Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force

Edited by Joshua A. Ederheimer

April 2007 This publication was supported by Motorola, Incorporated. The points of view expressed herein are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Motorola, Inc., or individual Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) members.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, but authors do not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other information on the websites.

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 1-878734-96-2

Library of Congress Number: 2006902459

Cover and interior design by Dave Williams. Cover photograph courtesy of Fat Chance Productions/CORBIS. Photograph before acknowledgment and photographs on pages 12, 46, and 70 courtesy of Jupiterimages. Photograph on page 98 courtesy of Frances Twitty/ istockphoto. Contents

Foreword ...... i CHAPTER FOUR By Chuck Wexler Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum Acknowledgments...... iii Force Decision-Making ...... 71 By Joshua Ederheimer By Steve Ijames and Joshua Ederheimer COMMENTARY High-Risk Entries and Less-Lethal Weapons CHAPTER ONE By David A. Klinger ...... 76

Introduction ...... 1 COMMENTARY By Joshua Ederheimer and Will Johnson A Force Accountability Model of Integrity: A Systems COMMENTARY Perspective By Will Johnson and Bryce Kolpack ...... 80 Creating Community Relationships That Will Survive ARTICLE Controversial Uses of Force By Darrel W. Stephens ...... 4 Implementing Less-Lethal Technology: A Chief’s ARTICLE Perspective By Jessica Toliver and Joshua Ederheimer...... 90 Chief Constable Sir Hugh Orde: Managing Conflict— COMMENTARY The Northern Ireland Experience By Jessica Toliver ...... 9 Policing Us More Gently: An Australian Case Study on the Police Use of Force By Christine Nixon and David Bradley...... 93 CHAPTER TWO Building Community Trust CHAPTER FIVE Around Issues of Force ...... 13 Conducted Energy Devices: By Lorie A. Fridell PERF’s National Studies and COMMENTARY Building Community Trust—A Major Thoroughfare Guidelines for Consideration ...... 99 By Annie Russell ...... 16 By Will Johnson, Mark Warren, ARTICLE Joshua Ederheimer, and Lorie A. Fridell Building Community Trust By Jessica Toliver and COMMENTARY Joshua Ederheimer ...... 22 Accelerated Triage for Medical Evaluations Following ARTICLE CED Activations By Dr. Gary M. Vilke, Dr. Christian Managing the High Profile Use-of-Force Incident M. Sloane, and Dr. Theodore C. Chan ...... 108 By Jessica Toliver and Joshua Ederheimer ...... 30 The Development of PERF CED Guidelines for COMMENTARY Consideration and CED Glossary of Terms...... 121 Building the Public Trust: Leadership, Transparency COMMENTARY and Accountability By Christine Silverberg ...... 36 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in a Use-of-Force Context By Daniel Dugan . . . 122 CHAPTER THREE PERF CED Guidelines for Consideration ...... 124 Police Use of Force and PERF CED Glossary of Terms ...... 128 People with Mental Illness ...... 47 By Melissa Reuland Book Conclusion ...... 133 STATEMENT By Joshua Ederheimer Statement of Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Executive Director, National Alliance on Mental Illness, December 8, 2005— Appendices ...... 135 Miami Shooting of Man with Bipolar Disorder ...... 54 References ...... 165 ARTICLE About the Editor/Authors/Contributors ...... 172 Initiating Specialized Police Approaches to People About the Police Executive Research Forum...... 177 Who Are Mentally Ill By Melissa Reuland...... 56 About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability (CFA)...... 179 ARTICLE About Motorola ...... 180 Should the Police Approach to People with Mental Illness Be Generalist or Specialist? By Melissa Reuland. . . . 58

ARTICLE Police Training for Interaction with People with Mental Illness By Melissa Reuland ...... 62

Foreword

t’s not likely that the challenges and conse- with people with mental illness, emphasizing Iquences of police use of force will ever be completely specialized approaches and promising training; resolved. Police executives are constantly striving to Examining less-lethal technology—both cur- discover new strategies, tactics, and weapons to safely n rently available and future devices—as well as conclude a violent encounter. For law enforcement discussing how technology relates to less-lethal agencies dealing with the challenges inherent in force decision-making; and police use-of-force incidents, this book provides valuable perspectives and vital assistance. n Presenting a glossary of terms on conducted This book is the fourth in the ongoing Criti- energy devices and proposed national guidelines cal Issues in Policing series supported by Motorola. for their use. The first book, Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force, provided guidance to police executives on Collaboration is a theme that recurs consis- how to ensure that force is used only when justified, tently throughout these pages. Especially in prevent- and provided examples of mechanisms for dealing ing and resolving use-of-force incidents, police with unjustified incidents when they occur. The agencies need to partner with other professions and second book, Police Management of Mass Demon- agencies, to bring the right mix of professional acu- strations, highlighted a number of issues and pro- men to potentially violent incidents. Consider, for vided guidance for police executives on how to example, what happens when a police officer con- effectively manage resources and interact with var- fronts an agitated man or woman with mental ill- ious constituencies while dealing with large num- ness, and it is clear that the agitation may spiral bers of demonstrators. The third book, A Gathering upward into violence. Police are called on to Storm—Violent Crime in America, provided infor- respond to high volumes of these calls, and each one mation about the rise in violent crime in the United can take a long time to resolve. But there has been States between 2004 and 2005 and the first six productive work on this issue. Agencies are develop- months of 2006 and captured the perspective of law ing promising strategies. In one strategy, a team enforcement leaders on this increase. These books composed of a law enforcement officer and a men- have been widely used throughout the country as a tal health professional arrive on the scene together resource for police executives. In a number of juris- when a person with mental illness is causing a dis- dictions, the books are used for promotional exams turbance. They collaborate to gain control of the and police leadership programs. This fourth book individual and also to provide crisis intervention builds on the success of the previous books, and and referrals to mental health facilities. focuses on: There has been a steady rollout of new products that give police officers more options— Building community trust around issues of force, n and thus more flexibility—in responding to poten- including the management of high-profile incidents; tially violent individuals. On the horizon, beyond n Managing police use of force while interacting familiar tools like conducted energy devices, are

