naciones Suramericanas. Union of South American Nations. The UNASUR members are: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela.

40 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY and Brazil to declare explicitly FARC as terrorists. In fact, the greater confrontation took place with Venezuela. Chavez saw Uribe’s government as an oligarchy which had links with the Venezuelan opposition. On the other hand, Colombia suspected the links between FARC and Venezuela and Ecuador, relationship which was proved by the guerrilla computers found in Ecuador (Pardo & Tickner 2003).

This mutual distrust led to the worst scenario in relationships since the diplomatic relationship were broken to the detriment of trade. After the incursion of the Colombian army in Ecuadorian territory in 2008 the formal break-off took place. In the same way, when Uribe announced in 2010 that Colombia would have seven American bases in its territory and that he found out that there is evidence of guerrilla presence in Venezuela, President Chavez decided also to breaking-off diplomatic relations with Colombia. Other consequences of the extreme alignment with Bush include that the discourse that was so well-received by Bush administration was not that effective with President Obama. The new American government froze the ratification of the Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement which Colombia has been waiting almost 5 years (Tickner, 2007).

The abovementioned difficult relation with the neighbours can be interpreted, according to Steadman’s notion when stating that the complexity of the implementation of a peace process is exacerbated by conditions inherent to the international arena. The environment, in the sense Steadman refers to, is not positive for the Colombian case since it holds two neighbouring states Venezuela and Ecuador which are supporting or at least have links with the Colombian internal spoilers because of ideological reasons. In the same way, the Colombian case meets the conditions described by Salehyan when having a guerrilla group organized transnationally which can manage to avoid the recently acquired Colombian state's military strength.

In sum, Uribe’s government foreign policy became the crucial tool for succeeding in his domestic policy to face the armed conflict. His Democratic security policy was incredibly supported within the country but unpopular among its neighbours and Europe. The period between 1998 and 2010 increased sharply the traditional alignment of Colombia with the U.S. but isolated it from the region. This period, in the sense Steadman and Salehyan refer to, was a failure insofar Colombia did not manage to turn the environment into a positive one for increasing the possibilities of conflict resolution. Ecuador and Venezuela strengthened links with the Colombian rebel groups and the permanent confrontations

41 COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY with the neighbouring governments drifted them away from Colombian’s government side. From Salehyan’s perspective, although Colombian military forces have enhanced their capacity it became limited since rebels groups have managed to avoid part of the repression by being hosted across the international boundaries in Ecuador and Venezuela. All this have fostered the prolongation of the conflict. Accordingly, it could be argued that this analytical framework has helped to confirm that the Colombian case has significant external obstacles for the conflict resolution and that, according to Steadman and Salehyan’s view, the approach used by the Colombian government so far has not been effective enough to eliminate the external obstacles for peace.

The winner of the presidential elections in 2010 was Uribe’s former minister of Defence, Juan Manuel Santos, who said he will continue the implementation of Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy therefore a similar behaviour of Colombia in the international realm was expected. However, Santos’ arrival to power seems to initiate a turning point in the Colombian foreign policy. The next chapter is devoted to that shift.

42 COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT 6. COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT

The former chapter was devoted to the historic development of Colombian foreign policy. Its more notorious trait has been the alignment with the U.S. This tendency was increased during the two terms of President Uribe and it could be currently facing a turning point.

6.1 Manifestation of the shift

President Santos took over before the writing of this thesis and therefore it is not possible to offer a conclusive assessment of his performance. However, since these first months already demonstrate an important shift in Colombia’s longstanding foreign policy, it is worthwhile analysing them in order to reflect about its causes and its possible impact in the current variables nurturing the conflict. It is noteworthy that he was elected because he was expected to continue Uribe’s ideology which sharply improved the security rates in the country. However, Santos’ government has acquired its own personality and some particularities have become apparent especially in the international relations realm.

During eight years Uribe’s discourse was formulated within a black and white reasoning in which he developed the concept of public enemy (guerrillas understood as terrorists). Uribe monopolized his discourse on the legitimization of the concept of security and hence the role of the state to guarantee it. Although some of the decisions made by Santos have surprised both within Colombia and internationally, some of them were subtly announced in his opening speech. First, President Santos, unlike his predecessor who defined the foreign policy based on the armed conflict, seems to have a more active notion regarding international relations. He highlighted that:

“Colombia is called to play a key role in the new global spaces, and we hope to assume the position of leadership that –after 40 years of being on the defensive- we are entitled to in the international arena. It is important to know how to become globalized, not just to be forced into globalization. To this end, we will establish a modern foreign policy that will face the future, with teams of diplomats who will multiply Colombian presence in multilateral entities and who will strengthen bilateral relations.” (Presidency of the Republic, 2010)

The interest of becoming more visible in the multilateral organization that until recently questioned Colombia is already tangible in 2011. The former President took a lot of time to ratify the UNASUR agreement and he missed some of the meetings because of his differences with Ecuador and Venezuela (Revista Semana 2009). Unlike Uribe, President Santos proposed a Colombian, Maria Emma Mejia, as UNASUR’s Secretary-General

43 COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT who took over from May 2011 to lead the South American organisation for 1 year (Revista Semana, 2011b). In the same way, Colombia is holding a temporary seat (2011- 2012) in the Security Council of United Nations and although Colombia has before voted along American lines, President Santos announced that Colombian would be the voice of Latin America and the Caribbean is this organism. He also accepted the invitation as panellist in the Third International Economic Forum for Latin America and the Caribbean where he insisted on the role of Latin America and Asia as an “engine” for the world and he exposed the progress of Colombia and its receptivity for foreign investment (Paredes, 2011). The last week of April 2011 President Santos signed the Pacific Arc Deepens Integration between Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru as an initiative for bringing Colombia to Asia (The Economist 2010). Santos and his Ministry of foreign affairs have also manifested that they have intensified efforts to being accepted in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as well as in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the same way, embassies in Indonesia, Turkey, Trinidad y Tobago and United Arab Emirates have been opened again (Revista Semana, 2011a). Furthermore, a representative from PROEXPORT10 office in Germany said that the current government aims to strengthen Colombia’s presence in Asia, opening joint offices with the counterpart agencies Prochile and Promperú in Shanghai, Singapore, Malaysia and Turkey (Sergio Calderón, 25-04-11).

