War and Liberty in Hamilton's Thought
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Karl-Friedrich Walling. Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. xii + 356 pp. $40.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-0970-3. Reviewed by Doron Ben-Atar Published on H-SHEAR (April, 2001) War and Liberty in Hamilton's Thought military academies; an ocean-going navy; a rapid‐ Republican Empire is a sophisticated histori‐ ly expandable army in time of peace; and a na‐ cal analysis of Hamiltonian thought. Versed in tional spirit rooted in Americans' devotion to both both historiography and the history of ideas, Karl- Union and liberty are now the cornerstones of our Friedrich Walling presents Alexander Hamilton as common defense." (p. 288) Republican Empire, a theorist and practical statesman, who recog‐ then, establishes Hamilton as the most profound nized the tensions between the political freedom and farsighted American founder. I agree. in republics and the necessity of protecting peace, Eighteenth-century thinkers doubted the abil‐ freedom, and prosperity through military action. ity of republics to defend themselves against ene‐ Freedom in the United States has not been affect‐ mies. Founded upon feminine impulses of trade ed by the nation's military engagements, accord‐ and cooperation, so the story went, republics ing to Walling, because the Founders --led by could not stand up to the masculine, marshal spir‐ Hamilton -- turned their back to Whig prejudice it of enemies. Faced with military challenges from against standing armies and established a system their enemies, republics were expected to choose of government that is realistic, responsible, and between mounting effective defense and preserv‐ capable of mounting effective military campaigns. ing political liberties. All republics that came be‐ While Hamilton suffered severe political set‐ fore the United States succumbed to the state of backs in the fnal years of life, his legacy had a war because by its very nature, war enhances the formative impact on the structure and content of power of the executive and demands suppression American politics. As Walling concludes, "Hamil‐ of dissent at home. "The necessities, accidents, ton won all the fundamental debates about Amer‐ and passions of war," Walling writes, have con‐ ican national security policy. Broad construction tributed to the collapse of free governments from of the Constitution and executive power; judicial antiquity to the modern era. In more than two review; a credit-based manufacturing economy; centuries of its existence as an independent na‐ H-Net Reviews tion, the United States has taken part in many for‐ had forced the army to supply itself off the land. eign wars. All the same, the United States has re‐ As E. J. Ferguson demonstrated, more than half of mained "the outstanding exception to the well- the cost of fghting the Revolution was covered grounded historical axiom that war is the great through arbitrary appropriation of the property destroyer of free governments" (p. xi). Walling be‐ of American patriots by the Continental army. lieves that the political legacy of Hamilton al‐ Hamilton, who was Washington's chief of staff, lowed the nation to mount effective foreign wars had frst hand knowledge of this pattern of abuse. without compromising liberties at home. He concluded that if the American republic The American Revolution and the military wished to avoid the fate of the Greek and Roman struggle against Britain were Hamilton's forma‐ republics that were destroyed by war, it must de‐ tive political experiences. A recent young immi‐ velop an apparatus of military preparedness that grant from the British West Indies, Hamilton did not threaten liberty. An ineffective govern‐ plunged into the revolutionary struggle as a stu‐ ment incapable of supporting its national defense dent at King's College. He dropped out to join the posed a greater risk to liberty than standing Continental army, where he quickly rose in the armies. Only a strong and effective government ranks. Unlike most of his peers, he had no experi‐ "would not sacrifice the rights of its people to its ence on the state level and his loyalty was always strategic necessities" (p. 194). founded on his commitment to the national cause. With the war over, Hamilton settled in New For young men like Hamilton, the Continental York where he began to develop his legal and po‐ army emerged as the only repository of collective litical careers. His courage and frm commitment American nationalism. to individual liberty were manifested almost im‐ While political conflicts between the states mediately when he took the unpopular and risky paralyzed the Continental Congress, citizens of public position against the persecution of former those states effectively cooperated as members of Loyalists. The anti-Tory orgy that followed the the unified Continental army. Hamilton thereafter withdrawal of British forces from New York broke with the Whig opposition