Foreword — i innovations using technologies that include laser- and best less-lethal weaponry, they still need to be lights, acoustic devices, and malodorants. aware of the latest information available to help It would be easy, amid all the excitement them make sound decisions in force situations. about new less-lethal weapons, to lose sight of the So, while use of force doubtless will be a com- principal objectives of the use of force. It is not the plex issue for many decades to come, this book will tool used that matters, after all—it is the desired share with you some of the latest thinking in this area outcome and how to best plan for it. The principal and will provide examples of promising practices. objectives regarding any potential use of force are to Importantly, the book will encourage you to review ensure the safety of citizens and officers, as well as your own efforts in scrutinizing your policies, prac- to prevent self-destructive behavior. Police officers tices, tactics, and weapon alternatives. It is our hope have learned how to do both these things by, for that this book will help law enforcement profession- instance, keeping a safe distance and talking the als and other stakeholders learn from the experi- subject into surrendering. But there are many situ- ences, approaches, and research of others, and ations where these kinds of practices just are not advance the debate on police use of force. adequate. Even if the officers are carrying the latest

Executive Director Police Executive Research Forum Washington, D.C.

ii — Foreword Acknowledgments

n behalf of PERF’s staff and members, I Police Department; Lieutenant Will Johnson, Owould like to thank the many people who have Arlington (TX) Police Department; Melissa Reu- worked hard in the creation of this book. It has land, former PERF Senior Associate; and Major been a collaborative effort, and the insight and Mark Warren, Baltimore County (MD) Police expertise offered by those involved will certainly Department. contribute to the collective wisdom of our profes- Special thanks to Sheriff Ken Jenne of the sion. As I worked on this project for more than a Broward County Sheriff’s Office for giving PERF year, I was continuously amazed—and grateful— permission to discuss their Force Accountability that the law enforcement field is filled with innova- Model. tive, brilliant, and empathetic people who are In addition, commentaries and articles by the committed to serving the public. following contributing writers provide valuable It has been an enriching experience for me perspectives and are essential elements of this book: personally, working with police officers, subject Research Fellow David Bradley, Victoria (Australia) matter experts, and other people from throughout Police Department; Dr. Theodore Chan, Depart- the United States—and around the world—who are ment of Emergency Medicine, University of Cali- committed to improving police service. I hope that fornia, San Diego Medical Center; Deputy Chief this book will provide valuable information to aid Daniel Dugan, Chicago Police Department; Execu- those in the profession to make more informed tive Director Michael Fitzpatrick, National Alliance decisions about police practices. on Mental Illness; Associate Professor David Special thanks are due to our partners at Klinger, University of Missouri, St. Louis; Bryce Motorola for their support of the Critical Issues Kolpack, former PERF Deputy Director of in Policing series. This book—the fourth in a series Management Services; Chief Commissioner Chris- that Motorola has supported—reflects their contin- tine Nixon, Victoria (Australia) Police Department; ued efforts as an exceptional corporate partner that Executive Director Annie Russell, Policing for Pre- truly cares about the law enforcement profession. vention Division, Metropolitan Police Department We are grateful to Mr. Greg Brown, President and (Washington, DC); Chief Christine Silverberg Chief Operating Officer; Mark Moon, Corporate (ret.), Calgary (Canada) Police Department; Dr. Vice President and General Manager, Government Christian Sloane, Department of Emergency Medi- and Commercial Markets; and Rick Neal, Vice cine, University of California, San Diego Medical President, Government Strategy and Business Center; Chief Darrel Stephens, Charlotte-Mecklen- Development. burg (NC) Police Department; Jessica Toliver, PERF PERF was fortunate to have a talented array of Research Associate; and Dr. Gary Vilke, Depart- writers who lent their expertise to this endeavor ment of Emergency Medicine, University of Cali- and wrote chapters in this book. Thanks to: Associ- fornia, San Diego Medical Center. ate Professor Lorie A. Fridell, University of South Also playing a critical role were many individ- Florida; Major Steve Ijames, Springfield (MO) uals who were interviewed, who reviewed various

Acknowledgments — iii sections of the book, or who offered other assis- Police Department; Commander Simon Foy, Lon- tance, including: Professor Geoffrey Alpert, Univer- don Metropolitan Police Service; Former Chief sity of South Carolina; Sheriff Kevin Beary, Orange Derrick Foxworth, Portland (OR) Police Bureau; County (FL) Sheriff’s Office; Chief Jim Burack, Chief Jack Harris, Phoenix Police Department; Milliken (CO) Police Department; Lt. Don De Chief Harold L. Hurtt, Houston Police Depart- Geare, Bakersfield (CA) Police Department; ment; Chief William Lansdowne, San Diego Police Deputy Chief John Diaz, Seattle Police Depart- Department; Chief Bernard K. Melekian, Pasadena ment; Senior Policy Advisor for Law Enforcement (CA) Police Department; Chief Albert Najera, Steven Edwards, Bureau of Justice Assistance; Sacramento (CA) Police Department; Chief Con- Deputy Chief Thomas Graham, New York (NY) stable Sir Hugh Orde, Police Service of Northern Police Department; Chief Chuck Harmon, St. Ireland; and Chief Noble Wray, Madison (WI) Petersburg (FL) Police Department; Chief Gil Ker- Police Department. likowske, Seattle Police Department; Inspector Thanks also to Dr. William Bozeman for con- Matthew Klein, Metropolitan Police Department tributing (and giving us permission to use) several (Washington, DC); Executive Assistant Chief Bill templates in conjunction with the HIPAA section of Maheu, San Diego Police Department; Chief this book; and Officer Steve Byrd, Baltimore Richard Myers, Appleton (WI) Police Department; County (MD) Police Department for assisting Captain Dave Ogden, Orange County (FL) Sheriff’s Major Warren with his contribution to this book. Office; Chief Jerry Oliver (ret.), Detroit Police Special appreciation goes to PERF Senior Research Department; Margaret Olsen, Seattle Police Associate Bruce Kubu, who managed both of Department; Chief William Rector, Bakersfield PERF’s national CED studies. (CA) Police Department; Officer Ron Rice, Bakers- Of course, this book could not have been pro- field (CA) Police Department; Gina Santo duced without the efforts of our talented and dedi- Domingo, Seattle Police Department; Bruce Taylor, cated PERF staff and support personnel. They have PERF Research Director; Chief John Timoney, put in long hours to make this book possible. Exec- Miami Police Department; Lieutenant Rick Wall, utive Director Chuck Wexler guided this project Los Angeles Police Department; and Cathy Wen- from start to finish, providing motivation, insight, deroth, Seattle Police Department. and resources. Special thanks to Jason Cheney, who Moreover, an international forum in San worked with all of the contributing authors, verified Diego allowed PERF to highlight promising references, and navigated the book production approaches in the critical issue topics from around process. Thanks for editing and organizational help the world. Many thanks to our forum speakers: to Nathan Ballard, Jim Cronin, Martha Plotkin, Sheriff Lee Baca, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dana Murphy, and Deirdre Mead Weiss. And thanks Department; Chief Dave Been, Tulsa (OK) Police to Jennifer Brooks, Myra Caballero, Ken Hartwick, Department; Dr. Lee Bowlus, San Diego County Ismaila Kane, and Raquel Rodriguez for excellent (CA) Psychiatric Hospital; Chief Theron Bowman, administrative support. Marketta Kopinski and Arlington (TX) Police Department; Chief William Craig Fischer produced important editorial review. J. Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department; Chief Finally, thanks to Dave Williams for his excel- James Corwin, Kansas City (MO) Police Depart- lent work developing the cover and layout of this ment; Commissioner Edward F. Davis III, Boston book.

