HS2: Phase 1 Environmental Statement Consultation 27 February 2014
Submission by HS2 Action Alliance
Contents Page
1. Introduction 4 2. Overview 5 3. Making Things Better 9 4. Public Participation 11 5. Hybrid Bill Process 16 6. Strategic Alternatives and Options 33 7. Volume 3 Route Wide Effects 52 7.1 Agriculture, Forestry & Soils 52 7.2 Air Quality 53 7.3 Climate 55 7.4 Community 65 7.5 Cultural Heritage 66 7.6 Ecology 67 7.7 Land Quality 72 7.8 Landscape 73 7.9 Socio economics 80 7.10 Sound, Noise & Vibration 81 7.11 Traffic & Transport 93 7.12 Waste 93 7.13 Water Resources 99 7.14 Electromagnetic Interference 100
8. Health 101 9. Code of Construction Practice 106 10. Conclusion 108
11. Appendixes 109 Appendix 1: Errors in ES Appendix 2: Carbon Study-SLR Consulting Appendix 3: Waste Study-SLR Consulting
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Appendix 4: Landscape Assessment- Waterman Associates Appendix 5: Biodiversity - Treweek Consulting Appendix 6: HS2 October 2013 Strategic Case Appendix 7: Noise-Further Information
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1. Introduction
1.1 HS2 Action Alliance (HS2AA) is a not for profit organisation that oppose the proposals known as High Speed 2 (HS2) on economic, transport and environmental grounds. Established in 2010, HS2AA has made the case against HS2 in the courts, Parliament and the media. HS2AA is a voluntary organisation, with directors who serve without remuneration and work closely with a range of other groups, including environmental organisations, in connection with our work, making the case in communities against the scheme and pushing for appropriate mitigation. Over 100 organisations have become affiliates of HS2AA. Thousands of people from across the country who share our goals have also signed up as registered supporters of HS2AA.
1.2 HS2 has been promoted from the outset as a project with strong environmental credentials. The Environmental Statement provides official confirmation, over 50,000 pages, of just how inaccurate such claims are. The plans for Phase 1 of HS2 mean the destruction of 32 hectares of ancient woodland from 19 different sites, 4,800 hectares of farmland and 250 hectares of forest. 330 hectares of the land to be lost are deemed important habitats for wildlife, including 195 hectares of lowland woods and 60 hectares of lowland meadows. More broadly, highly negative impacts will be felt in urban, suburban and rural communities across the country. Phase 1 of HS2 is, in every sense, a highly damaging project for our environment.
1.3 It is to be regretted that having committed to such destructive proposals, HS2 Ltd appear determined to avoid meaningful engagement with those communities which would be most affected should these plans proceed. Suggestions made in the Community Forums across the route have been ignored. Requests from local authorities, environmental organisations and community representatives for discussion and engagement have not resulted in meaningful dialogue. Proposals made in the consultation on the Draft Environmental Statement have not made their way into the Environmental Statement.
1.4 Running alongside this reluctance to make decisions in line with accepted public participation norms is an Environmental Statement for Phase 1 of HS2 that is substandard and riddled with errors of fact. Even matters brought to HS2 Ltd’s attention prior to the publication of the Environmental Statement appear not to have been corrected. Given the scope and potential environmental damage arising from Phase 1 of HS2, this cannot be right.
1.5 We believe that HS2 Ltd must respond to the points raised in this submission and that there should not be a Second Reading of the Hybrid Bill for Phase 1 of HS2 until a new Environmental Statement is produced which complies with the relevant legislative requirements.
1.6 This document sets out what HS2AA believes are just some of the material failures with the Environmental Statement, the process by which development consent will be obtained by HS2 Ltd and the standards which HS2 Ltd should seek to meet should construction start. Given the importance of the matters covered by the Environmental Statement, HS2AA have sought objective expert advice on some of the most important themes covered in the Environmental Statement. Reports from SLR Consulting on waste and carbon, Waterman Group on landscape and Treweek Environmental Consultants on biodiversity are attached as appendices to this response. They provide an independent assessment on some of the key topics covered by the Environmental Statement and highlight just how much work is to be done if the environmental impacts of HS2 are to be properly mitigated.
1.7 Lastly, we would extend our sincere thanks to our affiliates and supporters who helped put this response together.
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2. Overview
2.1 A train making a journey at HS2’s initial design speed of 360km/hr uses three times as much energy as a train travelling at the current intercity top speed of 200km/hr1. Environmental impacts such as noise, visual amenity and land take also increase disproportionately with speed. This, in simple terms, is the reason why HS2AA believes the environmental costs set out in the Phase 1 Environmental Statement (ES) of HS2 are unacceptably high.
2.2 HS2 is uniquely damaging to the natural environment. It passes through the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, the “Meridien Gap” of greenbelt separating Coventry and Birmingham, as well as tranquil rural and suburban areas, cutting a swathe through previously unspoilt countryside. Its negative effects are equally pronounced in urban communities too. These high levels of damage are an inevitable consequence of the demand for HS2 to run at the highest possible speed, meaning a route so straight as to be incapable of following existing transport corridors.
2.3 The justification for this destruction and energy profligacy is the value of speed to business. HS2AA believe it is important to note the close relationship between the flawed methodology used by the Department for Transport in successive business cases for HS2 and the high levels of environmental damage detailed in the ES. HS2’s business case remains critically dependent on discredited values of time for business passengers. However the case that the on-board journey time savings are worth, in economic terms, what the Government claim, simply isn’t backed up by the evidence. It is plain that shortening on-board journey times does not yield an equivalent increase in productive time.
2.4 Given the requirements of the Climate Change Act, HS2AA believes investment in trophy infrastructure should be consistent with the country’s decarbonisation agenda. However HS2 Ltd’s latest forecasts, issued in October 2013, conclude 95% of its passengers would move from less polluting modes of travel or wouldn’t otherwise travel at all2. Just 1% of HS2’s passengers are forecast to transfer from air (previously 3%), and 4% from road (previously 8%). 69% of the passengers using HS2 will transfer from classic rail and 26% are entirely new journeys (previously 24%). These figures are for the full Y network, figures are not given for Phase 1, but it is likely that the numbers would be even lower. HS2 therefore cannot, in any sense, be described as contributing to the wider carbon reduction and sustainability agenda.
2.5 The ES and associated consultation reflect the requirement that the HS2 project must comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. This European legislation requires that an environmental statement should include information to enable the assessment of environmental effects of any development, including an assessment of alternatives. An objective review of the ES indicates that neither the likely significant effects on the environment, the alternatives or the proposed mitigation measures have been adequately described. In many instances, no mitigation is offered or what little mitigation is referenced to the draft Code of Construction Practice, with no assurances that this will actually be secured.
1 Transport Policy Statement 09/03, High Speed Rail Table 1, Institute of Mechanical Engineers 2 Table 12 page 83, ‘Economic Case for HS2’ October 2013
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2.6 The principles that led the design of HS1 ensured the new route followed existing routes where possible, thereby minimising the environmental harm. HS2 adopts that principle for only the first 15 miles. The route emerges above ground in West Ruislip and then travels on a new line that does not follow an existing route all the way to the West Midlands. This causes a significant level of destruction to well established and highly diverse habitats. Beyond the route, the level of construction disruption and the placement of excavated material will give rise to the loss of further highly important ecological features. This has not been clearly shown in the ES, where the focus in the consultation documentation is on “selling” the case for HS2 rather than dispassionately reviewing and assessing environmental impacts and does not comply with relevant legal requirements.
2.7 HS2AA believe effective public participation has been stymied given the confusing drafting and structure of the ES. It is very difficult for a reader of the ES documents to develop a clear understanding of what is being lost and where. Instead consultees are expected to piece together the various maps, cross reference these with the descriptive text and then determine for themselves what is expected to be lost.
2.8 To provide a complete list of our concerns with the ES is beyond the resources or expertise of a voluntary organisation like HS2AA. But we have identified the following concerns with the ES:
The ES has a significant number of errors and inconsistencies. There is no mention anywhere in the ES that sensitive habitats will need to be buffered from the proposed works. The ES does not acknowledge the long lag time frames between habitats being removed and new habitats being recreated and the impacts that this may have on the species dependent on them. The maps accompanying the ES show the locations of the temporary materials stockpiles. Often they are adjacent to or even in sensitive habitats. This is not in accordance with statements made in the draft Code of Construction Practice. It is not clear from the ES how the amount of compensation planting has been calculated. The impact of noise on the natural environment has not been adequately addressed (there is no specific section on it). The use of the phrase “as far as reasonably practicable” is used too frequently in connection with mitigation/compensation actions that HS2 Ltd or its contractors will undertake. It is not clear who will judge what is ‘reasonably practicable’. There is very little information in the ES or the Hybrid Bill on management, maintenance and monitoring of environmental mitigation. There is an assumption in the ES that all mitigation proposed will be successful. There is no discussion of contingency plans or how appropriate some of the proposed mitigation is. In considering transport issues, the ES fails to consider factors of delay, disruption, overcrowding, changes to service frequency or capacity. The ES does all it can to report minimal impacts on communities and fails to address cumulative impacts that in a linear project are critical. The fragmented structure of the ES makes it impossible for a reader to get a comprehensive over-view of cumulative impacts on the environment arising from Phase 1 of HS2. Baseline information is unreliable, inadequate or inaccurate on key topic areas detailed in the ES.
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2.9 Just how far the ES is from HS2 Ltd’s own goals can be seen in assessing its performance against HS2 Ltd’s own sustainability goals, as detailed in the table below.
HS2 Ltd Priority 1 Reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combat climate change
Design Aim 1: managing energy - The project shall Construction and operation from HS2 will result in consider the energy efficiency of the operation of trains negative carbon outcomes and HS2 will be an and rail infrastructure, as well as the energy requirements intensive user of electricity. of construction and materials, as a means of establishing low energy priorities within the Proposed Scheme as a HS2AA Assessment: Phase 1 Fails This Test whole.
Design Aim 2: managing flood risk - The project shall aim The ES does not contain sufficient data to confirm to avoid any increase in flood risk, by maintaining overall position regarding the risk posed by floods. flood storage capacity (through, in order of priority, option selection that avoids floodplains, infrastructure design and HS2AA Assessment: Phase 1 Fails This Test flood compensation) and minimising disruption of flood flows. HS2 Ltd Priority 2 Protect natural and cultural resources and enhance the environment
Design Aim 3: protecting natural resources - The project ES makes clear that current plans will be highly shall seek to avoid direct or indirect harm to valued damaging to wildlife and landscape. landscape, water and ecological resources, to mitigate HS2 Ltd show few signs of a commitment to adverse impacts and to enhance such resources where mitigation given contents of ES. practicable. Measures to achieve this would be commensurate with the sensitivity of the resources and HS2AA Assessment: Phase 1 Fails This Test the level of their protection.
Design Aim 4: protecting cultural resources - The project ES indicates that HS2 Ltd have done little in the shall seek to avoid direct or indirect harm to valued historic way of assessment of risk in this area. cultural resources, to mitigate adverse impacts, and to enhance such resources where practicable. Measures to HS2AA Assessment: Phase 1 Fails This Test achieve this would be commensurate with the sensitivity of the resources and their level of protection.
HS2 Ltd Priority 3 Create Sustainable Communities
Design Aim 5: controlling noise and vibration – Where ES makes clear HS2 Ltd continue to avoid reasonably practicable, the operation of the Proposed complying with international norms in connection Scheme shall result in no significant adverse noise and with noise, with many households facing severe vibration impacts (by reference to relevant guidance and disruption from noise. precedence) to residents and other sensitive receptors near the route or proposed stations. Measures to mitigate HS2AA Assessment: Phase 1 Fails This Test potential impacts would be introduced, but where such impacts are unavoidable and cannot be appropriately mitigated, the project shall define circumstances under which residential properties shall be eligible for sound insulation. Design Aim 6: minimising property demolition - The project ES makes clear that HS2 will require significant would seek to avoid or, where this is not practicable, to numbers of properties to be acquired and minimise impacts due to the demolition of properties and, demolished. in particular, to minimise residential land required and demolition. HS2AA Assessment: Phase 1 Fails This Test
Design Aim 7: protecting communities - The project would ES makes clear that significant community impacts seek to maintain the health and amenity of residential will result from construction and operation of communities potentially affected by the Proposed Phase 1 of HS2. The likely scale and scope of Scheme. This would include, where practicable, these impacts has been downplayed in the ES. maintenance of access to services (such as health facilities, schools and places of worship) and shops, and HS2AA Assessment: Phase 1 Fails This Test maintenance of environmental conditions such that significant adverse effects on health and amenity are mitigated. Design Aim 8: safety - The project design would seek to ES doesn’t explicitly deal with whether or not the ensure that the travelling public and general public are not plans for Phase 1 mean an increased risk of death. subject to increased risk of death or injury as a result of HS2AA assume this should be an objective for all the operation of services associated with the Proposed construction schemes, rather than being HS2 Scheme.
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specific.
HS2AA Assessment: NA
HS2 Ltd Priority 4 Achieve sustainable consumption and production
Design Aim 9: optimising the land resource - The project The ES makes clear that HS2 will require a significant land would seek, where practicable, to use land with planning take, a decision worsened by HS2 Ltd’s view that waste designations appropriate to development for high speed should be dumped in areas close to the new route. rail and its infrastructure. The project would seek to maintain and enhance land use, provided this does not HS2AA Assessment: Phase 1 Fails This Test compromise other sustainability aims.
2.10 HS2AA believes there is a balance to be struck between environmental impact and economic growth. But if the case for HS2 is fundamentally weak, then the impact on Camden, the Chilterns and every affected location all the way along Phase 1 is unacceptable. A review of the ES makes it clear that the correct balance has not been struck in the case of HS2.
2.11 Given the scale of errors and omissions in the ES, HS2AA believes that it would be unlawful to bring forward the Hybrid Bill to Second Reading until a properly drafted Environmental Statement has been provided, to which the public are given an opportunity to review and respond.
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3. Making Things Better
3.1. HS2 Ltd still has time to engage effectively with the communities through which it plans to undertake construction work and then run Phase 1 of HS2. This submission makes a number of recommendations on how the process of decision making, design and construction of Phase 1 of HS2 could be improved.
3.2. HS2AA believe such a commitment would be demonstrated by HS2 Ltd undertaking the following steps:
Commit to Proper Mitigation o The environment has a value and this should be factored in fully and transparently by HS2 Ltd to decide appropriate mitigation including tunnels versus surface routes. o The costs being used by HS2 Ltd in determining what mitigation measures to accept must be made public and subject to independent review. Design Parameters That Put Communities First o Described as an ‘Engine for Growth’, HS2 is heralded as an exemplar infrastructure project, and as such, it should adopt the highest possible design standards. This could be achieved by the establishment of a national Design Panel for HS2, which would enable HS2 Ltd’s buildings and structures to reflect local and regional landscape character and cultural heritage. o Commit to deeper cuttings to hide HS2 fully, including the pantograph. In many cases this means just returning to the depths that were consulted on in 2011. o Comprehensive screening of structures by planting of native tree species, with properly robust plans for their management and oversight. o Ensure new buildings required by HS2 Ltd, such as autotransformer stations, blend into their local surroundings. Support Communities Impacted By HS2 o Clear and easy to enforce mechanisms for local communities and local authorities to ensure that if the environmental impacts once HS2 is up and running are not as HS2 Ltd forecast there will be a genuine commitment to rectify or compensate as required. o Full recompense for losses incurred by businesses and owners of residential property due to the construction and operation of the new line. o A community fund to support local causes to offset damage to the local amenity and environment that cannot be compensated by other means. Deal Properly With Waste and Spoil o Decisions on whether to dump spoil not needed for structures to be made in line with the Waste Framework Directive and in particular the “Waste Hierarchy” set out in that document. Handle Construction Effectively o Agree a Code of Construction practice that supports those communities where construction is due to be carried out and has real enforcement provisions. o Give local authorities the funds necessary to oversee compliance with the Construction Code. o Commit to restoring all public rights of way and private access routes close to their original alignment. o Use a realistic model for road traffic construction impacts, with appropriate strategies for the minimisation of disruption and damage arising from the construction process through engagement with and monitoring and regulation by affected local communities. Treat Biodiversity As a Priority o Make a real commitment to avoiding ancient woodland. If it has to be lost then the Woodland Trust should be asked to say what to do for each one (including how loss can be minimised) and how mitigation should work eg where new trees should be planted – types, age, etc o Include migration routes for wildlife, and screening of the track to reduce bird
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strikes, in locations agreed by local communities. o Compensatory measures to offset habitat loss and other damage to species of concern which are independently verified and monitored. Noise o Full-height noise barriers to provide acceptable peak sound levels close to and away from the line. o Integration of full-height noise barriers into the structural design of viaducts, with correspondingly shallower support structures beneath track level. Appoint A Communities Champion o HS2 Ltd’s senior management is dominated by engineers and others with established links to the construction and transport sectors. There is no one at a senior level in the organisation with the role of advocating on behalf of the communities which will be devastated should HS2 proceed. This position should be remedied, so communities have a voice when plans which will be highly adverse are considered by HS2 Ltd.
3.3. Overall HS2 Ltd could radically improve its engagement model with those communities that it plans to impact. Its record to date on public participation and engagement has been uniformly poor. HS2AA believe it’s time for this to change.
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4. Public Participation
4.1 The publication of the ES has highlighted the flawed manner in which the public have been permitted to participate in decision making about HS2, and in particular, its environmental consequences.
4.2 Our specific concerns include:
(i) ES Consultation Period
The ES includes a huge amount of new information, compared to the draft Environmental Statement published in 2013, most of which has not been released in any form before. The initial consultation period of 56 days, including the Christmas holiday period, which technically met Parliamentary requirements, was wholly inadequate in terms of the ability of any organisation, particularly voluntary organisations, to absorb and comment on the ES in the time available.
The extension, while welcome, came so late in the process that work programmes for most consultees would have already been set and HS2AA are aware that a number of consultees had already formulated their response before that date and so were not able to take advantage of the unexpected additional time.
The argument advanced by the Secretary of State that planning projects only need 28 days for consultation so 56 days for the ES consultation was appropriate was specious and amounts to a refusal by the Department for Transport to acknowledge the obligation to ensure an appropriate degree of public participation.
(ii) Use of Maps in the ES
HS2 Ltd took the peculiar decision to orientate the maps in the ES inconsistently and to use different scales as compared to maps it had previously issued. This resulted in maps running over multiple pages and in many cases parcels of land covered by the same annotation are separated. This makes the ES difficult to follow.
(iii) Appraisal Methodology
The purpose of the EIA Directive is to take account of the potential environmental impacts of a proposal and iteratively revise the design in the light of any impacts. The ES process has been influenced by experience of the HS2 Phase One Appraisal of Sustainability (February 2011) and in particular the HS2 Scoping Methodology for Environmental Statements (March 2011). Despite this work, it remains unclear in the ES how HS2 Ltd’s assessment on the scale of environmental effects have been reached. There appears to be a highly subjective analysis throughout the ES, with an attempt to “sell” the project by deliberately downplaying the likely environmental adverse effects.
HS2AA believe that HS2 Ltd should produce a summary methodology as to how terms like substantial harm, significant adverse, significantly affected, adverse or moderately adverse are defined by each topic - land use planning, cultural heritage, ecology, archaeology, hydrology, noise and vibration and socio economic and community. Without such definitions being set, it is difficult for any reader of the ES to be clear what the judgments reached by HS2 Ltd on different environmental impacts really mean.
(iv) Consideration of Route Alternatives
Many local communities have suggested route alternatives which would mean reduced environmental impacts. For many groups making such suggestions, it has been a frustrating process as ideas put forward and discussed with HS2 Ltd’s representatives have not been fully considered by HS2 Ltd and in many cases no formal response has been received.
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(v) Community Forums
Shortly after the announcement by the Secretary of State of her intention to proceed with HS2 in January 2012, HS2 Ltd announced the creation of “Community Forums” as vehicles for community engagement.
HS2 Ltd stated the purpose of these forums is as follows:
As part of our ongoing engagement with local people and organisations on the London-West Midlands route we have set up community forums and planning forums… The community forums enable local participation, facilitate ongoing discussions and build relationships, allowing us to identify local priorities and explore opportunities for further mitigation and local community benefits. 3
A key stated purpose of these groups therefore was to enable HS2 Ltd to “explore opportunities for further mitigation”. These meetings were supposed to provide a structure for engagement with local communities on mitigation and related issues. Despite these intentions, the reality was that they fell far short of the minimum expected given their stated purpose and the legal requirements which underpinned their creation.
The record of the Community Forums indicated the following problems:
Lack of Clarity on Areas of Responsibility
The Community Forums began meeting without agreed terms of reference, including specifying the roles and responsibilities of these meetings and its participants. In addition, no information was provided on how points raised in Community Forums concerning mitigation would be assessed by HS2 Ltd and what criteria will be applied by HS2 Ltd for them to be deemed worthy of being included in HS2 Ltd’s finalised mitigation strategy. There was also a clear lack of information on how Community Forums would interact with other engagement activities being undertaken by HS2 Ltd.
HS2 Ltd also met with individuals and community groups in so called “bilateral meetings” at the same time as the Community Forums were being undertaken. HS2 Ltd claimed these meetings were a further part of the engagement process, but opted not to provide any information on the outcome of these meeting to the Community Forums. As a result, Community Forums were unable to keep an accurate picture of commitments made by HS2 Ltd on mitigation in these meetings, and how they would fit with other environmental priorities for a particular area.
Lack of Specialised Assistance
The Community Forum meetings which took place indicated HS2 Ltd used these events to seek community feedback on a range of technical mitigation points. To be able to contribute to these discussions in any kind of informed manner clearly required specialist help and advice.
However, meeting attendees were expected to provide expert input on a range of technical mitigation matters, all of which have major environmental implications, without recourse to expertise to inform its decision making. HS2 Ltd opted not to make resources available to enable Community Forum participants to seek independent advice to scrutinise the environmental impacts of the materials upon which participants were being asked to comment.
Where participants did identify matters which were important to mitigation, HS2 Ltd demonstrated a pattern of not providing basic information to enable informed deliberation and decision making. One obvious example was the inability of HS2 Ltd to provide details of the
3 http://www.hs2.org.uk/consultation-engagement
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amount of spoil to be removed in each area covered by a Community Forum. When this was raised at the Euston Community Forum of 19 March 2012, HS2 Ltd representatives were unable to provide this information even in outline. In the ES this information was finally provided, but for the reasons described below, has highly negative environmental consequences.
Membership & Administration
There appears to have been no consistent approach to how participants were chosen for participation in Community Forums by HS2 Ltd. It was unclear what skills were required for persons to be chosen to be participants and how HS2 Ltd ensured participants represented their community.
HS2 Ltd personnel attending Community Forums appear frequently not to have been provided with sufficient information for the meetings to fulfil their stated role. For example, the HS2 Ltd representatives attending the July Central Chilterns Community Forum had no knowledge of the adverse route changes announced by the Secretary of State in January 2012.
The meetings were not initially minuted by HS2 Ltd representatives until participants raised this as an issue. Such minutes that were taken appeared to frequently omit key points of discussion or commitments made by HS2 Ltd. This, in turn, required meeting participants to engage in extensive discussions with HS2 Ltd to ensure accurate minutes were produced. Requests for more forum meetings or longer meetings to examine issues in more detail were refused by HS2 Ltd.
HS2 Ltd representatives also engaged in behaviour which appeared to be designed to minimise opportunities for engagement- for example waiting until the end of the allotted times of meetings to announce significant information (eg location of work camps) rather than providing information in advance.
HS2 Ltd also used the Community Forums to announce matters which should have been the subject matter of wider consultation processes, for example their announcement in the Euston Community Forum on 19 March 2012 that the total budget for mitigation for the entire Stage 1 Route was £250 million. Clearly there is a huge difference between informing the public about major aspects of the scheme, which should have been subject to consultation, and informing relatively few people in a Community Forum.
Failure to Provide Information Relating to Mitigation
Despite the stated goals of these meetings, the experience of participants in the Community Forums is that it was, in practical terms, impossible to have a substantive discussion about mitigation as HS2 Ltd would not provide details of what funds were allocated for each section of the line for mitigation.
Participants were therefore being asked to make assessments about mitigation without clarity around basic points such as what criteria would be used to determine whether additional mitigation was required or whether mitigation measures incorporated in the actual structure should be costed against construction or mitigation budgets. HS2 Ltd representatives would not provide information to forum participants (most of whom as community members have no specialised knowledge of the area) on what type of mitigation measures may be available, their respective relative strengths and weaknesses in terms of environmental impacts, and what issues forums should consider to determine which mitigation options may be preferable for a specific section of route.
This approach means that the Community Forums, which serve as the only mechanism for communities to provide feedback on mitigating the impact of HS2, were unable to properly discharge the role for which they were created. The primary reason for this failure was the inability or unwillingness of HS2 Ltd to provide even the minimum information required.
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Furthermore, there appears to be no mechanism for communities to be presented with the mitigation proposals developed by HS2 Ltd or opportunity for these to be challenged or subject to independent scrutiny or approval.
(vi) Lobbying By Those Who Will Benefit Financially
Public participation in decision making on the HS2 project has been skewed by the access and influence of those representing financial interests which will benefit directly and significantly should the HS2 project proceed.
This influence has been evident from the start. On 15 January 2009 the document Britain’s Transport Infrastructure High Speed Two4 was published by the DFT, which was the first official statement signifying a commitment to constructing High Speed 2. This January 2009 document signified a decision by a public authority that there was a need for a new high speed rail line and set out the essential principles of HS2 in terms of its route and key performance characteristics.
It is clear from the document that no public participation has been undertaken in coming to its conclusions. Instead the only external group mentioned in this document is Greengauge 21, where the report states
In 2006, the not-for-profit organisation Greengauge 21 was established “to research and develop the concept of a high speed rail network, and to promote its implementation as a national economic priority”. Network Rail is a member of the steering group and the Department for Transport and Office of Rail Regulation have observer status. Greengauge 21 has published various papers, including a proposition for a high speed railway between London and Birmingham, with links to the West Coast main line and a spur into Heathrow (High Speed Two, June 2007). A further paper considers five potential corridors for high speed rail (The Next Steps, November 2007).
The report doesn’t mention that Greengauge 21 was set up by two persons with strong links to the transport sector, Jim Steer and Julie Mills, who both have significant ownership stakes in businesses which stand to benefit significantly from the introduction of new high speed rail lines in the UK. No justification is provided as to why this group should be entitled to participate in the Government’s decision making process whilst the public was denied such an opportunity.
The involvement of Greengauge 21 in formulating policy appears to raise fundamental questions in connection with the DFT and HS2’s compliance with Article 3(2) of the Aarhus Convention, which requires parties to ensure that officials and authorities assist and provide guidance to the public in seeking access to information, in facilitating participation in decision-making and in seeking access to justice in environmental matters. Permitting a party with a clear financial interest in progressing high speed rail proposals to contribute to policy making on the subject and not providing public participation opportunities for any other person to contribute to this process would not appear to be consistent with these requirements. The Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee has previously stated. “While certain special provisions might be required due to specifics of various types of decision-making, the rights of the public should not be compromised to accommodate other interests, whether private or public, in particular with regard to projects of such potential environmental significance. The Committee, having in mind the objective of the Convention and the provisions of article 3, paragraphs 5 and 6, expresses its concern about such a tendency.”5
4 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/55872 5 Hungary ACCC/C/ 2004/4 ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.4, 14 March 2005, para. 17
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Similar behaviour was evident with the role of Westbourne Communications, a public relations firm hired by the secretive “campaign for high speed rail”. They fronted a campaign, funded by companies active in the transport sector. Upon the decision being taken in January 2012 to proceed with HS2, this organisation was hired by the Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd for communications services. Both organisations have declined to explain the procurement process governing this engagement.
4.3 The debate on HS2 has therefore been skewed by the Department for Transport and HS2 Limited who have spent public money to campaign remorselessly in favour of the project. This has been aided by the work of organisations like Greengauge 21 that are fronts for the very companies which will benefit most directly from the decision to proceed with HS2.
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5. Hybrid Bill Process
5.1 The Government is committed to obtaining the legal authority necessary to construct and operate HS2 by means of a Hybrid Bill. The Bill would provide broad powers, with little or no independent oversight, to enable HS2 Limited to construct and operate the new high-speed rail network between London and the West Midlands.
5.2 In particular the Hybrid Bill would: (vii) Provide development consent (for the purposes of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive) for HS2; (viii) Provide powers for HS2 Ltd to purchase land compulsorily and end private rights of way which are required for construction; (ix) Remove existing legal protections dealing with Ancient Monuments, Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas that are impacted by the route; (x) Provide the right to deal with trees overhanging the railway where necessary and removing certain protections relating to trees; (xi) Modify the application of the Control of Pollution Act 1977; Environmental Protection Act 1990 in relation to the construction of Phase 1 of HS2; (xii) Modify controls relating to a range of issues such as burial grounds, ecclesiastical law, London Lorries Act, London Buildings Act etc to give HS2 Ltd the powers to dig up church yards, demolish building of religious worship and undertake construction with measures designed to reduce construction traffic.
5.3 Hybrid Bills are a long established method for obtaining planning approval for large-scale infrastructure projects. They were first used in the nineteenth century, by promoters of new railways, to obtain the land required to construct new lines-a time long before environmental protection and public participation had the prominence in the legal system which they enjoy today. HS2AA believe many people would find it surprising that the Government would consider it appropriate to use a mechanism designed in the nineteenth century in 2014 for such an environmentally sensitive project.
5.4 The Hybrid Bill approach was used to obtain the consents required to construct the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) and Crossrail, with a mixed record of success. In the case of CTRL, the promoter was provided with wide powers following passage of the Hybrid Bill that they exploited during the construction stage to depart from what had been agreed in Parliament. The construction of HS1 was particularly disruptive for local communities, which enjoyed few protections from decisions taken by contractors building the new railway. The process emphasised the substantial disconnect between what was agreed in Parliament and what was actioned in practice, with environmental outcomes being far worse in reality than was promised in Parliament. Local authorities had few rights of oversight or challenge to practices during construction.
5.5 The Crossrail Hybrid Bill, although being far less controversial than HS2, still required substantial Parliamentary time before authorisation. There were particular environmental issues with the choice of the route and noise impacts on local communities.
5.6 HS2AA believes using the Hybrid Bill approach for HS2 is particularly cynical given the 2008 Planning Act contains a specific process for nationally significant infrastructure projects. This new process was specifically designed to deal with concerns that the planning regime was too complex and unwieldy for large scale infrastructure projects, given the experience of obtaining consent for the Sizewell B nuclear power station and Heathrow Terminal 5, yet provides the objectivity and independence of a process led by a professional planning inspector, subject to judicial oversight.
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5.7 HS2AA believe the 2008 Planning Act procedure should have been adopted by the Government rather than the Hybrid Bill process, given the importance of the planning and environmental issues raised in Phase 1 of HS2. HS2AA’s particular concerns with the Hybrid Bill process include:
(i) It prevents proper scrutiny
HS2 would be unlikely to survive in its current form if subjected to the degree of independent and detailed scrutiny that a process undertaken under the 2008 Planning Act requires. By contrast, the passage of the Hybrid Bill for HS2 can be forced through, no matter how significant the problems with the project’s business case or the severity of its environmental impacts.
The chances of opponents of HS2 or those pushing for better mitigation as a precursor to the scheme being approved influencing that Hybrid Bill are negligible because the Government commands a whipped majority at every stage of the Hybrid Bill's passage through the Parliament. Certainly, Parliament can make its voice heard, but it can hardly change anything that the Government has decided to do. The only rare exception is when there is a revolt on the Government benches which is backed by the Opposition. The experience of the last 30 years indicates this is a highly unusual event.
Preparations for the passage through Parliament of the Hybrid Bill have raised many fundamental questions about the scheme’s environmental impacts-including noise, carbon, waste disposal, cumulative effects. It is unlikely these issues will be examined in any substantive detail in the Parliamentary process. The time allotted for debate will be limited, Members of Parliament lack specialist expertise on these topics and there will be significant Government pressure to expedite the approval process. (ii) It limits debate on HS2
The timetable for approving the Hybrid Bill is far quicker than the period required under the normal planning process for a project of this size and complexity. It is also far harder for any planning decision made by Hybrid Bill to be challenged in the Courts. The Hybrid Bill process means that once there is an initial vote in favour of the project, the Select Committee looking at the Hybrid Bill cannot consider the principle of the project and are only able to deal with mitigation related matters.
Only those people “directly and specially affected” will be entitled to petition the Committee. This definition is likely to make it difficult for many of the environmental impacts referred to in the ES (particularly those with a route wide significance) to be scrutinised at the Select Committee stage. It’s also unclear how fundamental design aspects of HS2-such as its very high speed-will be dealt with by the Select Committee, given they are fundamental design features of HS2, with significant environmental impacts, yet go to the principal of the project. (iii) It grants very wide powers to enter land, construct new structures and ignore existing planning requirements, beyond those plans set out in the ES
The Hybrid Bill, when passed, will provide far wider powers to the Government and HS2 Ltd to construct the line than would be the case with a standard planning permission. These powers can be exercised without reference to any other planning authority. For example, when the Hybrid Bill was passed to construct HS1, Kent County Council was obliged to accept, and could not challenge, significant additional road construction even though this was not mentioned during consideration of the Hybrid Bill (iv) There will be a lack of expert scrutiny
Three major environmental regulators- the Environment Agency; Natural England and English Heritage - have a key role in the planning system, providing independent and expert scrutiny of major development consent requests, including Government schemes. However, aside from providing comments to HS2 Ltd in the run up to the preparation of the Hybrid Bill, these organisations will have no formal role in the consideration and approval for Phase 1 of HS2, with
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no standing right to advise the Select Committee, despite the scheme’s significant environmental effects relating to flood risk, water resources, sites of special scientific interest and listed buildings. (v) Independent Assessor
Local authority Planning Committees, which make the vast bulk of planning decisions in the UK, are supported by a myriad of independent technical experts to ensure decisions on planning applications are not based on guesswork or solely linked to high level principles. The technical experts, in combination with a planning inspector or officer, allow for a range of material planning considerations to be properly considered in any decision making process. It also presents the public with an outlet to have their comments heard and understood prior to a decision being taken.
Changes to Parliamentary Standing Orders were introduced during the Appeal Court proceedings in June 2013. Standing Order 27A was updated to introduce an “independent assessor” to the decision making process. This was designed to satisfy one of the concerns of the Court that there would be inadequate scrutiny of the consultation on the ES.
However, since then, more information on the independent assessor has been released: The Standing Order requires the minister to publish comments made in the ES Consultation and to send them to an ‘independent assessor’ (SO224A(5)). The independent assessor must then produce a report which is required to summarise “the issues raised by those comments” (SO 224A(6)(i)). The Standing Order does not require the independent assessor to reach any conclusion on those issues or to conduct any evaluation of the ES.
HS2AA believes the term assessor is misleading. There will be no replica of the normal planning processes, no proper independent scrutiny of the ES and Parliament will only have a summary of consultation responses to guide its consideration of the Hybrid Bill. Furthermore, the Hybrid Bill Select Committee will not have the ability to call its own witness evidence or rely on subject matter experts, but rather rely heavily on information provided by HS2 Ltd.
This is wholly inadequate. It will mean that Parliament will be left to debate matters of principle of HS2 without understanding any of the detailed impacts. The public’s concerns will be unfairly treated and technical matters ignored.
(vi) The petitioning process is unfair
Throughout the ES consultation materials, reference is made to ‘petitioning’. Petitioning is a process by which a summary of objections to any particular aspect of a bill is put before a Select Committee, convened to hear the petitioner’s case. For a petition to be considered there must be an identified individual, group of individuals or organisation ‘directly and specially affected’ by a provision of the bill.
Petitioning is subject to cross-examination, in this case potentially by legal representatives of HS2 Ltd, and is not a process lightly undertaken as successful petitions will become clauses within the Bill and eventually, if passed, part of an Act of Law.
HS2AA is concerned that the petitioning process will disenfranchise many people who have views on the environmental damage caused by HS2 but lack locus standi as they are not deemed “directly and specially affected”. Few details have been provided on what exactly this means. When petitioning does commence, there will only be a short period for petitions to be deposited- which may require each petitioner to physically travel to London to lodge their petition.
It is also unclear what exactly is being proposed in the ES and hence what people should petition on. Where intentions are stated within the ES, they are frequently caveated by phrases such as ‘where reasonably practicable’ giving limited assurance to impacted communities that works will be carried out as stated. Even where there is a clear commitment to appropriate mitigation, there
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is no assurance that a contractor or nominated undertaker would place this commitment before cost and programme requirements. It is HS2AA’s view that ‘where reasonably practicable’ should be replaced with a more effective and enforceable phrase, tying in specific activities to the current Best Practice standards of the relevant industry and this point explicitly guaranteed by the Select Committee.
The Hybrid Bill Select Committee will have wide powers in determining which petitions it intends to hear. It will not be obvious to petitioners what criteria will be applied by the Select Committee to determine whether a petition should be accepted and what appeal mechanism may be available for petitions which are not heard. The membership of the Select Committee will be chosen by the Government and any Member of Parliament who is opposed or sceptical of the HS2 project will not be able to serve on the Committee.
HS2 Ltd will have a large legal team arguing against petitions-whereas petitioners will not be entitled to Legal Aid. The connection between land ownership and entitlement to petition, which reflects the Nineteenth Century origins of hybrid bills, essentially means a wide range of environmental impacts will simply not be considered by the Select Committee.
For these reasons, HS2AA believes the Parliamentary authorities should consider further changes to the Hybrid Bill process and in particular the Select Committee’s activities to ensure adequate public participation as soon as possible. An obvious improvement would be for the Hybrid Select Committee to appoint their own counsel to cross examine the promoters and objectors. We note this is happening on the Thames Tunnel inquiry and it brings greater rigour to the process. Such an approach would mean a greater degree of examination of HS2 Ltd’s proposals and would give the Select Committee more independence from the promoters of the scheme
5.8 HS2AA’s concerns were heightened following the publication of the draft Hybrid Bill for Phase 1, which reserves to HS2 Ltd wide powers to acquire and develop land adjacent to the route of the new line, all with minimal oversight.
5.9 The specific clauses HS2AA believe to be too far ranging are as follows:
Clause 31 and schedule 20, which override key legal safeguards that protect public water supplies. These protections may have been removed because the consultation documents explicitly admit that there is a high risk that the so-called “mid-Chilterns chalk” drinking water table will suffer deterioration in its “chemical status” as a result of “sub-water table activities” — mostly tunnelling and bridge piling — planned during the construction of HS2. Clause 39 scraps the normal legal procedure for closing any existing railway line or station if ministers deem its closure “necessary or expedient” for HS2. Under the Railways Act 2005, any proposed closure of a passenger line or station must go through a complex process, involving long notice periods, transport assessments and consideration of hardship. The new summary procedure means that lines could be closed at the stroke of a pen. Clause 47 allows minsters to compulsorily purchase any land anywhere if they think it HS2 creates “an opportunity for regeneration or development” on it. This clause states that if the Government “considers that the construction or operation of phase one of High Speed 2 gives rise to the opportunity for regeneration or development of any land” it may acquire the land compulsorily. This clause, which has no spatial or time limits, represents a new general power that is unprecedented in the history of infrastructure projects. Clause 51 establishes a new “right of entry” for anyone nominated by HS2 to enter any property within 500 metres (546 yards) of the line. A refusal to provide entry would be a criminal offence. This new power not only applies to the route of Phase 1 but to any property near any other potential future high-speed line, even if no separate Bill for it has been published, let alone passed.
5.10 HS2AA believe these issues are unlikely to be properly reviewed due to the limited time allowed for parliamentary passage of the Hybrid Bill. It simply is far too short when compared with other projects like HS1 and Crossrail that achieved development consent using the same mechanism.
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HS1 required 25 months to pass its necessary Hybrid Bill. Crossrail required 41 months for its parliamentary passage. However, the Department for Transport has scheduled just 17 months for the same Hybrid Bill process — even though the line would be twice as long as High Speed 1, 10 times longer than Crossrail and have more tunnelling than either. As a result of this unrealistic timetable, corners have been cut, there has been insufficient risk assessments undertaken; in terms of construction, compensation and finance.
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (“EIA Directive”)
5.11 The EIA Directive details various minimum requirements that apply to any body making planning decisions that impact the environment. The EIA Directive is an important procedure for ensuring that the likely effects of new development on the environment are fully understood and taken into account before the development is allowed to go ahead.
5.12 The EIA Directive describes a procedure that must be followed for certain types of project before they can be given 'development consent'. The procedure is a means of drawing together, in a systematic way, an assessment of a project's likely significant environmental effects. This helps to ensure that the importance of the predicted effects, and the scope for reducing them, are properly understood by the public and the relevant competent authority before it makes its decision.
5.13 These requirements apply in the case of HS2 because Parliament, in a Hybrid Bill context, is operating as a body giving planning consent for a particular project, much as a local authority’s planning committee would consider a routine planning application.
5.14 It is common ground between the Government and the groups opposed to HS2 that the EIA Directive applies to the Hybrid Bill process. HS2AA however believes that the current Parliamentary procedure is incapable of meeting the requirements set out in the EIA Directive. These concerns formed a key part of the legal case brought by 51M, the group of local authorities opposed to HS2. Although the Supreme Court did not uphold this issue in the case, its decision was based on a combination of not wanting to get involved in the Parliamentary process before the Hybrid Bill began and various assurances from the Government’s counsel that the process would be brought into line with the EIA Directive. Indeed the Government has amended the Parliamentary Standing Orders twice in an attempt to ensure compliance with the EIA Directive.
5.15 HS2AA’s concerns around compliance with the EIA Directive relates to the extremely limited ability of persons who are concerned about the environmental impacts of HS2 to participate in the Parliamentary decision making process. In particular the Hybrid Bill process appears to be contrary to Article 6(4), Article 8, Article 9 and Article 11 of the EIA Directive.
5.16 Article 6(4) of the EIA Directive provides:
“The public concerned shall be given early and effective opportunities to participate in the environmental decision-making procedures referred to in Article 2(2) and shall, for that purpose, be entitled to express comments and opinions when all options are open to the competent authority or authorities before the decision on the request for development consent is taken.”
5.17 Article 8 requires that:
“The results of consultations and the information gathered pursuant to Articles 5, 6 and 7 shall be taken into consideration in the development consent procedure.”
5.18 Article 9 provides that, where a decision to grant or refuse development consent has been taken, the competent authority or authorities shall make available to the public:
“The results of consultations and the information gathered pursuant to Articles 5, 6 and 7 shall be taken into consideration in the development consent procedure.”
