Russian Forces Are Worse Than the Syrian Regime in Terms of Cluster Munitions Use
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Syria: 'Nowhere Is Safe for Us': Unlawful Attacks and Mass
‘NOWHERE IS SAFE FOR US’ UNLAWFUL ATTACKS AND MASS DISPLACEMENT IN NORTH-WEST SYRIA Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. © Amnesty International 2020 Except where otherwise noted, content in this document is licensed under a Creative Commons Cover photo: Ariha in southern Idlib, which was turned into a ghost town after civilians fled to northern (attribution, non-commercial, no derivatives, international 4.0) licence. Idlib, close to the Turkish border, due to attacks by Syrian government and allied forces. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode © Muhammed Said/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images For more information please visit the permissions page on our website: www.amnesty.org Where material is attributed to a copyright owner other than Amnesty International this material is not subject to the Creative Commons licence. First published in 2020 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW, UK Index: MDE 24/2089/2020 Original language: English amnesty.org CONTENTS MAP OF NORTH-WEST SYRIA 4 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 2. METHODOLOGY 8 3. BACKGROUND 10 4. ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS 12 4.1 ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES 14 AL-SHAMI HOSPITAL IN ARIHA 14 AL-FERDOUS HOSPITAL AND AL-KINANA HOSPITAL IN DARET IZZA 16 MEDICAL FACILITIES IN SARMIN AND TAFTANAZ 17 ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES IN 2019 17 4.2 ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS 18 AL-BARAEM SCHOOL IN IDLIB CITY 19 MOUNIB KAMISHE SCHOOL IN MAARET MISREEN 20 OTHER ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS IN 2020 21 5. -
Was the Syria Chemical Weapons Probe “
Was the Syria Chemical Weapons Probe “Torpedoed” by the West? By Adam Larson Region: Middle East & North Africa Global Research, May 02, 2013 Theme: US NATO War Agenda In-depth Report: SYRIA Since the perplexing conflict in Syria first broke out two years ago, the Western powers’ assistance to the anti-government side has been consistent, but relatively indirect. The Americans and Europeans lay the mental, legal, diplomatic, and financial groundwork for regime change in Syria. Meanwhile, Arab/Muslim allies in Turkey and the Persian Gulf are left with the heavy lifting of directly supporting Syrian rebels, and getting weapons and supplementary fighters in place. The involvement of the United States in particular has been extremely lackluster, at least in comparison to its aggressive stance on a similar crisis in Libya not long ago. Hopes of securing major American and allied force, preferrably a Libya-style “no-fly zone,” always leaned most on U.S. president Obama’s announcement of December 3, 2012, that any use of chemical weapons (CW) by the Assad regime – or perhaps their simple transfer – will cross a “red line.” And that, he implied, would trigger direct U.S. intervention. This was followed by vague allegations by the Syrian opposition – on December 6, 8, and 23 – of government CW attacks. [1] Nothing changed, and the allegations stopped for a while. However, as the war entered its third year in mid-March, 2013, a slew of new allegations came flying in. This started with a March 19 attack on Khan Al-Assal, a contested western district of Aleppo, killing a reported 25-31 people. -
SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2019: Update on Incidents According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Compiled by ACCORD, 23 June 2020
SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) compiled by ACCORD, 23 June 2020 Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality Number of reported fatalities National borders: GADM, November 2015a; administrative divisions: GADM, November 2015b; in- cident data: ACLED, 20 June 2020; coastlines and inland waters: Smith and Wessel, 1 May 2015 SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2019: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 23 JUNE 2020 Contents Conflict incidents by category Number of Number of reported fatalities 1 Number of Number of Category incidents with at incidents fatalities Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality 1 least one fatality Explosions / Remote Conflict incidents by category 2 3058 397 1256 violence Development of conflict incidents from December 2017 to December 2019 2 Battles 1023 414 2211 Strategic developments 528 6 10 Methodology 3 Violence against civilians 327 210 305 Conflict incidents per province 4 Protests 169 1 9 Riots 8 1 1 Localization of conflict incidents 4 Total 5113 1029 3792 Disclaimer 8 This table is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 20 June 2020). Development of conflict incidents from December 2017 to December 2019 This graph is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 20 June 2020). 