Joshua Ederheimer

iv — Acknowledgments 1

Introduction

by JOSHUA EDERHEIMER and WILL JOHNSON

he management and applications of police information about the most contemporary police useT of force are perhaps the most important, com- approaches and technology, and applied them plex, and pressing issues in modern law enforce- within their own agencies to improve service to the ment. The use of force—including deadly force—is community. at once necessary to achieve law enforcement goals Police executives not only have an obligation and contrary to the core mission to protect life. Law to ensure that their officers are operating within the enforcement is bound by a moral obligation and an law, but also have a responsibility to ensure that oath of office to keep the peace, enforce society’s their practices incorporate successful strategic laws, and provide the framework for individuals to approaches and modern equipment. Accordingly, live free from the fear of victimization. To accom- providing officers with resources to carry out their plish these ends, there are times when it is necessary duty—while minimizing the risk of injury and for law enforcement officers to use force. death to themselves and the public—is essential. In This awesome power to use force against the order to aid law enforcement officers to accomplish citizenry comes with a great responsibility to use it their duties in the most reasonable and objective only when necessary and justified. The profession fashion, police leaders must be vigilant in seeking has made progress over the years in the search for out and identifying more efficient and innovative the proper balance between restraint and the justi- resources to provide to their officers. These fied use of force. This progress has resulted from resources include: updated policies that reflect both social mandates, legal precedents, and progressive the law and contemporary industry guidelines; leadership. Successful police executives sought out comprehensive strategies that incorporate modern

Chapter 1. Introduction — 1 methods based on promising practices; integration information to inform policy makers and practition- of tactics that create opportunities for minimum- ers on the use of CEDs. force application and de-escalation during a violent The information in this book came from a encounter; and equipment—including less-lethal number of sources. Authors reviewed academic and devices—that offers police officers alternative force practitioner literature, examined stakeholder options during all stages of a confrontation. reports and studies, reviewed agency policies, con- Cumulatively, these innovative resources and ducted two national surveys on CEDs, and inter- strong leadership increase accountability and viewed numerous experts and practitioners. Other strengthen community trust in a police organiza- sources of information were presentations and dis- tion. A cycle of innovation, implementation, and cussions from two PERF conferences: PERF’s critical review is at the heart of progressive policing. National Summit on Conducted Energy Devices, It is important for the policing profession—and for held in October 2005 in Houston (which was sup- the communities that it serves—that law enforce- ported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of ment leaders continually scrutinize policies, prac- Community Oriented Policing Services), and the tices, tactics, and weapon alternatives. Expanding 2005 Critical Issues in Policing Forum, held in San beyond myopic police perspectives and seeking out Diego in December 2005. Many experienced law innovative practices on a global scale allow police enforcement executives and stakeholders attended leaders to create positive organizational and cul- both events. tural change. Further, critical self-examination and A police executive’s goal is to optimize force resistance to the status quo can help law enforce- through sound policies and training and the use of ment provide exceptional service. effective equipment and tactics. No amount of It is in this context that Strategies for Resolving effort to optimize force, however, can guarantee Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force is presented. that an agency will not have an event that is chal- This book—the fourth in the Critical Issues in Polic- lenged by members of the public. The police execu- ing series1—provides perspectives in three critical tive must be prepared to handle those events areas: building community trust; police use of force effectively and in a manner that conveys trans- and people with mental illness; and less-lethal parency and accountability to the public and the weaponry and force decision-making. It also news media (Ederheimer and Fridell 2005). The includes reports on the Police Executive Research content of this book helps to prepare police execu- Forum’s (PERF) national studies on conducted tives to better handle such events. energy devices (CEDs). The thematic chapters present historical perspectives, successful approaches, and practical examples on how law enforcement ABOUT THE BOOK agencies—nationwide and abroad—are dealing with Each chapter includes at least one commentary these critical issues. There is no single best practice written by an academic or practitioner expert on a for all agencies to emulate. However, by presenting related topic. Most chapters are also accompanied information and various strategies that executives by at least one article describing a discussion ses- can consider, law enforcement executives will be sion or presentation on promising approaches that better equipped with information that will help occurred as part of the 2005 Critical Issues in Polic- them make informed decisions on force issues. The ing Forum held in San Diego. chapter conveying PERF research provides critical

1. The other publications in the series are Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force, Police Management of Mass Demonstrations—Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches, and A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America.

