A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EDUCATION IN : THE CASE OF U.P.

by

Geeta Gandhi Kingdon Mohd. Muzammil

August 2000

Abstract

The paper explores the political economy factors that influenced the evolution of educational institutions and shaped the legislation that now governs the education sector in UP. The study focuses on the extent of and reasons for teachers’ participation in politics, the evolution and activities of their unions, the size of their representation in the state legislature, and the link between these and other factors such as the enactment of particular education Acts in UP, teacher salaries and appointments, and the extent of centralisation in the management of schools. It attempts to draw out the implications for the functioning of schools.

Keywords: education, political economy, teacher unions, elections, centralisation

Institutional affiliation of authors: Dr. Geeta Kingdon: Research Officer, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UQ, . Tel: 00 44 1865 271065, email: [email protected] Dr. Mohd. Muzammil: Reader, Economics Department, Lucknow University, Lucknow 226 007, UP, India. Tel: 0522 419837.

Acknowledgements: We would like to thank, without implicating in the final product, Jean Drèze for commenting on parts of the work reported in this paper. The research was partially funded by the India office of the UK government’s Department for International Development and partially by a Wellcome Trust grant number 053660.

1 A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EDUCATION IN INDIA: THE CASE OF U.P.

by

Geeta Gandhi Kingdon Mohd. Muzammil

August 2000

1. Introduction

There is now an impressive array of evidence linking education with both economic growth and social progress. This is an important reason to focus on education in India. More than half a century after independence, and despite the large-scale expansion of educational institutions over the past 50 years, the country’s educational achievements leave much to be desired. As seen in Table 1, the mean years of schooling in the population aged 25 years or more was a mere 2.4 years; the literacy rate among 15-19 year olds in 1991 was only 66% and among those who are 7 years old and above, 52%; and only 16% of females and 44% of males in the age 20 years and above had completed 8 years of schooling. The learning achievements of Indian children are very poor in inter-country comparisons according to the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA)1.

Table 1 Educational Achievements in India, 1991

Female Male Persons Literacy rate (%) age 7+ 39 64 52 age 15-19 55 75 66 Mean years of schooling (age 25+) 1.2 3.5 2.4 Median years of schooling (age 6+) 0.0 4.8 2.5 Proportion of adults (age 20+) with completed 8 16 44 30 years of education (%)

Sources: Census of India, 1991; Table 3.9, National Family Health Survey 1992-93 (International Institute for Population Sciences, 1995, Mumbai); Human Development Report 1994 (United Nations Development Programme, New York), p147.

1 International comparison of achievement among school-going 14 year olds across 25 high and low-income countries, using IEA data collected in early 1970s, showed that the mean science test score of Indian students was the second lowest. Iran was behind India by a small margin. Mean scores of students in Bolivia, Thailand, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay were all higher than those of Indian students; the mean score of Japanese students was twice as high as that of Indian students. The results were similar in (own language) reading comprehension: median reading score was 26 points, Chile’s mean was 14 points, Iran’s 8 points and India’s the lowest at 5 points (Kingdon, 1994, p8).

2

There has been a great deal of analysis, recently, of the causes of India’s poor educational achievements. Varied reasons have put forward such as (i) lack of parental interest in the education of children either because uneducated parents do not value education (Times of India, 1997) or because the economic returns to education are too low (Pradhan and Subramaniam, 1999); (ii) poverty and the consequent need for child labour (Campaign Against Child Labour, 1998); (iii) poor quality of supply, in terms of impoverished school infrastructure and lack of teachers2; (iv) the high private cost of education (Tilak, 1996). In contrast to these single-focus explanations, the PROBE Report (the Probe Team, 1999) presents what seems to be the first comprehensive and integrated analysis of the causes of poor educational attainments of Indian children. Based on PROBE data, Drèze and Kingdon’s quantitative analysis (2000) supports a ‘pluralist’ view of the causes of educational deprivation in rural India which gives due recognition to several key demand- and supply-side determinants of school participation: household resources, parental motivation, the returns to child labour, and school quality. The Probe Team (1999) also acknowledged the importance of other factors such as the burden of a dull and over-stretching curriculum and the centrality of more ‘macro’ factors such as teacher accountability, the extent of centralisation in the management of schools, and the effect of teacher politics on the functioning of schools in India.

According to Drèze and Gazdar (1997, p76-77), “the most striking weakness of the schooling system in rural (UP) is not so much the deficiency of physical infrastructure as the poor functioning of the existing facilities. The specific problem of endemic teacher absenteeism and shirking, which emerged again and again in the course of our investigation, plays a central part in that failure3. This is by far the most important issue of education policy in Uttar Pradesh today”.

The PROBE Report (1999, p63) recognises this and links teacher absenteeism and shirking partly to the disempowering environment in which the teachers have to work in India: being “trapped in a ramshackle village school, surrounded by disgruntled parents, irregular pupils and over-bearing inspectors, [teachers] can hardly be expected to work with enthusiasm”. However, it also says “yet, the deterioration of teaching standards has gone much too far to be explained by the disempowerment factor alone”. It goes on to link teacher absenteeism and shirking to the lack of monitoring and local accountability of teachers4. This,

2 The appalling state of rural primary schools has been well documented by many authors. To cite a recent example, the Probe Team (1999) discovered that in a sample survey of villages in rural north India, only 41% of all primary schools had drinking water; only 40% had non-leaking roofs; only 25% had at least two teachers, two all-weather class rooms and some teaching aids; 33% of primary schools had a single teacher present on the day of the survey; the pupil-teacher ratio was 50, and the proportion of teachers doing multi -grade teaching was 73%. 3 Our observations in rural UP that a good proportion of teachers own some side business apart from their school teaching work, such as bookshops, general stores and even small industries in towns and in the countryside. Sometimes they also work as contractors for the abundant public works, particularly in rural areas. The Probe Report has also mentioned, “... during the selection of investigators for the PROBE survey, no less than three goverment primary school teachers offered their services, in the middle of the school year, for three months at a stretch” (Probe Team, 1999, page 63). This shows that teachers welcome work (other than teaching) concurrently with their school job, suggesting negligence towards their teaching job. Many authors who have done field surveys of schools in India have documented the chronic problem of teacher absenteeism. 4 The PROBE Report observed that during a school survey in 242 villages across 5 north Indian states, in a large number of cases “there was no teaching activity at the time of the investigators’ visit. It is significant that this pattern occured even in cases where the school infrastructure (in terms of number of class rooms, teaching aids and even teacher-pupil ratio) was relatively good. Inactive teachers were found engaged in a variety of

3 in turn, has its roots in teachers’ own demands for a centralised education system, as discussed later in this volume.

Educational development in UP has been deeply affected by political considerations. Gould (1972) observed that “political penetration of the education system has gone far in Uttar Pradesh. In this respect the province is probably not unique in India, but it stands out when compared with many others” (p94). Another reason for suggesting that political penetration in education is greater in UP than in most other states is that UP is among only 4 states in India that still has a Legislative Council – the upper chamber of the state parliament – at which body teachers have guaranteed representation. Gould suggests that the high degree of political penetration helps account for certain patterns of educational development in the state which are otherwise difficult to understand. Political influence has been of two types: one, political influence from above which has been instrumental in shaping the education system; and two, the political lobbying and pressure groups from within the system originating at the local levels (and uniting at the State level) in the form of organisations of teachers. Education related legislation in UP has often been framed under immense lobbying pressure from teachers, particularly at the primary and secondary levels of education. Teachers in school (as opposed to higher) education have been instrumental in determining the local base of political parties in the State.

The influence of teachers’ organisations in the primary and secondary education sectors was particularly pronounced during the 1960s and early 1970s and again in the early and late 1980s. This is because during these periods, teacher organisations were very active in pushing ahead the agenda of their demands which were ultimately, almost in total, conceded by the State government. The frequent strikes and ‘agitations’ of the teacher unions at various levels of education in UP have been the main reason behind the effective influence of teachers on the educational law-making process in the state. The number of teacher representatives in both the Houses of the State Legislature is also substantial, enabling teacher politicians to exercise political influence in the education sector. The number of teachers in primary education is so large in the State and their presence so significant at the local level in villages and towns that no political party in a democratic set up has the courage to ignore them.

There are at least two occasions when primary school teachers are reckoned on with great confidence by the state government: (i) the population census every decade in India is done almost entirely by the primary school teachers, and (ii) the general elections (Parliamentary, Assembly and Local Body) all are conducted by the team of primary school teachers. This reliance on state-paid primary teachers is necessary because censuses and elections in India are gigantic tasks that cannot be performed satisfactorily without employing a very large number of geographically-spread, literate, and numerate personnel. The teacher pastimes such as sipping tea, reading comics, or eating peanuts, when they were not just sitting idle. Generally speaking, teaching activity has been reduced to a minimum in terms of both time and effort. And this pattern is not confined to a minority of irresponsible teachers - it has become a way of life in the profession” (PROBE Report, 1999, p 63, emphasis added). Several types of unethical practices are prevalent among teachers which may be linked to their lack of local accountability, such as being absent from school without taking leave; coming late to school and leaving early; obliging their students to come to their homes for private coaching/tuitions in order to be able to earn extra money over and above their teaching salaries; asking students for extra money (other than regular fee) or for in-kind gifts, in return for favours to them in tests/exams or in selection to college teams etc.; bribing authorities to achieve particular postings and transfers; not assuming any teaching load on the pretext of being a teacher leader (teacher union leaders are often exempt from teaching duties); leaking exam question papers to students for pecuniary gains, etc.

4 community - not only at the primary but also the secondary level of education - suitably fulfils this function.

While there is reason to believe that political factors impinge in a major way on the education sector in India, little is known or written about teacher politics or the political economy of education in India. This paper is an attempt to explore - in one large north Indian state, namely Uttar Pradesh - the political economy factors that influence the evolution of educational institutions and shape the legislation that governs the education sector. The study focuses on the extent of and reasons for teachers’ participation in politics, the evolution and activities of their unions, their representation in the state legislature, and the link between these and other factors such as the enactment of particular education Acts in UP, teacher salaries and appointments, and the extent of centralisation in the management of schools. The aim is to provide a factual account of teachers’ participation in state politics - and its implications - as a resource for future analysis of the education sector. We take a historical and descriptive approach, though some statistics are also presented where relevant.

While we adopt no formal theoretical rubric, the analysis is generally consistent with both a public-choice/rent-seeking framework and a principal-agent perspective. Under the former, the government is seen as responding to the demands of lobbyists in order to maximise the probability of staying in power. Rent-seekers are people who seek to make profits that are unrelated to their productivity (for example, the demanding of high minimum wages). Under a principal-agent perspective, the state government may be thought of as the principal and the teachers or schools as the agents. The principal faces the ‘moral hazard’ that it cannot perfectly observe or monitor the effort level of its many agents and yet the achievement of its objectives depends upon the effort level of its agents. Its task is, therefore, to devise incentive structures in such a way as to elicit the maximum effort from the agents (who prefer to minimise effort due to the disutility of work). Such a framework is relevant in school education because highly centralised educational management in UP implies that the state and district education authorities are responsible for thousands of schools and teachers, giving rise to largescale problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information between the principal and agent.

Teachers, education, and politics It is noteworthy that while framing the , a special provision was made to give representation, in the Upper House of the State legislature, to teachers and to members who are largely elected by teachers. This is in addition to the powers given to the Governor of the State by the Constitution to nominate members from ‘literature, science, art, co-operative movement, and social service’. Thus, teachers have a two-way provision for their representation in the Upper House of the state legislature. Firstly, many of the members appointed (nominated) by the State Governor are from among the teacher or academic community. Secondly, a stipulated number is elected by the constitutionally defined electoral college which consists of teachers in the case of the teacher constituency and mostly of teachers in the case of the graduate constituency.

The status of secondary school teachers in the so-called Private Aided schools is rather special. They are paid by the state government, but are legally employees of the private managements of their respective schools. They enjoy all the benefits of a state government

5 employee but de jure they are not government employees. This turns out to have important implications for their participation in politics. In particular Private Aided school teachers can contest elections to the lower house of the state legislature without entailing any harmful effect on their service conditions. None of the other categories of employees of the State government can do so. It is striking that this special treatment - the legal right to contest elections for the State legislature - has been given only to teachers.

Primary and secondary school teachers - being among the few educated and influential persons at the local (village) level - are elected in large numbers to the lower house of the State Legislature (Vidhan Sabha). Thus, since their numbers are substantial even in the lower house, they are well placed to influence the law making process at the State level. The district level chiefs of many prominent political parties are from the teaching community, the logic being the same - namely that they command more influence over the local electorate. Thus, they are not only Master Sahib (the teacher) but also Neta ji (the leader). Participation and pre-eminence in educational institutions are often seen by individuals as stepping stones to get entry into the political mainstream. That is one important reason why the struggle continues to have an educational institution ‘recognised’ by the State government and finally to have it placed on the grants-in-aid list of the State government.