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5.19 Article 11 of the EIA Directive provides that a means must be provided by which members of the public will
“have access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law to challenge the substantive or procedural legality”.
5.20 HS2AA’s concerns are as follows:
There is no adequate mechanism within the Hybrid Bill procedure to define and constrain the development and proposed mitigation measures in a sufficiently precise and definitive manner so that the works ultimately constructed are not materially different from what is assessed in the Environmental Statement.
The rules on locus standi in the Standing Orders are inherently inconsistent with the requirement in Article 6(4) of the EIA for the “public concerned” to be “entitled to express comments and opinions when all options are open to the competent authority” since only those individuals whose property or interests are directly and specially affected will be entitled to express comments and opinions on the ES to the Hybrid Bill Select Committee. All others are excluded.
The Select Committee which is considering the Hybrid Bill will do so after the principle of the Bill has been voted upon by the House of Commons at Second Reading. The Select Committee’s terms of reference will exclude further consideration of the principle of the Bill. The Committee will therefore be unable to decide whether in the light of the Environmental Statement, consultation responses, and other environmental information the project should continue, and/or whether there are better alternatives to the scheme set out in the Hybrid Bill. Its remit will be limited to considering mitigation measures, including only relatively minor route changes. Even these minor changes will be limited by the geographic scope of the Safeguarding Directions issued by the Secretary of State for Transport. Therefore the requirement under Article 6(4) for the public to be able to express their comments and opinions while “all options” are still open to the decision maker cannot be met.
The Select Committee cannot of itself meet the requirements of Article 8 of the EIA Directive for the decision-maker to take into account the environmental information and consultation responses in reaching decision on whether to grant development consent. This is because that whilst the principle of the Bill will be subject to a vote on the floor of the House of Commons at Second Reading, it is highly unlikely if not unfeasible that the decision-makers (namely the MPs who vote at Second Reading) will have read the Environmental Statement let alone considered all the environmental information in its entirety including all public responses. The issue is further exacerbated by the fact, outlined above, that the outcome of the debate will be subject to a party whip.
Any further environmental evidence which will emerge as part of the Hybrid Bill process following Second Reading will not influence the principle of the Hybrid Bill and thus development consent will have already been determined before such evidence is considered. Therefore the requirement under Article 8 for the environmental information and the consultation responses to be taken into account by the decision-maker prior to granting development consent will not be satisfied.
The Standing Orders do not require Parliament to give reasons for granting development consent by means of a Hybrid Bill. Accordingly, the legislative procedure is incompatible with Article 9 of the EIA Directive. Even if, as in the case of Crossrail, a Command Paper were to be published containing a purported statement of reasons, that would not be sufficient since the reasons given in any Command Paper are those of the Government, not Parliament.
The requirements of Article 11 of the EIA Directive cannot be met since there is no means by which members of the public will “have access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law to challenge the substantive or procedural legality” of the Hybrid Bill once it is enacted into legislation.
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5.21 HS2AA believes that further work is required on the Hybrid Bill process to ensure it complies with the provisions of the EIA Directive. As currently planned, the process for approving the construction of HS2 would appear to be highly deficient in the context of the EIA Directive.
5.22 A further consideration is whether the ES meets the minimum standards for the purposes of the EIA Directive. Annex IV to the EIA Directive specifies the following information which should be provided in an environmental statement:
“1. A description of the project, including in particular: a description of the physical characteristics of the whole project and the land-use requirements during the construction and operational phases; a description of the main characteristics of the production processes, for instance, the nature and quantity of the materials used; an estimate, by type and quantity, of expected residues and emissions (water, air and soil pollution, noise, vibration, light, heat, radiation, etc.) resulting from the operation of the proposed project. 2. An outline of the main alternatives studied by the developer and an indication of the main reasons for this choice, taking into account the environmental effects. 3. A description of the aspects of the environment likely to be significantly affected by the proposed project, including, in particular, population, fauna, flora, soil, water, air, climatic factors, material assets, including the architectural and archaeological heritage, landscape and the interrelationship between the above factors. 4. A description of the likely significant effects of the proposed project on the environment resulting from: the existence of the project; the use of natural resources; the emission of pollutants, the creation of nuisances and the elimination of waste.” 5. The description by the developer of the forecasting methods used to assess the effects on the environment referred to in point 4. 6. A description of the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce and where possible offset any significant adverse effects on the environment. A non-technical summary of the information provided under headings 1 to 6. An indication of any difficulties (technical deficiencies or lack of know-how) encountered by the developer in compiling the required information.”
5.23 A footnote to paragraph 3 states that the description referred to therein:
“should cover the direct effects and any indirect, secondary, cumulative, short, medium and long-term, permanent and temporary, positive and negative effects of the project. Whilst Article 5 makes clear that the degree of information to be provided under these headings may vary depending upon “the stage of the consent procedure”, “the specific characteristics of a particular project or type of project and of the environmental features likely to be affected”, and “current knowledge and methods of assessment”, some information under each of the Annex IV headings must still be provided.
5.24 There are a number of overarching areas where the ES appears to be non-compliant with the EIA Directive. These include:
Assessment of cumulative effects, as required by Annex IV, paragraph 3
The cumulative effects described in an environmental statement comprise: A number of individual environmental impacts on a single receptor (e.g. noise, dust and traffic) that, in combination, have a significant effect; The effects of other developments in the vicinity of the proposed scheme (which are under construction or have been consented), which when combined with the effects of the proposed scheme may have an incrementally significant effect; and The cumulation of individual effects on a receptor which, when assessed together (including in a regional context or across the Proposed Scheme), result in a significant environment effect.
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The “Proposed Scheme” is defined in ES as Phase 1 of HS2. There can be no question that Phases 1 and 2 of HS2 will have a range of in-combination effects on the environment. In order for the assessment of cumulative effects of Phases 1 and 2 taken together to be meaningful, the ES needs to provide a sufficient level of detail about the environmental impacts of Phase 2. Instead there is little information provided on the environmental impacts of Phase 1 and Phase 2. HS2AA therefore believes cumulative effects are not properly dealt with in the ES.
Assessment of the effects of HS2 on climatic factors (in particular its contribution to greenhouse gas emissions), as required by Annex IV, paragraph 3.
The ES acknowledges that the assessment of the climactic impacts of Phase 1 turns upon an assessment of its greenhouse gas emissions. In order to comply with the requirement under the EIA Directive to consider cumulative effects, such an assessment needs to analyse not only the contribution of Phase 1 to greenhouse gas emissions but also the cumulative contribution of Phases 1 and 2 taken together. This assessment also needs to consider the carbon footprint not only of the running of the trains but also a whole range of other carbon contributing elements of HS2 including the materials used for its construction, the transportation of those materials, labour and plant, the conversion of woodlands etc. into developed land, the production and maintenance of trains, the stations, tunnel ventilation. Given that HS2 is a long-term project, it is also necessary to base any comparison with other modes of transport by reference to how those modes are anticipated to evolve over the same period as opposed to their current carbon footprint (e.g. an allowance should be made for increased uptake of electric cars). The merits of what is asserted in relation to climate change in the ES fails these requirements, for the reasons set out in the carbon section of this submission.
Description of mitigation measures, as required by Annex IV, paragraph 6.
The ES seeks to comply with Annex IV Paragraph 6 of the EIA Directive by describing a number of mitigation measures (one of many examples being the package of construction management measures described in the Non-Technical Summary) which it is said would prevent, reduce and/or offset the environmental impacts of Phase 1 of HS2. What is not at all clear is how these mitigation measures will be tied to the grant of development consent for HS2 so that they can be legally secured and if necessary enforced. It is well established that in order for an ES to comply with the duty to describe the development and the proposed mitigation measures, the development and mitigation measures as described must be tied to the grant of permission. See e.g. R v. Rochdale B.C. ex parte Tew [2000] Env. L.R. 1 at p.30 per Sullivan J. and R (Elmbridge B.C.) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2002] Env. L.R. 1, where Richards J explained at para. 205: “in the absence of anything to tie the permission to a development in that form the material did not give a description of how the development might be carried out”. The point being that unless the description given in the ES reflects the parameters of what the development consent allows and requires to be done, it is meaningless.
The ES does not suggest any mechanism whereby the proposed mitigation measures will be tied into the grant of development consent for Phase 1 of HS2 so that they will be legally secured and enforceable. The ES refers to the concept of ‘Environmental Minimum Requirements’ which the Secretary of State would establish “in order to ensure that the environmental effects of the Proposed Scheme would not exceed those in the ES”. Furthermore the wording of clauses 31, 39 and 47 mean the scope of development permitted by the Hybrid Bill will inevitably be far wider than that contemplated by the ES.
The ES contains a statement that, during the passage of the Hybrid Bill, the Secretary of State will “make a commitment to Parliament to take the steps he considers reasonable and necessary to secure compliance with them [i.e. the EMRs] when they are not directly enforceable against the Nominated Undertaker”. No explanation is given of whether and if so how this will include provision for the mitigation measures described in the ES to be tied to the grant of development consent and enforceable in the event that they are not complied with. Unless such provision is made, the ES will suffer the same deficiency as those in Tew and Elmbridge, namely a failure to ensure that the description given in the ES is tied to the grant of permission.
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The Environmental Minimum Requirements (EMR) – the process by which HS2 Limited commits to mitigation and avoidance of environmental impacts in the Hybrid Bill process- is subject to considerations of cost and delay:
“The EMR will also impose requirements on the nominated undertaker to use reasonable endeavours to adopt measures to reduce the adverse environmental effects reported in the ES, provided that this does not add unreasonable cost or delay to the construction or operation of the Proposed Scheme.”6
This effectively means all mitigation is essentially wholly dependent on widely and largely undefined cost considerations, all determined by HS2 Limited, independently of any development consent.
Description of forecasting methods used
A further specific requirement of Annex IV para. 5 of the EIA Directive relates to requirements in this area. Again little detail is provided on how HS2 Ltd on this issue is provided and such data that is available does not appear to be confirmed by objective evidence.
Errors & Omissions in the ES
Any ES also needs to be accessible and understandable to the public concerned. HS2AA is concerned that this standard has not been complied with in this case.
o The ES has a significant number of factual errors The ES has an unacceptably high level of simple factual errors (examples of which are provided at Appendix 1). This undermines confidence in the accuracy of assessments made in the ES.
HS2AA is also concerned that the drafting of the Non-Technical Summary in particular, but also across the documents more generally, is more of a “sales” pitch for the entire HS2 project as opposed to a dispassionate assessment of likely environmental impacts.
o The ES is difficult to understand HS2AA is concerned that the provision of information has been considerable in volume in the ES but limited in terms of specific detail. In reading the ES, members of the public are frequently redirected to separate documents with data from adjacent Community Forum Areas also frequently referenced. As such, the usability of the documents is poor and confusing with large volumes of generalised data and limited detail.
This extensive cross-referencing means it is time-consuming and frustrating to follow, particularly given the short consultation period. HS2AA believe the impact of this format is to prevent a full assessment of the project within the consultation period.
To take one example, if you live in Aylesbury and wanted to understand what the ES meant for your area you would need to review over 700 pages of the ES that refer primarily to Aylesbury. These are made up of Volume 1 Introduction; Volume 2 Community Forum Area Report; the Non-Technical Summary; Volume 2 of the Map Books, CFA Stoke Mandeville and Aylesbury and the Glossary of Terms. Within these publications there are numerous cross-references to other documents as well as within the above five documents.
o Information in the ES Is Difficult To Access HS2AA is concerned that HS2 Ltd decided to charge for the provision of key ES documents-a clear attempt to reduce access to information. Charging the people being impacted by HS2 for documents is a barrier designed to put off people asking for documents, and the costs of providing such documents is tiny when compared to the overall budget for HS2.
6 Volume 3 Route Wide Effects, para 1.4.4
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Downloading the documents which form the ES requires a fast internet connection- which means a large percentage of the population has been disenfranchised. Lodging one copy per local library is too little to late – it reflects an approach of HS2 Ltd designed to emphasise secrecy and minimise debate.
o Lack of Surveys In some instances it is clear that affected areas of the proposed route have not been surveyed at all or in other instances that insufficient survey effort and at times inappropriate survey techniques have been employed. That view is shared by others, Dr Carol Williams, Director of Conservation, Bat Conservation Trust has stated: “We are concerned at the inadequate standard of surveying that supports this Environmental Statement. Also of concern is the interpretation of the survey findings into flawed proposals to negate impacts. This is particularly evident when considering the losses of ancient woodland. On such a major project, with equally major potential ramifications for bats and other wildlife it is vital that high professional standards are maintained. 7
Similarly Woodland Trust Ecologist, Luci Ryan said: “The 50,000-page document does not contain a complete map of the route, utilities or construction areas and HS2 Ltd are not able to tell us when this will be available. How can HS2 Ltd publish an Environmental Statement without completing all the surveys? The document raises more questions than it answers and betrays a shocking disregard for ancient woodland and the rare and protected species that depend on it. Some of the proposed mitigation measures make no sense, are untested, and could even cause further damage.”8
o Inadequate Photo Montages These are almost all misleading for the following reasons:
In virtually all cases the railway is shown on the far horizon. Few photomontages have been provided from the most adversely affected areas. For example the photomontages dealing with Aylesbury (Oat Close/Anton Way in south west Aylesbury, Nash Lee Road or Old Risborough Road) are all from the far horizon. Noise barriers in the photomontages seem to be painted grass colour. Will they change colour with season and drought? The true appearance of the noise barriers is shown on Page 72 of Volume 1. The overhead supply cables are shown sky-coloured and viewed from right angles to HS2. Overhead lines becomes more noticeable as the angle of view becomes more acute. No auto-transformer posts are included. These occur every 1.5km and should appear on some of the photomontages. Some photomontages do not appear to have been taken from the location shown on the accompanying map (for example LV-01-069 and 070).
Taken together these matters mean the ES does not comply with the requirements of the EIA Directive and should be resubmitted
Application of UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention)
5.25 The Aarhus Convention was adopted on 25th June 1998 in the Danish city of Aarhus. The Convention entered into force on 30 October 2001 with the UK a founding party to the Convention. As a Convention it is an agreement between sovereign states, to which the European Union is also a party. The Aarhus Convention focuses on setting and listing appropriate procedures and minimum requirements for public participation in environmental decision-making. The Aarhus Convention is unique in international law as it includes provisions that permit individuals and environmental NGOs to raise issues concerning compliance with the Convention
7 http://www.bats.org.uk/news.php/231/incomplete_inadequate_and_of_a_poor_standard_must_do_better_the_damning_verdict _on_the_hs2_environme 8 http://www.woodlandtrust.org.uk/mediafile/100090706/PR-ES-2nd-Media-Briefing-HS2-191213.pdf
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direct to an independent Compliance Committee. This Committee can review the actions of a party for possible non-compliance.
5.26 The Convention contains three broad themes or 'pillars': access to environmental information, public participation in environmental decision-making and access to justice. Each pillar is relevant to the current consultation on Phase 1 of HS2 and the Hybrid Bill process.
Pillars of the Aarhus Convention
Pillar 1- Access to Information 5.27 Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention sets out the essential elements of a system for ensuring the public's right to obtain information on request from public authorities. It sets out a presumption in favour of access and limits the circumstances when such information should not be provided. Article 5 sets out an active obligation on public authorities to provide environmental information to members of the public. Furthermore, the Convention creates an obligation that when public authorities make environmental information publicly available; they do so transparently and ensure that such information is really accessible.
5.28 This provision is designed to deal with the concerns that there are significant differences between making information available to the public in the minimalist sense that it is not secret, and actually making it accessible in a user-friendly form that reflects the needs and concerns of the public. Under the Convention, the information must be “sufficient”, or complete enough to ensure that it helps the public to effectively gain access to information. There is also an obligation on Parties to ensure that sufficient arrangements are made for making environmental information accessible through measures such as publicly accessible lists, registers or files at no charge, provide support to the public in seeking information and providing points of contact to request such information.
5.29 HS2AA believes it is unlikely that the process set out in the ES or the Parliamentary Standing Orders dealing with Hybrid Bills process will comply with these obligations. As outlined above, the ES does not provide clear and understandable descriptions of the likely level of environmental impact arising from Phase 1 of HS2. There is a consistent tendency throughout the documents to present the best possible outcome or provide misleading information. The documents seen by most people-the short summary sent to impacted households and the Non- Technical Summary- do not provide information in a transparent manner which “reflects the needs and concerns of the public”
5.30 No information has been provided on how the proceedings of the Hybrid Bill Select Committee will comply with Pillar 1 obligations. The Committee will be sitting for long periods (potentially years), receiving information from numerous bodies (much of which will be highly technical) and making decisions with significant environmental consequences impacting many people yet provision of information is unlikely, at best, to proceed much beyond the passive obligation set out at Article 4. It is unclear how the Select Committee will discharge its obligations under Article 5, in particular the obligation to ensure the public are helped to access information, points of contact for members of the public to use to request information and ensuring information is accessible in a user friendly form that reflects the needs and concerns of the public. Obligations under these provisions of the Aarhus Convention appear to need considerable further thought from the Parliamentary authorities.
Pillar II Public Participation 5.31 Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention establishes certain minimum public participation requirements for decision-making on whether to license or permit certain types of activity. The Convention states the provisions of Article 6 shall apply automatically to the activities listed in Annex 1 to the Convention. This list is similar to the list of activities for which an Environmental Impact Assessment or Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control licence is required under relevant EU legislation. Long distance railways are referenced on the Annex 1 list; meaning Phase 1 of HS2 is covered by the provisions of Article 6.
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5.32 The public participation requirements set out in Article 6 include early notification in an environmental decision making procedure, in an “adequate, timely and effective manner” of the public concerned of the proposed activity, the decision to be taken, the body responsible for taking such a decision, the envisaged process for the decision being taken, an indication of what further environmental information is available to the public concerning the decision and what opportunities for appeal may exist. In addition the Article 6 requires “reasonable time frames” for different phases of decision making, “allowing sufficient time for informing the public and for the public to prepare and participate effectively during the environmental decision making” The Convention requires early public participation “when all options are open and effective participation can take place” and procedures to permit the public to submit, in writing or, as appropriate at a public hearing or inquiry any comment, information, analyses or opinions that it considers relevant to the proposed activity.
5.33 The Convention requires any decision to take “due account” of the outcome of the public participation and, once a decision is made, the public should be promptly informed of the decision along “with the reasons and considerations on which the decision is based.” Lastly, in the event a “public authority reconsiders or updates the operating conditions” the provisions of Article 6 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
5.34 Guidance published by the Aarhus Compliance Committee has provided more detail around these public participation procedures. This guidance makes clear that all stages of the decision- making where public participation takes place must include time-frames that allow for the effective implementation of the related requirements in Article 6, including time for the public to digest the information provided in the notification requirements detailed immediately above, time to seek additional information from the public authorities identified in the notification, time to examine information available to the public, time to prepare for participation in a hearing or commenting opportunity, and time to participate effectively in those proceedings.
5.35 The process for the Hybrid Bill has seen a relatively short period permitted for consultation (only extended beyond the statutory minimum due to the orders of the House authorities). This short period appears to contradict the finding by the Compliance Committee that the requirement to provide “reasonable time frames” implies that the public should have sufficient time to get acquainted with the documentation and to submit comments taking into account, inter alia, the nature, complexity and size of the proposed activity. Given the Compliance Committee’s recognition that a time frame for consultation which may be reasonable for a small simple project with only local impact may well not be reasonable in case of a major complex project 9 it is clear that a longer period of consultation should have been provided.
5.36 The Government has sought to deflect criticism of this issue by pointing to the other consultations it has undertaken on HS2. But this is not a satisfactory defence-the only other consultation which contained detailed environmental information was the Draft Environmental Statement consultation, undertaken in 2013. However this consultation exercise was noteworthy for the amount of environmental information which was not provided, on the basis it was not ready and the information required would, in any event, be provided in the ES. Following the completion of this consultation period, there will be a Second Reading of the Hybrid Bill. For the reasons outlined above, this stage will not see decision makers taking “due account” of the ES or the comments received on it, and therefore appears inconsistent with this requirement in the Convention. Only a handful of MPs will have read anything in detail on the ES or know about the concerns of people which have responded to this consultation. In any event, even if an MP was minded to take account of the ES in reaching a decision on whether or not to proceed with HS2, the practice of whipping will mean there will be no opportunity for a decision based on the ES and public responses to this document to be made.
5.37 This obligation is not limited to public participation concerning the environmental aspects of the proposed activity, but applies to the outcome of all public participation. The official guidance
9 Lithuania ACCC/2006/16; ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.6, 4 April 2008, para. 69
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on this point states
“In general, it can be said that taking account of the outcome of public participation requires the relevant authority to consider seriously the substance of all comments received, regardless of their source, and to include the substance of the comments in the motivation of the final decision. It does not require the relevant authority to accept the substance of all comments received and to change the decision according to every comment. However, the relevant authority is ultimately responsible for the decision based on all information; including comments received, and should be able to show why a particular comment was rejected on substantive grounds.”10
In addition the Compliance Committee has noted “This provision also implies that the failure to take due account of the outcome of public participation is a procedural violation that may invalidate the decision. In appropriate circumstances a member of the public whose comments were not duly taken into account will be able to challenge the final decision in administrative or judicial proceeding on this basis under article 9, paragraph 2. It is therefore very important that authorities pay serious attention to the requirement that due account be taken of the outcome of public participation”11
5.38 The Committee recalls that the obligation do take ‘due account’ under article 6, paragraph 8, should be seen in the light of the obligation of article 6, paragraph 9, to ‘make accessible to the public the text of the decision along with the reasons and considerations on which the decision is based’. Therefore “the obligation to take account of the outcome of the public participation should be interpreted as the obligation that the written reasoned decision includes a discussion of how the public participation was taken into account.”12 Furthermore the Committee has determined “that a system where, as a routine, comments of the public were disregarded or not accepted on their merits, without any explanation, would not comply with the Convention.13
5.39 HS2AA believe the Hybrid Bill process will not comply with these obligations. Neither the Members of Parliament voting on the Second Reading or those serving on the Select Committee will be required to consider seriously the substance of comments received. They will also not be required to provide a written decision stating how public participation was taken into account either at Second Reading or Select Committee stage.
5.40 HS2AA would also highlight the wording in Article 6 that “Each Party shall provide for early public participation, when all options are open and effective public participation can take place.” The Aarhus Compliance Committee has confirmed this obligation does not prevent a public authority from taking a position or determining a preliminary opinion as to a possible decision about the proposed activity. However, the public authority must still be in the information gathering and processing stage and must be open to persuasion by members of the public to change its position or opinion. Such a change in position will be impossible in the currently contemplated Parliamentary process. Once the decision is taken at Second Reading, the Select Committee which will hear the detailed evidence about the environmental impacts of Phase 1 of HS2 will not be able to require major changes to the project or even its route alignment.
5.41 Compliance Committee guidance makes clear there should be prompt public notification of any decision, with the text of the decision and the reasons and considerations on which it is based being made publicly accessible. However the Select Committee will not be required to provide reasons for its decisions, so again it would appear the proposed process for approving HS2 is not compatible with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention.
5.42 The Convention states that where any decision is reconsidered, the clauses of Article 6 shall
10 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/ppdm/Aarhus_Implementation_Guide_second_edition_-_text_only.pdf 11 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/ppdm/Aarhus_Implementation_Guide_second_edition_-_text_only.pdf 12 Slovakia ACCC/C/2009/41, ECE/MP.PP/2011/11/Add.3, 12 May 2011, para. 51. Also See The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, United Nations, 2000 at 109. 13 Spain ACCC/2008/24; ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/8/Add.1, 30 September 2010, para.101
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be reapplied where appropriate. Again, this obligation appears incapable of being complied with in this context. There will be many proposals put to the Select Committee, which, if adopted, could result in significant changes to the line and the resulting environmental impacts. However there will be no opportunity for public participation in such reconsidered decisions. Given recent press comment concerning proposals to drop the tunnel between HS2 and HS1 as well as
“If the 2008 construction permit implied a reconsideration or an update of the operating condi- tions of the Mochovce NPP, the Party concerned should have ensured that the provisions on public participation in article 6, paragraphs 2 to 9, of the Convention were applied, “mutatis mutandis, and where appropriate”14.
5.43 The extremely limited scope of matters which can come before the Select Committee also appears to be inconsistent with Aarhus Treaty obligations. Specifically, the Select Committee will not look at those design features that are the most damaging environmentally - such as the emphasis on very high speed. This very high speed is a product of the Department for Transport’s own methodology for calculating Benefit Cost Ratios for HS2. By prohibiting discussion or consideration on the speed of HS2, a fundamental factor driving the high level of environmental damage will not be subject to challenge or discussion.
5.44 The Compliance Committee has emphasised the inherent incompatibility with any approval process which means technological decisions cannot be considered. It noted
A key issue is whether the public has had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making on those technological choices at one or other stage in the overall process, and before the “events on the ground” have effectively eliminated alternative options. If the only opportunity for the public to provide input to decision-making on technological choices, which is subject to the public participation requirements of Article 6, is at a stage when there is no realistic possibility for certain technological choices to be accepted, then this would not be compatible with the Convention.15
5.45 It appears clear that by the time the Select Committee is hearing evidence, there will be no realistic possibility of changes to the fundamental design characteristics of HS2 being discussed. In HS2AA’s view such an approach would simply not reflect the findings of the Compliance Committee- which has concluded in one case which came before it. The Compliance Committee has made clear circumstances where a decision maker is constrained by previous actions raise fundamental concerns under the Convention. It stated:
“Whether all options were in fact open to the Prefect and effective public participation could take place in the decision-making procedure, as required under article 6, paragraph 4 of the Convention, depends on many factors. The first issue to consider is whether the Prefect was in any way constrained by earlier decisions, so that all options were no longer open and, for that reason, effective public participation could not take place.”16
5.46 In this case, the Select Committee is wholly constrained by earlier decisions, all options are no longer open and effective public participation cannot be provided.
5.47 It is important to note, to meet the criteria that all options are open and effective public participation can take place, it is not sufficient that there is a formal possibility, de jure, for the Select Committee to turn down the application The Compliance Committee noted “If the practice in the jurisdiction of the Party concerned is such that, despite the possibility of the permit authority to reject an application, this never or hardly ever happens, then de facto all options would not be open at the stage in question. Thus, there would be no room for effective public participation as
14 Slovakia ACCC/C/2009/41, ECE/MP.PP/2011/11/Add.3, 12 May 2011 15 Lithuania ACCC/2006/16; ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.6, 4 April 2008, para. 74 16 France ACCC/C/2007/22, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/4/Add.1, 8 February 2011, para. 36
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required by the Convention.”17
5.48 The Committee considers decision-making should be made in a context where all options will be open and considered and participation in accordance with the Convention will be afforded. In a case concerning the Styrian Provincial Government preliminary documents assembled by the developer expressed a strong presumption in favour of the 4-lane option (corroborated by information available on the website of the Styrian Government) for a new road development. This decision, the Committee concluded might “narrow down the available options and thus hamper participation at an early stage when all options are still open and due account can be taken of the outcome of the public participation. Similarly, the Committee expresses concern with respect to the statements of the member of the provincial government, Mag. Kristina Edlinger-Ploder on public television and in newspapers that the 4-lane road will be built, excluding the consideration of other options.”
5.49 The parallels between this case and HS2 are clear-the Select Committee will have no other options to consider, and the Government have made clear that HS2 will be built, to the exclusion of other options.
Pillar III Access to Justice
5.50 The third pillar of the Convention (Article 9) aims to provide access to justice in three contexts:
Access to information appeals: A person whose request for information has not been dealt with to their satisfaction must be provided with access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law. The Convention attempts to ensure a low threshold for such appeals by requiring that where review before a court of law is provided for (which can involve high costs), there is also access to an expeditious review procedure which is free of charge or inexpensive. Final decisions must be binding on the public authority holding the information, and the reasons must be stated in writing where information is refused.
Public participation appeals: The Convention provides for a right to seek a review in connection with decision-making on projects or activities covered by Article 6. The review may address either the substantive or the procedural legality of a decision, of both. The scope of persons entitled to pursue such an appeal is similar to, but slightly narrower than, the 'public concerned', involving a requirement to have a 'sufficient interest' or maintain impairment of a right (though the text also states that these requirements are to be interpreted in a manner which is. consistent with 'the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice')
General violations of environmental law: The Convention requires Parties to provide access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which breach laws relating to the environment. Such access is to be provided to members of the public 'where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in national law' - in other words, the issue of standing is primarily to be determined at national level, as is the question of whether the procedures are judicial or administrative.
Other access to justice requirements: The procedures in each of the three contexts referred to above are required to be 'fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive'
5.51 HS2AA believe a review of the key features of the Hybrid Bill process indicates that these standards will not be complied with and in particular the requirements around appeals would are wholly inconsistent with current Parliamentary process. Due to constitutional convention, the UK courts would not challenge or overturn a decision of Parliament. There is therefore no forum for challenge of any decision made by the Select Committee considering the Hybrid Bill or the final
17 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-22/DRFcomments/ACCC-C-2007 22FranceDraftFindings.2009.05.15.doc
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decision reached at Third Reading. There will not even be an opportunity for Parliament as a whole to look at any issues raised to the Select Committee or for the Select Committee to provide a report to Parliament.
5.52 The Aarhus Compliance Committee has specifically considered the issue of planning decisions being made by national legislatures without recourse to judicial review. It concluded: This is nothing to do with the issue of jurisdiction or standing. Rather, it is connected to the fact that planning decisions whose subject matter is regulated by environmental legislation, and decisions on specific activities which, in accordance with the Convention, should be subject to an administrative or judicial review, were taken through a procedure that provides no possibility for the public to participate and no remedies. The Committee acknowledges that national legislature, as a matter of principle, has the freedom to protect some acts of the executive from judicial review by regular courts through what is known as ouster clauses in laws. However, to regulate matters subject to articles 6 and 7 of the Convention exclusively through acts enjoying the protection of ouster clauses would be to effectively prevent the use of access- to-justice provisions. Where the legislation gives the executive a choice between an act that precludes participation, transparency and the possibility of review and one that provides for all of these, the public authorities should not use this flexibility to exempt from public scrutiny or judicial review matters which are routinely subject to administrative decisions and fall under specific procedural requirements under domestic law. Unless there are compelling reasons, to do so would risk violating the principles of the Convention. In this case, the Committee has not been made aware of any compelling reason justifying the choice of this form of decision-making.18 [emphasis added]
5.53 This decision highlights the lack of compliance with the Aarhus Convention with the Government’s proposed approach for securing development consent. The Government has deliberately avoided using the process under the Planning Act 2008 and opted for a Hybrid Bill, thereby precluding judicial review of any decision reached. For any decision reached to comply with the Convention, HS2AA believe there should be access to a review procedure before a court of law and/or another independent and impartial body established by law, to challenge the substantive and procedural legality of the decision to proceed with Phase 1 of HS2 with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice within the scope of this Convention. This mechanism should cover all challengable aspects of the decisions to proceed with HS2, which has been described by the Compliance Committee in the following terms
“The Committee finds that the Party concerned allows for members of the public to challenge certain aspects of the substantive legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention, including, inter alia, for material error of fact; error of law; regard to irrelevant considerations and failure to have regard to relevant considerations; jurisdictional error; and on the grounds of Wednesbury unreasonableness (see paras. 87–89 above). The Committee, however, is not convinced that the Party concerned, despite the above- mentioned challengeable aspects, meets the standards for review required by the Convention as regards substantive legality.”19 5.54 It is also important that the Select Committee indicate the timing allowed for any challenge to take place. This relevant standard here has been described by the Compliance Committee in the following terms
“The communicant makes the point that it is meaningless to provide access to justice in relation to a public participation procedure that takes place after the construction starts. While the Committee does not accept that access to justice at this stage is necessarily meaningless, if there were no opportunity for access to justice in relation to any permit procedures until after the construction has started, this would definitely be incompatible with article 9, paragraph 2, of the
18 (Armenia ACCC/C/2004/8; ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2006/2/Add.1, 10 May 2006, para. 38) 19 (United Kingdom ACCC/C/2008/33, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2010/6/Add.3, December 2010, para. 125)
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Convention. Access to justice must indeed be provided when it is effectively possible to challenge the decision permitting the activity in question. “20
5.55 A review of the matters considered by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee indicates that there are serious deficiencies in the approach taken with the Hybrid Bill and the obligations under Pillar III provisions.
20 (European Community ACCC/C/2006/17, ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.10, 2 May 2008, para. 56
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6. Strategic Alternatives and Options
6.1 As part of the formal ES HS2 Ltd is required to include, "an outline of the main alternatives studied by the applicant or appellant and an indication of the main reasons for his choice taking into account the environmental effects". The usual way to meet this requirement is to establish clear objectives and outcomes that need to be achieved and then identify and consider a range of alternatives that might meet those objectives and outcomes. That is not the approach taken by HS2 Ltd. Rather than measuring the range of options against an agreed set of objectives and outcomes to see which is most and least effective, the options have been explicitly compared with HS2.
6.2 The ES states that consideration was given to a conventional speed version of Phase One of HS2 (London to Birmingham). This seems logical, since a conventional speed version could have a different alignment, do less damage to the environment and improve connectivity by stopping in more places. However, HS2 Ltd state that this alternative was, “assumed to comply with the same specification as HS2 in all respects except speed, and that it would follow the same route and provide the same connections, stations and level of service”. This suggests a conventional alternative that stops at four stations, using exactly the same alignment. It will clearly be inferior since no attempt has been made to maximise its potential and seems to be a thinly veiled attempt to justify the ‘preferred’ scheme.
6.3 Upgrading existing rail lines is dismissed by the Government on the basis of advice from Network Rail about forecast demand and anticipated disruption, which is summarised with the following comments “Even if some options may offer good value for money, they fail to offer an effective long-term solution to crowding issues and therefore cannot be considered a viable alternative to new lines. There is a significant risk that an approach of this kind would simply create years of delay and disruption for passengers and freight services, and even after that only give rise to a railway that it is still overcrowded, delaying but not avoiding the need for new lines.”
6.4 Such sweeping statements ignore the fact that HS2 Ltd’s current proposals will inevitably result in significant disruption including:
Significant remodelling of Euston station throughout the construction period, causing inevitable disruption to existing services to and from this station. Remodelling to existing or building new stations in both Phases One and Two. Diverting, realigning and crossing rail lines, motorways and major roads in both Phases One and Two.
6.5 The starting point for consideration of alternatives and options is an understanding of the scale of benefits likely to arise from the current proposals for HS2. The Government’s position on this issue is detailed in the October 2013 Strategic Case. The Government promised that its October 2013 Strategic Case would represent an “objective, rigorous and accurate assessment of the costs and benefits of proceeding with HS2” but this didn’t happen. Therefore those deciding whether or not to approve the high levels of environmental damage which will result should HS2 proceed have not been provided with an accurate picture of the limited nature of economic benefits arising from HS2 and how alternatives have far better economic and environmental outcomes. This is a major flaw in the ES
6.6 Time savings for HS2 now make up 79% (ie £45bn) of the claimed benefits (excluding the wider economic impacts – which they also affect). This figure has increased from 55% in the January 2012 Business Case that formed part of the Government’s decision to proceed with HS2. Given that the Secretary of State for Transport has claimed that speed is “almost irrelevant” as a factor in deciding to proceed with HS2 it is odd that an increasing value is being attributed in the Benefit- Cost ratio to every minute saved.
6.7 At a strategic level these mistaken figures will inevitably distort rail investment expenditure and lead to environmentally worse outcomes. A more realistic cost-benefit analysis of HS2 would
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make alternatives far harder to reject, and bring into sharper focus the mismatch between the highly negative environmental outcomes and highly limited economic benefits of HS2.
6.8 The October 2013 strategic case is the fifth business case concerning HS2. Table 1 shows the key results of each, all adjusted to 2011 prices.
TABLE1: Summary of DfT/HS2 Ltd's central case £bn NPV PHASE 1 FULL 'Y' 2011 prices Mar-10 Feb-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Aug-12 Oct-13 Mar-10 Feb-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Aug-12 Oct-13
Benefits £32.70 £18.9 £19.0 na £18.8 £23.8 c £76 £42.7 £44.15* na £48.2 £57.7 (with WEI) £36.8 £23.6 £23.1 na £23.6 £28.1 c £83 £50.1 £53.25* na £63.6 £71.0 Costs capital £20.2 £20.2 £18.8 na £18.8 £21.7 c £33 £34.6 £36.4 na £36.4 £40.5 operating £8.6 £7.0 £8.6 na £8.2 £8.2 £15.8 £21.7 na £22.3 £22.1 Revenues £17.0 £15.5 £13.9 na £13.2 £13.2 £31.0 32.9* na £32.9 £31.1
Subsidy £13.5 £11.7 £13.5 na £13.8 £16.7 c £19.2 £19.4 £25.2* na £25.7 £31.5 VfM: benefits per £1 of subsidy BCR £2.4 £1.6 £1.4 £1.2 £1.4 £1.4 £4.0 £2.2 £1.7* £1.4 £1.9 £1.8 (with WEI) £2.7 £2.0 £1.7 £1.5 £1.7 £1.7 c 4.3 £2.6 £2.1* £1.8 £2.5 £2.3 WEI = Wider Economic Impacts * midpoint of range eg BCR 1.6/1.9, 1.8/2.5 (inc WEI) Low end if stations are out of town, high end if in city centre BCR = Benefit Cost Ratio - shown as benefits per £1 taxpayer cost ie subsidy 6.9 While the headline figures have changed little since the August 2012 business case, there have in fact been large swings from individual changes in both directions.
6.10 Table 2 shows the main types of changes21, as summarized by the Department for Transport, but within each category there are a mix of positive and negative impacts. For example within ‘demand & growth’ (category 2) adopting the latest lower-growth rail forecast model (PDFHv5) had a negative impact but this was cancelled out when the revised fares impact of other factors was included. The adoption of the latest PDFH model had by itself a devastating effect on the BCR (as category 4 shows) as it led to very significant other modelling changes. The assumptions on extra business travel (category 5) and higher benefits for inconvenience (aversion) factors eg to crowding (in category 3) are necessary to retain any positive economic case. HS2AA believe it is unsatisfactory these changes are unsupported by new evidence.
TABLE 2: Impact of the various changes on the full Y Network - August 2012 to October 2013 £bn NPV Constru- Demand Appraisal Modelling Demand eg "do min." Released Cost 2011 prices Aug-12 uction & growth & V o Time eg PDFHv5 Busin. Use updated capacity methods Oct-13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Benefits 48.2 -0.2 1.2 6.5 -9.5 11.6 -2.1 1.9 0 57.7 inc WEI 63.6 0.2 4.3 -0.7 -11.2 12.9 -1.4 3.7 0 71 Costs 58.7 4.5 0 0 0 0 4.2 -6.0 1.3 62.6 Revenue 32.9 -0.1 -0.3 8.2 -11.5 4.5 -2.1 -0.5 0 31.1 Subsidy 25.7 4.5 0.3 -8.2 11.5 -4.5 6.3 -5.5 1.3 31.5 BCR 1.9 -0.3 0 0.9 -1.1 0.6 -0.4 0.4 -0.1 1.8 inc WEI 2.5 -0.4 0.1 0.8 -1.3 0.7 -0.5 0.5 -0.1 2.3
6.11 Our key concerns are as follows
(i) Travelling Time Is Not Realistically Valued In The October 2013 Strategic Case
HS2AA can see no evidence that the October 2013 Strategic Case takes any account of the productive work that is done on trains. Not only do people currently use their time productively (as the
21 The Economic Case for HS2: Summary of Key Changes to the Economic Case since August 2012, Department for Transport
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Department for Transport’s own prior research had concluded) but for the period over which the benefits are being assessed (from 2026/2033 for a further 60 years) it is hard to see how any benefit could be relied upon from this source, given expected advances in mobile technology.
While the business travellers unit values were updated in the October 2013 Strategic Case, simply re- labeling the updated figure (of £31.96/hr) as being on a “willingness to pay” basis (rather than a “cost savings” basis) did not addressed this fundamental issue. The figure is still calculated in exactly the same manner as previously. For it to be correct there would need to be evidence that businesses in valuing time savings for their employees are indifferent to whether their employees are working or not during the time “saved”. No evidence to substantiate this approach has been published by the Department for Transport. If businesses were asked it seems inconceivable they would be willing to pay the same sum in both situations.
The new business figure is now also used for a variety of other purposes too, for example, for crowding, and for interchange penalties, for which no empirical evidence has been offered and which appears illogical. There is no basis that we can find for assuming that businesses have the same preference as individuals about how time is spent.
Quite separately, and seemingly inexplicably, the amounts attributed to “waiting times"22 for leisure users have increased very substantially in the October 2013 Strategic Case. Given that HS2 service frequencies are not improved and the classic railway savings increase significantly it is difficult to see the logic behind this decision.
Reliance is placed in the October 2013 Strategic Case on the fact that the new business figure adopted is similar to that used abroad, rather than any evidence that the figure is appropriate to time savings in the particular circumstance at issue. This is not a rigorous approach and does not address the illogicality of the assumptions used against the clear evidence that people work on trains.
The new figures and approach are contained in Webtag 3.5.6 that, unusually, was issued in draft at the same time as having already been adopted for the October 2013 Strategic Case. Given the substantial implications of this new approach this was a highly unusual step that prevented meaningful discussion of this area.
(ii) Earnings Figures Used For Business Travellers Lack Rigour
The previous business case for HS2 indexed a 12-year-old National Travel Survey data (1999-2001) to produce the hourly values of time per business traveller. HS2AA provided extensive detail on how this methodology delivered an overestimate (by about one third), and we note that the core data has now been updated (using 2008-2010 data) and the unit values have reduced substantially (to £31.96/hr). They are now much nearer to the road values.
However a further major expansion of business travel is now predicted which implies that the new current figure will be an overestimate for the much higher forecast levels. No information has been provided on what consideration was given to the effect of future growth in determining the new unit value. In the same way as the previous figure had not taken account of the near 4-fold increase in business travel predicted, so the new figure will be too high. If business travel by rail increases still further it will tend to be even nearer to the road value (of £27.06/hr).
Therefore while an updated figure of average earnings for rail business travellers has now been used, a further adjustment is required for the further increase in business travel predicted.
(iii) The Value For “Crowding Benefits” Is Not Realistic
22 Benefits and Revenue Full Network Standard Case spread sheet – Total Benefits worksheet eg B61
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Far from correcting for the fact that a realistic alternative to HS2 – such as the 51m Optimised Alternative– has less crowding than HS2, a higher figure has been used for a “de-crowding” benefit in the October 2013 Strategic Case. This is a perverse outcome from the re-labelling of the business time values as “willingness to pay” based figures.