2 — Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 1: Introduction included that summarize panel presentations and This chapter establishes an understanding of the discussions from the 2005 Critical Issues in Policing force-related issues discussed. It includes a com- Forum. The first consists of a summary of the panel mentary from Chief Darrel W. Stephens of the presentation by former Lowell Superintendent Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department, Edward Davis, Phoenix Police Chief Jack Harris, who offers six principles on developing community and former Portland (OR) Police Chief Derrick trust in both crisis and non-crisis situations. In Foxworth, in which they described their successful addition, an article from the 2005 Critical Issues in efforts in connecting with communities in their Policing Forum shares the perspectives of Chief cities in order to develop trust. The second article Constable Sir Hugh Orde on how his agency—the summarizes the panel presentation on how four Police Service of Northern Ireland—manages con- police executives—Sheriff Lee Baca, Los Angeles flict and builds community trust in that country. County Sheriff’s Department; Chief William Brat- ton, Los Angeles Police Department; Chief Noble Wray, Madison (WI) Police Department; and Com- Chapter 2: Building Community Trust mander Simon Foy, London Metropolitan Police Around Issues of Force Service—successfully managed high-profile use-of- The trust and confidence that a community has in force incidents in their jurisdictions. its police department are primary indicators of an agency’s success. A police use-of-force incident— Chapter 3: Police Use of Force and and the department’s handling of it—directly People With Mental Illness impact public perception. However, according to author Lorie A. Fridell, the interaction, dialogue, Interaction with people with mental illness has and collaboration between a police department and emerged as one of the most critical use-of-force the community prior to such an incident play per- issues facing police today. Deinstitutionalization of haps the most significant role in defining commu- persons with mental illness, high-profile force inci- nity trust and gauging community confidence in dents involving people with mental illness, and the aftermath of a force incident. This chapter dis- greater public awareness have pushed this issue to cusses the components and importance of trust the forefront of the profession. In Chapter 3, building—and considers trust-enhancing practices. Melissa Reuland examines issues related to use of It reviews traditional accountability and trust- force on people with mental illness, including fre- building mechanisms, and shares promising prac- quency of interaction and dangerousness. The tices. The innovative “promising practices” from chapter describes nine essential program elements around the country include citizen education for a successful, proactive approach to the issue, efforts, interventions to reduce tensions following and highlights several strategies implemented in critical use-of-force incidents, and shared decision- the United States. making on issues of force. Also included in this chapter are three articles In commentaries, Annie Russell of the Metro- summarizing panel presentations and discussions politan Police Department in Washington, D.C., from the 2005 Critical Issues in Policing Forum. imparts her experiences in building community The articles—focusing on training, creating new trust in that city—where use of force had been a strategies, and generalist and specialist approaches significant issue. There is also an international view to people with mental illness—stem from two pan- in a commentary by former Calgary Police Chief els. The first focuses on what is known about police Christine Silverberg on the role of leadership, trans- interaction with people with mental illness. It con- parency, and accountability in affecting public contains information from this chapter’s author, fidence and trust. In addition, two articles are Melissa Reuland; Executive Assistant Chief Bill

Chapter 1. Introduction — 3 COMMENTARY: box 1.1 Creating Community Relationships That Will Survive Controversial Uses of Force by Darrel W. Stephens necessary and that, when it is used, police are accountable to the public for its use. Second, The public grants the police authority to use nec- police executives must demonstrate support for essary force in making arrests and to protect the police officers who have used force in a manner public. That authority is limited both by law and consistent with established policy. Third, when by the policies that police agencies develop to the force used was not consistent with policy, guide this critical area of discretion. Use-of-force mistakes must be acknowledged as soon as pos- policy and practice have also been greatly influ- sible. And finally, police leaders must be able to enced by civil litigation. One of the most signifi- accomplish the first three in a way that does not cant cases was the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court negatively impact subsequent criminal or civil lit- decision Tennessee v. Garner, which established igation that follows the incident. Meeting these parameters for shooting at fleeing felons. challenges is very difficult under the best of cir- Inevitably, when police use deadly force or cumstances, and it is nearly impossible if good physical force, there are questions from the com- relationships with the community have not been munity about the appropriateness of the force. developed. When sufficient trust has been estab- When a life is lost or there are significant injuries, lished, it gives police the time to complete the the intensity of the questions increases. In situa- investigation that will be the basis for demon- tions where the use of force involves a white offi- strating that the police are accountable for their cer and citizen from a minority group, the authority to use force. questions may create tension between the police I have learned some basic principles about and community—particularly if there have been developing trust from working in communities multiple incidents. It is well documented that over the years in both crisis and non-crisis situa- police use of force—especially deadly force—has tions. I believe that these principles will help been the flash point for a number of civil distur- police executives develop relationships that will bances in urban communities since the 1960s. survive the controversial use-of-force incident as However, usually such incidents have created well as provide the foundation for more effective community tension but have not led to civil policing. These principles include: unrest. Many factors influence whether or not a controversial police shooting will lead to civil Trusting relationships cannot be unrest, but one of the most important is the rela- developed in a crisis. tionship the police have developed with the com- Although a crisis may provide an opportunity munity. If the relationship is positive and there is to begin the development of a relationship that some level of trust, a foundation exists to resolve can grow into trust, it obviously is not the best community concerns without violence. environment for the first introduction to an impor- Police executives face many challenges in tant community leader. Chiefs who are new to dealing with controversial uses of force. First, a community should systematically make every police executives must be able to demonstrate effort to reach out to community leaders within to the community that force is used only when the first six months of their tenure. Developing