Drèze and Sen (1995a) rightly lament that there is a lack of attention to basic education in public discussions and political debates in India. In this sense, it could be said that education is an under-politicised issue in India5. However, there is another sense of the phrase ‘politicisation of education’ or of teachers, namely the exercise of political influence, by teacher politicians and teacher union leaders who are also legislators, on their colleagues, students, educational institutions, and on educational legislation. By ‘politicisation of teachers’ is meant the high degree of participation of teachers in political activity, e.g. contesting and/or campaigning for elections to the legislative assembly and the legislative council, and lobbying action/strikes (at the call of teacher legislators who are their union leaders), to bring political pressure to bear on the state government. This paper uses the term in the latter sense and scrutines the political and educational events in UP to examine the politicisation of teachers and students and even of the content of education itself6.

Gould (1972) observed that in all democratic societies, “continuous debate and competition occurs over who shall control education and for what purpose. The question, in other words, is not whether politics or politicians shall influence educational processes, but how and to what degree they will do so. This is the real issue in India today”. He goes on to quote Susanne Rudolph (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972) who states the matter in an apt way: “we do not assume, as is often assumed, that there is such a thing as an educational system free of political intervention…. In a democratic society and in educational institutions which receive government funds, there will be political influence… The real questions focus on distinguishing what type of political pressure and politicisation is benign and what not, .…., whether educational purposes are subsumed by the political system, or whether politics becomes a

5 For instance, there is inadequate political support for proposed 83rd Constitutional amendment to make education a ‘fundamental right’. Some eminent educationists have demanded what may be termed as greater politisation of education. For instance, Y.C. Simhadri, the vice-chancellor of has exhorted that “senior academics should contest election and become members of Parliament ” (Times of India, Lucknow, 11 January 2000). 6 When attempts were made to change the syllabus on party political agendas and whims - ignoring acdemic considerations.

6 means for strengthening or redefining educational goals”. This paper is an attempt to assess the nature and consequences of the politicisation of education in UP.

The politicisation of education in UP is more pervasive at the secondary level. This is mainly because of the Constitutional privilege bestowed specifically on secondary school teachers. However, to some extent it is also because students at the secondary stage are of an age that they can be mobilised for political action (Gould, 1972). At this age, students are easily urged by their energy to embark upon any enterprise and tend to flout the established rules and regulations. “There are some anarchical, unscrupulous and irresponsible politicians who exploit fully this weakness found in students and instigate them into collective indisciplined behaviour. Some politicians of lower order feel no sense of shame in using even small ignorant school children for the purpose of canvassing. We can see the ugliest instances of this on the occassion of various public elections in the country” (Rawat 1994, pp 428 -429).

2. Teachers’ status in the constitutional provisions

Traditionally, in India, teachers have always been held in high esteem. Hymns are sung in honour of the teacher in religious scriptures in India. In the ancient Indian tradition, teachers have been elevated to the rank of God. In several Government documents too, teachers have been assigned a place of great distinction. The Report of the Education Commission of 1964- 66 (Kothari Commission, 1966), for example, opens with the sentence: “The destiny of India is being shaped in her class rooms”, suggesting that teachers are the destiny makers. The National Policy on Education (Govt. of India, 1986, section IX) states: “No person in the society should rise above [sic] the status of a teacher”.

Probably in part due to this high opinion of them, teachers have also been given a special legal status by the Constitution of India. Their representation in the upper house of the State legislatures has been provided for by the Constitution.

This, however, also amounts to discrimination among teachers across the states as only few states in India have an Upper House (Legislative Council). In many other states where Upper Chambers earlier existed, they were later abolished by Acts of Parliament.

Article 171 (3c) of the Constitution of India states that 1/12 of the members of the Legislative Council shall be elected by electorates consisting of persons who have been for at least three years engaged in teaching in such educational institutions not lower in standard than that of a secondary school, as may be provided by or under any law made by the Parliament. Beside this, it empowers the Governor of the State to nominate members for the Upper House from among persons “having special knowledge or practical experience in respect of matters like literature, science, art, co-operative movement and social service”.

The Constitution grants voting rights to a limited number of groups to elect members of the Legislative Council. They are: 1. Members of the Legislative Assembly 2. Members of Local Bodies 3. Graduates of the State, and

7 4. Teachers of secondary schools and above

Thus, we find that no other section of government employees has been given the special status which is enjoyed by teachers. The general education system in the State has three sub-sectors which are constitutionally recognised: primary, secondary, and higher education. However, out of these three, only teachers of secondary and higher educational institutions are entitled to elect their representatives for the Legislative Council.

Primary teachers have been deprived of this special status. However, there exists a big anomaly. It is that “teachers teaching in primary and middle sections of a secondary school, if they otherwise are qualified, are eligible to vote in the election of teachers’ representatives and they are entitled to be registered in teachers’ constituency.” (Election Report: 1976). The special status of teachers can be analysed in two ways:

A. Their status as electors of their representatives, and B. Their status as candidates in teachers’ constituencies, or representatives of teachers after they have been elected to the Upper House.

While there is no debate with regard to their status as described in (A) above, their position as mentioned in (B) has been debatable and controversial.

In a decision, Madras High Court had observed that candidates for a teacher constituency must also be a teacher and that a candidate from a graduate constituency must also be himself a graduate. But on appeals, the Supreme Court of India observed that it was not necessary that a person seeking election from a graduate constituency must also be himself a graduate (S. Narayana Swamy Vs J. Selvam and others, 1972 (198) AIR 1972 SC 2284 (Tope, 1992).

A well known jurist and former chief electoral officer of UP has also observed: “It is not necessary that for election of local bodies, the candidate must be a member of the local authority or that a candidate for a graduate constituency must be himself a graduate or a candidate in teacher constituency must also be a teacher” (Srivastava, GSL: 1979, p.57).

A question is often asked as to why a teacher getting salary from government money can contest election but other government servants cannot do so. The most controversial line of demarcation in this regard is drawn by what is called holding ‘an office of profit.’

A person is declared disqualified for being chosen as member of Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council, if he holds an office of profit (article 191a of the Constitution of India). Similar is the provision for disqualification of the contestant for the Parliament of India (article 102) and identical provisions are also given in the Peoples Representation Act 1951.

In fact, it was the Government of India Act 1919 which provided that no government servant could become a member of the legislature. If a person did accept a Government job, he had to resign from being a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA). Similar provisions were retained in the Government of India Act 1935 (sections 26 and 69).

In several respects, the Constitution of India adopted in 1950 is almost a carbon copy of the Government of India Act 1935 and in the above mentioned case also, a similar provision

8 was retained. The Constitution disqualifies a person from contesting elections if she or he holds an office of profit.

Thus, government servants (of central and state Governments) cannot contest elections but aided school teachers are exempted from this category and they can, therefore, contest elections. The Supreme Court of India in its decision on election petitions has upheld this position (Navjeevan: 15.1.88).

The People Representation Act 1951 clearly states that a person will be disqualified from contesting elections if they hold an office of profit; they will have to resign from their post for contesting elections. Thus, only teachers in educational institutions that are private but government aided (though they enjoy all the benefits almost equal to State employees) have the liberty of contesting elections and to continue to hold the office of teacher even after having won the election. By contrast, teachers of government educational institutions are recognised as government servants and they are bound by the code of conduct of state employees (Shikshak Pratinidhi: 1992).

The special privileges of aided school teachers have often invited sharp criticism. Satyendra Pal Singh writes: “It is amazing to note that a teacher’s post has not been recognised as an office of profit. A teacher continues to remain a teacher in his post even after having won the election. Because of this facility, teachers in large number have entered into politics. It has corroded the virtue and holiness of the education system. Politically active teachers draw full salaries from their schools and colleges and they do not have time to take their classes.” (Singh, SP: 1986).

In the early 1980s, the so-called “Guardian Council” organised by P.N. Chaturvedi, a retired IAS officer, also waged a strong movement that all Private Aided school teachers should be declared disqualified from contesting elections because of the belief that this diversion of time and energy of teachers has a negative impact on their teaching work. Several election petitions were filed in the Allahabad High Court (with a Bench at Lucknow) pleading that teachers should be declared disqualified, but the High Court continued to uphold the view that teachers in non-government (Private Aided) educational institutions did not hold any office of profit.

In a judgement delivered on the election petition filed by Jagdish Chandra against the election of Om Prakash Sharma (famous teacher leader of UP and a teacher MLC) and others, the High Court has observed that all those teachers in UP working in recognised and private aided educational institutions do not hold an office of profit under the State Government. Therefore they cannot be held disqualified to contest elections for the Legislative Council (Election petition No. 1, dated 13.1.84).

Similarly, in several other election petitions [for instance, election petition No. 54, 1985 - Sarnam Singh Vs Mrs. Pushpa Devi; election petition No 13, 1985 - Dr Rajendra Kumari Verma Vs Vijai Singh Rana (decided on 7.2.86); election petition No.19, 1985 - Suraj Singh Shakya Vs Birendra (decided 12.1.87) etc.], the High Court has observed that Private Aided school teachers do not hold any office of profit and therefore cannot be declared disqualified from contesting elections.

9 Thus, Private Aided teachers need not resign from their posts after they win the elections and become MLCs or MLAs, and their teaching jobs are not discontinued. Taking advantage of this privilege, aided school teachers not only contest elections for MLC, they also freely contest elections for local bodies, Nagar Palika (municipalities), Nagar Nigam (town corporations) etc. along with the elections for the Legislative Assembly and the Parliament of India. Consequently, teachers in Private Aided schools have become politically more active and united.

The privileged political facility of election to the upper house is exclusive to teachers in Private Aided secondary schools. This privilege is not available to primary school teachers in UP because they are not considered a part of the teachers’ constituency for the Legislative Council (LC). However, a primary school teacher can himself or herself contest election provided he is not from a government school even though he/she cannot vote in such elections. Teachers in Government educational institutions can vote but cannot contest elections (even if they are teaching in a secondary school and above). This is because their posts are treated as ‘offices of profit ’. The Primary Teachers Association [Prathamik Shikshak Sangh (PSS)] in UP has been demanding that the primary teachers should be given the same privilege as their counterparts enjoy in Private Aided secondary schools. (Dainik Jagaran: 19.2.95). Teachers in government primary schools in UP are also demanding that equal rights be given to them so that they are also able to contest elections (Dainik Jagaran: 8.3.92).

Justification of teachers’ representation

The makers of the Constitution of India debated, at length, various aspects before they decided to make provision for teachers’ representation in the Upper House of State Legislatures (and the Upper House was created as a “second line of defence” comprising of “wise-men” as its members). It is important to know the reasons why teachers were given such a distinguished political status by the Constitution under article 171 (3) (c).

In the British period, representation in the upper house was decided on commercial and economic bases but the constitution makers of free India wanted to provide for “professional representation” on the pattern of the Irish Legislature. They did not agree with the then existing composition of the upper house of the state legislatures. They did not wish to provide representation for the capitalists and the landlords and for protecting commercial interests. The framers of the constitution, in fact, believed in giving a different shape to the composition of the upper house in the state legislature which would comprise of intellectuals and talented scholars so that society may get the benefit of their knowledge and wisdom.

A look at the debates of the Constituent Assembly (CA) reveals that even at the time of framing the Constitution, there were some dissenting voices about allowing teachers to be elected as MLCs and some fear about the potential politicisation of teachers. Dr P.S. Deshmukh was very critical of the amendment of Dr BR Ambedkar which was earlier described as “sudden air raids” by Naziruddin Ahmad (GoI: CA Debates, p 473). Dr Deshmukh vehemently opposed the proposal of nomination, by the Governor, of persons from the ‘co-operative movement’ and also on the inclusion of teachers. He did not consider secondary teachers as “experienced and sober elements”, the type of people he wished should become members of LC. In his own words: “The only justification for a second chamber is that a state should have for purposes of the stability as a check on nasty and harmful legislation

10 a chamber consisting of such persons who are not likely to take part in the day to day politics and to fight elections and spend the money that elections need. Their experience, their mature judgement and their position in the society and country are such that they do not want to take the trouble of going through an ordinary election. But at the same time, they constitute the more sober elements in the society and it is a national loss if their experience cannot be availed of or placed at the service of the State. It is for these purposes that second chambers are provided for. Is there any room except the nomination by the Governor for such persons to come to the second chamber? There is none.” (GoI: CA Debates, p.487).

Another member of the CA, K.T. Shah remarked: “I fail to understand what principle there could be in just selecting graduates and teachers against any other section or professions in the State. The teachers, moreover, would be a part of the ‘ social services’... to select a fraction of it like the teachers separately is again an over-doing or rather duplicating the machinery” (emphasis added) GoI: CA Debates, p. 489).

The above details show that in the CA itself, there was widespread criticism of the proposal to include teacher representatives in the LC and when Dr Ambedkar rose up to reply to the criticism, he could not find any convincing logic to revert the arguments raised against his proposed amendment. He could only say: “I do not know that those who have indulged in high flown phraseology in denouncing this particular article have done any service either to themselves or to the House.... We have to provide some kind of constitution (of the LC) and I am prepared to say that the constitution provided is as reasonable and as practicable as can be thought of in the present circumstances.” (GoI: CA Debates, p. 490).

Thus, the amendments suggested by members of the CA were withdrawn and the amended proposal of Dr B.R.Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, was approved and teachers’ representation in the Upper House of the State legislature adopted in the form of article 171 (3) (c) of the Constitution of India, which continues to date.

