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Threat Defense: Cyber Deception Approach and Education for Resilience in Hybrid Threats Model
S S symmetry Article Threat Defense: Cyber Deception Approach and Education for Resilience in Hybrid Threats Model William Steingartner 1,* , Darko Galinec 2 and Andrija Kozina 3 1 Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Informatics, Technical University of Košice, Letná 9, 042 00 Košice, Slovakia 2 Department of Informatics and Computing, Zagreb University of Applied Sciences, Vrbik 8, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia; [email protected] 3 Dr. Franjo Tudman¯ Croatian Defence Academy, 256b Ilica Street, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Abstract: This paper aims to explore the cyber-deception-based approach and to design a novel conceptual model of hybrid threats that includes deception methods. Security programs primarily focus on prevention-based strategies aimed at stopping attackers from getting into the network. These programs attempt to use hardened perimeters and endpoint defenses by recognizing and blocking malicious activities to detect and stop attackers before they can get in. Most organizations implement such a strategy by fortifying their networks with defense-in-depth through layered prevention controls. Detection controls are usually placed to augment prevention at the perimeter, and not as consistently deployed for in-network threat detection. This architecture leaves detection gaps that are difficult to fill with existing security controls not specifically designed for that role. Rather than using prevention alone, a strategy that attackers have consistently succeeded against, defenders Citation: Steingartner, W.; are adopting a more balanced strategy that includes detection and response. Most organizations Galinec, D.; Kozina, A. Threat Defense: Cyber Deception Approach deploy an intrusion detection system (IDS) or next-generation firewall that picks up known attacks and Education for Resilience in or attempts to pattern match for identification. -
Fourth Amendment Litigation
Still the American Frontier: Fourth Amendment Litigation Deja Vishny September 2012 United States Constitution: The Fourth Amendment 1 Wisconsin State Constitution Article 1 Sec. 11 The Exclusionary Rule The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Attenuation Inevitable Discovery Independent Source Other exceptions to the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Applicability of the Fourth Amendment: The Expectation of Privacy Cars Sample list of areas the court has found to private and non-private. Deemed Non-Private: Standing & Overnight Guests Searches by Private Parties Requirement of Search Warrant Determination of probable cause Definition of the Home: Curtilage Permissible scope of search warrants Plain View Good Faith Knock and Announce Challenging Search Warrants Permissible warrantless entries and searches in homes and businesses Exception: Search Incident to Arrest Exception: Protective Sweep Exception: Plain View Exception: Exigent Circumstances : The Emergency Doctrine Exception: Exigent Circumstances: Hot Pursuit Exception: Imminent Destruction of Evidence Warrantless searches without entry Consent Searches Who may consent to entry and searches of the home Scope of consent Seizures of Persons: The Terry Doctrine Defining a Seizure Permissible Length of Temporary Seizures Permissible reasons for a Seizure: 2 Seizures bases on anonymous tips Seizures on Public Transportation Requests for Identification Roadblocks: Reasonable Suspicion: Frisk of Suspects Scope of Terry Frisk Seizures of Property Arrest Probable Cause for Arrest Warrantless -
LEOSA) Program Internal Agency Concurrences Will No Be Provided
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Request forRecords Disposition Authority Records Schedule: DAA-0560-2019-0005 Request for Records Disposition Authority Records Schedule Number DAA-0560-2019-0005 Schedule Status Approved Agency or Establishment Transportation Security Administration Record Group/ Scheduling Group Records of the Transportation Security Administration Records Schedule applies to Major Subdivsion Major Subdivision Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service Schedule Subject Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) Program Internal agency concurrences will No be provided Background Information Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees who occupy law enforcement officer (LEO) positions, or who are separating or have separated from TSA as a LEO, may apply for concealed carry authority under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act(LEOSA) (P.L. 108-,277, 18 U.S.C. 926B-C). TSA organizational element (OE) points of contact (POCs) manage and administer the TSA LEOSA application process, including applicant classification during initial appointment and as necessary subsequently in accordance with TSA MD 3500.1, LEOSA Applicability and Eligibility. TSA is revising the record keeping for these records due to a policy change implemented on June 5, 2018. Applicants for LEOSA coverage are classified based on established criteria found in TSA MD 3500.1: applicant classification is defined as either eligible or ineligible. LEOSA eligibility is for the life of the applicant unless revoked by TSA. Ineligible applicants may appeal denial of LEOSA eligibility by forwarding a written request for appeal to TSA within thirty (30) days of the issuance of the written decision. Written requests for appeal contain the reason(s), and any supporting documentation, as to why the decision should be reversed. -
Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. -
Much Ado About Newsgathering: Personal Privacy, Law Enforcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-Paparazzi Legislation
