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Chief Minister and Bahujan Samaj Party Supremo Mayawati

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Chief Minister and Bahujan Samaj Party Supremo Mayawati Former Uttar Pradesh [ Images ] Chief Minister and Bahujan Samaj Party supremo Mayawati [ Images ] renewed demand for a Special Protection Group cover speaks volumes of her obsession for security, for which she already has more than 200 personnel to guard her round the clock. Sharat Pradhan reports. Interestingly, the numbers have come down only after she ceased to be chief minister, when there were as many as 359 sleuths protecting her day and night. The four-time state chief minister was the most heavily protected chief minister in the history of the country's most populous state. According to official records, her security net was headed by a superintendent of police, assisted by 10 deputy SPs, 27 inspectors, 78 sub-inspectors, 40 Cobra commandos, besides two dozen National Security Guard Black Cats. Since Mayawati rarely went to her office, all the security was concentrated at the chief minister's official residence which has as many as 10 sentry posts, each with 18 armed guards. Three of these sentry posts were equipped with Light-Machine Guns at strategic points to guard her against any air-attack. The entry gate was guarded by 30 cops and 15 remained on duty at the exit gate. In addition, there were special guards to keep track of multiple close-circuit cameras installed not only inside the chief minister's residence but also along Kalidass Marg on which the residence was located. Specially-trained cops were detailed to man the under-vehicle scanners to ensure that no explosive was sneaked inside the premises. Whenever she was on the move, there were never less than 30 vehicles in her motorcade which included the chief secretary, the DGP, home secretary, all top officials of the chief minister's personal secretariat as well as a couple of top cops, besides the divisional commissioner and district magistrate, for whom seeing off and receiving the CM at the airport had become a part of routine protocol. Besides three bullet-proof vehicles in her fleet at Lucknow [ Images ], she also ensured a special fleet of seven Prado [ Images ] SUVs, two of which were bullet-proof and stationed permanently at Delhi [ Images ] for her visits. While a team of food inspectors tested every sample of food that was served to the chief minister, nearly half a dozen doctors remained on round the clock duty at the specially created dispensary at the CM's residence. Significantly, even after she was out of office, there were more than 200 personnel looking after her security at the official bungalow she occupies in her capacity as former chief minister. According to a senior police official, "the former chief minister continues to enjoy heavy security cover which was much higher than given to any other ex-chief minister." Even after the scale down, Mayawati has a deputy superintendent of police to head her security team, which includes six personal security officers (inspectors), 12 ring escorts (sub-inspectors) , 15 armed escorts (sub-inspectors), 12 access control constables and 24 Cobra commandos. Five armed guards with automatic rifles manned the five watch-towers round the clock while nine trained cops were detailed to maintain vigil against sabotage. Likewise, eight cops took care of the wireless communication system and three keep watch on close-circuit cameras. In addition, some 21 home-guards also remained on general surveillance. The inimitable Dalit icon continues to enjoy the services of two bullet-proof cars in Lucknow and one in Delhi. Reacting to her sudden demand for enhancement of security to a SPG cover, for which she has shot off a letter to the union home minister, senior Samajwadi leader Mohan Singh commented, "I fail to understand why Mayawatiji is so obsessed with security that she has sought a higher security cover, when she was already over-protected." Several other politicians see her move as a hard bargain in view of the forthcoming presidential elections, in which her party could play spoilsport for the Congress nominee. "Sure enough she knows that this is the right time to blackmail the weak United Progressive Alliance [ Images ] government," remarked a senior Bharatiya Janata Party [ Images ] leader. Sharat Pradhan in Lucknow .
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