While teachers’ reserved representation in state parliaments was linked to their supposed high-thinking, erudite, and noble traits, a contemporary analyst observes: “Leaders of our country are found saying from the dias that the teacher is the nation builder because he is moulding the character of the new generation by his teachings. In fact, these statements do not have any substance. They are based on slogans which do not comprehend the entire social process. Education is only part of the total vision of a society. A teacher comes from groups of working persons in society who are engaged in different sectors of the economy, and is just one of them. No different ideal, psychology, attitude or outlook can be expected of him.” (translation from Raghuvansh: 1995, p. 29).

3. Teachers in the Legislative Council

Before the Independence of India, members of the LC were drawn on the basis of altogether different criteria. There were no teacher representatives but three categories, on other consideration, i.e. General Members, Muslims, Europeans etc. Often communal and economic criteria were used to decide the composition of members in the Legislative Council.

In view of the increasing politicisation of secondary teachers and of secondary education in the State, a suggestion has been made that teacher constituencies for electing

11 teacher MLCs should be abolished and the number of seats in graduate constituencies should be doubled from the existing 9 to 18 (R.P. Singh: 1990, p 50 -51).

Since the provisions under articles 171 and 174 of the Constitution of India and section 6 of the Peoples representation Act 1950 provide for non teachers also to contest elections from teacher constituencies, teachers’ candidature is not a must for their constituencies. But traditionally only teacher candidates have been contesting elections in an organised manner through their unions (Chaudhary: 1983). Therefore it is very difficult for any non-teacher to enter into the territory of organised secondary teachers of UP.

It is noteworthy that teacher constituencies and teachers’ participation in politics is limited only to Private Aided school teachers, particularly at the secondary level. They have taken it for granted that the candidature from these seats is reserved ‘exclusively’ for them, though, as stated above, this is not th e legal interpretation.

It has now been made very clear by legal experts and through several judgements of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India that non-teachers and non graduates are equally eligible for contesting elections from teacher and graduate constituencies respectively.

In view of teachers’ dominance in politics and the more general non desirability of the non-elected upper house in the state (which is of course a larger issue beyond our present focus), efforts have also been made to abolish the LC in UP, as has already been done in some other states. For instance, in April 1970, an effort was made to abolish the LC through a proposal in the LA in UP. In March 1982, this issue was again raised by several MLAs, and again in February 1995, when MLAs with opposing views on the issue even started threatening each other, and the speaker of the Legislative Assembly had to request the Governor to intervene (Swatantra Bharat, 26.2.95).

It is ironical that the person (Nityananda Swamy) who ha d moved the proposal in 1970 to abolish the LC in UP went in favour of retaining the LC in 1995 when he himself was the pro tem chairman of the Council! All veteran teacher MLCs stood up in opposition of the proposal to abolish the Upper house, including H.K Awasthi - who was sitting in the House for his fifth term - and Om Prakash Sharma, another teacher MLC who has led many agitations of teachers in UP (Swatantra Bharat, 26.2.95).

Elections are held for the Legislative Council every two years. The political activities of teachers intensify as the LC election draws near.

Teachers have been elected to the Council not only from the teacher/graduate constituencies but also as independent candidates. Some teachers also reach the Legislative Council in election by the members of the local bodies and also by the MLAs because these teachers are strongly related with one or the other political party.

The largest number of teacher representatives comes from the teacher constituencies of the Legislative Council. The number of teacher MLCs (along with MLCs who have formerly been teachers) in the Legislative Council from 1952 to 1992 is given in Table 2. This table reveals that the largest number of teacher representatives in the LC was reached in 1984 when

12 as many as 24 MLCs were teachers or ex-teachers. The number of teachers was smallest in 1956 when only 10 teacher members were in the Council.

Table 2 Teachers’ Representation in the UP Legislative Council

Year Total seats Teacher Ex-teacher Total teachers Teachers as a members members % of total 1952 72 7 5 12 17 1954 72 7 4 11 15 1956 72 6 4 10 14 1958 108 10 4 14 13 1960 108 12 4 16 15 1962 108 16 2 18 17 1964 108 14 3 17 16 1966 108 10 4 14 13 1968 108 12 2 14 13 1970 108 14 2 16 15 1972 108 14 - 14 13 1974 108 18 1 19 18 1976 108 17 3 20 19 1978 108 14 1 15 14 1980 108 15 - 15 14 1982 108 16 2 18 17 1984 108 19 5 24 22 1986 108 13 - 13 12 1988 108 17 1 18 17 1990 108 15 1 16 15 1992 108 16 4 20 19 1994 108 15 3 18 17 1996 108 16 3 19 18 1998 108 14 NA 14 13

Source: GOUP: Vidhan Parishad ke Sadasyon ka Jeevan Parichay, UP Vidhan Sabha Sachivalaya, 1998, and previous issues. Note: From 1960, the teacher MLCs were sitting in the Council in a group named the “Rashtriya Dal” (Nationalist Party). Their Group was soon recognised by the Chairman of the Council (Chaudhari: 1983 p. 73) but it did not exist for long and teachers were divided into political factions within a year.

To conclude, the number of teacher MLCs rose from 12 in 1952 to 20 in 1992, falling to 14 in 1998. Their proportion has varied between 13% and 22% of the total membership. Their proportion is sizeable enough to wield real influence.

4. Teachers in the Legislative Assembly and state ministries

While in the Legislative Council seats are reserved for teachers, a large number of teachers also contest the Legislative Assembly elections, and many of them are elected. Moreover, teacher legislators often go on to become ministers in the state cabinet.

13 While it is not possible to obtain information on the occupations of contestants for the LA elections, it is possible to obtain it for persons elected to the LA (Vidhan Sabha Sachivalaya, various years). Table 3 presents the number of teacher MLAs in each UP Legislative Assembly since independence. It suggests that there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of MLAs that are teachers.

Table 3 Teacher Members in the Legislative Assembly

Legislative Assembly Total Teacher % of MLAs that MLAs MLAs were teachers 1. First (1952) 430 N.A. N.A. 2. Second (1957) 430 11 2.6 3.Third (1962) 430 26 6.0 4. Fourth (1967) 425 21 4.9 5. Fifth (1969) 425 27 6.4 6. Sixth (1974) 425 22 5.2 7. Seventh (1977) 425 23 5.4 8. Eighth (1980) 425 39 9.2 (421) 9. Ninth (1985) 425 30 7.1 (422) 10. Tenth (1989) 425 27 6.4 (422) 11. Eleventh (1991) 425 36 8.5 (401) 12.Twelfth (1993) 425 46 10.8 (422) 13. Thirteenth (1996)* 425 37 8.7

Note: figures in brackets from Eighth Legislative Assembly onwards are those about which detailed information is available. * The thirteenth Vidhan Sabha is to continue until 2001 (five year term)

Source: Table computed on the basis of information available in: (1) GOUP: UTTAR PRADESH VIDHAN SABHA KE SADASYON KA JEEVAN PARICHAY, published by Vidhan Sabha Secretariat. (various issues); (2) Nirvachan Ayog (UP): Chunav Parinam Vishleshan (various issues)

Teachers have always been included in the Council of Ministers and on several occasions teachers have headed the government as Chief Ministers. Several Chief ministers in UP have been former teachers. For instance, , Sucheta Kripalani, Tribhuvan Narayan Singh, , and all were teachers formerly. It is also discovered that many Education Ministers in the State have also earlier been a teacher, for example, Acharya Jugul Kishore, Kalicharan, Swaroop Kumari Bakshi, and Narendra Kumar Singh Gaur etc. Apart from Education, teacher ministers also held many other portfolios.

Teachers have always been represented in the Council of Ministers in UP since 1952, except for one occasion when in 1967 as formed his 13 member Cabinet which lasted for 15 days and had no teacher as Mini ster.

14 Teacher union leaders and teacher MLAs, MLCs, and ministers continue to draw their teacher salaries for the full term of office, though they do not teach during this period. A Minister in the Government of Uttar Pradesh (Mr Vivek Singh) drew attention on this practice of teacher leaders in 1999. Addressing an open session of Pracharya Parishad (the organisation of Principals of Private Aided schools in UP) in Lucknow on 27 June 1999, he severely criticised the MPs, MLAs, MLCs and Ministers who were taking salaries from two places. It is a degradation of their morals, he said. (Dainik Jagaran: 28 June 1999).

The election process has gradually become more and more expensive and expenditure limits on elections have officially been raised periodically. To study the economic status of teachers who have won an election is thus a natural curiosity. Strong political connections of teachers are often based on solid economic foundations. But little is publicly known of their economic status, though it is desirable that such information of legislators and ministers be made public. While provisions under section 3 (2) of the Declaration of Assets and liabilities Act, 1975 make it mandatory for MLAs, MLCs and ministers to declare all their assets, properties, and sources of income etc., this provision has generally been violated by legislators, including teacher legislators. Enquiries into the matter have revealed that “in general this information is not made available by the Members/Ministers to the Vidhan Sabha (LA) Secretariat. The required paper formalities are somehow completed but the Members and Ministers do not take it seriously. None of the Members and Ministers (except one) did provide this information.” (Dainik Jagaran: 19.4.94).

Influence of teacher legislators

It is indicative of the influence of teachers both within and outside the state Legislature that they were able to raise the budgetary allocation for education. An example is given in Table 4 of what happened with regard to proposed outlay (budget estimates), revised estimates, and final expenditures on education in UP in 1990-91.

Table 4 shows that the government was persuaded to include new items of educational expenditures and increase the amount of outlay on the existing items of education, compared with original budget estimates. The table refers to the year 1990-91 and is merely illustrative rather than necessarily representative. It reveals that the revised budgetary estimates for education (Rs.2104.86 crores) was about 30 percent higher than the original budget estimates (Rs.1620.7 crores) while non-education total state expenditure witnessed a 8% decline since the government was under severe financial constraints to reduce overall expenditure. Most of this increase was the consequence of fierce lobbying by primary teachers along with the MSS (secondary teachers’ union) and the UP Employees association. The government caved in and, in order to meet primary teachers’ demands, the revised (and actual) allocation was raised from the original estimate of Rs 843 crores to Rs 1211 crores, i.e. by a large 44 percent! Similarly, the actual expenditure on secondary education went up by 15 percent and in higher education by 17 percent from their original estimates respectively. This occurred at a time when state non-education expenditure and total expenditure fell substantially.

15 Table 4 Increasing budgetary allocation for education 1990-91 Rs in Crores

Level of Education Budget Estimates Revised Estimates Actuals (Final Expenditures) Primary education 843.34 1211.85 1211.85 Secondary education 545.07 627.70 629.33 Higher education 144.39 169.29 164.17 Others 87.27 96.02 88.63 Total education expenditure (A) 1620.07 2104.86 2093.81 Total non-education state expenditure (B) 8068.13 7316.19 7444.55 Total State budgetary expenditure (A+B) 9688.20 9421.05 9538.36

Source: State budget

Nor is it only in the financial sphere that teacher MLCs, MLAs and ministers influence educational policy. When teachers were education ministers, they have often influenced education policy in the State in a direct way. For example, during July to November 1998, Nepal Singh and Ravindra Shukla - teacher Ministers and the former also a MLC from the graduate constituency elected in 1998 - ordered the revision of history books of the secondary classes and a committee was formed for the books to be revised. The ministers felt that the existing history books glorified the Muslim emperors and particularly the Mughals, and that if Akbar was glorified, then so should the Hindu warrior Rana Pratap be, as well. This is because the BJP Government in UP wanted to promote Hinduism. Since teacher Ministers and MLCs personally know well what is written in the school books, they are able to order a change in the curriculum according to their own choice or in accordance with the wishes of the political party which they represent in government. This is just one example of the way in which teacher ministers and teacher MLCs influence education policy directly in the state.

In sum then, teachers’ privileged legal position has meant their substantial presence in both houses of the State legislature as well as in State cabinets. The special status given to teachers by the Constitution of India has fulfilled the apprehensions of some of the members of the Constituent Assembly who had expressed misgivings that teachers would take advantage of this status and become too embroiled in party politics.

The effect of their presence in the corridors of power appears to have been to create a culture of political activism among Private Aided secondary teachers. There is now a strong body of teachers for whom the membership of the Legislative Council (or ‘serving the fellow teachers’, as they put it) is the ultimate aim of their career. Another effect is that their agitations sometimes force the government to favour the education sector with increased budgetary allocations. While, in principle, this could be good news for the education sector, this will depend on what particular educational expenditures are raised, e.g. salaries of existing teachers; new teacher appointments in schools with high pupil teacher ratios; greater resources and facilities for pupils; more monitoring and evaluation of schools etc.

16

5. Education, Teacher and Politics

Education is a fertile area for political activism in UP and it has provided a springboard for many a successful politician in the State. Based on interviews and careful field investigations in the Faizabad district of UP, Gould (1972) provides a detailed description of the incentives for managers and teachers of Private Aided secondary schools to participate in State politics and in elections in UP, and also describes the ways such participation takes place.

