John Knodel Rossarin Soottipong Gray Porntip Sriwatcharin Sara Peracca
Religion and Reproduction: Muslims in Buddhist Thailand
Report No. 98-417
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PSC Publications Population Studies Center, University of Michigan http://www.psc.lsa.umich.edu/pubs/ 1225 S. University, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2590 USA [email protected] Voice: 734-998-7176 Fax: 734-988-7415 Religion and Reproduction: Muslims in Buddhist Thailand
by John Knodel Rossarin Soottipong Gray Porntip Sriwatcharin Sara Peracca
Research Report No. 98-417 July 1998
Abstract: The present study examines the contrast between Muslim repro- ductive attitudes and behavior in Thailand and those of Buddhists, especially in the southern region. Results are based primarily on a large regional survey directed towards this topic and supplemental focus group discussions among Muslims in Southern Thailand. We interpret Muslim reproductive patterns from the perspectives of the major hypotheses that have been invoked in the social demographic literature to explain links between religion and fertility. These hypotheses go part way in helping understand what appears to be a complex and context specific relationship. Nevertheless, the linkages be- tween religion, ethnic and cultural identity, and political setting that appear to operating are more complex than can be fully accounted for by even a combi- nation of the existing hypotheses.
Data set used: 1994 Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand.
Authors Affiliations: John Knodel, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan, USA
Rossarin Soottipong Gray, Social Statistics Division, National Statistical Office, Thailand
Porntip Sriwatcharin, Social Statistics Division, National Statistical Office, Thailand
Sara Peracca, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan, USA
Acknowledgments: Research was supported by NIH grant D43 TW/HD00657 from the Fogarty International Center and NICHD to the Population Studies Center of the University of Michigan. Chanpen Saengtienchai provided valuable assistance in the analysis of the focus group data. Gavin Jones provided helpful comments on interpretation of some results. The encouragement and coopera- tion of Chintana Pejaranonda, Director of the Social Statistics Division, National Statistical Office, Thailand and discussions with Gavin Jones helped facilitate this report. Introduction
Social scientists have long recognized that religion influences a wide range of social behavior (Lenski, 1961). Within social demography, religion is frequently cited as an important component in explaining group variation in marriage patterns as well as reproductive attitudes and behavior (Chamie, 1981; Goldscheider, 1971; Reynolds, 1988). Such studies have explored current differentials and changes over time. Socially patterned differences are also found within religious groups suggesting that cultural and socio-economic diversity within groups is also significant in determining patterns of familial behavior.
In research on reproduction in the developing world, probably more attention has been focused on the influence of Islam than on any other major religion. Considerable evidence has accumulated documenting that high levels of fertility characterize the majority of Muslim communities (Ahmed, 1985; Nagi, 1984). Recently, however, some Islamic countries and communities have experienced fertility decline (Obermeyer, 1994). In the present study, we focus on Muslims in Thailand and contrast their reproductive behavior and attitudes with those of Buddhists, especially in the Southern region.
The relationship between religion and reproduction is particularly interesting in the case of Thailand where nationally, over the last few decades, total fertility fell from over six to about two births per woman and contraceptive prevalence rose to over 70 percent of reproductive aged women by the 1990s (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya, 1987; Guest, 1994; Hirschman et al., 1994; Knodel et al., 1996; National Statistical Office, 1997:14, 112). Theravada Buddhism, the predominant religion in Thailand, is thought to be an important aspect of the Thai setting that facilitated reproductive change. The link between religion and fertility decline through Buddhism‘s influence on the dominant Thai value system has been discussed extensively in prior research (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya, 1987). Of interest for the present analysis, however, is the fact that the Muslim minority has been exceptional in not participating fully in the changes in reproductive patterns that have characterized the rest of the Thai population.
Prevailing Hypotheses
Past studies of religion and reproduction have often interpreted the relationship within a framework of one or more of four hypotheses commonly referred to as the characteristics hypothesis, the particularized theology hypothesis, the interaction hypothesis, and the minority status hypothesis. In the present analysis, we assess the applicability of each to the Thai situation.
The characteristics hypothesis asserts that religious affiliation per se has little or no independent influence but rather it is the differences in the demographic, social and economic composition of religious groups that largely account for observed differences in reproductive behavior (Goldscheider, 1971, p.272-273). Several studies have indeed found that fertility differentials between religious groups largely disappear once these attributes of members
1 are statistically controlled (Ahmad, 1985; Johnson, 1993; Kollehlon, 1994). Virtually no researcher disagrees with the need to control for differing demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals when studying reproductive differentials between religious groups. However, most expect the relationship to be go beyond such differences and to involve influences more intrinsic to religion itself.
The particularized theology hypothesis argues that differences in fertility are found as a result of the specific doctrines of a religion. In its simplest form, differences in reproduction among religious groups are attributed to the presence or absence of specific religious tenets directly regarding contraception, abortion and family size. However, the hypothesis can also incorporate the influence of doctrines and beliefs that bear on reproductive behavior and attitudes in a more indirect way, such as those that deal with the familial and societal roles of women as well as related preferences for having children of a particular sex. An extension of this framework recognizes that religion extends beyond doctrines, rites and customs and typically prescribes a particular but more comprehensive normative structure that guides familial and social life (Goldscheider, 1971, p.272). Thus religion is seen as affecting cultural norms and the more general patterning of social interactions. Nevertheless, most studies relying on this framework concentrate on the more straightforward effect of the religion’s positions regarding family size and birth control (Goldscheider, 1971, p.283).
The characteristics and particularized theology hypotheses are often combined to explain fertility differentials (Goldscheider, 1971:273). Chaimie (1981) draws on both in his interaction hypothesis which allows for change in the relationships between religion and fertility to occur over time in response to socio-economic change. He argues that religious fertility differentials depend on the interaction of the socioeconomic levels of the religious groups and the moral attitudes of the religious community regarding procreation and fertility control. Chamie applies the hypothesis within the framework of the demographic transition. He predicts that fertility differentials between religious groups are most pronounced during the course of the overall population’s transition from traditionally high to low modern levels fertility as some groups, due to their particularized theology, are slower than others to respond to the socio-economic forces that depress fertility. In contrast, differentials are expected to be minimal prior to the onset of fertility transition, when deliberate limitation of family size is absent regardless of religious affiliation, and again during the post transition period, when conformity to pronatalist religious doctrines is negated by the characteristics of modern society (Chamie, 1981:11).
This hypothesis, despite its name, ignores several potentially important interactions between religion, social change, and demographic outcomes. As originally formulated, it assumes that all religious groups eventually respond in a similar manner to the socio-economic change associated with the fertility transition. Thus it does not allow for differences in the nature of the relationship between socio-economic characteristics and reproductive behavior and attitudes among groups. Goldscheider (1971:280), for example, reviews evidence showing that the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility differed between Protestants and Catholics in the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, although the hypothesis incorporates time (and hence social change) as a factor affecting fertility outcomes, it does not
2 explicitly recognize that interpretation of doctrines by theologians or local leaders may themselves change in reaction to the same forces that lead to fertility transition. For example, increases in women’s participation in the paid workforce or in schooling may stimulate changes in positions espoused by religious leaders. These in turn can affect the views and behavior of group members and impact their reproductive behavior. Obermeyer (1992) highlights this process in her discussion of the effect of Islam on demographic behavior in Arab countries. She argues for the need to consider links between changing political contexts, reinterpretations of religious traditions (especially with respect to societal position of women), and demographic outcomes.
The fourth hypothesis focuses on minority group status. According to this hypothesis, the insecurities of a religious group with minority status lead to lower fertility if the group desires or has attained both acculturation and social and economic mobility, and the religion does not have a strong pronatalist ideology or specifically discourage birth control (Goldscheider, 1971:297). Under such circumstances, the minority group limits family size to facilitate social mobility. If, however, acculturation is not of great importance to the group and the group feels economically and/or politically disadvantaged, the minority group may encourage increased fertility to ensure group preservation and strength in numbers (Goldscheider, 1971: 296). Furthermore they may encourage stricter adherence to moral religious codes to help to identify and maintain normative boundaries (Kennedy, 1973). The resistance to assimilation tends to encourage group integration and identification. This, in turn, may imply a greater commitment to religious ideology and socio-cultural norms particular to the minority group (Goldscheider, 1971: 295). It is thus important to consider the broader socio-cultural situation in which minority groups exist.
The hypothesis was first put forth to help explain differences in fertility of Catholic and Jewish minorities in the U.S. relative to the Protestant majority not accounted for by the characteristics or particularized theology hypotheses (Goldscheider, 1971, p.284). In a lesser developed country context, Johnson and Burton (1987) have shown that minority group status appears to influence reproductive goals in their analysis of Protestant and Catholic fertility in the Philippines. A study of religious differentials in fertility among Christians, Hindus and Muslims in India, however, found only minimal support for the hypothesis (Johnson, 1993). No studies incorporating this framework have yet explored Islamic minorities in the Southeast Asian context.
