10 Key Considerations in Preparing for a Direct Listing
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Stock Exchange Listing Agreements As a Vehicle for Corporate Governance
1981] STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING AGREEMENTS AS A VEHICLE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTRODUCTION After nearly two hundred years of operation, stock exchanges remain largely unexplored as vehicles for regulating the internal affairs of corporations whose stocks they list for trading. Such regulation would seek to establish uniform, easily comprehensible standards of corporate conduct and to communicate them to every investor. The standards would be implemented by requiring that corporations conform to them as a prerequisite to having their securities traded on an exchange. As a result, investors could more accurately assess the value of corporate equity securities than they can today, and would be less likely to base an investment decision on a misunderstanding of their potential rights as shareholders.1 In evaluating the price of an equity security today, investors face fifty state corporation laws and as many state judicial systems, which together determine the bundle of rights the investor pur- chases. This problem stems from the principle that state law defines the rights and obligations a corporation owes to its share- holders.2 Investors who have neither the expertise to school them- selves in the nuances of state corporation law nor the resources to hire an attorney for that purpose 3 may choose "safer" invest- ments,4 or equally risky but more understandable investments,5 or I Stock exchanges currently regulate some aspects of internal corporate affairs, see, e.g., note 40 infra, but this Comment advocates greater supervisory powers. Furthermore, because of the relative obscurity of listing agreement provisions, investors do not generally appreciate the specifies of current exchange regulations. -
Why Are the First Day Returns of China's Ipos So High?
University of Wollongong Research Online Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 2005 Why Are the First Day Returns of China’s IPOs So High? S. Ma University of Wollongong, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers Part of the Business Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Ma, S.: Why Are the First Day Returns of China’s IPOs So High? 2005. https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/474 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: [email protected] Why Are the First Day Returns of China’s IPOs So High? Abstract We investigate the causes of the high first day returns of Chinese firms making an initial public offering (IPO) of A-shares from 1991 to 2003 on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our results show an average underpricing of 175.21 percent. We argue that the IPO underpricing is an interaction of ex-market underpricing and on-market overpricing. The high first day returns of China’s IPOs are most likely generated from on-market overpricing. Government intervention, market speculation, special ownership structure, strategy of proceeds maximization and risk concerns are the main drivers of the high first day returns. However, the high first day returns have decreased significantly in ecentr years. We explained this change by testing the risk composition hypothesis, the realignment of incentives hypothesis and the changing issuer objective hypothesis, which shows that the reduction in risk, senior managerial shares and seasoned offerings mitigate the first day returns. -
Initial Public Offerings
November 2017 Initial Public Offerings An Issuer’s Guide (US Edition) Contents INTRODUCTION 1 What Are the Potential Benefits of Conducting an IPO? 1 What Are the Potential Costs and Other Potential Downsides of Conducting an IPO? 1 Is Your Company Ready for an IPO? 2 GETTING READY 3 Are Changes Needed in the Company’s Capital Structure or Relationships with Its Key Stockholders or Other Related Parties? 3 What Is the Right Corporate Governance Structure for the Company Post-IPO? 5 Are the Company’s Existing Financial Statements Suitable? 6 Are the Company’s Pre-IPO Equity Awards Problematic? 6 How Should Investor Relations Be Handled? 7 Which Securities Exchange to List On? 8 OFFER STRUCTURE 9 Offer Size 9 Primary vs. Secondary Shares 9 Allocation—Institutional vs. Retail 9 KEY DOCUMENTS 11 Registration Statement 11 Form 8-A – Exchange Act Registration Statement 19 Underwriting Agreement 20 Lock-Up Agreements 21 Legal Opinions and Negative Assurance Letters 22 Comfort Letters 22 Engagement Letter with the Underwriters 23 KEY PARTIES 24 Issuer 24 Selling Stockholders 24 Management of the Issuer 24 Auditors 24 Underwriters 24 Legal Advisers 25 Other Parties 25 i Initial Public Offerings THE IPO PROCESS 26 Organizational or “Kick-Off” Meeting 26 The Due Diligence Review 26 Drafting Responsibility and Drafting Sessions 27 Filing with the SEC, FINRA, a Securities Exchange and the State Securities Commissions 27 SEC Review 29 Book-Building and Roadshow 30 Price Determination 30 Allocation and Settlement or Closing 31 Publicity Considerations -