4 — Chapter 1. Introduction relationships with community leaders requires family and friends. Annual community surveys in that police executives invest time in finding oppor- Charlotte tell us that residents’ impressions of the tunities to build productive relationships. Those police are most influenced by their personal interac- opportunities come in many different ways. tions with officers, followed by the stories they hear Attending community events where leaders are from family and friends. It is very important that present is one of the best ways to make an initial employees throughout the department understand introduction, provide a business card, and extend that each and every citizen interaction leaves an an invitation for a longer conversation at a later impression. My experience suggests that the nega- time. The larger the community, the more difficult tive impressions have the most lasting impact. it is to develop these relationships, so it is impor- Developing trust in the police department comes tant that responsibility for relationships be shared from the hundreds of daily individual interactions with people throughout the organization. with citizens and neighborhood leaders that form partnerships. Trust comes from relationships that have been established over a period of time. Trust is a two-way street. Relationship-building takes time and must be To be trusted, one must be willing to trust. It is thought of as an investment that requires contin- sometimes difficult for police executives to trust ued attention. It is also important to recognize members of the community. There is risk involved that trust can grow over time through mecha- in developing a relationship of trust. It may nisms other than direct contact. Community lead- require that information important to under- ers are influenced by opinions of other leaders standing a particular situation be privately shared and people in the community. Goodwill can carry if the information cannot be released to the gen- over from one community leader to another as eral public. How that information is handled they talk about their interactions with police exec- helps define the level of trust and the nature of utives. They are also influenced by media reports the relationship. of how police executives handle situations in which they may not be directly involved and by Trust can be lost much quicker than employees in the department they may have it can be gained. known for years. Community leaders, like employ- Community relationships require continued atten- ees in the department and colleagues in govern- tion and maintenance. Trust is not likely to be ment and the business community, develop lost over one incident, but it can be lost very impressions over a period of time based on what quickly if the police executive does not pay atten- they see a police executive do—or not do—in a tion to the relationships and foundation on which variety of situations. it was built. A change in direction or policy without a discussion or communication with community Institutional trust cannot be developed and leaders could influence the level of trust enjoyed in maintained without individual trust. the relationship. Trust in the police department comes from trust in It is obviously a better state of affairs when the individuals in the executive offices to the officers police executives have had the opportunity to in patrol cars. The strongest impressions that peo- develop relationships with community leaders ple in the community hold of the police come most often from their individual experiences and those of >> continued on page 6

Chapter 1. Introduction — 5 >> box 1.1 continued leaders.2 At this stage, there are usually many before a controversial use of force occurs. It is not more questions than answers, so the notifica- always possible, particularly for the new police tions will not include much information beyond chief from outside the community, to reach out to that the incident occurred and is being investi- community leaders to address concerns or for gated. These are important notifications, because community leaders to feel comfortable calling to many people in the community who have ques- ask questions. There are several steps that a tions about the incident will contact political and police chief can take, whether newly appointed or community leaders to obtain information. not, that will help manage a controversial use-of- Depending on the circumstances of the shooting, force incident in a way that minimizes negative the chief may or may not want to provide an ini- outcomes and impressions. tial statement to the press. Third, it is very important that the chief provide Steps to help manage a controversial as much information as possible to the community use of force. as soon as practical. This is a difficult area for the First, particularly in cases where a life has been police chief. Most of the people involved with the lost from a shooting, I believe it is very important investigation—detectives and prosecutors—are that the chief respond to the scene. That is the best predisposed toward limiting the amount of infor- way to demonstrate the importance of the incident mation to be publicly released until the investiga- and show concern for the officers involved as well tion is complete. City attorneys and police legal as the victim and family. The role of the chief is not staffs see the situation in a similar way. The chief to personally direct the investigation but to repre- must take care not to harm the investigation, but sent the face of the department—dealing with it is clear that controversy and tension about a impact on the community and the officers use-of-force situation can increase if the depart- involved. The chief must maintain the critical bal- ment is, or appears to be, withholding informa- ance between support for the officers involved and tion about the situation. In most cases, it is not ensuring that an objective investigation of the cir- necessary to go into too much detail about the cumstances of the incident is completed. case under investigation, but it is necessary to Second, the communication process must begin talk about the process that must take place, rele- as soon as possible. In today’s world, there are very vant department policy, and the circumstances few significant events in which the police are and frequency in which force is used. It is also involved that do not quickly come to the attention important for the chief to express regret over the of the news media. In many cases, by the time the loss of a life. This is sometimes difficult for police chief arrives at the scene, the press will already be executives to do because some people in the there and, depending on the time of day, the department may believe that conveying regret for media may have begun making initial reports. It is loss of life implies that the police have not acted very important that the chief notify the city man- properly. The reality, however, is that if an officer ager, mayor, council members, and community must take a life, then it is a difficult situation for

2. The determination of who is appropriate depends on the circumstances of the incident. Age, race of the victim, location of where the incident took place, injuries to officers, and how the incident is initially portrayed by the media are all factors that can influence the timeliness, nature, and extent of the initial notifications.

6 — Chapter 1. Introduction both the officer and the community. Expressing an important part of the process for reducing regret over the loss of a life demonstrates caring community tension and correcting misinforma- and compassion for everyone involved. tion that is being shared in the community about It is also very important in the initial commu- the incident. nication process to get out in front of the rumors Finally, when the investigation is complete, the that quickly spread in the neighborhood. It is not department must inform the community of the out- at all unusual for some to claim they witnessed come. These investigations should be a high prior- the incident and make up a story that is designed ity for the department and completed as soon as to make the police look bad. In some cases, they possible, but they do take time. It is also impor- just repeat what they have heard from others and tant to acknowledge any mistake made in the use add a little bit to the story. The police may not be of force. If the force used was within the depart- able to explain what happened in detail, but they ment’s policy, then that must be explained as well. can certainly say what did not happen if the A high-profile incident where there is tension rumors have it all wrong. in the community about what happened is not the Fourth, the chief must be available to spend best time to begin working on building a relation- time in the community talking about the incident ship. To the extent possible, that work must be and other concerns community members may done in advance. Handled with care and sensitiv- have about the police department. These are ity, the police executive response does provide an important opportunities for the chief to further opportunity for strengthening relationships and develop relationships and trust within the com- increasing community confidence in the depart- munity. They also allow the department to speak ment. On the other hand, a police executive directly to people in the community without the response that hides behind the investigation and news media filter. It has become increasingly fails to communicate can seriously damage important for the police to use as many mecha- community confidence in the department and its nisms as possible for reaching the community leadership. If the department is not officially with their message. Community meetings provide telling the story of what happened, the story will that direct contact. They also provide the chance be told by people in the community and unidenti- for citizens to speak directly to police executives. fied sources within the department, neither of In many cases, what they have to say may not be whom generally has the best information on what about the specific incident; what is critical is their took place. It is always better to be open and as perception that the police executive is listening transparent as possible in dealing with these to and cares about what they have to say. This is situations. n