Interpreting religious group differences in terms of the minority status hypothesis faces several difficulties. One problem arises from the fact that a group’s minority identification can involve a variety of dimensions other than religion, such as language or dialect, place of origin or ancestral home, and cultural differences stemming from non-religious customs and beliefs. Indeed, discussions and tests of the hypothesis have not been limited to religious minorities but have also been applied to ethnic and racial minorities (Goldscheider, 1971). Given that religious affiliation may be inextricably entwined with other defining characteristics of a minority, distinguishing the separate effect of religion on demographic outcomes may not be possible. This is relevant for the present study since a substantial share of Muslims in Thailand are ethnic Malays and speak a Malay dialect. Another problem is that, when considering a group’s numerical strength as a criterion
3 for minority status, the hypothesis is silent on the appropriate area of reference (Mosher, Williams and Johnson, 1992:207). For example, a religious group that is a minority at the national level may be a majority at the regional or local level. For example, Muslims in Thailand, while a clear minority nationally, are concentrated in several provinces where they are numerically a majority. An additional problem in the context of this hypothesis is that it conditions the effect of minority status on the extent and nature of discrimination faced by the group. Defining discrimination, in turn, can be a complicated matter.
Each of the four hypotheses reviewed above have been both supported and refuted by empirical results (Chaimie 1981). In the present study we assess their applicability singularly and collectively to explaining differences between Buddhists and Muslims in Thailand.
Muslims in a Buddhist Country
Compared to many other countries, the Thai population can be regarded as relatively homogenous in terms of ethnicity, language, and religion (Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1987). Most are ethnic Thai and speak some form of the Thai language; about 95 per cent profess Theravada Buddhism as their religion. Still, numerous minorities can be defined in terms of ethnicity, language or religion. Muslims constitute approximately 4 percent of the population and make up the largest religious minority. According to the 1990 census, about four-fifths (81 per cent) of the country’s Muslims live in the southern region, while most of the rest (18 percent) are found in Bangkok and the central region. Most Muslims in the South are concentrated in four provinces bordering on or near to Malaysia: Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun. Among these four, in all but Satun, the Muslims primarily speak Malay. In total, over half of southern Muslims are Malay-speaking. Figure 1 summarizes provincial levels of the percent Muslim among the total population and the percent of Malay-speaking among Muslims.
[Figure 1 about here]
Historically the area encompassed by the three current provinces with Malay speaking majorities was for centuries part of the Sultanate of Pattani and under a form of Siamese suzerainty that permitted considerable autonomy (Cohen, 1991: 117). Only early in the 20th Century, when Thailand began to compete with Western colonial interests, especially the British in Malaysia, was this territory incorporated into the Thai state (Pitsuwan, 1985: 271; Wilson, 1989). An arbitrary international border negotiated between the Siamese and English in 1909 separated the Malay-speaking population of Thailand from the mainstream of Malay cultural activity (Golomb 1985: 31; McVey, 1989). The general thrust of Thai policy that evolved over much of the subsequent period was aimed at promoting assimilation (Pitsuwan 1985; Cohen, 1991). This included the introduction of Thai language secular education into the Malay-speaking dominated area. To some extent, government policy is flexible, permitting the continuance of traditional Muslim marriage and divorce practices and inheritance rules. Malay Muslims have also been allowed to teach the Malay or Arabic language, religious studies, and local history in private Islamic schools (Suhrke and Noble 1977: 199-200, cited in Golomb 1985: 45). Recent government policies attempt to be more accomodationist in nature
4 and the current Thai King has used his position to attempt to make Muslims and other non-Buddhists feel a part of the Thai nation (Keyes 1987: 131).
Despite substantial funds and resources devoted by the government in attempts to assimilate the Malay-speaking Muslims, these efforts appear to be largely unsuccessful (Cohen, 1991: 121; Cornish, 1997). Many Malay-speaking Moslems perceive Thai government policies in the South as promoting the destruction of Malay cultural and religious traditions (Che Man 1990). The continuous resistance of Malay Muslims to political incorporation and acculturation is thus due to a linguistic, ethnic and religious sense of identity and a deep historical political legacy. Although organized separatist movements appear to command limited loyalty, a more subtle resistance to accepting a Thai identity is pervasive among Malay speakers (Cornish, 1997).
In the present study, we consider both language and religion when comparing Muslims to Buddhists. Thus our comparisons involve three groups: Buddhists (among whom almost all are Thai speaking), Thai-speaking Muslims and Malay-speaking Muslims. The vast majority of both Thai and Malay-speaking Muslims, regardless of their place of residence in Thailand, are of Malay ancestry and trace their roots back to the particular Malay cultural area that encompasses both the northernmost states of Malaysia and the southernmost provinces of Thailand (Golomb 1985: 8-9). Thus the great majority of Thai- speaking Muslims of central and southern Thailand continue to share some traits in common with the Malay speakers in the South. At the same time, most observers argue that Malay-speaking Muslims near the Malaysian border are culturally distinct from their Thai-speaking counterparts in the rest of Thailand and far less assimilated into Thai society (Cohen, 1991:115; Farouk, 1988; Suhrke 1989: 1).
Although central Thai Muslims tend to live in their own religiously homogeneous local communities, work and other common-place activities take many outside the community where they may have frequent interactions with the majority Buddhist society (Farouk, 1988:9-10). Through such regular contact with Thai Buddhists, central Thai Muslims have come to share many of their attitudes and values, while still maintaining separate religious and cultural traditions (Golomb, 1985). Despite some specialization, Muslims of central Thailand can be found across the full occupational spectrum and are well represented in government service, especially in the military and police. Although Muslims are concentrated numerically in the South, central Muslims probably have more political power.
Thai-speaking Muslims in the South are also reasonably acculturated as manifested in their language and in their sense of shared tradition with other Thais. As with Muslims generally in Thailand, however, they have their own distinctive sense of identity by virtue of their religion (Burr, 1988: 83; Keyes 1987: 131). They are increasingly participating in national politics as members of parliament and as high-ranking government officials, having held positions including house speaker and cabinet minister. However, their proximity to and cultural and religious affinities with Malaysia, particularly the West Coast Malay states of Kedah and Perlis, likely moderates their general sense of Thai identity compared to central Moslems (Farouk 1988). This is probably particularly true for the Thai-speaking Muslims in the province of
5 Satun, given that it borders on the above mentioned West Malaysia States and that they constitute substantial majority of the population in the province.
While Muslims elsewhere in Thailand have assimilated to varying degrees into Thai society and the Thai state, Malay speakers in southernmost Thailand remain largely unassimilated (Keyes 1987: 131). Virtually all observers acknowledge that the Malay-speaking Muslims in the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat as well as parts of Songkla, maintain a sense of religious, geographical and ethnic identity separate from the predominant Buddhist Thai society at the national level (Farouk, 1988). This identity has deep historical roots and is perpetuated through the socio-religious bureaucracy associated with Islam in the area and by a variety of informal mechanisms (Cohen, 1991: 115; Cornish 1997; Farouk, 1988). Most live in rural areas consisting largely of other Malay Muslim communities and have little interaction with Buddhists (Cornish, 1997: 14). In addition, according to Che Man (1990), they maintain continuing sentiments for ethnic and religious separatism as a means of cultural survival.
Rather than merely perceiving themselves as a minority within the Thai nation, many Malay-speaking Muslims in this area identify with the broader Malay-Muslim population that spans the Thai-Malaysia border and particularly with the linguistically similar population in the neighboring east coast Malay state of Kelantan. Access to Malay television and radio in much of the area as well as extensive cross border kinship links reinforces the sense of a separate Malay-Muslim identity (Farouk, 1988). The Islamic fundamentalist movements present among Malay-speaking Muslims emphasizes a return to genuine Islamic principles (Pitsuwan 1985). Consequently, it is not surprising that Malay-speaking Muslims maintain their social distance and isolation from the dominant national Buddhist majority to a much greater extent than the Thai- speaking Muslims both in the south and the central region.
Data and Methods
Data Sources. The primary source of data for the present study is the 1994 Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO). For convenience we refer to this as the 1994 NSO survey. The stratified clustered sample was designed to cover women aged 15-49 (both single and married) in the 14 provinces of the southern region of Thailand. The sample includes information for 7961 women from urban, semi-urban and rural strata (defined as municipal areas, sanitary districts, and non-municipal areas) in each of the 14 provinces. Of these, 5875 were Buddhist, 910 were Thai-speaking Muslims and 1161 were Malay-speaking Muslims (an additional 15 were Muslims who spoke neither Thai nor Malay and are excluded from analysis). The NSO survey is the largest of its kind conducted in Thailand that permits comparisons between substantial numbers of Buddhist and Muslim women. With appropriate weighting, the sample is designed to be regionally representative. (For further details about the sample design see NSO, no date.) In the present analysis, unless explicitly stated otherwise, all results are weighted.
One feature of the survey that affects analysis is the fact that if the woman targeted for an interview was unavailable, a proxy interview was conducted with another person in the household. The response status of each
6 sample woman (by self or proxy) was recorded but no information on the identity or characteristics of the proxy are available in the data set. Information on the unweighted number of women for whom information was collected in the survey and the number and percentage for whom self-reported information is available are provided in Appendix A by religion, language and marital status. Overall, 79 percent of the interviews were conducted directly with the intended respondent. Self-reporting is higher for Malay-speaking Muslims than for Buddhist and Thai-speaking Muslim women and higher for ever- married than for single women. Exploration of the data suggests that little systematic difference is evident for most items between results based on self reporting and those based on proxy interviews. Nevertheless, in the present analysis, proxy interviews are excluded when presenting results referring to attitudes or knowledge of contraception.
In addition to the 1994 Survey, the National Statistical Office sponsored 16 focus groups during 1996 among Muslims in the four southernmost provinces in which Islam is the predominant religion (Satun, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat). The purpose was to gain supplemental qualitative data to help investigate factors affecting fertility among Muslims in Thailand and their views towards changes in family size. It also aimed to explore what factors underlie the higher fertility levels of Muslims compared to the majority population. Four group discussions were held in each sample province with participants separated by generation and sex: younger generation (15-30 years old) men and women and older generation (45 years old and above) men and women. The language used for the discussions (southern Thai or Malay) depended on which was locally predominant. All discussions were tape recorded and transcribed (although one lost transcript is unavailable for analysis). At the time of transcription, the discussions regardless of original language were translated into central Thai. At several points in the present analysis we draw on the focus group transcripts.
