DOCSLIB.ORG

Somalia: a Failed State?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Somalia: a Failed State? FEBRUARY 2017 ISSUE NO. 170 Somalia: A Failed State? HARISH VENUGOPALAN ABSTRACT It will not be an exaggeration to say that almost all the countries in Africa face some form of conflict. Yet, most of them have managed to survive, and some—like South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo—have even evolved into reasonably successful states. However, Somalia has not. What are the reasons for Somalia's failure to survive? Did external interventions play a role? Was Islamophobia a contributing factor, and the inter-clan civil war, too? This paper finds that although there have been many reasons, such as unnecessary interventions—especially the case of Ethiopian in 2006—the failure of Somalia as a state is mostly because of a lack of an effective leadership. INTRODUCTION In the 19th and the first half of the 20th From 1960 until 1969, Somalia was a centuries, colonialist countries divided democratic state. Through a coup d'etat in Somalia into five parts—the United Kingdom 1969, Siyad Barre came to power. Barre forged (UK) took two parts while Italy, Ethiopia and close ties with the Soviet Union, which France took one each. The Somalis fought for provided aid to Somalia throughout the independence from all the colonial powers. 1970s. Trouble started when Barre attempted Northern and Southern Somalia gained to take back the Ogaden Somali territory from independence on 26 June 1960 and 01 July Ethiopia and the Soviets decided to back 1960, respectively. All parts of Somalia would Ethiopia. This enraged Barre, resulting in eventually form a Greater Somalia.1 Somalia and the Soviet Union severing their Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think-tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research, and stimulating discussions. The Foundation is supported in its mission by a cross-section of India’s leading public figures, as well as academic and business leaders. Somalia: A Failed State? ties. Consequently, the United States (US) Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, thousands of became close to Somalia. The US gave Somalia Somali civilians were killed and wounded. By foreign aid for military technology, 1992, an estimated 350,000 Somali people amounting to US $163.5 million between had died due to disease, starvation or as direct 1980 and 1988, and four times that for casualties of the civil war. Following this, the economic development. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a military mission called 'Operation By the late 1980s, after the Ogaden war, Restoration Hope', entrusting the US with the Barre's policies in the north resulted in task of protecting the food shipments from discontent amongst the Isaaq clan. (There are the warlords. However, the US got involved in five major clans in Somalia—the Isaaq, entanglements with local groups. Darood, Digil and Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye—and various smaller clans.2) The In 1993, Somali rebels shot down two US Isaaq were the largest northern clan, and they helicopters, killing 18 US Army rangers and felt isolated from the current politics and state one Malaysian UN soldier. A severe battle resources. Some moves, such as resettling of followed, which claimed the lives of hundreds Ogaden refugees in northern areas, were seen of Somali civilians. In 1994, the US formally as southern attempts to subvert northern ended its mission in Somalia, which had cost interests. There was an uprising against Barre, the US $1.7 billion and left 43 American led by the northern Isaaq clan, and in soldiers dead and 153 injured.6 response, Barre ordered bombings of northern towns, villages and even rural The United Nations Operations in Somalia encampments. Gradually, the uprisings would (UNOSOM), which was a more well-developed spread to the southern areas, and in 1992 move to bring about stability to the country, Barre was forced to flee.3 Somalia's defeat in instead of achieving its target, entered into a the war led to a bitter blame-game. This conflict with the powerful warlord, Gen. ultimately resulted in uprisings against him.4 Mohammed Farah Aidid. The UNOSOM failed, and left Somalia in a permanent state of 7 CHAOS IN SOMALIA AFTER BARRE collapse and war. Somalis suffered heavily under Aidid's reign and from subsequent As a result, Siyad Barre fled Mogadishu in fighting among warlords. Following Gen. January 1991. Troops commanded by Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid's assassination, Mohamed Farah Aidid pursued Siyad Barre, Hussain Farah Aidid took over.8 But this did while Ali Mahdi Mohamed, who was a wealthy not result in a stable administration. Mogadishu businessman, declared himself the new president and formed a government. In It was only in 1999, through a conference the north, the Isaaq clans formed an sponsored by the Republic of Djibouti, that independent Somaliland. Ali Mahdi's claims assistance was given to Somali civil society to power were not recognised by groups groups, after which the negotiating parties beyond his own control.5 came to an agreement that paved the way for the Transitional National Government (TNG). As a result of the power struggle between While this could have been a turning point in the two warring clan lords, Mohammed Farah Somali history, the TNG failed, mainly due to 2 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 170 l FEBRUARY 2017 Somalia: A Failed State? the incompetence and greed of its leaders the conference were Kenya and Ethiopia. They combined with the relentless attempts of chose to form a tactical alliance with the Ethiopia and its allies to undermine the warlords. This resulted in the emergence of a agreement.9 new government led by the warlords in 2004. Ethiopia, through its influence, was able to