2 SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2019: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 23 JUNE 2020 Methodology GADM. Incidents that could not be located are ignored. The numbers included in this overview might therefore differ from the original ACLED data. -
Weekly Conflict Summary | 1 - 8 September 2019
WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 1 - 8 SEPTEMBER 2019 WHOLE OF SYRIA SUMMARY • NORTHWEST | Government of Syria (GoS) momentum slowed in Idleb this week, with no advances recorded. Further civilian protests denouncing Hayyat Tahrir ash Sham (HTS) took place in the northwest, in addition to pro-HTS and pro-Hurras al Din demonstrations. HTS and Jaish al Izza also launched a recruitment drive in the northwest. • SOUTH & CENTRAL | Attacks against GoS-aligned personnel and former opposition members continued in southern Syria, including two unusual attacks claimed by ISIS. GoS forces evicted civilians and appropriated several hundred houses in Eastern Ghouta. • NORTHEAST | The first joint US/Turkish ground patrol took place in Tal Abiad this week as part of an ongoing implementation of the “safe zone” in northern Syria. Low-level attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and SDF arrest operations of alleged ISIS members continued. Two airstrikes targeting Hezbollah and Iranian troops occurred in Abu Kamal. Figure 1: Dominant Actors’ Area of Control and Influence in Syria as of 8 September 2019. NSOAG stands for Non-state Organized Armed Groups. For more explanation on our mapping, please see the footnote on page 2. Page 1 of 5 WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 1 - 8 SEPTEMBER 2019 NORTHWEST SYRIA1 GoS momentum in southern Idleb Governorate slowed this week, with no advances recorded. This comes a week after Damascus announced a ceasefire for the northwest on 31 August that saw a significant reduction in aerial activity, with no events recorded in September so far. However, GoS shelling continued impacting the Hayyat Tahrir ash Sham (HTS)-dominated enclave, with at least 26 communities2 affected (Figure 2). -
Field Developments in Idleb 51019
Field Developments in Idleb, Northern Hama Countryside, Western Situation Report and Southern Aleppo Countryside During March and April 2019 May 2019 Aleppo Countrysides During March and April 2019 the Information Management Unit 1 Field Developments in Idleb, Northern Hama Countryside, Western and Southern Aleppo Countryside During March and April 2019 The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) aims to strengthen the decision-making capacity of aid actors responding to the Syrian crisis. This is done through collecting, analyzing and sharing information on the humanitarian situation in Syria. To this end, the Assistance Coordination Unit through the Information Management Unit established a wide net- work of enumerators who have been recruited depending on specific criteria such as education level, association with information sources and ability to work and communicate under various conditions. IMU collects data that is difficult to reach by other active international aid actors, and pub- lishes different types of information products such as Need Assessments, Thematic Reports, Maps, Flash Reports, and Interactive Reports. 2 Field Developments in Idleb, Northern Hama Countryside, Western Situation Report and Southern Aleppo Countryside During March and April 2019 May 2019 During March and April 2019 3 Field Developments in Idleb, Northern Hama Countryside, Western and Southern Aleppo Countryside During March and April 2019 01. The Most Prominent Shelling Operations During March and April 2019, the Syrian regime and its Russian ally shelled Idleb Governorate and its adjacent countrysides of Aleppo and Hama governorates, with hundreds of air strikes, and artillery and missile shells. The regime bombed 14 medical points, including hospitals and dispensaries; five schools, including a kinder- garten; four camps for IDPs; three bakeries and two centers for civil defense, in addition to more than a dozen of shells that targeted the Civil Defense volunteers during the evacuation of the injured and the victims. -