MUCH ADO ABOUT NEWSGATHERING: PERSONAL PRIVACY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FOR ANTI-PAPARAZZI LEGISLATION ANDREW D. MORTONt Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dan- gers to liberty lurk in insidiousI encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. INTRODUCTION: BALANCING THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY WITH LEGITIMATE LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEILLANCE Horror, not humor, brought actors Michael J. Fox and Paul Reiser to testify before a hearing of the United States House Judiciary Committee last summer.2 Fox described the "mercenary tactics of tabloid photographers" who turned his wedding into a "nightmare" as helicopters recklessly jock- eyed for position above the ceremony, then "fired away with high-powered cameras" on the couple's honeymoon suite.3 When Reiser's son was born prematurely, disguised journalists infiltrated the hospital with hidden cam- eras to steal a photo of the infant, and after returning home, the child was photographed in the privacy of the family's backyard by "resourceful" jour- t B.A. 1991, M.P.P. Candidate 2000, University of Maryland; J.D. Candidate 2000, Uni- versity of Pennsylvania. This Comment is dedicated to the memory of Alan Rubinstein- gifted attorney, and the father-in-law I have known only through the many whose lives he touched. I am deeply indebted to Ed Pease, Diana Schacht, the staff and members of the U.S. -
Procedure for Obtaining Arrest Warrants
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING ARREST WARRANTS In those cases where a warrant is needed before arresting a person for a misdemeanor charge, the law enforcement officer must use the following papers and procedures. An arrest warrant is not needed in most misdemeanor situations. (see Part III below) I.Papers. File a long-form criminal complaint and a probable cause affidavit. The affidavit must contain a sufficient statement of facts (who, what, when and where) to support the elements of the offense alleged in the complaint. II.Procdures A. Court open. If the court is open, the law enforcement officer must cause the papers to be filed at the court. A deputy clerk will read the affidavit. If probable cause is stated, an arrest warrant will be authorized. If probable cause is not stated, the warrant will not be issued. The Court will notify the Judge and the officer or his agency will be contacted. B. Court closed. If the court is closed, the law enforcement officer must telephone one of the following court officials: Clerk of Court, Deputy Clerk, Judge or Acting Judge (if one has been assigned in the absence of the Judge). The entire procedure will be handled by telephone. The officer will read the probable cause affidavit to the party called. Information may be added to the affidavit in response to any questions or concerns expressed during the conversation. If probable cause is stated, the officer will be authorized to take the following steps: 1. The probable cause affidavit must be signed in the presence of a notary public (or any law enforcement officer acting as a deputy clerk of court); and 2. -
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant Armenia*, ** International Covenant On
United Nations CCPR/C/ARM/2-3 International Covenant on Distr.: General 22 November 2010 Civil and Political Rights Original: English Human Rights Committee Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant Joint second and third periodic reports of States parties Armenia*, ** [28 April 2010] * In accordance with the information transmitted to States parties regarding the processing of their reports, the present document was not formally edited before being sent to the United Nations translation services. ** Annexes can be consulted in the files of the Secretariat. GE.10-46857 (E) 031210 CCPR/C/ARM/2-3 Contents Paragraphs Page I. Introduction........................................................................................................ 1–12 3 II. Implementation of the Covenant.......................................................................... 13–670 5 Article 1 ............................................................................................................. 13–66 5 Article 2 ............................................................................................................. 67–106 12 Article 3 ............................................................................................................. 107–152 18 Article 4 ............................................................................................................. 153–175 24 Article 5 ............................................................................................................. 176–179 -
The Case for Searches on Public Transportation
3 THE CASE FOR SEARCHES ON PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION By Jocelyn Waite Attorney Reno, Nevada 2. Focus I. INTRODUCTION The balance of the Introduction presents the histori- cal background and context for the possible need for A. Statement of the Problem transit authorities to conduct searches and briefly ad- dresses the legal background and context: basic Fourth Due to increased concerns about security, transit Amendment3 requirements, particularly the warrant agencies—of their own volition or at the request of fed- and individualized suspicion requirements, and the eral, state, or local governments—may seek to institute exceptions to those requirements. However, the primary search procedures analogous to those done in airports to focus for legal analysis of security screening is on the ensure that explosives, biological weapons, etc., do not exceptions to the warrant and individualized suspicion enter the transit system. While security screenings are requirements. Therefore, the main body of the paper routine in airports, they have to date been rare in the discusses the categories of warrantless searches that 1 transit environment. Given their open nature, their provide likely legal models for analyzing transit high volume of traffic, and the type of trips taken on searches,4 most notably cases involving airport security them, transit systems present a very different security screening and other types of entry screening. After re- environment than airports. These differences give rise viewing the applicable legal authority, the paper pre- -