Over a period of 16 years, Somalia had 14 dictate the choice of president and prime failed attempts at forming a government. One minister to their advantage.12 The old SSRC of the fundamental problems was that the coalition was fiercely anti-Islamic in nature TNG was dominated by Mogadishu-based and based outside Mogadishu. On the other clans, especially the Hawiye/Haber Gedir/Ayr hand, the Mogadishu-based coalition was sub clans, and thus was not a national unity supported by the Arab world, had an anti- government. It faced opposition in the form of Ethiopian attitude and contained Islamists in a loose coalition of clans called Somali its alliance. It preferred a strong unity Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Council government rather than a federalist state and (SRRC), which was backed by Ethiopia. The was dominated by the Hawiye clan. SRRC's leader was Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the autonomous state of Puntland in The IGAD made another attempt to bring northeast Somalia.10 about peace in 2002. In the past, it was common practice to decide which clan would In the second half of the '90s, commercial control what territories. Due to continuous opportunities opened up in Somalia. While pressure from the IGAD in general and businessmen had to pay security to the militia, Ethiopia in particular, there was success in the they did not receive substantial security in form of a 275-member parliament in August return. This frustrated them, and thus, they and the 4.5 formula in September 2004.13 surreptitiously paid the militiamen and According to the 4.5 formula, an equal number ensured that the gunmen were under the of places were allocated to each of the four command of the local Sharia courts. The major clans and half the places that were Sharia militia became a reputed security allotted to a clan were allocated to minorities source, more reliable than the warlords' and women.14 groups. The TNG government which was formed in 2000 ensured that the Sharia In October 2004, Abdullahi Yusuf from the militias declined temporarily as the business Mijerteen/Darood clan was selected as groups also shifted their support to the new president of the Transitional Federal government. After the TNG failed, the Government (TFG). Yusuf was also president businessmen formed huge private security of the autonomous state of Puntland in forces to protect their assets. These private northeast Somalia and a close ally of Ethiopia. groups became the most powerful militias in Yusuf made Mohammed Ghedi his prime Mogadishu, unchallenged until 2006.11 minister. Ghedi, too, had very good relations with Ethiopia. The 82-member Cabinet that Eventually, the TNG was forced into Ghedi formed, though it followed the 4.5 accepting the peace conference sponsored by pattern, was made up of supporters of the the Intergovernmental Authority on SRRC alliance. The TNG was virtually isolated Development (IGAD). The chief directors of with people associated with it getting no ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 170 l FEBRUARY 2017 3 Somalia: A Failed State? substantial positions. Moreover, there were with the TFG. At least three assassination charges of corruption that insinuated that attempts were made on Yusuf and Ghedi in votes of MPs were purchased using Ethiopian 2005. By mid-2005, the SCIC was the money. strongest political and military force in Mogadishu. PEACE PROCESS: AN ANALYSIS A missed opportunity was the failure of the The Kenyan peace process failed because the civic system that emerged from the root causes of the conflict were not properly Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan addressed—and for this, both the Somali (MSSP) in 2015. This was a loose alliance that groups and the ineffective international consisted of some major political figures from mediators were responsible. Some of the the Hawiye clan, especially from the Ayr sub- militia leaders refused to sit in the same room clan; Hawiye warlords including some in the as the TFG cabinet.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • USIP's Work in Somalia
    USIP’s Work in Somalia Making Peace Possible UNMISS Photo/JC Mcilwaine CURRENT SITUATION After decades of civil war and the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalis and international supporters have made progress in re-establishing state structures, such as a provisional 2012 constitution and the country’s first elections for a government since 1969. The African Union and the United Nations, with U.S. assistance, support the Federal Government of Somalia in restoring President Hassan Sheikh institutions. Still, continued attacks by the al-Shabab Mohamud on His Plan for extremist group, plus corruption and regional and clan Peace disputes, have complicated the government’s efforts to Somalia’s president spoke hold popular elections and establish stable governance. For example, consensus still must be at USIP in April 2016 to lay reached about the composition, boundaries, and powers of Somalia’s constituent states. The out his government’s plan government was unable to hold a direct vote for president in 2016 and scheduled an indirect for stabilizing his country— election in parliament for February 2017. Of an estimated 10 million Somalis, more than 2 million and Somalia’s need for are displaced and 5 million need humanitarian assistance, according to U.N. agencies. international support in that USIP’S WORK effort. The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) provides education, grants, training, and resources to help Somalis strengthen the institutions and skills needed to build a more stable, resilient society and state. USIP works through partnerships with Somali civil society organizations and government institutions, the U.S. State Department, non-governmental organizations, and the large Somali diaspora around the globe.
