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'An Inspection of the Home Office's Response to In-Country An inspection of the Home Office’s response to in-country clandestine arrivals (‘lorry drops’) and to irregular migrants arriving via ‘small boats’ (May 2019 – December 2019) David Bolt Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration An inspection of the Home Office’s response to in-country clandestine arrivals (‘lorry drops’) and to irregular migrants arriving via ‘small boats’ May 2019 – December 2019 Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 50(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007 November 2020 © Crown copyright 2020 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/official-documents This publication is also available at www.gov.uk/ICIBI Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration 5th Floor, Globe House 89 Eccleston Square London, SW1V 1PN United Kingdom ISBN 978-1-5286-1828-1 CCS0320324990 11/20 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum. Printed in the UK by the APS Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Our purpose To help improve the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of the Home Office’s border and immigration functions through unfettered, impartial and evidence-based inspection. All Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration inspection reports can be found at www.gov.uk/ICIBI Email us: [email protected] Write to us: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration 5th Floor, Globe House 89 Eccleston Square London, SW1V 1PN United Kingdom Contents Foreword 2 1. Scope and Purpose 3 2. Methodology 4 3. Summary of conclusions 6 4. Recommendations 10 5. Background 11 6. Inspection findings: Strategic assessments, governance and practical guidance for Home Office staff and first responders 25 7. Inspection findings: ‘lorry detections’ and ‘lorry drops’ 34 8. Inspection findings: ‘small boats’ 55 Annex A: ‘A short notice inspection of the Home Office response to ‘lorry drops’ (October 2015 – January 2016)’ Recommendations and Home Office responses 81 Annex B: Role and remit of the Independent Chief Inspector 85 Annex C: ICIBI’s ‘expectations’ 87 Acknowledgements 89 Foreword In 2016, when I looked at the Home Office’s response to the sharp increase in encounters with migrants who had entered the UK clandestinely concealed in lorries, I found that while frontline staff had coped well with the extra demands, this had been at the expense of other enforcement priorities, to the extent that in some areas little other operational activity had been conducted. In approaching this inspection, a key question was whether the response to the surge in ‘small boats’ was having a similar impact on other BICS business. In short, inspectors found that it was. Border Force’s Maritime Command, the General Aviation/General Maritime Team based in Folkestone, Immigration Enforcement’s Criminal and Financial Investigation directorate, and the Joint Debriefing Team, were all heavily occupied with small boats, as was UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) Kent (Asylum) Intake Unit. Some staff in these teams, as well as other agencies, expressed concerns about what was being missed as a result, particularly people and goods smuggling, which inspectors were told “had not gone away” and may indeed have increased in other parts of the UK as smugglers looked to exploit the concentration of resources in the South east. The Home Office has contended that the emergence in late-2018 of small boats as a favoured means of illegal entry was a consequence of the extensive investment over recent years, in collaboration with the French authorities, in strengthening security at and around the ports in northern France. But, while this may have made unaided clandestine entry harder, it is the case that the number of ‘lorry drop’ migrants encountered in the UK increased in 2019 by a third over the previous year, and organised smuggling of large groups concealed in road transport continues, often with casual disregard for the risks to the migrants’ health and welfare, as evidenced by the discovery of the bodies of 39 Vietnamese migrants in a refrigerated trailer at Purfleet, Essex, in October 2019. Overall, the are no signs of the threat of clandestine entry reducing and recent evidence points in the other direction. While the Home Office has shown some agility in marshalling and reprioritising resources in response, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it has neither the capacity nor the capabilities, in particular in respect of criminal investigation and prosecution, required to manage this threat more effectively. I have made five recommendations. These touch on skills, organisation and processes, partnership working, data and analysis, and staff management. None offers a ‘quick fix’ but this should not be a reason to delay. This report was sent to the Home Secretary on 13 March 2020. David Bolt Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration 2 1. Scope and Purpose 1.1 This inspection examined the Home Office’s identification and handling of migrants first encountered away from a port of entry, having entered the UK concealed in a commercial vehicle, and those migrants seeking to cross the English Channel in ‘small boats’.1 1.2 The inspection focused on the efficiency and effectiveness of the measures the Home Office had put in place to respond to these events. This included: • an overview of efforts by Border Force to prevent clandestine departures from the European mainland, including through support and encouragement for European law enforcement and border security measures • the current response to ‘lorry drops’, including a review of the recommendations from the 2016 inspection report: “A short notice inspection of the Home Office response to ‘lorry drops’” • the response, since late 2018, to the arrival of migrants in small boats, including the impact on other previously planned activities and priorities • contingency plans for dealing with a surge in arrivals either via lorry drops or small boats or both 1 The terms used to describe migrants and the means by which they seek to enter the UK can be contentious. For the sake of clarity, this report uses the following terms with the following meanings: • ‘Irregular migration’: “the movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination” – International Organisation for Migration (IoM) https://www.iom.int/key-migration- terms • ‘Illegal entry’: “(a) unlawfully entering or seeking to enter in breach of a deportation order or of the immigration laws, or (b) entering or seeking to enter by means which include deception by single person.” – Section 33(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/1971/77/section/33 • ‘Clandestine entrant’: “(1) A person is a clandestine entrant if: (a) he arrives in the United Kingdom concealed in a vehicle, ship or aircraft, (aa) he arrives in the United Kingdom concealed in a rail freight wagon, (b) he passes, or attempts to pass, through immigration control concealed in a vehicle, or (c) he arrives in the United Kingdom on a ship or aircraft, having embarked – (i) concealed in a vehicle; and (ii) at a time when the ship or aircraft was outside the United Kingdom, and claims, or indicates that he intends to seek, asylum in the United Kingdom or evades, or attempts to evade, immigration control.” – Section 32 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (as amended) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/33/ section/32 • ‘Lorry drop’: clandestine entry involving concealment in a commercial vehicle, where the migrant is first encountered in the vehicle or at the roadside having left the vehicle at its first stopping point away from the port of entry • ‘Small boats’: any vessel used to set off across the Channel with the aim of gaining entry to the UK either directly or having been intercepted en route and brought ashore. Although ‘small boats’ includes go-fast craft, yachts, motor cruisers, tugs and fishing vessels, this inspection focused on rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs), dinghies and kayaks. 3 2. Methodology 2.1 Inspectors: • between 22 May and 5 June 2019, spoke to relevant operational and policy teams across the Borders, Immigration and Citizenship System (BICS) as part of the scoping process for this inspection • reviewed relevant open source information, plus data and documentary evidence requested from the Home Office covering policies and operational guidance • between 20 June and 5 July 2019, met senior managers from Border Force (including the Small Boats Lead), Immigration Enforcement, and Borders, Immigration, Citizenship System, Policy and Strategy Group (BICS PSG) and made familiarisation visits to: • the juxtaposed control areas at Calais, Coquelles and Dunkirk • the Coordination and Information Centre (in French, Centre Conjoint d’Information et de Coordination or CCIC) (Calais) • Border Force National Command Centre (NCC) (Croydon) • Border Force National Maritime Intelligence Bureau (NMIB) (Portsmouth) • Joint Maritime Co-ordination Centre (JMCC) (Portsmouth) • National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) (Portsmouth) • Border
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