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Plato's Moral Theory Journal ofmedical ethics, 1985, 11, 88-91 J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/jme.11.2.88 on 1 June 1985. Downloaded from Moral theories Plato's moral theory Mary Margaret Mackenzie Fellow in Classics, New Hall, Cambridge Editor's note maximise my goods, and be happy. However, Plato comes to see that a naturalist This paper introduces a new series on important theories in approach to evaluative qualities, and to relations, moral philosophy. The series is primarily aimed at non- causes difficulties. For no sensible (perceivable philosophers with an interest in ethics. through the senses) object has a particular value any more than - at a different time, for a different person, Plato's ethics lie at the centre of his philosophy. His in a different relation - it has its opposite. That values approach to 'how best to live' must deal with questions vary subjectively is taken to show that the phenomena of what there is in the world where we live - and how themselves embody an objective contradiction (7). To we talk, think or know about it. So to grasp his moral be able to assess them, we must understand them; but theory we need to understand how it is integrated with since they are contradictory, they are cognitively the enterprise as a whole. Moreover, since he was a unreliable. Plato concludes, therefore, that over and dialectician par excellence we must discover what is his above sensible objects there exist entities that give method of doing philosophy with us and how he will absolute understanding of values. These are the enveigle us into philosophical inquiry - the answer to Forms, cognitively reliable, pure instantiations, or these questions may overturn our view of his moral absolutes, of value. They provide us with the theory. knowledge of what is best. All talk of Plato must take a preliminary tilt at the Furthermore, when we use a value term twice, on http://jme.bmj.com/ windmill - which of the ideas we encounter in the separate occasions, we must have the same meaning in Platonic dialogues belong to Plato himself, and which mind. From an early thesis that terms can have only must be attributed to his master Socrates? There is no one meaning, Plato develops the view that for any short answer to the academic 'Socratic question'. For given term, there will be just one Form representing it now, suffice it to register that there is development (8). But that move, which derives, after all, some from the earlier works, such as the Protagoras (1), to plausibility from our linguistic behaviour, excludes the rich theory ofthe 'middle period', from the Gorgias tautologically the possibility that words might be (2) to the Symposium (3) and Republic (4). Plato's ambiguous. So there can be no disjunction between the on October 1, 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. philosophy is organic, subject to growth and decay; we aesthetic term 'beautiful' and the moral term 'noble', may look for the flower of his moral theory in the inasmuch as they are both rendered by the Greek kalos; Republic, but must search for its roots in the early nor can there be a structured complexity of meaning - period. 'just' must have a single sense. Consequently, just so To know 'how best to live' we must know what is long as two objects are given the same value predicate 'best'. In contrast to the subjectivist or the relativist, we could - given the right skill - judge between them. Plato supposed that evaluative qualities really belong What is more, one value may be explained in terms of to the object that is valued. Thus we call something another (9), so that we may decide between objects that 'beautiful' not because we are pleased by it, but instantiate different evaluative qualities - 'useful', because it genuinely has, independent of being 'pleasant' and 'fine'. appreciated, the quality of beauty (5). Values are So values are objective, naturally instantiated in the natural and objective. From his early days, Plato physical world; and we can really decide what is best. supposes therefore that what is valuable can be However, any valued object in the physical world is calculated and assessed in a decisive way. Prima facie, ipso facto valueless - at some time, from some I could judge whether x is more pleasant than y just as perspective etc. So to achieve what is most valuable, we I do judge that a is bigger than b. All I need (6) is the should aspire to reach the Form, which contains no right measuring skill - then, with its help, I can such contradictions (10). This pursuit is achieved by words intellectual means: by reasoning we rise above the Key dubious values of the imperfect world to grasp the Ethics; moral theories; Plato. Form ofthe beautiful. Intellect and desire join together Moral theories 89J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/jme.11.2.88 on 1 June 1985. Downloaded from in the pursuit of happiness. willingly'. By the middle period however, a challenge That individuals always pursue happiness is taken as is issued to this consequentialist account of morality - obviously true. Equally obviously, however, we are the challenge of luck, (12). Surely the slings and arrows often mistaken about where our happiness lies. None of fortune may sometimes detach the proper the less, says Plato (2) what we really desire is consequences from virtue? Some tyrants may get happiness; anything that we appear to desire which goods, some heroes perish in misery - all by luck. In turns out badly for us is not the object of our real the face of that possibility, how may the connection desire, we did not really want it. Thus desire is for true between virtue and happiness be maintained? happiness; and any falling short of that goal may be Plato's answer lies in his account of the virtuous explained in terms of our having made a mistake about soul. The soul is a complex entity. Reflection will show our objectives. So a desire for x only exists if x is that the best state of a complex is harmony. That can genuinely valuable. Now we, subjectivists that we are, only occur in the soul when each part has and does its tend to view a desire as genuine just when it occurs, own - when reason rules and the other parts are irrespective of its object, and to regard the desire as an subdued. Thus, as the health of the body, intrinsically independent product of the psyche of the individual. desirable, is physical order, so the health of the soul is Plato, on the other hand, asks us to believe that the psychic harmony - and that is happiness. However, desires we think, we have, but which turn out to be order in the soul is exactly like order in the State - and sawdust and ashes, are not desires at all. All failure, it is justice. The harmonious soul, then, is the just then, will run counter to our real desire for happiness (virtuous) soul, where reason rules. Such an internal - all failure will be involuntary. disposition is happiness, which is immune from the This view looks too simple. It ignores the possibility invasions of luck. of psychological conflict, and denies weakness of the This analysis is manifestly vulnerable, not least will - knowing the better and doing the worse. As Plato because of its persistent use of analogy, and its moves away from the Socratic influence he develops a insistence on the single meaning ofterms (justice in the richer view of our psychological make-up than this State = justice in the soul). Instead of an account of (11). The soul (the person) has three parts: reason, behaviour, Plato has presented us with an account of a spirit (the source of moral indignation) and appetite. state, a disposition of the soul. In doing so, he lays Given such a complex, appetite, (for example) may himself open to the criticism that his theory is not desire x, while reason tells us to avoid x - and that is about morality at all - even if he has explained psychological conflict. So Plato seems to retract his happiness, his 'justice' is nothing to do with the justice earlier position. However, the tripartite analysis still that we know in the world of actions. Similarly, his requires that cases where appetite overcomes the conception ofhappiness bears very little relation to our prudence of reason, and bad results follow, count as notions, consequentialist as they are. His account is sohttp://jme.bmj.com/ ignorance, the failure of reason. He who fails to get heavily intellectualist that it even betrays his own good results, therefore, is still ignorant, and so acting complex psychology and offers us instead an arid involuntarily. Reliable success, on the other hand, only intellectualist ideal, which bears no relation to us, the occurs once the lower elements of the soul are subdued individuals he started with. In short, Plato's theory of and reason is in control. virtue and happiness is beside the point. Between the Some formal continuity, then, subsists between the crude calculi ofhis early consequentialism and the rara early thesis that knowledge (skill) brings success, and avis of the philosopher in the Republic a satisfying on October 1, 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. the Republic's analysis of the soul. In Plato's view of theory of morality has slipped between his fingers. virtue, too, there is a superficial uniformity. In the Yet Plato's theory does remain true to many of our early dialogues he claims that the virtues - wisdom, central intuitions about justice, justice as a temperance, justice, piety and courage - are a unity, distributive, static matter (13).
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