Santos’ position on Venezuela and Ecuador was one of the greater expectations since as Defence Minister he was the one authorizing the military operations which led to the confrontation with the neighbours. On this regard, Santos as President seems to have chosen a more dialogic approach to deal with high sensitivity issues which led in the past to high levels of polarization and controversy. Thus in his inaugural speech he announced that: “Respect, cooperation and diplomacy will be the cornerstones of our international relations. We will treat them with respect, so they will act accordingly. (…) Just as I do not see any enemies in national politics, I do not see them in any foreign government. The word “war” is not in my dictionary, when I think about Colombia’s relations with its neighbors, or with any other country in the world. (…) One of my main goals as President will be to rebuild the foreign relations with Venezuela and Ecuador, to reestablish our confidence and to privilege diplomacy and prudence. I must honestly say that, given the circumstances, and considering my personality, I prefer an open and direct dialogue. And hopefully, as soon as possible. Good relations benefit all of us, because when governments fight, it is their people who suffer”. (Presidency of the Republic, 2010)

10 PROEXPORT: Colombian government agency in charge of promoting Colombian non-traditional exports, international tourism and foreign investment to Colombia. www.proexport.com.co

44 COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT

Three days after taking office on August 7th 2010, Santos had a meeting with Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan President. Both agreed upon the necessity of restoring political and economical relations. This led hence to the normalization of the diplomatic relations on August 20th, less than a month after his takeover (Revista Semana, 2011a). Since then, the two leaders have frequently met each other have already signed sixteen agreements regarding infrastructure joint projects and the strengthening of the integration between the two countries (Revista Semana, 2011c).

In fact, when the vacancy for Secretariat-General of UNASUR was available the only two candidates were proposed by Venezuela and Colombia. Since the diplomatic relations were just restored no country wanted to favour one candidate over the other for not showing preferences. Both countries agreed upon sharing the secretary dividing the two year period into one for each candidate. This decision sent an important message to the international community when proving that both are committed to consolidate a more peaceful relationship.

Thus Colombia and Venezuela created technical bilateral commissions in charge of discussing the debts of Venezuela with Colombian entrepreneurs, the improvement of trade flow, the implementation of mechanisms to deal with Venezuelan withdrawal from Andean Community of Nations (CAN)11, the development of joint social projects for border communities and joint infrastructure including the possibility of Colombia to concede Venezuela access to the Pacific ocean (Pastrana, 2011).

On the other hand, The Ecuadorian President, Rafael Correa had expressed that if he receives the information found it in the guerrilla’s camp in Ecuadorian in 2008 he would restore the diplomatic relations. After Santos’ takeover in 2010 the contents of the computers confiscated in guerrilla’ camp were sent to Ecuador. Three months later, both Presidents announced the full restoration of relations between the Ecuador and Colombia in November 2010. They also have reactivated the Binational Border commission (COMBIFRON) with the establishment of three special committees. One for border crime

11 The Andean Community (Spanish: Comunidad Andina, CAN) is a customs union comprising the South American countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The trade bloc was called the Andean Pact until 1996 and came into existence with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement in 1969. Venezuela announced its withdrawal in 2006.

45 COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT issues and subversive groups, one for the development of border communities and humanitarian aid and another one for sensitive issues such as the international lawsuits filed by Ecuador and the domestic legal proceedings due to the bombing (Ibid 2011).

By the same token, Santos chose Brazil for his first international visit as President and not the U.S. as it was done traditionally. As a result of this visit both countries signed eight bilateral cooperation agreements in areas of strategic interest for both parties such as trade, border development, security and defence, academic and scientific cooperation, the environment, as well as the areas of bio-energy, nanotechnology and military aviation. Both leaders have defined the current context as “the decade of Latin America” (Ibid 2011:13).

Due to the fact that Colombia has been considered as the greater ally of the U.S. in Latin America, it is surprising that Santos’ inaugural speech did not mention the U.S. at all. He did not mention even once the Plan Colombia, or the FTA with the U.S., extradition or the drug policy. In fact, the agreement in which the U.S. were able to establish seven military bases within Colombian territory has been frozen by the Colombian government and it does not seem to get ratified soon. By the same token, at the Brown University in the U.S. President Santos criticized Washington’s apparent lack of interest in Latin America: “While the rest of the world, Europe and Asia, are strengthening their ties to our region, the U.S. is passive, is disengaged (…) This passive attitude toward the region is not only wrong, but suicidal"(EL NACIONAL 2011).

In fact in his first meeting in New York on 24th of September 2010 Santos said to Obama that he is interested in broadening the relation beyond military issues. Santos proposed to include issues as social development, economic development, environment energy and human rights (EL TIEMPO, 2010b). He also expressed his concern about the Free trade agreement that Colombia signed in 2006 but is still not ratified by the U.S. congress. However, Santos also said that if the agreement is not ratified soon, Colombia will not insist anymore.

Furthermore, using a high level of symbolism, Santos said to Obama that it is necessary to rethink the agenda and from now and on both are going to talk “de tú a tú”, meaning by

46 COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT this, speak between equals (Pastrana, 2011:5). Later in October 2010, after a meeting in Bogotá with 45 officers of the U.S State Department, Santos offered a press conference where he announced the “re-launching” of the bilateral relation between the two countries understood as “true strategic partners in traditional themes as well as many new issues” (EL TIEMPO, 2010a). Some analysts have even talked about the “denarcotization” of the agenda Colombia-U.S. insofar as a more rich variety of topics is included (Ibid, 2010a). It seems that Santos’ less military discourse matches better with Obama’s administration since last April 2011 the congress decided to restart the Colombian Free trade agreement that was frozen since 2006 (Ibid, 2011a )

Such a diversification of the international relations contrasts with the tenure of former President Uribe. Santos’ statements on the other hand, are full of words such as economy, development, cooperation, instead of drug-trafficking, human rights and the terrorism. As was mentioned before, Uribe’s administration neglected the existence of an armed conflict in Colombia. The existence of guerilla groups was explained due to the weakness of the rule of law instead of the conflict of interests and ideologies (Revista Semana, 2011g). Calling them narco-terrorist groups allowed for the alignment of the situation according to the American interests. As a result, the Colombian foreign policy lost its own identity and became the tool to legitimize the war on terrorism and therefore the Democratic Security Policy.

