The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law
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GRIMMELMANN FINAL 3/30/2009 10:08:14 PM View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Digital Commons @ UM Law THE ETHICAL VISIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW James Grimmelmann* INTRODUCTION All of intellectual property law is an act of imagination. If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to call it “property,” the tree still exists. But the objects of intellectual property have no existence apart from what we give them. You can’t copyright an unwritten novel; you have no trademark rights in a word the consuming public has never heard of. We must imagine these things into being before we can make them the subject of legal rights and obligations. Nor is the work of imagination done at the moment of creation. We must constantly play a game of practical metaphysics to grant legal rights over things that can’t be seen or touched. When the legal system says that this assembly of gears and levers infringes on that set of marks on a piece of paper, it’s calling an abstraction into being. The “invention” that connects the two is itself a creation of the legal mind no less than the arrangement of parts is a creation of the engineering mind. Lawyers must decide whether a given abstraction is an invention at all (most of us would agree that a short story isn’t one); whether it has attributes like “new,” “useful,” “obvious,” and so on; and what exactly its limits are. None of these distinctions come ready-made in nature; they require continuous, purposeful, collective imagination. Like Tinkerbell, intellectual property really would vanish if we stopped believing in our ability to see it. And if we must imagine intellectual property law, it must also imagine us. Every body of law has an internal logic to it, a logic drawn from and reflected in the social relationships it imagines among the people subject to it. Thus, for example, Carol Rose observes that property law validates exclusionary self-interest while also presuming that people are generally inclined to respect each other’s claims to property; it therefore imagines a “morality . not presum[ing] saintliness, but . not made for total * Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. Aislinn Black, Samir Chopra, E. Gabriella Coleman, Deven Desai, Doni Gewirtzman, Wendy Gordon, Dan Hunter, Molly Beutz Land, Frank Pasquale, Rebecca Roiphe, Clerk Shaw, and Richard Sherwin commented on earlier drafts, as did participants in the When Worlds Collide Symposium at Fordham Law School and the Cyberscholar Working Group at Yale Law School. This essay is available for reuse under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States license, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/. 2005 GRIMMELMANN FINAL 3/30/2009 10:08:14 PM 2006 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 sinners” either.1 We might similarly ask what copyright law thinks of when it thinks of us. This essay will give one possible answer to that question: copyright law imagines that we are ethical2 beings, capable of being creative and of being touched by the creativity of others, inclined to be sociable and to return good for good. It has in mind a deontic vision of reciprocity in the author- audience relationship. Or, more succinctly, authors and audiences ought to respect each other. That may sound like a platitude, but it isn’t. Everyone agrees that authors and audiences ought to respect each other, but they come to blows over how that respect ought to be expressed. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) thinks that audiences don’t respect authors enough; the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) counters that it’s the authors who aren’t showing enough respect for audiences. Meanwhile, free software advocates and fans of the commons sketch pictures of respectful exchange that look very different from the marketplace exchanges that both the RIAA and EFF treat as normal. We can learn some very interesting things about the state of the copyright debate by looking closely at those disagreements. When the EFF tells the content industries not to “sue their customers,” it’s making an ethical argument that’s the mirror image of the content industries’ call for people to “respect copyrights.” The arguments are the same, just directed at opposite sides of the author-audience relationship. Compare those arguments with the genuine radicalism in the way that some free software advocates don’t care whether programming remains a viable profession. They see legal restrictions on user freedoms as inherently unethical; no amount of software produced or programmers employed could justify them. As scholars, we should pay attention to these ethical visions, because they are descriptively important to how people behave, because they affect the persuasiveness of our policy arguments in the public arena, and because they make provocative claims about what intellectual property law ought to look like. This essay will find evidence of these visions in the language and structure of intellectual property law, and in the rhetoric that activists use as 1. Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1900 (2007); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1866 (2007) (“[P]roperty is critically dependent on simple moral intuitions about the importance of protecting possession against unwanted invasions . .”). 2. I use the term “ethical” rather than “moral” for three reasons. First, “moral rights” is a term of art in intellectual property law, and I wish to avoid confusion. Second, “moral” has come to have overtones of religious morality, particularly on sexual matters, whereas this essay is about issues of good and bad in a broader, more secular sense. Third, “morality” suggests a comprehensive view and a grounding of one’s theory of good and bad actions in a broader theory of right and wrong. On the other hand, “ethics” suggests instead a more specific focus on context, roles, and relationships, and is therefore closer to the issues this essay raises. When I refer to “moral” questions or theories in this essay, it is specifically to call attention to the fact that the overall grounding in a more complete theory of right and wrong is at stake—or because a familiar phrase such as “moral authority” simply sounds awkward if altered. GRIMMELMANN FINAL 3/30/2009 10:08:14 PM 2009] ETHICAL VISIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW 2007 they make arguments about intellectual property. These ethical visions link copyright law’s rules to a model of how those regulated by copyright law could and should behave. This essay’s approach is descriptive, rather than prescriptive: it doesn’t argue that these ethical frameworks correctly tell us what intellectual property should look like, only that people use these frameworks to talk about intellectual property. The approach is ethical, rather than metaethical: it focuses on the specific rhetoric people apply to real controversies, rather than on abstracted principles that could be applied to any issue. And the approach is agnostic, rather than authoritative: it argues that relational ethics is a different and interesting way to study intellectual property, not necessarily the only or the best way. Part I of this essay justifies the use of this “ethical vision” discourse. It analyzes trade secret law in ethical terms, then abstracts from the example to show how the ethical arguments involved are derived from standard normative frames for talking about law. It then isolates the key commitments that this way of speaking about intellectual property entails. Part II takes up copyright law, the essay’s main focus. It argues that the default ethical vision of copyright law contemplates authors and audiences who participate in a respectful marketplace exchange. The relationship isn’t symmetric—authors supply creativity, while audiences supply money—but it is reciprocal. When people buy and sell copies of copyrighted works at fairly negotiated prices, they’re respecting each others’ needs and autonomy. Part III uses the default ethical vision to illuminate some of the rhetoric of modern arguments about copyright law. It considers four common rhetorical clusters: “Downloading is theft,” “Don’t sue your customers,” “Software should be free,” and “I love to share.” All four start from the default ethical vision of copyright, but they take it in very different directions. Part IV then puts these rhetorics into conversation with each other. They all have something interesting to say about the tensions copyright law faces at the seams between different systems of production with different values. It focuses on the challenge potentially posed by free software, Creative Commons, and a culture of sharing to a commercial system of copyright. This interface is sometimes depicted as a purely economic one, or as a clash between competing consequentialist visions of society. This essay reminds us that there’s also an ethical dimension to the interface; participants have very different ideas of what it is to act ethically in one’s dealings with others when there are copyrights involved. The essay concludes by pulling the lens back and asking what larger lessons we might draw. It connects the ethical arguments analyzed herein to some more traditional debates in intellectual property law and policy, and sketches a few interesting potential further avenues of research. GRIMMELMANN FINAL 3/30/2009 10:08:14 PM 2008 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 I. ETHICAL VISIONS This part develops just enough theory to demonstrate that an “ethical vision” can provide a way of looking at intellectual property that’s neither completely trivial nor easily reducible to one of the more conventional approaches.