YOLO Trading: Riding with the Herd During the Gamestop Episode
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Lyócsa, Štefan; Baumöhl, Eduard; Vŷrost, Tomáš Working Paper YOLO trading: Riding with the herd during the GameStop episode Suggested Citation: Lyócsa, Štefan; Baumöhl, Eduard; Vŷrost, Tomáš (2021) : YOLO trading: Riding with the herd during the GameStop episode, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230679 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights -
Petroshale Announces Closing of Previously Announced Rights
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO U.S. NEWSWIRE SERVICES OR FOR RELEASE, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION OR DISSEMINATION DIRECTLY, OR INDIRECTLY, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN OR INTO THE UNITED STATES PETROSHALE ANNOUNCES CLOSING OF PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED RIGHTS OFFERING, PRIVATE PLACEMENT AND RECAPITALIZATION TRANSACTION CALGARY, ALBERTA, April 8, 2021 – PetroShale Inc. ("PetroShale" or the "Company") (TSXV: PSH, OTCQB: PSHIF) is pleased to announce the closing of its previously announced recapitalization transaction (the "Transaction"), which included a private placement of additional equity (the "Private Placement"), a rights offering (the "Rights Offering") and the exchange of all outstanding Preferred Shares (which had been issued by the Company’s wholly owned subsidiary) for common shares (the "Preferred Share Exchange"). The Rights Offering, combined with the concurrent Private Placement to the Company's two largest shareholders as described more fully below, raised total aggregate gross proceeds of $30 million. On March 4, 2021, the Company announced the Transaction which was designed to significantly improve the Company’s financial flexibility and sustainability. The Company anticipates the Transaction will provide the following benefits to the Company: • A comprehensive recapitalization of the Company that will improve and simplify the Company's balance sheet and enhance our business prospects going forward, for the benefit of all stakeholders. Total proceeds of $30 million raised through the Rights Offering and Private Placement will be used to reduce outstanding borrowings under the Company's senior secured credit facility (the "Credit Facility"). The current indebtedness under the Credit Facility will be reduced to approximately US$151.0 million and the current liquidation preference of the Preferred Shares will be eliminated with the Preferred Share Exchange, for a 42% aggregate reduction in financial obligations. -
Frequently Asked Questions About the 20% Rule and Non-Registered Securities Offerings
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 20% RULE AND NON-REGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS issuance, equals or exceeds 20% of the voting power understanding the 20% Rule outstanding before the issuance of such stock; or (2) the number of shares of common stock to be issued is, or will be upon issuance, equal to or in excess What is the 20% rule? of 20% of the number of shares of common stock The “20% rule,” as it is often referred to, is a corporate outstanding before the transaction. “Voting power governance requirement applicable to companies listed outstanding” refers to the aggregate number of on nasdaq, the nYSe or the nYSe American LLC votes that may be cast by holders of those securities (“nYSe American”) (collectively, the “exchanges”). outstanding that entitle the holders thereof to vote each exchange has specific requirements applicable generally on all matters submitted to the issuer’s to listed companies to receive shareholder approval securityholders for a vote. before they can issue 20% or more of their outstanding common stock or voting power in a “private offering.” However, under nYSe Rule 312.03(c), the situations The exchanges also require shareholder approval in in which shareholder approval will not be required connection with certain other transactions. Generally: include: (1) any public offering for cash, or (2) any issuance involving a “bona fide private financing,1” if • Nasdaq Rule 5635(d) requires shareholder approval such private financing involves a sale of: (a) common for transactions, other than “public offerings,” -
Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity: Cracking Glass-Steagall, 27 Cath
