Chapter 11: Human Populations

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Chapter 11: Human Populations CHAPTER 11: HUMAN POPULATIONS Read pgs. 238-258 Demographic Transition Game All books are closed. You must work with a partner. Arrange the cards into four scenarios. Each scenario needs a stage name, a birth rate, a death rate and a growth rate. Glue them down on the paper. Demographic Transition A hypothesis for how the growth rate of human populations change as they become industrialized. Answers Preindustrial – high birth rate high death rate zero population growth. Why? Difficult living conditions. Need high birth rate to compensate for high infant mortality and high death rate. Answers Transitional – high birth rate declining death rate high growth rate. Why? Living conditions have improved. More food and health care. Death rates decline faster while birth rates remain high. (infant mortality still an issue) Answers Industrial – declining birth rate low death rate low growth rate. Why? Living conditions continue to improve. Birth rates approach death rates because of better access to birth control, equality in the workplace, lower infant mortality Answers Post-Industrial low birth rate low death rate zero population growth. Why? Living conditions continue to improve. Birth rates match death rates (sometimes go below) High costs of living and raising children. The Demographic Transition Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Preindustrial Transindustrial Industrial Postindustrial 80 High ) 70 60 Birth rate 50 40 30 Death rate 20 Birth rate and death rate Relative Relative population size (number (number per 1,000 per year 10 Total population 0 Low Low Increasing Growth Very high Decreasing Low Zero Negative growth rate growth rate growth rate growth rate growth rate growth rate growth rate Fig. 11.26, p. 255 Time Key Concepts Factors affecting human population size Human population problems Managing population growth Factors Affecting Human Population Size Population change equation Population (Births + Immigration) – (Deaths + Emigration) Change = Crude birth rate (CBR) Crude death rate (CDR) Refer to Fig. 11-2 p. 239 What would happen to the population if the : Births exceeded the deaths? Deaths exceeded the births? Births equaled the deaths? Zero Population growth (ZPG) is when the population stays stable. Natural Rate of Increase Annual world population growth <1% 1-1.9% 2-2.9% 3+% Data not available Fig. 11.3, p. 240 Fertility Rates Replacement-level fertility is the number of children a couple must bear to replace themselves. Typically slightly higher than 2. Why? Total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children a woman will have during her childbearing years. What are the childbearing years? 15-49 Fertility Rates Replacement-level fertility Total fertility rate (TFR) Births per woman < 2 4-4.9 2-2.9 5+ 3-3.9 No Data Fig. 11.8, p. 242 Factors Affecting BR and TFR Importance of children as a part of the labor force. Urbanization Cost of raising and education children Educational and employment opportunities for women. IMR Average age of at which women have their first child. US BR’s Fig. 11.11, p. 243 see Fig. 11-10 p. 243 Factors affecting death rates. Why are people living longer? Life expectancy is the average number of years a newborn can expect to live. Infant mortality rate (IMR) is the number of newborns out of a 1,000 who die before their first birthday. Factors Affecting DR Life expectancy Infant mortality rate (IMR) Infant deaths per 1,000 live births <10 <10-35 <36-70 <71-100 <100+ Data not available Fig. 11.14, p. 246 Factors Affecting Natural Rate of Increase Rate of natural increase = crude birth rate - crude death rate Developing Countries Developed Countries 50 Crude 50 birth rate Rate of 40 40 natural increase Rate of natural 30 30 Crude increase Crude birth rate death rate 20 20 Rate per Rate per 1,000 people Rate per 1,000 people Crude 10 10 death rate Year Year 0 0 Fig. 11.13, p. 245 Population Age Structure Male Female Rapid Growth Slow Growth Zero Growth Negative Growth Guatemala United States Spain Germany Nigeria Australia Austria Bulgaria Saudi Arabia Canada Greece Sweden Ages 0-14 Ages 15-44 Ages 45-85+ Fig. 11.16a, p. 247 Solutions: Influencing Population Size Migration Environmental refugees Reducing births Family planning Empowerment of women Economic rewards and penalties Case Study: Slowing Population Growth in India. Read pgs. 257-258 Generally disappointing results: Poor planning Bureaucratic inefficiency Low status of women Extreme poverty Lack of support Case Study: Slowing Population Growth in China Generally positive results: Economic incentives Free medical care Preferential treatment Intrusive and coercive Locally administered Cutting Global Population Growth Family planning Reduce poverty Elevate the status of women 32 30 28 26 24 22 20 18 World War II 16 Demographic Births per thousand population transition Depression 14 Baby boom Baby bust Echo baby boom 0 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year.
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