Southeast Asia's Geopolitical Centrality and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
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JUNE 2015 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org Southeast Asia’s Lanham • Boulder • New York • London Geopolitical Centrality 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 301- 459- 3366 | www.rowman.com and the U.S.-Japan Alliance ISBN 978-1-4422-4086-5 AUTHORS Ë|xHSLEOCy240865z v*:+:!:+:! Ernest Z. Bower Phuong Nguyen A Report of the CSIS Sumitro Chair Murray Hiebert Gregory B. Poling for Southeast Asia Studies Blank Southeast Asia’s Geopo liti cal Centrality and the U.S.- Japan Alliance AUTHORS Ernest Z. Bower Murray Hiebert Phuong Nguyen Gregory B. Poling A Report of the CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies June 2015 Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 594-61776_ch00_3P.indd 1 6/9/15 7:36 AM hn hk io il sy SY ek eh About CSIS hn hk io il sy SY ek eh For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked hn hk io il sy SY ek eh to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are hn hk io il sy SY ek eh providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart hn hk io il sy SY ek eh a course toward a better world. hn hk io il sy SY ek eh CSIS is a nonprofit or ga ni za tion headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2015 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-4422-4086-5 (pb); 978-1-4422-4087-2 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Ave nue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www . csis . org 301 - 459 - 3366 | www . rowman . com 594-61776_ch00_3P.indd 2 6/9/15 7:36 AM Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations iv Preface v Ac know ledg ments vii Introduction 1 1. Current Outlook from Southeast Asia: Centrality and Balance 8 2. ASEAN within the Asia Pacific 19 About the Authors 34 | III 594-61776_ch00_3P.indd 3 6/9/15 7:36 AM hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh Acronyms and Abbreviations hn hk io il sy SY ek eh AEC ASEAN Economic Community APEC Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN-5 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation EAS East Asia Summit FTA free trade agreement FTAAP Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific GDP gross domestic product OECD Or ga ni za tion for Economic Cooperation and Development PIF Pacific Islands Forum RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organ ization TPP Trans- Pacific Partnership UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea IV | 594-61776_ch00_3P.indd 4 6/9/15 7:36 AM Preface he purpose of this report is to apply research and an in- depth understanding of South- T east Asia’s history, politics, economics, and regional trends to look forward two de cades and anticipate how trends may develop and impact the U.S.- Japan alliance. It also intends to look at how the alliance should adapt to these potential trends. The report seeks to provide key findings and recommendations for how the United States and Japan can work to encourage outcomes that promote regional peace and prosperity. To accomplish that objective, the research team at the Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted nearly 100 interviews, convened several roundtables and off- the- rec ord discussions, and performed extensive research to describe Southeast Asia’s thinking today, how it got there, and sce- narios for the future. Former U.S. national security adviser and CSIS counselor and trustee Zbigniew Brzezin- ski defines “geopolitics” as the study of a country’s history and geography. His concise description brings into play the multiple factors that need to be considered to understand a country or region’s sense of place and its destiny. These inputs include human and physical geography, economics, and politics. Southeast Asia today finds itself at the center of the geopo liti cal future of a region this paper will refer to as the Indo- Pacific, specifically refer- ring to the nations in an arc from South to Northeast Asia.1 Understanding the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, is vital for the U.S.- Japan alliance. For the United States, the more engaged Japan becomes in strengthening ASEAN and its institutions, the better an ally it becomes. And for Japan, the same is true about U.S. engagement in ASEAN.2 For both allies, more sophisticated under- standing of and multilayered engagement with Southeast Asia is necessary. They share a stake and a responsibility to encourage one another in this effort. At its core, this effort must be supported by a clearer domestic po liti cal consensus than now exists in either 1. The Indo- Pacific is a region whose definition is still evolving. It generally includes the traditional Asia Pacific— East Asia, the Pacific Islands, and parts of the Americas— along with the eastern Indian Ocean and its littoral states, especially India. The region encompasses all 18 members of the East Asia Summit: the 10 ASEAN states of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, along with Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Rus sia, South Korea, and the United States. 2. Ernest Z. Bower and Michael J. Green, “U.S.- Japan- ASEAN Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” CSIS, January 5, 2011, http:// c s i s . o r g / fi l e s / publication / 1 1 0 1 0 5 _ B o w e r _ USJpanASEAN . p d f . | V 594-61776_ch00_3P.indd 5 6/9/15 7:36 AM hn hk io il sy SY ek eh country that investing in ASEAN eco nom ically and from a security perspective is a core hn hk io il sy SY ek eh national security mandate. hn hk io il sy SY ek eh At stake is how the Indo- Pacific order will be defined in the next 20 years. China is hn hk io il sy SY ek eh asserting its interests with a clear strategic vision and desire to create a Sino- centric model hn hk io il sy SY ek eh for Asian development and security, as is argued in Decoding China’s Emerging “Great hn hk io il sy SY ek eh Power” Strategy in Asia.3 China’s governance model does not require national consensus on foreign policy or national security like that in the United States and Japan. Therefore China appears to be, in the near term, a more agile and strategic actor. It is allocating funds and diplomatic focus more quickly and consistently than other countries. How China builds po liti cal consensus for its foreign policy and national security will be determinative for the region. If China pursues strongly nationalistic themes and reinforces them, it will be harder for its neighbors and the alliance system to succeed in the shared current objective— namely, to create regional structures that allow China to feel secure and strong, but convince it to help define and abide by international rules governing the actions of nations. China’s size and proximity to Southeast Asia, and a perceived lack of transparency about Beijing’s goals and objectives (What does China want? What does China want to be? How will China achieve its goals?), create a natu ral demand pull among ASEAN countries to seek more balance and a desire for greater involvement by other powers in defining how the region will be or ga nized. Specifically, ASEAN hopes to promote itself as the core for po liti cal, economic, and eventually sociocultural integration in the Indo- Pacific. Its princi- pal vehicle for achieving that objective is the East Asia Summit (EAS). The United States and Japan support this ASEAN goal, but both countries must evolve their national po liti cal consensuses and invest in, adapt, and create new institutions. The United States and Japan should embrace their values, including deepening their partner- ships with commercial and nongovernment entities in the private sector, and modernize their bureaucracies to effectively utilize the U.S.- Japan alliance to build trust and promote regional peace and prosperity over the next 20 years.