Catholic University Law Review Volume 27 Issue 4 Summer 1978 Article 5 1978 Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity: Cracking Glass- Steagall Melanie L. Fein Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Melanie L. Fein, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity: Cracking Glass-Steagall, 27 Cath. U. L. Rev. 743 (1978). Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss4/5 This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTES COMMERCIAL BANK PRIVATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITY: CRACKING GLASS-STEAGALL The American financial industry' is undergoing a metamorphosis of major proportions. Financial institutions of different molds are shedding their traditional roles and diversifying their services in response to chang- ing economic conditions and market demands. 2 Growing competition be- tween varied types of financial institutions is eroding the artificial barriers which have separated specialized sectors of financial markets. 3 The spur 1. The term "financial industry" is used in this article in its broadest sense, encompass- ing all institutions which serve the financial needs of American consumers, businesses, and governments. These institutions include commercial banks, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, credit unions, trust companies, insurance companies, investment companies, and securities underwriters, brokers, and dealers. 2. See, e.g., Ten Local Credit Unions Start Electronic Banking, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1977, § B, at 3, col. 2; Credit Unions to Offer VISA Cards, Wash. -
Private Placements June 2021
® Private Placements June 2021 ASSET MANAGEMENT | STRATEGY SHEET A private placement is a security that is not registered with the SEC for public distribution and is sold by the issuing company directly to accredited institutional investors. Issuers of private placements range from publicly traded, multi-national, “household name” corporations to smaller, privately-owned, niche companies. For the 1H21, approximately $35 billion of debt was placed in the traditional private placement market in 110 transactions with an average deal size of roughly $315 MM. Average maturity of deals was 10.7 years with a credit quality mix of 35% NAIC- 1 (A- or higher) and 65% NAIC-2 (BBB- to BBB+). Investment Rationale Team Private Placement Volume Cynthia Beaulieu Portfolio Manager $74.6 $73.7 $74.8 $75.1 29 years of experience $54.2 $54.7 $51.3 $51.4 $51.2 Sheilah Gibson $46.8 Associate General Counsel $41.0 $34.5 22 years of experience $30.1 $Billions John Petchler, CFA Private Placement Analyst 41 years of experience 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 YTD YTD 2020 2021 Sam O. Otchere Private Placement Analyst Prepared by Conning, Inc. Source: ©2019-2021, ICE Data Indices, LLC (“ICE DATA”), is used with permission. ICE DATA, ITS AFFILIATES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE THIRD-PARTY SUPPLIERS DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS, EXPRESS AND/OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING ANY 25 years of experience WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, INCLUDING THE INDICES, INDEX DATA AND ANY DATA INCLUDED IN, RELATED TO, OR DERIVED THEREFROM. -
NYSE Listed Company Compliance Guidance Letter
NYSE Regulation 11 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 TO: NYSE Listed Company Executives FROM: NYSE Regulation RE: Listed Company Compliance Guidance for NYSE Issuers DATE: January 14, 2021 Each year, the staff of NYSE Regulation prepares a guidance memo for important rules and policies applicable to companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE” or the “Exchange”). A complete text of Exchange rules can be found online in the NYSE Listed Company Manual (“Listed Company Manual”). We have included items that are new below, with important reminders in the sections that follow. Please note that this memo is applicable to all listed issuers, with any rule or policy differences for Domestic vs. Foreign Private Issuers (“FPIs”) identified within. We encourage you to provide a copy of this memo to appropriate executives and outside advisers who handle matters related to your listing on the NYSE. We have also provided department contact information below. Please do not hesitate to contact the staff with any question or concern you may have. What’s New In response to the market and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the NYSE filed with the SEC temporary rules that provided relief to listed companies from certain quantitative and shareholder approval rules in the Listed Company Manual, most of which expired on July 1, 2020. However, the relief pertaining to shareholder approval remains in effect through March 31, 2021. The shareholder approval relief generally waives related party limitations and bona fide private financing requirements in Listed Company Manual Section 312.03 for market price transactions. -
Initial Public Offering Allocations
