Imperial Secrets Remapping the Mind of Empire
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Imperial Secrets Remapping the Mind of Empire Patrick A. Kelley Major, U.S. Army Director of National Intelligence and National Defense Intelligence College Research Fellow NATIONAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE WASHINGTON, DC October 2008 Th e views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not refl ect the policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government Th e National Defense Intelligence College supports and encourages re- search that distills lessons and improves Intelligence Community capabilities for policy-level and operational consumers Imperial Secrets: Remapping the Mind of Empire—Major Patrick A. Kelley, U.S. Army. In this work, Patrick Kelley interprets the intelligence environment of political, military and information empires. His contribution sheds light on the cause of enduring intelligence collection defi cits that affl ict the center of such empires, and that can coincide with their ebb and fl ow. Alert intelligence practitioners, present and future, can note here just how useful a fresh inter- pretation of the intelligence enterprise can be to a coherent understanding of the global stream of worrisome issues. Th e long-term value of this work will be realized as readers entertain the implications of Churchill’s comment that “Th e empires of the future are the empires of the mind.” Th e manuscript for this book was reviewed by scholars and intelligence practitioners, and was approved for public release by the Department of De- fense’s Offi ce of Security Review. [email protected], Editor and Director Center for Strategic Intelligence Research and NDIC Press Library of Congress Control Number 2008929709 ISBN 978-1-932946-20-8 ~ ii ~ CONTENTS vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix COMMENTARIES 1 INTRODUCTION In which a purpose is declared—explanations are off ered and the author sets out his scheme. 17 An Empire of Information. In which terms are not defi ned— information is considered as the determining quality of political space—cautionary tales are told regarding the pursuit of knowledge: Laplace’s Demon and Borges’ Map. Law, Map and Text: How Empires Know 27 Th uggee: Making the Invisible Visible. In which the British discover a terror network fulfi lling its religious vision through the slaughter of innocents (or maybe not)—information anxiety spurs artifi cial knowledge creation through law—the pressures of knowledge creation contaminate information and undermine the laws of the state. 39 Sai bil’ fesad: Fomenting Evil in the World. In which the Ottomans attempt to know their imperial subjects through the law—legal frames shape social reality—the power of empire is channeled and contested by alternative kinds of legal knowledge. 47 Rome: Concealing and Revealing. In which the Romans confront illegal enemy combatants of their own: bandits, pirates and rebels—understanding spaces of law shapes understanding spaces of the physical world—alternative meanings and alternative maps. 61 Barzakh: Th e Intermediate World. In which spaces outside the law (and the state) emerge as an arena for unfettered information fl ow—social networks in these outside spaces identifi ed as information conduits—misreading the critical and the irrelevant. 73 Rhizomes: Unity and Multiplicity. In which the rhizome and tree models of organization are compared (to the latter’s discredit)—the routes information travels in an empire are contrasted with the routes the state institutes and monitors—intersections are noted between offi cial and unoffi cial networks. ~ iii ~ CONTENTS (continued) 87 Nomads and States: Tent of Osman/House of Osman. In which empire acts to restrict the information it receives—the articulation of physical space refl ects and infl uences the operation of information space—negative spaces prove to be information reservoirs. 103 Chrono-Politics: Th e Accelerating Archive. In which empire seeks to shape the present through its records of the past— alternative experiences of time subvert imperial understanding. 113 Apocalypse: Th e Sepoy Revolt of 1857. In which the British are surprised by an Indian revolt which very nearly undoes the empire —the master narrative of imperial values drowns out the value narratives of its subjects—the problem of individuals learning to hear competing narratives Dress, Discourse and Imagination: How Empires Learn to Know Diff erently 123 Masquerade: Agents and Actors. In which agents of empire play at being subjects of empire—the costs and benefi ts of cultural border-crossing are accounted—the spy as compensation for information anxiety—the construction of imperial identity and the loss of information access. 137 Josephus: Th e “Hellenizing” Glass. In which the subjects of empire play at being the agents of empire—the problems of communicating cross-culturally—the limitations of native informants. 