Since the 1994 survey was restricted to the southern region it does not provide information for Buddhists or Muslims elsewhere in Thailand. Of particular interest for comparison, especially in light of several of the hypotheses reviewed above, are central region Muslims. Two previous surveys provide relevant information for this pupose: the 1984 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (CPS), which included a supplemental sample of Moslems in the south, and the relatively large 1987 Thailand Demographic and Health survey (TDHS). Details of sample designs are available elsewhere (Chayovan, Kamnuansilpa and Knodel, 1988; Kamnuansilpa and Chamratrithirong, 1985). In addition, we refer to findings from a variety of national, regional and local studies conducted over the last several decades, some of which were directed exclusively towards Muslims.
Methods. As indicated below, the three groups being compared based on the 1994 NSO differ with respect to numerous demographic and socio-economic background characteristics that are typically associated with reproductive behavior and attitudes. In order to statistically control for their influence, and thereby address the characteristics hypothesis, we rely on multiple classification analysis (MCA) in cases where the outcome variable is continuous and logistic regression in cases of dichotomous variables.
Given the focus of the present study on combined religion and language differentials, rather than showing the full array of demographic and socio-
7 economic differentials, we limit presentation of results to those for the three groups (sometimes further divided by marital status or subjected to age or marriage duration restrictions) showing results both unadjusted and statistically adjusted for the effects of other variables. When adjustment is made through logistic regression, the adjusted results represent the mean predicted probabilities. All independent variables employed in the analysis, except age and marriage duration, are entered as categorical variables, using the categories shown in Table 1 (see below). [1] Thus, for each independent variable included, a set of dummy variables was created corresponding to these categories. Age and marriage duration are entered as continuous variables. Since in all analyses involving multivariate controls, the results in relation to the combined categorical variable representing religion and language are statistically significant at least at the .001 level, we do not report statistical significance in the individual tables. [2]
Results
Background characteristics
Table 1 provides an overview of basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the sample divided into the three combined religious and language groupings. In general, the Buddhist women are slightly older than the Muslim women of either language grouping. The percentages of all three groupings who are currently married is similar although Malay-speaking Muslims are characterized by a somewhat lower percentage who are single and a higher percentage who are formerly married. In addition, Malay-speaking Muslim women are most likely to have been married more than once and Buddhist women least likely to have had multiple marriages. Malay-speaking Muslims are also characterized by a somewhat longer mean duration since first marriage.
[Table 1 about here]
Although the large majority of all three groups live in rural areas, Buddhists are more likely to reside in urban and semi-urban areas than either Muslim group. Likewise, although most women in all three groups have a basic primary education (4-7 years of schooling depending on the educational system at the time of school attendance), distinct differences are evident. Buddhist women are most likely to have attained secondary or higher education and Malay-speaking Muslims are least likely to have gone beyond the primary level. In addition, almost one fifth of Malay-speaking Muslim women had no formal schooling compared to far smaller fractions of either Thai-speaking Muslims or Buddhists. Finally, while substantial majorities of all three groups report that they are working and agricultural work is most common of the types of work, differences in the occupational distribution are apparent. Buddhist women are the most likely and Malay-speaking Muslim women least likely to have while collar positions; Thai-speaking Muslim women are more likely to be in sales than the other two groups. In brief, there appear to be relatively consistent, although modest, differences in the socio-economic characteristics that are associated with religion and language among women in southern Thailand. Buddhists tend to be the most socio-economically advanced, Thai- speaking Muslims intermediate and Malay-speaking Muslims the least advanced in terms of urban residence, education and occupation.
8 Fertility
The earliest information on religious fertility differentials in Thailand are based on special tabulations of a one percent sample of the 1960 Thai census (Goldstein, 1970) and the 1970 Rural Employment Survey in Southern Thailand (Jones and Soonthornthum, 1971). Both studies deal with periods either before or close to the onset of Thailand’s fertility transition and revealed lower cumulative fertility (as measured by the mean number of children ever born) among Muslims than Buddhists. [3] Given that Thailand’s fertility decline began sometime during the latter 1960s, these studies mainly reflect the situation prior to the onset of the fertility transition. The authors of these earlier studies speculated that greater marital instability, use of traditional methods of birth control, and poorer health may account for the generally lower Muslim fertility at the time although they lacked direct evidence to substantiate these suggestions. Neither of these studies contrasted Thai and Malay-speaking southern Muslims. A study of Muslims in 1968 in Yala province, where the Malay language is dominant, indicated even lower cumulative fertility levels than the 1970 Rural Employment Survey found for Muslims generally in the south (results shown in Jones and Soonthornthum, 1971). In contrast to these early studies, by the 1980s, measures of current fertility clearly indicated lower levels among Buddhists than Muslims. For example, a study of the rural south based on the 1981 CPS revealed substantially higher marital fertility during the prior year among Muslims than among Buddhists (Kamnuansilpa, Chamratrithirong, and Knodel, 1983). The 1984 CPS likewise found Muslims experienced considerably higher marital fertility than Buddhists during the prior two years, both nationally and in the south.
Table 2 provides some recent evidence reflecting religious and language differences in fertility in the southern region based on the 1994 NSO Survey. The mean number of children ever born to all ever married women is lowest for Buddhists and highest for Malay-speaking Muslims. Statistically adjusting for demographic and socio-economic characteristics only modestly reduces the extent of differences. The mean number of children ever born is also shown for women who have been married 10-19 years. This subset of women are chosen in order to permit sufficient time to allow cumulative differences in family building to emerge more clearly but while excluding women whose family building activity took place prior to time fertility decline was underway in the south. The differentials are somewhat more pronounced than for all ever married women. For example, based on adjusted results, among women married 10-19 years, Malay-speaking Muslims averaged .55 more children than Buddhists while for all ever married women the equivalent difference is .46 children.
[Table 2 about here]
The 1994 NSO survey did not attempt to measure current fertility. However, responses to a question asked to ascertain the age of the youngest child can be used as a rough indicator. For this purpose we calculated the percentage of women whose youngest child was reported to be under two years of age. This measure is influenced by differential child mortality but the effect should be trivial since child mortality levels are low in Thailand. The accuracy of age reporting can also influence the results but we are unaware of reasons why this would systematically bias the differentials. The results indicate that Buddhist women are experiencing the lowest fertility and
9 Muslim Malay speakers the highest whereas after statistical adjustment, the difference between Buddhists and Thai-speaking Muslims virtually disappears. This is in contrast to the measures of cumulative fertility which showed the Thai-speaking Muslims much closer to their Malay-speaking co-religionists than to the Buddhists.
Fertility Preferences
Previous studies have consistently found higher fertility preferences among Muslims in Thailand than among Buddhists. Every major survey for which data are available has shown this pattern. These include the 1975 SOFT, 1981 and 1984 CPS, and 1987 TDHS (Chayovan and Knodel, 1984; Kamnuansilpa, Chamratrithirong, and Knodel, 1983; Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1987; Chayovan, Kamnuansilpa and Knodel, 1988). Results from the 1994 NSO survey confirm the persistence of clear differences between Buddhist and Muslim women in the south as well as differences between Thai and Malay- speaking Muslims.
Information on fertility preferences are available from the 1994 NSO survey, both indirectly from responses from married women about their desire to have additional children, and directly from a question, addressed to all women “how many children should a couple have in the current situation?” For convenience we refer to the responses of this question as indicating the ‘appropriate’ number of children. It also asked about the respondent to state the appropriate number of sons and daughters. [4] This information can be analyzed both to reveal family size preferences and gender preferences. The following analyses relating to family size and gender preferences are based only on self-reported responses and thus excludes information that was provided by a proxy. [5]
Family Size Preferences. The desire to have additional children is strongly associated with religion and language. Among currently married women, 42 percent of Buddhists, 53 percent of Thai-speaking Muslims, and 62 percent of Malay-speaking Muslims expressed a desire to have more children than their present number. Once results are adjusted (by linear regression) for differences in duration of marriage among the three groups, the differences are even more pronounced, becoming 41, 50, and 66 respectively (results not shown). Thus according to this indicator of fertility preferences, marked differences exist among the three groups.
Table 3 shows the percent distribution of family sizes thought to be appropriate for couples in the present situation as well as the mean appropriate family size as reported by women in the three combined religion and language categories. Results are presented both for all women and women under age 30. The latter are of particular interest since younger women are less advanced in their reproductive careers and thus less likely than older women to have exceeded their preferred number of children. Thus their responses are less likely to reflect ex post facto rationalization of already existing but unwanted children. Moreover, since they are at earlier stages of family building, their responses are more reflective of the recent situation and more likely to be more predictive of emerging trends in fertility than responses of older women who have already ceased child bearing.
[Table 3 about here]
10 The percent distributions and means of the appropriate numbers of children both show the same pattern in relation to religion and language as the percentages wanting more children among currently married women. Buddhists express the lowest mean appropriate number, Thai-speaking Muslims an intermediate mean number, and Malay-speaking Muslims the largest mean number. As expected, women under 30 in all three groups reported lower average appropriate family sizes than women of all reproductive ages. There is a clear consensus among Buddhist women that a two child family is the most appropriate size under current circumstances. Fully four-fifths of those under age 30 stated two children as appropriate. Moreover, very few Buddhist women say 4 children are appropriate and almost none cite 5 or more children. In contrast, substantial proportions of Malay-speaking Muslims view 4 children as appropriate and even state 5 or more children. In all these respects, Thai-speaking Muslims clearly occupy an intermediate position, more or less midway between Buddhists and their Malay-speaking co-religionists.
