Karl-Friedrich Walling. Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. xii + 356 pp. $40.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-0970-3.

Reviewed by Doron Ben-Atar

Published on H-SHEAR (April, 2001)

War and Liberty in Hamilton's Thought military academies; an ocean-going navy; a rapid‐ Republican Empire is a sophisticated histori‐ ly expandable army in time of peace; and a na‐ cal analysis of Hamiltonian thought. Versed in tional spirit rooted in Americans' devotion to both both historiography and the history of ideas, Karl- Union and liberty are now the cornerstones of our Friedrich Walling presents Alexander Hamilton as common defense." (p. 288) Republican Empire, a theorist and practical statesman, who recog‐ then, establishes Hamilton as the most profound nized the tensions between the political freedom and farsighted American founder. I agree. in republics and the necessity of protecting peace, Eighteenth-century thinkers doubted the abil‐ freedom, and prosperity through military action. ity of republics to defend themselves against ene‐ Freedom in the United States has not been afect‐ mies. Founded upon feminine impulses of trade ed by the nation's military engagements, accord‐ and cooperation, so the story went, republics ing to Walling, because the Founders --led by could not stand up to the masculine, marshal spir‐ Hamilton -- turned their back to Whig prejudice it of enemies. Faced with military challenges from against standing armies and established a system their enemies, republics were expected to choose of government that is realistic, responsible, and between mounting efective defense and preserv‐ capable of mounting efective military campaigns. ing political liberties. All republics that came be‐ While Hamilton sufered severe political set‐ fore the United States succumbed to the state of backs in the fnal years of life, his legacy had a war because by its very nature, war enhances the formative impact on the structure and content of power of the executive and demands suppression American politics. As Walling concludes, "Hamil‐ of dissent at home. "The necessities, accidents, ton won all the fundamental debates about Amer‐ and passions of war," Walling writes, have con‐ ican national security policy. Broad construction tributed to the collapse of free governments from of the Constitution and executive power; judicial antiquity to the modern era. In more than two review; a credit-based manufacturing economy; centuries of its existence as an independent na‐ H-Net Reviews tion, the United States has taken part in many for‐ had forced the army to supply itself of the land. eign wars. All the same, the United States has re‐ As E. J. Ferguson demonstrated, more than half of mained "the outstanding exception to the well- the cost of fghting the Revolution was covered grounded historical axiom that war is the great through arbitrary appropriation of the property destroyer of free governments" (p. xi). Walling be‐ of American patriots by the Continental army. lieves that the political legacy of Hamilton al‐ Hamilton, who was Washington's chief of staf, lowed the nation to mount efective foreign wars had frst hand knowledge of this pattern of abuse. without compromising liberties at home. He concluded that if the American republic The American Revolution and the military wished to avoid the fate of the Greek and Roman struggle against Britain were Hamilton's forma‐ republics that were destroyed by war, it must de‐ tive political experiences. A recent young immi‐ velop an apparatus of military preparedness that grant from the British West Indies, Hamilton did not threaten liberty. An inefective govern‐ plunged into the revolutionary struggle as a stu‐ ment incapable of supporting its national defense dent at King's College. He dropped out to join the posed a greater risk to liberty than standing Continental army, where he quickly rose in the armies. Only a strong and efective government ranks. Unlike most of his peers, he had no experi‐ "would not sacrifce the rights of its people to its ence on the state level and his loyalty was always strategic necessities" (p. 194). founded on his commitment to the national cause. With the war over, Hamilton settled in New For young men like Hamilton, the Continental York where he began to develop his legal and po‐ army emerged as the only repository of collective litical careers. His courage and frm commitment American nationalism. to individual liberty were manifested almost im‐ While political conficts between the states mediately when he took the unpopular and risky paralyzed the Continental Congress, citizens of public position against the persecution of former those states efectively cooperated as members of Loyalists. The anti-Tory orgy that followed the the unifed Continental army. Hamilton thereafter withdrawal of British forces from New York broke with the Whig opposition to maintaining taught him the dangers of the tyranny of the ma‐ standing armies in times of peace, for he came to jority. Similarly, he took the unpopular position see in the national army a protector of liberties against forceful reassertion of the state's authori‐ against the parochial forces in American society. ty in Vermont. In fact, Hamilton sponsored an un‐ He envisioned a small professional standing army successful bill in the New York legislature that ready to protect the republic from internal and recognized Vermont's independence provided external threats. It was a highly sophisticated vi‐ that the state joined the Union and cease firting sion. As Walling writes, "the only ingredients of a with British Canada. His actions from his early modern, professional army missing from Hamil‐ days as a student protestor to his legal and politi‐ ton's plan were a military academy and a general cal battles in the state of New York, established staf, both of which seemed too expensive at the Hamilton's revolutionary credentials "three times time" (p. 69). over: frst, when he employed the conventional Catonic synthesis of Whig vigilance and Lockean The inefectiveness of the Continental Con‐ liberalism to justify resistance to England; second, gress during the war years and its inability to en‐ when he steered his own course by advocating a sure a steady supply to men fghting in Washing‐ responsible, confdence-inspiring national gov‐ ton's army plagued the American military efort ernment to increase the tangible and intangible for most of the war. Congressional inability and/ capabilities of the Confederation during the war; or unwillingness to fnance the revolutionary war and third, when he returned to the frst principles