145 Derive and Drift : Evliya Celebi, an Ottoman Situationist. In which an imperial agent wanders off the grid—alternative information strategies and actors subvert the state narrative— subversive narratives enrich offi cial imperial information. 153 Boukoloi: Historicizing Fiction/Fictionalizing History. In which the Romans are surprised by a revolt in Egypt—imperial information space is characterized by multiple readings of truth—hybrid political space engenders hybrid genres of knowledge. ~ iv ~ CONTENTS (continued) 161 Ekphrasis: Showing or Telling? In which visions of the world are compared with texts about the world—alternative genres of knowledge open up space for new ways of knowing the world— bad things are said about Powerpoint. 173 Boudica: A Terrible Disaster. In which the Romans are surprised by another revolt—a military understanding of imperial power subverts the social understanding required for imperial rule— the problem of identity in imperial space, who is the “other?” 183 Lessons Learned (or rather…observed). In which chaos is reconsidered as a virtue—alternative networks and visions are endorsed—the conditions for successful self-critique are expanded. 199 BIBLIOGRAPHY 225 INDEX 231 ABOUT THE AUTHOR ~ v ~ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the past, I have tended to skip over “Acknowledgements” pages in my rush to get to the substance of a given work. Aft er completing this project, it is a mistake I will not make in the future. I realize now the spare list of names on pages like this may well refl ect collective time and eff ort equal to, if not exceeding, that of the primary author—this is certainly so in my case. First and foremost, my thanks go out to Russell Swenson and his associ- ates at the National Defense Intelligence College. Readers who dip even a few pages into the text at hand will quickly realize this project represents some- thing of an intellectual experiment, and consequently a risk. Dr. Swenson’s willingness to take that chance, and his fortitude in managing the risk as we went along, has proven decisive in bringing this work to print. Other risks were taken by my military chain of command, for which I am equally grateful. In order to support this program, my superiors at the U.S. Pacifi c Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center essentially sacrifi ced a key Joint, by-name nomination billet without backfi ll during the course of my research. Nevertheless, they unstintingly provided workspace, travel and administrative support—and most importantly time, free of distraction. Th e work at hand is not necessarily the work I wanted to create when these ideas fi rst came to mind. To compose that ideal text would have required three or four PhDs in the Classics, European and Ottoman history, along with a supporting MA or two in linguistics, anthropology and philosophy. To even attempt this project with my rather more modest background was ambitious, to say the least, although foolhardy also comes to mind. By extraordinary good fortune, however (far more than I deserve), I enjoyed the counsel, wis- dom and guidance provided by a host of fi rst-rate academic minds. Mentors from my years at graduate school—chief among them Carla Sinopoli and Barbara and Th omas Metcalf—provided initial inspiration, guidance and personal introductions to scholars otherwise far out of my league. Even more critically, real yeoman’s work was done by Dane Kennedy, Th omas McGinn, James Der Derian, and Nayanjot Lahiri. Along with Dr. Swenson, each of them contributed enormously through sharing their ideas, prompting avenues for further research, and—perhaps most arduously—through multiple readings of the maturing draft text. Th e wide variety of backgrounds, institutions, aca- demic disciplines and philosophical perspectives represented by these names suggests how fruitful more interchange between academia and the security establishment can be for those willing to plow beyond the more traditional political-military fi elds. ~ vii ~ Last but not least, my wife, Kori, should certainly be considered a can- didate for beatitude, if not outright sainthood, for her shared labor in this project. She read draft aft er draft (cumulatively, she has probably read more of it than I have), put up with the weird hours and extended travel, and man- aged gracefully the careful balance between pointed criticism and unfailing support. I am honored to be associated in any capacity with all those named above, although it is perhaps worth emphasizing strongly here at the outset that any and all fl aws in the text that follows are entirely my own. ~ viii ~ COMMENTARIES Good intelligence, in both senses of the word, has been notably missing in U.S. foreign policy over the past several years. Skillfully moving from the Roman to the Ottoman to the British empires, adeptly applying ideas from a wide range of Eastern and Western philosophies, Patrick Kelley has pro- duced a remarkable set of lessons-yet-to-be-learned for the United States. Full of trans-historical and cross-cultural insights, this is the perfect supplement and essential sequel to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counter-Insurgency Field Manual.