Chapter 1. Introduction — 7 Maheu, San Diego Police Department; and Dr. Lee international perspective on use-of-force issues Bowlus, San Diego County Psychiatric Hospital. from Chief Commissioner Christine Nixon and The second, focusing on agency response models, Research Fellow David Bradley of the Victoria contains perspectives from Chief Richard Myers, Police Service in Australia. They share how police Appleton (WI) Police Department; Chief Bernard use of force has evolved in that country. Melekian, Pasadena (CA) Police Department; Chief Finally, Chapter 4 contains an article that sum- Theron Bowman, Arlington (TX) Police Depart- marizes a panel from the 2005 Critical Issues in ment; and Chief Dave Been, Tulsa (OK) Police Policing Forum that provides perspectives on how Department. Also included is a statement from several police leaders implemented less-lethal technol- Executive Director Michael J. Fitzpatrick, National ogy into their departments. Included are perspectives Alliance on Mental Illness, who shares information by Chief Darrel Stephens, Charlotte- Mecklenburg on bipolar disorder following the December 2005 (NC) Police Department; Chief Albert Najera, Sacra- shooting of a mentally ill man at Miami Interna- mento (CA) Police Department; Chief Harold Hurtt, tional Airport. Houston Police Department; and Chief James Cor- win, Kansas City (MO) Police Department.

Chapter 4: Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making Chapter 5: Conducted Energy Devices: Law enforcement leaders are constantly seeking PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines ways to minimize use of force and create greater for Consideration opportunities for de-escalation during encounters Chapter 5 provides the latest information available between police and the public. Various kinds of to the profession about conducted energy devices weaponry—including less-lethal devices—provide (CEDs). Will Johnson, Mark Warren, Joshua Eder- options for officers that help them achieve such heimer, and Lorie A. Fridell report on two national goals during the course of their duties. Chapter 4 studies conducted by PERF’s Center on Force and builds on information about use of force tools that Accountability. These findings influenced the were included in PERF’s first use-of-force book, development of PERF’s 52 CED guidelines for con- Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force. In sideration and CED glossary that were released in this chapter, Steve Ijames and Joshua Ederheimer October 2005. One study concentrated on deaths provide a comprehensive history of less-lethal occurring in proximity to a CED activation, while devices—including the history of some contempo- the other was the first to gather information to rary weapons. Also included is an exploration of determine the state of the field related to the future less-lethal technologies that are being devel- devices. Both the guidelines and glossary are oped to provide a greater variety of less-lethal alter- included in this book. natives. Further, Chapter 4 looks beyond less-lethal There are two commentaries included in weapons and examines less-lethal force decisions Chapter 5. The first, by Dr. Gary M. Vilke, Dr. that affect desired force outcomes. Christian M. Sloane, and Dr. Theodore C. Chan Chapter 4 contains three commentaries. Pro- from the University of California, San Diego Med- fessor David A. Klinger discusses the role of less- ical Center, contains information about a system- lethal weapons in high-risk entries. Arlington (TX) atic process to efficiently make medical assessments Police Lieutenant (and former PERF Fellow) Will of persons activated by a CED. The other, by Johnson and former PERF Deputy Director of Chicago Deputy Chief Daniel Dugan, provides an Management Services Bryce Kolpack provide a overview of the Health Insurance Portability and comprehensive model—from a systems perspec- Accountability Act (HIPAA) in a use-of-force tive—on force accountability. There is also an context.

8 — Chapter 1. Introduction ARTICLE: box 1.2 Chief Constable Sir Hugh Orde: Managing Conflict— The Northern Ireland Experience by Jessica Toliver continues to face challenges, with much of the conflict centering on the sectarian divide. Sir Hugh Orde became chief constable of the Chief Constable Orde is faced with a number Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) on May of policing challenges on a daily basis, but among 29, 2002. He was selected after many years of dis- the greatest challenges are the approximately tinguished service with the London Metropolitan 2,500 parades of varying sizes that occur each Police Department. His career began in 1977 in year. Both sides involved in disagreements see London, where he rose through the ranks, becom- parades as an opportunity to further their political ing a commander in 1998 and then deputy assis- purpose. To better contain contentious situations tant commissioner in October 1999. His that arise during these events and in order to achievements were recognized in 2001 when keep the peace, Chief Constable Orde has led his Queen Elizabeth II appointed him as an Officer of organization through a number of changes. Suc- the British Empire (OBE) at the Queen’s Birthday cessful crowd management activities that the Honors in 2001, and then again in 2005, when he police service has demonstrated at recent was knighted by the Queen for his significant con- parades can be attributed in large part to the tributions to the United Kingdom. lower-level police managers, designated as As chief constable, Sir Hugh is responsible bronze commanders. They provide local, front- for police service in a territory measuring more line executive leadership and are trained in the than 5,000 square miles. He leads the 7,500 offi- crowd management discipline through repeated cers policing the 1.7 million people living in practical exercises. The commanders operate Northern Ireland. The population is mainly com- under the principle of graduated response and are posed of two communities—Catholic and Protes- able to minimize police use of force with varied tant. While Northern Ireland has long been a tactics, including aerial surveillance, taking cover, center of protest and violent conflict, a dramatic and intelligence gathering (including alerts about change occurred in 1998. A political resolution— bombers). Above all, Chief Constable Orde enshrined in the Good Friday Agreements— emphasizes one basic principle in managing provided a framework for the opposing national parades and any related protests: decisions must identities to resolve constitutional issues based be lawful, proportional, and necessary. Chief Con- on the principle of consent. The reformed Police stable Orde’s philosophy, combined with employ- Service of Northern Ireland (formerly the Royal ing police tactics that are in accordance with that Ulster Constabulary) grew out of this agreement philosophy, has strengthened relations and trust as well. The reengineered police service was cre- between the PSNI and the community. ated in November 2001, in an effort to make the The tremendous restraint PSNI officers have police more accountable to the community. It learned and exhibited was demonstrated in the is supervised by a separate agency—the Northern policing of events surrounding two particularly Ireland Policing Board. While considerable contentious parades last year that culminated in progress has been made, Northern Ireland significant violent disorder.