The decisions made by Santos to date evidence a notable shift between the foreign policy led by former president Uribe and the current president of Colombia. In fact, Santos used an anaphora in his inaugural speech with the purpose of emphasizing the sentence “A new awakening” (un nuevo amanecer) meaning by this, a turning point with better outputs where the international realm is often mentioned.

“Colombians: I encourage you all to partake in the construction of a new dawn. In this new awakening we have the never before seen opportunity to transform Colombia and assume a positive leadership in the international arena. In this new awakening we are going to develop the potential of our people, our land, our regions, to conquer the global opportunities of the next 50 years. During this new dawning and in less than a decade, we will enable Colombia to be acknowledged internationally for its very high quality human capital, for its social equity, financial, corporate and technological world-class capacity. During this new awakening, businessmen, scientists, students, artists, sportsmen and regular citizens will become symbols of triumph, excellence, professionalism and innovation.

47 COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT

During this new awakening our country will stand out on the most important matters for mankind, such as the sustainable use of biodiversity, clean energy, food safety, technological development and the creative industries.” (Presidency of the Republic, 2010)

Hence, Santos’ proposal seems intended to project a new image of Colombia not as a conflict country within the region but as a key ally for the formation of a strategic bloc. This new approach and therefore the abrupt shift in the international relations of the country have been registered massively by several media within the country as well as foreign press such as The Economist (The Economist 2010) and The Washington Post.

6.2 Neighbours’ reactions

The shift in the Colombian foreign policy seems to have been perceived also by the neighbouring countries. The countries which have noticed it the most are the ones which are directly affected by the outputs of the Colombian foreign policy, meaning by this, Venezuela and Ecuador. Both countries had diplomatic relations broken with Colombia when Santos took office. In this regard, the four Ecuadorian professors interviewed agreed that the shift in the foreign policy of Colombia is notorious. For instance, Michel Leví, Coordinator of the Andean Centre for International Studies at Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar in Ecuador argues that:

“A shift has taken place during Santos’ tenure insofar that the foreign policy is not so centralized in the figure of the President, as in the case of Uribe. Instead, now it is handled in a very skillful way by an active Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (…)This led to more technical meetings based on bilateral agendas which have been previously designed” (Michel Levi, 05-04-11).

By the same token, Beatriz Zepeda, Coordinator of International relations at FLACSO- Ecuador12 agreed upon what was mentioned before and she also adds that: “Now Colombia shows greater appreciation for regional forums” (Beatriz Zepeda, 05-04-11). The shift has also been registered in the media. In an interview with an Ecuadorian journalist from the newspaper “La hora” he stated that:

“The shift in the Colombian foreign policy is not only noticed in Ecuador but highly appreciated. Santos is now perceived as a statesman and no one remembers that it was actually him, as Ministry of Defense, who ordered the bombing of FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory in 2008” (Simon Espinosa, 14-05-11-).

12 FLACSO – Latin American School of Social Science (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales – Sede Ecuador.)

48 COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT

The Venezuela case is similar. The four Venezuelan professors interviewed agreed upon the visibility of the shift. In this regard, Professor Miguel Ángel Martínez from Social science at Simón Bolivar University in Caracas said that:

"Indeed, in Venezuela a major shift in Colombian foreign policy is clearly perceived compared with Uribe’s behavior. The fact that Santos has described Hugo Chavez as his ‘new best friend’ has caused much commotion here” (Miguel Angel Martinez , 05-04-11)

The still delicate relationship was tested the second week of May 2011 when the British think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) released a study based on the files found in the guerilla camps in Ecuador. Once the files were checked by Interpol, which verified that the information had not been altered, Uribe´s government requested IISS to analyze the content. According to the IISS, the Venezuelan President promised FARC an important political support in order to promote FARC’s legitimacy abroad. The study also states that Chavez allowed FARC to use the Venezuelan territory with minor restrictions as well as support in medical assistance and weapons agreements with third parties (El Universal, 2011). In the same way, the study reveals the linkages between Ecuadorian President and FARC. It assures that FARC made a USD$ 100.000 contribution to Correa’s presidential campaign (Washington Post 2011). Despite the linkages between FARC and Venezuela and Ecuador were not new, the fact that this time it was not coming from Colombia but a foreign think tank sparked the debate again.

As expected, both governments have denied the allegations citing the lack of credibility of the study. In the past, these same accusations had led to heated public pronouncements among Uribe, Chavez and Correa. On the contrary, Santos announced that relations between the three neighbouring countries will not deteriorate again stating that this incident had left behind. Although the opposition parties in Venezuela are demanding more explanations to their government as well as more information from Colombia, Santos announced that neither he nor the Colombian foreign ministry will comment this matter. He also clarified that the idea of sending the files to the British think tank was coming from the former government. In this regard, Santos unexpected reaction was noticed in Venezuelan newspapers as this one entitled “Unusual pragmatic” at the Universal: “Colombia's foreign policy is getting unusually pragmatic and right now it prefers to continue its honeymoon with Venezuela. (...). It is not reprehensible. Until now Santos’ extraordinary ability to play in politics and to negotiate become self-evident. However it is very interesting how Santos allowed the scandal to take a backseat”. (Hernandez 2011)

49 COLOMBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT

On the other hand, Santos’ reaction has not been discussed in Ecuadorian editorials. According to the interview with the Ecuadorian journalist from Newspaper ‘La Hora” Franklin Barriga, this is because Ecuador is in the middle of a very important referendum which has occupied the pages of the newspapers and the public opinion. Nevertheless, Ecuadorian President has offered to take the polygraph test to prove he is not lying when stating that he did not receive money from FARC (Barriga, 16-06-11).

50 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT

7. POSSIBLE CAUSES

Several decisions made by President Santos reveal that in fact there is a shift in the Colombian foreign policy and also that this has been perceived by different international actors including its neighbours. It is significant insofar as it breaks with a historical tradition where the U.S. has remained as almost the only national priority. Since the shift is in progress and there is not the historical distance to establish for sure why it took place it is possible to infer and even suppose some of the most feasible explanations.