    [Show full text]
  • Briefing Paper
    NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH Working Paper No. 65 Pastoral society and transnational refugees: population movements in Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia 1988 - 2000 Guido Ambroso UNHCR Brussels E-mail : [email protected] August 2002 Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees CP 2500, 1211 Geneva 2 Switzerland E-mail: [email protected] Web Site: www.unhcr.org These working papers provide a means for UNHCR staff, consultants, interns and associates to publish the preliminary results of their research on refugee-related issues. The papers do not represent the official views of UNHCR. They are also available online under ‘publications’ at <www.unhcr.org>. ISSN 1020-7473 Introduction The classical definition of refugee contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention was ill- suited to the majority of African refugees, who started fleeing in large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s. These refugees were by and large not the victims of state persecution, but of civil wars and the collapse of law and order. Hence the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention expanded the definition of “refugee” to include these reasons for flight. Furthermore, the refugee-dissidents of the 1950s fled mainly as individuals or in small family groups and underwent individual refugee status determination: in-depth interviews to determine their eligibility to refugee status according to the criteria set out in the Convention. The mass refugee movements that took place in Africa made this approach impractical. As a result, refugee status was granted on a prima facie basis, that is with only a very summary interview or often simply with registration - in its most basic form just the name of the head of family and the family size.1 In the Somali context the implementation of this approach has proved problematic.
    [Show full text]
  • The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions
    Istituto Affari Internazionali IAI WORKING PAPERS 12 | 15 – May 2012 The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions Rossella Marangio Abstract The long-lasting Somali conflict is profoundly linked to the country’s historical development and its socio-cultural specificities. The political milieu and the struggle for power in Somalia reflect the cleavage between tradition and modernity. This rift has led to a legitimacy vacuum, which has made it difficult for the warring parties to find enough common ground for a compromise. Furthermore, external influences, at both regional and international levels, have contributed to the fragmentation of the political arena, due notably to the emphasis on the use of force as the principal tool for acquiring or maintaining power. In this unfolding crisis, regional pressures and rivalries, international interventions, economic and strategic interests as well as piracy, corruption and Islamic extremism all play an interlocking role. In view of this, a new approach to the crisis is badly needed. The EU, in particular, should promote a new strategy based on three components: enhancement of social cohesion through local cooperation programmes, state-building and development. Keywords : Somalia / Civil conflict / Society / European Union / Military intervention / European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia / Piracy / European Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) / Regional Maritime Capacity Building (RMCB) / African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) © 2012 IAI IAI Working Papers 1215 The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions by Rossella Marangio ∗ Introduction The civil war in Somalia has been ravaging the country for two decades. The difficulties in achieving peace have highlighted the powerlessness of the international community.