The mean numbers of children thought appropriate by the full range of women aged 15-49 as well as by women below age 30 are shown in Table 4 by religion and language as well as marital status. Results are presented both unadjusted and statistically adjusted for area of residence, educational attainment, occupation, and age, background characteristics that typically are associated with fertility preferences. Regardless of marital status or whether or not the sample is restricted to younger women, Buddhists express an average preference for the fewest children, Thai-speaking Muslims for an intermediate number, and Malay-speaking Muslims the largest number even after statistical adjustment for background characteristics.
[Table 4 about here]
In addition, to the background information that was collected for all women, ever married women were also asked about their expectations for the education of their children. The question was asked in a generic sense rather than in reference to specific children. The majority of respondents indicated that the education of their children would depend on the children’s abilities rather than state specific expected levels. Nevertheless among women who stated specific levels clear differences are apparent by religion and language. [6] Buddhist women expressed the highest expectations and Malay- speaking Muslims the lowest. Since educational expectations for children are frequently theorized to be an important influence on the number of children couples chose to have (e.g. Caldwell 1980; Axinn 1993), we additionally adjusted results for differences in the expectations expressed [7] As the results also shown in Table 4 show, including educational expectations in the analysis has almost no additional effect in accounting for the differences in fertility preferences among the three groups of women.
The 1994 survey did not include any questions about whether respondents felt that family size was related to their religious beliefs. However, facilitators of the 1996 focus groups held with Muslims in the south were instructed to ask if the reason some people had more children than others was related to religion. In discussing family size preference, most participants across all 13 focus groups for which the topic was discussed and transcripts are available agreed that people nowadays, including themselves, prefer to
11 have a smaller number of children. The following excerpts illustrate this view.
Mrs. N: By (Moslem) doctrine, if Allah gives many children to us we will have many children.. But with many children.. we cannot afford it.. because of the economic situation. Mrs. F: We accept that it is against the doctrine but it (contraception) is necessary. (Malay-speaking younger adult women, Pattani)
It is better for the younger generation to have fewer children because of the higher cost of living and if you have fewer children they can obtain higher education. (Malay-speaking, older adult male, Yala).
We want our children to obtain higher education so therefore we must have fewer children. To raise our children we need money but actually we want to have more children. (Malay-speaking younger adult woman, Narathiwat).
Nevertheless, participants in 6 different groups, mentioned that they do not have preference regarding the number of children they have because that is a matter up to God (Allah). Regardless of whether they have many or few children, the number will be accepted because it is from Allah. Similar comments were reported from focus groups conducted among Southern Muslims in the early 1980s (Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1987: 164). Taken at face value, these statements imply that some Muslims take a fatalistic stance regarding family size and believe that deliberate choice in the matter on the part of the couple is inappropriate. Excerpts from the 1996 groups illustrate this view.
I like to have many children, but how many I will have will be up to Allah. (Malay-speaking younger adult male, Yala)
I didn’t think about the number of children I wanted when I got married. I didn’t have any desires about that. If God (Allah) gives many children to me I will have many. (Malay-speaking older adult woman, Narathiwat)
In addition, in independent discussions between one of the co-authors and two provincial staff of the National Statistical Office in one of the provinces with Malay-speaking Muslim majorities who served as interviewers in the 1994 NSO survey, both reported that when respondents were asked the questions about the appropriate or desired family size, the usual initial response from Muslims was that whatever number God gave was appropriate. Only with a further probe would they state a personal numerical preference (personal communication to John Knodel, April 9, 1998). The fact that most Muslim respondents felt it necessary to explicitly defer first to Allah before stating a personal preference regarding the number of children hints strongly of a pronatalist influence of Islam on popular thinking about family size in this area.
Gender Preferences. In societies where couples deliberately and consciously control their fertility, parents typically have preferences about the sex as well as the number of the children they want. Such preferences can reflect ingrained cultural values including those with religious roots. Respondents in the 1994 NSO survey were asked not only their opinion about the appropriate
12 number of children but also how many sons and how many daughters couples should have. [8]
Results related to gender preferences are summarized in Table 5. Regardless of religion or language, women in southern Thailand state approximately the same average number of children of each sex as being appropriate for couples in the current situation. The ratio of the mean appropriate number of sons to appropriate number of daughters is slightly above one for Buddhist and Thai-speaking Muslim women and slightly below one for Malay-speaking Muslims.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 also indicates the percent distribution of women according to whether they think a couple should have more sons than daughters, an equal number of each, or more daughters than sons. Results are shown for all women combined as well as separately for women who state even and odd numbers of children as being appropriate. The latter are of particular interest since such women must necessarily state a different number of sons than daughters as being appropriate. Indeed among women who state an even number of children as appropriate, almost all, regardless of religion and language, indicate that the number of sons and daughters should be equal.
Consistent with other studies of the gender preferences of Thai women generally (e.g. Knodel et al. 1996), Buddhist women overwhelmingly state it is appropriate for a couple to have the same number of sons as daughters. This is related to their overwhelming preference for a family size of two children (see Table 3) combined with their desire for one child of each sex. Among those Buddhist women who think it is appropriate to have more children of one sex than the other, however, a modest preference for sons is apparent. This is particularly evident for those who state an odd number as being appropriate, among whom slightly more than 60 percent favor more sons. The majority of Muslim women also indicate that it is appropriate for a couple to have equal numbers of children of each sex. However, the proportions holding this view are lower than for Buddhists, particularly in the case of Malay- speaking Muslims. This is related to the greater share of Muslims compared to Buddhists who prefer family sizes larger than two and thus who state odd numbers of children, particularly three, as appropriate. Among Muslim women who state an unequal number of sons and daughters as appropriate, Thai speakers are only slightly more likely to prefer more sons than more daughters and Malay speakers show a modest preference for daughters. This pattern is even more apparent among Muslims who indicate an odd number of children as being appropriate, with 46 percent of Thai speakers and just under 60 percent of Malay speakers saying having more daughters than sons is appropriate.
Information on the desire for additional children (asked to ever married women only) can also be examined for evidence of gender preferences. The fact that Buddhist women are least likely to want additional children and Malay- speaking Muslims are most likely has been noted above. Of interest in the present analysis is the pattern of desire for additional children in relation to the sex composition of their existing family. Thus if women with no or few sons are less likely to want another child compared to women with no or few daughters, this would suggest a greater preference for sons than for
13 daughters. Table 5 includes these results for currently married women with one, two and three living children.
For all three religion and language groupings, the vast majority of women who have only one child want additional children regardless of the sex of their existing child. There is a tendency in each group, however, for those who already have a daughter to be more likely to want another child than those who already have a son. For women with two living children, the wish to have more depends very much on the sex composition of the existing family. Regardless of religion or language, women are distinctly less likely to say they want another child if they already have one of each sex than if both children are of the same sex. Moreover, among women whose both children are the same sex, those with only sons and those with only daughters show little difference in their desire to continue having children. Among women with three children, some modest differences in the pattern of association between sex composition and desire for additional children are apparent. Among Buddhist women, the percentage who want additional children is higher among those with more daughters than sons than those in the opposite situation. In contrast, the reverse is true for Malay-speaking Muslims. Thai-speaking Muslims are intermediate with the percentage wanting more children being almost the same regardless of whether they have more daughters than sons or the reverse.
In addition to asking ever-married women if they wanted more children, the 1994 NSO survey also inquired about the desired sex of the additional children that were wanted. Respondents were able to specify how many additional boys, girls or children of either sex they wished. The results shown in Table 5 indicate that currently married Buddhists were only slightly more likely to want additional sons than additional daughters while Malay- speaking Muslims show the opposite pattern. The most pronounced difference is apparent for Thai-speaking Muslims, among whom the percentage wanting more sons exceeds the percentage who want more daughters by a greater, but still modest, extent than is true for Buddhists.
Overall, the impression that the evidence on gender preference gives for the three groups of women is that there is no systematic widespread preference for children of one sex over the other. At most, the Buddhist women show a slight tendency to want sons more than daughters while Malay-speaking Muslims show a slight tendency in the opposite direction. Evidence for Thai-speaking Muslims is more mixed but they seem to resemble Buddhists more than their Malay-speaking co-religionists on this count.
Contraceptive Use and Related Attitudes
Ever since around 1970 when the use of modern contraceptives in Thailand started to increase rapidly, studies have consistently found lower levels of prevalence among Muslims than Buddhists. These include the 1970 Rural Employment Survey, the 1975 SOFT, the 1980 census (which included a question on contraceptive use), the 1981 and 1984 CPS, and the 1987 TDHS (Jones and Soonthornthum, 1971; Chayovan and Knodel, 1984; Kamnuansilpa, Chamratrithirong, and Knodel, 1983; Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1987; Chayovan, Kamnuansilpa and Knodel, 1988). Table 6 summarizes the prevalence of contraceptive use among women in southern Thailand based on the 1994 NSO survey. The table indicates both ever use of contraception among
14 ever married women and current use among currently married women. Given the special status of permanent methods of contraception in Muslim doctrine (Obermeyer, 1994:62) and that previous studies in Thailand have shown that Muslims have a particular aversion towards such methods (e.g. Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1987), results referring to the current use of sterilization and of non-permanent methods are also shown separately.