7.1 Disappointment with US policies

For a start, according to the opinions of the national and international interviewees as well as the feelings registered by the Colombian media, it is possible to argue that the shift responds in a greater extent to the Colombian disappointment of their relationship with the U.S. For instance, in its article entitled ‘Colombia’s foreign policy: Seeking new friends’, the British magazine The Economist explain the new behaviour of Colombia in the international realm given that: “Colombia has received more than $8 billion in American aid to fight guerrillas and drugs since 2000, and in return has been a loyal ally. But Colombian officials are annoyed that the United States has failed to ratify a free-trade agreement concluded in 2006”(The Economist, 2010)

In the same way, the famous Argentinean journalist Andres Oppenheimer in his article for the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS, explained the new attitude of Colombia arguing that: “(...)Carl Meacham, an adviser to the chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, explained to me that the lack of ratification of the FTA ‘has led Colombia to look at other options. Colombia is definitely drifting away’ he said.

(...) Curious about what Santos’ external policy plans are, I spoke with various Colombians who are very close to the new president. The majority of them say that there is a change in Colombia, motivated principally by the lack of ratification of the commercial treaty in Washington. This lack of ratification comes despite numerous gestures of good will on Colombia’s part. In the past few years Colombia has accepted the presence of American troops on their military bases, sent Colombian police agents and anti-drug agents to Afghanistan to help out American soldiers and has voted along American lines on almost all of the topics seen at the United Nations. Despite all of this, Colombia has not even received a response from Washington about the free trade agreement, my sources told me”.

(...) Enrique Santos, the former director and columnist of the influential Colombian newspaper El TIEMPO, and brother of the Colombian President, told me this week that ‘the Colombians are a little disappointed of the United States’. He added that ‘there is the feeling that we should distance ourselves a little and stop doing unilateral favours that are not reciprocated” (Oppenheimer 2010).

51 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT

In addition to the assumptions of the international press, all scholars and journalist interviewed from Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombian supported the idea that the lack of ratification of the FTA is one of the most important reasons behind the shift in the Colombian foreign policy (Romero 2011, Davila 2011, Martinez 2011, Mijares 2011, de Majo 2011, Godoy 2011, Tickner 2011). It seems to be true also because last years Colombia began the consolidation of new FTAs with Canada, the European Union, EFTA13, Korea and currently with Turkey.

The strong belief based on the idea that the unconditional alignment with the U.S. is the best strategy to defend the Colombian national interests seems to have lost force. This has not been said explicitly by the government, and therefore statements against the United States have not been made. In several events María Angela Holguín, the Colombian Foreign Minister has reaffirmed the importance of the cooperation with the United States (Revista Semana 2010b). Although Colombian diplomats declare themselves unable to offer an opinion, there is strong evidence to believe that the shift in the policy is due to the Colombian frustration about the U.S. reluctance to ratify the FTA that Colombia already approved in 2006 and which has been waiting for 5 years. It seems that Santos has managed to revive the discussion and ratification process in April 2011 and the Colombian media is very positive in this regard. Still it is too soon to confirm that it will be ratified and Colombia seems to have understood that with the U.S. nothing can be taken for granted. Colombia is also waiting for the U.S. to prolong the tariff preferences for Colombian products in American market as part of the drug policy.

7.2 Economic pragmatism

Following the same economic reasoning, the shift could also be responding to an economic pragmatism from President Santos when restoring diplomatic relations intended mainly to recover the Venezuelan market. This is a common thesis among some of the Venezuelan scholars interviewed (Davila 2011, Martinez 2011). In fact, Prof. Marco Ortiz explains that:

“In Venezuela the perception is that President Santos is seeking to reactivate the political relationship with Venezuela due to the bilateral trade, especially now since Venezuela is about to leave the Andean Community” (Marco Ortiz 14-04-11)

13 European Free Trade Association includes the member states: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

52 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT

This explanation is based upon the significance of the Venezuelan market for Colombian economy. Traditionally the vast majority of Colombian exports had been directed towards only two countries United States and Venezuela. In 2008 the main destinations of Colombian exports were the U.S. with 37% of Colombian exports followed by Venezuela with 16% (MinComercio, 2008). In contrast, in 2010 the U.S. bought 42% of Colombian exports while Venezuela only 3,8% (Mincomercio, 2010). Thus, the trade between Colombia and Venezuela that used to exceed 7,000 million of dollars in 2008 now dropped to about 1,600 million dollars in 2010 (Revista Semana 2011j). In fact, the president of Proexport Maria Claudia Lacouture stated that the big goal of Colombia in this matter is diversification. She argues that 6,000 of 12,000 exporters are exporting to exclusively one country and that situation entails a very high risk (Proexport, 2010).

Although Colombia has coastline on the Pacific and several scholars have called for the need to diversify relations in the way Chile has done integrating its economy to Asia through the Pacific Ocean, Colombian exporters have focused for decades only on American and Venezuelan markets. Unexpected events such as the rupture of diplomatic and trade relations with Venezuela, the withdrawal of Venezuela from the Andean Community of Nations and the finalization of American tariff benefits in February 2011, make the risk of dependency evident. The latter is significant because 61% of Colombian exports to the U.S. (mainly oil and flowers) in 2010 entered to the American market covered under this program (Mincomercio, 2011). In light of that, it seems plausible that the Colombian government could also be motivated to encourage the shift for a desire of recovering the Venezuelan market. The Venezuelan newspaper ‘EL NACIONAL’ agrees upon this premise: “The fact that Colombia is doing titanic efforts to develop other foreign partners such as China and Europe, only highlights the high costs of the obstacles that the U.S. is unfairly imposing in their commercial relations with Colombia. That explains why Santos has decided to ignore some of the Chavez’ excesses while he strives to restore the glorious ages of tremendous commercial flow between Venezuela and Colombia. Not having the stability and continuity in both scenarios, the U.S. and Venezuela, is more of what Colombia can deal with” (De Majo, 2011).