The issue is compounded by the fact that the Department for Transport’s own “do minimum” comparator base case still suffers from a wholly unrealistic treatment of crowding – with demand unconstrained when in practice excess demand would be priced off or capacity expanded. It is unclear how this approach is best practice, or why the crowding benefits of alternatives (including the 51M Optimised Alternative) have not been assessed.
No account appears to have been taken of the fact that business people will reserve their seats to avoid crowding effects, although this is widely recognized to be the case. Despite this issue being raised in the 2011 Consultation on High Speed Rail, no evidence has been provided on this issue in the October 2013 Strategic Case. Therefore the crowding benefits in this latest business case are not realistic- De-crowding benefits are attributed to HS2 when the real alternative (51m Optimised Alternative) is simply no more crowded.
(iv) Plans to Improve the Existing Railways Are Not Adequately Taken Into Account
While plans like Midland Main Line electrification are we understand included in the October 2013 Strategic Case, this only assumption extends to committed projects with the result that the “do minimum” comparator base case is incapable of carrying all the forecast passengers.
Descriptions in the October 2013 Strategic Case which are described as showing “how HS2 would transform journey times between various towns and cities”23 in fact include savings that would have happened from other projects such as Midland Main Line electrification and ECML IEP trains.
(v) The Forecast of How Many Business Passengers Will Use HS2 Is Not Accurate
Far from the proportion of business travellers on HS2 reducing to reflect their reducing numbers, the percentage of HS2 business travel increases very substantially from around 28% to 38% (with further hikes when Phase 1 and 2 commence) in the October 2013 Strategic Case. This accounts for a more than 50% increase (over £14bn) in the claimed business benefits. It is not clear what survey evidence was used to support this increase. If city-to-city data were used to support figures like 64% business travel between London and Sheffield, then adjustments should have been made to reflect en-route joiners, leavers and those starting and finishing at different locations between which the city to city rail journey is only a part.
Neither National Travel Survey nor NPS National Passenger Survey sources support the increased level of business travel. The latest NPS suggests the original 28% figure is still correct (given the level of business travel on the classic services that will feed across to HS2), and the evidence that long distance trips is declining. No information has been provided to confirm what crosschecks were done to ensure that the new data is robust. HS2AA believe it is difficult to see how anyone can have confidence in the current estimates when they are so at odds with the previous basis and which had accorded with the published evidence.
(vi) Use of Up To Date Rail Forecast Modelling Techniques
HS2AA have been pressing for the latest version of the rail forecast model (PDFHv5.0), which includes a lower estimate of long distance growth, to be used in assessments of the costs and benefits of HS2. Whilst this has now been adopted, the key assumption is still that demand will grow until it doubles (now forecast to be one year earlier in 2036) which remains unsupported by evidence.
Population growth accounts for under one fifth of the growth and long distance trips have fallen again. The increase in demand – which is said to cancel out the impact of applying PDFHv5.0 – is attributed to lower growth in rail fares and higher forecasts in the costs of travel by other modes, particularly bus
23 Figure 4.7, page 83, October 2013 Strategic Case
February 2014 36 www.hs2actionalliance.org and coach. It is hard to see how bus and coach are competitors to HS2, particularly if business travel is taking such an increasingly large slice of the users. Given bus and coach are not even an option in Planet Long Distance model, the explanation is difficult to understand.
(vii) Bias In The Demand Forecast Base Year
Previous business cases have seen an overestimate in the base demand estimates on the routes that HS2 would serve. This bias inflates future passenger demand figures for HS2. The bias is the discrepancy between the Planet Long Distance allocation of rail demand to specific routes compared to the factual evidence of passenger counts. Planet Long Distance rail model and the forecasts generated for 2010, 2011 and 2012 are inconsistent with history and exaggerate demand. The 2012 forecast contains unexplained distributional bias to the North West and West Midlands. The base year from which forecasts are derived should correspond to the actual levels of passenger numbers, and not simply be the model’s estimates of them.
(viii) Price Competition Is Still Being Ignored
There is a discussion of price in the new Strategic Case. However the discussion fails to address the implications of fewer people travelling on HS2 and more on the classic network services – which would be the implication of a price differential. This scenario would prevent the classic cost savings from occurring as well as prevent creating re-use of freed up capacity.
Price competition exists now and its impacts can be seen and not just on HS1 eg Chiltern Railways and London Midland already provide cheaper alternative services on the London/Birmingham corridor, and this attracts custom from the Virgin intercity services. The evidence therefore demonstrates that people do take price into account when deciding how to travel. Given experience of other high speed rail lines, it is to be expected that HS2 will be premium priced, which will produce a financial disincentive to travel. It is noted that Ashford to London HS1 services carry a 20% premium on their ticket price compared to classic rail services. In Europe the typical ticket price premium for high speed rail is 70%.
HS2AA believe it is wholly unsatisfactory to do a business case to support the Hybrid Bill that does not demonstrate the effects of price competition. It is difficult to see how this can meet the requirements of being “objective, rigorous and accurate”.
(ix) Wider Economic Impacts (WEI) Are Not Transparent
The KPMG report (that looks at wider benefits) has been much criticised by academic experts. The report itself even states “We recognise that this approach does not have a firm statistical foundation” Experts in spatial economics agree24 that the KPMG work lacks statistical rigor and even contains methodological errors. Professor Henry Overman states that the technical flaws cause the scale of anticipated benefits to be overestimated by 6 to 8 times, and that ignores the fact KPMG use 2037 NPV values and not 2011 figures.
The sheer scale of their figure of £15bn/a appears to equate to about £1000 worth of benefit to the economy for every extra journey that HS2 itself creates. On the face of it this cannot be right. Similarly, how can it be common sense to presume a business’s access to connectivity alone determines its growth, and not for example its access to skills or capital?
There has been much discussion about transparency too, after it was revealed that the detail on the “losing” cities was omitted from the KPMG report. It is not clear why such work was not peer reviewed by the Analytical Challenge Panel before being published. That KPMG were members of the newly created review panel (irrespective of whether they were involved in this specific review) indicates an inappropriate lack of independence.
24 Daniel Graham, Professor of Statistical Modelling, and Research Director of Railway & Transport Strategy Centre, Imperial College; Henry Overman, Professor of Economic Geography, LSE; John Tomaney, Professor of Urban and Regional Planning, UCL.
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It is concerning that the October 2013 Business Case omitted the core standard Benefit Cost Ratio of the monetized elements excluding WEI (ie 1.8 for the Y Network and 1.4 for Phase 1), and solely provided the higher less reliable BCR including WEI (at 2.3 and 1.7). It thus failed to be transparent to the public about the effects of WEI on the BCR. HS2AA believe the basis of the Wider Economic Impacts must be traceable, understandable and consistent with the assumptions being made. The latest case would appear to be deficient on these grounds.
(x) Insufficient Transparency on Financing
There is still no transparency in how the cost of capital is treated. It could not be a self-funded project, as it requires very substantial subsidy. No account of the cost of capital is included either as a financing cost (as with Network Rail), or as an opportunity cost ie in terms of the forgone benefits of alternative uses.
The alternatives should have been costed on the same basis as HS2. Credit should also have been given for improvements to existing lines being implemented in stages – only if and when demand requires it. It is surprising that the cost of financing is still not taken into account. We cannot see how this represents a rigorous assessment of all the costs of HS2.
(xi) No realistic comparator to HS2 is used
The economic comparisons are still done against an unrealistic “do minimum” comparator base, instead of the next best alternative – which is the 51m Optimised Alternative. Despite the levels of demand forecast being unachievable without a greater expansion of capacity, no adjustment is made to the “do minimum”. The alternative to the full Y that has now been assembled includes developments that are unnecessary and expensive. Notwithstanding, the BCR’s of the alternatives are still better than HS2. HS2AA believe it is vital that the revised business case should compare HS2 with the next best alternative – which is the 51m Optimised Alternative proposal.
6.12 Further detail on HS2AA’s concerns on the October 2013 Strategic Case are set out in Appendix 6
Long Distance Rail Demand
6.13 Total transport demand has fallen in recent years, and there is emerging evidence that long distance rail demand may be flattening out. If these trends are confirmed, the demand forecasts which lie at the heart of the case for HS2 will be heavily compromised.
6.14 A number of key indicators suggest this:
(i) Recent ORR data shows flat long distance demand for over a year, although London and South East demand is still growing strongly; (ii) Virgin’s passenger miles showed rapid growth after completion of the upgrade, but growth has now virtually ceased (Figure 1).
6.15 There are some obvious factors which have driven long distance rail demand. Increasing company car taxation has dramatically reduced company car use and there has been significant modal shift from air to rail between Manchester and London following the West Coast Main Line upgrade – but these are one-off changes, and aren’t the basis for assuming perpetual, compound growth.
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6.16 Perhaps the most important factor has been service improvements on all the main InterCity routes – frequencies from London to Leeds, Sheffield, Bristol, and Cardiff have doubled; Manchester has improved from one train an hour to three, Birmingham from two to three; and journey times have been cut, particularly on the West Coast Main Line, and the Cross Country network has improved dramatically. It would be very surprising if passenger volumes hadn’t grown, but HS2AA believe much of this is a one-off effect, with rail now the dominant mode for middle and long distance demand to central London, so further growth to London is dependent on structural growth in the market, not increased modal share.
6.17 East Coast and Eurostar are already demonstrating this; the Eureka timetable on East Coast, with more trains and some faster journey times, has produced little or no additional revenue – East Coast passenger miles grew by only 0.5% in 2012/13, and Eurostar is increasingly looking to markets beyond Paris and Brussels, where it already has something like an 80% market share, and low growth.
6.18 The latest data from the Office of Rail Regulation, showing rail passenger data for the third quarter of 2013-14, has confirmed this trend. It shows that comparing the most recent four quarters with the previous four quarters we can see the following:
(i) Long distance rail passengers increase of 0.3 million passengers year on year = 0.2% (ii) Regional passengers, increase of 4 million journeys = 1.2% (iii) London and South East, increase of 49 million journeys, = 4.7%
6.19 Whether you look at the number of passenger journeys or percentage increase, long distance rail passenger growth is virtually static.25
Disruption
6.20 Supporters of HS2 have constantly argued that alternatives will cause major disruption because of the infrastructure work required. This simply isn’t true – work is only required at three locations (Ledburn Junction south of Milton Keynes, Brinklow – Nuneaton, and Colwich junction south of Stafford), and this is comparable to the work being carried out on the route at present, for example the recently completed flyover at Nuneaton, Bletchley remodelling, and the new flyover at Norton Bridge. The scale of work proposed is not in any way comparable to the previous West Coast upgrade, which involved comprehensive renewal of the route.
6.21 The 51M Optimised Alternative does not require any works at Euston. In contrast, HS2 construction work will be very disruptive at Euston, with a permanent reduction in the number of approach tracks (from 6 to 4) and platforms (from 18 to 13/14) at an early stage of the construction programme, inevitably resulting in a permanent reduction in peak services for both commuters and InterCity passengers. This will also impact on the Scottish sleeper services, which will no longer be able to stand at Euston after arrival in the morning, enabling passengers to remain on the train until 0800, even for the 0647 arrival; it is quite likely that these trains will have to be permanently transferred to another terminal.
6.22 Even away from London, HS2 will require works that will cause as much disruption to exiting services as the 51M Optimised Alternative, with construction of new grade separated junctions near Lichfield, south of Crewe and south of Wigan
West Coast Main Line – disruption caused by the construction of HS2
Location Severity Comments Euston Very severe. The work involved at Euston is highly complex, and has always been on the critical path for construction of HS2 Phase 1. It will start Impacts on all services to and from shortly after Royal Assent and will take c8/9 years. Euston The work will certainly involve a high number of weekend closures,
25 http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/10651/passenger-rail-usage-quality-report-2013-02-20-q3.pdf
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and is also almost certain to require closure for a number of extended periods, eg over entire Christmas/New Year holiday periods and for complete weeks at Easter/Bank Holidays In addition, there will be extended periods when the capacity of Euston will be severely limited, with reduced peak services. It is possible that the London Overground service between Euston and Watford will be suspended for the entire construction period. The reduced capacity during the construction work will also inevitably impact on service reliability over the entire period. HS2’s current proposals will permanently reduce the number of platforms for the existing route from 18 to 13, and the number of approach tracks from 6 to 4 Far from increasing commuter capacity, as promised, the reduction in the number of platforms and approach tracks is likely to permanently limit the peak capacity into and out of Euston, probably below current levels. Camden Very severe The proposed HS2 – HS1 connection will require major work to the Impacts on: London Overground North London Line in the Camden Road area, including bridge services between reconstruction and work to allow operation of continental gauge Richmond/Clapham Junction and trains on the route. This will inevitably require extended periods of Stratford (25,000 passengers closure for this intensively used orbital route daily) freight operation on the most important cross London freight route Street level in the Camden area, causing traffic chaos and seriously impacting Camden Market Lichfield Medium Installation of a new grade separated junction to connect HS2 with This work will affect services the existing route. between Euston and Manchester, Likely to require a number of weekend closures over a 1-2 year Liverpool, Preston, Glasgow and period, with probable closure for a couple of extended periods eg North Wales. over Christmas and the New Year and/or a Bank Holiday week Services can be diverted via the West Midlands at weekends, with journey times extended by 20-30 minutes Crewe Medium Installation of a new grade separated junction to connect HS2 with (Phase 2) This work will affect services the existing route south of Crewe. between Euston and Liverpool, Likely to require a number of weekend closures over a 1-2 year Preston, Glasgow and North period, with probable closure for a couple of extended periods eg Wales, also some services to over Christmas and the New Year and/or a Bank Holiday week Manchester. Depending on the detailed design of HS2 in the Crewe area, some services could be diverted via Stoke-on-Trent/Manchester, with extended journey times Wigan Medium Installation of a new grade separated junction to connect HS2 (Phase 2) This work will affect services with the existing route south of Wigan between Euston and Likely to require a number of weekend closures over a 1-2 Preston/Glasgow, also year period, with probable closure for a couple of extended Birmingham – Glasgow/Edinburgh periods eg over Christmas and the New Year and/or a Bank services Holiday week Some services could be diverted via Manchester with extended journey times
West Coast Main Line – disruption caused by the Optimised Alternative
Location Severity Comments Euston No impact The Optimised Alternative requires no work at Euston Camden No impact Ledburn Severe Installation of a new grade separated junction south of Leighton Buzzard junction to increase capacity for fast commuter services between Euston and All long distance services would Milton Keynes and Northampton be affected. London Overground services, and suburban services Likely to require a number of weekend closures over a 1-2 year period, between Euston and Watford, with probable closure for a couple of extended periods eg over Hemel Hempstead and Tring Christmas and the New Year and/or a Bank Holiday week would continue to operate Rugby/Nun Medium Construction of a section of additional Northbound track to increase
February 2014 40 www.hs2actionalliance.org eaton capacity for freight. This work will affect services between Euston and Manchester, Likely to require a number of weekend closures over a 1-2 year period, Liverpool, Preston, Glasgow and with probable closure for a couple of extended periods eg over North Wales. Christmas and the New Year and/or a Bank Holiday week
Services can be diverted via the West Midlands at weekends, with journey times extended by 20-30 minutes Colwich Medium Construction of a grade separated junction to reduce conflicts where the Junction Manchester via Stoke route diverges from the main West Coast route. This work will affect services between Euston and Manchester, Likely to require a number of weekend closures over a 1-2 year period, Liverpool, Preston, Glasgow and with probable closure for a couple of extended periods eg over North Wales. Christmas and the New Year and/or a Bank Holiday week
Services can be diverted via the West Midlands at weekends, with journey times extended by 20-30 minutes
Capacity
6.23 Capacity has become the main argument for justifying HS2 on the basis that the proposed new line will provide additional intercity seats and release capacity to allow more local trains to be run on existing lines.
6.24 Measured by standing passengers during the morning three hour peak in autumn 2012, London clearly has the most significant train overcrowding problem.26 The main cities affected were as follows:
Birmingham 2,751 Bristol 502 Cardiff 839 Leeds 2,961 Liverpool 915 London 112,246 Manchester 3,366 Sheffield 440
6.25 This is not a major surprise as the number of rail passenger journeys in London and the South East has increased by almost 400 million compared to 10 years ago27. The increase in number of long distance journeys over the same period has been very much smaller.
Million Passenger Journeys
London and South East Operators Regional Operators Long-distance Operators
2002-03 Q3 to 2003-04 Q2 682.9 226.6 79.7 2012-13 Q3 to 2013-14 Q2 1068.3 346.3 128.5 Increase 385.4 119.7 48.8
6.26 The busiest London stations have as many as 31,000 standing passengers on their trains in
26 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rail-passenger-numbers-and-crowding-on-weekdays-in-major-cities-in-england- and-wales-2012 See zipped files containing spreadsheets RAI0212 through to RAI0215 27 http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/pass-rail-usage-2013-14-q2.pdf See section 3
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the morning three hour peak and there are five mainline stations which have more than 8,000 standing passengers on their trains during this period. The West Coast Mainline terminus is at Euston, where there were 2,821 standing passengers during the morning three hour peak. The vast majority of those that were standing on Euston bound trains were on London Overground and London Midland trains.28
6.27 The following table shows the percentage of standing passengers arriving during the morning three hour peak in London split by train operator:
Train operator % standing London Overground 48 South West Trains 28 Southern 25 c2c 25 Southeastern 19 First Great Western 15 Greater Anglia 14 First Capital Connect 12 London Midland 12 Chiltern Railways 11 East Midlands 7 Virgin Trains 1 East Coast 0
6.28 Measured by standing passengers, the West Coast Mainline and East Coast Mainline intercity services were the least crowded trains serving London. The percentage of standing passengers on Virgin Trains and East Coast services at other stations was at most 1% and often 0%. Yet these are the two lines which the HS2 project is designed to provide capacity relief for.
6.29 It is evident that the most severe train overcrowding issues are in London. Providing more capacity into Euston would indirectly address approximately 2.5% of the current rail overcrowding issue for London.29 In other words HS2 would not benefit 97.5% of the passengers who currently have to stand during their morning commute to London.
6.30 The West Coast Mainline is nearing the limit of trains that it can accommodate per hour, but so are many other lines into London. However it is possible to add some additional trains to the timetable. Project 110, which is due for introduction in May 2014, will provide three additional trains in the morning peak and five additional trains in the evening peak for WCML commuter services.30 A series of enhancements to the WCML in the Stafford area are underway although one is still awaiting approval.31 If all the enhancements are introduced, then it is intended four extra trains per hour will be run in each direction. The 51M group has proposed two further changes which would allow more trains to be run on the WCML.
28 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rail-passenger-numbers-and-crowding-on-weekdays-in-major-cities-in-england- and-wales-2012 See zipped files containing spreadsheets RAI0212 through to RAI0215 29 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rail-passenger-numbers-and-crowding-on-weekdays-in-major-cities-in-england- and-wales-2012 Spreadsheet RAI0213 shows total number of standing passengers at Euston in morning three hour peak, and these are 2.5% of total standing passengers arriving at London mainline stations on weekday mornings. 30 http://www.northamptonrug.org.uk/documents/pdf/111021%20Project%20110%20SLC%20Consultation%20Documents.pdf See page 2 31 http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk/content/detail.aspx?ReleaseID=8073&NewsAreaId=2
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6.31 The usage of the West Coast Mainline is greatest close to London. Further away from the capital, the usage diminishes.32
Section Million journeys/year both directions London Euston to Watford Junction 30 – 35 Watford Junction to Tring 25 – 30 Tring to Wolverton 20 – 25 Wolverton to Rugby 15 – 20 Rugby to Rugeley 10 – 15 Rugeley to Manchester 5 – 10 Rugeley to Acton Bridge 5 – 10 Acton Bridge northwards Less than 5
6.32 Looking at specific journeys there were nine times more journeys made from Milton Keynes to London than there are from Manchester to Birmingham in 2009/10. The latter journey was the most popular on the WCML not involving London
Impact on Released Rail Capacity
6.33 Neither the Government nor HS2 Ltd have provided any quantification of commuter benefits from HS2 for regional cities. HS2AA believe this is because HS2 simply won’t release much useful rail service capacity around Birmingham, Manchester or Leeds.
6.34 The most overcrowded trains in the North and Midlands tend to be commuter trains reflecting the situation experienced in London. Using Manchester as an example to show the percentage of passengers standing during the three hour morning peak in 2012:33
Train Operator Percent passengers standing First TransPennine Express 23 East Midlands Trains 10 Northern Rail 8 Arriva Trains Wales 7 CrossCountry 3 Virgin Trains 0
A similar picture is evident in Leeds during the three hour morning peak:
Train Operator Percent passengers standing First TransPennine Express 22 Northern Rail 12 CrossCountry 0 East Coast 0
32 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisation%20strategies/west%20coast%20m ain%20line/westcoastmainlinerus.pdf Figure 3.13
33 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rail-passenger-numbers-and-crowding-on-weekdays-in-major-cities-in-england- and-wales-2012 See zipped files containing spread sheets RAI0212 through to RAI0215
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6.35 The commuter trains in both cities are overcrowded while the intercity services either have either very little or no overcrowding, even on official figures.
6.36 The limited relevance of HS2 to relieving commuter overcrowding in regional cities is also obvious from a review of the lines which serve the regional cities on the HS2 route. 34
6.37 In Leeds there are eight main rail corridors into the city, and HS2 only relieves one of them,
34 Maps are taken from http://beleben.wordpress.com/ with thanks
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the route from Doncaster via Wakefield. In the morning peak, East Coast operate just two trains arriving in Leeds before 0900, both of which are well loaded with commuters from Doncaster and Wakefield. So the trains would need to run anyway, at least from Doncaster, and the total of “extra capacity” released by HS2 equates to the number of passengers on these trains from London who would transfer to HS2; the trains leave Kings Cross at 0550 and 0630, so it won’t be a great number.
6.38 The impacts in Birmingham are similar. A total of 8 major rail routes serve Birmingham. If intercity trains between London and the North West were transferred to HS2, there would be capacity release only on the West Coast trunk between Birmingham and Coventry. If the classic New Street — Coventry — Euston service were cut from three to two trains per hour, one fast path would be freed. The overall effect on West Midlands commuting capacity (and crowding) from HS2 would be minimal.
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6.39 In Manchester, HS2 stage two could remove one or two fast Stoke / London trains from the Stockport corridor. Again overall the potential to provide capacity increases for commuter traffic is minimal.
6.40 HS2 therefore will not address these commuter overcrowding issues. HS2AA therefore believes that claims HS2 will permit additional commuter services to be run as largely spurious. If the Government is serious about such services, it should publish indicative timetables for regional services it proposes to run once HS2 is built.
Improving Existing Lines
6.41 A £500 million investment to increase the capacity of trains on the West Coast Main Line would address claimed current and forecast capacity issues and eliminate the need for HS2.
6.42 Converting one First Class carriage to Standard class on every West Coast Main Line train - of which there are 56 in operation and adding a single Standard class carriage to 25 of the 35 11- car train and three standard class carriages to the 21 shorter 9-car trains - would increase the capacity to 693 seats a train. 693 seats a train is three times the average number of passengers currently using each train in the peak, which currently stands at just 229.
6.43 Also, letting the lightly loaded long distance trains which already stop at Milton Keynes carry passengers from Euston to Milton Keynes would ease the chronic overcrowding on evening peak Milton Keynes/Northampton commuter services immediately, at no cost.
6.44 There is no logical justification for HS2 on capacity grounds. HS2 doesn’t address the real issues affecting commuters into Manchester, Birmingham, and Euston. In reality, long distance services to Waterloo, Liverpool Street and Victoria are full now with no prospect of significant extra capacity, and London and South East volumes are still growing.
6.45
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Classic Rail Service Cuts
6.46 The October 2013 Strategic Case appraisal spread sheets showed that £8.3 billion of cost savings from cuts to classic rail services. The service cuts can be identified from HS2 Ltd’s “The economic case for HS2 PFM v4.3: Assumptions report”35. These are part of what HS2 Ltd calls “released capacity” from HS2. The tables below shows which towns and cities are forecast to have worse services should HS2 be constructed.
6.47 The October 2013 service patterns reinstated some of the services the Department for Transport had previously said would be cut. This had two further implications:
i. It used up the freed-up space on the WCML for freight growth on the southern part of the WCML – which had been a key argument for HS2 ii. It meant there was no space to meet commuter suburban growth eg for Watford, Hemel Hempstead and Berkhamsted to London. Suburban commuter growth was a core reason for Network Rail to reject the 51m Optimised Alternative of improving WCML, yet the assumed service pattern for HS2 Phase 2 only has seven suburban trains an hour at peak periods, one less than in the current peak hour today.
6.48 The tables below shows the latest service cuts for intercity services to/from London. For those services which will get additional stops, each such stop typically extends journey times by five minutes.
West Coast Main Line
The service cuts on the WCML will take effect when Phase 1 of HS2 comes into operation.
Current Service City Service post HS2 Service Change Summary HS2 Service (to/from London)
Coventry 3 intercity trains/hour 2 intercity trains/hour, Loss of 1 intercity train/hour Nil 1 intermediate stop 2 intermediate stops and approx 5 min. longer journey time
Birmingham 3 intercity trains/hour 2 intercity trains/hour, Loss of 1 intercity trains/hour Nil International 2 intermediate stops 3 intermediate stops and approx 5 min. longer (HS2 will serve journey time Birmingham Interchange)
Birmingham 3 intercity trains/hour, 2 intercity trains/hour, Loss of 1 intercity train/hour HS2 service to Curzon Street, 3 New Street 3 intermediate stops 4 intermediate stops and approx 5 min. longer trains an hour journey time Lancaster 1 train/t hour, 1 train/hour, Approx 53 min. longer Nil 3 intermediate stops 8 intermediate stops journey time (only direct train is via Manchester) Carlisle 1 train/ hour, 1 train/hour, Approx 53 min. longer Nil 5 intermediate stops 10 intermediate stops journey time (only direct train is via Manchester) Stoke-on-Trent 2 trains/hour (1 non- 1 train/hour, Loss of hourly non-stop Nil stop, 1 with 1 1 intermediate stop, train intermediate stop) Wilmslow 1 train/hour, No service No trains at all Nil 1 intermediate stop Stockport 3 trains/hour, 1 train/hour, Loss of 2 trains/ hour and Nil 2 intermediate stops 3 intermediate stops, approx 5 min. longer journey time Chester/North 1 train/hour with 2 I train/hour with 7 Approx. 25 minutes longer Nil Wales intermediate stops intermediate stops journey time between Euston and Chester
35 http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/S%26A%2020_PFM%20assumptions%20report.pdf
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Midland Main Line (as from Phase 2 of HS2 ie 2033)
Service Post HS2 Phase City/Town Current Service Service ChangeSummary HS2 Service (Phase 2 only) 2 Leicester 4 trains/hour 3 trains/hour Loss of 1 non-stop train/hour Nil (2 non-stop) (1 non-stop) East Midlands 2 trains/hour, 1 train with 3 stops, 1 Longer journey times 2 trains/hour calling at an “East Parkway 2 intermediate stops train with 2 stops Midlands” (Toton) HS station c6 miles further north. Nottingham 2 trains/hour 1 train an hour with 5 Loss of 1 train/hour. Approx No city centre HS2 service. (1 with 3 stops, 1 with 8 stops 10 min. longer journey time “East Midlands” (Toton) HS2 stops) station c6 miles west of city centre . Derby 2 trains an hour 2 trains/hour Approx 15 min. longer No city centre HS2 service. (1 with 1 stop, (1 with 4 stops, journey times “East Midlands” (Toton) HS2 1 with 4 stops) 1 with 8 stops) station c10 miles E of city centre. Chesterfield 2 trains/hour 1 train/hour, Loss of one train/hour, and Nil (1 with 2 stops, with 5 stops approx 15 min. longer 1 with 5 stops) journey time Sheffield 2 trains/hour 1 train/hour, Loss of one train per hour, No city centre HS2 (1 with 3 stops, with 6 stops approx 15 min longer service.“South Yorkshire” HS2 1 with 6 stops) journey times station at Meadowhall c4 miles NE of city centre
East Coast Main Line (as from Phase 2 of HS2)
6.49 Frequency has generally been maintained at East Coast stations after HS2 is constructed, but the number of trains/hour from London has been reduced from 5 to 4, and those remaining make more stops to compensate for this, typically extending journey times by 5 mins for each stop. The London-Leeds service is reduced from two trains an hour to one; while Leeds has HS2 services, Wakefield, in particular, will have a much worse service.
6.50 No services are shown to run north of Edinburgh, not only taking away through trains to London, but breaking long standing non-London flows eg Aberdeen – Newcastle.
The table illustrates this impact.
Service Change HS2 Service (Phase City/Town Current Service Service Post HS2 Phase 2 Summary 2 only) Peterborough 3 trains/hour 4 trains/hour, but only 1 non- Loss of 1 non-stop service Nil (2 non-stop) stop Doncaster 3/4 trains/hour, 3 trains/ hour Increased journey times Nil 2 with only 1 intermediate stop (1 with 1 stop, others with 4/5 by approx 10/15 mins stops) Wakefield 2 trains/hour 1 trains/hour, with 5 stops Loss of one train/hour and Nil (1 with 2 stops, 1 with 3 stops) approx 10 -15 min. longer journey time Berwick on 1 train/hour 1 train/hour with 7 Approx 20 min. longer Nil Tweed with 3 intermediate stops intermediate stops journey time Aberdeen, Through services to Aberdeen No through trains Nil Dundee, (3 daily) and Inverness (1 Inverness daily)
Great Western Main Line
6.51 All Great Western trains are assumed to stop at Old Oak Common, with journey times to and from Paddington extended by 3 – 5 minutes, even though for long distance passengers, direct cross country services are faster and more convenient (and certainly cheaper) for the great majority of
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journeys than interchanging with HS2
6.52 The existing classic service between Liverpool and London will be discontinued so such journeys will have to be made by HS2 in future. Several services will become slower post HS2, as some classic trains will stop at more stations.
6.53 Currently there are two Virgin trains per hour on the section between Preston and Carstairs (Scotland) where the routes to Glasgow and Edinburgh separate. For HS2 Phase One there are expected to be three trains per hour (HS2 and Virgin trains combined) on this section. For HS2 Phase Two this will rise to four trains per hour. As this section of track has only one track in each direction this is likely to have an adverse effect on other existing services including rail freight traffic between England and Scotland. HS2AA believe it is important the Government sets out how it proposes to overcome these issues given their potential impact on the existing rail network as part of the Hybrid Bill approval process.
Classic Compatible Trains
6.54 Trains running on classic rail for part of their journeys will be 200 metres long. The majority of Virgin Pendolino trains have 11 carriages with 589 seats.36 Currently East Coast has a mixture of Standard trains (10 carriages and 608 seats) and Mallard trains (9 carriages and 530 seats).37 From 2018, East Coast will be using IEP trains (new rolling stock for East Coast Mainline) that will have 627 seats in their 9 carriages). 38
6.55 So although passenger demand is forecast by the Department for Transport to increase, each classic compatible HS2 train will have less capacity (39 seats) than the 11 carriage Pendolino train it will be replacing. Similarly, each classic compatible HS2 train will have less capacity (77 seats) than the IEP train that it will be replacing. This seat reduction applies on routes to Manchester, Preston and Glasgow from Phase 1 and further destinations from Phase 2.
Birmingham-London Bottleneck
6.56 The International Union of Railways has advised that it is not safe to run more than 16 trains per hour at speeds of 350 kph. The Department for Transport is proposing to run 18 trains per hour on the main section between London and Birmingham at up to 360 kph once Phase Two becomes operational in 2032/3. The indicative schedule does not include any trains to connect with Europe on this section of the route.39
6.57 Therefore there is no expansion capability for additional train paths seven years after HS2 becomes operational. This has been confirmed within the ES that shows that any direct services from Birmingham (or further north) to Europe would be at the expense of currently planned services using the Birmingham - London section of HS2. This major restriction appears to be a very significant oversight for a line with a £50 billion price tag. The Victorians built lines which could accommodate growth for more than 150 years.
6.58 Eight of the eighteen trains using the Birmingham – London section in the peak hour will have started their journeys on classic rail. They will have had to travel on classic rail for up to 200 miles before joining HS2 rails. The overhead line equipment on the West Coast and East Coast Mainlines is some of the least reliable in the United Kingdom as evidenced by the lower Public Performance Measure granted to the train operating companies on these routes until 2019 by the Office of Rail Regulation40
36 http://www.virgintrains.co.uk/assets/pdf/global/seating-plan.pdf 37 http://www.eastcoast.co.uk/seat 38 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/intercity-express-programme 39 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/259491/Volume_1_Introduction_to_the_Enviro nmental_Statement_and_the_Proposed_Scheme.pdf See Figure 13, including note 2 40 http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/pr13/PDF/guide-periodic-review-2013.pdf See page 20
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6.59 Trains operating on the Birmingham – London section of HS2 will be spaced every 3 minutes 20 seconds on average with an extremely small window of running early or late. It seems unlikely that all the HS2 trains will run to the required timetable requirements when joining the HS2 network. Consequently some may run out of sequence with knock on effects to the overall timetable.
6.60 It is evident that this Birmingham – London section will be intensively used. However it is only two track, i.e. one track in each direction. Consequently any breakdown by one train is going to quickly affect many others. There are three maintenance loops between Birmingham and London but they are so infrequent that they are unlikely to be of much help in most cases, even if the loop happens to be empty. Where 1100 seat trains are in use, more people will be affected than would happen on classic rail. Much of the WCML and ECML is four track, so there are ways of avoiding a broken down train. In addition, reroutes are possible using alternative classic lines which would not necessarily be suitable in the case of dedicated HS2 trains.
6.61 If HS2 is built these issues will affect travellers from north of Birmingham who use the WCML or HS2 to reach Euston.
HS2’s Euston Challenge
6.62 Volume 3 of the ES sets out HS2 Ltd’s conclusions on the impact at Euston, stating:
“Despite the scale of the works during construction, overall station capacity will be maintained through efficient use of available platform space and there will be only a relatively short period during which train frequency will reduce (with a loss of two peak trains to/from Watford). Once construction is complete, the total of platforms at Euston station will increase from the current 18 to 24, comprising 13 classic rail platforms and 11 HS2 platforms.”41
“However, all of these activities during construction will place pressure on the available capacity and will have a potential impact on network performance and consequent delays to services and passengers on the WCML. The extent of change during construction at Euston station could result in some level of disruption to the services which run on the WCML.”
6.63 The statement at Volume 3 Paragraph 13.3.12 that “overall station capacity will be maintained” contradicts that in the following paragraph that construction “will place pressure on the available capacity”.
6.64 The reality is that services to Euston will be severely hit by the plans for HS2. Soon after construction starts at Euston, the number of platforms for classic rail services will be reduced from 18 to 13 and the number of lines on the approach will be reduced from 6 to 4 for classic trains. These changes will be permanent. While an indicative schedule has not been produced for the construction period, indicative schedules have been provided for London Midland services post HS2. Supposedly the only services that will be adversely affected (on a temporary basis) will be those serving Watford. This is most surprising when the total number of platforms and number of approach lines have both been reduced by approximately 30%.
6.65 The Department for Transport estimates the number of passengers arriving by classic rail at Euston during the morning three hour peak will increase from 24,682 (2012) to 36,100 by 2041, an increase of 46%. Coupled with the reduction in the number of platforms detailed in the previous paragraph, the average number of passengers using each platform will double.
6.66 Another capacity issue created by HS2 will be the handling of additional passengers on the Underground system at Euston. It has been estimated by the DfT/HS2 Ltd that the number of passengers wishing to use the Underground during the morning three-hour peak hour is likely to more than double from 24,682 to 56,420 by 2041. No agreement has been made to build Crossrail 2 and the HS2 budget does not contain any allowance for increasing Underground capacity.
41 Volume 3 Paragraphs 13.3.12-13
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6.67 The likelihood is that the classic train service will only be able to be accommodated in 13 platforms for a 10-11 year construction period through a significant reduction in the turn-round times, particularly for the current Virgin services, as turn-rounds for many London Midland services are already very short.
6.68 However, reducing turn-round times has consequential impacts in terms of reducing the ability to recover from delays on incoming services. The expectation is that the performance of services out of Euston, which is already poor, would deteriorate further as a result of the reduction in platforms, but no analysis of this impact is given in the ES.
6.69 Compared with the significant amounts of information in the technical appendices on highway impacts in the Euston area in the sections of volume 5 supporting CFA report 1, the lack of any published detail on platform capacity, service performance or overcrowding during the construction period at Euston does not allow an assessment of the degree of impact to be made, or indeed give any confidence that a robust assessment has been carried out.
6.70 Paragraph 13.4.13 of Volume 5 of the ES shows that the number of trains forecast to leave London on the West Coast Main Line once HS2 is open is likely to be more than during the construction period: 2026 baseline 253 trains, 2026 with scheme 259. These services will need to be accommodated in 13 platforms on an ongoing basis, and once again no analysis of the ability to accommodate this level of service is provided. Our concerns about the impact of the operational phase are therefore very similar to the construction phase.
6.71 HS2AA therefore believe that it is essential that supplemental information is published at the earliest opportunity to give:
A clear demonstration of how the baseline train service (including the proposed extra services referenced in Table 6.6 and 6.7 of Volume 5 Technical Appendices – Transport Assessment Part 3 London Assessment such as Project 110 extras) and forecast passenger growth to 2026 can be accommodated in 13 platforms; A clear demonstration that the post-HS2 service on the West Coast Main Line can be accommodated in 13 platforms; A clear demonstration that the lengthening of platforms 8 and 11 at Euston, and the consequent loss of platforms 9 and 10, is a better solution than retaining four shorter platforms; and A clear demonstration of the impact on service performance and overcrowding which is likely to result from these changes.
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7. Route Wide Effects
This section of our response reviews those sections of the ES that deals with route wide issues. These are set out in the same order as Volume 3 of the ES.
7.1. Agriculture, Forestry & Soils
7.1.1. There is a highly significant impact on agriculture due to Phase 1 of HS2. To take one example, Table 4 of Volume 2, CFA10, shows that 235.9 hectares are required for construction of which 145.6 hectares will be restored after construction – a permanent loss of 90.3 hectares. In CFA6 there will be 110.6 hectares of agricultural land lost to the construction of HS2 with just 5.9 hectares returned on completion, meaning 104.7 hectares will therefore be lost permanently. CFA7 shows that there will be a further 82.8 hectares of designated agricultural land lost due to construction with 42.5 hectares restored and a permanent loss of 40.3 hectares.
7.1.2. Overall it is evident that there will be a significant reduction in agricultural land but the ES is deficient in consideration of this issue. The ES merely describes the affects on agricultural land-it does not provide a commentary on what the loss of hectares of agricultural land does to a particular area, nor does it present any solutions for the continued viability of those holdings and properties which it will significantly effect through land take.
7.1.3. HS2AA is also concerned about the ability to fully restore the agricultural land taken during construction without some level of contamination. While there are some proposed procedures in the Code of Construction of Practice to cover this issue, it would appear they are not enforceable with an independent arbiter. Concerns around contaminated land will only become evident once the land is back in agricultural use, and the ES provides no indication of how HS2 Ltd can be held to account and required to ensure land returned to agricultural use is in an appropriate state.
7.1.4. HS2AA therefore believes
The ES should cover in detail the likely effects of removing so much agricultural land, including the impact on the visitor economy in each area. The ES should identify which farms will be so badly effected as their continuing viability is in question, at which point HS2 Ltd should make clear what compensation arrangements will be available. HS2 Ltd should publish its proposals for dealing with the return of contaminated land to regular use following the construction of Phase 1 of HS2.
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7.2. Air Quality
7.2.1. The heavy construction required to construct HS2 includes demolition, land grading, earthmoving, pouring concrete, building viaducts and bridges and laying tracks. This will produce significant emissions over a number of years. In addition there will be many HGV movements required to bring concrete and materials to construction sites and move spoil around. All that work, and the equipment used to undertake it, are expected to produce reactive organic compounds and nitrogen oxides -- two chemicals that mix in the atmosphere to create ozone -- as well as dust and carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Once HS2 is up and running there would be further emissions arising from maintenance of tracks and associated works.
7.2.2. The ES acknowledges that there would be dust-generating activities arising from construction. However no specific level of emissions is identified in the ES and it is asserted by HS2 Ltd, that the Code on Construction Practice will mitigate this problem to an acceptable level.
7.2.3. HS2AA concur that it is inevitable that there will be significant issues (as was the case with construction of HS1) with dust. Given that HS2 Ltd are planning to store spoil along the length of the proposed line and much of the spoil is predominantly chalk it will dry out very quickly and produce dust and particles which given the prevailing wind direction will blow onto surrounding rural and urban areas. The physical impact of this will see houses, house windows, washing being hung out to dry will be covered in a film of chalk dust. In the summer patios and allotments may become unusable due to the dust storms.
7.2.4. More importantly, this dust will cause respiratory and other cardiovascular reactions in specific groups of the population. The ES appears to offer little in terms of mitigation against this issue, with commitments to mitigation not extending much beyond the “erection of hoardings and other barriers along the site boundary.” This will do little to mitigate dust arising from construction relating to earthworks and removal of spoil. The commitment to ensure location of spoil away from sensitive receptors simply has not been complied with. For example, in Wendover, HS2 Ltd propose to store waste in a strip running the full width of the town at a distance of 300m. It is likely that watering will do little to alleviate the dust levels and stockpiles of spoil and other material are likely to be too large to be sheeted.
7.2.5. HS2AA believes that HS2 Ltd must address this issue in a far more robust way than is currently the case in the ES. In particular HS2 Ltd should:
Provide forecasts showing the quantity of emissions that the construction phase will create. Without the specific details of likely emissions it is impossible to know (or comment on) whether the level of pollution that will be emitted by the project during the construction phase will be acceptable. Requirements for dust emissions levels should be based on the NPPF Technical Guidance for Minerals issued by the Department for Communities and Local Government (March 2012) – this should be regarded as the minimum acceptable levels. Before construction starts, HS2 Ltd should be required to carry out air quality baseline monitoring which should then be benchmarked against the Air Quality Standards Regulations 2010. A summary of HS2 Ltd’s monitoring activity should be made available to local councils and communities. It is not clear from the ES which regulatory body will have oversight responsibility monitoring air quality. HS2AA believe local authorities should be provided with oversight responsibility for
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this area and the funds necessary to monitor HS2 Ltd’s compliance with relevant standards. Local authorities should be empowered to monitor dust emissions and compliance with agreed mitigation plans and provided with powers to enforce compliance. The results of this monitoring should be made publicly available. The use of new less polluting construction equipment should be made mandatory in the Code of Construction Practice, again with provision for oversight from the relevant local authority.