Police-Media Relations
0EASTHAMPTON POLICE Department Manual: DEPARTMENT Policy No. 1.08 Subject: Searches & Seizures MASSACHUSETTS POLICE ACCREDITATION GENERAL ORDER STANDARDS REFERENCED: 1.2.4, a, b, c, d, e, f, g; 74.3.1 M.G.L. Chapter 276 Section 2D (12/21/20) Issue Date: 01-17- Issuing Authority 2021 Robert J. Alberti Effective Date: 01- Robert J. Alberti 27-2021 Chief of Police I. General Considerations and Guidelines: The term “searches and seizures” includes the examination of persons or places for the discovery of contraband, property stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or held, or of evidence of the commission of crime, and the taking into legal custody of such property or evidence for presentation to the court. Failure to comply with the legal technicalities which govern these procedures results in more failures to obtain convictions than any other source. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to require that, whenever possible and practicable, with certain limited exceptions, a police officer should always obtain a valid search warrant in advance.1 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Page 1 Article XIV of the Massachusetts Constitution provides as follows: Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. -
Out of County Felony Arrests
Out of County Felony Arrests What is the procedure when a suspect is arrested for a felony that occurred in another county? Specifically, may officers immediately transport the suspect to the county in which the crime occurred, or must they first take him before a judge in the county of arrest? As we will explain in this article, it depends on two things: (1) Did the suspect have a right to a bail hearing in the county of arrest? (2) If the suspect is transported, will he be arraigned within the required time limits? There are a few other issues that might arise, and we will cover them, too. No-bail warrant If the suspect was arrested on a no-bail felony warrant, he does not have a right to a bail hearing in the county of arrest.1 He may therefore be transported without delay to the county in which the crime occurred. If the arrest was made by local officers, they must “immediately” notify officers in the county in which the warrant was issued that their suspect is in custody.2 Those officers must then pick up the suspect without unnecessary delay but, in any event, within five calendar days if the two counties are 400 miles apart or less, or within five court days if the two counties are over 400 miles apart.3 What about arraignment? A suspect must ordinarily be arraigned within 48 hours of his arrest.4 Although the courts will give officers some flexibility when the arrest occurs in a distant county,5 officers should attempt to comply with the 48 hour time limit. -
Title 3 – Tribal Court Chapter 3 – Rules of Criminal Procedure
Title 3 – Tribal Court Chapter 3 – Rules of Criminal Procedure Sec. 3-03.010 Title 3-03.020 Authority 3-03.030 Purpose and Scope 3-03.040 Definitions 3-03.050 Time Computation 3-03.060 Assistance from State and Federal Agencies Subchapter I - Complaints 3-03.070 Form of Complaint 3-03.080 Time of Complaint 3-03.090 Tolling of Time for Complaint 3-03.100 Amendments to Complaints Subchapter II - Arrests, Summons and Warrants 3-03.110 Cause for Arrests 3-03.120 Arrest Warrants or Summons Upon Complaint 3-03.130 Notification of Rights Subchapter III - Search Warrants 3-03.140 Who May Issue 3-03.150 Probable Cause 3-03.160 Content and Service 3-03.170 Effective Date of Search Warrant 3-03.180 Search and Seizure 3-03.190 Disposition of Seized Property Subchapter IV - Probable Cause Hearing & Arraignments 3-03.200 Bail or Bond - Release Before Trial 3-03.210 Procedure Following Warrantless Arrest 3-03.215 Right to Counsel 3-03.220 Commitment and Arraignment 3-03.230 Receipt of Plea 3-03.240 Copy of Complaint and/or Citation and Order on Release 3-03.250 Withdrawal of Guilty Plea Subchapter V - Disclosure of Information and Discovery 3-03.260 Prosecutor's Obligations 3-03.270 Defendant's Obligations 3-03.280 Additional Disclosures 3-03.290 Matters Not Subject to Disclosure 3-03.300 Regulation of Discovery 3-03.310 Depositions Title 3, Chapter 3 Page 1 Subchapter VI - Pretrial Proceedings 3-03.320 Confession Procedure 3-03.330 Pretrial Motion Procedure Subchapter VII - Speedy Trial 3-03.340 Speedy and Public Trial 3-03.350 Length of Time SubchapterVIII -
Unpublished History of the United States Marshals Service (USMS), 1977
Description of document: Unpublished History of the United States Marshals Service (USMS), 1977 Requested date: 2019 Release date: 26-March-2021 Posted date: 12-April-2021 Source of document: FOIA/PA Officer Office of General Counsel, CG-3, 15th Floor Washington, DC 20350-0001 Main: (703) 740-3943 Fax: (703) 740-3979 Email: [email protected] The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is a First Amendment free speech web site and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. U.S. Department of Justice United States Marshals Service Office of General Counsel CG-3, 15th Floor Washington, DC 20530-0001 March 26, 2021 Re: Freedom of Information Act Request No.