>> continued on page 10

Chapter 1. Introduction — 9 >> box 1.2 continued

In July 2005, Orange Order 3 members took equipping officers with the skills to handle con- part in annual twelfth-of-July celebrations. A frontations have all contributed to the organiza- standoff between nationalist protestors and tion’s increasing success with managing conflict. police occurred when protestors refused to move Chief Constable Orde cited several points that he from the main street. Following a period of disor- believes will enable a police service to better mander that included the throwing of missiles, petrol age civil disorder and emphasize conflict man- bombs, and blast bombs, the standoff was agement to strengthen community trust. resolved through discussions between police offi- In addition to constant personal interaction cers and community representatives. with community members, Chief Constable Orde The September Whiterock Parade presented suggested that police spend time throughout the another opportunity for Chief Constable Orde and year investing in communication and building the PSNI to demonstrate how stronger commu- relationships with the news media, especially key nity relations help its officers to effectively man- journalists. He also suggested that holding pre- age a situation. The primary disagreement about and post-event press conferences about major this particular parade was that the Parades demonstrations fosters transparency and better Commission—responsible for approving parade informs the media and the public. Chief Consta- routes—had banned Protestant groups from ble Orde also recommended that police leaders parading through a Catholic area. Chief Constable analyze the agency’s command structure for Orde relayed that police were aware that the weaknesses and then make necessary adjust- Protestant group was determined to march on ments to ensure accountability. He also recom- their original route—through the Catholic com- mended investing in closed-circuit television for munity. In order to promote safety, the PSNI real-time and post-incident intelligence gathering. mounted a substantial police operation. He believes that the use of this technology will As police worked to enforce the Parades Com- help thwart threats to officer and citizen safety mission’s decision, serious disorder broke out. before they occur and also, when necessary, help Police officers and soldiers came under sustained in the investigation of incidents after they occur. attack from missiles, petrol bombs, blast bombs, Finally, Chief Constable Orde encouraged the and pipe bombs. More than 150 live rounds were development of command-level specialists to fired at police lines. The police officers on the maintain the front lines and engage in graduated scene were equipped with body armor, shields, responses during incidents of civil disorder. and flame-retardant boiler suits, and they needed Members of the Police Service of Northern this equipment as they tried to manage an angry Ireland have learned a great deal about maintain- crowd of approximately 1,000 people. However, ing community trust while managing civil disor- the police officers showed restraint and main- der situations. More American cities are tained their composure, and eventually they dis- experiencing mass demonstration and civil disor- persed the crowds. der situations in their communities. The perspec- Reorganizing the command structure to fos- tives shared by Chief Constable Orde can help ter stronger accountability, adequately training police leaders in the United States better manage police leaders to manage civil disorder, and conflict in these types of situations. n

3. The Orange Order is a Protestant patriotic organization in Northern Ireland.

10 — Chapter 1. Introduction Conclusion The issues surrounding police use of force are The perspectives, contemporary information, extensive, and they will always be among the most successful approaches, and practical examples in critical issues facing the law enforcement profes- the four focus areas in this book—building com- sion. The ability of police to use force—including munity trust; police use of force and people with deadly force—creates a profound responsibility on mental illness; less-lethal weaponry and force deci- law enforcement officers to strike the proper bal- sion making; and PERF’s national studies on con- ance between restraint and the justified use of force. ducted energy devices—all serve to better equip Police leaders must remain vigilant in their efforts police executives. The information presented in this to find innovative strategies and opportunities that book will help police executives make more give officers options to minimize use of force informed decisions on force issues and build and/or de-escalate confrontations. stronger relationships with the community.

Chapter 1. Introduction — 11

2 Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force

by LORIE A. FRIDELL “For too many people in America, the trust that is so essential to effective policing does not exist because residents believe that police have used excessive force, or that law enforcement is biased, disrespectful and unfair.” JANET RENO, 19991

INTRODUCTION intensity, and length [of the riots], they were usually ignited by a minor incident fueled by antagonism In the mid-1960s, many urban communities were between the Negro population and the police.” burning. The six-day 1965 riot in the Watts section (1968, 40). of Los Angeles led to 34 deaths and nearly $40 million in property damage. In July 1967, Newark lost The riots in the 1960s were not all about 23 lives to rioting and experienced $10 million in police and use of force. The underlying cause was property damage. Less than two weeks later, Detroit the greatly reduced opportunities for minority erupted; 43 people died and property damage citizens—particularly African-American citizens. amounted to $32 million. During that turbulent The causes were segregation and a lack of housing, period of our country’s history, the trigger for vio- quality education, and employment opportunities. lence and unrest often involved a law enforcement Minority groups viewed the government as oppres- officer’s use of force against members of a minority sive and abusive, with police being the face of that group. oppression and abuse. Referring to this era, Samuel Referring to the riots of 1966, the National Walker (2005, 22) reports: “The police officer in the Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (known as ghetto became the symbol of the national crisis in the Kerner Commission) reported, “Although there race relations.” These riots and more recent inci- were considerable variations in circumstances, dents of unrest represent critical breaches in the