7.2.6. The ES states, “There are no direct atmospheric emissions from the operation of trains that will cause an impact on air quality. In normal operations, there will be no pollutant emissions and indirect emissions from sources such as rail wear and brakes have been assumed to be negligible.”42 This sentence is the extent to which emissions from the operation of HS2 is dealt with in the ES
7.2.7. No empirical evidence is provided in the ES to support this conclusion. Given the HSR lines in existence around the world in place today there should be evidence to support this contention. Practical experience suggests that this statement should be challenged. Given the extremely high speed that HS2 plans to run at (with the associated high level of maintenance activities (such as grinding) required to be undertaken on the line) there is clearly scope for release of metal particles in the atmosphere. HS2AA believe research should be undertaken to ascertain just how robust is HS2 Ltd’s assumption on this important issue, particularly given the relevance of this topic to the health of people living near the line.
42 http://assets.dft.gov.uk/hs2-environmental-statement/volume-2/Volume_2_CFA5_Northolt_corridor.pdf
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7.3. Climate
7.3.1. The ES is highly misleading in stating that HS2 will contribute to a low carbon transport network. Paragraph 5.7.2 of Volume 3 of the ES states:
The Proposed Scheme’s operational emissions are anticipated to result in between -2,970,000 tCO2e and -3,160,000 tCO2e over the 60 year operational assessment period, once modal shift, carbon mitigation from tree planting and freight benefits from released capacity on the classic network is taken into account.
7.3.2. However, this part of the conclusion only relates to operational emissions. When the construction impacts are factored in, the conclusion changes dramatically. The construction carbon footprint is estimated to be between 5,300,000 tCO2e and 6,460,000 tCO2e. This is mostly a result of the construction of tunnels, earthworks, bridges, viaducts and underpasses, of which many of these elements have been included in order to mitigate other significant environmental noise and visual amenity. (5.7.4 Volume 3 Route Wide Effects). HS2AA believes this is highly significant, given the original justification for HS2 emphasised its importance as part of efforts to reduce carbon emissions. The ES concludes that the residual carbon ranges between 2,140,000 tCO2e and 2,620,000 tCO2e. In other words, HS2 will significantly add to the carbon emissions and will not contribute to the urgent need to tackle climate change.
7.3.3. When the Climate Change Bill was introduced into Parliament, the long-term target was a reduction in the UK’s CO2 emissions of 60% by 2050. During the passage of the Bill, this was changed to a reduction of 80%. Meeting the 2050 target in the Climate Change Act will be difficult and is unlikely to be achieved without reduction in the amount of consumption and travel. HS2 Ltd and the Department for Transport appear intent in promoting a project which contradicts these goals.
7.3.4. Set out in this section is consideration of the key issues which HS2 raises about carbon. We would also draw your attention to the report by SLR Consulting on this issue which is set out at Appendix 2.
Carbon Intensity of Electricity
7.3.5. In the ES, quantities of electricity are estimated in kilowatt hours (kWh). The carbon footprint calculation is driven by the quantity of electricity used and the emission factor. The emission factor for UK electricity is expressed in kg CO2e/kWh. UK electricity is currently produced by a variable mix of energy generating facilities including coal, gas, wind, solar, oil, wave/tidal, and pumped storage (hydroelectric). As each has a different individual emission factor the Department for Energy and Climate Change produces an average UK emission factor for electricity on an annual basis.
7.3.6. The figures in the table below are from the DECC website and are calculated according to the Electricity (Fuel Mix Disclosure) Regulations 2005 for the 12 months to 31 March 2010.
Energy source g CO2/kWh UK fuel mix
Coal 870 25.8% Natural Gas 370 47.7% Nuclear 0 18% Renewables 0 6.6% Other 630 1.9%
7.3.7. Emissions from industry have been reducing for 30 years but this is mainly because Britain has been exporting industrial activity to other countries and importing the goods by sea and air – not included in the calculations. Dieter Helm at Oxford University has shown that the emissions for which UK consumers are responsible, as opposed to those emitted within national boundaries, are actually increasing and not reducing as indicated by official statistics.
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7.3.8. Using the average annual energy mix, the carbon emitted in producing 1 kWh of electricity is equivalent to 412 g of CO2/kWh (the value will be different if the calculation includes micro- renewables and imports via the links to the Continent). This average varies from year to year, depending on the exact mix of generation that is used (which is partially dependent on the weather), which fuel sources are used and other factors. The instantaneous figure also varies by the season and by the time of day. On a windy summer’s night the carbon intensity could be less than 100 g/kWh while during a winter anticyclone, when coal provides more than half the output, the figure could be more than 600 g/kWh.
7.3.9. HS2AA believe that, if a new load, such as HS2, is being considered one should take not the average carbon intensity of electricity, but the marginal carbon intensity of the additional electricity that would have to be provided to feed the additional load. For some years to come, this is likely to be coal-fired generation with a carbon intensity of around 900 g/kWh. By 2030, when HS2 would be in full operation, peak demand is likely to be combined-cycle gas turbine plant (CCGT).
Decarbonisation
7.3.10. The objective of the Department of Energy and Climate Change is to increase the proportion of electricity generated from low-carbon sources so that the system is largely decarbonised by about 2030. The ES has based its carbon forecasts for Phase 1 of HS2 on the assumption that the decarbonisation objective of DECC will be met.
7.3.11. However, HS2AA do not believe such an assumption is sufficiently robust, on the basis that it is highly questionable whether this objective is achievable. The two major components of a low- carbon electricity supply are likely to be nuclear power and renewables. In much of Europe, “renewables” consist largely of hydroelectric generation, which can be turned on or off in a matter of minutes to respond to changes in demand. In Britain, the amount of hydroelectric power is limited and “renewables” generally means solar, tidal, or wind energy. All of these sources of energy are uncontrollable; either you use them when the sun is shining, the tide is flowing or the wind is blowing or you lose them.
7.3.12. The economics of renewable energy are quite different to the use of oil or gas, where fuel cost is an important component. For renewables, the capital costs dominate the equation and the running costs are almost zero. This means that it is unattractive to invest in renewable technology unless there is a guaranteed market for the electricity.
7.3.13. By 2030, there is predicted to be about 10 new nuclear power stations, each capable of producing around 2.5GW. Every summer, some will be taken off-load for maintenance, which is likely to leave an operating capacity of around 15GW. During the summer months, most of the night-time load could be provided by nuclear power with renewables providing additional power during the day. The situation in winter in the 2030s would be very different. If there was a fully decarbonised electricity supply, we will need sufficient renewables to guarantee 40GW during the evening peak. As wind, tides and the sun are intermittent, that would require an installed renewables capacity in excess of 100GW, much of which would be unused for long periods in the summer. The economics of such a system are likely to be unattractive to investors unless heavily subsidised.
7.3.14. It is also unlikely that the total load on the grid will stay constant: DECC’s plans for a low carbon economy include replacing the gas boilers in millions of homes by heat pumps fed from low-carbon electricity. These are likely to be supplemented by direct electrical heating, which will emphasise the peaks, and by electric vehicle charging, which will tend to fill-in the night-time troughs.
7.3.15. The effect of these additional loads will be to accentuate the difference between summer and winter demand and to flatten the diurnal load cycle during the summer. Overall, this is unlikely to make investment in renewables more attractive. A situation is therefore likely where the night time load (used, inter alia, for EV battery charging) can be supplied by nuclear and renewables throughout the year while the morning and evening peak load for at least 6 months of the year will
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be largely provided by gas turbine generation. During the winter, gas-fired plant is likely to be used for most of the daytime, particularly during anticyclones. Even if there were the investment appetite for the installation of more than 150GW of various types of renewables, it is likely that there would be supply chain constraints as well as a shortage of suitable sites.
7.3.16. It is difficult to translate the above scenario into the carbon intensity of electricity used by a new high-speed line but it is likely that the annual average from 06:00 to 21:00 hrs (the core operating time for long-distance rail services) will be around 200 g/kWh and the average carbon intensity during the commuting peak will be around 300 g/kWh. These figures are rather different those that appear to have been used in the ES.
7.3.17. By contrast, the night-time carbon intensity, when most electric road vehicles will be charged, is likely to be close to zero for most of the year. This is significant as it changes the relative “greenness” of commuting by road and by rail. The Climate Change Committee envisages that, by 2030, 60% of new vehicles will be electric or plug-in hybrids. With this penetration of zero- carbon road transport, it will be difficult to make an environmental case for transferring passengers from road to rail, other than for long distances where the battery capacity of electric road vehicles would be inadequate.
The Physics of Rail Energy Consumption
7.3.18. The resistance to motion of a train is largely due to aerodynamic drag. Drag is a function of the cross sectional area of the train, the drag coefficient, the density of the air through which it is moving and the speed squared. To a first approximation, the energy used on a rail journey can be calculated as the drag multiplied by the distance travelled. Drag increases as the square of the speed so, if one train goes twice as fast as another, it will use four times the amount of energy and produce four times the quantity of CO2.
7.3.19. In practice, very high speed trains tend to be more streamlined than slower trains, to be longer and to stop less frequently. Longer trains use less energy per passenger than shorter trains as there is only one nose and tail for more seats and it is these extremities of the train that increase the drag. But there is no reason why slower speed trains should not be as long or as streamlined as a high-speed train.
7.3.20. A study carried out for the Rail Safety and Standards Board, acting on behalf of the Department for Transport, analysed the measured energy use of a number of present-day intercity trains.43
7.3.21. It can be seen that energy use varies between 0.023 and 0.065 kWh/seat-km. This wide variation is related to the operating speed and number of stops, the drag factors and also the number of passengers that are seated per metre of train. The Japanese Shinkansen 700 train,
43 Kemp R J, Traction Energy Metrics , RSSB Research Report T618, June 2007
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which has a wide body to allow 5-across seating and has passengers up to the back wall of the driver’s cab, can accommodate 3.31 passengers/metre while the German ICE3, which provides more facilities and space per passenger, only accommodates 2.08 /metre. British trains are at the lower end of the spectrum because of the narrow allowable body width, due to Victorian infrastructure limits, and dead space at the ends of trains, due to safety requirements.
7.3.22. If one takes Eurostar as typical of a 300km/h train built to British requirements, the energy use is 0.055 kWh/seat-km. Using the estimated figure for the 2030s carbon intensity of electricity of 200 g/kWh, calculated earlier, this is equivalent to CO2 emissions of 11 g/seat-km. This is significantly higher than the figures set out in the ES.
ES Approach on Carbon Is Inconsistent With Previous Work on This Area
7.3.23. A number of carbon assessments have been conducted throughout the development of the HS2 project.
7.3.24. The first, in 2007 undertaken by Booz Hamilton Allen and the Temple Group for the Department for Transport recognised that there would be significant emissions from construction which would only be outweighed if sufficient modal shift occurred from road transport and air travel. It found that the shorter routes (London to West Midlands) would be net carbon emitters compared to the longer routes (London to Scotland) which were estimated to be net carbon reducing. These conclusions were heavily dependent on judgments about modal shift.
7.3.25. The Appraisal of Sustainability, produced in February 2011, as part of the documents provided for the national consultation on High Speed Rail included an assessment covering operational and embedded carbon, presenting the results using ranges to account for uncertainties. These figures have changed significantly with the numbers presented in the ES.44 The Appraisal of Sustainability required any released takeoff/landing slots to be withdrawn from use to be included as a carbon saving. Therefore aviation associated with increased long haul flights from UK airports as a result of releasing UK and short haul slots were included as a legitimate element of analysis. In the ES all assessment to treatment of flight slots has been omitted. The ES claims that the reallocation of additional slots becoming available due to HS2 is a commercial decision by the airport owners and thus not directly related to the HS2 project itself45 Consideration of this issue is made significantly more difficult given there are some notable omissions in the ES.
7.3.26. The effect of carbon is further downplayed given the ES contains no detailed data on carbon footprint calculations used in the ES and a similar lack of information about the study undertaken by Trapeze that is referred to in the ES as being used to justify a significantly changed approach about the predicted use of energy in train operation.
7.3.27. The carbon footprint boundary in the ES has therefore been tightened since the Appraisal of Sustainability such that secondary and tertiary impacts have been excluded. HS2AA believe these secondary and tertiary impacts should be considered, particularly for a project of such national significance as HS2.
Carbon Forecasts In The ES
7.3.28. The carbon footprint assessment in the ES adopts two different scenarios to account for uncertainty -known as Scenario A and Scenario B. Scenario A uses emissions based on forecasts factors drawn from DECC and the Inter-departmental Analysts Group (IAG); the latter from the Committee on Climate Change (CoCC) fourth carbon budget. Scenario A uses a mid- range estimate based on likely improvements. Construction emissions based on scenario B are based on optimistic ‘stretch’ targets being achieved. The difference between Scenarios A and B
44 Vol 5. Section 5.1 covers the reconciliation between the AoS and ARUP construction emissions assessments (1.2MtCO2e and 5.6 MtCO2e respectively). 45 Vol 5 Climate Summary. Carbon calculation outputs. CL-002-000. Section 5.2. para 5.2.2, p24
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is roughly a factor of two.46 In addition a higher figure of 6,460,000tCO2e is also quoted based on no improvements in efficiency being realised within the cement and steel industries
7.3.29. The table below summarises the predicted carbon footprints for the first 60 years of operation under each scenario.
Area Scenario A (tCO2e) Scenario B (tCO2e) Construction Emissions 5,590,000 5,300,000 Operational Emissions 2,800,000 1,750,000 Mode Shift -3,200,000 -2,340,000,000 Freight Uptake -2,070,000 -500,000 Tree Planting -500,000 -500,000 Total 2,620,000 2,140,000
7.3.30. The ES estimates that over 120 years the operating emissions and savings will be doubled from the 60 year assessment, reducing the overall footprint to 360,000 tCO2e (Scenario A) and 230,000tCO2e (Scenario B) respectively for each scenario. Therefore by using the forecast for 60 years and simply doubling the operational emissions and the savings (excluding tree planting) it is possible to get to a slight carbon negative position. However HS2AA believe it is not robust methodology to make sweeping assumptions about carbon emission 120 years into the future-a time horizon far further than the other forecasts included in HS2’s business cases. 120 years ago cars and aeroplanes had not even been invented-so it is hard to see how HS2 Ltd can make forecasts about carbon use in a similar time horizon.
7.3.31. The figures in the ES are highly dependent on modal shift. In both scenarios about half of the predicted carbon savings arise from passenger mode shift (55% Scenario A; 48% Scenario B). Around 40% of the carbon savings are from freight; 10% arise from tree planting. HS2AA believes the uncertainties and assumptions that lie behind each of these calculations make the carbon forecast outcome speculative in the extreme.
7.3.32. The overall carbon footprint for the proposed HS2 project is therefore calculated from five key areas detailed in the ES:
1. Construction emissions; 2. Operating emissions; 3. Reductions from modal shift of passengers; 4. Reductions from modal shift of freight; and 5. Carbon sequestration from tree planting.
7.3.33. Elements 1 and 2 lead to carbon emissions. Elements 3-5 relate to potential carbon savings. Producing an overall carbon footprint requires that the totals of elements 3 to 5 are subtracted from the totals of elements 1 and 2. Each of these elements is considered below.
Construction emissions
7.3.34. The ES confirms construction emissions dominate the carbon footprint. The assumptions stated in the ES for this area are consistent with industry norms (e.g University of Bath 2011); and software tools (SimaPro 7.3.3). Industry data sources (e.g. Eurofer 2013; MPA the Concrete Centre 2013) are used where relevant as well as in-house software (ARUP CO2ST tool).47 However the raw data underpinning the calculations is unavailable and without this information a reader of the ES documentation is unable to determine whether construction emissions have been forecast in a robust manner.
7.3.35. Table 8 of the Technical Appendix lists the data gaps, the majority of which are for construction. This includes the construction of items such as temporary haul roads, pilling crane
46 Scenario A emits 2.8mtCO e; Scenario B emits 1.75mtCO e.
47 See Vol 5. Climate Summary. Carbon Calculation Outputs (CL-002-000) Table 5, p.9 onwards.
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platforms, temporary roads/road widenings/roundabouts, temporary compounds, drainage materials, precast concrete units/ beams, steel bridge girders/beams, auto-transformer substation bases and access roads, railway material laydown areas, footpath/farm track diversions, road construction - hammer heads/turning circles, utility diversions, drainage ponds and access roads, Tunnel Boring Machine related labour data including commuting, tunnel fan manufacture, maintenance and transport, and rail track construction ground stability improvement works.
7.3.36. HS2AA believes this open-ended list indicates that the calculations in the ES simply don’t accurately reflect the carbon emissions from many of the activities required to construct HS2. These data gaps are fundamental aspects of any carbon assessment and indicate the ES was published without the information provided within it being rigorously checked.
7.3.37. In addition to the embedded emissions associated with the materials used (mainly steel and concrete) the assessment in the ES also includes detail on transport, labour and plant emissions. This is based on the ARUP CO2ST tool. Table 6 in the Technical Appendix lists a number of elements assessed using this tool. Each assessment apportions emissions to materials, transport or plant and workers travel. Again the data underpinning these calculations are not provided in the ES and look to be significantly lower than other studies of this area.
7.3.38. The ES cites the Green Construction Board’s prediction that by 2026, though UK construction emissions will have decreased due to efficiency gains, the annual HS2 construction emissions will be around 2% of the UK total.48 HS2AA believe it is highly unlikely these efficiency gains will have been realised by 2017, the year construction is supposed to start.
Operating Emissions
7.3.39. The vast majority of operating emissions for Phase 1 of HS2 will arise from the use of electricity in train operation (71% in Scenario A; 60% Scenario B). Other operating emissions arise from maintenance (10-15%); and stations (19-24%). Over the proposed project’s lifetime the carbon footprint from the operation of HS2 will be driven by a combination of energy use (largely related to the number of trains operating and their efficiency) and the variation in UK electricity generation emission factor. Though the efficiency of rolling stock may well improve over a 120 year lifetime it is the predicted changes in electricity generation that will be most influential in the scale of the operating carbon footprint.
7.3.40. The ES uses average electricity consumption figures of 24.65kWh/km for the 200 captive trains; 47.32kWh/km for the 400m captive trains; and 15.27kWh/km for the classic compatible trains. The origin of these figures is unclear and the raw data and analysis underpinning the operating carbon footprint analysis are not available.
Reduction For Modal Shift of Passengers
7.3.41. The ES contemplates significant carbon benefits arising from passengers transferring from more polluting modes of transport-cars and planes. The link between these figures in the ES and the overall figures for numbers of passengers shifting in the October 2013 Strategic Case does not appear to have been explained in the ES.
7.3.42. However modal shift has dropped significantly since HS2 was first proposed, with the figures in the October 2013 Strategic Case indicating only 5% of passengers are expected to have shifted from air or car. Classic Rail New Trips Air Car 2010 Economic Case 57% 27% 8% 8% 2011 Economic Case 65% 22% 6% 7% 2012 Economic Case 65% 24% 3% 8% 2013 Economic Case 69% 26% 1% 4%
48 See Vol 3. Section 5; para 5.6.13.
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Modal Shift From Air
7.3.43. One of the main attractions of high-speed rail is the ability it has to offer an alternative to wasteful short-haul flights. It is clear that high speed rail has provided a viable alternative to flying in busy transport corridors in France or Japan. The TGV has achieved a high market share at the expense of air between Lyon and Paris, but only with a journey time of 2 hours, and only by serving the main airports in both cities.
7.3.44. However claims that passengers transferring from air to HS2 will occur on the scale set out in the ES doesn’t stack up. Phase 1 is due to run from London to the West Midlands. At present, there are no direct flights from any London airport to any West Midlands airport. This is hardly surprising as the rail journey time from London Euston to Birmingham New Street is only 85 minutes, comparable with the time it takes to get from Central London to Heathrow and through security. With this background, it is difficult to see any significant carbon benefit for the route to the West Midlands. Classic Compatible services are forecast by HS2 Ltd to run as soon as Phase 1 is open to Leeds, Manchester and the Central Belt in Scotland. Journey time savings on these services do not appear sufficient to drive significant modal shift to high speed rail, and no information has been provided in the ES on what modeling assumptions have been used for modal shift to Classic Compatible services.
7.3.45. The carbon benefits of the line, due to modal shift, might be expected to be more significant should Phase 2 get built or an extension built to Scotland but even this appears unlikely given:
HS2 Ltd’s figures for modal shift from air are based on projections that the market would continue to grow, whereas the market for domestic flights has actually been shrinking since 2005. HS2 Ltd’s also assumes a significant proportion of passengers travelling between London and Scotland would automatically migrate onto Classic Compatible train services, despite the overall cut in journey times only being around an hour at best, and even this only being possible after the second phase of HS2 had opened. Perhaps a larger share of the market could be attained if a high-speed rail service ran all the way on new tracks as far as Edinburgh and Glasgow, but this is not what is being proposed. If proposals emerge to extend HS2 to Scotland, there is also the huge political question of who would pay for such a line, given that rail is a devolved issue and paying for a connection to the Central Belt would likely cost a further £8-£15 billion. To put this figure in context, the entire rail budget of the Scottish Government is around £300 million annually. Many people travelling from Scotland to London depart from airports outside the Central Belt- places like Aberdeen, Dundee and Inverness. Passengers from these areas would be very unlikely to shift to taking a classic train to Glasgow/Edinburgh and then a Classic Compatible train to London. Very few air passengers travelling from a regional UK city to a London airport are undertaking a city centre to city centre journey for which HS2 would be a valid alternative. For example, Heathrow handles large volumes of transfer traffic from domestic shuttle flights onto long-haul services not offered from elsewhere in the UK. Those passengers are unlikely to transfer to HS2. Meanwhile London’s other airports cater to different catchment areas (London City- Canary Wharf/West End City; Heathrow-Thames Valley; London Luton-Milton Keynes).
7.3.46. Taken together the claims that significant numbers of air passengers will shift to HS2 appears highly questionable and the ES should have provided more detail on this area to enable its assumptions to be reviewed.
Reduction for Modal Shift For Freight
7.3.47. A significant proportion of the anticipated carbon savings for Phase 1 of HS2 arise from freight transferring from road to rail. However little detail is provided in the ES as to how such figures were calculated, the risk factors in achieving such goals and whether there are alternative means of obtaining modal shift from road to rail for freight.
7.3.48. HS2 is not designed to enable efficient freight operation. The gradients of the line would make
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running such services difficult. More significantly the proposed service pattern would preclude freight trains from running when HS2’s passenger services were operating. The demands of maintaining track at a standard trains can operate at 350 kmh and operating freight trains are also incompatible.
7.3.49. Modal shift will therefore come, if at all, by using freight paths on the lines “freed up” by HS2- principally the West Coast Main Line. But the ES makes clear there are already unused freight paths on the West Coast Main Line and doesn’t explain how having a greater number of paths on this line will result in an increased modal shift. The ES also doesn’t discuss alternatives that could achieve greater use by freight trains on the West Coast Main Line-steps like enhanced signaling or passing loops
7.3.50. Current freight flows on rail suggest that enhancing freight capability between London and the West Midlands (the corridor which HS2 travels) should not be regarded as a priority. Centro, published in 2012 a consultation on West Midlands Freight Strategy, which identified that 94% of inbound West Midlands railfreight in the year 2008 originated from south east England container traffic (the ports of Southampton, Felixstowe, and Harwich) and 0% from Greater London. It is also worth noting that, at present, the Channel Tunnel has not taken off as a freight conduit. Therefore the principal railfreight movements to the West Midlands would not benefit from “capacity relief” provided by HS2.
7.3.51. A realistic strategy for improving the use of rail for movement of freight would require a different scheme of works, focused on improving connections with Britain’s principal container ports (located on the South and East coasts). Currently, only one third of container traffic from Felixstowe is rail-borne. The cross country railway between the port of Felixstowe (Britain’s largest container port), Ely, Leicester and Nuneaton is undergoing an upgrade to increase its freight capacity. This would allow freight to be re-routed away from the southern West Coast Main Line and North London lines, thereby increasing passenger capacity. Future resignalling and electrification between Felixstowe, Water Orton, Aldridge, and Dudley would provide the means to increase goods movement well above current levels. In eastern England, reconstruction of the tracks between March and Spalding would allow rail freight to run to northern England without inconveniencing passenger services on the main lines.
Offsetting
7.3.52. Offsetting carbon emissions that are not otherwise reduced is an established feature of carbon management. Given the variable quality of carbon offset initiatives a Publicly Available Specification (PAS 2060) is now available which seeks to provide a common definition for offsetting and a recognised method of verification in support of a claim of carbon neutrality – a position where residual carbon emissions are balanced to zero by carbon offsets. It is therefore to be regretted that the ES does not refer specifically to PAS 2060.
7.3.53. From existing examples on the carbon sequestration potential for UK woodland it is possible to estimate the carbon stored in a stand of different trees from initial planting to maturity up to 100 years.A 10Ha native woodland project consisting of a mix of oak, ash, birch, aspen, alder, rowan, hazel and willow is estimated to sequester 4,692tCO2e over 100 years, net of a 20% buffer to account for potential risks such as disease or fire. Scaling this up to 650Ha, the area to be planted in 2017, would lead to 305,000 tCO2e being sequestered by 2117, significantly different from the 500,000
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tCO2e estimated in the ES. In summary, achieving a 500,000 tonne sequestration of carbon through planting two million trees is unlikely to be achievable given the tree planting schedule required.
Carbon Impacts of Alternatives To HS2
7.3.54. The 51M Optimised Alternative would have a significantly reduced carbon footprint, given it needs comparatively little additional infrastructure work and some extensions to existing rolling stock. The HS2 project carbon footprint is driven by construction emissions primarily derived from the steel and concrete required to make tunnels, bridges, viaducts and track whereas the 51M Optimised Alternative avoids this level of infrastructure demand. In operational terms it is clear that reducing train velocity reduces carbon emissions. The 51M Optimised Alternative is a slower solution which in energy and carbon terms is a positive outcome given reducing speeds from 360kmph to 300kmph reduces energy use and carbon emissions by 23%.
Power Requirements For HS2
7.3.55. Some simulation modelling has been conducted on individual train journeys between London and Birmingham. In 2009 Imperial College conducted a study looking at different scenarios for train size, speed, and stopping points. A more recent study on this issue by the Trapeze Group is reported in the 2013 Economic Case for HS2, though the study details have not been made available. This is surprising as the Economic Case for HS2 report cites the Trapeze Group study as having a significant impact on operational costs. In the absence of the study it is unknown whether its cost impacts are positive or negative. As cost and carbon are closely linked it seems very likely that it will have a similar impact on carbon emissions.
7.3.56. The Imperial College study estimates that annually the HS2 project would consume 150 million kWh, based on 50x200m trains running to/from London-Birmingham. To put this into perspective 150 million kWh is 150 gigawatt hours (GWh) or 1.5 terawatt hours (TWh). In 2012 electricity generation from coal fired power stations alone was 133TWh; from gas-fired power stations 85TWh. In terms of power generation a 120MW peak load is equivalent to roughly one nuclear power station (typically about 250MW at 50% load); or about 80 offshore wind turbines (5MW per turbine at 30% load).
7.3.57. The ES is still fundamentally flawed, in respect of assessing carbon emissions, given:
The report does not adequately set out any of the detailed inputs that went into the modelling. For example it sets out the biggest reductions in modal shift, but there is no information on who, what, where and when there will be a switch to HS2. There is no information on the assumptions.
There is no information on increased journeys as a result of HS2. For example, there is a huge park and ride network proposed as part of the Birmingham Interchange yet no reference is made to the number of additional journeys that will are likely to this facility.
There is no information on what freight routes will benefit, how many lorries will be removed from the roads, and where these freight benefits will be realised.
There is no clear acknowledgement of the likely emissions factors in 22 years time when HS2 starts to have operational improvements. It is highly likely that by then motor vehicles have a much reduced carbon footprint and therefore the benefits are being hugely over stated. HS2 will however still require grid electricity which will continue to be reliant on fossil fuels when opening.
There is no acknowledgement that the emissions from construction will be well established prior to any improvements generated from the operation of the scheme.
There is no acknowledgement of what impacts reduced classic lines services in rural areas will have. This is likely to result in increased car journeys.
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7.3.58. In general, the climate issues in the ES are based entirely on theories and are not supported by a detailed assessment. These problems are particularly significant given the strategic objectives for HS2 included carbon reduction. Anything short of this target should be considered a failure.
7.3.59. HS2AA believes that proper assessment of the HS2 project carbon footprint assessment in the ES is hindered by a lack of available raw data. Construction emissions are based on many design assumptions that are subject to significant change as design fundamentals evolve and many of the most carbon intensive construction processes have been excluded from consideration. Passenger and freight mode shift is a significant element in the ES to reduce the overall HS2 project carbon footprint yet the accuracy of these forecasts are barely covered in the documentation. The difference between the carbon impacts in the 2011 Appraisal of Sustainability and the ES are startling-they appear to have increased by an order of five. This increase is despite the methodology in the ES excluding carbon emissions from airport slots currently used for domestic flights being reused for more polluting longer distance flights. So despite narrowing the scope of forecasting, the ES indicates that the emissions from Phase 1 of HS2 will be significantly higher than the numbers detailed in the 2011 Appraisal of Sustainability.
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7.4 Community
7.4.1 Communities will be negatively impact by the construction and operation of Phase 1 of HS2. These negative implications will be apparent both in rural and urban areas.
7.4.2 Rather than accept this level of damage caused by HS2, HS2 Ltd appears to totally ignore this issue in the context of the ES. HS2AA believes it is essential that HS2 Ltd appoint a community champion to ensure that there is a senior and robust voice advocating on behalf of communities within HS2 Ltd.
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7.5 Cultural Heritage
7.5.1 Whilst the Hybrid Bill seeks to disapply existing legislation under the Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas Act, HS2AA believe that archaeological deposits are a finite resource of national value and should be protected.
7.5.2 There is a distinct lack of sufficient information in the ES on the scope of construction to properly consider their impact on heritage.
7.5.3 It is in the best interests of HS2 Ltd to undertake a proper assessment of this topic. Once construction works commence, any notable finds could cause delays, require redesigns and increase the cost of the project. These could be avoided now if HS2 Ltd were to carry out a proper archaeological assessment.
7.5.4 HS2AA believe that HS2 Ltd should agree a scheme for archaeological investigation and reporting and that this be properly incorporated into the Code of Construction Practice and communicated to all contractors in line with the NPPF requirements for Heritage Assets.
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7.6 Ecology
7.6.1 If Phase 1 of HS2 proceeds as proposed it would, in HS2AA’s view, have a major impact on the natural environment and result in arguably the most significant net loss of biodiversity from any single project currently being planned in the UK. Given this scale and magnitude of impact, the ES fails to provide sufficient information about proposals for mitigation and compensation, or evidence of their likely effectiveness, for a no net loss outcome to be assured. Given the importance of this issue, HS2AA commissioned Treweek Environmental Consultants to review the ES in respect of its wildlife impacts. A copy of the report is enclosed at Appendix 6.
7.6.2 The project will affect as many as 89 Local Wildlife Sites (LWSs). At 61 of these, the impacts will result in a significant adverse effect on the integrity of the site. As well as being highly valued by local communities, these sites form an essential part of the country’s overall biodiversity and, in many cases, support species which are important at national or European level. LWSs are often key stepping stones for such species in the landscape. The implications of losing them have not been adequately assessed and no strategy has been presented for offsetting residual impacts on them so that no net loss of biodiversity can be achieved.
7.6.3 The ES document assesses impacts superficially. In many cases the baseline data used to assess impacts are lacking or questionable because of limitations acknowledged in the reports, such as failure to secure access to land for purposes of surveying or the fact that surveys were carried out at an inappropriate time of year. These limitations apply to some sites of considerable local importance, including at least one ancient woodland. In general impacts are not quantified in relation to background trends, making it impossible to derive meaningful assessments of significance. HS2AA are concerned that the ES presents minimal details about how impacts were assessed, what mitigation and compensation measures will be carried out or how success or failure will be determined.
7.6.4 Importantly, the ES makes no mention of the major barrier effect of Phase 1 of HS2, given that it will be fenced along the entire route. This effect has not been quantified even for nationally or European Protected Species populations and no attempt has been made to maintain connectivity of habitat e.g through provision of wildlife crossings. These are now used routinely in other countries (the Netherlands and Canada for example) and represent international good practice. The ES makes clear HS2 Ltd has seemingly accepted the destruction of habitats as inevitable. HS2AA believe providing mitigation that will take decades to establish is not sufficient to demonstrate no net loss. For example, the ES acknowledges that the proposals for Phase 1 of HS2 alone would lead to the loss of 1% of the UK’s Barn Owl population. The proposed mitigation amounts to no more than a promise to talk to landowners about providing alternative nesting sites and does not address habitat impacts at all.
7.6.5 It is clear that HS2 could have a significant impact not only on individual protected sites, but also on the biodiversity of the wider landscape. This needs to be more clearly acknowledged by HS2 Ltd and explicitly addressed in their biodiversity strategy. The assessment made in the ES is entirely site-based. There is little ‘in combination’ assessment and very few references to effects on the wider landscape or the viability of species populations within it. HS2AA would have expected a detailed, categorised assessment of the existing wildlife, so that the principle of no net loss of diversity can be met through mitigation and compensation. Ensuring that compensatory habitats are as good as the assets lost is very challenging and successful examples are rare. Given such concerns, and the likelihood that biodiversity offsetting will be required, we are therefore concerned and disappointed by the almost total lack of information on how equivalence will be ensured and the options available to provide compensation for the many residual impacts on both species and habitats.
Compliance With Relevant Policy
7.6.6 The Government’s stated policy is that it “expects the planning system to deliver the homes,
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business, infrastructure and thriving local places that the country needs, while protecting and enhancing the natural and historic environment.”49 This policy statement goes onto to state that “Our leadership must stretch beyond its headline commitments – extending, for example, to the way we promote and conserve biodiversity on our estate and the standards we set for construction projects”.
7.6.7 HS2 Ltd’s sustainability policy does not appear to reflect these principles, and only makes a commitment to achieving no net loss of biodiversity across the delivery of the HS2 project.50 They commit to “Minimise impacts where they occur and deliver enhancements as far as practicable to ensure there is no net loss to the natural environment.”
7.6.8 This wording, and the broader policy adopted by HS2 Ltd, indicates a minimal commitment to safeguarding, and if possible improving, biodiversity. HS2AA believes HS2 Ltd should be seeking to deliver a net gain in biodiversity rather than the current minimal commitment in this area. The Government has recognised the importance of landscape-scale networks of wildlife habitats, but this project is a major challenge to these principles. The landscape-scale impacts need to be more clearly acknowledged by HS2 Ltd and explicitly addressed in its biodiversity strategy and compensation.
Faults With Surveying and Baseline Studies
7.6.9 HS2AA believe that necessary baseline information is either missing, or hasn’t been provided with the ES, which leads to the ES significantly underrepresenting wildlife impacts. Examples include:
An approach to areas that haven’t been surveyed (the majority of the route) which is described as “precautionary”, but which relies primarily on informed guesswork. Data which were acquired during the preparation of the report not being included, specifically with data from Environmental Record Centres provided to HS2 Ltd being selectively reported. Surveys of probably the rarest and most vulnerable species impacted by the proposals, the Bechstein’s bat, being wholly inadequate and likely to lead to major underplaying of the potential impacts and consequently of the remedial measures required to maintain the species.
7.6.10 An assessment of the biodiversity impacts in Warwickshire, has been undertaken by Warwickshire County Council using the current DEFRA process for biodiversity offsetting. It highlights that, even using the government’s own yardstick, the mitigation proposals within Warwickshire are inadequate. They fail to provide between 1700 and 3500 hectares of habitat an offsetting scheme should require, with further losses to linear habitats, such as hedgerows, which are also not being replaced.
7.6.11 HS2 Ltd accepted within the ES that they have not been able to assess all areas to be impacted by the scheme. This is due to not having permissions or being unable to access land, which surprisingly includes Network Rail land in one instance. Land ownership and permissions were always going to be a controversial matter. However, the purpose of voting through the HS2 Preparation Bill was to facilitate HS2 Ltd’s ability to access land. It is therefore strange that the ES was completed without the adequate surveys and assessments prior to the voting on the HS2 Preparation Bill. It demonstrates that there was a sense of urgency in producing the ES to the detriment of a proper assessment.
Misleading Drafting of The Non Technical Summary
7.6.12 Despite the impacts acknowledged by the authors of the ES themselves, the non-technical
49 The Natural Choice: securing the value of nature. HM Government 2011. Paragraph 2.33 50 http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf/es_maps_docs/Sustainability%20Policy.pdf
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summary of the ES would lead a reader to conclude that the project would indeed achieve no net loss of biodiversity. For example, the non-technical summary states “HS2 has included mitigation and compensation measures to reduce effects on species and habitats” and “In line with Government policy, HS2 Ltd is seeking to achieve no net loss in biodiversity”51. Not only is it not currently true that mitigation and compensation has been provided for all effects (see comments on Barn Owls above) but the non-technical summary does not make it clear, as is stated elsewhere, that mitigation will only be provided “where practicable”.
7.6.13 There is an extensive literature to show that birds are disturbed by operational roads, with significant effects on species diversity, population density and breeding success, up to 3 km away. This adds up to very significant landscape scale effects, even without degradation and fragmentation, which are simply ignored in the Non-Technical Summary.
Appropriate efforts to avoid or compensate for impacts on important biodiversity
7.6.14 HS2 crosses designated sites (eg SSSIs) without explaining clearly why they could not be avoided. As a general rule, no detailed discussion is provided about efforts to avoid sites, it is simply stated that such sites are avoided “to the extent possible”.
7.6.15 HS2 crosses a large number of LWSs and does not specify in any detail what measures are proposed to ensure that important biodiversity values are retained in the landscape. In particular detail of efforts to avoid impacts on protected species populations are lacking.
7.6.16 Ancient woodland is rare, covering just 2% of the UK's land area. It is also irreplaceable due to the unique, undisturbed soils and ecosystems found in ancient woodland. It is arguably the UK’s richest land habitat, supporting a host of protected and threatened wildlife - species that are slow to react to change, find it difficult to adapt, and are not mobile enough to move to other locations to survive. Phase 1 of HS2 will cause direct loss and damage to ancient woodland and in some cases cut straight through the centre of a wood, destroying the naturally protected 'core area'. The Woodland Trust believe the confirmed route from London to Birmingham will cause direct loss to 26 ancient woods with a further 17 ancient woods likely to suffer damage from noise, vibration, changes to lighting and dust. This is a huge environmental price for such an economically flawed project.
7.6.17 Ancient and veteran trees are also at direct risk due to HS2 yet the ES does not cover the impact of the proposed scheme on ancient and veteran trees. Only 8 are specifically mentioned in the ES reports and none of these are marked on the accompanying maps. These trees can stand alone but are habitats in their own right and, like ancient woods, due to their age they support wildlife that can not survive anywhere else. Route alterations, the width of the track (which is likely to vary along the route), road building to allow vehicle access, or noise and disturbance - first from construction and later the high speed trains that will pass at speeds of up to 250mph several times a day - could all increase the impact on these woods.
7.6.18 HS2 Ltd. states that ‘compensatory planting will mitigate for the loss’. This is misleading in a number of ways. Most importantly, it falsely suggests that a complex habitat such as ancient woodland can be simply recreated or relocated in a process known as “Translocation”. Habitat translocation is a process used as mitigation or compensation for loss of a habitat, usually to development. Evidence suggests some habitats, such as certain types of grassland, can be successfully translocated. The term is used in the ES in a way that implies ancient woodland can effectively be removed from a site and re-established elsewhere. However, Natural England 2012 states that “ancient woodland as a system cannot be moved.” As the features of ancient woodland are a product of the interaction between unique geographical and historical factors, which cannot be replicated. Translocation cannot therefore be viewed as mitigation for ancient woodland loss, since the latter is irreplaceable.
51 Non-technical summary – Page 45, para 7.6 Page 158, Paragraph 7.6
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7.6.19 It would be far more accurate to call the process “translocation of soil and/or features associated with ancient woodland” or “salvage of ancient woodland soil and/or features”. If translocation is to take place then the developer needs to identify a suitable receptor site. This site needs to replicate the conditions found at the donor site (i.e. the existing ancient woodland) as nearly as possible. It also needs to be the same size, or bigger, to have any chance of minimising biodiversity loss. If the site is not similar in soil type, hydrology, aspect etc. then the prospect of failure of an already high-risk process is increased.
Species
7.6.20 The ES focuses solely on European protected species and does not evaluate the likely loss of other species protected or otherwise. The documentation is therefore lacking appropriate details to quantify the impacts on wildlife. The ES makes no qualification of what this area does for non-European protected species or the range of small mammals, birds, insects, reptiles and amphibians that will be impacted. It is clear to see that such a wide impact on ecological areas will have a devastating effect. The proposed mitigation cannot in any way make up for the death of so many animals.
High Speed Rail’s Impact on Wildlife
7.6.21 While there is almost no published work on the effects of railways on wildlife, there have been extensive studies on the effects of roads. Roads impact on wildlife in several ways. First, building roads and their ancillary structures destroys habitat directly. Secondly, the resulting road network fragments the landscape, restricting animal movements, thereby blocking their access to the remaining habitat. That roads are effective barriers is convincingly demonstrated by studies that show major genetic differences in populations of animals either side of major roads (e.g. voles (Gerlach and Musolf 2000), red deer (Frantz et al. 2012) and carnivores (Riley et al. 2006)). Thirdly, roads are also sources of light, noise and chemical pollution, and so degrade the habitat around them. Finally, fast moving traffic kills animals directly. Roads can affect birds and bats as much as terrestrial vertebrates. They may also affect invertebrates and plants through their effects on local wind patterns, hydrology, light (if running on embankments or in cuttings) and local chemical pollution. These factors are all likely to be present in the case of Phase 1 of HS2. There is also a risk that the very high speeds of the trains will increase the risk of direct strikes on wildlife.
Barrier Effect on Wildlife
7.6.22 Sites of biodiversity importance are reliant on the ability of many species to move between higher quality habitat patches, often along linear features such as hedgerows, tree lines and waterways. Linear transport infrastructure represents a barrier to such movements, reducing home ranges and foraging areas, disrupting migration, and preventing the dispersal of new generations of offspring, all of which are essential processes in animal life cycles.