However, the three Colombian diplomats14 interviewed disagree over the abovementioned reasoning. All of them vehemently agree that the shift in Colombian foreign policy is not due to economic reasons. First, they concur on the importance the

14 Confidentiality was asserted to the diplomats participating in this study. Therefore, their names remain exclusive.

53 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT

Venezuelan market had for Colombian exports in the past, but they also state that is not like that anymore. They explain that 85% of Colombian exports are already reallocated in new markets and they are not willing to do business with Venezuela again because it still owes money to Colombian entrepreneurs and there is always the risk of expropriation in Venezuelan territory. They argue that, on the contrary, Chavez’ decision of suspending the entry of Colombian exports brought a tremendous cost for Venezuelan economy since the purchase to more distant partners added a higher cost in logistics just when Venezuela is having hyperinflation and is growing negatively while the rest of Latin America is growing at an average rate of 6%. In fact, this coincides with one of the appreciations of a Venezuelan professor who argues that:

“(...) On the other hand, Venezuela need these Colombian supplies: Despite Chavez’ government prefers buying from Brazil and Argentina (for political reasons), the fact is that the huge decline of Venezuelan private production has increased the dependence on imports, and Colombia is the safest supplier of several basic items”( Miguel Martinez , 05-04-11)

The Colombian diplomats also agree on the fact that Colombia has other trade options besides Venezuela. The legislation to implement Canada’s free trade agreement with Colombia received Royal Assent on June 2010. It is now law in Canada and it provides the same than the U.S. do. The FTAs with Switzerland and Liechtenstein are about to be executed and there two more trade agreements that are progressing very well: South Korea, which will provide the technological support and the Pacific Union (Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile), which together represents a more important market for the U.S. and Europe. Furthermore, the FTA with the U.S. has been recently defrosted in April and there is an established agenda towards the ratification. Regarding the FTA with the European Union one of the diplomat interviewed argues that he believes that this FTA agreements is going to be ratified although not very soon. It is already signed and right now the issue regarding ecological cars is been renegotiated. In fact, on 28 of April 2011 the European parliament José Manuel García-Margallo, president of the Delegation for relations with the countries of the Andean Community, stated that currently there are enough votes positively for it (Portafolio, 2011).

Whilst Colombia has made an effort to find new partners and avoiding the dependency on Venezuelan market, Colombia may still need – to a lesser extent the Venezuelan market. First, not all trade agreements signed have come into force and this process can take some time. Also, Colombia has found new social partners but they are not buying

54 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT the same type of products. José Guillermo García, Professor of Economics of Universidad Nacional de Colombia explains that:

“Although Colombia has found new destinations for its exports the replacement is still controversial. The new partners buy mainly primary goods from Colombia and not as many industrial products as Venezuela used to do” (BBC Mundo 2010).

Given what was said before, the shift in Colombian foreign policy could also be motivated in a certain extent to recover at least some proportion of the Venezuelan market while the other FTAs come into force and its diversification strategy get consolidated.

7.3 Other causes

One of the diplomats claims that the shift of the Colombian foreign policy is not based only on the delay of the ratification of the Colombia-U.S. free trade agreement. She argues that if that was the only reason supporting the shift it would have already changed during the five years of waiting. She additionally adds that the shift has not been only in the economic realm. The new discourse reveals that the shift responds to a more comprehensive and ambitious understanding of the Colombian position in the world. In this regard, two of the scholars from Colombian universities interviewed, Arlene Tickner and Horacio Godoy argue that the shift is motivated also due to the particular profile of Santos, meaning by this, his cosmopolitan mentality and his pragmatism. In this regard, Senator Galan and Professor Godoy argue that:

“The shift in the Colombian foreign policy is because Santos’ political pragmatism he has applied in different realms” (Senator Juan Manuel Galan, 27-05-11).

“President Santos thinks more in global terms. He understands the dynamics of the world much better than Uribe. Santos is seeking a broader international scope to hopefully contribute with the difficult task of regional integration” (Horacio Godoy,30-04-11).

While Uribe’s education and political career were concentrated within Colombia as senator, major of his home town and later governor of his province before becoming president, Santos developed a more international profile. Uribe received his bachelor from the Universidad de Antioquia in his home region and he pursued seminars on negotiation and business in Harvard University. On the other hand, Santos received his bachelor from the University of Kansas and later obtained his master’s degrees in Economic development and Public administration in the London School of economics

55 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT and Business and Journalism at Harvard, and in Law and Diplomacy from Fletcher school of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Presidency of the Republic, 2011a). In the same way, his professional career was also linked with the international realm. His former positions as Chief Executive of the Colombian Coffee Delegation to the International Coffee Organization in London for several years provided him with a greater understanding of the dynamics of the world. As a consequence, his speeches deal with a richer variety of topics which therefore reach to a more diverse type of audiences. In contrast, Uribe’s performance in international scenarios often discussed domestic issues and insisted about the terrorist threat lived in Colombia. For instance, the following are interventions of President Santos during a state visit to Germany on April 11th 2011 and Spain on April 13th:

“This visit is done in a very special moment in our history, and thanks to the progress we have made in security; we are trying to expand the international agenda, the agenda with the friendly countries. And that's what we did today. We talk not only about traditional topics such as the fight against terrorism and combating drug trafficking, but we include in the agenda issues that deal with technology transfer, cooperation in food production, public infrastructure. (...) we want the Spanish companies to get involved in Colombia’s infrastructure projects, to make a qualitative leap in our competitiveness.” (Presidency of the Republic, 2011b)

“Let me emphasise that the agenda between Colombia and Germany has been extended to issues of great interest, other than the traditional ones. Topics such as science and technology, education, just as has been mentioned by Chancellor Merkel, as well as topics such as the environment protection and renewable energy.” (Presidency of the Republic, 2011c)

In contrast, this is the speech offered by former President Uribe at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 2008:

“Crimes against public safety continue to decrease, but we are not satisfied. 1936 of 11,204 homicides have been workers and teachers affiliated with trade unions and independent teachers. (...) The government maintains individual protection to 8,612 people which 1,462 of them belong to unions. (...). In the past, terrorist organizations penetrated the labour movements and fostered the murder of workers. Dismantling of the paramilitaries has removed this source of suffering, but still guerrillas terrorists persist with these crimes, as happened recently in the south of the country with the murder of a group of professors by FARC” (Presidency of the Republic, 2008)

Uribe’s lack of experience in the international realm and his particular posture aligned with the U.S. opened a space between Colombia and the other countries of South America. It is portrayed by the British magazine The Economist like this: “There was nothing diplomatic about Álvaro Uribe, Colombia’s president for eight years until August. His friendship with George Bush’s administration in the United States and his tendency to speak his mind about threats to his country’s security led to frequent rows with Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and to Colombia being relatively isolated among the mainly left-wing governments of South America” (The Economist 2010).