    [Show full text]
  • Report on Minority Groups in Somalia
    The Danish Immigration Service Ryesgade 53 DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø Phone: + 45 35 36 66 00 Website: www.udlst.dk E-mail: [email protected] Report on minority groups in Somalia Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya 17 – 24 September 2000 Report on minority groups in Somalia Table of contents 1. Background ..................................................................................................................................5 2. Introduction to sources and methodology....................................................................................6 3. Overall political developments and the security situation in Somalia.......................................10 3.1 Arta peace process in Djibouti...............................................................................................10 3.2 Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and new President ..................................................10 3.2.1 Position of North West Somalia (Somaliland)...............................................................12 3.2.2 Position of North East Somalia (Puntland)....................................................................13 3.2.3 Prospects for a central authority in Somalia ..................................................................13 3.3 Security Situation...................................................................................................................14 3.3.1 General...........................................................................................................................14
    [Show full text]
  • CLAIMING the EASTERN BORDERLANDS After the 1997
    CHAPTER SEVEN CLAIMING THE EASTERN BORDERLANDS After the 1997 Hargeysa Conference, the Somaliland state apparatus consolidated. It deepened, as the state realm displaced governance arrangements overseen by clan elders. And it broadened, as central government control extended geographically from the capital into urban centres such as Borama in the west and Bur’o in the east. In the areas east of Bur’o government was far less present or efffective, especially where non-Isaaq clans traditionally lived. Erigavo, the capital of Sanaag Region, which was shared by the Habar Yunis, the Habar Ja’lo, the Warsengeli and the Dhulbahante, was fijinally brought under formal government control in 1997, after Egal sent a delegation of nine govern- ment ministers originating from the area to sort out local government with the elders and political actors on the ground. After fijive months of negotiations, the president was able to appoint a Mayor for Erigavo and a Governor for Sanaag.1 But east of Erigavo, in the area inhabited by the Warsengeli, any claim to governance from Hargeysa was just nominal.2 The same was true for most of Sool Region inhabited by the Dhulbahante. Eastern Sanaag and Sool had not been Egal’s priority. The president did not strictly need these regions to be under his military control in order to preserve and consolidate his position politically or in terms of resources. The port of Berbera was vital for the economic survival of the Somaliland government. Erigavo and Las Anod were not. However, because the Somaliland government claimed the borders of the former British protec- torate as the borders of Somaliland, Sanaag and Sool had to be seen as under government control.
    [Show full text]
  • Faithless Power As Fratricide: Is There an Alternative in Somalia?
    Faithless Power as Fratricide: Is there an Alternative in Somalia? Abdi Ismail Samatar I. The Meaning of Faith Mohamed Suliman’s lovely and famous song for the Eid is not only suggestive of the joys of the past but reminisces about the great values that the Somali people shared and which served them well during test- ing times of yesteryear. Here is a line from the song: Hadba kii arrin keena Ka kalee aqbalaaya Ilaahii ina siiyay isagaa ku abaal leh Simply put, this line and the spirit of the whole song echo Somalis’ traditional acumen to generate timely ideas and the competence to lis- ten and heed productive compromises. These attributes that nurtured their collective best interests have been on the wane for three decades and are now in peril or even to perish for eternity. As a result, much despair is visible in the Somali landscape. Yet it is worth remembering that there is no inevitability about the extension of the present despon- dency into the future as long as civic-minded Somalis are resolute and remain wedded to their compatriots’ well-being and cardinal values. The concept of Faith has triple meanings in the context of this brief essay (Figure 1). First, it means devotion to the Creator and the straight path of Islam. This is clear from the core principles of Islam (not as defined by sectarian ideologues but by the Qur’an and the Haddith), one of which is imaan. Second, Faith enshrines self-reliance and the effort to pull oneself up by the bootstraps as well as attend to the needs 63 Bildhaan Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Immunity of Current Or Former Foreign Officials Who Are Sued for Acts Per- Formed in an Official Capacity