7.6.23 HS2 has the potential to be a major barrier to the movement of a wide range of animals and plants. Because HS2 will be a long, continuous linear structure, it will likely disrupt wildlife at the landscape scale, so it is important to look at its effects not only on specific protected sites but on the landscape as a whole. The high fences that will line either side of the HS2 track will be a significant barrier to wildlife and the frequency of trains running on HS2 is forecast to be much higher than on existing lines.
7.6.24 Fragmentation will also reduce the ability of many species to move and adapt to environmental change in response to climate change, one of the many reasons put forward in the Lawton Report (Making Space for Nature 2010) when arguing for a landscape scale
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approach to nature conservation. As such HS2 is a major challenge to these principles, yet this aspect of its impact is not discussed in the ES.
Mitigation
7.6.25 Despite the almost total lack of evidence to support current mitigation strategies, the assessments in the ES assume mitigation will be successful, and successful to the point that the effects on wildlife and habitats are negligible. Despite such positive conclusions, the plans in the ES for mitigation are barely developed. Insufficient information is presented to support evidence-based conclusions about the likely effectiveness of mitigation. Too much has to be taken on trust.
7.6.26 The success of mitigation measures, for example crossing points for animals, is largely unproven, and we are concerned that HS2 Ltd is over-confident of the impacts that can be mitigated.
7.6.27 HS2AA believes HS2 Ltd needs to develop a far more comprehensive approach to mitigation, including accepting that the construction impacts will result in a long period of decline in species and biodiverse areas which will only recover, in a best case scenario, 20 years into the maturation of the new planting. All finalised mitigation measures should be accompanied by clear and well funded management plans.
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7.7 Land Quality
7.7.1 The ES places significant emphasis on the Code of Construction Practice, indicating this document will govern how soil quality will be assessed and maintained. These include methods to control spillage and prevent contamination of adjacent areas, methods for the storage and handling of excavated material which includes both contaminated and uncontaminated material and the management of any unexpected contamination found during construction.
7.7.2 HS2AA believes relevant local authorities should be provided with appropriate powers to monitor these activities, to ensure HS2 Ltd carries out appropriate checks of the soil and reinstates land properly.
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7.8 Landscape
7.8.1 The visual intrusion of the proposed scheme ranks second only to noise disturbance in the list of major concerns for impacted communities. In light of the importance of this issue, HS2AA commissioned Waterman Group to objectively analyse the methodology used by HS2 Ltd In the ES To assess landscape effects on Phase 1, with a particular emphasis on the most sensitive areas on Phase 1 route-the AONB and Green Belt. Their report is set out in Appendix 5 and a summary of the problems identified is set out in the table below.
7.8.2 Taken together, these findings indicate HS2 Ltd has failed to provide a reasonable overview of the landscape effects of Phase 1 of HS2 and comprehensively underplayed the impact of the scheme.
7.8.3 These negative impacts should have taken into account the Overhead Line Equipment is one obvious failing. The conductor wires will be around 5m above the rails and the gantry pillars around 7m above the rails. As well as these structures, full-height noise barriers, of similar height, are likely to be needed because of the high aerodynamic noise generated at the level of the conductors. It is also noted that the proposed Limit of Deviation allows the line to be constructed 3m higher than the proportions set out in the ES. Consequently, there are parts of the line where features will approach 20m above the ground level. The visual intrusion, combined with tree loss, will seriously degrade the present appeal of the landscape in many areas.
7.8.4 It is therefore critical to reduce the elevation of embankments, viaducts, and bridges wherever possible, and to ensure that everything is done to harmonise the new features with the existing landscape. Alternative proposals such as deeper cuttings and greater tunneling should be provided with appropriate priority.
Design Considerations
7.8.5 Bridges and viaducts, particularly those with noise barriers and Overhead Line Equipment, will be prominent features in the landscape, and will require a good standard of design that harmonises with adjacent buildings and structures. Aspects that can be optimised to lessen the intrusion of noise barriers include: colour; texture; patterning; edge profile. Lighting can be used to diminish silhouette effects. Given the time-scale of the project, it may be possible to use raster displays to tone structures into the environment.
7.8.6 Given the importance of this issue, HS2 Ltd should create a nationwide panel for architectural design and ensure the highest design standards are followed in the construction process.
Screening Planting
7.8.7 Though the HS2 project will result in the loss of 250 Hectares of woodland the intention is to plant two million trees (650Ha) as a means of reducing the carbon footprint of the overall project. Were these to be planted in the first year of construction it would equate to 5,479 trees planted per day during 2017. This seems unlikely to be achievable.
7.8.8 The planting of trees is essential to mitigate the landscape and visual impact of the scheme. Suitable foliage can conceal the constructed works, and also break up the outlines of buildings and the linearity of the noise barriers and Overhead Line Equipment. In addition, plantations can reduce the intrusion by disguising features as natural parts of the landscape. Screening foliage needs to be planted early in the work programme. Fast-growing species should be planted close to elements such as noise barriers, to achieve a dense green wall.
7.8.9 HS2 Ltd needs to identify how agreements for the on-going care and maintenance of the screening plantings will be determined. Such agreements would need to include comprehensive arrangements for maintenance (watering, drainage, weeding, disease management, replacements etc). No details are provided on this issue in the ES.
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7.8.10 HS2AA believe the carbon sequestration potential of tree should be organised using the Woodland Carbon Code (WCC).52 Operated by the Forestry Commission, the WCC is a voluntary standard for woodland creation projects in the UK. The Code provides guidance for project designers and managers setting up new woodland projects so would be very relevant to HS2 Ltd’s ambition to plant two million trees in 2017. It provides advice and guidance on carbon sequestration and emphasises the need for addtionality, verification and retirement.
Security Fencing
7.8.11 Little detail has been given about security fencing of the line. It is understood that for maximum effectiveness, noise barriers will be close to the line, while cable troughs and access tracks could result in a trace width, across fences, of 22 m. It is important that the fences are coloured to tone into the environment. In rural settings, olive or yellow-green would be preferred. In built-up settings, chocolate brown or terracotta would be advisable. The colour of the fencing should be approved by the relevant local authority. HS2 Ltd should be required to enter into undertakings to maintain the fencing in good repair.
Shadow Pricing
7.8.12 While it is very difficult to value the damage caused by HS2 it is possible to establish the minimum market value of alternative developments that may be considered to give a similar level of damage and which at that "established value" are not acceptable within that particular area of the route.
7.8.13 A combination of derivatives of “contingent valuation” and “shadow pricing” could be used to indicate or establish a minimum value loss attributable to HS2 going thorough the areas designated as the route for Phase 1. Both are recognised valuation techniques which should be accepted as consistent with the Treasury Green Book and good valuation practice.
7.8.14 A reference case would be to theoretically permit a limited amount of housing along the 10 km untunneled section of the AONB. If a residential road of similar density as Ballinger Rd South Heath, were permitted the value of the HS2 route land, simply as building land, would be about £300 million. As this development is unacceptable under the restrictions of the AONB it follows that from a nationwide perspective the Government values the unblemished landscape more highly. The minimum value of the 10km untunnelled section using these techniques would come to between £350-£500 million making a good case for additional mitigation.
7.8.15 It will be a matter of considered opinion whether the damage from this development would be greater, less or the same as from HS2. Given it could be tailored to avoid ancient woodland, areas of special interest and be more dense in certain less visible and less impactful locations it is probably at about the right level. Stated preference techniques can be used to establish a level of theoretical development that would generally be considered to be similar in terms of damage to the AONB as HS2 taking into account both the construction and operating phases.
7.8.16 To this established minimum value can be added other aspects of environmental damage as defined in the Green Book and good environmental valuation practice. As an example, and as the Green Book points out, shutting quarrying in National Parks because of its impact was valued using contingent valuation techniques by the former DETRA at £10.52/extracted tonne. The HS2 Tunnelling and earthworks are quarrying in terms of the environmental damage they will create. This approach could be a bridge between those who see no value in nature’s beauty and those that see it as priceless.
52 The Woodland Carbon Code is directly referred to in Vol.5 Table 7. Underlying assumptions by sector and area. Row entitled ‘Operation’.
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ISSUE/AREA WHAT GLVIA 3 RECOMMENDS WHAT HAS BEEN PRODUCED POTENTIAL ISSUE WITH ES BY HS2 Methodology Study Area GLVIA3 states that the study area The study areas used in The ES underplays the should be agreed with the competent the ES are not clearly extent of potential impacts authority at the outset and should cover defined and have not and does take into the area from which the proposed been agreed with the account all the potential development will potentially be visible. competent authorities. receptors likely to be The ES does note that for significantly affected by CFA 9 a 500m corridor the proposals. either side of the track has been used for the assessment and for CFA18 a 2km corridor has been used. Neither of these distances would cover the geographical area from which the proposed development would potentially be visible. As a result there are likely to be large numbers of receptors (both landscape and visual) which are likely to be impacted upon by the proposals but have not been included within the ES. Zone of Theoretical GLVIA 3 (para 6.9 page 103) states that The ZTVs generated and The ES underplays the Visibility (ZTV) ‘in the case of linear developments such used for the purposes of geographical extent of as road or rail schemes the ZTV must be the ES do not show the potential effects/impacts. constructed for a sequence of points worst case scenario and along the road….In addition, the height as a result underplay the of structures such as bridges or gantries, geographical extent of and of vehicles that will use the route, potential effects/impacts. should be built into the ZTV construction Elements of the scheme so that the visibility of all aspects of the such as cranes (used proposal is considered’. during construction) and the overhead electric cables used to power the trains have not been included in the ZTVs.
Landscape Character Individual GLVIA 3 (page 36) states that landscape The ES methodology and The ES does not properly Landscape receptors (including the constituent assessment does not or comprehensively Receptors elements of the landscape, its specific explain how potential establish the value or aesthetic or perceptual qualities) and the impacts on individual sensitivity of the existing character of the landscape in different landscape receptors have landscape areas should be identified. The predicted been assessed and does character/resource and changes resulting from the different not properly assess the does not properly or component s of the development and the potential impacts on comprehensively evaluate resulting effects should then be individual receptors within the impact of the described. the ES. Individual proposals on the landscape receptors can landscape character or include settlements, the landscape resource. public right of way network, trees, hedges, woodland and other landscape features and elements. Within the ES there is a lot of weight given to the evaluation of tranquillity but no evaluation of other aesthetic or perceptual qualities. Key Characteristics As part of the assessment of character The key characteristics of The ES does not properly GLVIA 3 (page 86) the individual each landscape character or comprehensively elements and aesthetic and perceptual area have not been establish the value or February 2014 aspects of the landscape, particularly75 identified and thereforewww.hs2actionalliance.org sensitivity of the existing emphasising those that are key the impact of the landscape
characteristics contributing to the proposals upon them has character/resource and distinctive character of the landscape. not been assessed. does not properly or comprehensively evaluate the impact of the proposals on the landscape character or landscape resource. Landscape Value Pages 80-85 Landscape value within The ES does not properly GLVIA 3 (paras 5.26 and 5.27 provides the Environmental evaluate the existing guidance on how to value undesignated Statement has been landscape character and landscapes. ‘A review of existing evaluated almost entirely is likely to have landscape designations is usually the using the designation undervalued undesignated starting point in understanding approach with no landscapes and receptors landscape value, but the value attached methodology or criteria which are impacted by the to undesignated landscapes also needs set out to value proposals. to be carefully considered. undesignated landscapes. GLVIA (pages 83 and 84) suggests as a starting point reference to existing Landscape condition has landscape character assessments, been evaluated within the planning policies, strategies and ES however the approach guidelines and identifies a series of is very simplistic and there factors which can help in the is not enough discussion identification of valued landscapes or evidence base within including: the ES to explain the Landscape Condition decisions that have been Scenic Quality made. Rarity Representativeness Conservation Interests Recreation Value Perceptual Aspects Associations Viewpoint Locations GLVIA3 ( p153) states that in the Viewpoint locations used It is standard best practice baseline for visual effects photographs within the ES have not within an ES to not only should illustrate existing views and visual been formally agreed with consult with the competent amenity at agreed viewpoints. the competent authorities. authority regarding the location of viewpoints but also to gain formal approval to the selection. The reason for this is to ensure that all the relevant viewpoints are included within the assessment and that none are overlooked. Viewpoint GLVIA3 and The Landscape Institute’s The presentation of the The photographs provided Photographs Technical Advice Note 1/11 provides viewpoint photographs within the ES to show the technical advice on the taking and the ES is inconsistent various viewpoints do not presentation of viewpoint photographs. and does not fully comply give an accurate with the current guidance representation of the issued by the Landscape existing baseline. Institute in Technical Advice Note 1/11 as follows:
Within CFA9 the presentation of the photosheets is incomplete, uses inconsistent focal lengths and inconsistent presentation which does not comply with current guidelines.
Within CFA18 there are viewpoints without photographs and the photographs presented do not comply with current guidelines Predicting and GLVIA3 sets out criteria for predicting This criteria has not been The effects of the Describing Visual and describing visual effects (para 6.27 not been fully followed proposals on views and Effects page 112). A range of issues should be within the ES. visual amenity have not
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described to help establish the effects on been properly described, views, these are: assessed and Nature of the view of the proposed communicated within the development – eg full, partial or glimpse ES. Proportion of proposed development or particular feature that is likely to be visible Distance of viewpoint from proposed development and whether viewer would focus on development due to its scale and proximity or whether development would be a small, minor element within a wider view Whether the view is stationary , transient or one of a sequence of views as from a footpath or moving vehicle Nature of the change to the view eg changes to existing skyline, creation of new visual focus, introduction of man- made objects, changes in simplicity or complexity, alteration of visual scale, changes to the degree of visual enclosure. Choice of GLVIA3 (para 8.16 page 141) notes that No rationale has been The full effects of the Viewpoints used for predicted changes (to views) must be provided as to why certain proposals cannot be photomontages described in the text and should also be viewpoints have been understood with so few illustrated by means of visualisations and selected for the photomontages being states that it will not usually be possible production of presented within the ES. to prepare visualisations for every photomontages within the viewpoint and there will need to be ES. discussions with the competent authority and consultation bodies to ensure that The number and location an appropriate number and range of of photomontages has not viewpoints is used, allowing the been formally approved significant visual effects to be illustrated with the competent at a range of representative locations authority or consultation covering the types of visual receptor. bodies.
There are not enough photomontages presented within the ES to communicate the full extent of landscape and visual effects of the proposals. Photomontages GLVIA3 (para 8.20 page 145) states that The photomontages do The photomontages the ‘photomontages that are included in not have information produced do not correctly an Environmental Statement must meet regarding the viewing portray the full impact of appropriate standards, as described in distance of the image the proposals. the Landscape Institute’s advice note’. which is a requirement of GLVIA3 and the One key guideline is that Landscape Institute’s ‘photomontages should be reproduced at advice note. an agreed image size and should show an appropriate level of detail’. The size of the images presented within the ES Photomontages should be printed at an do not meet the standard appropriate scale for comfortable as set out with the viewing at the correct distance Landscape Institute’s (Page 154). advice note as they are undersized.
Photomontages should be reproduced at In addition: an agreed image size Photomontages are one of the best mediums currently available for communicating the potential impacts of development proposals and it is very difficult to judge the level of impact on viewpoints given the low number of
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photomontages provided within the ES.
The photomontages created within the ES use different photographs to the visual baseline viewpoints and capture different extents of the view taken from slightly different locations. As a result they are misrepresentative and cannot be compared on a like for like basis with the baseline viewpoint photographs contained within Volume 5.
Night Time Effects GLVIA3 (para 6.12 (page The ES has briefly The night time effects (of 103)recommends that night time reported on the predicted artificial lighting) cannot be ‘darkness’ surveys of the existing effects on the night time understood from the conditions are carried out so that the environment of artificial information presented potential effects of lighting can be lighting. However no within the ES. assessed. assessment methodology, night time baseline or other assessment evidence is presented within the ES which explains the decisions made. This makes the robustness of judgements highly questionable. Magnitude of GLVIA3 states that magnitude of change The magnitude criteria From the information Change (for both for landscape and visual elements contained with the ES provided within the ES It is landscape and should be determined by assessing methodology and the not possible to gain a full visual) size/scale of effect, geographical extent discussion within each understanding of the true and duration of effect and reversibility of impact does not meet the level of landscape and effect. criteria set out within visual effects. GLVIA3. Mitigation GLVIA3 states that ‘In accordance with Numerous significant Mitigation has not been the EIA Directive and relevant country landscape and visual properly considered within Regulations, mitigation measures should impacts have been the ES and the ES fails to be proposed to prevent/avoid, reduce identified within the ES, adequately show how and where possible offset/remedy any however specific mitigation proposals have significant adverse landscape and visual mitigation which would reduced the landscape effects identified’. help reduce the and visual effects of the significance of individual proposals. Enhancement is not a requirement of the impacts has not been EIA Regulations and according to GLVIA identified or discussed 3 is ‘often referred incorrectly as an within the ES tables. outcome of proposed mitigation measures’. Enhancements are defined Some proposed mitigation as ‘any proposals that seek to improve is included and discussed the landscape of the site and its wider within the ES however setting beyond its baseline condition, much of it is either generic and is not specifically related to or is not mitigation at all mitigation of adverse landscape and (as it forms part of the visual effects’. scheme design or are enhancements rather than mitigation).
Where specific mitigation is identified the level of detail is poor and it is difficult understand (particularly on within the Map Books).
The effects of mitigation have not been properly taken into consideration within the ES.
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Cumulative GLVIA3 (page 120) states that the n/a n/a Assessment assessment of cumulative effects is a requirement of both the EIA and SEA Directives and by the associated Regulations. Cumulative landscape and visual effects must be considered in LVIA when it is carried out as part of EIA. The 2002 edition of GLVIA (GLVIA2) defines cumulative landscape and visual effects as those that ‘result from additional changes to the landscape or visual amenity caused by the proposed development in conjunction with other developments (associated with or separate to it), or actions that occurred in the past, present or are likely to occur in the foreseeable future’.
Methodology for GLVIA3 notes that cumulative The ES cumulative Cumulative impacts have assessing assessment is an evolving area of assessment methodology not been properly cumulative practice which very much depends on is very weak and does not identified or assessed landscape and the specific characteristics of both the comply with GLVIA3. within the ES visual effects development proposal and the location. There is no evidence of Great emphasis is placed on consultation on consultation with the competent authority cumulative assessment and other stakeholders at the scoping with either the competent stage to agree the scope, approach, authorities or any other study area, and focus of the potential stakeholders in order to effects (either additional or combined). agree the scope, approach and content of the cumulative assessment.
Schemes GLVIA3 (pages 122 and 123) provides The cumulative Cumulative impacts have considered as part guidance on what types of development assessment of the ES not been properly of the cumulative should be included within the cumulative only takes into account identified or assessed assessment assessment but states that it is a matter potential future schemes within the ES for agreement at scoping stage, and and has not taken account could relate to one or a combination of: existing projects. One 7 Other examples of the same type of example is within the development Chilterns AONB where the 8 Other types of development baseline identifies a proposed within the study area number of existing linear Cumulative assessment should include developments (such as those schemes considered in the LVIA the National Grid Pylons, (existing schemes and schemes which the various railway lines are under construction) as well as those and the A413, M40) but which are not yet present but are in these are assessed in various stages in the development and combination with the consenting process. proposals for HS2 to identify any cumulative impacts. Study Area and GLVIA3 suggests using overlapping No ZTVs relating to other Without using cumulative overlapping ZTVs ZTVs to help define a study area. schemes (likely to give ZTVs as a starting point it rise to cumulative effects) is difficult to understand to show the potential how cumulative impacts cumulative impact have have been evaluated been produced within the assessed within the ES. ES.
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7.9 Socioeconomics
7.9.1 HS2AA believes the ES is incomplete in its assessment of community impacts. In some instances significant effects have been ignored entirely and where significant effects have been acknowledged there is still no mitigation proposed. The reliance on the Code of Construction Practice and a generic list of measures provides no comfort to communities that their impacts have been taken seriously. The poor quality of the ES means that many of these issues will have to be dealt with through the petitioning stage at further expense to the public purse.
7.9.2 The community issues HS2AA are most concerned about are:
Limited consideration appears to have been given to the likely significant effects of the long-term construction activity and operational impact on local communities. The impact of construction workers has been assessed on a national scale with very minimal data. This does not accurately reflect the local conditions of the proposed scheme or its relationship with the local community. The assessment in the ES that temporary and permanent adverse impacts to the local landscape arising from the scheme be considered to have no adverse impact on the psychology, health and well being of the local community appears to lack any evidential basis.
7.9.3 HS2AA believe HS2 Ltd has to face up to its obligations to do the right thing for those communities which it will impact. HS2 Ltd should commit to appointing accessible Community Relations personnel with an in depth knowledge of the complex activities proposed at each site to act as a single point of contact to local residents and contractors. Such personnel should have the power to ensure construction activities are carried out properly, including levying financial penalties on contractors in cases of non-compliance.
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7.10 Sound, Noise and Vibration
7.10.1 The noise and vibration section in the ES sets out the expected train schedule with up to 18 trains per hour each way between 07.00 and 22.00, effectively a train less than every 2 minutes. This will provide an almost constant elevated sound level. The bigger intervals before and after the peak hours will create a greater rise and fall in the noise level compared to the ambient noise, and at a time when people will be trying to sleep.
7.10.2 HS2AA believes the assessment of the potential noise impacts within the ES needs to be conducted on a basis that is consistent with relevant national policy. We obtained legal advice on the issue which showed that there are a number of material aspects of the ES appraisal framework which are not consistent with national noise policy. These key concerns are set out below, with further information in Appendix 8
7.10.3 In particular:
(i) The Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level and the Significant Observed Adverse Effect Level have not been correctly identified;
(ii) The LOAEL and SOAEL levels utilised in the HS2 ES are too high, leading to material underestimation of the adverse noise impacts and the significant adverse noise impacts;
(iii) The impact upon those receptors falling within the range between LOAEL and SOAEL has not been assessed on an individual receptors basis as required by national policy;
(iv) The ES does not identify that the impact upon those receptors lying between LOAEL and SOAEL has been mitigated and minimised as required by national policy;
7.10.4 The uncertainties in identifying the effect levels, the assessment of impact and the analysis of mitigation to minimise adverse impacts have not been identified – this information is required by the EIA Directive and means that the Environmental Statement is not compliant with EU Law. As a result, HS2 is contrary to national policy and to permit it to proceed would give rise to breach of the EIA Directive. To allow HS2 to proceed would be unlawful.
National Noise Policy
7.10.5 National Noise Policy is set out in the Noise Policy Statement for England (NPSE). The Noise Policy Statement identifies an approach based upon three effect levels:
(i) The No Observed Effect Level - this is the level of noise exposure below which no effect at all on health or quality of life can be detected;
(ii) The Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level - this is the level of noise exposure above which adverse effects on health and quality of life can be detected;
(iii) The Significant Observed Adverse Effect Level - This is the level of noise exposure above which significant adverse effects on health and quality of life occur.
7.10.6 The draft National Planning practice Guidance explains that:
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7.10.7 The range below LOAEL equates to a level where: 7.10.8 7.10.9 “Noise can be heard, but does not cause any change in behaviour or attitude. Can slightly affect the acoustic character of the area but not such that there is a perceived change in the quality of life.” 7.10.10 The range between LOAEL and SOAEL equates to a level where: “Noise can be heard and causes small changes in behaviour and/or attitude, e.g. turning up volume of television; speaking more loudly; closing windows for some of the time because of the noise. Potential for non-awakening sleep disturbance. Affects the acoustic character of the area such that there is a perceived change in the quality of life.”
7.10.11 The range above SOAEL equates to a level where:
“The noise causes a material change in behaviour and/or attitude, e.g. having to keep windows closed most of the time, avoiding certain activities during periods of intrusion. Potential for sleep disturbance resulting in difficulty in getting to sleep, premature awakening and difficulty in getting back to sleep. Quality of life diminished due to change in acoustic character of the area.”
7.10.12 The LOAEL levels and SOAEL levels must be defined by reference to this policy approach. As set out below that is not the case in respect of the LOAEL and SOAEL thresholds adopted in the HS2 ES.
7.10.13 Where noise will be produced that lies between the LOAEL level and the SOAEL level the Noise Policy Statement explains that all reasonable steps should be taken to mitigate and minimise adverse effects whilst taking into account guiding principles of sustainable development. Thus, the national policy approach is to avoid noise above the SOAEL level. However if this cannot be done, then the policy is that noise impacts should be mitigated by taking all reasonable steps and any residual impacts should be weighed in the planning balance.
7.10.14 This approach is also reflected in the draft National Planning Policy Guidance which contains a Table explaining the appropriate response at each tier of the noise assessment hierarchy:
(i) at or below NOEL no action is required; (ii) at or below LOAEL no action is required; (iii) between LOAEL and SOAEL – noise impacts should be mitigated by taking all reasonable steps.
7.10.15 It follows that national policy requires the following approach to be adopted in determining whether to permit the HS2 and if so, the noise mitigation controls to which it should be subject: Where HS2 will give rise to noise below the NOAEL level it will be acceptable in policy terms; Where HS2 will give rise to noise levels between the NOAEL level and the SOAEL level all reasonable steps should be taken to mitigate and minimise noise levels; Noise levels beyond the SOAEL level should be avoided.
7.10.16 This approach is also reflected in the draft “National Policy Statement for National Networks” which is to apply to nationally significant rail projects. It advises at paragraph 5.179
“The Secretary of State should not grant development consent unless satisfied that the proposals will meet the following aims: (i) avoid significant adverse impacts on health and quality of life from noise as a result of the new development; (ii) mitigate and minimise other adverse impacts on health and quality of life from noise from the new development; and (iii) where possible, contribute to improvements to health and quality of life through the effective management and control of noise.” (emphasis added)
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7.10.17 This policy approach also reflects that adopted in other NPS’s. Consequently, if HS2 were permitted on a basis other than through the application of this policy approach it would be treated on a basis that is inconsistent with the approach adopted in relation to other nationally significant rail and infrastructure projects. Such an inconsistent approach cannot be and has not been justified.
7.10.18 It follows that it is national policy that projects that do not avoid impacts above SOAEL are unacceptable and should not be permitted. Further, projects that have impacts between LOAEL and SOAEL are unacceptable and should not be permitted unless it is demonstrated that:
i. All the impacts between LOAEL and SOAEL have been identified; and ii. Those impacts have been mitigated and minimised.
7.10.19 Even on the basis of the SOAEL’s adopted in the ES (which are not accepted to be appropriate), HS2 is forecast to give rise to numerous and wide ranging impacts above SOAEL upon a wide range of receptors in a wide range of locations. It follows that consistent with national noise policy HS2 does not avoid significant adverse impacts on health and quality of life from noise. As such it is national policy that HS2 must be refused consent.
7.10.20 Further, in general terms (elaborated further below) the HS2 ES does not identify all of the impacts between LOAEL and SOAEL upon every relevant receptor; rather it employs an approach of examining impacts within this range on a “community impact” basis53. This is justified by reference to projects undertaken prior to the adoption of the NPSE. It is an approach which is now out of date and which does not reflect current national noise policy.
7.10.21 National policy as set out in NPSE does not allow for an assessment of impact on a community wide basis; rather it requires every individual receptor that is likely to receive an impact lying within LOAEL and SOAEL to be identified. This has not been done in the HS2 ES. As a result, by following the approach adopted in relation to projects that pre-date NPSE, HS2 has not identified the impacts as required by national policy. Consistent with that policy it must be refused.
7.10.22 Yet further, the HS2 does not demonstrate that the impacts upon those receptors lying within LOAEL and SOAEL have been mitigated and minimised. Policy requires an assessment of the benefits that would be obtained by mitigation for a receptor against the economic and social benefits being derived from the activity causing the noise. Because the approach adopted is one taken on a community wide basis rather than on the basis of individual receptors, the assessment of the cost effectiveness of mitigation is not compliant with national policy. Indeed, the HS2 ES explains in terms that the consideration of mitigation has been undertaken by reference to reducing and controlling exposure to noise for communities54. National policy does not provide for the assessment of mitigation on a community wide basis; rather it requires it on an individual receptor basis. As a result, HS2 does not comply with national policy in this respect and consistent with that policy must be refused.
The Definition of LOAEL and SOAEL
7.10.23 It follows from the above that national policy requires that SOAEL and the LOAEL must be defined. Paragraph 2.22 of the Explanatory Note to NPSE states:
“It is not possible to have a single objective noise-based measure that defines SOAEL that is applicable to all sources of noise in all situations. Consequently, the SOAEL is likely to be different for different noise sources, for different receptors and at different times.”
53 HS2 ES Vol 5 Annex A p3 para 1.3.4. 54 HS2 ES Vol 5 Annex A p7 para 1.3.23
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7.10.24 Whilst the HS2 ES purports to identify LOAEL and SOAEL for a number of noise sources and potential receptors, the approach set out is flawed in a number of respects addressed below. The result is that the HS2 ES does not provide an assessment of the potential impacts of the construction and operation of HS2 which is compliant with national noise policy. As matters stand, the HS2 project is therefore contrary to national noise policy and must be refused.
7.10.25 It is crucial to note that the HS2 ES explains that the effect thresholds it has adopted are “based upon best practice and previous projects”55. They are not then necessarily based upon dose response research which identifies for a particular receptor in relation to a particular source of noise the lowest level of noise that will give rise to an adverse effect on health or quality of life or a significant effect upon health or quality of life.
Ground Borne Noise during Construction and Operation
7.10.26 In relation to ground borne construction and operational noise, the HS2 ES has adopted 35 56 dB LASmax as LOAEL and 45 dB LASmax as SOAEL . These are levels applicable at any time of day or night. The HS2 ES suggests that Table 28 of the SMR “defines the LOAEL and SOAEL for ground borne noise”. However, Table 28 merely sets out impact classification criterion and does not purport to define LOAEL or SOAEL. It follows that the basis for the selection of 35 dB LASmax as constituting LOAEL for a ground borne noise source is not justified in either the HS2 ES or the Scoping and Methodology Report.
7.10.27 The WHO Night Noise Guidelines of Europe identify that 32 dB LASmax is a level at which effects upon motility during sleep are observed. This is a threshold for noise induced motility to occur which a sign of arousal. The WHO NNG explains that frequent “arousal and accompanying sleep fragmentation can affect mood and functioning next day and lead to a lower rating of the sleep quality. Therefore, motility is relevant for adverse health effects”57. Further. The WHO NNG also recognise that noise events at 32 dBA and below will be audible within a property. This would suggest that adverse effects could be experienced within a property at a level of 32 dB LAmax.
7.10.28 That would suggest that the LOAEL is lower than the 35 dB LASmax adopted in the HS2 ES and that the level adopted in the HS2 ES is inappropriate. It would then follow that the entire appraisal of the impact of the HS2 project from ground borne noise sources is flawed because a LOAEL level has been adopted which is 3 dB too high. Thus the impact assessment does not and cannot have identified all of those subject to a level of noise above LOAEL but below SOAEL. It also follows that the impact assessment cannot have considered the need to mitigate and minimise noise caused to receptors which ought to have been considered as falling within this range but were not because a LOAEL level was adopted that is 3 dB too high.
7.10.29 The consequence is that the appraisal of the impact of construction ground borne noise (e.g. noise from TBMs or from the proposed underground railway) is flawed. It also the case that the appraisal of the impact of operation groundborne noise is flawed.
7.10.30 These errors give rise to conflict with national noise policy which requires the identification of LOAEL, the identification of those experiencing noise between LOAEL and SOAEL and the mitigation and minimisation of such impacts. As a result, to grant consent for HS2 would be in direct conflict with national noise policy.
7.10.31 It is similarly, the case that the 45 dB LASmax level identified in the HS2 ES as SOAEL in relation to ground borne noise sources has not been justified in the HS2 ES or the SMR.
7.10.32 There is no dose response research relied upon in the HS2 ES that establishes that this is the level at which significant adverse observed effects occur. Indeed, the level of 45 dB LASmax
55 HS2 ES Vol 5 Annex A p6 para 1.3.18. 56 HS2 ES Vol 5 Annex A p10 Table 1 57 WHO NNG page 99.
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is not identified in Table 5.1 of the WHO NNG in relation to any threshold; rather waking up in the night and/or too early in the morning is identified to occur at 42 dB LASmax. In other words, levels at 42 dB LASmax and above will wake people up. By adopting a level for SOAEL that is 3 dB higher than this, the HS2 ES fails to assess impact significance against SOAEL.
7.10.33 Again, the HS2 ES has adopted an effect level which is not justified and which appears to be 3dB too low. The consequence of this is that the appraisal of significant effects set out in the HS2 ES is flawed. The ES will not have identified receptors which will experience an impact above the SOAEL.
7.10.34 This gives rise to a conflict with national noise policy which requires the identification of SOAEL, the identification of those experiencing noise above SOAEL and the avoidance of impacts above SOAEL. As a result, to grant consent for HS2 would be in direct conflict with national noise policy.
7.10.35 In relation to ground borne noise associated with construction impacts, the HS2 ES adopts an approach relating to the duration fo impact that means that even where noise levels are above the level identified in the ES as SOAEL they are not considered to be significant if the noise level is experienced for a period of less than one month58. There is no basis in either research or policy for suggesting that those who experience construction related ground borne noise above a SOAEL level for a period of less than a month do not experience significant adverse impacts as defined in national policy. The consequence of this approach is the HS2 ES does not identify receptors as experiencing a likely significant adverse effect when in fact they are forecast to experience impacts that are above SOAEL. The HS2 ES is therefore flawed in this respect.
Ground Borne Vibration
7.10.36 The HS2 ES identifies a LOAEL level in respect of ground borne vibration of 0.2 VDV m/s1.75 and a SOAEL level of 0.8 VDV m/s1.75 for the daytime. At night the HS2 ES identifies the LOAEL level in respect of ground borne vibration as 0.1 VDV m/s1.75 and 0.4 VDV m/s1.75.
7.10.37 Again the HS2 ES indicates that the SMR defines these levels59. However, once again the SMR does not set out any justification for the adoption of these levels as LOAEL and SOAEL; rather it states that these levels “have been developed using the guidance in BS6472 and are consistent with those applied to other projects such as HS1 and Crossrail”.
7.10.38 BS6742 at Table 1 does indeed refer to the VDV levels referred to above. However, it does not do so in the context of defining the lowest level at which an adverse effect would be experience or the level at which a significant adverse effect would be experienced. Rather, the levels taken from BS6742 are levels identified by reference to the likelihood of adverse comment being made by person who experienced a given dose. In other words, the levels are drawn from research into whether people are likely to complain when they experience a given dose. This is far from being based upon research as to whether people will experience adverse effects from a given dose.
7.10.39 Further, the fact that these levels were utilised by projects assessed prior to the adoption of the NPSE does not mean that these levels are appropriate to adopt as LOAEL and SOAEL.
7.10.40 It follows that the both the LOAEL and SOAEL levels adopted in the HS2 ES in respect of ground borne vibration do not represent thresholds derived by reference to adverse effects that can be observed; rather they are levels that relate to likelihood of complaint. As a result the LOAEL and SOAEL levels adopted do not correspond with levels required by the NPSE to be adopted. It follows that he HS2 ES appraisal of ground borne vibration is entirely flawed. HS2 must therefore be considered to be contrary to policy and should be refused
58 HS2 ES Vol 5 p14 para 1.4.36. 59 HS2 ES Vol 5 App A p10 paragraph 1.4.18
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Ground Borne Noise and Non-Residential Receptors
7.10.41 The HS2 ES identifies a series of criteria to be applied in respect of the assessment of adverse impacts upon non-residential receptors60. These are all described as representing a threshold of “adverse” effect. In other words, these levels are identified as the point at which adverse effects are experienced or LOAEL. It appears that no SOAEL level is identified in respect of non-residential receptors.
7.10.42 As a result, the HS2 ES does not follow the approach required by national policy as set out in NPSE in respect of identifying both LOAEL and SOAEL in respect of non-residential receptors. This means that it is not possible to identify whether any non-residential receptor experiences an effect above SOAEL. This means that the impact of HS2 in terms of ground borne noise upon non-residential receptors cannot be assessed in accordance with national policy. The HS2 ES is thus flawed in this respect also. The result in that HS2 is contrary to national policy and must be refused.
7.10.43 Further, no justification is provided for the adoption of the thresholds in the HS2 ES as being considered to be LOAEL for the particular receptors in relation to ground borne noise sources.
7.10.44 Indeed, some of the criteria appear to be anomalous. The 40 dB LASmax criterion for hospitals if exceed would give rise to an adverse effect i.e. it is said to represent LOAEL. This can be contrasted with the LOAEL adopted in the HS2 ES of 35 dB LASmax for residential properties. It thus appears to be suggested that receptors within a hospital are less sensitive to ground borne noise than residential receptors. However the WHO NNG states that “the following groups may be hypothesised to be more vulnerable to noise during sleep: old people, ill people, people with chronic insomnia, shift workers and people resting during the daytime, people with a tendency to depression, light sleepers, pregnant women, people with high anxiety and high stress levels.”61
7.10.45 This would suggest that a LOAEL for a hospital could be expected to be at a lower than that adopted generally for a residential receptor. In the HS2 ES however the reverse is true and without any explanation provided. It must follows that the level adopted as LOAEL for hospitals in respect of ground borne noise impacts cannot be and is not justified. This gives rise to a breach of national policy in that a group of receptors has not been appraised against LOAEL as required by that policy.
7.10.46 Airborne Noise - Construction
7.10.47 In respect of airborne construction noise the HS2 ES identifies SOAEL for the daytime, evening and night time periods as 75 dB LAeq, 12 hr, 65 dB LAeq 1 hr and 55 dB LAeq 1hr during the night respectively. These are levels to be measured externally.
7.10.48 No justification is provided in the HS2 ES for the identification these levels as SOAEL. They appear to be drawn from BS5228 Annex E ABC method category C. However, the values set out in BS5228 Annex E are not values derived from any dose response study; rather the 75 level can be traced back to having origins in the Wilson Report as being a level at which a meeting could be held in a building with windows shut.
7.10.49 In relation to the adoption of an evening 1 hour LAeq level of 65 dB as SOAEL, no dose response evidence is referred to in the HS2 ES to justify the use of this threshold. 7.10.50 7.10.51 Further, in relation to the adoption of a 1 hour LAeq level of 55 at night as SOAEL no dose response evidence is referred to in the HS2 ES to justify the use of this threshold. Indeed, it is instructive to have regard to the WHO NNG section 5.6 which explains that in relation to the range of 40 to 55 dB Lnight (i.e. and LAeq measured over 8 hours of the night):
60 HS2 ES Vol 5 p 16 Table 4 61 WHO NNG p100
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“adverse health effects are observed among the exposed population. Many people have to adapt their lives to cope with the noise at night. Vulnerable groups are more severely affected.”
7.10.52 This suggests that significant observed adverse effects will be experienced at levels of 40 dB at night and above. On this basis it would appear that the 55 dB adopted does not represent SOAEL but a much higher level. Indeed, the WHO NNG states at section 5.6 that at levels above 55 dB L night :
“The situation is considered increasingly dangerous for public health. Adverse health effects occur frequently, a sizeable proportion of the population is highly annoyed and sleep- disturbed. There is evidence of the risk of cardiovascular disease increases.”
7.10.53 Thus the 55 dB level adopted in the HS2 ES is not SOAEL but rather a level much higher than SOAEL.
7.10.54 It follows that the HS2 ES appraises construction impacts from airbourne noise at night by reference to a threshold level that is above SOAEL. As a result, it fails to capture all of the likely significant impacts arising. The fact that that level has been used in assessments conducted in relation to other projects conducted prior to the adoption of the NPSE does not justify the selection of 55 dB as SOAEL now.
7.10.55 In addition to these matters, the HS2 ES does not identify LOAEL for any receptor in relation to airborne construction noise. This means that a critical threshold has not been defined and there has been no assessment of the adverse impacts of the project against such a threshold. The consequence is that there has been a fundamental failure to engage with the requirements of national policy as set out in the NPSE and indeed as emerging in the draft NPS.
7.10.56 It is not possible to identify from the ES the receptors that lie in the range between LOAEL and SOAEL in respect of airborne construction noise impacts. The impact upon these properties cannot therefore be taken into account by the decision maker. It is also not possible to have identified those properties in respect of which there is a policy requirement to mitigate and minimise the impacts. Nor can any judgement be reached as to whether this policy objective has been attained.
7.10.57 Once again, only where the airborne construction noise SOAEL is exceeded for a period exceeding one month does the HS2 ES record the impact upon a receptor as significant. There is no basis in either research or policy for suggesting that those who experience construction related airborne noise above a SOAEL level for a period of less than a month do not experience significant adverse impacts as defined in national policy. The consequence of this approach is the HS2 ES does not identify receptors as experiencing a likely significant adverse effect when in fact they are forecast to experience impacts that are above SOAEL. The HS2 ES is therefore flawed in this respect.
7.10.58 The HS2 ES is thus fundamentally flawed in respect of its approach to airborne construction noise. HS2 is contrary to policy and cannot be permitted.
Airborne Noise - Operations
7.10.59 In respect of operation airborne noise, the HS2 ES adopts as SOAEL levels of 65 dB LAeq 16 hour during the day and 55 dB LAeq 8 hour at night.
7.10.60 The day time SOAEL is said to be consistent with the daytime trigger level in the UK Noise Insulation (railways and Other Guided Systems) Regulations. The daytime SOAEL is measured as an external level.
7.10.61 The WHO Guidelines for Community noise identify that 50 dB LAeq 16 hour is a threshold of moderate annoyance for the daytime and evening for outdoor living areas and that 55 dB
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LAeq 16 hour is a threshold of serious annoyance for the daytime and evening for outdoor living areas. The threshold of 65 dB adopted as SOAEL is thus 10 dB above the level that the WHO Gudelines has identified as the threshold of serious annoyance. The level adopted in the HS2 ES is thus a level that is twice as loud as a level where serious annoyance would be caused.
7.10.62 Indeed the WHO Guidelines for Community Noise indicate that an internal level of 35 dB LAeq 16 hour for the daytime represents the threshold beyond which there is an adverse impact upon speech intelligibility within a dwelling and moderate annoyance caused. The WHO NNG identifies that in general a partially open window will provide 15 dB of noise attenuation to an external noise level. Thus, an SOAEL level of 65 would equate to 50 dB internally with a partially open window. Even with a window closed it is unlikely to offer significantly greater than 20 dB of noise attenuation i.e. the 65 dB level equates to 45 db internally. Those levels are 10 dB greater than the threshold identified by the WHO guidelines as appropriate i.e. a level of noise which is up to twice as loud as the WHO threshold is considered not to have a significant adverse effect on the approach adopted in the HS2 ES.
7.10.63 It is plain 65 dB is a level that is set without regard to the relevant dose response research and does not represent SOAEL; rather a lower level of 50 dB LAeq 16 hour for SOAEL from operational noise in the daytime should have been adopted.