to maintaining taught him the dangers of the tyranny of the ma‐ standing armies in times of peace, for he came to jority. Similarly, he took the unpopular position see in the national army a protector of liberties against forceful reassertion of the state's authori‐ against the parochial forces in American society. ty in Vermont. In fact, Hamilton sponsored an un‐ He envisioned a small professional standing army successful bill in the New York legislature that ready to protect the republic from internal and recognized Vermont's independence provided external threats. It was a highly sophisticated vi‐ that the state joined the Union and cease firting sion. As Walling writes, "the only ingredients of a with British Canada. His actions from his early modern, professional army missing from Hamil‐ days as a student protestor to his legal and politi‐ ton's plan were a military academy and a general cal battles in the state of New York, established staff, both of which seemed too expensive at the Hamilton's revolutionary credentials "three times time" (p. 69). over: frst, when he employed the conventional Catonic synthesis of Whig vigilance and Lockean The ineffectiveness of the Continental Con‐ liberalism to justify resistance to England; second, gress during the war years and its inability to en‐ when he steered his own course by advocating a sure a steady supply to men fghting in Washing‐ responsible, confidence-inspiring national gov‐ ton's army plagued the American military effort ernment to increase the tangible and intangible for most of the war. Congressional inability and/ capabilities of the Confederation during the war; or unwillingness to fnance the revolutionary war and third, when he returned to the frst principles 2 H-Net Reviews of the Revolution and opposed democratic despo‐ eration was intolerable. "Republican government tism and republican imperialism in New York" (p. requires the rule of law, but the confederated 92). form of union denied Congress the means of es‐ Hamilton left his greatest mark on American tablishing the rule of anything but martial law. Ei‐ politics in the second half of the 1780s, when to‐ ther an army must put down resistance, or the gether with Madison he led the Constitutional government could not uphold its law. Either the movement from its early conceptualization at An‐ Confederation would become a military despo‐ napolis through the ratification battles, and as tism, or it would collapse."(p. 107). The only way Washington's Secretary of the Treasury from 1789 to avoid such calamities is to establish an effective to 1795. The American executive was the com‐ government that will have the appearance of hav‐ bined brainchild of Madison and Hamilton. On ing significant force at its disposal. As Hamilton the domestic front, as Madison would have it, famously declared, "whenever the Government Congress, the states, and the judiciary checked its appears in arms it ought to appear like a Her‐ powers. In the realm of foreign affairs, however, cules." the Hamiltonian vision of a powerful President, Hamilton recognized that the new national commander of the Federal army, with freedom to government had to demonstrate at home and devise policy and enact measures, prevailed. abroad that it was not plagued by the paralysis of Hamilton recognized that defending the Union the Articles of Confederation. The new govern‐ could threaten domestic liberties, for it is "in the ment would be accepted by the people only if it nature of war to increase the executive at the ex‐ materially improved the daily lives of citizens, es‐ pense of the legislative authority." His actions as a tablished and enforced the rule of law, and estab‐ de facto prime minister in the Washington cabinet lished its "natural cultural legitimacy" with the gave content and substance to the structure estab‐ majority of its people. His vision of national great‐ lished in Philadelphia. His primary goal was to in‐ ness was rooted, frst and foremost in the consent fuse the Federal executive with energy. Only an of the governed. Because the United States was energetic executive was capable of setting the na‐ composed of a multiplicity of semi-autonomous, tional agenda and establishing national and inter‐ culturally diverse communities, he centered his national legitimacy. It was Hamilton who made nationalization scheme on the only group that the American Presidency "both constitutional and could bind the nation. Merchants, by the very na‐ republican" (p. 153). ture of their activities, constituted that element Establishing the young republic as a frst rate most disposed to breadth of vision, and most sen‐ power in the family of nations then was his pri‐ sitive to all of society's larger interests. Supplying mary goal. Hamilton's empire, as Walling ex‐ the different regions with goods not locally avail‐ plains, did not imply military conquest of far able, they served artisans and farmers alike as away territories and the subjugation of their peo‐ natural allies.