[Table 6 about here]
The results indicate pronounced differentials in contraceptive use according to religion and language. Buddhist women are by far the most likely and Malay-speaking Muslims the least likely to have ever used or to currently use contraception. Thai-speaking Muslim women are characterized by an intermediate level of use, although they are substantially closer to the Buddhists than to their Malay-speaking co-religionists in this respect. Where Thai-speaking Muslims do resemble Malay-speaking Muslims is in the very low use of sterilization compared to Buddhists. Indeed, when only use of non- permanent methods is considered, Thai-speaking Muslims show levels of prevalence similar to that for Buddhists. Adjustment through logistic regression for area of residence, educational attainment, occupation, and age has very little impact on any of these results indicating clearly that differences in background characteristics can not account for them.
The 1994 NSO survey also makes clear that differences in contraceptive use among the three groups of women is not related to differences in the lack of awareness of contraception. Respondents were asked if they had ever heard of contraception as well as if they knew each of a series of specific methods. There is virtually universal awareness of contraception as indicated by the fact that only 0.1 percent of Buddhist women, less than 2 percent of Malay- speaking Muslims and less than 3 percent of Thai-speaking Muslims did not acknowledge knowing any of the methods mentioned. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of women acknowledged knowing at least several methods. For example, 99.5 percent of Buddhists, 96.5 percent of Thai-speaking Muslims, and 91.7 percent of Malay-speaking Muslims mentioned knowing at least three specific methods. [9]
To some extent, the higher family size desires among Muslim women, particularly among Malay-speakers, would be expected to lead to lower use of contraception. However, this clearly is not sufficient to account for the very pronounced differences actually observed. This is evident from the fact that equally pronounced differences exist among currently married women who say they want no more children. Among such women, 83 percent of Buddhists compared to 57 percent of Thai-speaking Muslims and only 14 percent of Malay- speaking Muslims currently practice contraception.
Evidence from the 1994 NSO survey suggests that unfavorable attitudes towards contraception, stemming from the belief that the use contraception is contrary to Islam, is an important factor in accounting for lower contraceptive practice among Muslims, especially Malay Speakers, in comparison to Buddhists. All women were asked whether or not they agreed that a husband and wife should use contraception to achieve their desired number of children or to space their births. In addition, Muslim women were asked, in their opinion, whether the use of contraception to achieve the desired number of children or to space children is against their religion. [10] The results are
15 summarized in Table 7. Clear differences are apparent by religion and language. Virtually no Buddhists said they disapproved of contraception. However among Muslims, slightly more than a tenth of Thai-speakers and over two fifths of Malay speakers said they disapproved. Moreover, when asked specifically if contraception is against their religion, almost three fifths of Thai-speaking Muslims and almost 90 percent of Malay speakers answered affirmatively. Very similar patterns in terms of responses to this question are evident for both single and ever-married women.
[Table 7 about here]
Single women were asked in the survey if they intended to use contraception after marriage. As Table 7 also shows, the percentages who explicitly said they did not intend to use contraception varies clearly with religion and language. Although substantial proportions of all three groups of women said they had not thought about it, Malay-speaking Muslims were most likely to explicitly deny they expect to use contraception and Buddhists were by far the least likely to say they would not. [11]
Additional evidence that religious beliefs among Muslims in southern Thailand are a barrier to contraceptive use among Muslims comes from questions addressed to ever married women who never used contraception about the reason for not using. As shown in Table 7, no Buddhists cited a religious reason for not using contraception. Among women who never used contraception, religious objections account for almost half of non-use among Thai-speaking Muslims and two-thirds of non-use among Malay speakers. Similar findings emerged based on the 1984 CPS which found that two-thirds of Muslim women who never used contraception, both in the south and in the rest of the country, cited religious reasons for non-use (Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1997:167). As Table 7 also shows, when all ever-married women are considered (as opposed to just never-users) religious objections appear to account for non-use of contraception for almost one fifth of Thai-speaking Muslims and over half (54 percent) of Malay-speaking ever married Muslim women.
The 1996 focus groups with Muslims in southern Thailand provide additional confirmation that religious objections play a central role in leading Muslims not to use contraception. Participants were asked if birth control was against Islamic doctrine as well as which methods were specifically forbidden. There is a clear consensus across all 13 focus groups for which the topic was discussed and transcripts are available that practices in family planning, with any modern methods and particularly sterilization are against Moslem doctrine. Participants expressed the view that, according to Moslem belief, “it is a sin”, “it is forbidden”, “it is not allowed” and “it is against the doctrine” to practice family planning. Nevertheless, many appeared to make an exception in the case where contraception is used for birth spacing. For example, taking the pill or using contraceptive injectables is justified to prolong the next pregnancy if women are not in sufficiently good health to have another child or if the couple cannot afford another child right away. Among modern methods, however, sterilization is strictly prohibited and seen as a profound sin since it terminates the chance of future reproduction. These view are illustrated by the following quotes.
Every method (of contraception) is against (Moslem) doctrine. We are not allowed to do that. We’ve been taught to have many children.
16 (Thai-speaking younger adult man, Satun)
Moderator: Are birth control practices against (Moslem) doctrine? Mrs. Y: Yes, it’s clear that it’s against the doctrine. Moderator: Is there anyway to do it without it being a sin? Mrs. M: Absolutely not. It will always be a sin. (Malay-speaking older adult women, Pattani)
Mrs. B: It (birth control) is against (Moslem) doctrine but it’s necessary. Mrs. S: We cannot afford having many children. It doesn’t mean that we will stop entirely (having children) but just space (between births). We don’t intend to be sterilized because it is forbidden. (Thai-speaking older adult women, Satun)
Participants in the focus groups also mentioned that Muslims are allowed to use some methods of birth control, particularly withdrawal and the safe period, as they are “natural methods” that can prolong the next pregnancy. Some also mentioned that these methods as well as herb medicine have been traditionally used among Muslims in Thailand in the past. Similar opinions regarding the importance of religious objections to modern contraception, the particular aversion to permanent methods, and the view that traditional methods, especially withdrawal, are tolerated have all been voiced in previous focus group research (Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1987:163-165).
Comparisons with Central Region Muslims
The 1994 NSO survey only covered southern Thailand and thus does not provide evidence on reproductive behavior or attitudes for the substantial minority of Muslims that live elsewhere in Thailand. Some evidence of religious differentials that single out central region Muslims (including Bangkok), where most Muslims outside the south live, is available from earlier surveys, although typically the number of cases for Muslims is small. Table 8 presents previously published results from the 1984 CPS, which included a supplementary sample of Muslim women in two southern provinces, and original tabulations from the 1987 TDHS. No distinction is made among Muslims in the central region with respect to language since virtually all are Thai-speakers. Some caution in interpreting results is required due to the small number of Muslims in the samples, especially for the central region. Also in the case of the 1984 CPS, the results for the southern region Muslims are not regionally representative given that they include additional cases from the two provinces that were purposively selected for the supplementary sample.
[Table 8 about here]
Several clear patterns are evident from the results shown in Table 8. With only minor exception, Central Thai Muslims are characterized by lower fertility levels and preferences and higher levels of contraceptive use than either Thai-speaking or Malay-speaking Muslims in the south. A similar regional difference is evident for Buddhists and thus central Muslims show consistently higher fertility levels and preferences and lower contraceptive use than central region Buddhists. For most measures, the differences between central and southern Muslims, between central Muslims and Buddhists, and between central and southern Buddhists are all substantial. Particularly noteworthy, is that use of permanent methods of contraception is far higher
17 among central Muslims than those in the south. Although the use of permanent methods among central Muslims is still lower than for central Buddhists, it almost approaches the level of use that characterizes southern Buddhists.
Consistent with the 1994 NSO survey, among southern Muslims, Malay- speakers are characterized by higher fertility preferences and lower contraceptive use compared to Thai-speakers. Differences in fertility levels, however, are mixed. Also consistent with the 1994 NSO survey, Buddhists in the south are clearly characterized by lower fertility levels and preferences and higher contraceptive use than are either Thai or Malay-speaking Muslims in the region. In brief, the results in Table 8 show clear associations of reproductive behavior and attitudes with religion, language and region. Of most interest for the present analysis is that central Muslims are substantially further along in the fertility transition than Muslims in the south but still distinctly less far along than Buddhists in the central region. [12]
Discussion and Conclusions
The preceding analysis reveals diverse findings that a comprehensive explanation of the association between religion and reproductive attitudes and behavior in Thailand needs to accommodate. Despite Muslims having lower fertility than Buddhists three decades ago before fertility declined among either group, in recent years the reverse is clearly the case. Among Buddhists nationally, fertility is now approximately at the replacement level and contraceptive use is virtually universal. In contrast, Muslims in both the south and central regions have substantially higher fertility levels and preference for a greater number of children than Buddhists in their region, are less likely to use contraception and, at least among Muslims in the south, are particularly unlikely to use permanent methods. Most Muslims in Thailand believe their religion opposes contraception and they commonly state religious objections as a reason for non-use. At the same time, there is substantial variation in terms of reproductive behavior and attitudes among the three groupings of Muslims for which data have been presented. This is particularly evident with respect to contraceptive use which is very low among Malay speakers, intermediate among Thai speakers in the south, and highest among Muslims in the central region. Central region Buddhists, however, are also characterized by lower fertility levels and preferences and higher levels of contraceptive prevalence than their counterparts in the south.