7.10.64 This means that the HS2 ES does not assess the impact of operational noise form the operation of HS2 upon residential receptors during the daytime on a basis that is appropriate or consistent with national noise policy. The HS2 ES by adopting an level for SOAEL necessarily significantly under-estimates the likely significant impacts arising from operational airborne noise during the daytime.
7.10.65 In relation to the nightime, the HS2 SOAEL level for operation noise is 55 dB LAeq 8 hour externally. This is identified at equating to the Interim Target defined by the WHO NNG. The WHO NNG describes this interim target in the following terms:
“An interim target (IT) of An interim target (IT) of 55 dB Lnight,outside is recommended in the situations where the achievement of NNG is not feasible in the short run for various reasons. It should be emphasized that IT is not a health-based limit value by itself. Vulnerable groups cannot be protected at this level. Therefore, IT should be considered only as a feasibility- based intermediate target which can be temporarily considered by policy-makers for exceptional local situations.”62
7.10.66 Indeed, a threshold of 55 dB Lnight is described in the WHO NNG as a level where:
“The situation is considered increasingly dangerous for public health. Adverse health effects occur frequently, a sizeable proportion of the population is highly annoyed and sleep- disturbed. There is evidence that the risk of cardiovascular disease increases.”63
7.10.67 The Interim Target is thus not a level that represents SOAEL. Rather the WHO NNG advises that between 40 and 55 dB Lnight,
“Adverse health effects are observed among the exposed population. Many people have to adapt their lives to cope with the noise at night. Vulnerable groups are more severely affected.”64
Further the WHO NNG states that:
62 WHO NNG p109 63 WHO NNG p108 table 5.4 64 WHO NNG p 108 Table 5.4
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“For the primary prevention of subclinical adverse health effects related to night noise in the population, it is recommended that the population should not be exposed to night noise levels greater than 40 dB of Lnight,outside during the part of the night when most people are in bed.”65
7.10.68 Again, the HS2 ES has adopted a value for SOAEL which is far above the level that actually represents the threshold of significant observe adverse effects as described in national policy. This means that the HS2 ES does not assess the impact of operational noise from HS2 upon residential receptors during the night on a basis that is appropriate or consistent with national noise policy. The HS2 ES level for SOAEL at night necessarily significantly under-estimates the likely significant impacts arising from operational airborne noise during the night.
7.10.69 LOAEL in respect of daytime operational noise is identified in the HS2 ES as 50 db LAeq 16 hour. As set out above this is a level which the WHO Guidelines identify a representing the threshold of moderate annoyance, and impacts upon speech intelligibility within a dwelling. It is not a threshold below which there are no observed adverse effects, thus it cannot be LOAEL.
7.10.70 The HS2 ES is thus fundamentally flawed in respect of its approach to airborne operational noise. HS2 is contrary to policy and cannot be permitted.
Airborne Noise and Non-residential receptors
7.10.71 The HS2 ES adopts a series of different assessment criteria in relation to airborne noise and non-residential receptors. The approach is similar to the approach adopted in relation to the thresholds for ground borne noise and no-residential receptors namely, that a LOAEL level is identified.
7.10.72 It appears that no SOAEL level is identified in respect of non-residential receptors. As a result, the HS2 ES does not follow the approach required by national policy as set out in NPSE in respect of identifying both LOAEL and SOAEL in respect of non-residential receptors. This means that it is not possible to identify whether any non-residential receptor experiences an effect above SOAEL. This means that the impact of HS2 in terms of airborne noise upon non-residential receptors cannot be assessed in accordance with national policy. The HS2 ES is thus flawed in this respect also. The result in that HS2 is contrary to national policy and must be refused.
7.10.73 Further, no justification is provided for the adoption of the thresholds in the HS2 ES as being considered to be LOAEL for the particular receptors in relation to airborne noise.
Traffic Noise
7.10.74 No LOAEL or SOAEL values are identified for use in assessing the impact of noise from traffic. Indeed, the impact methodology followed is one that simply examines the magnitude of change in terms to road traffic noise.
7.10.75 As approach to impact assessment that simply assesses the magnitude of change without reference to absolute levels and without reference to LOAEL and SOAEL is one that does not comply with national noise policy. This is because it does not enable a decision maker to identify whether properties would be affected by traffic noise above a SOAEL level, nor does it allow for the identification of properties adversely affected between the LOAEL and SOAEL levels or consideration of whether the impacts upon such properties have been mitigated and minimised in accordance with policy requirements.
7.10.76 A SOAEL level must be defined for road traffic noise. Properties that are already experiencing levels above SOAEL should not experience any increase in road traffic noise as a result of HS2: such impacts are to be avoided consistent with national policy.
65 WHO NNG p109
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7.10.77 A LOAEL level must also be defined for road traffic noise. Properties experience adverse impacts lying between LOAEL and SOAEL have to have those impacts mitigated and minimised consistent with national policy.
7.10.78 The failure to adopt this approach in relation to road traffic noise means that the HS2 ES appraisal of road traffic noise impacts is totally inadequate. The ES presents no impact assessment on a basis that could be considered to be remotely consistent with national policy.
7.10.79 The HS2 ES is thus fundamentally flawed in respect of its approach to road traffic noise. HS2 is contrary to policy and cannot be permitted.
Ground Borne Noise Assessment Methodology
7.10.80 The assessment of ground borne noise has assumed that a temporary construction railway will be utilised. However, the use of such a railway gives rise to a number of impacts above SOAE and above LOAEL and SOAEL. It is therefore incumbents upon the HS2 project in accordance with national policy to consider how to avoid the impacts above SOAEL and how to minimise the impacts between LOAEL and SOAEL.
7.10.81 No such consideration is presented in the ES consistent with the requirements of national policy. For example, there is no examination of whether alternatives to using a railbased railway (e.g. trucks on rubber tyres) might be used.
7.10.82 Although the HS2 ES refers to matters relating to uncertainty in the forecasting of ground borne noise and vibration, it present no data relating to a train travelling at the speeds that HS2 is proposed to operate at. Nor does it present any data that indicates to the reader how accurate the forecasts are likely to be. This is crucially important in respect of those receptors where forecasts are just below LOAEL and SOAEL levels as it may be that due to inaccuracy in the forecasting such receptors may experience adverse or significant adverse impacts.
Airborne Noise Assessment Methodology
7.10.83 In relation to construction noise, it is to be noted that the impact assessment has been conducted using predicted calendar monthly average noise levels. The HS2 ES acknowledges that daily levels can be around 5dB higher than the monthly levels66.
7.10.84 It follows that given that SOAEL and LOAEL should be defined by impacts over a single day, night or evening (as appropriate), to assess impacts by reference average monthly levels will not identify either the number of recpectors that will actual experience impacts above SOAEL levels or adverse effects between LOAEL and SOAEL. In other words, the methodology adopted seriously underpredicts the scale and nature of the impacts arising from construction. The methodology is thus inconsistent with the requirements of noise policy because it allows receptors to experience impacts above SOAEL whereas policy states that such impacts should be avoided. The methodology is thus wholly flawed.
7.10.85 Further, the impacts are only presented for the worst affected floor in buildings with multiple floors. This means that a particular occupier on a floor other than the worse affected floor cannot identify from the HS2 ES what the project predicts the impact upon his/her particular property is likely to be. Further, it means that in circumstances where in a building some floors may be affected above SOAEL but other between LOAEL and SOAEL, the reader o the ES is unable to identify the dividing line. This means that there will be properties between LOAEL and SOAEL that experience adverse effects that are not identified in the ES. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine whether the impacts upon such properties have been mitigated and minimise din accordance with national policy.
66 HS2 ES Vol 5 Annex C p5 para 2.1.11
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7.10.86 The precise specification of HS2 trains is unknown. Sensitivity testing has demonstrated that changes to the specification could lead to changes in predicted sound level of up to 3 dB67. It is wholly unclear from the HS2 ES whether the project has appraised the operational airborne noise impact on the basis of an assumption that trains may be up to 3dB noisier. If that has not been done then there has been a failure to appraise the project on a robust basis. The need to make allowance for such uncertainty is crucial in relation to properties lying within 3dB of either the LOAEL or SOAEL levels as these might be subject to adverse or significant adverse effects which the ES would not report if this matter is not taken into account.
The Approach to Mitigation
7.10.87 National noise policy is clear that noise impacts above SOAEL are to be avoided and that development consent for nationally significant infrastructure projects should be refused if this aim is not achieved.
7.10.88 Where adverse impacts are experienced by receptors i.e. impacts between LOAEL and SOAEL, national policy requires these impacts to be mitigated and minimised on a basis that is consistent with the costs and benefits that the project would deliver.
7.10.89 In relation to construction related ground borne noise, no appraisal is presented that demonstrates that the forecasts adverse impacts have been minimised. For example, there is no appraisal that justifies the use of a construction railway as opposed to the use of trucks with rubber tyres on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis.
7.10.90 Similarly in relation to operation ground borne noise, there is no appraisal of whether such noise could be further minimised through the use of floating slab track on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis.
7.10.91 In relation to airborne noise impacts (both construction and operational) noise insulation for properties is only proposed where impacts above SOAEL are predicted to arise.
7.10.92 There is no material presented in the ES that examines whether it would be possible to extend noise insulation to those affected by airborne noise between the LOAEL and SOAEL levels. The only appraisal conducted has looked at the provision of noise barriers.
7.10.93 This means that properties predicted to experience noise just below SOAEL levels will not be provided with noise insulation where as properties above will. The latter properties will then experience a reduction in noise to levels below that experienced by the properties just below the SOAEL. In other words the approach creates a “black hole” where properties will experience high levels of noise and materially adverse conditions without mitigation.
7.10.94 It follows that the HS2 ES does not present the information necessary to determine whether adverse effects have been minimised in a manner that is consistent with national policy.
Noise from Stationary Systems
7.10.95 As with road traffic noise, the approach adopted to the assessment of noise impacts from stationary systems is based upon examination of the magnitude of change in noise levels. For the same reasons set out above in relation to the road traffic noise this approach does not comply with the requirements of noise policy because it is not based upon the identification of LOAEL and SOAEL levels.
Utility Diversions
7.10.96 The precise nature of the utility diversion required has not yet been defined68. Where the HS2 project requires utilities to be diverted any noise impacts of those works fall to be assessed as
67 HS2 ES Vol 5 Annex D p24 para 1.3.5 68 HS2 ES Vol 5 Annex C p 8 para 2.2.6
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part of the project itself because they form part of the project. It follows that the failure to assess the impacts of utilitiy diversions is a failure to assess the likely significant impacts of the project. The HS2 ES is thus defective in that it fails to assess the likely significant impacts of the project in this respect.
CONCLUSION
7.10.97 For the reason set out above, the appraisal of the noise impacts arising from HS2 set out in the HS2 ES is not compliant with national policy. Further, the defects within the ES are so numerous and of such consequence that it cannot be reasonably concluded that the ES is an ES within the requirements of the EIA Directive.. As a result it would be contrary to national policy and it would be unlawful to allow HS2 to proceed.
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7.11 Traffic and Transport
7.11.1 Constructing Phase 1 of HS2 will require a significant workforce, numerous construction depots, overbridges, viaducts and associated highway works. The scheme will also require access to large areas of land for construction purposes and to stockpile materials.
7.11.2 HS2AA believes that HS2 Ltd has not accurately determined the full extent of the extent of likely traffic disruption. It seems clear that the impact on communities of increased traffic due to construction will be extremely significant with very high levels of HGV trips per day across a wide number of areas, particularly rural areas which are not used to such high levels of traffic and often have roads unsuitable for sustaining such large numbers of HGV movements per day.
7.11.3 The principle problems with HS2 Ltd’s approach stem from the types of modeling used and the misunderstanding of when the peak hours are. There is also still a lack of understanding of the roads being used which suggests HS2 Ltd has never driven the routes they intend to send hundreds of lorries down. The assessment in the ES also includes contradictions about what roads will be used which makes it unclear to residents as to what is affected and where.
7.11.4 HS2 Ltd appears to hide behind generic solutions outlined in the draft Code of Construction Practice to deal with this problem-thereby acknowledging they are able to determine in the ES that significant effects will occur but simply suggest these will be resolved at some time in the future using unspecified mitigation measures.
7.11.5 The draft Code of Construction Practice states that “public access is maintained where practicable” which suggests that access will not be maintained where considered not practicable by HS2 Ltd. The draft Code of Construction Practice also envisages the traffic management plan will be compiled by the contractor, meaning no oversight or control being exercised by local authorities.
7.11.6 HS2AA believe detailed traffic management plans should be agreed with local communities and the relevant local authority, designed to minimise HGV movements during school drop-off and pick-up times. In particular, traffic volumes on narrow country lanes, particularly those roads without pavements, must be closely monitored. Environmental Health Officers should be authorised and empowered to independently monitor traffic levels against the plan and to enforce compliance with the agreed controls.
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7.12 Waste
7.12.1 Examining the different Volumes in the ES that cover waste (Volume 3 that looks at route- wide issues and covers waste in each CFA; Volume 2 that looks at each CFA area; Volume 5 and its appendix that concentrates solely on waste) reveals very substantial and concerning inconsistencies and serious omissions in four areas: i. The application of the waste hierarchy and justification for selecting sites for on-site disposal of surplus excavated materials ii. The amount to be deposited at each sustainable placement site iii. Where it will come from ie local surplus material or imported surplus from other CFA’s? iv. How the waste gets to the sustainable placement site – by road, if so which roads, or on the trace itself?
7.12.2 Given the importance of this issue, HS2AA commissioned SLR Consulting to undertake an objective review of plans HS2 Ltd set out in the ES on waste. Their full report is set out at Appendix 3. It provides a detailed overview of the problems with the waste strategy adopted by HS2 Limited.
7.12.3 As a first and most fundamental point, determining the volume of material to be extracted from constructing Phase 1 of HS2 is a difficult task due to the fragmented nature of the ES documentation. Material arising from the proposed scheme is not broken down to the specific elements (e.g. the Chiltern Tunnel) but rather by reference to Community Forum Areas.
7.12.4 The likely reason for this lack of clarity is that construction of HS2 produces an enormous amount of excavated material. The ES forecasts the total at 128Mt – although a figure of 112.1Mt is given elsewhere69 . Putting aside this substantial discrepancy these figures should be put in context. 128Mt represents almost three times the total amount of sand and gravel that was extracted in the whole of the UK in 2011. Given the obvious linear and localised nature of HS2 and the potential environmental implications of moving and disposing of such a huge amount of material this issue clearly has significant environmental implications.
69 Table 1a in Annex 1 of the Waste Assessment reports gives a cumulative total of 112.1Mt from the 26 CFA’s.
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7.12.5 Despite the size of the task, HS2 Ltd’s consideration of the options for the deposition of surplus material appears not to reflect the requirements of the Waste Framework Directive. In making decisions, HS2 Ltd seem to have ignored the waste hierarchy (displayed above) and instead chosen proximity. Furthermore the ES indicates that HS2 Ltd failed to take proper account of local authorities’ waste policies when formulating its waste strategy.
7.12.6 Volume 3 of the ES makes reference to the “proximity principle” (contained in both the EU Waste Directive and in DEFRA’s Planning Policy Statement 10), which is the concept of managing waste as close as possible to its point of production. However both these source documents make clear (which the ES does not) that waste should be disposed of in one of
“the nearest appropriate installations by means of the most appropriate methods and technologies, in order to ensure a high level of protection for the environment and public health”
7.12.7 The ES states 116Mt of the 128Mt total will get re-used in the project (as engineering fill or in creating earthworks etc for environmental mitigation). But this leaves 11.35Mt surplus to requirements to be disposed of. Volume 3 Table 22 shows disposal is split between:
Off-site disposal of 4.49Mt to existing landfill sites, and On-site permanent disposal of the remaining 6.86Mt to what are effectively new areas of landfill (euphemistically called “sustainable placement areas”)
7.12.8 We are told that the surplus material at the Sustainable Placement Areas will be ‘landscaped’ and the area returned to workable agricultural land. Thus while an effect is admitted during construction, no permanent residual effect is attributed to this land in the ES. That the ground level would be raised by 15m over an extensive area is disregarded.
7.12.9 HS2AA believe the waste hierarchy set out above, and qualified in terms of the “proximity principle” should have been applied in each CFA, by:
i. Demonstrating how each method above disposal in that hierarchy was considered, eg prevention, re-use, recycling and recovery. ii. Demonstrating how disposal was specifically considered eg the range of options examined in order to determine which was the closest “appropriate” installation at which waste should be deposited.
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7.12.10 But this is not apparent in the CFA sections of the ES or in Volumes 3 or 5 that discuss waste in detail. Instead the ES states at Paragraph 14.1.17 of Volume 3 that HS2 Ltd followed an “integrated design approach” to ensure the surplus is minimised, but no details of this approach are provided in the ES. In addition Volume 570 continually refers to “the integrated engineering earthworks design approach, described in Volume 1, section 4.5”. But Volume 1 has no section 4.5, and the two references in that Volume tell us no more.
7.12.11 What we do learn from the ES is that surplus materials will only go to fill up a mineral site if its transportation does not result in significant environmental effects. Otherwise there will be the “sustainable placement” of surplus material because it cannot be re-used and there are significant environment effects resulting from transportation issues71.
7.12.12 HS2 Ltd have therefore focused solely on the need to avoid road transportation, and this has skewed their approach towards creating a new land fill site, but without proper consideration of alternatives. Such a deviation from the waste hierarchy is only permitted in certain circumstances by the Waste Framework Directive:
“where justified by life-cycle thinking on the overall impacts of the generation and management of the waste72.
7.12.13 There is no indication that such a holistic approach has been taken.
7.12.14 Furthermore decisions on the siting of “Sustainable Placement Area” appear to fail to meet HS2 Ltd’s own design criteria, as set out in HS2 Ltd’s own documentation73.Access to this information was only provided following a recent Freedom of Information Act Request but would have been available in an earlier form when the ES was prepared. It was not however included in the ES. This HS2 Ltd documentation states that the purpose of selecting sites (which is the “option of last resort”) is to give “flexibility to optimise the design at late stages”. It is not clear what is meant by this “flexibility”, but reference is not made to it in the ES. This appears to be a major omission from the consultation.
7.12.15 The HS2 Ltd documentation then goes on to say (at paragraph 4.6) that the chosen site must be demonstrated to meet the following four criteria:
There is no available and / or suitable landfill void space within a reasonable distance from the source of the material arising (e.g. 25 km by road); or
The significant environmental impacts associated with the transportation of excavated material off site (for either disposal or recovery), as identified by the Environmental Impact Assessment, would be worse than those associated with depositing the material onsite; or
There are clear environmental or social benefits of such an approach (e.g. land remediation or restoration, enhanced public open space provision, etc); and
The area of land is suitable for this type of material and is not located within nationally sensitive landscapes or on legally protected sites.”
7.12.16 Aside from the fact this issue was not mentioned in the Draft Environmental Statement the decision around the existence and location of these facilities is deficient in several ways:
70 Every section in Volume 5 WM-001-000 begins with this reference eg para 2.2.1; 3.2.1; 4.2.1 etc 71 Volume 3 para 14.1.22 72 Article 4 (2) of the Waste Framework Directive 73 Management of Surplus Excavated Materials, Deliverable Approach Statement, HS2 3 December 2013
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Beneficial use: It does not consider taking the surplus material to where the spoil can be used beneficially in the restoration of a mineral working or partially full landfill sites. This should have been examined. Option 2 rejection: There is no discussion of the closest appropriate landfill sites to where the surplus was coming from, nor consideration of different means of moving it there – apart from using public roads. Rail transport alternatives: It fails to examine other transport removal options from the eg creating a new temporary rail route to remove the surplus. This is entirely appropriate where there is evidence that the use of existing public roads for such a large volume is wholly unrealistic. Sensitive sites. It ignores the fact that one of the selected sites (Hunts Green) is in a nationally sensitive landscape area (despite criteria ‘d’ in the statement at Paragraph 25 above ) – in the AONB. It is disappointing that HS2 Ltd’s own rules are so blatantly ignored and the criteria were not included in the ES despite its 50,000 pages. Other new sites: no alternative sites for “sustainable placement” are discussed. Given the surplus partly arises from different CFAs and according to HS2 Ltd can be moved along the trace, a wider search is warranted.
7.12.17 The criteria themselves also ignore the noise and related impacts of moving the surplus material, yet an Environmental Impact Assessment is not complete without also taking into account noise, air pollution and traffic, for whichever means of transport apply.
7.12.18 Specific conclusions which, in HS2AA’s view, mean that the work done by HS2 Ltd is of an insufficient standard includes
The HS2 project would involve a very significant waste management effort with the total volume of excavated materials being equivalent to almost three times the UK’s entire production of sand and gravel in 2011; The project would appear to generate a surplus of excavated material, variously described as exceeding 14 Million Tonnes (in Table 1d of Annex 1 of the Waste Assessment (WM-002- 000)) or being 11.35 Million Tonnes (paragraph 14.6.13 of Section 14 of Volume 3 of the ES on route wide effects of waste management); The Integrated Engineering Earthworks Design Approach, upon which the environmental impact assessment of waste management associated with the HS2 appears to be predicated, is not included in Volume 1 at Section 4.5 despite there being consistent references to it being included at this location; With a few exceptions, the proposals for movements of large quantities of excavated material within and between CFAs are either completely absent or, at best, are described in vague terms. There is generally, no clear picture of the routes along which excavated materials would be moved and the methods that would be used to haul them. This makes the assessment of environmental impacts associated with this activity almost impossible; Where sustainable placement landfills are proposed, the rationale behind selection of the CFAs in which these landfills would be developed is not clear nor does the process of consideration of alternatives appear to have considered opportunities for beneficial use of the surplus material in quarry or landfill restoration projects, for instance. There appears to have been an assumption that the proximity principle should over-ride the requirements of the waste hierarchy whereas, opportunities for beneficial use of the waste in a recovery process should have been given greater weight, particularly when a landfill in an AONB is being proposed. HS2 Ltd has identified three locations for the ‘sustainable placement of excavated material’ in order to facilitate the construction of a tunnel in west London. There is no clear evidence as to how these three areas have been selected. Sustainability is a combination of social, economic and environmental impacts. Therefore the selection of ‘sustainable’ locations must in someway be supported by evidence as to how the combination of the impacts has been
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assessed. No information has been provided and as a consequence HS2AA considers that HS2 Ltd has misused the term ‘sustainable’ and therefore misrepresented the placement of excavated material. Given the scale of the earthworks operation required by HS2, and its potential for having indirect effects on large numbers of residents and businesses due to the traffic it would generate, it is considered that the materials handling and balance proposals should have been presented in a clear and holistic fashion to allow the reader of the ES to understand what would be excavated and where it would be placed, disposed of or recovered. This is not currently possible.
7.12.19 HS2AA would argue that the principles from Crossrail should be followed regarding the placement of excavated material. Crossrail acknowledged they had excess material but instead of randomly placing it on areas picked out from aerial mapping as HS2 Ltd has done, they opted for a more sustainable approach:
The final destinations for the excavated material in Essex and Kent have been specifically chosen to ensure that the vast majority is transported by either rail or river thereby limiting the impact on the road network.74
7.12.20 HS2 Ltd’s approach to dumping excavated material share none of the innovative or aspirational objectives of Crossrail. The same ethos of reducing road traffic has not been applied to HS2 and the proposed outcomes from the dumping of spoil are entirely negative. HS2 Ltd must rethink their ideas for dumping spoil and must formulate a greater plan and vision that avoids an operational large scale composting facility on valued land. It must also properly compensate for the loss of useable farmland, address the adverse impacts on roads, the loss of open ecological habitat and the harmful changes to the landscape that will arise from its waste strategy.
74 http://www.crossrail.co.uk/news/articles/crossrail-will-move-five-milliontonnes- earth-via-river
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7.13 Water Resources
7.13.1 The ES makes clear that in many locations there will be significant risks around water arising from construction and operation of HS2. HS2AA is not resourced to assess the impact to ground water aquifers or surface water river or canal flooding on a route wide basis-the omission of such a study means that it is impossible from the data provided in the ES to come to an overall assessment on this issue.
7.13.2 The Water Framework Directive requires a screening assessment of all crossings of surface and groundwater bodies. It is difficult to understand from the ES how accurately or comprehensively this process has been undertaken.
7.13.3 Possible impacts on groundwater, focussing on water quality issues for strategic aquifers, and the sensitivity of these to pollution require further work, particularly where aquifers are used for potable water supplies. To take one example, the ES states “The project may give rise to a significant temporary adverse effect on public water supplies that depend on groundwater resources in the Chilterns and Colne Valley area.” The Misbourne aquifer feeds the Colne, which in turn supplies 22% of London's drinking water. Besides polluting the aquifer there is a risk that tunneling will divert the water flow through the aquifer away from water abstraction points.
7.13.4 HS2AA believe significant improvements are required in this area. In particular:
The project should not proceed until a proper evaluation of the water resources and the impacts on drinking water are fully understood and made public. Throughout the course of construction, HS2 Ltd should ensure effective sampling of surface water at different locations surrounding each construction site and have them independently tested at a UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service) laboratory. The results from the sampling should then be shared with the Environmental Agency and applicable local authorities and benchmarked against environmental water quality levels. To minimise the danger of water pollution arising from construction, detailed water management plans should be provided by HS2 Limited, which would detail how any water that is required on site will be stored before and after it is used and the strategy for its removal to licensed disposal sites. Compliance with this plan should be the responsibility of the appropriate local authority. HS2 Ltd should commit to ensuring that no water will be stored in open pits or ponds. Plans for final regrading of the land used for construction should include a long-term management plan for ditch and balancing pond maintenance and that the responsible authority for these works be identified and appropriately funded.
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7.14 Electromagnetic Interference
7.14.1 HS2AA is not aware of a statutory body that covers this issue, which means HS2 Ltd’s assessment is the only source for understanding the impacts. For such an important scheme HS2AA would request that HS2 Ltd seek a second opinion on their assessment for professional verification.
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8 Health Impact Assessment
8.4.1 HS2AA is concerned that the Health Impact Assessment (HIA) deposited with the HS2 Hybrid Bill is not included in the ES documentation. It is clear that the construction and operation of HS2 will lead to significant public health impacts and the topic will be the subject matter of petitions received by the Hybrid Bill Select Committee. Therefore HS2AA feels it is important that its comments on this area are submitted as part of this consultation.
8.4.2 HS2AA believes the evidence shows there has been a noticeable deterioration in health and wellbeing among those most directly affected by the proposed route of Phase 1 of HS2. The Proposed Scheme has already caused stress and anxiety as lives, livelihoods and property values are blighted. The very real pattern of anxiety, depression, insomnia, stress and despair identified affects both adults and children, with knock-on physical symptoms as well.
8.4.3 These negative health and wellbeing impacts appear to be of little concern to HS2 Ltd. No independent research has been commissioned by HS2 Ltd to explore and expose the extent of adverse health effects. A recent survey, conducted under the aegis of the Chilterns Conservation Board in the environs of South Heath in Buckinghamshire, revealed that of 286 respondents, 87.8% reported adverse effects upon their health and wellbeing directly attributed to HS2 and 16.4% had sought medical help. These concerns should certainly have been highlighted in the ES. Instead, all that is provided is a comment in Appendix 3 1.4.3 of the HIA, dismissing the legitimate concerns of respondents to the draft ES, without any serious explanation.
8.4.4 HS2 Ltd knows, via the Community Forum process, the importance that local communities attach to this issue. Throughout the HS2 Community Forum process, questions remained unanswered about how health and wellbeing would be addressed and what the scope and methodology employed would be. HS2 Ltd employees promised that the draft ES and then the ES would contain this information. Only in June 2013 were participants in the Community Forums notified (by accident) that HIA documents were to be produced separately from the ES and that they would not be subject to public consultation. No satisfactory explanation has been given for this seemingly arbitrary decision.
8.4.5 HS2AA believe this attempt to shut down public participation on health issues is doomed to fail. The ES documents list a host of activities which have the potential to be harmful for human health. Therefore human health is clearly a topic which is in scope of the current consultation process.
8.4.6 HS2AA consider the HIA is a flawed desk-top exercise given:
It ignores the significant adverse effects on health and wellbeing that are already evident. It contains factual mistakes previously made in the Draft ES and already corrected by members of the Community Forums. It omits vital information, for example the danger to public health of potential contamination of the potable water supply. It does not properly address the issue of increased risk of heart attacks due to increased environmental noise. The section dealing proposed mitigation for the loss of Public Open Spaces omits the whole stretch from Camden to the West Midlands, which includes an AONB. The authors’ conclusion that this stretch is completely unaffected and in no need of mitigation lacks credibility.
8.4.7 HS2AA is concerned that the literature review in the HIA is far from 'comprehensive', and flawed conclusions are reached, based on cherry picking of research to give the impression that the construction and operation of HS2 will produce no notable adverse effects upon health and wellbeing. For example, at Paragraph 5.5.8: it is considered that there will be no respiratory health effects arising from construction dust emissions. This sweeping statement is based on the findings in Section 4 of the ES Volume 5 AQ-001-009 Appendix, where there is complete faith in the measures set out in Draft Code of Construction Practice. Likewise, although Paragraphs
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5.5.11-15 in the HIA identifies moderate or substantial adverse temporary effects from construction traffic emissions, Appendix 4 5.5-5.7 makes highly selective reference to research on the risks that they pose. Paragraph 5.5.16 concludes that: “The increased risk of health effects to any individual as a result of emissions associated with the Proposed Scheme will be extremely small.”
8.4.8 These inadequately substantiated assertions typify the sloppy way in which research data are either ignored or manipulated to obscure the well-documented dangers to public health presented by such a project, in thinly disguised attempts to obscure the true extent of the risks posed by HS2.
8.4.9 There is also conflicting information provided in the ES and HIA. For example, the ES Volume 2 CFA9 report states at Paragraph 13.4.44 that: If fissures connect the working area of the Proposed Scheme directly to the Affinity Water groundwater abstractions protected … the impact of low levels of turbidity will be major due to the high quality required to be met for potable use, resulting in a large and significant effect…and: “Until a management strategy is agreed with the Environment Agency in consultation with Affinity Water, a potentially significant temporary residual effect on the Affinity Water groundwater abstractions remains.”
8.4.10 The implication is that no-one has yet been able to resolve the problem, which has major implications for public health, yet the HIA report concludes at 1.3.9 that: “The risk to public health of groundwater contamination arising from the Proposed Scheme is considered to be negligible and therefore this determinant has been scoped out of the HIA. The only conclusion is that HS2 Ltd. does not wish to address this potential problem preferring to ignore it.”
8.4.11 The HIA makes confident pronouncements in relation to sleep disturbance that feed into the Code of Construction Practice and noise sections of the ES, for example in Appendix 4 of the HIA it states:
Examining nocturnal railway noise and aircraft noise in the field: sleep, psychomotor performance and annoyance, Science of the total Environment, 424, pp 48-56.] found that railway noise did not lead to prolonged sleep latencies or to impaired sleep efficiency compared to normal population values. Important reported modifying factors include the number and duration of train passbys; passby sound rise time (onset rate); distance to railway; and incidence of perceptible vibration. The results of the Elmenhorst study are considered to provide the best available objective evidence for the assessment of awakenings associated with nighttime train event noise.75
8.4.12 Such assertions, however, do not reflect the conclusions of more recent published research. There is an extensively referenced paper, “Auditory and non-auditory effects of noise on human health”76 which the authors of the HIA most definitely must have been aware. Bernard Berry, who cited this review before its publication at the Institute of Acoustics meeting September 201377 and Stephen Stansfield, one of its authors, were both members of the HS2 Ltd. Acoustic Review Panel. This paper states
Sleep disturbance is thought to be the most deleterious non-auditory effect of environmental noise exposure because undisturbed sleep of a sufficient length is needed for daytime alertness and performance, quality of life, and health. Human beings perceive, evaluate, and react to environmental sounds, even while asleep.
Maximum sound pressure levels as low as LAmax 33 dB can induce physiological reactions during sleep including autonomic, motor, and cortical arousals (eg, tachycardia, body
75 Elmenhorst et al [(2012) 76 Basner, Babisch, Davis, Brink, Clark, Janssen and Stansfeld, published in the Lancet online October 2013 77 Berry, B., “Environmental noise and effects on health: history; recent developments; horizons” Institute of Acoustics London: evening Meeting Wed. 11.9.13
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movements, and awakenings). Whether noise will induce arousals depends not only on the number of noise events and their acoustical properties, but also on situational moderators (such as momentary sleep stage66) and individual noise susceptibility. Elderly people children, shift- workers, and people with a pre-existing sleep) disorder are thought of as at-risk groups for noise induced sleep disturbance. Repeated noise-induced arousals interfere with sleep quality through changes in sleep structure, which include delayed sleep onset and early awakenings, reduced deep (slow-wave) and rapid eye movement sleep, and an increase in time spent awake and in superficial sleep stages. However, these effects are not specific for noise, and generally less severe than those in clinical sleep disorders such as obstructive sleep apnoea. Short-term effects of noise-induced sleep disturbance include impaired mood, subjectively and objectively increased daytime sleepiness, and impaired cognitive performance. Results of epidemiological studies indicate that nocturnal noise exposure might be more relevant for the creation of long-term health outcomes such as cardiovascular disease than is daytime noise exposure, probably because of repeated autonomic arousals that have been shown to habituate to a much lesser degree to noise than other—eg, cortical—arousals.
8.4.13 This review concludes:
In 2009, WHO published the Night Noise Guidelines for Europe78 an expert consensus mapping four noise exposure groups to negative health outcomes ranging from no substantial biological effects to increased risk of cardiovascular disease (panel 2). WHO regards average nocturnal noise levels of less than LAeq, outside 55 dB to be an interim goal and 40 dB a long-term goal for the prevention of noise-induced health effects.
In this Review, we emphasise that non-auditory health effects of environmental noise are manifold, serious and, because of the widespread exposure, very prevalent. These factors stress the need to regulate and reduce environmental noise exposure (ideally at the source) and to enforce exposure limits to mitigate negative health consequences of chronic exposure to environmental noise. Educational campaigns for children and adults can promote both noise- avoiding and noise-reducing behaviours, and thus, mitigate negative health consequences. Efforts to reduce noise exposure will eventually be rewarded by lower amounts of annoyance, improved learning environments for children, improved sleep, lower prevalence of cardiovascular disease.
8.4.14 Therefore there is credible, peer reviewed academic evidence concerning the harmful impacts to human health arising from high-speed trains. This information was not covered in the HIA or noise sections of the ES.
8.4.15 The word noise also occurs 550 times in the Health Impact Assessment’s 199 pages. At Paragraph 5.6.1 it acknowledges the dangers to human health and wellbeing, stating that:
Direct health effects from noise are well established in terms of sleep disturbance, annoyance, cardiovascular effects and cognitive impairment of children when at school. There is also an established link between vibration and annoyance.
8.4.16 Yet, while admitting in Appendix 4.5 Cardiovascular disease at 4.5.1, that:
It has been shown that long term exposure to road traffic noise may increase the risk of Heart disease, which includes myocardial infarctions. Both road traffic noise and aircraft noise have also been shown to increase the risk of high blood pressure. It has been noted that there are few studies that exist regarding the cardiovascular effects of exposure to rail traffic noise
and at 4.5.3 that:
There are no reported studies that specifically investigate possible associations between cardiovascular disease and noise from high speed rail
78 www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/43316/E92845.pdf
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it seeks in the same paragraph to deflect attention from the probability that noise from HS2 will be found to be implicated:
It should also be borne in mind that hypertension is one of many risk factors for cardiovascular disease, other risk factors include genetic predisposition, age, sex, socio-economic status, lifestyle and risk taking behaviour. Exposure to air pollutions may also be a relevant factor. Studies to date have not clarified whether noise exposure during the day or night (or total noise dose) are contributing to this health outcome.
8.4.17 This tactic of acknowledging the potential problem, appearing to review the research, but doing so highly selectively, then finding excuses why HS2 won’t be a problem, is typical of the approach taken on noise.
8.4.18 There is, however, extensive evidence of the deleterious effects of noise upon health and wellbeing: stress, hearing impairment, tinnitus, distraction, physiological effects on digestion, metabolism, the immune system, can be added to the HIA list above, which plays down the serious and possibly life-threatening effects upon the cardio- vascular system from hypertension and ischaemic heart disease leading to myocardial infarction.79
8.4.19 HS2AA believe these effects need urgently to be assessed and quantified in relation to HS2; notwithstanding the fact that both the ES and the HIA seek to minimise the likelihood of these extremely worrying potential consequences of the project.
8.4.20 It is also a matter of concern that the authors of the reference given for the review of research on high-speed train noise (Fenech, Cobbing, Greer and Marshall), in the HIA turn out to be HS2 Ltd Overview Consultants, working with the HS2 Acoustic Review group in association with Arup UK, ARM Acoustics UK and HS2 Ltd. Their paper, “Health effects from high-speed railway noise – a literature review” given at the Innsbruck Internoise conference in September 2013, is not accessible online without payment of a fee80 yet it is cited to support the statement in Appendix 4 at 4.3.2 that:
The research on noise annoyance from high-speed trains is relatively recent and a review paper by Fenech et al. reports significant variability between studies. No evidence was found that the different spectral content of high-speed train sound might affect annoyance. Studies report no difference in noise annoyance between traditional and high-speed rail for the same timetable frequency.
8.4.21 This statement is untrue. The paper does refer to the comprehensively referenced work of Guoqing and Lingjiao in China: “Behavioral and plasma monoamine responses to high-speed railway noise stress in mice”, in Noise Health 2013, which examines the effect of HS rail noise in mice and which was published in June 2013, three months before the HS2 Ltd employees’ Insbruck paper. Guoqing and Lingjiao conclude that the emission limit (Ldn )* for high speed rail noise should be stricter than that for conventional railway noise.81
8.4.22 The HIA states that:
The on-going research into noise annoyance from high speed rail suggests a number of modifying factors may be influencing response. These factors include distance from railway, onset rate, combined effects of noise and vibration, and number of train passbys (especially for people living very close to the railway). For new railway schemes there is also evidence that uncertainty about the future may increase annoyance whilst subsequent habituation with the
79 Burden of disease from environmental noise. Quantification of healthy life years lost in Europe” WHO, 2011 80 Fenech, Benjamin, Cobbing, Colin, Greer, Richard, Marshall, Tom, Arup, UK, ARM Acoustics, UK, HS2 Ltd., UK, “Health effects from high-speed railway noise – a literature review”, Internoise 2013 81 Guoqing, Di, Lingjiao, He, “Behavioral and plasma monoamine responses to high-speed railway noise stress in mice”, Noise Health 2013; 15: 217-23
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changed situation may reduce annoyance. In one study in France 75% of the sample living close to TGV-Atlantique became accustomed to the noise within one year
8.4.23 The study referencing the experience of the TGV turns out to be Fenech et al’’s own Internoise conference paper. HS2AA believe it is not acceptable that statements on noise which are presented as objective summaries of academic evidence are instead just recycled conclusions from HS2 Ltd’s own paid consultants.
8.4.24 Taken together, the approach by HS2 Ltd to assessing and mitigating the health implications for Phase 1, and the obvious impact in areas such as noise, traffic and waste falls far short of the minimum that could be expected for such a large scale project. It is highly disappointing that even on an issue as important as human health, HS2 Ltd prefers to present spun conclusions are objective evidence rather than engaging meaningfully with the issues.
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9 Code of Construction Practice
9.1 The Code of Construction Practise (COCP) sets out the practices that HS2 Ltd propose to be followed during construction of Phase 1 of HS2. It is a vital document; given the Hybrid Bill will exempt HS2 Ltd from usual oversight and monitoring processes, the scope of the construction activity required to construct HS2 and the length of time envisaged for construction.
9.2 If construction is handled badly the impact on communities already facing upheaval will be even more severe. In addition, poor practice will result in far worse environmental outcomes. In the context of a multi-billion pound project, HS2AA believe it is reasonable to expect that management of construction for HS2 would be best in class. This document, in HS2AA’s view, does not come close to such a standard. What is even more disappointing is that HS2 Ltd appears to have ignored any comments provided in the Draft ES consultation on this topic.
9.3 The importance of the Code of Construction Practice is particularly important given it is frequently referred to in the ES as a means to reduce the significant effects outlined in the ES. Unfortunately, the Code of Construction Practice is only a generic document and many of the significant effects outlined in the ES require bespoke solutions. The reliance on the COCP means that HS2 Ltd are deferring responsibility to properly mitigate effects until a date in time when they are the primary body responsible. The ES therefore provides no comfort at this stage as to how residents will be protected from significant effects. Instead, residents are effectively asked to ‘trust’ HS2 Ltd that a solution will be found some time in the future.
9.4 HS2AA has identified the following issues with the COCP:
It is not clear from the consultation documents whether the nominated undertaker is under any kind of positive duty to enforce the provisions of the COCP, without such a positive duty there would appear to little incentive for the provisions of the Code to be followed. The intention set out in the ES for HS2 Ltd to strip and store the topsoil and reinstate it later is referred to within the COCP. However there is no specific detail in the COCP about how this might be done, and, most critically, where it is to be stored. It is not detailed how topsoil will be protected from active construction compounds and industrial processes which will take place for a period of up to ten years. Implementation of the COCP is stated to be dependent on the ‘nominated undertaker’ ie HS2 Limited. Therefore the promoter of the scheme or its contractors will be responsible for ensuring appropriate construction standards are followed. There would clearly be a conflict between complying with the COCP and ensuring construction is carried out as quickly and cheaply as possible. It is not clear what powers the nominated undertaker will have to ensure the contractors comply with their duties under the COCP, with the consultation materials simply stating “appropriate action will be taken by the nominated undertaker as required to ensure compliance” With no penalties on the contractor for non-compliance with the COCP, the document is effectively a voluntary code that will be discarded if the contractor is under time pressure to deliver construction works. The nominated undertaker will develop an EMS, which will set out the arrangements and responsibilities for auditing and assuring compliance with the environmental mitigation set out in the COCP. Again this measure will be meaningless unless there are legal powers to enforce compliance and specific resources allocated by the nominated undertaker to undertake compliance work. There appears to be no mechanism for local communities to be consulted on items that impact them in terms of construction practice.