    No. 15-1345 In the Supreme Court of the United States YUSUF ABDI ALI, PETITIONER v. FARHAN MOHAMOUD TANI WARFAA ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE JEFFREY B. WALL Acting Solicitor General Counsel of Record EDWIN S. KNEEDLER Deputy Solicitor General ELAINE J. GOLDENBERG Assistant to the Solicitor General DOUGLAS N. LETTER SHARON SWINGLE LEWIS S. YELIN Attorneys RICHARD C. VISEK Department of Justice Acting Legal Adviser Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 Department of State [email protected] Washington, D.C. 20520 (202) 514-2217 QUESTION PRESENTED In Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010), this Court held that the common law, rather than the For- eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq., governs the immunity of current or former foreign officials who are sued for acts per- formed in an official capacity. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that petitioner is not immune from suit on the ground that a categorical judicial exception to foreign official im- munity applies in civil suits alleging violations of jus cogens norms. (I) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Interest of the United States....................................................... 1 Statement ...................................................................................... 1 Discussion .................................................................................... 12 A. The decision of the court of appeals rests on erroneous circuit precedent ........................................... 13 B. This Court should deny certiorari ................................. 20 Conclusion ................................................................................... 23 Appendix A — Letter from Omar Sharmarke (Nov. 23, 2016)......................................... 1a Appendix B — Diplomatic Note (Jan. 11, 2017) .................... 6a Appendix C — Letter from Omar Sharmarke (Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Intellectualism Amid Ethnocentrism: Mukhtar and the 4.5 Factor
    Intellectualism amid Ethnocentrism: Mukhtar and the 4.5 Factor Mohamed A. Eno and Omar A. Eno I. Background The prolonged, two-year reconciliation conference held in Kenya and the resulting interim administration, implemented under the dominant tutelage of Ethiopia, are generally considered to have failed to live up to the expectations of the Somali people. The state structure was built on the foundation of a clan power segregation system known as 4.5 (four-point-five). This means the separation of the Somali people into four clans that are equal and, as such, pure Somali, against an amalga- mation of various clans and communities that are unequal to the first group and, hence, considered “impure” or less Somali. The lumping together of all the latter communities is regarded as equivalent only to a half of the share of a clan. In spite of the inherent segregation and marginalization, some schol- ars of Somali society, like historian Mohamed H. Mukhtar, believe that the apartheid-like 4.5 system is an “important accomplishment.”1 In a book chapter titled “Somali Reconciliation Conferences: The Unbeaten Track,” Mukhtar chronicles this episode as one of various “success sto- ries”2 that have emerged from the Sodere factional meeting of 1997. As the historian posits it, this could be called an achievement, particularly considering the fact that “for the first time Somali clans agreed about their relative size, power and territorial rights.”3 Then the professor emphasizes that, “the conference also recognized another segment of the Somali society which included minority groups not identified with one of the above clans, i.e., the Banadiris and the Somali Bantus, just to 137 Bildhaan Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Failed States in Theoretical, Historical, and Policy Perspectives
    Failed States in Theoretical, Historical, and Policy Perspectives Jean-Gennaln Gros 1 Introduction Olobalizalion and interdependence compel .. 10 think aftuh about how w. man. our joint acllvities and shared in ....su. for many chan..... that we confront today "'" beyond the "",c/l of anyone slate 10 meel o. I.. OWn. At the national level we must govern beI..r; Dnd at the international leve1 we must gO\'tm beuer wge.ther-. Bff'cctive states are es&erl(ial 10 both task •• Kofl Annan (2000) These words from a former secretary-general of the United Nations underscore one of the NAlilies and challenges of the post-Cold War era: the unsuitabilily of failed Slates in a world in which the solution 10 problems from global warming to poverty requires stales that can al:lon their own. as well as in unison with other stalCS and non-stale institulions. Annan's statement also confirms Ihat the sludy oHailed Slales has taken center slage in international relations. Some oflhe mosl innuential works include LWilliam Zanman's Col1opsed Slates 1995, which is concerned primarily with Africa. Robert Rotherg's Whell States Fail (2004) provides detailed and graphic descriptions of state failure and its conse­ quences. Rother,'s description of the failed state as "a polily that is no longer able Of willing to perform the fundamental IaSks of a nation-stale in the IIlQdern world" and his notion that "failure is a Iluid halting place, with movemenl back 10 weakness and forward into collapse always possible" underscore a fundamental aspect ofstate failure that is often ignored: its dynamic nature.