56 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT

By the same token, the interviewees Tickner (2011) and Godoy (2011), foreign professors in Colombian universities, pointed out the significance of the element mentioned by The Economist. According to them, the shift also responds to the feelings of isolation from Latin America felt during last decades and to a greater understanding of the importance of the region. In fact, for that reason, Colombia now wants to have a much more friendly image towards the region and wants to have a new role in the world not only as a recipient of international cooperation but as a supplier of his know-how on drug-trafficking, organized crime and counterinsurgency to different governments in need for the assistance as currently Mexico (Revista Semana, 2011a).

As described above, the shift in the foreign policy responds to a greater extent to the Colombian disappointment of the relationship with the U.S. when regretting to ratify the FTA. This is one of the most mentioned statements to explain the new behaviour of Colombia. On the other hand, the need for opening and recovering markets could be also a motivation for encouraging a more outgoing attitude towards the Andean countries and other continents. Additional factors could have also influenced the shift: a more comprehensive and ambitious understanding of the Colombian position in the world, the particular profile of the new president and the fact that Colombia was relatively isolated among left-wing governments in South America. So far none of the media or the interviewees has mentioned the impact of the shift in the conflict. However, it is possible that the shift could be also intended to modify the dynamics of the conflict to, as Stedman suggests, improve the conditions for domestic conflict resolution. Next chapter will be devoted to explore this possibility.

57 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT 8. IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT

The abovementioned circumstances discussed in the previous chapter can hence explain to a greater extent some motives that inspired the shift in the Colombian foreign policy. However, the shift may also be intended to modify some of the dynamics of the ongoing conflict. The following fragments of information were used to find any connection of the foreign policy shift to the internal conflict.

For a start, it is important to establish whether the shift in the foreign policy has already had an impact in the conflict. In this regard, since Santos’ took over as a president, it seems that the conflict has not suffered dramatic changes in its structural conditions, nor number of actors, or in their capabilities beyond regular adaptation moves. An initiative for starting peace talks has not either occurred. In this regard, Miguel Ortega, Researcher of Security and Defence Studies at the Ideas for Peace Foundation –FIP- in Colombia clarifies that:

“Despite the fact that after eight years of Uribe's Security Policy has weakened FARC, this guerrilla group is now much more adapted to the new strategic scenario. It knows how to move units without being so easily detected, attack less but is more accurate in some places such as Cauca, Meta, Nariño, and it is much more careful with its communications”.

“As I said, asserting that the conditions of the conflict remain unchanged should be a nuanced statement. That is true insofar none of the actors has taken a significant advantage as to think that the counterpart is about to be defeated. But when you zoom into specific areas of the country there is another story to tell” (Miguel Ortega 31-05-11).

It is also useful to examine how concerned Santos has been on the internal conflict since he took office. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Santos’ approach towards the conflict reveals a considerable variation compared with his predecessor. Santos struck in his inaugural speech talking about negotiation –with certain conditions, of course- and he also changed the official position regarding the conflict. Surprisingly, the first week of May 2011 President Santos decided to recognize publicly the existence of a conflict in Colombia, acknowledgment which was permanently neglected during Uribe’s eight years tenure. The decision created a great debate internally although it has been very well accepted internationally. Santos argues that one of his more important reforms, the establishment of the Law of Victims (Ley de victimas) cannot be developed if the conflict is not acknowledged. It also forces subversive groups to comply with the International Humanitarian law. (Revista Semana 2011h). This bill is intended to return two million

58 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT hectares to their real owners and repair a number of victims estimated about four million people which had Uribe’s opposition for four years (Urrego 2011). On September 2010 for first time in history a president went to Congress to file himself the ‘Victims Law’. Santos stated that: “If only this bill is approved it will be worthwhile being President”. It was finally approved by the congress on 24th of May of this year (Ibid, 2011).

Although perhaps it is too soon to affirm whether the shift in the foreign policy will impact visibly the internal conflict some changes could be on brewing now and become more explicit in the future, as is suggested by The Economist:

“The test of Mr Santos’s approach will be whether he persuades Brazil and others that his country’s fight for security against guerrillas and drug traffickers deserves their active solidarity, so that they in turn lean on Mr Chávez to end his government’s hospitality towards the FARC. It may not take long to find out” (The Economist, 2010).

Although subtle, some events that occurred suggest a potential variation in some variables of the context. In this regard, Miguel Ortega (2011) argues that:

“FARC is more adapted also to the new strategic scenario in political terms. Having Chavez as Santos’ ´new best friend´ and the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador FARC became more careful with the little political oxygen they have, for now, in the region” (Miguel Ortega, 31-05-11).

For instance, a recent event for the first time in several years led to a hostile behaviour from Chavez towards FARC who, as was described in previous chapters, has been a supporter of the guerrilla group, has financed them and hosted them in Venezuelan territory. In April 2011 a very wanted Venezuelan drug dealer, Walid Makled, was captured in Colombia and requested in extradition by Venezuela and the U.S. Up till then, Santos had been managed to have cordial relationships with everyone but in this situation he had to choose between antagonists. There was a high probability Santos have chosen the U.S. since Colombia is being doing a great effort to reopen the discussion about the FTA. Finally, Santos decided to extradite Makled to Venezuela because they have requested him first and Santos also argued that:

"We are a nation of laws, a democracy that has a constitution, procedures, and we will decide according to those rules. I am obligated to comply with the Constitution and laws and I will go that way. We have an extradition agreement with Venezuela, not the U.S." (El Espectador 2011).

Eighteen days later, Santos asked Chavez to capture a Colombian citizen naturalized in Sweden who was about to arrive in a flight to Caracas. Joaquín Pérez was one of the

59 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT leaders of the international front of FARC in Europe and according to Colombian authorities, the responsible for FARC’s contacts in Italy, Germany, Spain, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden and Norway. He was also the editor of the news agency ANNCOL (New Colombia) with the headquarters in Stockholm and which usually publishes documents on the armed conflict in Colombia and about FARC (Revista Semana, 2011e). Chavez answered positively to Santos request and he deported him to Colombia a couple of days later.