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The COCP states noise levels around 45 to 50db are intrusive and require mitigating action. These levels are much too high to be useful and likely do not comply with World Health Organisation requirements. On working hours, the COCP lists working hours as being 0800 to 1800 on weekdays and 0800 to 1300 on Saturdays. In addition there is a one hour start up and close down at each end of the normal working hours. These restrictions are to be observed only “as far as reasonably practicable”, which means that these are non-binding guidelines only. The COCP states that out of hours works will be limited to 10 consecutive days in any 15 day period-clearly far too high. There is also no provision in the COCP for a contractor failing to reach agreement with the local authority in relation to noise and little in the way of sanctions for non-compliance with COCP principles in this area. There will inevitably be substantial loss of visual amenity/visual intrusion-and the COCP is very vague around the protections to the landscape available in relation to spoil heaps, work sites, excavators and other machinery. An assessment of the impact on public services – police, health centre, hospitals and council services-from construction has not been completed. The COCP lacks detail on how air pollution will be managed. It is not sufficient to say the construction process will use best practise and provide no information on how this will be achieved.
9.5 HS2AA believes that these omissions mean the COCP simply doesn’t provide any level of assurance that construction will be carried out properly.
9.6 HS2AA believe a revised version of the COCP should be provided with the following safeguards included at a minimum:
County and District Councils should be provided with a formal role in relation to exercising their statutory duties and obligations. This could be achieved by funding being made available through the Hybrid Bill for District Councils to appoint Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) tasked with ensuring that the contractor complies with the COCP and enforcing sanctions where it does not. Such EHOs should have sufficient powers to force contractors to comply with the COCP and should have powers to stop operations by a contractor where there is non-compliance. There should be a clear schedule of penalties for contractors for non-compliance with the COCP. There should be a Parliamentary Ombudsman to assess and rule on cases where communities and the Nominated Undertaker are in dispute. Acceptable noise levels should be confirmed in a Section 61 agreement between HS2 Ltd and the local authority. EHOs need to monitor noise and ensure compliance with agreed levels as required. They should be legally enforceable with strict penalties for breach. Independent monitoring of working hours should be included in the COCP- as currently drafted there is no provision for any independent monitoring and as a result appears that communities will be vulnerable to works being carried out 24-7 over prolonged periods. The COCP should provide that construction activities to be carried out outside core hours (other than tunnelling works) should be agreed with the Local Authority in advance of the works – applications should be made 14 days in advance and the work specified in detail. Bank Holiday hours should be the same as Saturdays. The COCP should contain a much clearer obligation on contractors to remove spoil heaps and construction compounds etc from public view by locating well away from residential areas and in places where they can be screened by natural topography or located in woodland. Appropriate assessment and funding should be provided for communities which are significantly impacted by HS2 construction to ensure access to key public services can be maintained. The COCP should include precise targets for dust and air pollution with legally enforceable sanctions up to and including the right to halt construction progress until the situation is rectified.
9.7 Communities from London to the West Midlands deserve better-if HS2 will be undertaking work for up to 10 years, it should be common ground that this work should be carried out to the highest possible standards.
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10 Conclusion
9.1 The business case for HS2 would have to be overwhelming to justify the level of environmental damage detailed in the ES. But HS2 is not value for money and its business case is deeply flawed and remains critically dependent on discredited values of time for business passengers, even though this has been cleverly disguised in the October 2013 Strategic Case. The regeneration benefits which are claimed for HS2 are largely made up and there is no need for the capacity which HS2 would provide-the 51M Optimised Alternative has been proven to deal with even the most aggressive forecasts in future passenger growth, all at a fraction of the cost and environmental damage.
9.2 The benefit cost ratio for HS2 contrasts negatively with the 51M Optimised Alternative (5:1), flood defences (8:1) and the roll out of superfast broadband (20:1). Therefore, in simple terms, there is a significant mismatch between the environmental damage HS2 will cause and the economic and transport benefits the scheme would create.
9.3 The ES provides a greater understanding of these highly negative environmental effects, but the documentation continues the trend seen with other major documents published by HS2 Ltd which consistently understates just how significant the environmental impacts will be. This means the ES is poorly presented, deliberately misleading is places and understates environment effects. These conclusions are supported not only by the information produced by HS2AA, but by the conclusions set out in the reports from independent environmental consultants commissioned by HS2AA which form the appendixes to this submission.
9.4 Taken together, these flaws in the ES are serious enough to mean that the ES cannot be said to comply with the minimum standards set out in the EIA Regulations. HS2AA believes HS2 Ltd and the Department for Transport should respond to the points in this submission and there should be no Second Reading until a properly compliant environmental statement is provided for consultation.
9.5 HS2AA is also concerned that the process by which it is proposed Phase 1 of HS2 will receive development consent is incapable of being compliant with the EIA Directive. The Government as the promoter of the scheme, has removed decision making from normal planning decision makers, that are governed by strict rules. Instead it has placed the matter in the hands of Parliament where the Government can control the entire process in an overtly political fashion. This approach appears to raise fundamental issues with the United Kingdom’s compliance with the Aarhus Convention.
9.6 HS2AA believe HS2 Ltd and the Department for Transport need to face reality about the highly negative impacts HS2 will inevitably cause. It cannot be right for a Government which claims to prioritise the environment to publish a scheme which relies on as yet unknown mitigation measures to deal with highly adverse environmental outcomes. There is little in the ES to provide comfort that communities will be protected- it’s time for a proper commitment to environmental mitigation and public participation in decision making in respect of HS2.
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Appendix 1-Errors in the Environmental Statement
The list below is not definitive but illustrates the extent of the inaccurate and misleading information contained in the ES.
Number Area/Reference Error 1. NTS Fails to include demolition of Barn Cottage, Lone Oak, Non-technical and Cranebrook as referenced in Vol 2 CFA21 Table 1. summary 8.21 NTS fails to mention the properties of Stone House, Oak Dairy Farm, South View Farm and Oak Tree Farm, which are vulnerable to noise, and visual intrusion from Drayton Bassett Viaduct as detailed in 9.4.29, 9.5.12 and 9.5.45. 2. Non-technical Burton Green Tunnel is not 0.6 km long (actually 0.52 km of summary P14 tunnel, and a 100m portal at each end) In Volume 2 CFA 18 2.2.14 the tunnel is described as 621m long. Maps invariably show the ‘tunnel’ as around 720m long – i.e. including the 520m of tunnel plus the 100m either end of portal. This provides a misleading impression. 3. Non-technical Sketch of tunnel portal is not typical, especially with summary P16 reference to following comments about reducing noise and air pressure effects 4. Non-technical ‘the project will not give rise to significant ground-borne summary P48 noise or vibration effects on those living close to the railway’ – contradicted elsewhere in the ES-far too simplistic statement. 5. Non-technical ‘a permanent beneficial effect on woodland’ is referenced in summary P120 the same paragraph as 3.8 hectares of ancient woodland lost. This is mitigation not benefit, fundamental error. 6. Volume 1 2.5.8 The discussion of carbon emissions and contributions from various transport modes needs placing in the context of each mode's share of total transport activity along with HS2's carbon contribution as compared with classic rail's reduced contribution arising from classic rail's lower speed. None of these factors are referenced. 7. Volume 1 4.2.15 The paragraph states that the route passes beneath the Chilterns AONB implying that the AONB will be tunnelled along its length-not the case. 8. Volume 1 5.3.3 No comment is made upon urban drainage systems having the capacity to accept HS2 run off. 9. Volume 1 Figure 3 Are the towns of Aylesbury, Tamworth and Lichfield not worthy of annotation? 10. Volume 1 Figure 40 Shows only the scenario where HS2 is at existing ground level. It fails to illustrate excavation and removal of earth where HS2 and the bridge foundations are below existing ground level as is the case through Drayton Bassett County Parish. 11. Volume 1 7.3.3 Paragraph defines impacts as either temporary or permanent which applies a gloss to impact assessment and belies people’s and communities’ long-term experience. e.g. 7 years of construction is deemed “temporary”. 12. Volume 1 7.3.3. Seriously misleading statement which conflates benefits Phase 1 and Phase 2 and applying them to Phase 1. This is not acceptable in considering Phase 1. 13. Volume 1 10.3.6 There is a statement that the proposed scheme is a discrete project that can be justified on its own merits, it has been conceived as part of a long-term strategy for a network of
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high speed lines connecting major conurbations. However Phase 1 is a discreet project and no strategy for a network of high speed lines beyond HS2 has been announced or debated. The ES is focused on the impact of Phase 1 London to West Midlands. There is an element of duplicity. It is apparent from the ES that it requires the conflated benefits of phase 1 and phase 2 to justify the benefits of Phase 1. The very circularity of the argument is deeply worrying because if phase 1 goes ahead having relied on these benefits, it adds very significant weight to the development of phase 2. (counsel’s arguments in JR and appeal court) 14. Volume 1 10.3.18 There is no mention of current upgrade plans by Network Rail for upgrades to MML and ECML. 15. Volume 1 Evidence was provided of the impact of the line on businesses in Great Missenden but this has not been included in the ES. 16. Volume 1 Full details supplied of local communities Detailed in appendix but not main text Minimisation of importance of local communities in key texts 17. Volume 1 Safety concerns Not all Schools identified as notable features 18. Volume 1 The assumptions made for successful business relocations are based on London Development Agency figures based on the London Olympics. To apply these statistics to rural areas is misleading 19. Volume 1 Absence of assessment of the impact of Tourism is startling omission especially because NPPF requirements include assessment of development on local economy. The scoping for socio-economic section is narrow. HS2Ltd have a myopic view of the development, focusing on impacts close to route – except when discussing ‘wider benefits’ 20. Volume 1 There is no quantification of loss of equity due to falling house prices because of property blight The scoping for socio-economic section is narrow. HS2Ltd have a myopic view of the development, focusing on impacts close to route – except when discussing ‘wider benefits’ 21. Volume 1 ES states Community Forums were held monthly. This is not true. For example on two were held in CFA 8 and CFA 9 in 2013. 22. Volume 1 The summary of the themes in Paragraph 2.5.4 is incorrect, including omitting two vital issues-the extended tunnel through the AONN and the lower track levels for mitigation. These issues were raised in the response to the Draft Environmental Statement but seemingly ignored. They were even noted as being important by a senior HS2 Ltd employee as the important issues in the CFA 9 area in March 2013. 23. Volume 2 CFA 21 In the ES section dealing with CFA 21 Volume 2 (Drayton Bassett, Hints and Weeford) it is stated that surplus from CFA 18 (Stoneleigh, Kenilworth and Burton Green) would require off site disposal in this CFA (2.3.47). Following questions from local action groups, it became clear that the wording was incorrect and was simply a “cut and paste” from another section of the ES. The HS2 response is below
Hi Dean, Apologies for the delay getting back to you on this. I have
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checked with colleagues - this is an error and should read ‘…originating from the Drayton Bassett, Hints and Weeford area…’. Best wishes Daisy 24. Vol 2 CFA 13 2.3.62 Section references Volume 1 Section 5.18 for information on Auto Transformer Station but this is incorrect, the referenced section is Train Control and Telecommunications, not Power Supply. 25. Vol 2 CFA 13 2.3.59 Major utility works are noted in report, but not shown on corresponding maps despite featuring in the map legend.
26. Vol 2 CFA 13 9.5.25 Section refers to visual effects on landscape from ATS infrastructure. Responses to consultation on draft ES and Community Forum asked for an image to be provided of an Auto Transformer Station. This image has still not been provided. It is not possible to comment on visual effects and mitigation required without knowing what ATS will look like. 27. Vol 2 CFA 13 2.6 Green tunnel for Chetwode. Responses to draft ES pointed out the significant omission of the fact that the green tunnel that the community and Church of England have proposed would not have to be lowered, but could be banked and landscaped over the top. This option was discussed and HS2 Ltd produced engineering drawings at Chetwode bilateral meeting with Peter Miller of HS2 Ltd and the Cathedral and Church Buildings Division of the Church of England in April 2013. However this error has been repeated in the ES. 28. Vol 2 CFA 13 5.5.9 & Very high noise levels for Chetwode. At the time of Map SV-05-030 publication of both the earlier Appraisal of Sustainability and the draft ES and during community forums, residents of Chetwode were assured by HS2 Ltd that these high noise levels would be removed after further proposed mitigation - the results of which we would be shown in firstly the draft ES, then the full ES. This simply hasn’t happened 29. Vol 2 CFA 13 6. Section dealing with impacts on the setting of heritage assets omits to mention Chetwode Conservation Area and Grade I listed Chetwode church. This is a significant omission 30. Vol 2 CFA 17 This issue concerns the apparent absence of systematic data on track height in ES/HB documentation. In Cubbington and Offchurch, a major concern is with the height of the trackbed. Previously, HS2 Ltd have supplied (via the relevant Community Forum) a series of maps which show the distance between track height and ground level at every chain along the track. However it has not been possible to identify such systematic data within the ES documentation. The only potentially relevant data seems to be that in the Hybrid Bill Sections volumes, but these only show track height at specific points associated with works packages and in formats which it is impossible to correlate accurately with the systematic previous chain-by-chain data. Local groups took this up with HS2 Ltd and were access to data from HS2's Route Development Appraisal process. This includes systematic track height data relating to HS2's preferred route option which they term Option A, (from a map dated 15.3.13). In
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correspondence, an HS2 Ltd employee has said the track height for the ES is the same as this. We are therefore in a situation where: o There does not appear to be systematic information in the ES documentation on track height. o The track height data which HS2 has is only being disclosed to us on request and has not been made generally available. o This data appears to differ from that which was made available in association with the draft ES. o it is possible further information will be coming. One email from HS2 says: “HS2 Ltd regrets that it has so far been unable to publish the plan and profile maps. To ensure that all publically-available material is both precise and accurate, vigorous checks are continuing and the information will be made available as soon as possible. Participation in the consultation on the Environmental Statement is not curtailed by the current unavailability of this information” We do not agree that the absence of this data does not curtail response to the ES consultation. Track height data is highly important to many potential responses to the ES consultation and should have been provided as part of, or alongside, the ES documentation. 31. Volume 2 CFA 9 There is no reference to the Chilterns Conservation Board Management Plan in the list of local policies and key planning designations listed in 2.1.12, which is an omission 32. Volume 2 CFA 9 2.2.6 The ES states: a land drainage area to the west of the landscape earthworks, just east of Mantle’s Farm, with an associated access track. In other ES documents, this track has been described as temporary. This is another example of segmentation of information. 33. Volume 2 CFA 9 This paragraph reveals that this road is to be upgraded and 2.3.34 used to service the Chiltern tunnel north portal satellite. This has a function, amongst many, of extracting the TBM. This is a clear example, amongst many, where the segmentation of the ES and the morass of information provided are deliberately used to disguise and minimise the detail of the impact of the scheme. 34. Volume 2 CFA 9 The land drainage areas on the eastern side of the vent shaft head house in the Chiltern Tunnel do not feature on the plans 35. Volume 2 CFA 9 The Proposed Scheme will emerge from the Chiltern tunnel 2.2.10 north portal at Mantle’s Wood. HS2 Ltd has released little information about cuttings – depth etc prior to the ES being published. It was expected the ES would have this information but this section does not provide details of the cuttings, for example the degree of slope nor the special measures taken with regard to them. 36. Volume 2 CFA 9 There is an access road connecting the portal to Hyde Heath 2.2.10 Road. Hyde Heath Village Society has attempted a substantial amount of consultation with HS2 on this point and received no answers. The ES does not identify the need to widen local roads. Hyde Heath village association have sought reassurances that the detail would be provided in the Final ES. The ES does not provide this detail
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37. Volume 2 CFA 9 6.4 This section contains only an outline of the advance works, meaning there is insufficient detail to understand what impact advance works will have on tourists, residents and businesses. 38. Volume 2 CFA 9 The ES states that advance works will include utility diversions. The Hyde Heath Village Society requested details on the local communities’ behalf. HS2 Ltd. informed the Society that this detail would be provided in the ES. No such detail is provided. 39. Volume 2 CFA 9 Significant inconsistency given the majority of the civil 2.3.17 engineering works are planned to occur simultaneously according to the construction programme in Figure 5, yet Section 12.4.10 states these will be staggered. 40. Volume 2 CFA 9 The ES states “The effect on accident and safety risk is not 12.4.19 significant as there are no locations where there are existing clusters of accidents” However the A413 between Great Missenden and Amersham has experienced a number of fatal and serious accidents during the last 18 months which contradicts this statement. 41. Volume 2 CFA 9 Little Missenden is not mentioned in the ES as being effected yet this village will be severely affected by the proposed scheme by having two construction site access points one to the West and the other to the East of the village 42. Volume 2 CFA 9 Map The map does not show Bull Baiters Lane as a construction CT-05-032-02 route hence the text is incorrect. 43. Volume 2 CFA 9 The ES states no road realignments will be required with 2.3.63 works associated with this compound. This is inconsistent with the need to block Frith Hill whilst the green tunnel is constructed 44. Volume 2 CFA 9 Figure 5 sets out details of the Indicative Construction Programme. However the second page of this table (p 35) in the on-line pdf version has no time-lines. 45. Volume 2 CFA 9 This section raises the question of removal of spoil and of 2.6.34 building earth banks along the line. The statement attributed to the Chilterns Conservation Board misrepresents their view. 46. Volume 2 CFA 9 (1) 'The Lee' is referred to as 'Lee' on numerous occasions e.g. 9.3.6 Lee and Buckland Common Farmland 47. Volume 2 CFA 9 South Heath is left out of heading references e.g. 9.3.5 Hyde Heath North LCA 9.4.11; 9.4.15 etc. 48. Volume 2 CFA 9 Table 7-51 gives the 2021 base-line flow from Frith Hill onto the A413The flow/capacity of 36% is demonstrably incorrect as the queue is currently often more than 50 cars. 49. Volume 3 The protected status of the AONB is stated but there is a deliberate minimisation of impact. The ES fails to distinguish the specific differences between the Chilterns AONB and others. Nor does it note that the Chilterns AONB is internationally recognised as Graded V protected landscape – the same level of protection as National Parks and, indeed, French national parks 50. Volume 3 The ES provides an inaccurate summary of NPFF requirements. The description of the status of the AONB omits that it has the highest protection and the NPFF list three extra assessments which have not been included. . This is a major omission that the ES has not considered or addressed.
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51. Volume 3 The ES omits references to the assessments required by NPFF 52. Volume 3 The valley floor is described as featuring an existing road and rail corridor. This wording is misleading and appears to be a deliberate attempt to minimise impact in this area. Use of the term “Corridor” is a deliberate attempt to downgrade the importance of AONB 53. Volume 3 The ES states that in several areas Public Rights of Way were inaccessible (CF9 Para 9.2.4).This cannot be correct. 54. Volume 3 The statement that the M1 passes through the AONB is factually incorrect. 55. Volume 3 The statement that the Misbourne valley is affected by the M25 is factually incorrect. 56. Volume 3 2.3.12 The relevant paragraph omits two important historic settlements that have conservation areas, Little and Great Missenden 57. Volume 3 2.3.16 The ES incorrectly states that for the most part the scheme lies within a wide valley setting. The 9.4 km. tunnel emerges within ancient woodland on the northern ridge and the route follows the ridge for the remaining 10.6 km where, incidentally, the report acknowledges tranquillity is at its highest. 58. Volume 3 2.5.19 The ES emphasises that the impact of the vehicular movements will be limited to the Misbourne Valley and will not be perceived over the wider AONB. This ignores the fact that the construction routes leave the Misbourne Valley to access the motorway network. 59. Volume 3 The ES fails to assess and give weight to the cumulative impact of construction along the Misbourne Valley. 60. Volume 3 The statement that Shardeloes RPG will be unaltered in the ES is inaccurate. The Little Missenden vent shaft is directly opposite the Grade 1 listed garden. The statement also fails to assess the effect on the listed buildings in Little Missenden. 61. Volume 3 The ES contemplates shifting large amounts of earth which will create dust. The ES only refeences watering for dealing with this issue. Dust may be reduced by watering but never eliminated. The ES is misleading in stating the COCP would enable activities to be controlled such that the effects on air quality would generally only be locally slight. 62. Volume 3 4.1.3 The strategy of segmentation of information means that there is no cumulative assessment, on traffic impacts, vital in a linear project on this issue. 63. Volume 3 The ES shows an access road from the A413 to Mantles Map CT-05-032-L1 Wood and also access route from the A413 via Hyde Lane but no mention of their purpose in the construction period. 64. Volume 3 12.4.25 Contradiction in ES- from areas to the south, including CFA8, the cumulative average construction traffic flows of approximately 20 cars/LGV per day (two-way) have been included in the assessment for this area. This statement is in direct contradiction to Sections 2.3.27, 2.3.34, 2.3.43, 2.3.46, 2.3.56 & 2.3.59. 65. Volume 3 2.3.18 Contradiction in statement that movements between the construction compounds and the work sites will be on designated haul roads within the site, often along the line of the railway or running parallel to it”. This statement is directly contradicted in CFA10, 2.3.21-26 which states: The
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compound will be accessed via Leather Lane, Potter Row, Frith Hill, and B485 Chesham Road. 66. Volume 3 The ES references the installation of a de-watering system (if required), to deal with dust. Requests for information about the de-watering system were raised in the Community Forum and HS2 Ltd promised this would be provided in the ES. No such information is provided. 67. Volume 3 The PRoW running through Keepers Wood is situated within the confines of the construction site There is no record of temporary obstruction of this PRoW. 68. Volume 3 2.3.40 The ES states: “Diversion of utilities and the installation of new utilities will be required” HS2 Ltd when requested stated that these details would be included in the ES. Details of these requirements are not included in the ES. 69. Volume 3 2.3.47 Details of enabling works should have been included here and at all other places where they are mentioned. Without details there is no way residents can gauge the impact on their lives. See also 2.3.60 for similar ommission 70. Volume 3 2.5.4 These were adjusted in response to DES but changes omitted identifies the main themes emerging from community engagement 71. Volume 3 The ES states that the AONB status of the Chilterns was taken into account when developing the design of the route. However the following statements exemplify the extent to which that status has not been accommodated. Volume 3 Section 2.5.4 (entire) Volume 3 Section 2.5.10 (entire) Volume 3 2.5.11 (entire) Volume 3 2.5.12 (entire) 72. Volume 3 2.6.20 The statements which comments on the two options to extend the tunnel to Liberty Lane are misleading. The obvious environmental benefits are qualified by reference to the impact of the construction of a vent shaft by the Chesham Road which is relatively minor when compared with the extreme impact of Option A. The statement in 2.6.20 fails to put this in to context. 73. Volume 3 2.6.33: The statement in the ES that the community has raised concerns over the potential effects and has proposed a lowering of the alignment through this section is inaccurate. The community has always required the line to be as low as possible to avoid both visual and noise impact. 74. Volume 3 The particular points in the ES that relate to Hyde Farm and which are incorrect are as follows o The property immediately to the west of Hyde Farm is marked on the maps as "Chapel Farm". Also Chapel Farm is stated in the text of the ES as being a commercial property. This is wholly incorrect. There is a house to the north-west of Hyde Farm which is called Chapel Farm and this is exclusively residential. The rest of the land to the west of Hyde Farm which comprises a barn with 20 stables, 3 isolation stables, a 5 bay barn for storing hay, horse boxes and farm machinery, an indoor riding school and an internationally sized dressage arena plus approximately 10 acres of pasture land with cross-country jumps and a field shelter is all part of Hyde Farm o The ES states that Hyde Farm is let out for grazing. This is, again, wholly incorrect. None of
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our pasture land is let out and none is used solely for grazing. o The ES in the table in paragraph 3.3.26 states that Hyde Farm's grazing land is let (see 2 above) and that there is no diversification. The table in paragraph 3.4.15 states that the disruptive affects of the works would be negligible. The operation of the railway and the accompanying noise and dust would be severely adverse to the carrying out of the business of training elite competition horses, the use of Hyde Farm West for which planning permission has been given. 75. Volume 5 map book, No map shows forests. On the agricultural map it is shown Ag/Forestry/soils only as ‘other land’ meaning the impression is given forestry is not affected. This is disingenuous – there should be a map in this book to show forestry (including type). 76. Vol 5 Ecology EC-005- The ES does not refer to Broadwells Wood (ancient), Black 003 Waste Wood. This appears to be an attempt to hide the effects on local woodland. 77. Vol 5 CFA 18 Footpath surveyed in wrong places. Three surveys are listed Community CM-001- for the Greenway north of Burton Green, however this is the 018 least used part. HS2 would affect routes to the south of the village and this would have much larger traffic. 78. Volume 5.2 In the Colne to Burton Green section, the height of Cromwell Lane crossing (on cut and cover tunnel) is inconsistent between lateral and transverse sections (and visualisation) 79. Vol 5 SV-002-018 In the sound and vibration baseline, Table 1 Sheet 5-87 (pdf p36) shows a 1m elevation. Sheet 5-110 (pdf p59, Work No 2/183) shows a, 3-4m elevation. LV-01-122 (Volume 2 map CFA 18, pdf p55) shows road exactly at existing (flat) grade. Its not clear which one is correct. 80. Vol 5 SV-002-018, ES states that “data are considered to be an estimate of the table 2/3.3.3 sound climate (e.g taken from Defra noise maps, etc)”. meaning these are either not measurements, or taken so badly as to not be truly representative. 81. Vol 5 SV-001-000 Sound and vibration in Table 2 has a missing reference to Annex D2 the source for Rsel. 82. Vol 5 SV-001-000 Figure 7 on sound and vibration contains no information for Annex D2 regression results (the line fit to points). The diagram appears to contradict statement 1.3.2 ‘the prediction method tends to over-estimate in service noise levels’, especially at the ‘lower’ noise end (e.g. SEL of 75dB calculation shows measured of > 75 dB average). It is difficult to tell without a better diagram and/or the regression results 83. Vol 5 SV-001-000 Figure 17/18 are not consistent with statement at 1.3.28 that Annex D2 ‘HS2 predicts reasonable worst case sound levels at receptors situated at large distances from the railway’. At large distances (e.g. 800m points) the measured data clearly shows the HS2 method with no ground attenuation will be most applicable, but 1.3.16 implies that this curve would not be used for an open field (no barrier) situation 84. Volume 5 Transport Peak traffic flow assessment of the A413-A404 junction, as Assessment, Part 6 presented in tables 7-30, 7-31 appears to be incorrect. It shows 122 more vehicles and 62 HGV’s entering than leaving junction of the A413 and A404 in the morning and 294 more leaving in the evening. Rows 17 (AM) & 27(PM)
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give the total flows for the junction, which would ideally be zero. Some sampling error is to be expected, but I regard a 30% error as excessive. If traffic flows were measured on all 3 roads at the same time, then (provided that HGVs were correctly identified), the total HGV flow across the junction would be zero, even for small sample sizes. 85. Volume 5 Transport ES contains minor errors, such as apparently transposing Assessment, Part 7 quoted traffic flows for village main street with those for the nearby A4091and calling Curdworth ‘Cuddington’ The ES states that the A4091/A446 junction is currently operating over capacity at the PM peak, but states that the maximum queue (AM peak, A4091 southbound) is 4 vehicles. Observations by a number of local residents show that up to around 40 vehicles can be in this queue (which is regularly over 15 vehicles) and delays of up to 15minutes have been recorded. The addition of HS2 construction traffic will make this junction heavily congested but the ES states that the ‘…….overall impact on congestion levels is not substantial.’(Para 7.16.42). Similar gross underestimates of maximum queue length apply to the A446 northbound leg of this junction in the PM peak. 86. Vol 5 Map EC-07-031a Map shades areas which according to legend appear to show scoping visits were conducted but most are where access for surveys was not obtained. It is unclear as to how this information was drawn together. Estimates and approximations/ desk top studies should be clearly detailed. 87. Vol 5 EC-08 & Map Birds that are known to be in Chetwode parish include: Barn EC-08-063 Owls, red kite, peregrine falcons, cuckoos, lapwing, kingfishers, grey partridge, and woodcock. Of the above, only Lapwing and Cuckoo are marked on Map EC-08-063. Without access for field surveys it is impossible for HS2 Ltd to have accurately recorded the risk to these and many other species. 88. Vol 5 AG-001-013 Chetwode Manor. Total hectarage for holding shown incorrectly as 436.5ha. Should be 491.5ha 89. Work 2/186, CFA18 Public Footpath M184 requires a permanent diversion to join with the Work 2/186 replacing the former bridge over the Kenilworth Greenway at Waste Lane. The footpath needs extending, as the new road bridge is offset from the old one, and the footpath needs rebuilding and re-grading to accommodate a height difference of 4 metres. The only reference in the Bill schedules to any work on the path is temporary closure within Bill limits Reported in consultation response, July 2011. No response or acknowledgement received. 90. Volume 2 CFA 9 The ES states at 7.5.14 that: The assessment covers the Volume 5 Route Wide AM (08:00-09:00) and PM (17:00-18:00) peak periods for an Appendices: Traffic average weekday This is fundamentally flawed, as village and Transport part 6 roads are at their busiest at these times whilst between Country Assessment there is very little traffic. Undoubtedly this will have lead to section 7.5 covers under estimate of percentage increase in traffic (see tables Central Chilterns (CFA 7-47 and 48) on village road when construction is in 09).. progress. Overall baseline figures do not reflect the likely traffic increases on roads such as Kings Lane, Frith Hill and Potter Row and as a consequence construction traffic.
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Number Area/Reference Error 91. Glebe farm area stated as 526.1 ha when in fact it is 44 ha . CFA14 | Newton The land required for construction is stated as 11.9ha (2%) with Purcell to Brackley negligible impact when in fact it is 25% with a severe impact. Data appendix ( AG- The residual effect is stated as 6.6 ha (1%) with negligible 001-014 ) impact when in fact it is 15% with a severe impact. Agriculture, forestry Overall temporary and permanent assessments are minor and soils (based on the 2% and 1% erroneous figures) when in fact they CFA14/10 are both severe.
92. Non Technical Paragraph 7.10 states the number of “...1,510 jobs are at risk, Summary route-wide...” On any reasonable estimate the number is twice that in Camden, alone. Page. 59 of the Non-technical summary adds, “It is estimated that the project will result in the displacement of possible loss of a total of 3,090 jobs within the Euston area.” We further note that the Non-Technical Summary does not mention the, possibly fatal, effects upon the restaurateurs and traders on Drummond Street, where access from Euston Station will be severely diminished during construction.
93. CFA 1 Euston Paragraph 2.2.3 “...there is Georgian housing on Park Village East and Park Village West” should be changed to “...there is Grade II* Listed Georgian housing on Park Village East and Park Village West, whose freeholds are owned by the Crown Estate” This is relevant when it comes to construction methods and mitigation, which will need to be specially designed and not to have mentioned the Listing shows a sloppy Heritage Assessment.
94. CFA 1 Euston 2.2.4 “...there is Georgian terraced housing on Mornington Terrace and Mornington Crescent” should be changed to “...there is Grade II Listed Georgian terraced housing on Mornington Terrace and Mornington Crescent” This is relevant when it comes to construction methods and mitigation, which will need to be specially designed and not to have mentioned the Listing shows a sloppy Heritage Assessment.
95. CFA 1 Euston 2.2.32 The information referred to in this section on the map (CT-10-001), and other maps, is insufficient and misleading. Little mention is made of conservation areas (two of which affect us: Regent’s Park and Camden Town) in the Cultural heritage section and no information is included either in the written statement or on the accompanying maps, of positive contributors in conservation areas or buildings on the Camden draft Local List. The information on this map, and others, is inadequate as the system of one dot per list entry does not indicate where the entry covers multiple listings such as terraces of houses and other building groups which are widespread in an urban area such as Camden. Indeed, on Park Village East there is 1 dot but there are 16 Grade II* Listed Buildings and on Park Village West there is, again 1 dot but there are 16 Grade II* Listed Buildings. On Albany Street and in Regent’s Park there are numerous Listed Buildings, fobbed off with a few dots.
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96. CFA 1 Euston Paragraph 5.1.2 Bullet point 6 misleadingly states that there will be ‘temporary closure of vehicular access’ to Park Village East. It neglects to mention that this ‘temporary closure’ is actually for a minimum of 4 years. Yet there is no discussion of mitigation nor compensation. At very least, the compensation schemes proposed for rural areas should be offered to those living in urban areas and a Property Bond Scheme should be offered.
97. CFA 1 Euston .3.12 Totally omits to mention Camden Conservation Area, north and east of Granby Terrace although it contains “Land potentially required during construction;” at least 3 Satellite Construction Comp0unds; and will be subject to noise and air pollution due to HGV movements. 98. CFA 1 Euston Paragraph 7.3.7 No mention is made of the loss of urban habitat for birds and mammals in the approximately 0.4 mile long plantings along the Euston railway cutting retaining wall and parapet at Park Village East, which will be demolished to make way for a much deeper wall. While it is envisaged that the plantings will be restored, in some measure, the loss will be for more than a decade. Such loss is most deeply felt in an otherwise urban environment.
99. CFA 1 Euston 9.4.3 omits to mention loss of trees along Park Village East while it mentions loss of trees, elsewhere. In 9.4.20 the loss of those trees is confirmed. There is a lack of attention to detail throughout the ES, which causes us to worry that there is a lack of attention to detail on other aspects of the Proposed Scheme.
100. CFA1 | Euston – Map CT-05-001 In this map, the York & Albany Hotel, Grade II Station and Approach Listed Building is shown as, “Land potentially required during (ES 3.2.2.1) construction.” However, for example, in Volume 2 | CFA 1 (ES 3.2.2.1), it is NOT mentioned.
101. CFA1 | Euston – Map CT-10-001 There are numerous errors and omissions of Station and Approach Listed Buildings. Structures on Camden’s Local List are not (ES 3.2.2.1) shown, including the Euston railway cutting retaining wall on Park Village East.
102. CFA1 | Euston – Maps CT-20-005 is misleading in that it does not show utility Station and Approach diversions on Park Village East and Mornington Street in 2015, (ES 3.2.2.1) which are clearly detailed in Volume 2 | CFA 1 (ES 3.2.2.1) Fig. 8 p. 55
103. CFA1 | Euston – Station and Approach Maps CT-20-005 – CT-20-008 merely confirm our comments (ES 3.2.2.1) relating to the Non technical summary (ES 3.0.0) at 8.1--“To the north of Euston station, residents at Park Village East are predicted to experience temporary isolation and amenity (noise and visual) effects.” The term “temporary” is totally erroneous and misleading, as the construction will last for, at least, 11 years in front of our houses, as is clearly spelled out in these maps. Neither mitigation nor compensation is available, bar exceptional hardship. HS2 should provide alternative housing and compensation, rather than have affected residents prove some exceptional need. The polluter should pay.
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104. Operational Viewpoint 330.3.002 (volume 2: 9.5.29) is not Map LV-04-008b annotated on the map although it is shown by purple circle Operational with black central dot. Viewpoints Stone House is annotated as Oak Dairy Farm. Oak Dairy Farm is not annotated. 105. Number Area/Reference Error 106. CFA07 “railheads will connect with the existing railway network for the delivery of materials for the construction of the rail systems, further details are provided in Section 2.3.34; (Para 2.3.14 CFA7)” Section 2.3.34 does not refer to railheads and simply states: No watercourse realignments will be required. The ES does not actually contain any information about this railhead. 107. CFA06 The detailed assessment of the rights of way diversions also highlights a number of inconsistencies and contradictions. In some instances, rights of way are stated as being diverted for 3 months in one document but 4 years in another. The lengths of diversions are also contradicted in places 108. CFA06 Public Footpath U46 & U45 & U47- the Rights of Way diversion takes in a road that is fundamentally unsuitable for pedestrians; there is no pavement and as well as a major commuting route it is a road that HS2 Ltd will use for extensive vehicular traffic including HGVs 109. CFA07 HS2 plans show the dumping of excavated material on top of the West London Composting site. This is a highly valuable waste management site that is integral to the management of waste across west London: Established in 2004 to help increase the amount of organic waste recycled in the UK, West London Composting (WLC) is the largest invessel facility of its kind in Europe today for bulk composting. 110. CFA06 HS2 have selected an area of grassland for the planting grassland mitigation 111. CFA06 The ES makes several references to the Northolt Tunnel and Earthworks Main Compound. Contrary to the description this is nowhere near Northolt. Instead it is situated in Ickenham in between Harvil Road and Breakspear Road South. 112. CFA06 The boundary of the Ruislip Village conservation area is incorrect; this does not show the recent extension to the south. 113. Map CH-01-022-L2 shows Denham Place in the position of 254 Swakeleys Road and is therefore wrong 114. CFA07 Harefield Place and associated lodge (CVA005) are both grade II listed and are located off The Drive in Ickenham. A reference for the former is not noted on the maps, but is included as CV058 in the assessment. The house is close to an area noted as being potentially required for the construction period, and which could negatively impact on its setting; this is not considered in the assessment. The history of the house now called Harefield Place is noted in the background report, but is referenced wrongly as CV054 and 55 (Church Gardens).
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115. CFA06 Locally Listed structures are not included on the maps but most have been included in the assessment. South Ruislip Station, ref RUI033, is Locally Listed. RAF West Ruislip RUI011 is included as a heritage asset despite the site having been totally cleared and partially redeveloped; as such it can no longer be considered a heritage asset. At RAF Northolt RUI010, the guard room has been demolished, and the hangar is listed as Grade 2 not 1 and the officers mess is listed Grade 2, but not shown on the map. Other listed buildings have not been indicated on the map, but are discussed in the Gazetteer. The listed structures at Ruislip Manor Sports Ground, Grosvenor Vale, are not recorded on the maps or Gazetteer. RU1007, properties at 1-2 The Green, Ickenham, are Locally Listed rather than statutory listed. The Ruislip Gazetteer does not include descriptions for entries RUL1067 to 80. The former underground munitions factory at Ruislip Gardens Depot is not recorded or discussed. 116. Volume 5 - Annex C Model performance reports, seeks to create a model that can be validated in line with current modelling guidelines. The information provided by TfL has not been used in its entirety, leading to a shortfall of 187 vehicles per day. 117. CFA06 Recent traffic surveys undertaken by Robert West on behalf of the London Borough of Hillingdon on the 30th May 2012 show the morning peak two way traffic volume on Ickenham High Road from West Ruislip Station to be nearer 1900 vehicles, against the 1,076 in the HS2 report. 118. CFA06 Section 12.4.13 states that “Access to the compounds….”are expected to need to be signalised”
The introduction of these additional signalised junctions on this route has not been modelled and again makes the figures presented incorrect. 119. Volume 5 Technical The assessment, by its own admission, is based on “limited Appendices traffic flow information” derived from sample manual counts that Transport do not include the two primary transportation routes proposed. Assessment The journey times observed are up to 10 times longer than those used by HS2 to model the impact during the construction period. This is acknowledged in Section 4.7.34 of Volume 5 - Technical Appendices Transport Assessment - Traffic and transport.. 120. CFA06 The nearest golf course owned by LBH is Haste Hill Golf Course, which is approximately 4km north. Not true...... Uxbridge Golf course is nearest 121. CFA06 View west from dwellings on Breakspear Road South and Swakeleys Road (close to junction with Harvil Road) has intervening vegetation Not true for a number of houses who will be overlooking a major construction site (10 years) and fields where material waste will be dumped. 122. Volume 5 Transport Table 7-3: Colne Valley road network future baseline flows Assessment - TR-001- (vehicles) – PM peak shows six roads (including the A40) where 000 Baseline flow was just one vehicle in the one hour period, six others (including the A412) where it was in single figures.
Table 7-4: AM peak figures shows seven roads with just one
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vehicle in the hour and five others with single figure flows. Harvil Road is shown as having three vehicles NB and 4 SB in the AM peak yet 365 vehicles NB and just four SB in the PM peak period.Table 7-5: PM peak has two roads with one vehicle in the hour and nine others in single figures.These assessments are so obviously incorrect that further study and conclusion is meaningless. Other tables are very misleading and contain jargon that is impossible for the lay person to understand. As an example 7.2.72 states: The 2012 future traffic baseline with Proposed Scheme construction traffic flows on the strategic road network, where traffic flows (all vehicles or HGVs during either AM or PM peak) will change by 10% or more, are shown in Table 7-10 and Table 7-11 for AM and PM flows respectively. This renders the data meaningless and so a reasoned understanding of the implications is impossible
123. 7.5 Central Chilterns Paragraph 7.3.103 states that: Temporary closures and (CFA9) diversions of PRoWs during construction are shown on Map CT- 06-001 (Volume 2, Map Book 7). There is no such map. 7.5.32 states that: Central Chilterns construction activity phasing are summarised in Figure 7-4. This only shows advance works and those for the Chilterns Tunnel Main Compound and the Little Missenden vent shaft Satellite Compound but no activity whatsoever at the remaining sites. This is yet another example of a rushed and incomplete report
124. CFA 8 – The Chalfonts 7.2.3 states that: It was not possible to access all of the land and Amersham areas where general habitat surveys (Phase 1 habitat survey) were proposed. Locations with the potential to support key ecological receptors where access could not be gained for survey include the River Misbourne upstream of Shardeloes Lake. 7.3.5 states that: The Chiltern tunnel will pass under the River Misbourne in two places, one at Chalfont St Giles and one upstream of Shardeloes Lake where field surveys recorded a natural channel with marshy margins and wet woodland.These statements contain contradictions. 7.2.3 states that it was not possible to access all of the land areas including upstream of Shardeloes Lake yet 7.3.5 states that: ..... upstream of Shardeloes Lake where field surveys recorded a natural channel with marshy margins and wet woodland. There is no evidence surveys have been undertaken yet 7.3.5 suggests they have. Which is correct?
125. 11.2.4 The soundscape at Savay Lake, located to the north of Denham Green is shaped by traffic noise from local roads and the more distant North Orbital Road as well as activity around the lake, giving rise to daytime noise levels which typically range between 45 – 55dB.. The night time noise levels are generally 6dB lower than daytime at this location." This reading can’t be given as no landowner provided access.