2 H-Net Reviews of the Revolution and opposed democratic despo‐ eration was intolerable. "Republican government tism and republican imperialism in New York" (p. requires the rule of law, but the confederated 92). form of union denied Congress the means of es‐ Hamilton left his greatest mark on American tablishing the rule of anything but martial law. Ei‐ politics in the second half of the 1780s, when to‐ ther an army must put down resistance, or the gether with Madison he led the Constitutional government could not uphold its law. Either the movement from its early conceptualization at An‐ Confederation would become a military despo‐ napolis through the ratifcation battles, and as tism, or it would collapse."(p. 107). The only way Washington's Secretary of the Treasury from 1789 to avoid such calamities is to establish an efective to 1795. The American executive was the com‐ government that will have the appearance of hav‐ bined brainchild of Madison and Hamilton. On ing signifcant force at its disposal. As Hamilton the domestic front, as Madison would have it, famously declared, "whenever the Government Congress, the states, and the judiciary checked its appears in arms it ought to appear like a Her‐ powers. In the realm of foreign afairs, however, cules." the Hamiltonian vision of a powerful President, Hamilton recognized that the new national commander of the Federal army, with freedom to government had to demonstrate at home and devise policy and enact measures, prevailed. abroad that it was not plagued by the paralysis of Hamilton recognized that defending the Union the Articles of Confederation. The new govern‐ could threaten domestic liberties, for it is "in the ment would be accepted by the people only if it nature of war to increase the executive at the ex‐ materially improved the daily lives of citizens, es‐ pense of the legislative authority." His actions as a tablished and enforced the rule of law, and estab‐ de facto prime minister in the Washington cabinet lished its "natural cultural legitimacy" with the gave content and substance to the structure estab‐ majority of its people. His vision of national great‐ lished in Philadelphia. His primary goal was to in‐ ness was rooted, frst and foremost in the consent fuse the Federal executive with energy. Only an of the governed. Because the United States was energetic executive was capable of setting the na‐ composed of a multiplicity of semi-autonomous, tional agenda and establishing national and inter‐ culturally diverse communities, he centered his national legitimacy. It was Hamilton who made nationalization scheme on the only group that the American Presidency "both constitutional and could bind the nation. Merchants, by the very na‐ republican" (p. 153). ture of their activities, constituted that element Establishing the young republic as a frst rate most disposed to breadth of vision, and most sen‐ power in the family of nations then was his pri‐ sitive to all of society's larger interests. Supplying mary goal. Hamilton's empire, as Walling ex‐ the diferent regions with goods not locally avail‐ plains, did not imply military conquest of far able, they served artisans and farmers alike as away territories and the subjugation of their peo‐ natural allies. ples. On the contrary, his republican empire was The concerns of the "assiduous merchant, the founded on the formation of an efective union of laborious husbandman, the active mechanic and the existing states. Unlike his Republican rivals the industrious manufacturer," Hamilton wrote, who craved the conquest of new lands to ensure become "intimately blended and interwoven" in the persistence of a republican political economy the commercial order. Moreover, founding the for generations to come, Hamilton's vision cen‐ new nation on an alliance between the govern‐ tered on consolidating and strengthening the ment and the urban bourgeoisie was also a barri‐ Union. The situation under the Articles of Confed‐ er to abuse of rights. Machiavelli had warned long