The nature of the relationship between education and politics has changed significantly over time in UP and other states of India. There are roughly two periods, the period before about 1970 and the period post- 1970. When Harold Gould was writing on education and politics in UP about three decades ago (Gould: 1972), he concentrated on managers of private schools – educational entrepreneurs - gaining political power through owning educational institutions and obtaining government aid for them to become Private Aided institutions. The system of grants-in-aid to schools was introduced by the British following the so-called Wood’s Educational Despatch of 1854 and has continued after independence7. Since independence, private individuals and groups have continued to found educational institutions which receive accreditation and grants-in-aid from the department of education when they fulfil certain criteria, though with good political contacts, such impediments can usually be bypassed. Apart from the unhealthy practice of using their schools as a political spring-board, the managers of Private Aided schools also engaged in other mal-practices. For example, it was contended by many teachers of Private Aided schools and colleges in the 1960s that their managers did not pay them the full government-prescribed salaries but rather obliged them to sign receipts showing full salaries received.

Gould quoted J.P.Naik (Member secretary of the Education Commission 1964-66) as having said: “The Congress has abolished the Zamindari in land and has created a Zamindari in Education. Such Zamindars are managers of [Private Aided] colleges, who are well fed, well clothed and maintain their own cars, all on the profits from the institutions which they run. It is now recognised that running an educational institution can be an important means of economic and political power.” (Gould: 1972, p. 94). Gould described as ‘loathsome’ the fact that managers of Private Aided schools and colleges used their schools as a springboard for their political ambitions.

7 The objective of the Wood’s Despatch was to “combine with the agency of the government, the aid which may be derived from the exertions and the liberality of the educated and wealthy natives of India (extract from the Wood’s Despatch quoted in Naik and Nurullah, 1974, p. 135-40). It was successful in encouraging educational entrepreneurship, which was initially inspired by patriotic and service motives. In the first half of the twentieth century, Congress party workers sought ways in their home districts to be of service to their fellow Indians and many became educational entrepreneurs. Gould (1972, p 99) argues that “the educational entrepreneur and the nationalist politician in many instances became one. As they did, numerous primary, secondary, and higher educational institutions were brought into being throughout the country whose aims were simultaneously pedagogical and ideological. Educationists became politicians, politicians became educationists, and students became political”. However, in the post-independence period, Congress became absorbed in internal strife and ideology became less important; this was reflected in the realm of education too, where educational entrepreneurship – which had previously been fused with political ambition - became an aspect of intense political competition for position and advantage.

17 However, since the Salary Disbursement Act of 1971 in UP (and similar Acts in other states, for example, the Direct Payment Agreement 1972 in Kerala) – which greatly centralized the management of Private Aided schools – such profit-making has not been possible for managers of Private Aided schools. The formula for grant-in-aid changed in a fundamental way following this Act. Before these acts, the grant to a Private Aided school was half of its total expenditure on the institution (on salaries, teaching materials, rent and maintenance etc.8).

The Salary Distribution Act 1971 came about as a result of intense political lobbying on the part of aggrieved teachers in Private Aided schools to get government-set salary rates. It was prompted partly by the apparently widespread corrupt practice of the managers of Private Aided schools that they paid their teachers less than the government-prescribed salaries while claiming a government grant equivalent to the full salaries. The Act applied to all secondary Private Aided schools and it provided that thenceforth the government grant to Private Aided schools would equal the total salary bills of the respective Private Aided schools and that salaries would be paid directly by the government to the teachers. In addition, these schools would receive back, for all non-salary expenses each month, 15% of the fee revenue that they collect and deposit in the state government’s treasury. This of course was a very nominal figure because the fee rates have been very low. Since fees were abolished in 1990, Private Aided schools receive 15% of imputed fee revenues. Private Aided schools are not allowed to set their own tuition fee, 85% of their (meagre) fee income has to be deposited in the state treasury, and the private managers no longer receive grants to pay teacher salaries, these being now paid directly by the government treasury. The provisions of the Salary Distribution Act were extended to all junior Private Aided schools in 1979. In Muzammil’s (1989, p149) opinion, this divorce of ownership and control has slowly but substantially impaired the private managers’ motivation to provide private charitable funds for education.

Being now primarily government funded, Private Aided schools have come to be seen as semi-government schools. The state government has increasingly centralised aspects of management of Private Aided schools. For example, recruitment of their teachers has since 1982 been carried out by the UP Education Service Commission. While these measures arising from the Salary Disbursement Act may have reduced malpractices by the managers of Private Aided schools and colleges and reduced their opportunities for political ascent, they have greatly empowered teachers of Private Aided schools and colleges by virtue of centralising school management; teachers can no longer effectively be locally monitored or disciplined for negligence.

Now it is teachers rather than managers of Private Aided schools that are intimately involved with State politics in UP. There appear to be two important reasons why teachers’ participation in politics is pervasive at various levels: one, the Constitutional provision granting them the right to seek elections and, two, the posts of teachers in Private Aided schools having been recognised as ‘office of no profit’. These two routes have been frequently resorted to by teachers in Private Aided educational institutions in order to enter active politics.

As stated previously, the privileged position of teachers of Private Aided educational institutions - namely that they do not hold any ‘office of profit’ - has periodically been

8 Madan and Halbar in Rudolph and Rudolph (1972 p128) report that according to the Education Commission of 1966, government funds accounted for 48.2% of the finances of Private Aided schools.

18 challenged (unsuccessfully) by their counterparts in government employment in other departments and corporations who question the fairness of granting this special status only to teachers. However, this move to prevent teachers from entering into politics is not generally motivated by recognition of its possible negative effects on children’s education but rather due to a desire to obtain comparable treatment or, at the least, for clipping the wings of another worker-group9. Thus, teachers can and do contest elections while their counterparts in other public sector professions are denied this opportunity for political office. Political parties and influential teacher-leaders use money or intimidation (via threats and physical violence) to gain support of groups of teachers.

6. Evolution of Teachers’ Associations

The evolution of teachers’ associations in the State of UP dates back to the 1920s, the decade known for the emergence of the trade union movement in India in an organised manner when the All India Trade Union Congress was established. In the beginning in 1921, two organisations viz. Adhyapak Mandal (Teachers Board) and UP Secondary Education Association were formed as the unions of the primary and secondary school teachers respectively. They were tiny organisations in the beginning but they laid the foundation for the further development of teachers associations in UP.

Analysing the evolution of teachers’ associations in UP, a representative of teachers has stated: “In the establishment of a union in any organisation, there is a presumption that there are two groups - the exploiter and the exploited, and the latter is resource-less and very weak. Therefore, they accumulate power by organising themselves into a union against the exploiter in order to be able to protect their interests. Knowingly or unknowingly, these groups do not believe and have confidence in each other and a sense of insecurity arising out of this disbelief prepares the ground for union formation. This situation appears to be true with regard to the evolution of teachers’ associations as well in Uttar Pradesh” (Singh, S.P.: 1983, p. 79).

The most important reason for the formation of a teachers union in the 1920s was the poor condition of teachers during the British period. They were paid very low wages and taught under very poor working conditions. They were also often oppressed by officers and management committees, and faced varied adversities and challenges. According to K.L. Shrimali, Ex-Vice Chancellor of Banaras Hindu University, “There were several restrictions and limitations for teachers. If their opinion or institutions went against the wishes of officers, they had to bear their anger and wrath and were penalised in various ways. There was no freedom in education. Teachers did not enjoy even the rights of an ordinary citizen.” (Shrimali, 1951: p 52) They enjoyed little freedom and did not feel dignity or honour in being in this profession. Teacher leaders claim that it was this subjugation that compelled them to unite in the form of unions as early as in the 1920s (Chaudhari: 1983).

Prior to the establishment of the UP Secondary Education Association, an earlier beginning was made in South India in 1908 when teachers in Madras organised the South India

9 The so-called ‘Guardian Council’ - a sort of parents’ union – also challenged teachers’ right to contest legislative assembly elections but this challenge was motivated by the belief that teachers’ undue politicisation has a harmful effect on their teaching work and that children’s education suffers as a result.

19 Teachers Association and subsequently in 1920, an All India Teachers Association was formed. These precedents also gave encouragement to the formation of a Teachers Association in UP.

Secondary Teachers’ Association:

It was at a teachers’ meet in Allahabad organised in May, 1921 that the foundation was laid for the formation of the UP Secondary Education Association. The assistant teachers in secondary schools in UP organised themselves in a separate union known as “UP Sahayak Adhyapak Sangh” (UP Assistant Teachers’ Union) which later on, along with UP Secondary Education Association merged into what came to be known as the “UP Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh” (Secondary Teachers’ Union) in 1956. It adopted a new constitution in the same year. The Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh (MSS) is continuing to date and it is the strongest teachers union in the State.

Primary Teachers’ Association:

Like secondary education teachers, primary school teachers also started their organised career in the 1920s. They organised themselves into “Adhyapak Mandal” (Teacher Association) in 1921. The organisation stood for safeguarding the interests of primary education and of teachers in primary schools in UP. It is also claimed that the Adhyapak Mandal stood for promoting and protecting the interests of students. (Smarika: 1990)

This organisation of primary teachers gradually grew stronger, especially after independance. The primary teachers organised under the Adhyapak Mandal waged a State wide agitation/strike in 1951-52. Their agitation invited the reaction of the Government which decided to de-recognise the association. But the primary teachers continued to strengthen themselves and increased their membership. Ultimately the organisation of “Adhyapak Mandal” was re-named as “UP Prathmik Shikshak Sangh ” (UP Primary Teachers Association) and it was with this nomenclature that it was re- recognised by the GOUP. Thus it was in 1950s that the UP Prathmik Shikshak Sangh (PSS) came into being and gradually became stronger and stronger on the massive strength of its members who constitute the largest teaching body in the State.

Both the above organisations, i.e. the MSS and the PSS, gathered momentum over time and made their presence felt more significantly during the decade of the 1960s. It was during this period that these teacher organisations mustered wide support and publicity and became influential in many respects.

The British Government in India was vehemently opposed to the rise of trade unionism. The teachers knew that if they organised themselves like a trade union, the British Government would crush them by force. At the same time they were also very conscious not to equate themselves with industrial labour. Therefore, their organisation was known by a nomenclature which looked different from that of other trade unions. A prominent leader of the Secondary School Teachers Association (MSS) explains: “since teachers were not willing to equate themselves with trade unions, they deemed it below their professional dignity, and therefore, they preferred to name their organisation as “Secondary Education Association” instead of calling it as Secondary Teachers Association (Nagina Lal, quoted in Chaudhari: 1983).

20 Similarly, the organisation known as “Adhyapak Mandal” which was established by the primary school teachers did not give priority to the interests and welfare of teachers, instead it emphasised educational upliftment and students’ interests. (Smarika: 1990).

Thus in the decade of the 1920s, the teachers organisations gave the impression that they stood for the betterment of education itself. Mention may be made here of the observations of the then (1954) Education Minister of UP C.Y.Chintamani which he made on the occasion of the Eighth Convention of the Secondary Education Association: “The organisation of teachers has not taken the course of trade unionism, instead its activities are concerned with important educational matters.” (Secondary Education Association: 1954).

University / College Teachers Association:

As compared to the associations of teachers at lower levels of education (i.e. PSS and MSS), teachers associations at the university and college level in UP emerged much later. It was in 1966 that the Federation of UP Universities and College Teachers’ Association (FUPUCTA) came into being. At the individual institution level, the teachers of Agra University formed the first organisation of teachers at the university level in 1954 when the Agra University Teachers’ Association was established. The Federation of UP Residential Universities Teachers’ Association (FUPRUTA) was formed in 1982. Thus university and college teachers in the State had a very late beginning in establishing their unions. They also have much less strength, publicity and political influence as compared to unions of school teachers.

In order to increase their strength and bargaining power, teacher leaders have pressurised more and more teachers to join politics by, first, encouraging them to become a member of the teacher union and then by gradually taking active part in their political activities and agitations. For example, at the time of instituting a new union at Lucknow university, teachers wishing to contest for the executive of LUTA (Lucknow University Teachers’ Association) deposited a fee on behalf of a large number of teachers, effectively coaxing them all into joining the union.

7. Politicisation and composition of teacher unions

The Kothari Education Commission (1966) cited the example of foreign experiences of teachers unions, particularly those in the United Kingdom. The teachers union was founded in 1870 in the UK, says the Kothari Commission, “because of a desperate need to improve salaries and conditions of work”. Since then the teachers union in UK has broadened its functions enormously though it still continues to be active and increasingly successful in negotiating material benefits for its members.

In India too the “teachers’ organisation are developing on the same broad lines. Most of them are currently engaged, and rightly so, in securing better salaries and conditions of work for teachers.” (Kothari Commission: page 113). While it is true that the economic situation of teachers was indeed poor in the decade of 1960s, over the years their status has strengthened in real terms. For example “from 1980 to 1990, teacher salaries rose by 9 percent per year in real terms” (Drèze and Sen: 1995b, p. 122), i.e. government paid teachers’ salaries

21 nearly doubled in real terms over a decade. Moreover, it seems that in India, teacher salaries relative to per capita income are higher than in many other countries. For example, the ratio of average teacher salaries to per capita income (admittedly only an imperfect measure of teachers’ standard of living vis-a-vis others) is 2.4: 1 in Latin America and 2.6: 1 in Asia but a much higher 3.6: 1 in India (Colclough and Lewin 1993, p52 and 143).

