Case Comments
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Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 4 Fall 9-1-1956 Case Comments Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr Recommended Citation Case Comments, 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 171 (1956), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/ vol13/iss2/4 This Index is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1956] CASE COMMENTS CASE COMMENTS CONFLICT OF LAWS-TORT LIABILITY AS GOVERNED BY LAW OF PLACE INJURY WAS SUSTAINED OR OF PLACE WRONGFUL ACT WAS COM- MITTED. [Federal] A unique conflict of laws problem was presented in the recent case of United States v. Union Trust Co.,1 involving a mid-air collision between an Eastern Airlines DC-4 passenger plane and a P-3 8 pursuit plane operated by a Bolivian military pilot. The crash occurred while the passenger plane was on the final approach for landing at the Washington National Airport, a controlled public airport owned by the United States, and resulted in the death of all 55 persons aboard. Suit against the United States to recover for the death of two of the passengers was brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by the personal representatives of the estates of the deceased passengers. 2 There it was established that the proximate cause of the crash was the negligent operation of the airport control tower by a government employee, and that under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act,3 the government was liable for such negligent conduct. After an examination of lengthy and conflicting testimony, it was further held that the situs of the collision was in the District of Columbia, rather than in adjoining Virginia. There being no statutory limit on wrongful death recovery under the law of the District of Columbia,4 the court awarded damages in the amount of $50,000 to the estate of the male decedent, and $15,oo to the estate of the female decedent. On appeal, the liability of the United States and the finding of fact as to the locale of the collision was affirmed by the Court of Ap- peals for the District of Columbia.5 However, the decree of the Dis- trict Court was modified by reducing the award to the estate of the male decedent from $50,000 to $15,ooo. The basis for this reduction in damages was found in the language of Section 410 (a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act which provides that the government shall be liable for death caused by the negligent conduct of a government employee 1221 F. (2d) 62 (C. A. D. C., 1955), cert. denied, Union Trust Co. v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 192, 1oo L. ed. 127 (1955). The principal case is commented on in Notes (1955) 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1455; (1955) 9 Vand. L. Rev. 83. 2113 F. Supp. 80 (D. C. D. C., 1953). 6o Stat. 842 (1946), codified in various sections of 28 U. S. C. A. (195o). 'D. C. Code (1951) § 16-12ox. rUnited States v. Union Trust Co., 221 F. (2d) 62 (C. A. D. C., 1955). 172 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII "where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant.., in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."6 Since the negligently operated control tower was located in Virginia, the majority of the court apparently felt com- pelled, although no express rationale was given on this point, to apply the law of Virginia where a statute limited the amount of recovery for wrongful death to $15,ooo,7 rather than the law of the District of Columbia, the place where the injury was sustained. However, this result was reached by a divided court with Judge Miller taking the view that this strict construction of the statute did not effectuate the intent of Congress since it was contrary to the generally accepted conflict of laws rule that tort liability is governed by the law of the place where the injury was sustained, rather than the place where the negligent act was committed.8 He felt that the language in Section 410 (a), "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred," should be construed as meaning "inaccordance with the law of the place where the tort occurred."0 This conclusion was based on the reasoning that the correct meaning of the word "act" includes all the consequences of the act.'0 That view is in accord with the Restatement which declares: "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."" Futhermore, such a broad con- struction has been applied to very similar language in the Death on 06o Stat. 844 (1946), 28 U. S. C. A. § 13 46(b) (195o) [italics supplied]. '2 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 8-636. The 1952 amendment increased the maximum recovery from $15,000 to $25,000. 8Young v Masci, 289 U. S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L. ed. 1158 (933); Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F. (2d) 97o (C. A. 3rd, 1952); Kieffer v. Blue Seal Chemical Co., 196 F. (2d) 614 (C. A. 3rd, 1952); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.C. D. C., 1955); Jeffery v. Witworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E. D. Wash. 1955); Electric Theatre Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937 (W. D. Mo. 1953); Neiman- Marcus Co. v. Lait, 107 F. Supp. 96 (S. D. N. Y. 195-); Dobbins v. Martin Buick Co., 206 Ark. 861, 227 S. W. (2d) 620 (1950); Summar v. Besser Mfg. Co., 31o Mich. 347, 17 N. W. (2d) 209 (1945); Welch v. Kroger Grocery Co., i8o Miss. 89, 177 So. 41 (1937); Hughes Provision Co. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co., 242 S.W. (2d) 285 (Mo. App. 1951); Mann v. Policyholders' Nat. Life Ins. Co., 78 N. D. 724, 51 N. W. (2d) 853 (1952); C. I. T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. i6, 195 S. E. 659 (1938); Dallas v. Whitney, 1i8 W. Va. io6, 188 S. E. 766 (1936); Restate- ment, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949) 263; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1951) 182. aSee United States v. Union Trust Co., 221 F. (2d) 62,'80 (C. A. D. C., 1955)- '°Very recently a similar interpretation was applied by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. "Under the Tort Claims Act, the language quoted means the place where the negligence, either of act or omission, became operative, directly causing the injury and not places where the negligence existed but was then in- operative." United States v. Marshall, 230 F. (2d) 183, 187 (C. A. 9th, 1956). "Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377. 1956] CASE COMMENTS the High Seas Act, which permits a decedent's personal representative to bring suit in the federal district courts "whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore....-12 In Lacey v. L. W. Wiggins Airways,13 the decedent died in an airplane crash which occurred more than a marine league from shore, but which was caused by the negligent inspection of the aircraft while it was on land. The district court retained jurisdiction of the suit, construing the above language to mean that the substance of the occurrence was the "consummation of the wrongful act as distinguished from its 1 4 origin." Although there is little or no legislative history on the choice of law section of the Federal Tort Claims Act, further support for the interpretation of the minority judge can be found in the testimony given by the Assistant Attorney General before the House Judiciary Committee regarding the then pending venue provision of the Act which now provides that suit may be brought "where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred."'u At this hearing it was stated that a claimant under the Act could bring suit "either where the claimant resides or in the locale of the injury or damage."' 6 Since the language of the two sections is prac- tically identical, the minority judge in the principal case felt that this testimony indicated that Congress intended a similar construction to be placed on Section 410 (a). The principal case is the first instance in which a federal court has been called upon to interpret the choice of law provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act. In view of the explicit language therein, the majority was apparently forced to conclude that liability would be governed by the law of the place of the act, rather than the place of the injury. It is unfortunate that this language produced a result which is diametrically opposed to the general conflicts rule. It seems highly unlikely that the drafters of the Act had such a result in mind, especially when one considers that the express purpose of the Act is to have the United States treated "as a private individual under like circumstances."'17 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, one writer 324, Stat.