3 H-Net Reviews ago that the coalition between landed aristocracy this view enjoys an unfair historical hindsight; and the military threatened to undermine liberty. reasonable people in 1798 could have had "honest The commercial classes, on the other hand, by diferences of opinion about the nature, direction, virtue of their allegiance to peaceful trade rela‐ and extent of the French threat." (p. 226) tions, are the best allies of peace and prosperity. In other words, Hamilton seriously thought Hamilton's fnancial program, which aimed frst that France was about to invade. Yet, there is no and foremost to attach the allegiance of the busi‐ real evidence that Hamilton thought a French at‐ ness classes to the new government, ensured that tack was forthcoming. He did not plan a defensive the new administration would be committed to war. No one could seriously consider the small peace and prosperity rather than to the mission‐ Federalist army more than a symbolic response to ary advocacy of worldwide republicanism. the huge armies employed by France from 1792 to Historical portrayals of Alexander Hamilton 1815. Finally, the idea of an invasion of the South as a trigger-happy militarist eager to assert na‐ from the French West Indies is even more ludi‐ tional authority through the use of a Herculean crous given the civil war in St. Domingue and the army are highly inaccurate. Hamilton was aware efective siege of the other French islands by the of the risks of military action and developed a so‐ Royal Navy. A more fuid view of Hamilton, one phisticated theory about the timing and limits for that allows him to change through time, is better the use of power. He was instrumental in develop‐ equipped to explain how the republican states‐ ing the American defnition of a just war: when man of the 1780s and early 1790s came to stand rights are violated, talk before employing coer‐ for suppression of dissent and persecution of ri‐ cion, impose sanction if the violations persist, and vals in the fnal days of the eighteenth century. use violence only as a last resort. There is a measure of self-serving patriotism Hamilton's support for energetic government in Walling's celebration of American exceptional‐ originated not only in his military experience, but ism, which makes foreigners, like myself, a bit un‐ also in his desire to rekindle the public spirit of comfortable. Walling's portrayal of the United the revolutionary days. More than any American States as the only bastion of virtue and freedom in of his generation, Hamilton began the exploration the world follows in the tradition of four cen‐ of the modern "form of civic virtue that we call turies of American chutzpa. Since the days when nationalism" (p. 45). John Winthrop crowned the journey of one hun‐ Walling's refutation of Hamilton's supposed dred marginal Englishmen into the boondocks a militarism is most problematic when it comes to "city on a hill", Americans have been telling us the events of the late 1790s. In the aftermath of that the United States is the best of all possible the XYZ afair, as the nation prepared for a war countries. The American record on liberty at war, with France, Hamilton led the struggle for the for‐ however, is no cause for celebration. Freedom mation of a peacetime army that was used to had many setbacks -- from the Alien and Sedition crush the protests of Pennsylvania Germans in Acts of the Quasi-war with France to the massive the Fries rebellion. Since France did not have the assaults on individual liberties of the Vietnam era naval capability to mount an invasion of the Unit‐ exposed by the Watergate scandal, from the Balti‐ ed States, most historians concluded that Hamil‐ more riots during the War of 1812 to the anti-com‐ ton and the High Federalists intended to use the munist hysteria of the Cold War. And I have not army against their domestic opponents. Hamil‐ mentioned the brutal, persistent, and willful sup‐ ton's army of 1798, then, was the violator rather pression of the rights of African Americans, slaves than protector of liberties. Walling retorts that and free, which was the cornerstone of American

4 H-Net Reviews society and diplomacy well into the 1960s. Even in conversations with Plutarch, Machiavelli, Locke, comparison to other nations at war, United States Hobbes, Seabury, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and wartime assaults on liberty were hardly mild. Hume. Readers of Republican Empire are treated The author is also a modern political conser‐ to an Alexander Hamilton who was not only a vi‐ vative and at times he takes issues with modern sionary statesman, but also a sophisticated theo‐ political disputes. For example, at one point rist who had a unique ability to cut to the core of Walling argues that there were many similarities issues and make presentations that were consis‐ between Hamilton of the late 1790s and the fate of tently brilliant. Through a discussion of the inter‐ George Patton and Douglas McArthur. All three action between what Hamilton said and wrote were military men who dared tell the truth to and what his peers said in response, Republican their country and paid a dear personal and politi‐ Empire takes readers through the debates over cal price for their courage. Readers who think dif‐ the legitimacy of Revolution, to the issues behind ferently about modern politics and the legacies of the Constitutional movement, to the founding of Patton and McArthur need not worry that Repub‐ the Federal government, and to the collapse of lican Empire is political polemics masquerading Federalism in the early decades of the nineteenth as scholarship. It is not. Walling's wrong-headed century. views (from which he may still recover) do not de‐ This is a highly demanding read. The book is tract from the intellectual quality of his analysis. dense and highly theoretical. It is thus addressed Walling's grand thesis -- that Hamilton de‐ to the small group of historians and political theo‐ serves much of the credit for the American ability rists who are well versed in both theory and the to wage wars without destroying domestic liber‐ history of the early republic. For the specialists, ties -- assumes much about the power of ideas to however, the depth and insight of Walling's analy‐ shape the future. While I share the author's ap‐ sis make the efort required to read such academ‐ preciation for Hamilton's thinking and fnd many ic analysis wholly worthwhile. The complex and of his insights useful, I cannot accept the argu‐ profound thought of Alexander Hamilton de‐ ment that what Hamilton wrote and thought in serves such a serious frst-rate study. the last quarter of the eighteenth century has Copyright (c) 2001 by H-Net, all rights re‐ shaped the relationship between liberty and war served. This work may be copied for non-proft for the entire era of American history. The Ameri‐ educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ can style of politics and diplomacy is a work-in- thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ progress of many individuals over many genera‐ tact [email protected]. tions. I fail the see a direct link between what even someone as infuential as Hamilton wrote in 1787, for example, and the toleration of dissent during the Gulf War. These methodological and political disagree‐ ments aside, Republican Empire successfully places Hamilton's thought within English and Scottish discourses on rights. Walling's mastery of the history of ideas from antiquity to the present allows him to analyze Hamilton's views in the context of their foundations in Western culture. Walling's Hamilton is engaged in philosophical

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Citation: Doron Ben-Atar. Review of Walling, Karl-Friedrich. Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government. H-SHEAR, H-Net Reviews. April, 2001.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5061

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