When interpreting the reproductive patterns of Muslims in Thailand, it is useful to also consider the situation of Muslims elsewhere in the region and particularly in neighboring areas of Malaysia. Fortunately, there are several recent studies that provide appropriate information for this purpose (Jones, 1990; Leete and Alam, 1993; Leete and Tan Boon Ann, 1993; Leete, 1996). Of special interest are the striking similarities in terms of low contraceptive prevalence and high fertility between Malay-speaking Thai Muslims and east coast Malays, especially those in Kelantan, the state which borders on the Malay-speaking areas of Thailand, and Tengganu directly south of it. It is noteworthy that culturally, linguistically, and in terms of kinship ties, Malays in Thailand and east-coast Malays across the border are basically the same ethnic subgroup sharing a common dialect (Farouk, 1988). Within Peninsular Malaysia overall, fertility of the ethnic Malay majority,
18 virtually all of whom are Muslims, was lower than that of Chinese and Indian non-Muslim minorities at the onset of Malaysia’s fertility transition (in the late 1950s and early 1960s). However, fertility declined much slower among ethnic Malays generally and has more or less stabilized since the late 1970s. Thus in recent years fertility among Malays is much higher than among Chinese and Indians who have already reached replacement fertility by the 1990s. Much of the decline in Malay fertility is attributable to a rising age at marriage and reduction in marital fertility is limited mainly to high parity births (Leete and Tan Boon Ann, 1993:143; Leete, 1996). Moreover, marital fertility among Malays in Kelantan and Tengganu has actually risen rather than declined over the last four decades. Current fertility in these states is particularly high and contraceptive use particularly low (Leete, 1996).
Taken together, the above findings suggest that the association between religion and reproduction in Thailand is likely to defy any simple explanation, especially in terms of the four hypotheses reviewed in the introduction. Before considering the hypotheses, however, we can rule out lack of knowledge of contraception or access to contraceptive services as playing an important role in accounting for religious differentials in contraceptive use in Thailand. According to the 1994 NSO survey, virtually all respondents knew of at least one method and over 90 percent knew at least 3 methods among Buddhist and Muslims alike (results not shown). Moreover, availability of contraception is very widespread, especially through the extensive government network of hospitals and health services as well as though private outlets (Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1987).
While our data do not permit full and rigorous testing of the four hypotheses, they at least provide a useful starting point for assessing the extent to which each is consistent with the observed reproductive patterns. The characteristics hypothesis receives very limited support from our findings since, at least in the south of Thailand, substantial differences between Buddhists and Muslims and between Thai and Malay speaking Muslims in most dimensions of reproductive behavior and attitudes remain largely unchanged or at most only modestly reduced after controlling major demographic, social and economic attributes. The fact that Malay fertility in Kelantan and Tengganu over the last four decades appears unresponsive to substantial increases in education and advances in socio-economic development (Jones, 1990; Leete and Tan Boon Ann, 1993:140), further suggests that socio-economic characteristics are unlikely to be a key to understanding the relatively high fertility and pronatalist attitudes of their counterparts in Thailand. In addition, in an international comparison, Nagi (1984) found no relation to economic and social differences between countries that would explain his findings of higher fertility in Moslem than non-Moslem countries. It would be surprising, however, if in Thailand, some of the differences between the highly urbanized central region Muslims and their predominately rural counterparts in the south could not be accounted for by socio-economic characteristics. Unfortunately, studies based on adequate sample sizes to permit statistically controlled comparisons between central region Muslims and others are lacking.
The particularized theology hypothesis stresses the role of religious doctrines. Clearly beliefs and practices associated with Islam in Thailand are far more pronatalist than those associated with Buddhism. Many Islamic scholars around the world argue that religious doctrine permits the limitation of fertility, although arguments against specific forms of birth control,
19 especially abortion and sterilization, are more usual (Nagi, 1983 and 1984; Obermeyer, 1994; Omran, 1973 and 1992). Regardless of these international debates, popular interpretation by Muslims in the south of Thailand sees contraception as a sin and the acceptance of the number of children Allah gives as their duty. This is in sharp contrast to popular beliefs of Thai Buddhists as well as more formal Buddhist theology (Fagley, 1967; Ling, 1969). Thus popular Islamic theology appears to directly influence the pronatalist fertility preferences and negative views of modern contraception and family size limitation among Muslims in Thailand, especially Malay speakers in the south. In addition, the southern Thai Muslim aversion to sterilization appears to have some basis in more widely accepted interpretations of doctrine. Nevertheless, the fact that there is substantial variation between Thai and Malay speaking Muslims in the South, and in some respects between these groups and central region Muslims, indicates other factors are operating that either create differences in popular interpretations of Islamic doctrine or that override its importance for determining behavior. Thus while clearly relevant, any simplistic application of the particularized theology hypothesis still leaves much to be explained.
The particularized theology hypothesis also recognizes that different interpretations of religious doctrines, such as may exist among religious leaders in different localities, affect behavioral outcomes. The adherence to different interpretations of Islamic doctrines by the central Thai Muslims, Thai-speaking southern Muslims, and Malay-speaking Muslims may help explain the observed differences in their reproductive behavior. Central Muslims have gradually discarded Malay elements from their religious instruction and observance and have strengthened their links to Middle Eastern teachings. Local Islam in central Thailand has also taken on some of Thai Buddhism’s permissiveness and individuality (Golomb, 1985:26). McVey (1989:35) refers to the more “relaxed Islam” of the Thai-speaking Muslims of Satun compared to their Malay-speaking counterparts in the other three southern provinces with Muslim majorities. In contrast, Islamic fundamentalism and its stress on traditional values has taken hold in the last few decades in the Malay- speaking areas in southern Thailand, as has been the case in neighboring Kelantan in Malaysia (Leete, 1996: 98). Indeed, according to Leete and Tan Boon Ann (1993: 144) the fundamentalist movement has been largely responsible for reduced use of modern contraception among ethnic Malays in Malaysia.
A broader interpretation of the particularistic theology hypothesis also allows for more indirect influences than just through prohibitions on contraception or exhortations to have large families. Many have argued that Islam's historical emphasis on high fertility and the low status of Moslem women influence high fertility rates (Obermeyer, 1992). In this sense, it is possible that the fundamentalist movement may have affected perceptions about the role of women in the family and the social role of women more generally in ways that encourage childbearing among Malay-speaking Muslims (Leete and Tan Boon Ann, 1993; 144). The evidence, however, is not clear on this. A substantial degree of autonomy seems to generally characterize women in Southeast Asia regardless of religion (Prachuabmoh, 1989:114). The common lack of son preference among both Buddhists and Muslims is undoubtedly one reflection of this. An earlier study in Pattani province found that Muslim women have considerable autonomy and differ little in this respect from Buddhist women (Siripirom and others, 1983). Moreover, a recent regional comparative study examining Muslim women in five South and Southeast Asian
20 countries (including Thailand and Malaysia) concluded that, although Muslim women’s freedom of movement tends to be more constrained in some contexts than their non-Muslims counterparts, there is no clear pattern that they have less power or domestic autonomy (Mason, Smith and Morgan, 1997). Thus research to date is not supportive of the view that impacts through women’s status are key to understanding the more pronatalist views and behavior of either Malay or Thai-speaking Muslims relative to Buddhists in Thailand although the available evidence does not seem strong enough to rule this route out completely.
In sum, while the particularistic theology hypothesis helps explain the more pronatalist attitudes and behavior of Muslims compared to Buddhists in Thailand, it is incomplete. The fact that Thai Muslims commonly believe that contraception generally is against Islamic Doctrine, despite the fact that there is far from universal consensus about this in the broader Muslim world, requires an explanation that takes account of the local context that generates these views. Overall, the particularized theology hypothesis is too limited in its reliance on the formal content of religious doctrines and ignores the local traditions and political context that mediate the impact on popular attitudes and actual behavior.
According to the interaction hypothesis, the lack of substantial reproductive change among Malay-speaking Muslims and the slower change among other Muslims compared to Buddhists is only a temporary phenomenon stemming from a cultural lag created by differing degrees of compatibility between the beliefs of religious groups and modern levels of low fertility. Eventually common forces of socio-economic change will overcome the resistance to family size limitation and use of modern contraception that is embedded in local interpretations of Islam. Thai Muslims, including Malay speakers, are thus expected to eventually to follow Thai Buddhists in adopting a small family norm and practicing modern contraception to achieve it. The fact that the current differentials emerged only after the fertility transition got underway at the national level is consistent with the hypothesis. Indeed, religious fertility differentials were actually reversed in the earlier pre-transition period. The fact that Thai-speaking Muslims in the central region and the south are increasingly using family planning methods and lowering their fertility after a lag is also consistent with the hypothesis. There is even some indication from the focus group discussions that socio-economic changes are creating pressures to have fewer children among the Malay speakers. It is too early to tell, however, if Malay speakers will actually follow the more general trend. Indeed, fertility has yet to fall among Malays in neighboring east coast Malaysia, even though they are likely to have experienced greater socio-economic progress than their counterparts in Thailand due to national policies in Malaysia favoring ethnic Malays (Jones, 1991; Leete and Tan Boon Ann, 1993; Leete, 1996). Moreover, the interaction hypothesis is unable to account for why, after socio-economic factors are taken into account, Thai and Malay speakers among Muslims differ so much in their reproductive behavior.
