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Ministry of Defence: Movementsof Personnel, Equipmentand Stores to and from the Gulf ORDEREDBY the HOUSEOF COMMONS to BE PRINTED 7 JUNE 1993

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Ministry of Defence: Movementsof Personnel, Equipmentand Stores to and from the Gulf ORDEREDBY the HOUSEOF COMMONS to BE PRINTED 7 JUNE 1993 NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE REPORTBY THE COMPTROLLERAND AUDITOR GENERAL Ministry of Defence: Movementsof Personnel, Equipmentand Stores to and from the Gulf ORDEREDBY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO BE PRINTED 7 JUNE 1993 LONDON : HMSO 693 f8.95 NET MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: MOVEMENTS OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND STORES TO AND FROM THE GULF This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act. John Bourn National Audit Office Comptroller and Auditor General 4 June 1993 The Comptroller and Auditor General is the head of the National Audit Office employing some 800 staff. He, and the NAO, are totally independent of Government. He certifies the accounts of all Government departments and a wide range of other public sector bodies; and he has statutory authority to report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which departments and other bodies have used their resources. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: MOVEMENTS OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND STORES TO AND FROM THE GULF Contents Page Summary and conclusions 1 Part 1: Introduction 11 Part 2: Control and monitoring of movements 15 Part 3: Chartering of civilian transport resources 23 Appendices 1. Relationships between key movements organisations during Operation GRANBY 38 2. Management information systems for movements activities operating during Operation GRANBY 39 3. Commercial systems for controlling freight movements 40 4. Key players and technical terms associated with ship chartering 42 5. Ports and Airheads in Europe 44 6. Ports and Airheads in the Arabian peninsula 45 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: MOVEMENTS OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND STORES TO AND FROM THE GULF Summary and conclusions Background 1 In response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, the United Kingdom and other Allied governments deployed Armed Forces to the Gulf. The British effort was known as Operation GRANBY (GRANBY). The failure of Iraq to comply with United Nation resolutions led to the outbreak of hostilities in January 1991, and culminated in the Allied liberation of Kuwait on 28 February 1991. 2 To support GRANBY, the Ministry of Defence (the Department) transported to the Gulf by air 46,000 personnel and 46,000 tonnes of freight; and by sea 14,700 vehicles, 87,000 tonnes of ammunition and loose freight and 7,000 containers. To achieve this, and to carry men and materiel back from the Gulf, the Department used nearly all their Air Transport Force aircraft, and ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and chartered aircraft for 490 flights and ships for 245 voyages at costs of E69 million and El43 million respectively [paragraphs 1.6-1.8, Table 1). Scope of National 3 The National Audit Office examined the study Department’s arrangements Audit Office study for movements of personnel, equipments and stores to and from the Gulf, having regard to previous concerns on Service movements expressed by the Committee of Public Accounts (49th Report of Session 198.5-86 - HC 465). The main aspects addressed were: l the effectiveness of control and monitoring of movements using the Department’s and civilian resources, with particular reference to management information systems: and l the arrangements for the chartering of civilian resources to achieve good value-for-money. 4 The National Audit Office’s investigation took account of: l the Department’s own reviews of the lessons learned from GRANBY, including extensive Internal Audit reports, and the action taken by them; l reports by the National Audit Office’s consultants on best practice in civilian shipping logistics and management information systems and on the composition and costs of the civilian shipping chartered by the Department. l the United States Forces’ experience of movements to and from the Gulf. The National Audit Office’s examination of individual ship charters took account of investigations being undertaken by the Department’s Internal Audit and by the Ministry of Defence Police into possible irregularities in ship chartering. The National Audit Office supplied information to assist both these investigations and drew heavily on Internal Audit’s findings in compiling this Report [paragraphs 1.15, 1.17, 1.19). 1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: MOVEMENTS OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND STORES TO AND FROM THE GULF 5 The National Audit Office’s detailed findings should be considered in the context of a highly successful military Operation, in which the movement of personnel, equipments and stores was a key element and quick and effective transportation was the prime consideration. The National Audit Office recognise the considerable commitment, professionalism and resourcefulness shown by many service and civilian and agency personnel involved with movements during GRANBY, while working long hours, often in poor working environments. 