Shelter/NFI Cluster-Beneficiaries Reached in October 2016
Shelter/NFI Cluster X-Border Operation - Turkey Hub SouthernTurkey: Shelter/NFI cluster-beneficiaries reached in October 2016 (Sub-district level) ShelterCluster.org, Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter H! Shelter & NFI Turkey H! NFI Jarablus Jarablus Mediterranean Sea H! reached beneficiaries reached beneficiaries Suran 105,999 H! 95,054 A'zaz Suran A'zaz H! Tall Refaat Female 51% H! H! TallH! Refaat Boys 27% Mare' Turkey Mare' Girls 27% Daret Azza Turkey Dana Daret Azza Dana H! Male 49% Aleppo Jebel Saman 24% Aleppo Jebel Saman Qourqeena Women Qourqeena Atareb SalqinKafr Takharim Atareb Maaret Tamsrin Zarbah Men 22% Maaret Tamsrin Zarbah Armanaz Armanaz Bennsh H! Idleb Bennsh H! Janudiyeh Sarmin Idleb H! Janudiyeh Sarmin Badama H! Ar-Raqqa H! Saraqab H! Ar-Raqqa Jisr-Ash-Shugur Badama H!H! Ariha Saraqab Mhambal Idleb Jisr-Ash-Shugur H! Ariha H! Syria Mhambal Abul Thohur H! EhsemH! Tall Ed-daman H! Tall Ed-daman Syria H! Ma'arrat An Nu'man H!H! Al-Hasakeh H!Ehsem Idleb H!H! Al-Hasakeh H! Aleppo Ma'arrat An Nu'man H!Aleppo Mediterranean Sea Lattakia Kafr Nobol Sanjar Heish H! Ar-Raqqa H!H!H! Ar-Raqqa H! H! Kafr Nobol Sanjar H!Idleb Madiq Castle H!!Idleb Lattakia H! H Heish Lattakia H! Khan Shaykun Lattakia H! H! H!H! H!H! Madiq Castle Hama H! H! Hama Deir-ez-Zor KafrH! Zeita Deir-ez-Zor Khan Shaykun Tartous Hama Tartous Hama H! H! KafrH! Zeita Homs Homs Mediterranean Sea Tartous Tartous Mediterranean Sea DamascusRural Damascus Quneitra Damascus Rural Damascus Dar'aAs-Sweida Quneitra Dar'a As-Sweida H! HTR & Besieged communities H! HTR & Besieged -
Consumed by War the End of Aleppo and Northern Syria’S Political Order
STUDY Consumed by War The End of Aleppo and Northern Syria’s Political Order KHEDER KHADDOUR October 2017 n The fall of Eastern Aleppo into rebel hands left the western part of the city as the re- gime’s stronghold. A front line divided the city into two parts, deepening its pre-ex- isting socio-economic divide: the west, dominated by a class of businessmen; and the east, largely populated by unskilled workers from the countryside. The mutual mistrust between the city’s demographic components increased. The conflict be- tween the regime and the opposition intensified and reinforced the socio-economic gap, manifesting it geographically. n The destruction of Aleppo represents not only the destruction of a city, but also marks an end to the set of relations that had sustained and structured the city. The conflict has been reshaping the domestic power structures, dissolving the ties be- tween the regime in Damascus and the traditional class of Aleppine businessmen. These businessmen, who were the regime’s main partners, have left the city due to the unfolding war, and a new class of business figures with individual ties to regime security and business figures has emerged. n The conflict has reshaped the structure of northern Syria – of which Aleppo was the main economic, political, and administrative hub – and forged a new balance of power between Aleppo and the north, more generally, and the capital of Damascus. The new class of businessmen does not enjoy the autonomy and political weight in Damascus of the traditional business class; instead they are singular figures within the regime’s new power networks and, at present, the only actors through which to channel reconstruction efforts. -
The 12Th Annual Report on Human Rights in Syria 2013 (January 2013 – December 2013)