Factions in Teachers’ Unions:

At present teachers’ unions in UP are not unified bodies of teachers, though they started out as a single representative organisation for all the teachers at a particular level of education. They are now ridden with internal in-fights, mutual bickering and groupism. Consequently on many issues various groups within a teacher organisation oppose each other and do not hesitate in pulling the other down. It is frequently observed that when there are no common issues to be taken up, groups within a union start fighting on petty matters. The different groups are patronised by different political leaders/parties and, owing to groupism among teachers, political intervention gets heightened.

The Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh (MSS) or secondary teachers association is particularly ridden with differences and factionalism. At present the MSS of UP is divided into many groups. The “Sharma Group” is supposed to be the largest within the MSS. It has dominated teacher politics for at least the last one decade. The teachers’ representatives in the UP Legislative Council for the last decade have been elected mainly from this group.

Placed at number two in strength is the “Pandey Group” which has led many teacher agitations in the State. The “Thakurai Group” occupies the third place. Its strength has, however, been dwindling over the last few years. After the death of R.N. Thakurai who had formed this group, it has becoming weaker and weaker over time. There is also a fourth group within the MSS known as the “Bhatt Group” but its presence is hardly felt and its strength is waning fast.

It is estimated that about 60 percent of all secondary school teachers are members of the “Sharma Group” of the MSS. Many teachers have also assumed membership of more than one group. It is, therefore, difficult to place all groups of the MSS in descending order in a precise manner. If we assume that the remaining three groups of the MSS have only 10 percent membership each, we can surmise tentatively that 90 percent of the secondary teachers in UP are politicised10.

The teacher representatives of the MSS in the UP Legislative Council (LC) claim that they not only represent the interests of secondary teachers but also safeguard the interests of all teachers of the State. The MSS has been all powerful in the LC since 1950s. Similarly, the Prathamik Shikshak Sangh (PSS) or the primary teachers association has also been plagued by internal factionalism but these have been less pronounced than those of the MSS discussed above.

10 Evidence from a survey of 20 government and private aided junior and secondary schools in urban Lucknow in 1991 showed that 84% were members of a union (Kingdon, 1996b). It is likely that the proportion of secondary teachers who are union members is greater than that of primary or junior school teachers.

22 Factionalism in teacher unions has divided the teaching community into political groups and ideology-based-factions.

8. Teacher union movements and strikes

The Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh (MSS) or secondary teachers’ union was organised in 1956 and it is the strongest among all the teachers’ unions in UP, having spearheaded several strikes and ‘agitations’ in support of teachers’ demands from the government.

The main agitations of teachers are listed in Table 5 with dates of important strikes and closures of educational institutions between 1956 and 1994.

The teachers of the MSS claim that they try to resolve the issues and have their demands accepted by the Government through various means (mentioned below) and only when these do not succeed do they resort to strikes and agitations. The following methods are frequently used by teachers to press their demands:

1. Creating mass awareness through discussion, seminars, symposia etc. 2. Meetings of teacher representatives with the government 3. Mass casual leave, meetings and demonstrations 4. Statements on mass media 5. Signature campaigns, observing black day and opposition day etc. 6. Sit-in’s, demonstrations, and processions 7. Collective fasting and gherao (picketing) 8. Opposing the ministers in election 9. Writing postcards to government 10. Boycott of or disturbing the sessions in the Legislature 11. Examination boycotts 12. Pen-down / chalk-down strikes 13. Jail Bharo Andolan (fill-the-jails agitation) etc.

Conversations with a number of teacher leaders suggest that about 90 percent of them believe that they resort to only legal methods of agitation but about 10 percent of them admit that even non-constitutional methods are also resorted to, if need be, to press their demands with the government.

In the early phase of the history of the MSS, the teacher leaders adopted what they called “persuasive methods”, “requests” and “appeals” etc. However, since 1959 and, more particularly, since mid 1960s, their agitations became more aggressive and were organised for weeks together (some times even up to 6 weeks) to press their demands before the state government.

Note that, other than the strikes and activities listed in Table 5, there was substantial teacher action in other years too. For example, on 14 January 1974, the Pandey Group of the MSS threatened to go on strike. They demonstrated in Lucknow on 4 March, which also invited a “Lathi Charge” by the police as they were violating the prohibitory orders in force.

23 Their leader Chandra Bhushan Tripathi was badly injured and remained hospitalised for eight days (Chaudhari: 1983). That was also made an issue for extending a strike.

On 31 March 1975, the Pandey Group staged a demonstration in Lucknow in front of the Legislative Assembly, this time demanding parity of salary increases with the rate of increase in national income because it believed that the DA was not enough in compensating for price rises. The MSS convention demanded nationalisation of education so as to end the system of private management of educational instituions. About 2000 teachers were arrested. They also held talks with the government and ultimately an agreement was reached and the strike was thus averted.

In 1979, the All India Secondary Teachers Federation and the University Teachers Association held demonstration in New on 23 April to express their resentment against the Employees Service Condition and Dispute Reconciliation Act - which gave the government powers to take action against teachers unions. Under the leadership of the Teachers Federation of UP11, the PSS, MSS and the UTAs organised a big demonstration in Lucknow on 1 May 1979. They raised the slogans against the Act: “Sangathanon Par Rok Lagi To Khoon Bahega Sarkon Par” (if the organisations are opposed/banned, it will lead to blood-shed on the streets). They were demanding that the Act should be revoked by the government.

11 The combined group of all teachers unions in UP, i.e. the MSS, the PSS, and the UTA (University Teachers’ Association).

24 Table 5 Important teacher Agitations in UP (1956-1994)

Year From To Duration Details (days) 1956 31 Jan. 31 Jan. 1 - 1959 3 May 8 May 2 Main demand: revision of pay scales 1964 24 Apr, 1 4,000 teachers demonstrated 4 Aug. 1 10,000 teachers demonstrated; 11-point charter included demands for triple-benefit-scheme 1965 11 Mar. 28 Mar. 18 30,000 teachers demonstrated; demands included interim relief, equal pay to G and PA teachers; hunger strike by some teachers from 22-28 March; central govt announced financial help for UP Teachers; GOUP increased salaries of PA teachers by Rs. 20 per month. 1966 5 Dec. 10 Dec. 5 5,000 teachers demonstrated in violation of prohibitory order; demand was pay parity between G and PA teachers; teacher leaders were jailed but released on 17th December. 1968-69 25 Nov. 5 Jan. 45 Initially 3000 teachers demonstrated (600 arrested); strike intensified; 20,000 teachers sent to jail; Demands included pay parity between PA non-teaching staff and G employees and direct salary to PA teachers from the state govt treasury 1971 27 Jan. 18 Feb. 23 Total strike observed; issues were lack of implementation of agreements; 1000 teachers and their leaders arrested. 1973 3 Dec. 23 Dec. 21 11-point charter of demands included nationalisation of education; 500 teachers arrested. 1974 14 Jan. 4th Mar. >2 Pandey group threatened to go on strike; on 4th March, demonstration invited ‘lathi charge’. Leader badly injured, remained hospitalised for 8 days. This was made an issue for prolonging the strike. 1975 31 Mar. 31 Mar. >1 Demonstration in front of LA, demanding pay increases and nationalisation of education. 2000 teachers arrested. !977-78 2 Dec. 13 Jan. 42 Organised by Pandey group of MSS; demands included the nationalisation of education, retention of education of Concurrent List, and parity in gratuity pensions etc. between PA and G teachers; 40,000 teachers took mass casual leave; 80,000 striked; 30,000 teachers were arrested 1979 1 May 1 May 1 Demonstrated against the Employees Service Conditions and Dispute Reconciliation Act, which sought to regulate the activities of teacher unions 1981 27 Jan. 27 Jan. 1 Pandey group’s dharna and demonstration to ask for a Education Service Commission to regulate teacher appointments 17 Aug. 17 Aug. 1 ‘Pen down’ strike against the removal of temporary teachers from service 21 Oct. 21 Oct. 1 ‘Pen down’ strike in demand for pay revision 7 Nov. 7 Nov. 1 Mass casual leave and demonstration because of dissatisfaction with the UP Pay Commission’s recommendations 16 Nov. 16 Nov. 1 Sit-in or dharna at Raj Bhavan in demand of pay revision 24 Nov . 24 Nov. 1 ‘Fast until death’ (A-maran Anshan) protest; fasting teachers arrested 27 Nov. 27 Nov. 1 Pandey group and Sharma group stage separate demonstrations 1 Dec. 3 Dec. 3 Strike in opposition to the UP Pay Commission’s recommendations 1984 12 Jan. 18 Feb. 35 Demands included nationalisation of education; 3000 teachers sent to jail; schools remained closed for 35 days 1985 30 Aug. 30 Aug. 1 -Sharma group of MSS organised mass casual leave 5 Sep. 5 Sep 1 -Sit-in at DIOS office, ‘postcard to chief-minister’ campaign 5 Nov. 5 Nov. 1 -80,000 teachers took mass casual leave 7 Nov. 7 Nov. 1 -40,000 teachers demonstrated; 28 demands included nationalisation of education, payment of salary for the previous strike period, abolition of private management in schools, and regularisation of ad-hoc teachers etc.

25

1986 5 Sept. 5 Sept. 1 All three groups had agitations in 1986. On 5 Sept. Scooter rally agitation against the appointment of part-time teachers 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 1 ‘Chalk down’ strike, against National Policy on Education 14 Nov. 14 Nov. 1 Rally to demand the implementation of the Fourth Pay Commission’s recommendations, schools remained closed 1987* 15 Sept. 7 Oct. 23 Agitations on 16 June (warning day), 15 September (historic rally of teachers with govt employees suppressed by use of tear gas and lathi-charge, one person died and many teachers were injured; many teachers were arrested; called off on 7 oct), and 13 November (60,000 teachers participated in a rally). GOUP announced generous improvements in DA. 1988** 14 Oct. 26 Oct. 13 GOUP failed to implement 1987 agreement; Awareness week observed from 25 August. Big rally organised on 15 September; fasting by rotation organised from 25 Sept to 11 Oct; Shouting slogans: “Jeene Layek Vetan Do” (give wages worth a living). GOUP admitted that in giving new scales, a new burden of Rs 656 crores would come on its shoulders. Talks held 26 Oct. and agreement reached. 1989 19 Aug. 19 Aug. 1 All MSS factions in unified rally to demand Central pay scales for UP teachers; to make 450 more unaided schools aided; for the regularisation of ad-hoc teachers. Agreement pushed up GOUP education expenditure sharply. 1990 9 Aug. 9 Aug. 1 Pandey group’s sit-in dharna in support of their 15-point charter of demands 29 Aug. 30 Aug. 2 Sit-ins at Director of Education’s offices. Agitation programmes for Nov /Dec. postponed in view of Babri Masjid unrest 1991 5 Jan. 5 Jan. 1 Pandey group demonstrated at LA in support of 51 point charter of demands, including regularlisation of ad hoc teachers, bringing more schools onto the aided list, and remove of pay anomalies. Thakurai group agitated in month of 27 Nov. 27 Nov. 1 August Demonstration at LA and gherao of the Director of Education offices - demanding implementation of various govt orders. MSS underwent a further split this year - a new group (the Bhatt group) formed. 1992 10 Jan. 10 Jan. 1 10,000 teachers involved in a sit-in by the Sharma group of MSS on 10th Jan.; Many days’s teaching wasted in March March March ‘many days’ due to mass casual leave, demonstrations and sit-ins. Unions declared (but did not carry out) a boycott of examinations. 1993 21 July 21 July 1 No statewide agitation of teachers in 1993 but most previous issues were taken up at low levels of agitation. Thakurai 5 Sept 7 Sept 2 group satyagrah on 21/7/93; sit-in on 7th Sept and a processions and demonstrations on 5 th Sept (31 demands) and 16th 16 Oct 16 Oct 1 Oct. Many other demonstrations were also held during the year but they did not make a notable impact. 1994 25 Nov. 6-Dec. 11 Agitations took place on 5-6 May (demonstration); 25th Oct (picket); strike 25 Nov-6 Dec (strike); main demands were: unaided private schools be brought on aid list, regularisation of ad hoc teachers, removal of pay anomalies, no modification be attempted in the Salary Disbursement Act 1995 24 Aug. 24 Aug 1 Sit-in at the offices of the District Inspector of Schools and at the LA, 49 point charter of demands 14 Nov. 14 Nov. 1 All four groups of the MSS came together in historic unity to demonstrate 1996 17 Jan. 23 Jan. 7 Jail-bharo andolan (Fill-the-Jails agitation). Talks with the governor ended the agitation - but MSS factions accused each other for calling-off the agitation. Sit-in (dharna) on 6 June demanding salary payment in the first week of the month; demonstrations on 12th Dec. at the district headquarters of all teacher unions in the state, with a 13 point charter of demands for district magistrates - one particular demand was the release of the report of the Fifth Pay Commission. 1998 - - - Prolonged strikes related with the Fifth Pay Commission’s recommendations

Notes: * led by Sharma Group; ** led by Pandey and Thakurai Groups; PA= Private aided school; G=Government school

26

In 1992, the BJP Government in UP led by Kalyan Singh (himself a teacher by profession) made several announcements in the field of education which were largely disliked by the teaching community. The government gave more powers to management committees of private aided schools, self-financing schools were allowed, self-financing courses were started, pay disbursement authority was again transferred to private managements, cheating in examinations was declared a cognisable offence and security of services were reduced by giving the management of Private Aided schools some more powers. However, when all factions of the MSS united to fight these anti-teacher measures and announced a call for boycott of examinations, the government of UP declared that it had no intention of changing legislation regarding the transfer of secondary teachers from one district to another, or of bringing in rules to allow authorities to prolong indefinitely the suspension of any teacher.