6 The National Audit Office’s main findings are set out below. On the effectiveness Mechanisms to control and monitor movements of the Department’s control and 7 It would be uneconomic for the Department to have their own ships and monitoring of aircraft to cater for the movements required for all possible operations; they movements aim instead to have a balance between their own resources and chartering (paragraph 2.6). 8 Prior to GRANBY, the Department’s operational plans were based on the deployment of relatively small, light forces, which they considered would cover the most likely military eventualities. Consequently, there were no movements plans for a deployment or recovery on the scale required for GRANBY. Plans for that scale of operation had to be drawn up from scratch. The Department were not always able to recast the movement plans they developed sufficiently quickly to respond immediately to political decisions about force dispositions which, necessarily, were taken at short notice. This suggests that, while the Department coped well with the movements task for GRANBY, it may well be worth them considering the further development of contingency planning to place them in a better position to respond quickly to a wider range of operational possibilities than they had to cater for in the past. This development could draw on the experience of GRANBY, and on commercial approaches to movements planning and execution (paragraphs 2.5 and 2.13). 8 These suggestions are made in the light of the facts that the Department had systems to identify the availability of military aircraft and ships, but were not always able to obtain the reserve movements personnel or equipments vital to the movements process. Shortages of freight handling equipments, and also of personnel until January 1991, together with inadequate facilities at some airfields for the increased volume of activity, led to backlogs of freight and clogged facilities. A lack of heavy lift aircraft in the Air Transport Force was also a constraint on air movements. The problems reflected both the unforeseen size and distance of the United Kingdom deployment (paragraphs 2.6-2.10). Movements 10 Most movements requirements arose from operational imperatives based requirements on military judgements and were subject to frequent change. A lack of information on circumstances in the Gulf during the early planning of deployments, and difficulties in anticipating the levels and timing of resupply necessary, also affected the Department’s ability to identify detailed requirements. In the absence of operational contingency plans for such a large out of area operation, complex movements requirements had 2 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: MOVEMENTS OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND STORES TO AND FROM THE GULF to be compiled from scratch. Moreover, the time available to plan and execute movements was necessarily constrained by the timing of approvals of force levels (paragraphs 2.12-2.14). Prioritisation of 11 Because of the need to provide a viable defence of Saudi Arabia and other movements Gulf countries under threat and, later, to allow United Kingdom forces adequate time to acclimatise and prepare for the operation, there was a military imperative to move items to the Gulf quickly. In doing so the Department made effective use of their own and chartered movements resources but operational needs generally had to take priority over economy. For example, the need to transport operationally vital items in specific timescales to support planned operations in the Gulf limited the choice of available civilian shipping, and thereby affected the price paid. High priority items, subject to size, tended to be moved by air. On a pound for pound comparison, this was 17 times more expensive than by sea. 12 A Departmental report suggested that too much freight was moved to the Gulf by air, mainly due to the lack of an effective system for determining movements priorities and the high priorities given to the re-supply freight. The Department pointed out that given the uncertainties about when the hostilities would start and their possible intensity and duration, all stores and equipment were moved as high priority, which undermined the effectiveness of the system. They considered that to make a priority system work required independent, experienced personnel at key points in the supply chain who had sufficient overall knowledge of the operation to make on the spot, impartial and acceptable decisions about relative priorities. (paragraphs 2.17-2.21). Tracking of 13 The Department had adequate arrangements to track the aircraft and ships movements used for movements. But they could not readily track individual consignments of equipments and stores or individual items. There was also difficulty in tracking aircraft pallets and of the 3,400 used, 228, worth E680,000 including ancillary equipment, were unaccounted for at the end of GRANBY. Difficulty in tracking items led to confusion and some re-ordering of operationally vital items. The recovery of items from the Gulf was made more difficult by a lack of accurate records in theatre concerning equipment location and numbers.
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