    [Show full text]
  • S/2016/919 Consejo De Seguridad
    Naciones Unidas S/2016/919 Consejo de Seguridad Distr. general 31 de octubre de 2016 Español Original: inglés Carta de fecha 7 de octubre de 2016 dirigida al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Presidente del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea En nombre del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea, y de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 32 de la resolución 2244 (2015) del Consejo de Seguridad, tengo el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe sobre Somalia del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea. A este respecto, el Comité agradecería que la presente carta y el informe adjunto se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo. (Firmado) Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño Presidente Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea 16-16743 (S) 021116 021116 *1616743* S/2016/919 Carta de fecha 28 de septiembre de 2016 dirigida al Presidente del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea por el Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea De conformidad con el párrafo 32 de la resolución 2244 (2015) del Consejo de Seguridad, tenemos el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe sobre Somalia del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea. (Firmado) Christophe Trajber Coordinador
    [Show full text]
  • Five Challenges in Somalia's Game of Thrones
    DIIS POLICY BRIEF OCTOBER 2015 Somali elections in 2016 FIVE KEY CHALLENGES IN SOMALIA’S GAME OF THRONES The security situation and infighting between RECOMMENDATIONS clans and politicians in Somalia have made it impossible to carry out the planned full-scale ■ Develop better models to engage productively elections in August 2016. More realism must with questions of clans. guide expectations of Somalia in the short and ■ Maintain pressure on the offices of the President medium-term. and the Prime Minister to clarify and consolidate roles and responsibilities. Somalia is at a critical juncture. The current ■ Maintain a strong focus on existing and emerging government’s mandate is ending and a constitutional interim administrations, including Puntland. referendum and elections are planned for August 2016. In 2012, when President Hassan Sheikh ■ Establish a better understanding of how to engage Mohamoud took office, it was clear that ending in security matters beyond al-Shabaab. conflict and building state institutions were Sisyphean ■ Ensure that the humanitarian situation does not tasks. In the course of the last few months, it has turn into a crisis, which would undermine progress become increasingly apparent that there are made. Working explicitly with the question of clans in Somalia constitutes a considerable and unavoidable dilemma “It’s the pinnacle of democracy that everyone who is eligible votes to elect, but there is a big gap between there and where we stand. There are different phases and different models for elections, but we have not yet agreed on a format to transition in 2016.” President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, July 2015 unreasonable expectations of what the government state-building and reconciliation.
    [Show full text]
  • Fragile Contexts in 2018
    CHAPTER ELEVEN Leaving No Fragile State and No One Behind in a Prosperous World: A New Approach Landry Signé undreds of millions of people are left behind in fragile states despite the efforts of the international community to make progress on development Hand alleviate conflict. People in fragile states are victim to persistent poverty,1 enduring violence, poor public facilities, deteriorating infrastructure,2 limited civil and political liberties,3 deteriorating social conditions,4 minimal to nonexistent economic growth,5 and, often, humanitarian crises.6 Research and policies on state fragility build on concepts of limited state capacity, legitimacy, insecurity, stability and socioeconomic, demographic, human development, environmental, humanitarian, and gender contexts to determine states’ apparent effectiveness or ineffectiveness in fulfilling the role of the state. Within this -con text, fragility has become a catch- all concept encompassing fragile states, weak states, failed states, collapsing or decaying states, conflict- affected countries, post- conflict countries, brittle states, and states with limited legitimacy, author- ity, capacity, governance, security, and socioeconomic and human development. 1. Collier (2007). 2. Rotberg (2011). 3. Bah (2012). 4. Van de Walle (2004). 5. Brainard and Chollet (2007). 6. Nwozor (2018). The author would like to express his sincere appreciation to Payce Madden, Genevieve Jesse, and Elise El Nouchi, who contributed to the research, data analysis, fact- checking, and visual elements of this chapter. 239 Kharas-McArthur-Ohno_Leave No One Behind_i-xii_1-340.indd 239 9/6/19 1:57 PM 240 Landry Signé When used without conceptual clarification and contextual consideration, as is often the case, the concept of fragility lacks usefulness for policymakers, as the various types, drivers, scopes, levels, and contexts of fragility require differ- ent responses.
    [Show full text]