The same government also legislated the historic anti-cheating law whereby students caught cheating could be jailed. The introduction of the anti-cheating law was accompanied by the deployment of police in all examination centres in 1992. The effect of this measure was to drastically reduce the pass rate in the UP High School Exams from 57% in 1991 to less than 15% in 1992! This is seen in Table 612.

Table 6 Pass rates in exams of the UP High School Exam Board

Year Percentage of exam-takers who passed

Regular candidates Private candidates Total 1988 49.6 40.6 46.6 1989 47.6 39.4 44.8 1990 46.4 40.4 44.2 1991 61.2 52.2 57.0 1992 17.3 9.0 14.7

Source: Swatantra Bharat (High School Exam Results Supplement) Wed 15th July 1992, p3.

The above discussion indicates that teachers in UP have a long history of being involved in the activities and agitations of their respective unions. Table 5 shows that their efforts - in the form of sit-in’s, pickets, pen/chalk-downs, rallies, strikes, mass casual-leaves, and campaigns - have continued almost yearly since 1956 (the birth year of the MSS) and on several occasions they resorted to prolonged strikes, paralysing all academic work in educational institutions. Sometimes their agitations forced the government to yield and often they had to withdraw without any notable gain. It also shows that the issues on which teachers have campaigned have almost invariably been to do with teachers’ pay and job-security.

12 Students caught cheating were sent to jail and only released after a few days on the basis of clemency, especially in the case of girls whose marriage prospects would be worsened if they had a prolonged jail sentence.

27 The frequency of strikes by teachers’ unions is quite astonishing. There is no data that would enable us to provide a benchmark and state whether teachers went on strike more often than workers in other government departments. However, it is worth remembering that the Constituent Assembly accorded teachers a privileged political position because it believed that teachers were a different, nobler group than others. It expected that teachers would give a moral example before society and behave in a more responsible manner than other groups. Teachers’ strikes have not only been frequent but also often been prolonged.

Teacher MLCs draw upon professional political resources to have the issues resolved in teachers’ favour. Prolonged strikes of teachers witnessed the involvement of top political leaders of the country (and not only of UP) and sometimes even the national Parliament and the Prime Minister of India did not remain unconcerned.

We conclude that teacher unions have resorted to strikes and other action to safeguard and promote their own interests. They have campaigned overhwhelmingly on the issue of salaries and service conditions and rarely, if ever, for broader improvements in the schooling system or for the promotion of education in general. The facts presented in this paper agree with the assessment in the Report of the National Commission on Teachers which observed in 1986: “The main preoccupation of teachers’ organisations particularly since independence has been with the improvement of salary and service conditions of teachers. And in this they have achieved considerable success.” (NCT: 1986, p. 73).

9. The Politics of educational finance

The present system of financing of education in UP is based to a large extent on state support in the form of grants-in-aid to privately managed educational institutions, particularly at the secondary level of education. The main responsibility for funding primary education is meant to lie with local bodies. This pattern of financing has its roots in the recommendations of the Wood’s Educational Despatch of 1854 and subsequently the Indian Education Commission of 1882.

The State Government directly supports institutions that are under its own control, the most important being government Secondary schools (Rajkiya Madhyamik Vidyalaya) and Government degree colleges. It also provides grants-in-aid to the so-called Private-Aided educational institutions. Local bodies managed and funded most primary schools until the early 1970s. However, after the legislation of the Basic Education Act of 1972, the local body/zila parishad schools were brought under the state government’s direct control - or at least taken away from being under the control of local bodies in the sense that their teachers were thenceforth going to be paid directly by the state govt’s exchequer rather than through the local bodies. From the point of view of the payment of their salaries, they are directly state- govt funded schools but from the point of view of administration, they are under the local bodies. This is the reason that the state goverment does not treat them as government educational institutions even though almost their entire funding comes from the state government in the form of teacher salaries. Even today official published education statistics refer to them as local body schools13.

13 Kingdon (1994) reports that in her survey of upper primary schools in Lucknow city in 1991, many teachers of municipality schools said that their schools were in a parlous and neglected condition because they ‘fell

28

Therefore, primary schools run by local bodies are not treated as government schools for purposes of allocation of funds in the state budget. At the secondary level, the percentage expenditure on non-government secondary schools (Private Aided schools) accounted for 76.1 percent for the year 1996-97 and at the higher education level the corresponding figure ws 63.3 percent.

Table 7 shows that at the secondary level of education, the largest majority of schools is of the private aided type but at the pre-secondary level, the role of the government schools is dominant. The table also shows that the proportionate share of private unaided, i.e. fee charging schools, more than doubled in the fifteen years between 1978 and 1993. However, it should be noted that the private unaided schools that appear in official statistics are only those that have official ‘recognition’. Since private schools that do not seek grants need not register or apply for government recognition, there is no way of knowing their numbers and they do not appear in the official education statistics. Kingdon (1996c) has shown that unrecognised private schools exist almost entirely at the primary level of education only and that the effect of their omission from the All India Education Surveys is to seriously skew the education statistics - giving the erroneous impression that primary school education is largely state- supported14.

Table 7 Distribution of schools by management-type and level, UP

Primary Junior Secondary Total Number % Number % Number % Number % 1978 G 64552 94.8 7689 63.8 724 14.9 72965 85.8 PA 1046 1.5 1241 10.3 3847 79.0 6134 7.2 PUA 2524 3.7 3119 25.9 298 6.1 5941 7.0 Total 68122 100.0 12049 100.0 4869 100.0 85040 100.0 1993 G 75387 87.1 10922 57.1 1558 22.8 87867 78.1 PA 1266 1.5 1816 9.5 4446 64.9 7528 6.7 PUA 9886 11.4 6376 33.4 840 12.3 17102 15.2 Total 86539 100.0 19114 100.0 6844 100.0 112497 100.0

Source: GOUP (1982) “UP Report of the Fourth All India Education Survey 1978-79”, Table 47, p383-384. NCERT (1998) “Sixth All India Education Survey: National Tables Volume II”, Table IS2, p 5-12. Note: Only recognised schools are included in published official statistics.

between two stools’: they were effectively funded by one source and ‘owned’ and managed by another. This divorce of ownership and financial control has been detrimental to their development. 14 Kingdon (1996c) cites evidence from sample surveys suggesting that the fee-charging private unaided school sector (recognised and unrecognised together) absorbs a very much higher proportion of the school-going 6-11 year olds than that suggested by the official statistics (27% in rural UP and up to 86% in urban UP). On other biases in education statistics, see Drèze and Kingdon (1998).

29 Since private aided schools predominate (relatively) at the secondary level, the proportion of state educational expenditure in the form of grants to aided private schools is large - 76 percent (1997-98).

The decision as to which private schools will get grants is not based on any well defined principles or objective criteria. Though many procedural norms have been laid down by the state government for regulating grants, ultimately it is only political pulls and pressures that determine the allocation of grants-in-aid to educational institutions in UP15. Initially it is the political pressure and strong lobbying from the teachers of a particular recognised private school which plays the decisive role in forcing the government to include it on the grants -in-aid list; and once an institution is included in the aid list, it becomes the responsibility of the government to maintain it as an aided school.

The teacher unions, and particularly the MSS, have almost always included the demand in their agenda that more private unaided schools be brought on to the grants-in-aid list of the government. They have achieved success in their efforts16. For example, between 1984 and 1991, 681 junior and 298 secondary PUA schools were made Private Aided (GOUP Shiksha Ki Pragati, various years). During the financial year 1995-96, as many as 200 private unaided primary and secondary schools were included in the grants in aid list (GOUP: Uttar Pradesh Annual 1995-96). Bringing unaided schools – that run entirely on fee revenue – on to the aided list has large financial implications for the government.

The politics of grants-in-aid is related with category (2), i.e. with private aided schools and it is in these institutions that the political activities of teachers are the most pronounced.

There are obvious drawbacks to the politicisation of grants-in-aid. If teacher politicians or teacher union leaders help a private school to gain aided status - by bringing political pressure to bear on its behalf - the teachers in that school feel indebted to their political patrons for their ‘services’ and ‘favours’, i.e. for the fact that they helped the school gain recognition and/or aid. These indebted teachers support the political activities of the union/teacher leader that helped them. This mutual back-rubbing undermines the maintenance of academic standards because the institution receiving these grants use their facilities, teacher time, and even

15 To be eligible for aid, a private unaided school must be recognised and, to be eligible for recognition, a Private unaided school must be a registered society, have an owned rather than a rented building, employ only trained teachers, pay salaries to staff according to government prescribed norms, have classrooms of a specified minimum size and charge only government-set fee rates. It must also instruct in the official language of the state and deposit a sum of money in the endowment and reserve funds of the education department. A recent condition for recognition of a private school is that it must not be situated within 5 kilometres of a G school. Kingdon (1994) notes that many aided schools do not actually fulfil all the conditions of recognition. In other words, they obtained their aided status via political influence which enabled them to bypass the eligibility criteria.

16 See later in the paper for a discussion of the perverse equity and efficiency effects of bringing unaided schools on to the aided list. A World Bank country study on social services in India (World Bank 1989, p128- 9) finds it a puzzling feature that there appear to be “large leakages in public educational expenditures” because although expenditure has risen greatly, the number of schools and teachers has not risen much. Our investigations can confirm that this puzzle is at least partly accounted for by the policy to make private unaided schools aided. When a private unaided school becomes aided, the overall number of students and teachers remains unchanged but government education expenditure increases, and well-off students start receiving educational subsidies. It appears that government education spending has leaked because increased expenditure does not result in any increases in the number of students or teachers.

30 students to support the political ends of the teacher union leaders that helped them. Another reason why gaining aided status is inimical to the maintenance of academic standards is that there is a loss of local accountability when an unaided school becomes aided, since its teachers do not feel as accountable to their private managers and parents of pupils any more.

The system of grants-in-aid to educational institutions has remained the same as introduced by the British Government in India in the 1880s. By contrast, the British system of grants underwent revolutionary changes and became more objective particularly since 1920s. The present system of Parliamentary grants to local authorities in the UK incorporates educational indicators. The formula for the distribution of grants incorporates over a dozen factors: such as the area’s total population, number of children over five years of age, persons over 65, primary and nusury school age children, secondary school age children, further education age persons, university awards, school meals served, and local development indicators such as density of persons per mile of road, density of persons per acre, long term decline in population, and the milage of non trunk roads and principal roads (Muzammil: 1989, chapter 4, Certain National and International Comparisons). This type of a rational approch to grants for education has been totally absent in India. Indian states having larger responsibility (far greater than the private share in financing education), failed to emulate the modern British system of grants in aid to education. These are still based on the conventional pattern created by the British Government in India.

The Japanese experience with grants-in-aid is also interesting to note because of the incentive-structure built into the grant formula: Japan imposed restrictions on enrolment as the State subsidy to private schools was linked to the number of enrolments. The sanctioned grant to be available to any school was to be multiplied by the ratio of authorised enrolments and actual enrolments of the school. Thus more enrolment was a penalty. Yet most schools continued to accept more students than the allowed quota because the marginal costs were small and additional tuition fee far exceeded the loss of subsidy (James and Benjamin: 1988).

Despite certain rules and conditions, the system of grants-in-aid in UP is not linked with the qualitative performance of schools. Even when the criterion of examination performance of the schools was included, the pass rate was fixed at a paltry 45 percent. The same is true with regard to the number of working days.

The following observation of Rudolph and Rudolph (1972, p.105) with regard to flouting the conditions of grants-in-aid still holds good: “these grants in aid are technically conditioned upon the maintenance of certain academic and administrative standards, but in reality an educational entrepreneur who enjoys political favour has little difficulty in establishing his institution’s qualification”. Susanne Rudolph further points out that the condition for founding and maintenance institutions are probably less onerous in UP than in at least some other State with stronger administrative and political traditions (Rudolph and Rudolph: 1972).

Grants to private aided schools account for a very substantial proportion of the education budget in UP - about 70% and 80% of the higher and secondary education budgets in UP respectively - (see Muzammil 1989, p179-80 and GOUP 1992a, p30) but, at present, they are largely devoid of performance conditions or incentives. How and what incentives can be built into grants is an area that deserves detailed study. Such research could be based on an examination of the alternative grant structures in other countries. For example, a structure

31 may be desirable which relates grant levels to various school performance indicators such as percentage of total expenses spent on non-salary costs (to encourage quality improvements), percentage of total funds raised from non-fee sources such as parental donations (to encourage equitable resource-generation), percentage of parents who are satisfied with the school (to encourage accountability), and average number of students per class (to encourage cost- consciousness), etc. A more rational grant structure could be a policy correction that has potentially the biggest pay-offs in terms of improved cost-efficiency in UP education (Kingdon: 1994).