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Appendix 2: Carbon Study
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Appendix 3: Waste Study
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Appendix 4: Noise
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Appendix 5 Landscape
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Appendix 6: Biodiversity
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Appendix 7: October 2013 Strategic Case Overview
The Strategic Case published in October 2013 underpins the Government’s case for HS2. HS2AA believes that the assumptions and data in this document are highly misleading, and taken together, lead to conclusions about the economic benefits of HS2 which do not stand scrutiny. Our key concerns are as follows:
New treatment of journey time savings How journey time savings are valued is central to the business case, accounting for two thirds of the benefits. It is also contentious. HS2AA argued that the previous approach taken was demonstrably outdated and unsupported by evidence in presuming all time spent on trains was wasted, yet Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd stridently defended it. A new approach has now been adopted, but it raises new concerns. The value of the business time savings previously stemmed from three main components: The hourly salary rate (including add-ons, NI etc) of business travellers – taken as £47.18/hr (1999- 2001 NTS data and indexed to 2010). This ignored the predicted rail growth which would clearly lead to a lower average salary figure (that had equated to about £70k/a). The extra working time from the journey time reduction – assumed by the Department for Transport at 100% of the journey time saving ie that no-one works on trains. This was despite Department for Transport research to the contrary. The proportion of business travel – assumed to be just under 30% of all HS2 travellers. No account was taken of future advances in communication technology, or recent trends. The hourly rate used to value savings is reduced by a third but this is too little for HS2 The new business case has reduced the unit values, ie how much each minute of journey time saved is worth to businesses, by about one third. The new hourly salary rate of rail business travelers is £31.96/hr (instead of £47.18/hr) with Department for Transport now using recent NTS data (for 2008- 2010). This reduction is in line with what HS2AA had estimated. It is now much nearer to the road drivers rate (of £27.06). But a further major expansion of business travel is predicted (see para 23 below) which implies that the new figure will be an overestimate for the much higher forecast levels. A 4-fold increase in business travel is predicted, so the new £31.96/hr will be too high for the forecast level of business travellers: it should be even nearer to the road drivers’ rate (£27.06/hr). The combination of the lower unit rate but increased amount of business travel accounts for the journey time benefits remaining static (at about £30bn), as Table 3 overleaf shows. The new hourly rate has been inflated in line with GDP (for 60 years from HS2 commencement to 2093). This assumption is inconsistent with how other earnings figures have been inflated in the analysis eg drivers’ salaries are capped at 2035. This puts the benefits and costs on an inconsistent basis. If the value of time growth were treated in the same way as earnings for cost purposes, the BCR reduces by 0.4 for Phase 1 and 0.5 for the Y (see Table 4 in Annex). This is material. That the time saved is already productive is ignored The October 2013 case does not explore the most controversial issue – that shorter journey times would not lead to extra productivity. People already work on trains, and, by the time HS2 is operating, trains will be as productive as offices, eliminating any productivity benefits from a faster journey. All that the new analysis82 says is that Department for Transport has concluded that the new value of time is suitable for use for all time savings for business travellers using trains, because the new value is in the range of other estimates used elsewhere. They simply claim that the new value of time is
82 ‘…we have undertaken a comprehensive review of the evidence on values which have been estimated using different academic approaches. This shows that the values we use for business travel time savings lie very comfortably in the middle of the range suggested by other research evidence. The Department has therefore concluded that these values are a suitable representation of businesses’ willingness-to-pay for quicker journeys and take appropriate account of the extent to which people work on trains. ‘ Strategic Case page 34 section 89
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equally good for reductions in productive time as unproductive time. This has to be nonsense. The absence of any proper discussion is most surprising given the fundamental change of approach that has now been adopted. The updated business travellers unit value (of £31.96/hr) while still being derived in exactly the same way as before (ie on a “cost savings” basis) is now relabeled as representing businesses’ “willingness to pay” for savings in the journey times of their employees – and, without offering any evidence to support it, applied equally to productive and unproductive time. For the new approach to be justified there would need to be evidence that businesses in valuing time savings were indifferent as to whether their employees are working or not working in the time saved. There is no such evidence and it is inconceivable that businesses would be willing to pay the same for a given journey time reduction during which their employees had spent their time productively, as one where their time was wasted. It is of serious concern that the new approach was not subject to consultation, with the draft that was consulted on entirely based on the previous approach. Furthermore, contrary to normal protocol, the new draft Tag Unit 3.5.6 was published on the same day as the new business case that employed it. The Department for Transport justify the new approach on the basis that the new business figure (£31.96/hr) is similar to those other countries use, and not by providing evidence that the figure is appropriate to time savings in the particular circumstance at issue. None of this addresses the clear research evidence that has been built up that people do work on trains – nor the certainty that businesses will now reflect this in how they value time savings. It is also clear from Webtag that the new empirical work83 that might support the new approach has still to be done. This is not a robust process for such an important change. How time is valued has a large impact on the BCR. If the time saved were 50% productive (as the December 2009 research had found) this reduces the BCR by about 0.3 for Phase 1 and 0.5 for the full Y. These figures increase to 0.7 and 0.9 respectively if time is treated as 100% productive. The table below sets out how these different factors impact the overall BCR for HS2 TABLE 4 Adjustments to October 2013 business case for varying factors - each valued independantly
£bn NPV No reliability saving Lower VoT growth 50% productive VoT 100% productive VoT 20% Finance provision 2011 pricesPhase 1 Full Y Phase 1 Full Y Phase 1 Full Y Phase 1 Full Y Phase 1 Full Y Benefits 21.2 52.3 17.5 39.7 17.9 42.2 12.0 26.8 23.8 57.7 (with WEI) (25.5) (65.5) (21.8) (53.0) (22.3) (55.5) (16.4) (40.1) (28.1) (71.0) Costs 29.9 62.6 29.9 62.6 29.9 62.6 29.9 62.6 34.2 70.7 Revenues 13.2 31.1 13.2 31.1 13.2 31.1 13.2 31.1 13.2 31.1 Subsidy 16.7 31.5 16.7 31.5 16.7 31.5 16.7 31.5 21 39.6 Benefits per £1 of subsidy BCR 1.3 1.7 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.3 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5 (with WEI) (1.5) (2.1) (1.3) (1.7) (1.3) (1.8) (1.0) (1.3) (1.3) (1.8) A further aspect of this new “willingness to pay” approach is that the new figure is also used to value other factors such as crowding, and for boarding/interchange penalties, that create inconvenience (and an aversion factor is used). Previously for business travellers these factors were valued using the lower time values (around £6/hr) that individuals rather than businesses have. No empirical evidence is offered to support the assumption that businesses value the aversion to crowding or boarding/interchanges so highly. It is inherently unlikely that businesses would value how their employees’ time is spent this way. For a business, the primary issue is the value of the time wasted, it is secondary exactly how it is wasted. This was the approach of the previous, and now abandoned, guidance. The impact of the increase in these factors can be seen in the table below. The increased benefit from reduced waiting times however is difficult to understand. The proportion of business travel on HS2 increases by over a third Since 1997 total UK business travel has been reducing (by 13% from 68bn passenger km to 59bn
83 Box 1, Page 6 of draft webtag 3.5.6, October 2013
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passenger km in 2011), despite significant growth in GDP, and a rising population. The increase in long distance rail business growth (from 3.2bn in 2002 to 4.8bn passenger km in 2011) has been due to modal shift. The modal shift forecasts for HS2 have however been steadily reducing (to just 5% of all passengers) The previous business case assumed about 28% of rail users on the HS2 corridor were business travellers. This was in line with the published evidence of rail usage84. The new business case re- estimates the proportion of current business travel to be 38% - with further increases when Phase 1 and 2 commence. This accounts for a 52% rise (over £14bn) in claimed business benefits85 and explains the large category 5 increases in Table 2. The data to support this has not been released. If city to city-only data were used to support figures like 64% for business travel between London and Sheffield, then adjustments need to be made to reflect en-route joiners and leavers, and those starting and finishing at different locations between which the city to city rail journey is only a part. Neither the National Travel Survey or the National Passenger Survey support the increased level of business travel. The latest NPS86 would suggest the original 28% figure is still correct (given the level of business travel on the classic services that is assumed to transfer across to HS2), and the evidence that the number of long distance trips is declining. Both the NTS and NPS have been available for all stages of HS2’s assessment. It is concerning that new estimates have been introduced for the first time in the fifth version of the business case – and without any supporting evidence. We were told that the previous business cases were all subject to extensive scrutiny and checking. Either there is something wrong with the new estimates, or the integrity of the evaluation process itself is questionable. It is therefore difficult to see how anyone can have confidence in the current estimates when they are so at odds with the previous basis, which had accorded with the published evidence. The new treatment of the value time is profoundly unsatisfactory. It neither properly discusses the issue of working on trains, nor provides the evidence to justify the new approach. It defies common sense – why would businesses be willing to pay as much to reduce already productive time as unproductive time? The proportion of business passengers using HS2 has very substantially increased (from about 28% to 38%), more than offsetting the reduction in unit values.
70.0 TABLE 3: Change in Transport User Benefits £57.7bn other 60.0 non rail £48.2bn boarding
other 50.0 non rail waiting time boarding waiting time access/egress walking access/egress indirect tax crowding 40.0 crowding other non rail reliability reliability boarding 30.0 waiting time access/egress
walking £bn 2011 2011 £bn prices NPV 20.0 crowding reliability journey time journey time journey time
10.0
0.0 indirect tax indirect tax
-10.0 August 2012 October 2013
Crowding benefits are artificial Crowding benefits reflect that HS2 would be less crowded than the ‘do minimum’ comparator. The value of this crowding benefit is increased (as Table 3 above shows) for two reasons:
84 The National Passenger Survey gives the proportion of business travellers on Virgin trains to be 29%, page 31 of the Virgin Trains Spring 2013 survey 85 Table 7 page 20. The Economic Case for HS2: Summary of Key Changes since August 2012; October 2013 86 National Passenger Survey, Spring 2013, weighted sample composition for all train companies
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o There are assumed to be substantially more rail business travellers o The de-crowding benefit is now assumed to be related to the much higher business value of time (£31.96/hr) rather than the individual’s one (at £6.04/hr), as was previously assumed The first point is questionable, as discussed above. The second point is also questionable as the Department for Transport offers no evidence to support this revaluation. The previous logic was that if productive time is lost a business would pay the cost of that time to them to gain it. If the time lost involves something the individual involved finds disagreeable this is a cost to the individual (not the business) which the traveller (not the business) would be willing to pay a sum to avoid. That there is less crowding than the ‘do minimum’ case is not a basis in any event for ascribing a benefit. The ‘do minimum’ case is artificial and has unachievable levels of crowding. HS2 should be compared against a realistic comparator – for example the 51m Optimised Alternative (51mOA) for uprating the WCML. Against this comparator HS2 has no crowding benefit, because 51mOA is no more crowded. The application of PDFHv5 which specifically affects crowding87 would be important. Best practice in cost benefit analysis involves comparing HS2 against the best alternative not an infeasible ‘do minimum’ case. The crowding benefits are not realistic. De-crowding benefits are attributed to HS2 when the real alternative (51m OA) is simply no more crowded. Demand forecasting HS2AA has pressed for the latest version of the rail forecast model (PDFHv5.0), which includes a lower estimate of long distance growth, to be used, and are pleased it has now been adopted. The key assumption however is still that demand will grow until it doubles (now forecast to be one year earlier in 2036). This cap remains unsupported by evidence. Given the inherent uncertainties in forcasting and because PDFH is a fixed elasticity model, the model should only be used to forecast for a set period into the future, for example 10 years. Population growth accounts for under one fifth of the growth if the number of domestic long distance trips per person remain constant (as they have for the last 18 years). An increase in demand – claimed to cancel out the impact of applying PDFHv5.0 – is attributed to lower growth in rail fares and higher forecasts in the costs of travel by other modes, particularly bus and coach. This is a bizarre claim given bus and coach are not even competing modes in the Planet Long Distance model that DfT and HS2 Ltd used for HS2. Savings from classic rail are greatly and implausibly increased HS2’s documentation88 now states that the optimism bias in the savings attributed to HS2 from cuts in services on the conventional rail network has been removed. This had previously caused the savings to be increased from £5.5bn to £7.7bn. HS2AA had raised this issue many times in correspondence and consultation responses. We are pleased it has now been accepted that to include optimism bias in savings “goes against its purpose”. We note however that the savings from cuts in current services have since the August 2012 now increased from £5.5bn to £8.3bn. In phase 1 alone the cuts have increased by 150% - with a near doubling in train km lost (from 8.6bn to 15.3bn train km). This major change from the earlier modelling calls into question the credibility of the analysis and the integrity of DfT’s and HS2 Ltd’s approach. This is particularly evident as greater re-use of freed-up capacity should reduce the classic rail savings, not increase them. Price competition There is a short discussion of price competition in the new business case89 However price competition is not modelled and the discussion does not address the full implications of less people travelling on HS2 and more on the classic services – which would be the effect of premium prices on HS2. The consequences of competition go far beyond revenue, which is the subject of the business case
87 Section 5, Summary of key changes to Economic Case since August 2012, Department for Transport 88 Paragraph 9.1.6 page 25 of the Economic case for HS2 89 Section 5.7 in ‘Economic Case for HS2’ October 2013
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discussion. It concludes that competition should not have a major effect on HS2’s value for money. But, in focusing on just revenue, it misses the serious impact of competition. With many passengers staying on classic services, service cuts are impractical, and re-use of freed up capacity impossible (as there isn’t any). It would leave unused capacity on HS2, ie much as it exists on HS1 today. Price competition exists now and its impacts can be seen and not just on HS1 (from competition with budget airlines) but between railways. Chiltern Railways and London Midland already provide cheaper services on the London/Birmingham routes, attracting custom from the faster Virgin intercity services. The evidence demonstrates that people do take price into account when deciding how to travel, and journey time and crowding are not the only considerations (as HS2’s business case assumes). Wider Economic Impacts (WEI) The October 2013 business case, which includes the report into economic benefits authored by KPMG, incorporates demonstrably unsubstantiated and contested results. The KPMG report has been much criticised by academic experts. The report itself even states “We recognise that this approach does not have a firm statistical foundation”. Experts in spatial economics agree90 that the KPMG work lacks statistical rigor and even contains methodological errors. Professor Henry Overman states the technical flaws cause the results to be overestimated by 6 to 8 times, and that ignores the fact KPMG use 2037 NPV values and not 2011 values. The sheer scale of their figure of £15bn per annum of economic benefit appears to equate to about £1000 worth of benefit to the economy for every extra journey that HS2 itself creates. It plainly lacks common sense to assume a business’s access to connectivity alone determines its location and prospects, and not for example access to skills. It is concerning that the work was not peer reviewed by the Analytical Challenge Panel before being published. In fact HS2 Ltd convened a new review body of which KPMG were members (although we understand not present during the review of their own work) but which nevertheless illustrates an inappropriate lack of independence. It is surprising that KPMG were engaged for the task. Work was previously done for the Northern Way91 (an organisation that supported HS2) on the KPMG approach (in which Lewis Atter of KPMG was involved) which withheld its endorsement for use in mainstream appraisal. The WEI (under the NATA assessment) are inevitably less reliable figures and this is recognised by Webtag92 It is concerning therefore that the main publicised document (the Strategic Case), and press releases, omitted the core standard Benefit Cost Ratio of the monetized elements excluding WEI in Table 1 (ie 1.4 for Phase; 1.8 for Y Network), and solely provided the higher less reliable BCR incl. WEI (at 1.7 and 2.3). It thus failed to be transparent to the public about the effects of WEI on the BCR. We understand that the Value for Money classifications of ‘good’, ‘poor’ etc are determined against the BCR excluding WEI. Applying these criteria to the BCR with WEI added is simply misleading. Financing costs There is still no transparency in how the cost of capital is treated. HS2 could not be a self-funded project, as it requires an increasing and very substantial subsidy (now over £30bn). No account is taken for the cost of capital, which is neither included as a financing cost (as with Network Rail’s capital projects), nor as an opportunity cost ie in terms of the forgone benefits of alternative uses.
90 Daniel Graham, Prof. of Statistical Modelling; Research Dir. of Railway & Transport Strategy Centre, Imperial; Henry Overman, Prof. of Economic Geography, LSE; John Tomaney, Prof. of Urban & Regional Planning, UCL 91 Review of Methodologies to Assess Transport’s Impacts on the size of the Economy, September 2010, by Institute for Transport Studies, Leeds University, James Laird and Peter Mackie. The Review examined prior KPMG and Spatial Economic Research Centre (SERC) work that used an alternative “GVA assessment” approach. The ITS review concluded:’ it remains clear that further work on methods and techniques will be needed beforeGVA assessment could become part of ‘mainstream’ appraisal.’ 92 Webtag 3.5.4 para 2.1.4. states that the Monetised Costs and Benefits exclude any wider economic impacts; although, wider economic impacts can be included in the Appraisal Summary Table.
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Appendix 7: Noise Further Information
1.1.1. HS2AA believes the treatment of noise in the ES is highly problematic given the ES fails to:
i. differentiate between average day-time and night-time noise levels; ii. provide baseline (existing) average noise levels; or iii. provide peak noise levels.
This makes it very difficult for consultees to fully comprehend the impact of noise, resulting in a skewed and misleading consultation. Overall the ES is unhelpfully presented with a number of different reports in various volumes, contradictory statements and important information is missing.
Standards in the ES Don’t Reflect Applicable World Heath Organisation Thresholds
1.1.2. HS2 Ltd use airborne noise limits of 65dB (daytime) and 55dB (nights) in the ES as trigger points to determine whether a noise impact should be deemed ‘significant’. These figures are referred to in the ES as the Significant Observed Adverse Effect Level (SOAEL) level. The noise level is calculated on an average basis over daytime (16hrs average) and night time (8hrs average). Under the Noise Insulation Regulations, insulation is offered to properties which will be impacted over this limit.
1.1.3. These thresholds are set at levels above what the World Health Organisation (WHO) considers acceptable other than as an interim target on existing railways. HS2 Ltd admit that the WHO guidelines state that the lowest point at which adverse health and quality of life effects from noise are first noticeable is at 50dB (daytime annoyance) and 40dB (night-time sleep disturbance). This is known as the Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level trigger point (LOAEL). But HS2 Ltd do not adopt these figures as their principal threshold. This suggests that HS2 Ltd should be designing to 50db, and not 65dB. A 15dB difference equates to three times as loud.
1.1.4. For daytime, the ES ignores the WHO guidelines that state “where reasonable and practicable” the 50dB daytime threshold level of annoyance should be the “maximum desirable sound level for a new development”.
1.1.5. For nights, the ES relies upon the WHO interim target of 55bB which is higher than the WHO base 40dB level for when the noise level is noticeable (ie their LOAEL point). The ES does not refer to the fact that:
(i) WHO specifically says that the higher interim target of 55dB is NOT for health and quality of life reasons but purely for feasibility reasons ie where 40dB is not practicable in the short term. In these circumstances 55dB can be temporarily considered by policy makers for “exceptional local situations” and as an “intermediate” target. (ii) The WHO guidelines emphasise that the 40db limit is needed to protect the public, especially vulnerable groups eg children, the ill, and the elderly.
1.1.6. While HS2 Ltd do use the 40db night thresholds when considering changes in noise levels (discussed below) it is inadequate that they do not have a design limit of 40dB for nights
1.1.7. This issue of lagging behind the WHO noise recommendation is likely to become more pronounced as the project is built and by the time it comes into operation is likely to
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considered ‘out of date’ from an environmental health point of view. The WHO have recently reiterated targets for new projects are interim. Their draft permanent target for comment showed a target level of 35dB – which was based on research which showed that even asleep the body continues to react to external environmental noise stimuli adversely with consequential impacts on sleep disturbance, irritability, increased blood pressure and Myocardial Infarction (heart attacks).
1.1.8. As well as identifying noise impacts above the significant levels (using the 65dB/55dB trigger points discussed above), HS2 Ltd are also required to “mitigate and minimise adverse effects on health and quality of life” where noise effects lie between the lowest point where impacts are felt (LOAEL) and the significant level. HS2 Ltd do this by measuring the change in noise levels due to HS2 and if these changes are large enough they are then treated as a significant effect if the LOAEL threshold has been exceeded.
1.1.9. While HS2 Ltd do use the WHO thresholds of 50dB (daytime) and 40db (nights) as the LOAEL in this context they consider the change in noise level from HS2 only if the additional noise is contributed solely by HS2 has exceeded the 50dB/40dB thresholds rather than the total noise exposure (of background noise plus HS2 train noise). This makes a material difference and means the extra noise that HS2 trains is bringing is being disregarded, even though the residents of that property will experience health and quality of life effects by exceeding the threshold. This is a material deficiency in how noise is being treated in the ES.
1.1.10. The ES also seemingly ignores the peak noise that disturbs sleep (LA max) threshold advised by the WHO for operational noise impacts. The WHO’s Night Noise Guidance reiterates earlier advice in the 1999 Community Noise Guidelines and in particular demonstrates how for high frequency train pass-bys, maximum ie peak noise, rather than average noise level correlates better with sleep disturbance:
“If the noise is not continuous, sleep disturbance correlates best with LAmax and effects have been observed at 45 dB or less. This is particularly true if the background level is low”
1.1.11. The WHO goes on to say that the 60 max pass-by noise level is the relevant outside level at which noise can disturb sleep (based on 45max inside the bedroom). The ES however makes no reference to these WHO guidelines on peak noise, despite a very extensive write up in Volume 5 on methodology.
1.1.12. HS2 Ltd do use peak noise for night but 85maxpass-by noise level is used as the threshold for night levels to count as “significant impact” (or 80max if more than 20 pass- bys). At that point households can get insulation (as applied for HS1). 85dBmax is 25dB higher than 60max level. This means that HS2 Ltd’s only use of peak levels represents a noise level that is 5 times louder than the WHO 60dB threshold.
1.1.13. The peak noise for each individual property (in Volume 5 Appendices) which acts as a receptor. The number of properties exceeding the 60max pass-by noise can hence be calculated.
1.1.14. Using 60max demonstrates that:
Many more properties are exposed to sleep disturbance than using a 85max threshold. This is a material deficiency in the process detailed in the ES 60max and 70max contours can be drawn on the maps (as well as the LAaverage basis that HS2 Ltd draw) and this should have been done for nights. Totals of properties affected should also have been provided.
UK/European Commission Guidance on Noise
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1.1.15. The National Planning Policy Framework specifically states that planning policies and decisions should aim to “identify and protect areas of tranquility which have remained relatively undisturbed by noise and are prized for their recreational and amenity value for this reason”. It is not clear from the ES how this responsibility will be discharged.
1.1.16. The European Commission updated its advice about the health effects of noise in January 2014. Its clear recommendations to Member States and should supersede outdated 1996 NIR guidelines93 It is not clear from the ES how HS2 Ltd will revise its position on noise following the publication of this document.
1.1.17. More broadly, legal limits relevant to residential or equivalent areas for new-build high speed rail are reported in a recent UIC study.94 The report shows it is common to have stricter limits for new railways, and that noise limits may vary by who is affected eg hospitals and residential areas have lower limits than cities. The table shows most other EU countries have lower limits that HS2 Ltd propose and nearer to the thresholds specified by the WHO. None of this information is presented or discussed in the ES, meaning consultees would simply have no way of knowing how the thresholds proposed by HS2 Ltd compared to relevant international standards.
1.1.18. The thresholds in the ES to compare these figures to would be the point where HS2 Ltd regard noise as being “significant”- 65db in daytime and 55db for night time.
EU Country Daytime Night-time dB limits Specific rail lines? Applicable category dB limits (22.00 to 06.00) (06.00 to 22.00) France 60 55 HSR. Non-high Residential speed 3dB less Germany 57/59 47/49 New & upgraded Hospital/residential areas Switzerland 50/55 40/45 All new. 5dB less Recovery/residential than existing areas Poland 50/55 45/50 No distinction Health,hospitals/resid ential Portugal 55 (24hr 45 No distinction Residential, hospital, average) school Netherlands* 55 (24hr as daytime New & upgraded Residential .(* diff calc average) basis) Sweden New & upgraded “Inside” limits are in (1) Outside: 55 (24hr 60 peak ie LAmax addition to the normal (2) Inside: average) 45 peak ie LAmax “outside” ones that all 30 (24hr (bedrooms) countries have average)
Treatment of Noise In The ES Documentation
1.1.19. The ES is vague in many of the issues relating to noise and vibration. For instance, it simply states that HS2 Ltd will mitigate the sonic boom coming out of the tunnels without stating how this is going to be done. Given the importance of this issue, this approach is highly disappointing. The Non-Technical Summary is typical in that it contains inconsistencies and statements that contradict each other in respect of noise.
1.1.20. References to noise occur 313 times in its 174 pages, indicating that the effects of noise are a significant consideration, as does the statement at Paragraph 7.11:
93 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/noise/health_effects.htm 94 UIC (International Union of Railways) “Exploring bearable noise limits and emission ceilings for railways. Part 1: National and European legislation and analysis of different noise limit systems”. 2012
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Operation of the railway has been assessed as likely to result in increases in external noise that are considered significant around a limited number of residential areas and non- residential buildings. These effects occur mainly within 300m of the route.
1.1.21. However the Non-Technical Summary concludes “Taking into account of modern high speed trains and resilient track designs, the project will not give rise to significant ground- borne noise or vibration effects on those living close to the railway.”
1.1.22. These conclusions are highly misleading and not supported in the detailed sections of the ES. For example the Community section for Euston states at Paragraph 8.1:
Despite the provision of noise mitigation, the amenity of approximately 50 to 60 residential properties … will be affected permanently by … noise arising from the operation of the project.
1.1.23. Likewise, in the sound noise and vibration section for South Ruislip and Ickenham states at Paragraph 8.6:
Noise from construction is likely to result in significant adverse effects on residential areas closest to the construction works at Cottesmore House in West Ruislip, The Greenway in Ickenham and Breakspear Road South in Harefield. Potential significant adverse effects are reported for the buildings at Ruislip Golf Centre and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.
1.1.24. Similarly, in the Central Chilterns document, Paragraph 8.9 states:
During operation, there will be residual permanent adverse effects on residential amenity for some properties in Hyde End from residential demolitions within the community and on Potter Row in South Heath due to noise from passing trains.
and:
Noise from construction is likely to result in significant adverse effects on residential areas closest to the construction works at South Heath along Sibleys Rise, Bayleys Hatch and Frith Hill.
1.1.25. In each of these documents no detail is provided about what the significant adverse effects may be – that is left to the equally self-contradictory HIA - but instead reference is made to generalised references to mitigation measures, e.g. bunds and noise insulation that lack detail.
1.1.26. HS2AA’s specific concerns with the way in which noise is treated in the ES are as follows:
(i) Not providing data that individual residents can use Despite all the noise detail in the appendices for receptor locations, unless a resident is aware of whether their property was measured the data cannot be used to challenge the results in the ES. Clearly some are errors. (ii) Downplaying of noise effects There are direct effects from construction noise and indirect effects from HGV traffic. Only the direct effects are tabulated and quantified in the ES sections dealing with noise. The indirect effects are mentioned but not tabulated with no reference to the number of properties affected. The ‘significant’ noise effects only are quantified which means only those at community impact level – isolated properties with significant effects are ignored (only the appendices to Volume 5 mention such properties). All non-significant noise impacts that still result in changes to human health and quality of life are not even mentioned in Volume 2 or Volume 5. While the core numbers are given the reader is left to try and understand it and interpret it – with no worked examples this is extremely difficult.
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(iii) Inconsistencies in ES documentation Partly no doubt because the results are reported in different volumes they get reported differently eg Volume 2 (CFA 9) says approximately 40 properties have significant noise effects from construction works while Volume 5 records exactly the same places but states its approximately 50, while adding up the properties from the detailed Appendix totals 53 – plus all the others with significant change but which are individual properties which get overlooked. The construction appendix (SV-003-009) appears riddled with errors in categorising properties as A/B/C according to the methodology using the figures baseline numbers from a different Appendix (SV-002-009). It is hard to find a property where it seems to have been classified correctly. There are many small errors eg missing bits from the legends describing the terms, endless very high level cross refs that give almost no help in trying to understand how something has been calculated; individual property results giving rise to impacts that are clearly wrong; individual properties when clearly neighbours will be affected too. With so many errors it is hard to have confidence in the results listed. (iv) No consideration of engineering trains
Another factor which requires greater assessment are the noise impact of engineering trains. The ES makes clear engineering trains will operate in HS2 during the night-time for a variety of purposes. These include locomotive hauled ballast trains (LHB), track geometry trains, diesel powered Multi Purpose Vehicles (MPV) and Speno Grinder vehicles. HS2 Ltd has claimed that the operation of the engineering trains will not result in an impact that is greater than the normal passenger trains yet residents near the North Downs tunnel claimed that they had a very different experience from HS1. They were often woken up during the night-time from excessive noise levels due to various operations from such engineering trains. Given these activities are temporary and sporadic they are difficult to quantity and it would appear HS2 Ltd has provided no consideration on how these issues could be dealt with.
(v) Defects in Noise Mapping
The contours on the maps provided in the ES show noise range from 50dB – 65dB. This range is so wide that no one can draw any meaningful conclusions. The noise level difference between 50dB and 65dB, as measured by sound pressure, represents a sixfold increase in noise levels. The maps in the ES should have been contoured at 3dB intervals to provide a reasonable level of certainty to local communities.
Noise forecasting in the ES have been carried out using recognised computer modelling. However it is virtually impossible for a reader to understand and comment on the input data for this modelling. The details are spread between different documents making it impossible to understand, and therefore comment on, the accuracy of the forecasting undertaken for noise.
To give just one example- it appears that the calculations have assumed 3 metre noise barriers along the scheme whereas the ES states that HS2 Ltd has assumed barriers are 2 metres high on viaducts and the bridge parapets are 1.8 metres high. Thus in some locations the calculated noise levels may be significantly under-estimated.
(vi) Ignoring “isolated” properties
The EIA Directive and the NPPF requires that the “the nature of the noise source, the sensitivity of the receptor and local context” should all be taken into account. But where there are “isolated” properties (eg single dwellings by themselves) these may suffer large ‘changes in noise’ and exceed the 50dB/40dB thresholds but this still not be regarded as a “significant impact”. (Though if any property reaches the absolute 65dB level they then get noise insulation). This is because HS2 Ltd require that there must be a “community” effect for it to be regarded as “significant noise impact”. The more remote the rural area the more this is likely and wholly unreasonable.
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Only acknowledging community-wide noise impacts are justified by HS2 Ltd on cost/ benefit reasons for mitigation for individual isolated single properties. But it cannot be reasonable from the individual property owners perspective and should be changed.
(vii) Use of Average Noise Calculations To Hide Extent of Negative Noise Impacts
HS2 Ltd understate the actual night noise impacts by not adjusting for the most sensitive periods The LA average figure that is calculated for night times, averages over the whole 8hr period. HS2 trains however are only operational for a few hours in that period and using the whole 8-hr period does not reflect the impact of HS2 on the most sensitive 3hr periods (between 11pm and midnight, and 5am to 7am). For example a 4dB increase over an 8 hr period would actually imply noise increases of 7/8dB (approaching twice as loud) in the times when the trains are operational eg (11-midnight and 5-7am in the morning). Using this criteria massively increases the number of properties that would be exposed to adverse effects. The same logic applies for using a 16hour LA average for day time effects. People have a right to expect a quieter evening, but the 16hr average does not differentiate between daytime and evening ie it goes up to 11pm at night. Construction Noise
1.1.27. HS2 Ltd justify using higher thresholds for construction noise on the basis they are temporary and are in line with the figures used by HS1, Thames Tunnel. HS2 Ltd state “significant” is 75dB (daytime) 65dB (evening) and 55dB (night time).
1.1.28. Given the long time that construction will take for HS2, it is unreasonable that residents should be subjected to years of significant noise impacts. HS2 Ltd however never quantify all the homes that will be affected by construction works – either when summarising the impacts, when drawing the contours, when mapping the results – they are only done for the operational impacts. It is unsatisfactory that a consultee must try to identify the position from the detailed Appendices of the raw data.
1.1.29. The impact of construction noise impacts are further misrepresented in the ES by the use of monthly averages. The methodology is described at Volume 5 (SV 001-000) paragraph 1.5.12) and in the Appendices for each CFA (eg SV-003-009). HS2AA are concerned that monthly averages: o Ignore significant effects that can occur over shorter periods; o Find no support from the relevant British Standard (BS 5228); o Underplay the scale of impact. For example if 70db was the figure for the first 15 days and 60db for rest of month then the log average over the month is 67dB ie 3db less. The worst values for the majority of the month is hidden; and o Is inconsistent with the noise insulation/temporary re-housing criteria. This uses a trigger of 10 days in any 15 day period.
Ground Borne Noise 1.1.30. Ground borne noise, such as that induced by trains in tunnels differs from airborne noise (e.g. noise entering through windows) in that it is low frequency and cannot be reduced by closing windows or going into a different room. It is also perceptible at night by transmission from the floor through the bed. Ground borne noise is of greatest concern when it is the dominant noise, and also when the source cannot be seen, as in the case of trains in a tunnel.
1.1.31. It is therefore a hugely important issue for those communities through which HS2 Ltd propose to tunnel through sections of the Phase 1 Route.
1.1.32. The ES sets a level of 35dBA Lsmax as the Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level (LOAEL) for ground borne noise.95 The ES further details the procedure for the prediction of ground-borne noise. Section 1.1.8 it states “calculation procedures for the proposed
95 Table 1, Page 10, Appendix SV-001-000:Annex A
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scheme are based upon the verified calculations methods that were developed for HS1”. It goes onto state that the validation for the prediction method for HS1 “showed that there is a degree of scatter between the predicted and measured values. The validation shows that 99% of measured values should fall within ±13.5dB of the predicted value with 68% falling within ±4.5 dB of the predicted value”.96
1.1.33. HS2AA have significant concerns on whether the classification adopted by HS2 Ltd is appropriate and whether reliance on the prediction method developed during the HS1 Project
Standards For Ground Borne Noise Adopted By HS2 Ltd Lack Rigour
1.1.34. These classifications have been used to justify the decision to adopt 35dBA Lsmax as the appropriate level for ground borne noise on the basis that they would represent a negligible impact. Such a classification should be compared to the range of limits and design specifications adopted for ground borne noise in other comparable projects. A number of these are summarized in the table below.
Country Level Lmax Comments Sweden 30dBA LpAsmax 30dBA LpAfmax as a goal for Malmo Citytunnel Norway 32dBA LpAfmax Tek 97 regulations Australia 35dBA LpAsmax During the night, 5dB higher during the day Austria 35dBA LpAsmax Good protection assuming no trains for at least 4 hours during the night Italy 35dBA LpAsmax USA 35dBA LpAsmax Assuming more than 70 events per day Ireland 35dBA LpAsmax Metro North and Dart Underground
1.1.35. In the UK, local Authorities like Camden, Tower Hamlets and Kensington and Chelsea have been required to make determinations about appropriate levels of ground borne noise in connection with projects in their administrative area.
1.1.36. When the Crossrail Bill was in committee in Parliament, there was opposition from Local Authorities to Crossrail’s design aim of 40 LpAsmax on the basis it was too high, and it was agreed that Crossrail would use reasonable endeavours to achieve 35dB LpAsmax. There were petitioners against the Crossrail Bill who lived close to the tunnel portals, and in response to their concerns, the House of Lords select committee asked the Promoter to ensure that floating slab track was installed in all tunnels which are routed under residential property at a depth of 15 metres or less. This was not linked to any numerical noise level.
1.1.37. For the Northern Line Extension, Transport for London is committed to a noise and vibration measure for new tracks of a maximum of 40 dB LAFmax and commits to use reasonable endeavours to meet a more stringent measure of 35 dB LpAfmax. This is a better standard than that of Crossrail by a margin equivalent to the difference between LpAsmax and LpAfmax.
1.1.38. The London Borough of Lambeth commissioned Ramboll (consulting engineering group) to provide an independent technical review for the Northern Line Extension to Battersea. In their response document dated 24 December 2012 they have stated that “Ramboll has experience of auralisation of groundborne noise from underground trains and has conducted subjective listening tests. The outcome of the audio demonstrations was that train noise levels of 40 dB LAmax,S were considered unacceptably high. Noise levels of 35 dB LAmax,S were considered acceptable, with 30 dB LAmax,S being a preferable target. Whilst these metrics are in terms of the slow time response these levels could be related
96 Volume 5 Appendix SV-001-000:Annex D1
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back to the fast response with an appropriate correction based on measurements of similar train passby noise…The design target is considered by Ramboll to be acceptable to most people but a lower design target closer to 30dB LAmax,S would be preferable, and Ramboll recommends that TfL should aim for this as a target.”
1.1.39. It should be noted that the advice in relation to suitable limits for ground-borne noise is mainly concerned with urban locations. The annoyance threshold of rural residents to ground-borne noise will be lower.
1.1.40. HS2AA believes therefore that the classification adopted on ground borne noise does not reflect recent practice or experience and the classification used by HS2 Ltd should be changed to reflect the experience of Crossrail and work done on the Northern Line Extension.
1.1.41. This issue has clearly been considered by HS2 Ltd- the minutes for HS2’s the first Acoustics Review Group meeting on Friday, 22nd June 2012, at key point 2 (Section 7.22) states that “Consultation response from local authorities on the proposed groundborne sound impact criteria suggested that they are “wholly inadequate” and the suggested that 25dB(A) should be used as a test of significance.” 97However, the Acoustics Review group “considered that there is no merit in the assertion that the suggested methodology would be inadequate or any credence to a significance criterion of 25dB(A) for residential property”.
1.1.42. No reason is given for this decision and it would appear to mean the classification by HS2 Ltd of which properties will have significant impacts will therefore inevitably be flawed. HS2AA therefore believe that a more appropriate figure would be to achieve a noise level for ground borne noise of achieve noise levels no greater than 25dB LpAsmax for rural areas and 30dB LpAsmax for urban areas.
Prediction Methodology
1.1.43. Whether or not the forecasts set out in the ES concerning ground borne noise impacts are correct is clearly an important consideration. It is generally accepted that predictions for ground borne noise can produce errors due to circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable, such as buried structures between the tunnel and the building above which would have the effect of increasing transmission of ground borne noise and vibration. In such circumstances it may not be possible or reasonably practicable to rectify the problem and noise in excess of predicted maximum will remain.
1.1.44. The ES makes clear HS2 Ltd have relied extensively on the prediction methodology for HS1. However it is clear this approach is not robust enough to ensure that the design criterion was not exceeded at any property. Ground borne noise level measurements of LpAsmax due to the passage of Eurostar trains were undertaken in selected properties above the North Downs Tunnel (HS1 network). The table below presents the results of the ground-born noise measurements in relation to the number of properties which fall under the various impact classifications in HS2’s Table 8.1.
97 http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/220612%20Acoustics%20Review%20Group%20Meeting%20%231%20- %20issue_0.pdf
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Impact Groundborne Number of Classifica Noise Level, Description properties tion LpAsmax dB
The passage of trains may be audible to particularly sensitive people during quiet periods of the day in rooms Negligible <35 16 with low background noise. Very unlikely to cause complaint
The passage of trains may be audible particularly during Low 35-39 8 quieter periods of the day such as evening or early morning. Level of annoyance is likely to be low with few complaints.
The passage of trains is likely to be audible regardless of the time of day. Levels likely to give rise to some annoyance Medium 40-44 6 during quieter periods of the day. There may be some complaints Noise from the passage of trains will tend to be prominent High 45-49 2 and give rise to annoyance regardless of time of day. It is likely that there will be some complaints.
During the passage of trains ground-borne noise will probably dominate above noise from other sources (road Very High >49 0 traffic etc). Considerable annoyance likely throughout the day and night. There may be some sleep disturbance. Complaints very likely
1.1.45. HS2AA therefore believe it is essential to verify the HS2 model with a numerical model using finite element analysis and any predicted accuracy errors should be included in the model.
1.1.46. HS2’s roadshow sound demonstrations simulated the impact from airborne noise (from the passage of HS2 trains) outdoors. It would have been useful to include an audio demonstration of HS2 train induced re-radiated noise inside habitable rooms with varying background noise levels for cases where the trains move in tunnels and the airborne component is not masking the re-radiated noise.
Amelioration measures
1.1.47. Amelioration of ground borne noise retrospectively is not straightforward and the following options will be open to HS2 Ltd to deal with this issue:
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(i) Separation of trains from properties
It is clearly not practical to move either the railtracks or the affected properties. Open or filled trenches have been used in isolated cases in order to reduce the incident vibration levels to buildings. However, due to the requirement of low frequency attenuation the required depth of the trench would be impractical in the HS2 project.
(ii) Vibration Isolate the Source
Several proposals for vibration isolation of the HS2 railtracks are discussed in the ES. Solutions offering the highest possible degree of vibration isolation must be considered at the outset as it will be impractical to incorporate these retrospectively. Therefore it is critical that accurate classification of likely ground borne impacts is provided by HS2 Ltd.
(iii) Vibration Isolate the properties
The most practical option for a detached building is to vibration isolate the building by placing it on vibration isolators. This is a proven technique, which is commonly adopted on new buildings. The degree of isolation will differ based on the chosen vibration isolator. However, the typical solutions reduce ground borne noise by around 15dB.
HS2AA is not aware however that an existing building has ever been vibration isolated retrospectively in the UK, even though examples do exist internationally. Even though it is technically possible to retrospectively isolate properties the cost would be high.
(iv) Compensation-Ground Borne Noise
In view of the number of properties potentially impacted by ground borne noise from tunnels, it is vital that appropriate compensation arrangements are provided as part of the Hybrid Bill. Such a process should be paid speedily, fairly and make it possible for the occupants of a property impacted in this way to relocate to a different property.
Monitoring of Impacts
1.1.48. During HS2’s third Acoustics Review Group meeting on Thursday, 13 December 2012 it was stated that “there is no HS1 post operation commitment to monitor impacts. The same is true for Crossrail. Both have overarching commitments to EMRs. Both have ‘comply by design’ commitments where the detailed design (and its acoustic assessment) are discussed and for agreement with key stakeholders particularly local authorities (EHPs).
HS2 Ltd explained that the EMR compliance regime for HS2 is a matter to be decided with Parliamentary Agents, including whether monitoring of impacts post operation will be included.”
1.1.49. HS2AA believe this decision was misguided and the Hybrid Bill must contain robust monitoring requirements with binding penalties for non-compliance.
1.1.50. HS2AA believe the approach to noise throughout the Hybrid Bill documentation reveals a cynical disregard for public health and an ill-concealed attempt to minimise the dangers and save money on noise mitigation.
1.1.51. There needs to be an assessment of the mitigation of micro-pressure waves at all tunnel portals. The groundborne noise and vibration effects in soft soils and chalky soil (the bow wave effect); how the model applies in each specific case; maintenance requirements; and whether use of floating track slab etc would be appropriate given noise and vibration impacts on local communities.
1.1.52. Given the extent to which night noise is underestimated reducing the speed of trains at night could improve the impacts on residents
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1.1.53. At a minimum HS2 Ltd must:
Provide accurate calculations on the total number of households that will be affected by noise along the whole route, and the costs then added in to the overall HS2 budget and included in the figures for the Benefit/Cost Ratio.
Include a commitment in the Hybrid Bill for ongoing noise monitoring with binding obligations on HS2 Ltd to introduce additional mitigation measures, including reductions in train speeds, in the event forecast noise levels are exceeded. Without such safeguards, HS2 Ltd will have no incentive to deliver a properly noise mitigated railway Further, as also discussed below other countries have lower limits than us. Using higher levels is not justified in the ES.
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