Université Lumière Lyon II La Politique De L'ambiguïté Comme Facteur D
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Université Lumière Lyon II Institut d’études politiques de Lyon École doctorale "Sciences humaines et sociales" (SHS) Centre de Politologie de Lyon CERIEP La politique de l’ambiguïté comme facteur d’échec de la dissuasion au Moyen-Orient.- Étude du cas israélien 1955-2005. Annexes – Volume II Thèse de doctorat en Science politique Par Mohamed Abdel Azim Sous la direction du professeur Jean-Paul Joubert Directeur du Master politiques de sécurité, relations internationales et analyse politique Université Lyon III Membres du jury Charles Zorgbibe Professeur de Science politique, Université Paris I, la Sorbonne. Martin Van Creveld Professeur d’Histoire, Université hébraïque de Jérusalem. Paul Bacot Professeur de Science politique, IEP de Lyon. Jean-Louis Marie Professeur de Science politique, IEP de Lyon. Mars 2005 Annexe 101 Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 1-36 Prewar Crisis, May 15-June 4, 1967 1. President's Daily Brief Washington, May 15, 1967. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 2. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, May 15, 1967, 1920Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated Priority to Amman and to Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut, Kuwait, Dhahran, London, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, CINCMEAFSA, Jerusalem, Aden, and Sanaa. Received at 5:14 p.m. Passed to the White House and USIA at 5:40 p.m. 3604. Ref: Cairo 7494./2/ /2/Telegram 7494 from Cairo, May 15, reported that UAR military forces had been placed on alert and that extensive movement of troops and materiel was in process. (Ibid.) 1. Bitan (Fon Off) advises Battle saw Harman this morning and expressed concern at reports Egyptian troop concentration in Canal area which blocked to normal traffic and interpreted development as Egyptian demonstration solidarity with Syrians who apprehensive possible Israeli intentions./3/ /3/No memorandum of this conversation between Battle and Ambassador Harman has been found. Secretary Rusk told Battle that morning that "we should have a very frank talk with the Israelis" and that "it was very important for the Israelis to sit tight." (Notes of telephone conversation at 9:46 a.m. on May 15, prepared by Rusk's personal assistant Carolyn J. Proctor; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) Telegram 194189 to Tel Aviv, May 15, instructed the Embassy to approach the Israeli Government at the highest level and express the U.S. hope that the Israelis would "maintain steady nerves in interest avoiding serious deterioration area situation." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR) 2. Bitan said that following talks with PM Eshkol and FM Eban he authorized give following GOI reaction this representation. A. There no Israeli troop concentration Syrian, Egyptian or other frontier. (This corresponds with US Attaches reconnaissance to this hour.) B. GOI hopes infiltration and sabotage will stop. C. If there no further sabotage there no reason anyone to worry. D. GOI interpretation Egyptian demonstration troop activities is that Syrians trying involve Egypt in Syrian-Israeli issue and if Egyptian concentration true Syrians could represent this as support. 3. GOI has no objection foregoing being transmitted to Cairo. 1 Annexe 101 4. Situation with Syria is obviously precarious and, if additional serious sabotage incidents such as attacks on settlements, main roads etc. continue it impossible predict GOI will sit idly by without reacting. However, I believe GOI aware risks escalation, disposed make minimum effective response, and exercise what to them would seem maximum patience. I doubt that they will be very impressed in any event with Nasser's foot shuffling one way or the other. Barbour 2 Annexe 102 Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 37-71 Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ Washington, May 23, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 28. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The memorandum is unsigned, and bears no drafting information. It was sent to the President with a brief covering memorandum from Walt Rostow stating that two memoranda from Helms, which the President had requested that morning, were attached. The second memorandum has not been identified. SUBJECT Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities 1. The judgment of the intelligence community is that Israeli ground forces "can maintain internal security, defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth." In the air, the judgment is less clear: the Israelis "probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not damaged beyond repair." 2. Those judgments rest essentially on the proposition that the quality of Israel's military leadership, its ability to organize operations and maintain its equipment in a high state of readiness, and the high morale and intelligence of the individual Israeli ground soldier will make up for Israel's quantitative inferiority in men and equipment. The Israelis have consistently stressed intensive training, with emphasis on armor, standardization of weapons, rapid and reliable communications, and a very strong tactical intelligence effort. Egyptian capabilities in these areas appear to be inferior. 3. Moreover, in the air, the Israelis have been acutely conscious of the difficulty of defending their air facilities, and have made strenuous efforts to overcome the fact that their bases are very short warning time from the Arab borders. They have "hardened" their fields with dispersed pens, for example. Israeli pilots and tactics are considered superior, and, in terms of operationally assigned fighter aircraft rather than total inventory, Israel has a slight edge--256 to 222. 4. Israeli planning is based on a short war, conducted by ground forces with air cover. If this assumption should prove wrong, Israel might well be in trouble, since the Arabs' quantitative superiority would come into play. At M+48 hours, for example, Israel would have 280,000 men vs. the Arabs' 117,000 deployed in the vicinity of the Israeli borders. But the total strength of the Arab armies is nearly 500,000, vs. the same 280,000 on the Israeli side. 5. This is not to say that the rout of the Egyptians in 1956 will be repeated. The Egyptian forces have improved substantially in the past eleven years, and they have acquired considerable operational know-how by rotating combat units in Yemen. Nevertheless, we consider that the Israeli forces have retained an over-all superiority. 3 Annexe 103 Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 1-36 Prewar Crisis, May 15-June 4, 1967 8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, May 17, 1967, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Rusk; cleared by Battle; and cleared with changes by Walt Rostow. 196541. Please deliver following personal message from President to Prime Minister Eshkol: "Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am following very closely the tense situation in the Near East and am deeply concerned about the maintenance of peace in that area. We have made known our concern in Damascus and Cairo and are working closely with other countries in the United Nations. Our efforts will continue. I know that you and your people are having your patience tried to the limits by continuing incidents along your border. In this situation, I would like to emphasize in the strongest terms the need to avoid any action on your side which would add further to the violence and tension in your area. I urge the closest consultation between you and your principal friends. I am sure that you will understand that I cannot accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted. With personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk 4 Annexe 104 Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 1-36 Prewar Crisis, May 15-June 4, 1967 7. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 17, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Secret. SUBJECT Urgent Message to Eshkol We had hoped yesterday that tension in the Israel-Syria-UAR triangle was dropping after an ostentatious Egyptian show of putting its forces around Cairo on alert. Last night, however, we and the Israelis learned that the Egyptians have moved forces into the Sinai. Now they have moved forces in front of the UN Emergency Force on the Israel-UAR border and all but ordered it to withdraw. The UAR's brinksmanship stems from two causes: (1) The Syrians are feeding Cairo erroneous reports of Israeli mobilization to strike Syria. Regrettably, some pretty militant public threats from Israel by Eshkol and others have lent credibility to the Syrian reports. (2) Nasser probably feels his prestige would suffer irreparably if he failed a third time to come to the aid of an Arab nation attacked by Israel. Moderates like Hussein have raked him over the coals for not coming to Jordan's aid in November or to Syria's when Israel shot down 6 of its MIG's last month.