The effect, on state educational finances, of teacher union lobbying to bring Private UnAided schools on to the aided list:

Political pressures by teachers unions have led to more and more private unaided (i.e. fee-charging) junior and secondary schools being brought on to the grants-in-aid list of the GOUP, something which greatly increases the financial burden on the state without leading to any increase in the overall number of students or teachers. This is because all that happens when a private unaided (i.e. fee-charging) school is brought onto the aided list is that an existing private school stops charging fees and its teachers begin to get paid by the government treasury rather than out of fee revenues. Kingdon (1996b) has argued that the practice of bringing private unaided schools onto the grant-in-aid list is inimical both to equity and to efficiency.

Before a private unaided school is brought onto the state grant-in-aid list, its students paid a fee that covered the full cost of the running of that school. In other words, they were relatively well-off children who were willing and able to pay for their education. The teacher salaries and all other costs of the school were met out of the fee revenues. When brought onto the state government’s aided list, the school becomes almost entirely government-funded and its nature changes dramatically: it stops charging tuition fee (government-funded education is meant to be free of tuition-fee until class 12 - i.e. until children are aged about 18, see below); its teachers begin to be paid government salary scales directly from the state government treasury; and the role of the private management of the school is minimised in the sense that teachers are no longer so accountable to the local private manager or to parents because their salaries now come directly from the state government (Kingdon, 1996b). This is clearly perverse from the point of view of equity in the distribution of state educational subsidy because relatively well-off students who previously chose a fee-paying school are targeted for subsidy. Moreover, it is perverse from the point of view of efficiency as well because there is evidence that private unaided schools are more effective in helping their students to learn than aided schools (see Kingdon, 1996a for UP). This may be partly because teachers in unaided schools are accountable to and closely monitored by their school managers and by fee-paying parents. Once an unaided school is brought on to the aided list, its teachers cannot effectively be monitored or disciplined by their managers as their salaries now come from the state government treasury, and they are apt to be more negligent.

Thus, lobbying for unaided schools to be brought on to the aided list is detrimental both for equity and efficiency and it suggests that teachers’ interests are pursued in preference to the interests of the efficient and equitable distribution of scarce state educational resources.

32 It seems that there is no strong lobbying for primary schools to be brought on the grants-in-aid list in UP. This appears to be partly because primary teachers’ unions are not so well connected politically, as has been discussed previously, though it is also partly because few private primary schools are recognised17.

In sum, private aided schools depend almost entirely on State grants, more than 95 percent of which usually go to finance teacher salaries. That is the reason why politics plays a decisive role in the allocation of educational grants in UP. These grants ideally need to be linked with the quality of education in order to provide aided schools with incentives to become more effective. Moreover, we have noted that the practice of bringing unaided private schools on to the state government’s aided-school list is both inefficient and inequitable.

10. Teacher appointments and service benefits

Teachers in Private Aided schools have long been concerned about fairness in their appointments/dismissals and about improving their service benefits. They have campaigned long to achieve their goals. In an interview to the authors in January 1997, Rampal Singh, General Secretary of the UP Primary Teachers’ Union, explained that teachers were discontent in the 1960s because their appointment procedures were faulty and arbitrary, because teachers in aided school did not get adequate, just and timely salaries, and because there was no cross- district consistency in the service conditions of teachers (Singh, Rampal: 1997). From 1968-69 onwards, teachers campaigned in particular for the establishment of a Secondary Education Service Commission and a Basic Education Board.

As stated earlier in the paper, teachers’ organised lobbying for centralised State government management (rather than by local bodies or by private managements) started yielding results in the early 1970s when two far-reaching education Acts were passed: the Basic Education Act 1972 - which brought all local body schools directly under State government control - and the Salary Disbursement Act 1971 - which brought the teachers of all Private Aided schools directly under the State government’s remit. The effect of these Acts was to greatly improve teachers’ job security, to hugely centralise educational management in the State and, thereby, to diminish the local accountability of teachers. The enforcement of these Acts and the creation of the Basic Education Board substantially weakened the influence of local bodies and of private managements in basic education. The State government’s authority was strengthened.

Other important Acts have been the UP Basic Education Staff Rules of 1973, The UP Recognised Basic School Rules, 1978, and the UP Secondary Education (Service Commission) Act 1982. This last was legislated by the GOUP in 1982 and it was favourable to the private

17 The state considers it its own responsibility to provide primary education and so is reluctant to recognise the thousands of private primary schools that exist in UP. Since such schools are not recognised and they are not required to be registered, they do not appear in the official education statistics, which give the gravely erroneous impression of the role of private fee-charging institutions in primary education in UP (Kingdon, 1996b). For example, official statistics show that in 1986 only 8.5% of all children were enrolled in rural primary and junior schools were attending private unaided schools (GOUP, 1991). By contrast, A recent household survey showed that in 1994, 27.2% of all 6-14 year olds were attending private fee-charging schools in rural UP (Shariff, 1996). A survey of Lucknow city found that in 1995, 86% of all school-going 6-11 year olds were attending private fee-charging schools in Lucknow city in UP.

33 aided secondary teachers since it stipulated that the selection of teachers in UP would now be made by the Secondary Education Services Comission - seen as fairer than private managers. Under the Intermediate Education Act 1921, the private management of a school was authorised to impose punishment with the approval of the District Inspector of Schools (DIOS) in matters pertaining to disciplinary action. Teachers argued that this provision was arbitrary in cases where the management proposed to impose the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Therefore it was considered necessary that this power should be exercised subject to the prior approval of the Secondary Education Service Commission or the Selection Boards, as the case may be, which would function as an independent and impartial body.

The many concessions won by teachers regarding appointments, emoluments, promotion and service conditions18 of teachers in primary and secondary schools by way of the above Acts can be regarded as the achievements of their agitations and political lobbying. They were transferred from the sometimes exploitative control of the private management and local bodies to the ‘generous’ supervision of the State Government through various beneficial rules and legislations enacted by the State Government during the decades of 1970s and 1980s.

The various educational Acts and Rules of the UP government have been promulgated almost invariably in direct response to teacher demands and the effect has been to (i) centralise the procedures for the selection and recruitment of teaching staff and (ii) to eradicate private managers and local bodies’ authority in disciplining errant teachers by means such as punishment, dismissal, or demotion in rank, thus greatly reducing teachers’ local answerability.

11. Increases in teacher salaries

It would be interesting and instructive to examine whether teacher unions achieved success by the following two yardsticks: firstly, whether they made real gains in salary and secondly whether they increased their share of total state educational expenditure. We compare the rate of increase in the salary of teachers in UP with the rate of increase in prices, to see whether real salaries have changed much over time, and scrutinise the change in the share of salaries in total education spending over time.

The rate of price rise is measured through the All India Consumer Price Index (CPI) which is used for determining the announcement of D.A. etc. The details of the pay scales of teachers of various categories and the CPI are given in Table 8a. The salaries presented are the minimum at the basic pay scale, exclusive of Dearness Allowance. Since the salaries shown are inflation proofed via the Dearness Allowance, we assume that they represent teachers’ real salaries.

Table 8a shows that until about 1970, the rate of increase in teachers’ basic salary (in real terms) was relatively low. For example, the annual rate of increase in the real pay of high school headmasters between 1960 and 1969 was only 1%. Of the five categories of teachers shown in the table, the maximum benefit accrued to CT grade teachers whose basic pay went up from Rs 75 (per month) in 1960-61 to Rs. 4250 in 1995-96, representing a growth of

18 Such as parity (with govt employees) in triple benefit scheme, DA, house rent allowance, bonus, gratuity, etc.

34 12.2% per annum. The lowest increase was recorded in the salary of headmasters of high schools, which has gone up from Rs 225 in 1960-61 to Rs 6500 in 1995-96, giving a still huge real growth of 10.1% per annum. The basic salary of CT grade teachers grew at a rate of 12.1% per annum between 1985 and 1995. This is higher than the real rate of growth of salaries of elementary school teachers between 1985-1990 estimated by Drèze and Sen (1995b, p122) who find that between 1980 and 1990 alone UP teachers’ salaries rose by 9% per year in real terms, i.e. a doubling in just 10 years rather than from 1960 to 199519.

However, it is possible that inflation-proofing via the so-called Dearness Allowance does not compensate adequately for price rises. Thus, we assume a more pessimistic scenario for teachers, namely that the basic salary figures reported in Table 8a are not real but entirely nominal, though it is likely that in doing so, we are deflating teachers salaries by the CPI twice. Table 8b is based on the assumption of nominality, and it shows that teachers’ real salaries increased at an annual percentage rate of approximately 4% to 5% over the 22 year period 1973 to 1995, a still spectacular rate of growth over a long period of time which may be taken as a rough indicator of the success with which teachers and their unions have lobbied the government for pecuniary gains. It is likely that the actual annual growth of real salaries was somewhere between those shown in Tables 8a and 8b.

19 Drèze and Sen’s (D&S) calculations are not directly comparable with ours (M&K) for several reasons: firstly, D&S’s figures are for India as a whole; M&K’s for UP only; secondly, D&S’s figures relate to all elementary school teachers; M&K’s figures are for CT grade teachers; D&S’s figures are calculated by dividing total expenditure on elementary schools by the number of elementary teachers, a procedure which is valid since salary expenses account for 96-98% of the total expenses of elementary schools; M&K’s figures are the actual pay scales of CT grade teachers.

35 Table No 8a TEACHERS’ SALARY & THE PRICE INDEX IN UP (PAY IN Rs.)

YEAR PRINCIPAL HEAD ASSTT. TRAINED CT GRADE CPI MASTER TEACHER GRADUATE TEACHER 1960=100 TEACHER Intermediate High School Intermediate High School 1960-61 250 225 175 120 75 100 (..) (..) (..) (..) (..) (..)

1969-70 275 247 215 138 100 180 (10) (7) (23) (15) (33) (80)

1971-72 500 400 365 300 220 192 (100) (78) (109) (150) (193) (92)

1973-74 550 450 400 300 250 250 (120) (100) (129) (150) (233) (150)

1975-76 850 770 650 450 450 313 (240) (242) (271) (275) (500) (213)

1985-86 2200 2000 1600 1400 1350 620 (780) (789) (814) (1067) (1700) (520)

1995-96 8000 6500 5500 4500 4250 1542 (3100) (2789) (3043) (3650) (5567) (1442)

Rate of Annual 10.4 10.1 10.4 10.9 12.2 8.1 percentage increase

NOTE: The salaries presented here are the minimum at the basic pay scale, exclusive of Dearness Allowance. Figures in brackets show the percentage increase over 1960-61.

Table No 8b TEACHERS’ SALARY & THE PRICE INDEX IN UP (PAY IN Rs.)

YEAR PRINCIPAL HEAD ASSTT. T.G. CT GRADE CPI MASTER TEACHER TEACHER TEACHER 1960=100 Inter college High School Inter college High School

Nom. Real Nom. Real Nom. Real Nom. Real Nom. Real 1960-61 250 250 225 225 175 175 120 120 75 75 100

1969-70 275 153 247 137 215 119 138 77 100 56 180

1971-72 500 260 400 208 365 190 300 156 220 115 192

1973-74 550 220 450 180 400 160 300 120 250 100 250

1975-76 850 272 770 246 650 208 450 144 450 144 313

1985-86 2200 355 2000 323 1600 258 1400 226 1350 217 620

1995-96 8000 519 6500 422 5500 357 4500 292 4250 276 1542

Annual % 4.0 3.9 3.7 4.1 4.7 increase ‘73-95

NOTE: The above amounts of pay are the minimum at the basic pay scale exclusive of D.A.

36

Table 9 SALARY EXPENDITURE AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE

YEAR Recurrent as a Salary as a percentage of total % of total recurrent educational expenditure educational (%) expenditure Primary Junior Secondary 1960-61 74.7 87.9 85.1 72.3 1965-66 79.4 90.7 89.2 75.3 1969-70 85.0 92.3 90.4 85.6 1974-75 87.1 96.6 94.3 87.1 1981-82 94.8 96.7 93.8 89.9 1987-88 97.3 NA NA 90.7

Source: (GOI, Education in India), various years. Note: The figures published for the year 1987-88 for primary and junior education levels are not comparable with figures published in previous years because for 1987-88, non-teaching staff salaries have been lumped together with the item ‘other’ giving the implausibly low figures of 94.0% and 91.6% for primary and junior education respectively. Note that prior to 1960-61, expenditure information in published documents is not presented by item of expenditure (salaries, consumables, others,etc) but rather by expenditure on boys’ schools and expenditure on girls’ school, etc or expenditure by source.

Another indication of the success of teachers in winning financial victories is if teachers win increases in the share of salary expenditure as a proportion of total educational expenditure, i.e. manage to squeeze out the share of other heads of educational expenditure. The government of India itself notes (GOI, 1985a, p25): “more than 90% of the expenditure - in some states even more than 98% - is spent on teachers’ salaries and administration. Practically nothing is available to buy a blackboard and chalks, let alone charts, other inexpensive teaching aids or even pitchers for drinking water”. Certain non-UP microstudies have found similarly, for example Tilak and Bhatt in Tilak’s (1992) study of school costs in state which shows (p130) that salary costs account for between 96.2% (in secondary) and 99.0% (in primary) of total recurrent unit costs. The authors conclude (p165) that a “negligible proportion of total recurring costs are incurred on items other than the salaries of teachers”. Aggarwal (op. cit. p86) calculates that expenditure on staff salary accounts for 93.5% of total expenditure in G schools, 94.0% in Private Aided schools and 87.7% in PUA schools in his sample of secondary schools in .