Initial Public Offering Allocations by Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme A dissertation submitted to BI Norwegian Business School for the degree of PhD PhD specialization: Financial Economics Series of Dissertations 9/2011 BI Norwegian Business School Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme Initial Public Offering Allocations © Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme 2011 Series of Dissertations 9/2011 ISBN: 978-82-8247-029-2 ISSN: 1502-2099 BI Norwegian Business School N-0442 Oslo Phone: +47 4641 0000 www.bi.no Printing: Nordberg Trykk The dissertation may be downloaded or ordered from our website www.bi.no/en/Research/Research-Publications/ Abstract Stock exchanges have rules on the minimum equity level and the minimum number of shareholders that are required to list publicly. Most private companies that want to list publicly must issue equity to be able to meet these minimum requirements. Most companies that list on the Oslo stock exchange (OSE) are restricted to selling shares in an IPO to a large group of dispersed investors or in a negotiated private placement to a small group of specialized investors. Initial equity offerings have high expected returns and this makes them very popular investments. Ritter (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) argue that there are three views on how shares are allocated in the IPO setting. First, is the academic view based on Benveniste and Spindt (1989). In this view investment banks allocate IPO shares to informed investors in return for true valuation and demand information. Informed investors are allocated shares because they help to price the issue. Second, is the pitchbook view where investment banks allocate shares to institutional investors that are likely to hold shares in the long run. -
Alternative Equity Offerings for Volatile Markets
Alternative Equity Offerings for Volatile Markets Summary overview of certain alternative equity offering types that public companies may consider in addressing their funding and liquidity needs in light of volatile markets. For additional information, read our alert here. Equity Offering Type Key Advantages Potential Limitations At-the-Market (ATM) • Less impact on stock price and • Not ideal for large capital raises lower agent commissions as Offering Program • Requires quarterly “bring- compared to underwritten downs” of diligence, comfort offerings letters and opinions to keep • Sales made quickly and A TM ac t ive discretely into market over time • No sales when issuer is in • Management or investor possession of material non- presentations not required public information, except pursuant to a 10b5-1 program Private Investment in • Confidential until signing of • Limited to private placement Public Equity (PIPE) transaction transactions • Deal terms negotiated directly • Securities are not immediately between issuer and investors, registered and subject to resale providing structuring flexibility restrictions • Does not require effective • Stock exchange shareholder registration statement at time of approval rules potentially limit transaction offering size Registered Direct • Confidential until signing of • Not widely marketed Offering (RDO) transaction • Stock exchange shareholder • Deal terms negotiated directly approval rules potentially limit between issuer and investors, offering size providing greater flexibility than • Small -
The Market Reaction to Cross-Listings: Does the Destination Market Matter?
ARTICLE IN PRESS Journal of Banking & Finance xxx (2009) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Banking & Finance journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf The market reaction to cross-listings: Does the destination market matter? Peter Roosenboom, Mathijs A. van Dijk * Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands article info abstract Article history: This paper examines (i) whether market reactions to cross-listings differ across destination markets and Received 26 November 2008 (ii) to what extent the following explanations for value creation around cross-listings can account for dif- Accepted 17 April 2009 ferences in market reactions across cross-listings on various destination markets: overcoming market Available online xxxx segmentation, increased market liquidity, improved information disclosure, and better investor protec- tion (‘‘bonding”). We analyze 526 cross-listings from 44 different countries on eight major stock JEL classification: exchanges and document significant announcement returns of 1.3% on average for cross-listings on US F30 exchanges, 1.1% on London Stock Exchange, 0.6% on exchanges in continental Europe, and 0.5% (not sig- G14 nificant) on Tokyo Stock Exchange. We find evidence consistent with improved disclosure and bonding G15 creating value for cross-listings on US exchanges, while overcoming segmentation and bonding are asso- Keywords: ciated with higher announcement returns on the London Stock Exchange. The evidence is mixed for con- Cross-listings tinental European exchanges and for Tokyo. Our results highlight the role of the destination market in Capital market integration value creation around cross-listings. Investor protection Ó 2009 Elsevier B.V.