The 12th annual report On human rights in Syria 2013 (January 2013 – December 2013) January 2014 January 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 3 Genocide: daily massacres amidst international silence 8 Arbitrary detention and Enforced Disappearances 11 Besiegement: slow-motion genocide 14 Violations committed against health and the health sector 17 The conditions of Syrian refugees 23 The use of internationally prohibited weapons 27 Violations committed against freedom of the press 31 Violations committed against houses of worship 39 The targeting of historical and archaeological sites 44 Legal and legislative amendments 46 References 47 About SHRC 48 The 12th annual report on human rights in Syria (January 2013 – December 2013) Introduction The year 2013 witnessed a continuation of grave and unprecedented violations committed against the Syrian people amidst a similarly shocking and unprecedented silence in the international community since the beginning of the revolution in March 2011. Throughout the year, massacres were committed on almost a daily basis killing more than 40.000 people and injuring 100.000 others at least. In its attacks, the regime used heavy weapons, small arms, cold weapons and even internationally prohibited weapons. The chemical attack on eastern Ghouta is considered a landmark in the violations committed by the regime against civilians; it is also considered a milestone in the international community’s response to human rights violations Throughout the year, massacres in Syria, despite it not being the first attack in which were committed on almost a daily internationally prohibited weapons have been used by the basis killing more than 40.000 regime. The international community’s response to the crime people and injuring 100.000 drew the international public’s attention to the atrocities others at least. -
Idleb Governorate February 2018
Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS): Sub-district Factsheets Idleb Governorate February 2018 Introduction This multi-sectoral needs assessment is part of a monthly data Dana collection exercise which aims to gather information about needs Harim Qourqeena Salqin and the humanitarian situation inside Syria. The factsheets present Kafr information collected in March 2018, referring to the situation in Takharim ALEPPO February 2018. Maaret Armanaz Tamsrin Teftnaz These factsheets present information at the community level for Darkosh Bennsh 20 sub-districts in Idleb governorate. Selected key indicators for Janudiyeh Idleb the following sectors are included in the factsheets: displacement, Sarmin shelter, non-food items (NFIs), health, food security, water sanitation Jisr Ash- Saraqab and hygiene (WASH) and education. The factsheets do not cover the Badama Shugur Mhambal Ariha entire range of indicators gathered in the questionnaire. Abul Thohur Ehsem For full visualisation of all indicators collected, please see the SIMAWG Ma'arrat Needs Identification Dynamic Reporting Tool, available here: An Nu'man https://reach3.cern.ch/simawg/Default.aspx. LATTAKIA Kafr Nobol Sanjar Heish Tamanaah Methodology and limitations HAMA Khan Shaykun These findings are based on data collected both directly and remotely (in Turkey) from Key Informants residing in the communities assessed. Information was collected from Key Informants in 138 communities in 20 sub-districts of Idleb governorate. For each question asked, confidence levels were assigned based on the Key Informant’s area Remote data collection of expertise and knowledge of the sector-specific situation. Direct data collection For a full description of the methodology, please see the Terms of Mixed data collection PDF: click on a sub-district Reference, available on the REACH Resource Centre. -
CTC Sentinel 6:8 (2013)
AUGUST 2013 . SPECIAL ISSUE . VOL 6 . ISSUE 8 Contents Syria: A Wicked Problem for All By Bryan Price INTRODUCTION 1 Syria: A Wicked Problem for All By Bryan Price SPECIAL REPORTS 4 Turkey’s Tangled Syria Policy By Hugh Pope 9 Israel’s Response to the Crisis in Syria By Arie Perliger 11 Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria By Karim Sadjadpour 14 Hizb Allah’s Gambit in Syria By Matthew Levitt and Aaron Y. Zelin 18 The Battle for Qusayr: How the Syrian Regime and Hizb Allah Tipped the Balance By Nicholas Blanford 23 The Non-State Militant Landscape in Syria By Aron Lund 28 From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi`a Militias By Phillip Smyth 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Syrian rebels stand guard as protesters wave Islamist flags during an anti-regime demonstration in Aleppo in March 2013. - AFP/Getty n august 26, 2013, Secretary from those that were truly “wicked.”3 In of State John Kerry called their interpretation, wicked problems the recent use of chemical feature innumerable causes, are weapons outside of Damascus tough to adequately describe, and by