Yet, research suggests that teacher salaries have no significant influence on student achievement but that other forms of educational expenditure does. For example, in 72 developing country studies, the factors that boosted student achievement most were: (i) instructional materials, (ii) length of the weekly instructional programme, (iii) school library activity, and (iv) teacher training at tertiary level etc. (Fuller: 1986). Teacher salaries did not significantly affect student achievement in the majority of the studies. Similar findings were obtained in a survey of 147 developed-country studies (Hanushek: 1986, 1996). For the state of UP, Kingdon (1996) found similarly to Fuller and Hanushek - namely that teacher salaries had no significant impact on student achievement after controlling for student and household

37 characteristics, but that school resources, instructional time, and quality of teacher’s education did significantly improve student learning.

The first column of Table 9 shows that recurrent expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure has increased monotonically over time and that, by 1987-88, virtually the whole of government educational expenditure was devoted to recurrent expenditures – which include mainly salaries but does not include equipment, furniture, buildings, maintenance, or other durable resources. Moreover, salaries have made significant inroads into total recurrent expenditure as well: the share of salaries in total recurrent expenditure has increased secularly over time in the case of each of primary, junior, and secondary education. In secondary education, the share of non-salary expenses fell from 27.7% to a mere 9.3%, between roughly 1960 and 1987; Between 1960 and 1981, the equivalent share in junior education fell from 14.9% to a mere 6.2% and in primary education from 12.1% to a paltry 3.3%. These figures seem to provide a very plausible guage of the increasing power of teachers and their organisations. However, they point attention to the unfortunate fact that as a result of this success, expenditure which has great educational merit has been progressively squeezed out: studies worldwide (cited above) show that increases in salary expenditures are not associated with improvements in student achievment but that increasing school resources and teaching materials and lengthening the instructional programme are.

12. Conclusions

We started this paper with reference to the significance of education for economic growth and social progress. We set ourselves the task of exploring the relationship, if any, between teachers, politics, and education, and of investigating the extent to which teachers’ politicisation has influenced the evolution of educational legislation and of educational structures in UP.

The paper has documented evidence of significant political penetration by teachers. This is so particularly in the case of teachers of private aided secondary schools, which constitute the main bulk of all secondary schools. This politicisation of teachers appears to have been helped by a Constitutional provision for their reserved representation in the Upper House of the state legislature and by the fact that they are not debarred from contesting for election to the Lower House of the state legislature. Capitalising on this special status, their representation has gradually became sizeable in the Lower House as well. Thus, teachers of the private aided educational institutions in UP can significantly influence the legislative activities of the government. Their lobbying has gradually become stronger and has earned them substantial economic gains from the GOUP. It would be naïve to think that the politicisation of the main actors in the education sector – namely teachers - has been without effect on functioning of school education in UP. There is widespread concern about the deleterious effects of teacher politics on the progress of the education sector in UP.

This paper has argued that the political identities of teachers are stronger than those of any other group drawing salaries directly from the public exchequer. Since they form a separate electoral college to elect their representatives to the Legislative Council, their political motivations are well made. It is a commonplace observation that teachers’ frequent political

38 activities have converted educational institutions into what is popularly called a “Rajnaitik Akhara” (political boxing -ring).

Teachers’ politicisation – in the sense of their active participation in their union activities and the fact that their union activities are directed or supported by professional teacher politicians who are MLCs, MLAs and ministers in government - has been linked to the poor performance of school education in India. For example, the National Commission on Teachers states that “the most important factor responsible for vitiating the atmosphere in schools, we were told, has been the role of teacher politicians and teachers’ organisations.” (NCT: 1986, p. 68).

In view of the negative aspects of teachers’ political activities, which are frequently brought into public focus in the media, they have often been advised to mend their ways and become constructive, through exhortations such as: “teachers’ associations should play an important role in increasing the professional honesty and dignity of teachers and in restraining professional misconduct. The National Federation of Teachers can prepare a professional code of conduct for teachers” (Agnihotri: 1987, p. 282)20.

The influence of teacher MLCs, MLAs and ministers on education policy making has been substantial in UP. When teachers were education ministers, they influenced education policy in the State in a direct way. For example, during 1998, Nepal Singh and Ravindra Shukla - teacher Ministers and the former also a MLC from the graduate constituency elected in 1998 - ordered the revision of history books of the secondary classes and a committee was formed for the books to be revised because the BJP Government in UP wanted to promote Hinduism.

The evolution of educational finance policy in UP appears to have been heavily influenced by the demands of teachers. There are many indications to suggest this. For example, Private Aided school teachers – aggrieved partly by the corrupt practices of the managers of their schools - lobbied hard in the late 1960s for salary disbursement directly from the government treasury. Their agitation of November-December 1968 lasted for 45 days, with 20 thousand teachers being sent to jails and most of the educational institutions in the State being closed. The result was the Salary Distribution Act of 1971 whereby the State Government undertook to pay the full salaries of all aided school teachers, a measure which was only a little short of nationalising aided schools. Local-body school teachers had also campaigned hard for the removal of inter-district disparity in matters such as pay, service conditions and appointments, calling effectively for state government takeover. This resulted in the momentous UP Basic Education Act of 1972, whereby the State Government brought all primary and junior local body schools under direct State Government control. These Acts in UP (and similar Acts in other states) represented a massive centralisation of educational management.

The fact that the Salary Disbursement Act 1971 and the Basic Education Act 1972 – arguably the most important educational legislations in UP - came about immediately after

20 Some analysts believe that “the office bearers of the unions themselves lead the most corrupt life. Their posts are the most secure” (Agarwal, 1985 p. 425).

39 periods of intense strikes by teachers, suggests that educational legislation in UP has come about as a reaction to protests rather than being based on well-conceived principles of efficiency and equity. The measures legislated, i.e. the actual content of these Acts, had the effect of increasing job-security and salaries of Private Aided and local body school teachers, but at the same time, they greatly centralised the administration and management of schools. The effect was to all but remove teachers’ accountability to their local managers and local bodies. This abandonment of local accountability is likely to have had an adverse effect on the functioning of schools. Since the school manager or local body cannot sack a shirking teacher, and have virtually no discretion to penalise errant teachers, there is an incentive to shirk.

The well-documented lax attitudes of many teachers towards their schools and students have resulted not only from their loss of local accountability, but also from the strength and influence of their unions. Union-backed teachers do not fear adverse repercussions on slackness in their work. There is support for this notion in the Report of the National Commission on Teachers which notes that “some of the Principals deposing before it (i.e. before the Commission) lamented that they had no powers over teachers and were not in a position to enforce order and discipline. Nor did the District Inspectors of Schools and other officials exercise any authority over them as the erring teachers were often supported by powerful teachers’ associations. We were told that that there was no assessment of a teacher’s academic and other work and that teachers were virtually unaccountable to anybody” (NCT, 1986, p68). It seems that knowledge that powerful unions protect them encourages teachers to be bold and allows them to get away with behaviour that is privately profitable but less than ethical, such as absenteeism, late arrival and early departure from school, compelling their students to take paid home tuitions from them for a private fee, etc.

Teachers’ participation in politics also has a direct adverse effect on the functioning of schools: it keeps them away from schools because they are engaged in union/political activities. Evidence presented here and discussions with knowledgeable persons suggest that teachers are mobilised by their leaders for agitation in one form or another every year and their strikes are frequent and often prolonged. Consequently, teaching suffers adversely. While no estimates are available of the number or proportion of teachers that directly contest elections, we estimated crudely that 90% of the teachers of state-funded secondary schools are members of the secondary teachers’ union. Information is also available on the approximate numbers of teachers that were involved in strikes during particular episodes. Evidence presented showed a high degree of participation by teachers in protest action21 and suggests that a substantial amount of teaching time must be lost for a large number of teachers in most years in union related activities such as pen-down strikes, mass casual leaves, pickets and sit-ins, demonstrations, and jail terms, etc. Moreover, teacher MLAs and MLCs continue in their teaching posts which are often not filled by replacement teachers, thus leading to a loss of teaching activity - although, here, only a small number of teachers are involved. Teacher union leaders and teacher MLAs and MLCs continue to draw their teacher salaries (plus their

21 For example, during a particularly stormy period of union lobbying in 1968, about 20,000 demonstrating teachers were sent to jail, the agitation lasted for about 45 days, and most educational institutions in the state were closed for this period. In another episode in August 1964 about 10,000 teachers demonstrated and in February 1965, about 30,000 teachers demonstrated to lobby for their demands. On 5th November 1985, about 80,000 teachers took mass casual leave and 2 days later, on 7 th November, some 40,000 teachers demonstrated in Lucknow. In January 1992, about 10,000 teachers participated in a sit-in (picket) in Lucknow.

40 MLA/MLC salary) for the full term of political office, though they do not teach during this period. These financial resources could arguably be better spent in other ways.

The Report of the National Commission on Teachers (NCT: 1986) levels the following three criticisms at teacher unions: firstly that there is too much politicisation in the teachers organisations; secondly that there has been too much proliferation of such organisations and it would be a good thing if their numbers could be reduced substantially; and thirdly that teachers’ organisations have not paid enough attention to the intellectual and professional improvement of their members.

Teachers’ undue involvement in politics and the fact that they campaign within secondary schools (often during election time) may have the effect of diluting the educational environment of the schools. The fact that teachers in Private Aided schools have been at the forefront of political activity among all teachers is important in the light of recent arguments for educational voucher type schemes in India, which would probably utilise private aided schools.

It is not plausible to attribute the poor functioning of the school education system in India to the single cause, namely the politicisation of Private Aided secondary school teachers22. The extreme paucity of resources and of even simple teaching materials; decrepit or disintegrating school buildings; and lack of even basic facilities such as drinking water and toilets, must surely create a disempowering environment for teachers and students, especially in primary schools where such problems loom larger than in secondary schools. However, it could be argued that this state of affairs has come about because of two important factors: (i) education is not a political issue with the electorate at large, as Drèze and Sen (1995) have argued, so that successive governments have given it a low priority in funding allocations and (ii) because politically influential teachers and their unions have campaigned singularly for their own financial betterment and not for the improvement of school facilities etc. more generally. Any financial capacity of the state to increase educational resources has been fully tapped by teachers for themselves and no parents or children’s lobby exists to demand greater allocations to school non-salary expenses.

There is a substantial Indian and international body of literature which finds that school inputs boost students’ achievement while increases in teacher salaries do not. Studies cited earlier show that in a review of 72 developing country studies and 147 developed country studies, increases in teacher salaries did not have an impact on student achievement levels in the majority of the studies. The 72 developing country studies (Fuller, 1986) and Kingdon’s (1996) study on UP suggested, however, that other inputs such as school resources, instructional materials, school infrastructure, longer school days, etc. did significantly improve student learning. Unfortunately, teacher unions in UP have never lobbied for increased resources, better infrastructure, or longer school days. Our investigations corroborate the finding of the National Commission on Teachers that “the main preoccupation of teachers’

22 There is a tendency, in many educational debates in India, to blame poor educational performance on single causes. For instance, the failure of a large proportion of rural children to participate in schooling or to complete primary schooling has often been attributed to poverty and the consequent need for child labour. Yet, Drèze and Kingdon (2000) who empirically examine the determinants of children’s schooling participation in rural north India find that there are many different factors that determine schooling participation and primary school completion, as discussed early in the paper.

41 organisations particularly since independence has been with the improvement of salary and service conditions of teachers. And in this they have achieved considerable success.” (NCT: 1986, p. 73).

Between 1960 and 1981, the share of non-salary expenditure in total educational expenditure fell from about 28% to 10% in secondary education, from 15% to 6% in junior education, and from 12% to a mere 3% in primary education. The fact that the share of non- salary expenditures in total educational expenditure has been so considerably squeezed out by inroads made by salary expenses is indeed sad because it has been persuasively argued that these other expenditures have greater educational merit. The political economy reasons for this phenomenon - namely that government-funded schools now spend only a tiny fraction of their total expenditure on non-personnel costs - are well articulated in Mathew’s (1990) study of secondary education in Kerala: he observes that while militantly unionised teachers exert strong pressure on the state government to increase their salaries, no lobby or pressure group exists to demand government grants for non -salary school expenses.

It is not surprising then that the National Commission on Teachers (NCT, 1986, p71) makes the impassioned appeal “we must draw attention … to the need to promote actively parents’ organisations all over the country. At present there are hardly any organisations interested in providing good education to their children. We feel that such organisations are desperately needed to promote and safeguard the educational interests of their wards and to counteract the negative and unhealthy political preoccupations of some the teachers and their organisations”.

Forming a trade union is a legitimate worker right in any democratic society and campaigning for better salaries and service conditions is one of the main legitimate purposes of worker unions, including teachers’ unions. However, this paper has presented evidence which shows how teachers’ political clout has made it difficult for the government to deal impartially with teacher demands, and the consequences of this.

This paper has attempted to examine the political economy factors that impinge on the school education sector in Uttar Pradesh. We have presented evidence based on imperfect data that are available currently. It is hoped that better data both on UP and for other states will stimulate more detailed future research and also permit an examination of the extent to which the conclusions reached here are generalisable to other states.

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46