Information Laundering and Counter-Publics: the News Sources of Islamophobic Groups on Twitter
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The Workshops of the Tenth International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media Social Media in the Newroom: Technical Report WS-16-19 Information Laundering and Counter-Publics: The News Sources of Islamophobic Groups on Twitter 1 1 2 2 Cornelius Puschmann , Julian Ausserhofer , Noura Maan , Markus Hametner Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society, Französische Str. 9 10117 Berlin, Germany [email protected], [email protected] Der Standard, Vordere Zollamtsstraße 13, 1030 Vienna, Austria [email protected], [email protected] Abstract ferences (Pariser, 2011; Vicario et al., 2016). Social media Which news sources do supporters of populist islamophobic such as Facebook and Twitter are particularly suitable to groups and their opponents rely on, and how are these rally support for populist stances, as not all sources pro- sources related to each other? We explore these questions moted through them conform with journalistic standards of by studying the websites referenced in discussions sur- careful sourcing, editorial balance, and factual accuracy. rounding Pegida, a right-wing populist movement based in Germany that is opposed to what its supporters regard as is- In addition to the websites of traditional media organiza- lamization, cultural marginalization and political correct- tions, such as private and public broadcasters as well as ness. We draw on a manual content analysis of the news newspaper publishers, social media audiences draw on a sources and the stances of Twitter users, to then calculate range of non-traditional media actors that rely exclusively the overlap of sources across audiences. Finally, we perform on the Internet. The ownership structure of many of these a cluster analysis of the resulting user groups, based on shared sources. Preferences by language, nationality, region organizations is opaque. Many are supported by a variety and politics emerge, showing the distinction between differ- of unusual sources of revenue, including reliance on direct ent groups among the users. Our tentative findings have im- state sponsorship, private patronage, and the free labor plications both for the study of mass media audiences supplied by volunteer contributors. These actors increas- through the lens of social media, and for research on the ingly disseminate information in foreign languages to public sphere and its possible fragmentation in online dis- course. This contribution, which is the result of an interdis- reach audiences abroad. Examples for this strategy are RT ciplinary collaboration between communication scholars in (previously Russia Today) and Sputnik, both of which are Germany and journalists in Austria, is part of a larger ongo- financed by the Russian government, and Epoch Times, ing effort to understand forms of online extremism through widely assumed to be influenced by Falun Gong, a group the analysis of social media data. of spiritual practitioners with origins in China. Keywords: populism, islamophobia, Twitter, altmedia The aims of these actors include influencing the public agenda, for example by fostering support for the Russian Introduction government and opposition to the European Union, or promoting a socially conservative world-view in accord- Debates on controversial political issues, such as immigra- ance with the teachings of Falun Gong, while some sites tion policy and climate change, frequently revolve around also seek to maximize advertising-based revenues through the choice of news sources. Right-wing populists thrive on particularly incendiary headlines. In addition to these or- polarized discourses that allow them to mobilize their sup- ganizations, a number of other non-institutionalized porters in opposition to "politically-correct" liberal elites sources of news and opinion, such as partisan blogs and that are presumed to control the media (Allen, 2011, Dan- populist grass-roots initiatives also feature prominently in iels, 2009, Padovani, 2008). In such debates, mainstream controversial discourses on social media platforms. Taken and populist factions often draw on markedly different together, the availability of these sources enables what repertoires of news sources, leading some scholars to assert Klein (2012) refers to as ‘information laundering’, that is, the existence of echo chambers shaped by ideological dif- the legitimization of xenophobic and islamophobic atti- tudes through the guise of legitimate sources. Based on these observations, we formulate the following three re- Copyright © 2016, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelli- gence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. search questions: 143 upon with those cited by its opponents (see Burnap & Wil- RQ 1: What is the role of traditional and non-traditional liams, 2015, for a broadly similar analysis of the UK). media sources in relation to mainstream and populist polit- ical stances on issues such as Islam and immigration? RQ 2: How can the relationship between traditional and Research on islamophobia and racism online non-traditional media sources be described? To better understand the Twitter discourse surrounding RQ 3: Which preferential clusters can be distinguished Pegida, it is instructive to first review the issues of islam- among users on the basis of the sources that they favor? ophobia and racism online more generally. Oboler (2008) studies the rise and fall of an anti-Semitic Facebook group We approach these questions through an analysis of that in 2007 attracted close to 50,000 members. Allen Twitter data surrounding Pegida, a right-wing anti- (2011) discusses the roots of islamophobic movements in immigration movement centered in Germany. Pegida was the UK, describing particularly the rise of the English De- founded in late 2014 to counter the alleged ‘islamization’ fense League (EDL) as a melting pot of several in some of German society. The movement holds regular weekly cases ideologically incompatible groups. Allen (2011, p. rallies in the city of Dresden framed as "evening walks" or 280) refers to the milieu within which the EDL thrives as "candlelight vigils". While Pegida’s origins lie in Dresden, "disparate, diverse and divergent". Tracing the rise of the the group has made efforts to expand within Germany, the British National Party in the early 2000s, the author points European Union and globally, with rallies in Eastern Eu- out that targeting Islam may have had legal advantages rope, the UK and Australia. The movement relies heavily over aggressively targeting race, because of precedence in 1 on Facebook for its organization , rallying support through the application of hate speech laws written to combat eth- its page, which also serves as a communication platform nic discrimination. The 7/7 terror attacks further bolstered for sympathizers. Hundreds of comments are posted each the appeal of islamophobic campaigns for right-wing day in relation to issues such as immigration, Islam, the groups such as the BNP and the EDL. Allen (2011) high- EU, mainstream political parties and politicians, main- lights the role of Facebook for the otherwise loosely-knit stream (liberal) media, gender politics, and other manifes- organization of the EDL. The EDL has since then partly tations of what is perceived as a political agenda of cultural merged with Pegida UK, signaling a convergence into a liberalism that excludes dissenting views (for a preliminary pan-European islamophobic movement, at least in terms of analysis of the commenting practice, see Stefanowitsch & its external communication. As the author furthermore Flach, 2016). The communication on social media (which points out, the EDL cultivates the image of a multicultural represents only a partial picture of Pegida's supporters) is movement that departs from the stereotype of right-wing characterized by deep internal inconsistencies, for example chauvinism. It has a division for gay members, whose with regards to its stance towards Russia. Many of its pro- protection from islamist repression it claims to cherish. ponents are staunchly pro-Russian, while others, such as This 'innovative' (Allen, 2011, p. 288) means of presenting Breitbart.com, are sympathetic towards U.S.-style libertar- itself as a positive civic movement is another commonality ianism and evangelical Christian groups. with Pegida, as is the tendency to replace biological racism Though Facebook is the core platform used by Pegida’s with cultural racism, which argues that insurmountable supporters, Twitter is another important stage on which differences separate the Northern European, Judeo- discourse related to Pegida takes place, though in a more Christian identity from a middle eastern Muslim identity. ambivalent fashion. While on Facebook the ability of page Social media, and particularly Twitter, is a popular scene owners to moderate content means that the discourse envi- of conflict in polarized discourses on race and religion. ronment is controlled and dissenting views can be sup- Chaudry (2015) draws up a ‘hate map’ of the United States pressed, this does not apply to Twitter. On Twitter, a using racist tweets. Awan (2014) presents an analysis of search for Pegida inevitably leads to both supporting and islamophobic Twitter discourse in the wake of the May opposing views. The hashtag #nopegida captures tweets 2013 Woolwich attacks. The author notes that on Septem- from opponents, while the hashtag #pegida and the search ber 11, 2013, the hashtag #FuckMuslims was trending in term pegida both lead