One version of the minority status hypothesis predicts that when there is a pronatalist ideology combined with a low desire for acculturation and a sense of political disadvantage, the minority religious group will have higher fertility than the majority population. This version seems consistent with the higher levels of Muslim fertility in Thailand, especially among Malay- speaking Muslims who are far more resistant to assimilation than Thai- speakers. However, when we consider the very similar reproductive patterns of
21 ethnic Malays across the Thai-Malaysian border, this interpretation is more problematic. It seems very likely that common factors underlie the similar reproductive behavior on both sides of the border. Yet ethnic Malay Muslims are the majority population in Malaysia and are politically advantaged given the government policies during the last several decades explicitly favoring them over other ethnic and religious groups (primarily the Chinese and Indians). Thus on the surface at least, the minority status hypothesis seems consistent with only the Thai case and not with the Malaysian one thus detracting from its credibility as an explanation for either.
On closer consideration, the situations of the Malay Muslims in Thailand and in the neighboring east coast Malaysian provinces, especially Kelantan, may not be as different with respect to minority status as it first seems. Leete (1996) points out that Malays in the east coast states of Kelantan and Tengganu share a distinctive subculture inspired by Islamic traditions associated with the former Sultanate of Pattani, i.e. the area which constitutes the three Thai provinces with Malay Muslim majorities. Kelantan and Tengganu are also where the fundamentalist Islamic opposition party (PAS) has received strongest support (Leete, 1996). Thus among ethnic Malays, those in the east coast states that most closely resemble Malay Muslims in Thailand in their reproductive behavior, may have some similar sense of minority status within their own country.
Largely outside the framework of the four hypothesis relating reproduction and religion, discussions of Muslim fertility have recently emphasized the interaction between interpretations of Islamic doctrine and political setting (e.g. Obermeyer, 1992 and 1994). In fact, to some extent, the minority status hypothesis also recognizes that political context can play a role (Goldscheider, 1971). One important aspect of the political context are government population policies and particularly the extent of state involvement in family planning programs. Leete (1996:168) has pointed out that where the policies of secular political leaders are constrained by the influence of religious leaders, government promotion of family planning can be severely hampered. The Thai government has actively sponsored a program promoting modern contraception and small families for almost three decades. [13] It is quite possible that local religious leaders in Muslim communities in Thailand, especially in the Malay speaking provinces but elsewhere as well, have been unsympathetic to this policy. This may be not only related to their interpretation of religious doctrine but also for purposes of increasing political influence of the Muslim minority through greater numerical strength. Moreover, encouragement of high fertility and opposition to modern contraception might also come from separatists or their sympathizers in the case of Malay-speaking Muslims in southern Thailand. Even Muslim political leaders in these provinces may see high fertility as an appropriate way to counteract potential increases in the number of Buddhists resulting from government sponsored in-migration by settlers from outside the area (Suhrke, 1989). While we lack direct evidence to substantiate these speculations, we believe these are promising areas for future inquiry.
Malay-speaking Muslims in Thailand have largely been resistant to government development programs in general (Cornish,1997). Thus in connection with the political context, it is tempting to interpret the avoidance of family planning services by Malay speakers in Thailand as symptomatic of their general distrust of the Thai government and as a form of “everyday resistance”
22 to the Thai state and the programs it sponsors. It would not be surprising that they would resist efforts to promote family planning, which not only are associated with the Thai government but relate to aspects of family life intimately related to Islamic religious convictions. However, the fact that the practice of modern contraception is also very low in Malaysia, and especially neighboring Kelantan casts some doubts on such an interpretation. Ethnic Malays are not an oppressed minority in Malaysia who are attempting to retain their own ethnic and political identity, as might be the case in Thailand. At the same time, as pointed out above, the position of east coast Malays may less straight forward in as much as they may feel some sense of minority status by virtue of there regional cultural identity and their fundamentalist religious orientation. The rather different stances taken regarding population policy and family planning programs in Thailand and Malaysia further complicate interpreting the situation. In contrast to Thailand’s consistent policy encouraging low fertility, Malaysia initiated an anti-natalist policy in the mid-1960s that was largely abandoned and in 1970s and later reversed (Leete 1996:114-115). Although family planning is still available as a government health service, the program is described as “very low key” (Jones, 1990). Interestingly, the program from the beginning seems to have been particularly unsuccessful in the east coast states (Leete, 1996).
Our analysis of Muslims in Buddhist Thailand raises interesting questions about the relationship between religion and reproduction, many of which we have been able to only incompletely address. The hypotheses linking religion and fertility that have dominated the social demographic literature during the last several decades go part way in helping understand what appears to be a complex and context specific relationship. But major questions remain. It seems clear that Islam exerts an important pronatalist influence on the attitudes and behavior of Thai Muslims. At the same time, it is also apparent that the national and local context condition the extent to which Islam inhibits the influences of social and economic changes that generally operate to encourage lower fertility. The fact that religion influences reproduction in interaction with other cultural, political, socio-economic and historical factors makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, to isolate the impact of religion per se. This is especially the case when religious identity is itself a component of these other factors. Survey data such as used in the present study, even when supplemented by focus groups, can only go so far in providing insights into these multi-fold interactions. Ultimately, any complete analysis will need to draw on a variety of disciplines. Nevertheless, social demographic evidence and interpretations can serve as an important starting point for a more comprehensive approach.
FOOTNOTES
[1] In the case of education, the 4-7 years of schooling category is divided into 4 and 5-7 years when entering education as a categorical variable.
[2] For results based on logistic regression, determination of significance is based on the improvement in the log likelihood when the combined variable of the three religion and language categories are added to the model containing all the other independent variables. When results are based on Multiple
23 Classification Analysis (MCA), statistical significance is assessed from the F-ratio in an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).
[3] One exception was higher Muslim fertility found in Bangkok in the 1960 census data, although the number of Muslim women on which the Bangkok results are based is quite small (Goldstein, 1970: 337).
[4] The survey actually included two separate questions about preferred family size. In addition to the one on the appropriate family size in a general sense another question asked “how many children do you want” and thus refers more to a personally desired family size. The mean number yielded by each question is almost identical. However, the desired number of children tended to below the appropriate number for single women while the reverse was true for married women. Among married women, there is some indication that responses about the desired number was more affected by rationalization than responses about the appropriate number. For example, the average difference between desired and appropriate number of children is higher among women with larger numbers of living children than those with fewer. For this reason we choose to present results based on the appropriate number rather than the desired number. In fact, differentials by religion and language are very similar regardless of which measure is used.
[5] In fact, results are affected very little by whether or not proxy interviews are included. For example, the percentage of ever married women who indicated they wanted more children is almost identical (46 compared 47 percent) for those who reported themselves and for those for whom a proxy reported. This is true both before and after adjusting (by linear regression) for differences in duration of marriage and religious and language composition. Likewise, there is very little difference with respect to the average family size that was thought to be appropriate. After statistically adjusting for differences in marital status, religion and language, socio- economic background, and age, the mean appropriate family size differed by only .05 of a child (2.50 versus 2.45) between self reporting women who and those for whom a proxy reported.
[6] Among ever married women with children, only 23 percent stated a specific level of schooling. Among those who did, only 8 percent of Buddhists indicated that their children would only receive a primary education compared to 32 percent of both Thai-speaking and Malay-speaking Muslims. In contrast, 71 percent of Buddhists compared to 33 percent of Thai-speaking Muslims and 28 percent of Malay-speaking Muslims expected their children to receive a university education.
[7] Educational expectations were entered as a categorical variable including a separate category for women with no children since they were not asked the question.
[8] Apparently respondents were not permitted to state that the sex of the child did not matter since there is no code for this in the data set and for virtually every respondent the sum of the number of appropriate sons and daughters equals the total appropriate number of children. The same is true of the question regarding desired numbers of children.
24 [9] Malay-speaking Muslim women, however, appear to be less forthcoming than others about their awareness of contraception as indicated by the fact that 14 percent responded negatively to the initial general question about knowing any methods compared to only 4 percent of Thai-speaking Muslims and 2 percent of Buddhists. When probed about specific methods, however, most who initially denied knowing about contraception acknowledged hearing of one or more methods.
[10] It may be relevant that the questionnaire in Thai uses a modern word for contraception (“cum kam nuat”) which tends to be associated with modern contraceptive methods promoted by the government family planning program. There is some evidence that Muslims in the south think of non-modern methods, especially withdrawal, in different terms and moreover, that non-modern methods may be more acceptable to them (Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1997:107).
[12] Those who said they intended to use contraception were further asked which method they planned to use. Among women who said they intended to use contraception, Muslims were much less likely to mention sterilization than Buddhists confirming their greater aversion to permanent methods.
[12] Given the small numbers of Muslims in the 1987 TDHS sample, we do not present statistically adjusted results. However, preliminary analysis reveals that controlling for rural-urban residence, educational level of the couple, and marriage duration has little effect in reducing differences between central region Muslims and Buddhists.
[13] In recognition of the unusually high level of fertility among Malay- speaking Muslims in the South, the most recent government five year social and economic plan (covering the period 1997 to 2001) specifically includes them among high fertility groups targeted for special attention by the National Family Planning Program.