In the same way, on June 1st 2011, President Santos announced that one top commander belonging to FARC, the rebel known as ‘Julián Conrado’, was captured in Venezuela in a joint effort by Colombia and Venezuela. In fact, the U.S. had offered a $2.5 million reward for his capture. Chavez also confirmed that Conrado will be sent to Colombia in a couple of days (Fox 2011). So far, the fact that Santos has made FARC doubt the unconditional loyalty of Chavez just as it was expressed in its news portal Anncol (Revista Semana 2011f), is in itself already an important progress.

The abovementioned events can be interpreted, according to Stedman’s notion, as an effort to enhance the peace conditions for Colombia. The environment, in the sense Steadman and Salehyan refers to, would be positive when Colombian neighbouring states, Venezuela and Ecuador, stop supporting Colombian guerrillas and Colombia can make fully use of its military strength fighting guerrilla groups within its territory. The recent events can be regarded as an attempt for modifying part of the current conditions nurturing the conflict. Steadman’s claim about the significance of the existence of a external supporter of the spoilers as well as Salehyan’s belief of external military bases as causing the prolongation of the country become a warning voice regarding an unnecessary escalation in the already complex Colombian case. In this regard, Santos’s decisions seems to reflect Salehyan’s advice which claims that counter cross-border groups are best handled through the cooperation with others to develop joint strategies for combating transnational violence, just as in the joint cooperation between Santos and Chavez described before.

It seems that Santos’ shift aimed at building more friendly relationships with the neighbours perhaps is intended to satisfy their interest for obtaining later something in

60 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT return. Santos’ reluctance to comment the British study proving the links between Correa and Chavez to FARC perhaps was highly valued by the two presidents since both are in the middle of important political process were scandals would not be pertinent right now: Ecuador is in the middle of a very important referendum to entail several reforms and Chavez is in his pre-electoral year. In return, Santos seems to be expecting less interference in the internal conflict.

As seen so far, on the one hand, the distancing of Colombia from the U. S. could be explained by the frustration with the FTA and, on the other hand, its new relations with Europe and Asia could be grounded to commercial reasons. However, his camaraderie with Chavez, his former antagonists still creates suspicion since in fact it was Santos as Defence minister who ordered military strikes that ruined the diplomatic relations. Improving conditions for resolution of the conflict could be another motivation for the shift in foreign policy that would bring greater understanding of the additional consequences of the shift. The abovementioned gestures from Santos towards his neighbours are the only information available to analyse whether the shift was intended to produce a shift in current dynamics of the conflict. Indeed, they suggest some probable tendencies but it is still not possible to certainly establish that President Santos encouraged the shift in the foreign policy in order to impact directly the internal conflict. It is also not possible to predict the future behaviour of Colombia in the international realm. For this reason, two scenarios have been created on how Colombian foreign policy could continue in the next months and their corresponding impact in the conflict.

8.1 Scenarios

The following scenarios are based upon the dichotomy President Santos permanently faces when dealing with the U.S. and Venezuela, two antagonist countries which have a deep-rooted history with Colombia.

Scenario 1: Back to the U.S. and far from Latin America

Having taken into account the historical relationship between Colombia and the U.S., it is possible to expect a scenario where Colombia returns to its traditional proximity with the U.S. This is due to the significance of the FTA for the Colombian economy and the American tariff benefits which used to cover 61% of Colombian exports. This move will

61 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT be intended also to prolong the financial support for Plan Colombia which has been reduced since Obama took office15. In the same way Obama could also encourage this proximity given that he will not want to lose his most loyal ally in Latin America. A nice gesture towards Colombia in Obama’s pre-electoral year could be well received by the Latino population which today has almost 50 million people and is the second largest minority in the U.S. After all, every day it becomes more evident that Santos does not have the same discourse Uribe used to use lined up with the Republicans.

Once both countries have shown their willingness for getting closer again, Colombia might reconsider the treaty that would allow the seven American military bases in Colombian territory. If it happens to be ratified, the deterioration of Colombian relations with its neighbours will be imminent. This statement is based on the reactions the Latin American countries had when Uribe announced the deal with South American countries. The most moderate countries would express their discontent, but countries like Venezuela and Ecuador could impede again the entry of Colombian products to their countries at the expense of the Andean trade. These last two countries could also increase sharply their support to the Colombian rebel groups. This situation could restore the guerrilla capabilities lost during Uribe’s tenures which in turn would certainly fuel the Colombian armed conflict fostering its prolongation. In Stedman’s terms, in this scenario Venezuela and Ecuador could be potential spoilers of an eventual peace process which in turn would transform the environment in a negative one again.

On the other hand, the return of Colombia’s alignment with the U.S. would probably not be welcomed by the European Union. The relationship is already distant since Latin America seems not to be a priority for the European Union and the relationship is currently stagnant (Maihold, 2007:270). EU has showed greater interest towards Easter Europe and Africa. Europe expressed its discontent with the high military component of Plan Colombia and Uribe’s terrorism discourse did not convince the European parliaments who have delayed the FTA with Colombia claiming human right violations. Therefore a scenario of excessive alignment with the U.S. would drift away the European Union as well.

15 The budget proposal for 2012 by the U.S. President Obama, included a cut in $107 million to the aid given to Colombia (Just the facts, 2011).

62 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT

Scenario 2: Leading to Latin America and drifting away from the U.S.

A second scenario would be based on the continuation of Santos’ approach so far. Santos’ strategy seems to be successful to recover the proximity with the Latin American countries at the same time as gaining the respect from the U.S. His leading attitude when taking Haiti problematic to the UN Security Council and his mediation to get Honduras back on the Organization of American States (OAS) have provided him some new authority and the possibility to become a regional leader. His pragmatism allows him to get alone with presidents of diverse ideologies within Latin America (Revista Semana 2011d).