O“undeniable” and a “moral obscenity.”1 definition have no “right” answers. This is the latest chapter in an already In fact, solutions to wicked problems complex civil war in Syria, a crisis are impossible to objectively evaluate; About the CTC Sentinel that Kerry’s predecessor called a rather, it is better to evaluate solutions The Combating Terrorism Center is an “wicked problem” for the U.S. foreign to these problems as being shades of independent educational and research policy establishment.2 That term good and bad.4 institution based in the Department of Social was introduced 40 years ago by two Sciences at the United States Military Academy, professors of urban planning who were By anyone’s account, the Syrian civil West Point. -
BACKGROUNDER Rebel Groups in Northern Aleppo Province
Jeffrey Bolling BACKGROUNDER August 29, 2012 REBEL GROUps IN NOrthERN ALEppO PROVINCE n August 5, 2012, BBC World News reported over 20,000 Syrian troops massed around Aleppo, Oready to move into rebel-occupied districts of the city in what has become one of the largest military operations of the ongoing Syrian conflict.1 Until recently, rebel activity in Aleppo, Syria’s largest city and primary commercial hub, had been largely overshadowed by clashes elsewhere in the country.2 Despite the overwhelming media attention given to Homs and Damascus, the ongoing showdown between rebel and regime forces in Aleppo City is rooted in the months-old conflict in Aleppo’s northern countryside. The development of the major rebel units of the Kilis Major Hamadeen has kept Corridor, a string of outlying towns that straddle the a low profile, appearing Aleppo-Gaziantep highway connecting Turkey to only to make official northern Syria, sheds light on the current battle for announcements for the Ahrar Aleppo. The armed opposition’s willingness to come al-Shamal Brigade or the together in increasingly large and ambitious unit Aleppo Military Council.4 hierarchies has augmented rebel ability to resist the Hamadeen’s statements Assad regime. Between March and August 2012, Aleppo are devoid of personal rebel groups have resisted major regime offensives and information and ideological MAJOR MOHAMMED HAMADEEN, LEADER OF AHRAR AL-SHAMAL; coordinated large scale counteroffensives in the Kilis affiliation. Unlike rebel SOURCE: YOUTUBE Corridor and al-Bab, a town 40 kilometers east of Aleppo leaders in other parts of Syria, City. These rebel successes have exposed the limits of the whose strong personalities often occupy a central place regime’s ability to project force outside of major urban in the public portrayal of their units’ identities, this low centers. -
The New Salafi Politics October 16, 2012 KHALIL MAZRAAWI/AFP/GETTYIMAGES KHALIL POMEPS Briefings 14 Contents
arab uprisings The New Salafi Politics October 16, 2012 KHALIL MAZRAAWI/AFP/GETTYIMAGES KHALIL POMEPS Briefings 14 Contents A New Salafi Politics . 6 The Salafi Moment . 8 The New Islamists . 10 Democracy, Salafi Style . 14 Who are Tunisia’s Salafis? . 16 Planting the seeds of Tunisia’s Ansar al Sharia . 20 Tunisia’s student Salafis . 22 Jihadists and Post-Jihadists in the Sinai . 25 The battle for al-Azhar . 28 Egypt’s ‘blessed’ Salafi votes . 30 Know your Ansar al-Sharia . 32 Osama bin Laden and the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood . 34 Lebanon’s Salafi Scare . 36 Islamism and the Syrian uprising . 38 The dangerous U .S . double standard on Islamist extremism . 48 The failure of #MuslimRage . 50 The Project on Middle East Political Science The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) is a collaborative network which aims to increase the impact of political scientists specializing in the study of the Middle East in the public sphere and in the academic community . POMEPS, directed by Marc Lynch, is based at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University and is supported by the Carnegie Corporation and the Social Science Research Council . It is a co-sponsor of the Middle East Channel (http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com) . For more information, see http://www .pomeps .org . Online Article Index A new Salafi politics http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2012/10/12/a_new_salafi_politics The Salafi Moment http://www .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2012/09/12/the_salafi_moment The New Islamists http://www .foreignpolicy