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29 Table 1. Mean age and percent distribution according to area of residence, marital status, educational attainment, and occupation, by religion and language, southern region, Thailand, 1994
Muslims ------Thai Malay Buddhists speaker speaker
Mean age 28.9 27.6 27.9
Marital status Single 32.7 32.9 29.0 Currently married 62.9 63.3 64.0 Formerly married 4.4 3.7 7.0
Percent married more than once (ever married women) 4.6 8.2 13.5
Mean duration since first marriage (ever married women) 11.6 11.6 13.4
Area of residence Urban 16.0 5.3 7.6 Semi-urban 7.7 6.8 5.9 Rural 76.3 87.9 86.4
Education None 2.3 5.4 18.9 Less than 4 years 2.1 2.4 5.0 4-7 years 61.3 73.6 61.6 Lower secondary 13.8 9.4 9.0 Upper secondary 11.1 6.1 4.9 Beyond secondary 9.3 3.0 0.6
Occupation White collar 9.3 3.4 1.3 Sales 10.8 20.3 8.6 Agriculture 40.4 33.3 41.5 Others 11.7 9.8 12.1 Not working 27.8 33.2 36.6
Source: The Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand, 1994. Table 2. Mean number of children ever born to all ever married women and to women married 10-19 years and percent of currently married women who have a child under age 2, unadjusted and adjusted for background characteristics, by religion, southern region, Thailand, 1994
Moslems ------Thai Malay Buddhists speaker speaker Mean children ever born ------All ever married women Unadjusted 2.20 2.62 3.00 Adjusted 2.26 2.62 2.72
Women married 10-19 years Unadjusted 2.64 3.17 3.33 Adjusted 2.67 3.14 3.22
% with a child under age 2 ------Currently married women (married 2+ years) Unadjusted 18.8 20.6 24.1 Adjusted 16.4 16.5 22.1
Notes: Results referring to mean number of children are statistically adjusted for background characteristics through multiple classification analysis (MCA); results referring to the percent with a child under age 2 are adjusted through logistic regression with the adjusted results representing the mean predicted probabilities. The background characteristics for which adjustment is made included area of residence, educational attainment, occupation, and marriage duration; the mean number of children ever born are additionally adjusted for current marital status and whether or not the woman was married more than once.
Source: The Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand, 1994 Table 3. Percent distribution of the appropriate number of children and the mean appropriate number, by religion and language, southern region, Thailand, 1994
All women Women under age 30 Moslems Moslems Budd- Thai Malay Budd- Thai Malay hists speaker speaker hists speaker speaker
Appropriate number (percent distribution) 0-1 1.0 0.4 0.1 1.5 0.5 0.0 2 72.9 53.0 26.6 80.1 59.9 33.9 3 21.0 28.7 30.0 16.1 25.4 34.4 4 4.8 13.7 28.8 2.3 10.5 23.0 5+ .4 4.2 14.5 0.1 3.7 8.8 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mean 2.31 2.69 3.36 2.19 2.57 3.11
Note: Results in this table exclude proxy respondents.
Source: The Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand, 1994 Table 4. Mean appropriate number of children among women age 15-49, unadjusted and adjusted for background characteristics and educational expectations for children, by religion and language, marital status, and age, southern region, Thailand, 1994
Muslims ------Thai Malay Buddhists speaker speaker Women aged 15-49 Total Unadjusted 2.31 2.69 3.36 Adjusted for background characteristics 2.32 2.67 3.31 Single women Unadjusted 2.15 2.59 2.86 Adjusted for background characteristics 2.16 2.55 2.84 Ever married women Unadjusted 2.37 2.73 3.54 Adjusted for background characteristics 2.39 2.73 3.48 Adjusted for background and educational expectations 2.39 2.72 3.47
Women under 30 Total Unadjusted 2.19 2.57 3.11 Adjusted for background characteristics 2.21 2.54 3.09 Single women Unadjusted 2.14 2.63 2.85 Adjusted for background characteristics 2.15 2.60 2.82 Ever married women Unadjusted 2.24 2.54 3.32 Adjusted for background characteristics 2.25 2.50 3.30 Adjusted for background and educational expectations 2.25 2.50 3.32
Notes: Results in this table exclude proxy respondents. Results are adjusted statistically through multiple classification analysis (MCA). The background characteristics taken into account are area of residence, educational attainment, occupation, and age.
Source: The Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand, 1994. Table 5. Indicators of appropriate sex composition of family and desire for additional children by sex composition of current family, by religion and language, Southern Region, Thailand, 1994.
Moslems ------Thai Malay Buddhists speaker speaker Women of all marital statuses ------Mean appropriate number of Sons 1.18 1.36 1.66 Daughters 1.13 1.33 1.72 Ratio of sons to daughters 1.04 1.05 0.97
Appropriate composition (a) (% distribution) All women Sons > daughters 13.9 18.0 18.8 Sons = daughters 76.9 66.8 56.3 Daughters > sons 9.2 15.2 24.9 Total percent 100 100 100 Women stating an even number Sons > daughters 0.6 0.4 3.2 Sons = daughters 98.8 99.4 93.7 Daughters > sons 0.6 0.2 3.1 Total percent 100 100 100 Women stating an odd number Sons > daughters 60.6 54.4 42.2 Daughters > sons 39.4 45.6 57.8 Total percent 100 100 100
Currently married women only ------Percentage wanting more children by current sex composition of family Women with one child 1 daughter 86.3 97.6 93.8 1 son 83.7 91.7 89.6 Women with two children 2 daughters 46.0 78.1 86.5 1 son, 1 daughter 19.4 43.1 69.0 2 sons 47.4 81.5 86.0 Women with 3 children More daughters than sons 6.3 20.5 52.7 More sons than daughters 12.7 19.0 68.3
Of those wanting more children, percentage wanting more (b) Sons 53.6 61.4 53.0 Daughters 49.7 49.0 55.8 Children of either sex 22.8 19.7 29.7
Notes: Results in this table exclude proxy respondents. (a) Excluding women who want no children. (b) Categories shown are not mutually exclusive since a respondent could specify any combination of additional boys, girls or children of either sex. Source: The Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand, 1994 Table 6. Ever use of contraception among ever married women and current use of contraception among currently married women, unadjusted and adjusted for background characteristics, by religion Moslems ------Thai Malay Buddhists speaker speaker Ever use of contraception (ever married women) Unadjusted 77.2 60.9 19.7 Adjusted 78.0 61.6 21.0
Current use of contraception (currently married women) Any method Unadjusted 64.9 51.0 11.2 Adjusted 64.3 51.0 12.2
Sterilization Unadjusted 20.1 3.7 1.5 Adjusted 23.8 5.2 2.4
Non-permanent method Unadjusted 44.8 47.4 9.7 Adjusted 41.1 41.8 8.5
Notes: Results are adjusted through logistic regression for area of residence, educational attainment, occupation, and age. The adjusted results represent the mean predicted probabilities.
Source: Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand, 1994. Table 7. Attitudes towards family planning, by marital status, religion and language, Southern Region, Thailand, 1994
Moslems ------Thai Malay Buddhists speaker speaker All women ------% disapproving family planning 0.9 10.5 41.9
% believing family planning is against their religion n.a. 58.4 87.8
Single women ------% disapproving family planning 0.7 11.1 36.1
% believing family planning is against their religion n.a. 61.6 86.9
Intention to use contraception after marriage (% distribution) Yes 45.1 25.3 12.1 No 5.5 26.8 32.8 Did not think about 49.3 47.9 55.2 Total percent 100 100 100
Ever married women ------% disapproving family planning 1.0 10.3 44.1
% believing family planning is against their religion n.a. 57.2 88.2
% of never users who cite religion as reason for never use 0.0 47.7 66.7
% of all women who cite religion as reason for never use 0.0 18.8 54.1
Notes: Results in this table exclude proxy respondents. n.a. = not applicable. Source: The Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand, 1994 Table 8. Indicators of fertility behavior, fertility preferences and contraceptive use in the central and southern region, by religion and language, Thailand 1984 and 1987
Southern region Central region ------(including Bangkok) Thai Malay ------speaking speaking Buddhists Muslims Buddhists Muslims Muslims Unweighted cases (ever married women) CPS3 1984 2735 132 975 232 547 TDHS 1987 2503 137 884 210 122
Mean number of Children ever born (ever married women) CPS3 1984 2.6 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.3 TDHS 1987 2.5 3.0 3.1 3.7 3.2
Current fertility indicators (currently married women) CPS3 1984 (annual births per 1000 women in previous 2 years) 155 220 195 315 276 TDHS 1987 (percent having a birth in previous 2 years) 21.2 24.5 26.8 38.3 43.7
Mean preferred number of children (ever married women) CPS3 1984 2.7 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.0 TDHS 1987 All women 2.6 3.5 2.9 3.3 3.5 Women under 30 2.2 3.0 2.6 3.1 3.3
Percent wanting no more children (currently married women) CPS3 1984 65 60 66 50 35 TDHS 1987 66 54 67 54 43
Current contraceptive use (percent of currently married women, age 15-44) All methods CPS3 1984 70 56 57 44 23 TDHS 1987 71 59 63 30 18 Permanent methods CPS3 1984 31 18 24 8 2 TDHS 1987 33 25 26 8 1
Source: CPS3 results are from Kamnuansilpa and Chamratrithirong, 1985. TDHS results are original tabulations. Appendix A. Unweighted number of women (total and self-reported) and percentage self-reported interviews in the sample of the 1994 Survey of Knowledge, Attitude and Family Planning Practice in the Southern Region of Thailand, by religion, language and marital status
Muslims ------All Thai Malay women(a) Buddhists speaker speaker All women Total number 7961 5875 910 1161 Self-reported Number 6287 4534 715 1028 Percentage 79.0 77.2 78.6 88.5
Never married women Total number 2278 1683 253 338 Self-reported Number 1586 1139 162 282 Percentage 69.6 67.7 64.0 83.4
Ever married women Number 5683 4192 657 823 Self-reported Number 4701 3395 553 746 Percentage 82.7 81.0 84.2 90.6
Note: (a) includes 15 Muslim women who do not speak Thai or Malay