In this regard, the current conjuncture seems to be a good one to become a leader since the traditional Latin American countries who used to play a more active role in the international sphere seems to be in a temporary recess. The new president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff does not seem to be as extroverted as Lula and she seems to be absorbed with domestic issues. President Felipe Calderon, on the other hand, is focused on the fight against drug cartels which in turn limits his international action. Within the middle- sized countries, Chavez, who is a very charismatic person, right now is facing on the one hand, an economic crisis and a disease (cancer) and, on the other hand, for some Latin American sectors he is perceived as too radical and even anachronistic (Revista Semana 2011d). Regarding Peru, it seems that it is too soon to know what Humala’s external policy plans are. Argentina is busy deciding the continuation of Kirchner and Chile seems to like more its quiet diplomacy favouring the economical issues over political ones (Ibid, 2011d). Given this situation, a scenario where Colombia becomes a more active actor in the region is highly possible.

This scenario is also feasible due to the importance of the economic relation between Colombia and Venezuela. The 16 agreements signed by Santos and Chavez are expected to gradually revitalize the regular trade between both countries and it seems that this is a situation that benefits both economies. The relationship between Santos and Chavez seems to get stronger given the join cooperation to capture key rebels in Venezuela. By the same token, Chavez expressed on June 3rd 2011 that he is convinced that Colombian

63 IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL CONFLICT government will not allow conspiracy against Venezuela (El Tiempo, 2011b). Thus, Santos managed to get FARC to doubt about Chavez loyalty towards them as it was expressed in FARC’s news web portal. In the same way, the vice-president of Ecuador stated on May 23rd that he believes the FARC has lost orientation of what a revolutionary movement should be (Revista Semana 2011i). Based on the new hostile behaviour of Ecuador and Venezuela towards guerrilla groups it could be said that Colombian government relationship with these two countries will get fortified which in turn would lead to a decrease of the regional support towards FARC. In this scenario, guerrilla groups will not recover the military capacity already lost during Uribe’s tenures nor the political support. In Stedman’s words, the environment would tend to be more positive since external spoilers supporting the internal rebels would disappear. Joint strategies would be implemented for combating transnational violence and Colombia could focus instead in the structural causes of the internal conflict.

On the other hand, Europe seems to be pleased with the drifting away from U.S. and has expressed its contentment with Santos’ acknowledgement of the armed conflict, his good offices resolving disputes between leaders of Central America and the significance granted by Santos to the Victims bill. Given this situation, the new behaviour of Colombia in the international realm would foster a closer relationship with Europe.

64 CONCLUSION 9. CONCLUSION

The research process began with the interest to discover the driving forces behind the shift in the Colombian foreign policy, in particular the ones capable to displace a historical belief which has shaped the Colombian worldview.

The analytical frame has enabled to understand and size the variation in foreign policy President Santos is doing. In this regard, a shift in the Colombian foreign policy has in fact occurred and it has been perceived by the neighbouring countries. It was proven by taking a glance at the Presidential interventions and at the reactions within Colombia as well as in the Andean countries. The shift does not respond to a single cause but to a set of different motives as for example the disappointment with US policies, economic pragmatism, the isolation of Colombia in South America, the profile of the new president, among the most important reasons.

Furthermore, it is still not possible to certainly establish that President Santos encouraged the shift in the foreign policy in order to impact directly the internal conflict. In this regard, since Santos’ took over as a president, it seems that the conflict has not suffered dramatic changes in its structural conditions, nor number of actors, or in their capabilities beyond regular adaptation moves. An initiative for starting peace talks has not either occurred. Although it is too soon to affirm whether the shift in the foreign policy will impact visibly the internal conflict some changes could be on brewing now and become more explicit in the future. Although subtle, some events occurred so far suggest a potential variation in some variables of the context since Santos has made FARC doubt of the unconditional loyalty of the neighbouring countries allied with the guerrillas.

This research has shown that, although it is perhaps too soon for pointing out definitive conclusions for the Colombian case, the foreign policy of a country could be a functional tool when trying to modify certain dynamics nurturing a conflict. The two scenarios have proved that a friendly relationship with its antagonists seems to improve the conditions for peace. Using current theory not only for improving the implementation of peace agreements but as a source of indicators to prevent negative environments in the future constitute a great contribution for better policy making.

65 CONCLUSION

Given that this research is limited, there are several interesting questions that may serve as future research fields. For instance, conducting a similar research once Santos has finished his tenure would be useful to test the scenarios provided in this study. Having the protagonists of the shift as former officers of the government would allow them to disclose some of the decision making process that led to the shift.

66 REFERENCES

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74 APPENDIX APPENDIX

List of Personal interviews:

Interview 1, Sergio Calderón, Proexport (Germany), 25-04-11. Interview 2, Michel Leví, Coordinator of The Andean Centre for International Studies at Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar (Ecuador), 05-04-11.

Interview 2, Beatriz Zepeda, Coordinator of International Relations at FLACSO-Ecuador (Ecuador) 05-04-11. Interview 3, Simon Espinosa, journalist from the newspaper “La hora” (Ecuador) 14-05- 11. Interview 4, Miguel Ángel Martínez, Professor Social Science at Simón Bolivar University (Venezuela), 05-04-11.

Interview 5, Franklin Barriga, journalist from the newspaper “La hora” (Ecuador). 16-06- 11. Interview 6, Marco Romero. Professor at Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar (Ecuador), 05-04-11. Interview 7, Victor Mijares. Professor Universidad Simon Bolivar (Venezuela) 05-04-11. Interview 8, Marco Ortiz Palanques. Professor Universidad Simon Bolivar (Venezuela) 14-04-11 Interview 9, Horacio Godoy. Argentinian professor at Universidad del Norte. (Colombia), 30-04-11 Interview 10, Arlene Tickner. American professor at Universidad de los Andes (Colombia). 05-05-11 Interview 11, Miguel Ortega. Researcher of Security and Defence Studies at the Ideas for Peace Foundation –FIP-(Colombia) 3-05-11 Interview 12. Senator Juan Manuel Galan. (Colombia) 05-30-11 Interview 13. Colombian Diplomat 1, Embassador, (Europe). 20-04-11 Interview 14. Colombian Diplomat 2. Ministro Plenipotenciario (Europe), 07-04-11. Interview 15. Colombian Diplomat 3. Tercer secretario (Europa). 20-04-11.

75 Linnaeus University – a firm focus on quality and competence

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