1. U.S. Department of Justice [USDOJ] 1999, 3.

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 13 perceived legitimacy of and trust of police. In the tensions, or involving citizens in shared decision- 1960s especially, people in many communities making around issues of force, a key constituency viewed police as forces with few or no restraints on should be those who have had—and to this day their behavior and no accountability. have—the least amount of trust in police. The pay- Minority access to housing, quality educa- off in these strengthened relationships will be great. tion, and employment has improved substantially since the 1960s. Police are more responsible in their THE IMPORTANCE OF use of force and other powers and, overall, there is BUILDING COMMUNITY TRUST a much greater level of professionalism. As then- AROUND ISSUES OF FORCE Attorney General Janet Reno said in 1999, “In so many ways, the police are doing their jobs and Lack of trust regarding issues of force between the doing them better” (USDOJ 1999, 2). Law enforce- police and communities is a critical issue. Trust ment agencies are reaching out to their diverse varies across communities and within jurisdictions, communities and involving them in policing but in general, minority residents have the least efforts. Agencies are recognizing they are account- trust in police (Tyler 2005; Huang and Vaughn able to the people they serve. 1996). In some agencies, the trust in police has been In jurisdictions where police have become severely breached; in others, the relationship is more professional, there has been a vast reduction much stronger. But even in agencies with relatively in incidents of community violence following high levels of citizen trust, efforts to maintain that police use of force. According to the U.S. Depart- trust are never-ending. Thus, all agencies can bene- ment of Justice, Community Relations Service fit from learning about some of the promising [CRS] (n.d.): approaches identified from around the country that serve to promote trust around issues of force. “Where there are good police-community rela- That trust is imperative is indicated by the tions and high confidence within the minority practical consequences of its breach. The conse- community in the integrity and accountability quences are felt by the officer on the street as well as of the police department, a use-of-force inci- the agency as a whole. As Carlson (2005: xvi) states, dent may result in little turmoil. However, in “When citizens lack trust in law enforcement, the communities where there is a lack of confidence job of being a police officer becomes much, much between police and minority residents and a more difficult.” People who do not trust the police perception that complaints about police mis- are less likely to report crimes, provide information conduct will not be addressed fairly, no issue to investigators about crimes, and assist police in can be more racially explosive or more easily solving neighborhood problems (see, e.g., Rovella lead to violent disturbances.” 2000; Tyler 2005). When police are seen as lacking legitimacy, they may encounter more resistance This chapter is about developing community from citizens (see “Mayor Heartwell, Commission- trust, particularly on issues of force. I describe in ers Must Do More to Support the Police” 2005). the next section the many consequences to agencies This lack of cooperation “on the street” and communities of a breach in trust and, con- reduces the effectiveness of a law enforcement versely, the payoff when trust is strong. I list some agency. An agency needs citizens to report crimes traditional practices and describe promising prac- and provide vital information. Lack of trust affects tices from around the nation. Most of these prac- the agency and the jurisdiction when residents tices are not targeted for implementation refuse to serve as witnesses in court or, as jurors, are exclusively toward minority communities within a disinclined to believe the testimony of the officer in particular jurisdiction. However, whether an court. The lack of trust impacts the agency in the agency is providing education, holding discussions, form of civil litigation and a lack of political and implementing measures to reduce post-incident financial support. As reported above, this lack of

14 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force trust in the police manifests itself most destruc- accountability. To “account” is “to furnish a justify- tively in civil disturbances. ing analysis or explanation” (Merriam-Webster Dic- Conversely, the benefits of strong trust tionary 2006 [emphasis added]). Accountability between police and the community are significant. exists at the officer and agency levels. At the officer Strong trust produces support for the law enforce- level, accountability mechanisms can facilitate ment function at the incident level (that is, resi- adherence to policies in place to optimize force. The dents are more inclined to report crimes, provide agency as a whole is “accountable” if it accounts for information, and serve as witnesses in criminal jus- and/or shows responsibility for the acts of its officers. tice proceedings), support for the law enforcement It is important to note here that being account- agency (for instance, in the form of support for able is not only needed in order to build trust but budget requests), and involvement in cooperative also is a moral imperative of police departments. problem-solving efforts. It may even, practitioners Police are given great powers; most awesome is the believe, reduce the level of physical conflict between power to use force, even deadly force. It is unthink- police and citizens (Fridell 2004b). Strong trust able that an agency would not be accountable to its allows residents and police to come together to constituency for its use of this great power: “It is a address crime problems and otherwise improve the basic principle of a democratic society that the quality of life in communities. police should be answerable to the public” (Walker 2005, 8). That these two components—optimized force practices and accountability—go hand in C OMPONENTS OF hand is indicated by the fact that an agency will, in TRUST BUILDING fact, be unable to provide “a justifying explanation” There are two critical components of efforts to for its use of force if force is often used unnecessarily strengthen trust between the police and the com- or in ways that are not justified under policy. munity around issues of force. First, the agency Walker (2005) explains that some accountabil- must optimize its use of force. Optimizing force ity mechanisms are internal to the agency and some means that the agency is “utilizing it as necessary to are external to it. A police department’s internal maintain order but not to the extent that is excessive mechanisms include its policies and procedures. and abusive” (Fridell and Pate 1997, 217). “A police External mechanisms are managed by people who department’s procedures—what it actually are not members of the law enforcement agency. (See practices—are, of course, a fundamental element in also National Research Council 2004.) Traditional determining relationships with the community.” internal accountability mechanisms include routine (USDOJ, CRS 2003, 29). Second, the agency must be supervision, early intervention systems, use-of-force accountable to its constituency for its use of force. reporting, and internal affairs processes. Traditional We will not, in this chapter, cover how an external mechanisms of accountability include inde- agency ensures that the force used by its personnel pendent police commissions, citizen complaint is necessary and just. This broad and critically review boards, the courts (pursuant to their role in important topic is addressed in numerous publica- civil lawsuits), and political bodies (such as city tions, including the book published by PERF enti- councils and county commissions). Agency trust is tled Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force strongest when both forms of accountability are in (Ederheimer and Fridell 2005). That publication place. While agencies across the United States have, describes promising practices in use of force policy, over the last two decades, greatly enhanced their policy enforcement, training, and tools, and internal accountability, they have not, for the most describes responsible agency practices following an part, embraced external accountability. This chapter incident of force. raises the issue of whether accountability is more This chapter focuses on the second critical than merely justifying an agency’s actions but also component of trust building around issues of force: involving constituents in deciding what those actions

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 15 COMMENTARY: box 2.1 Building Community Trust—A Major Thoroughfare

by Annie Russell There are lessons that can be learned from Metropolitan Police Department’s experience in At the beginning of the new millennium, the building community trust and creating a viable efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department of community policing environment (especially with the District of Columbia (MPD) to build commu- a backdrop of use-of-force incidents and other nity trust, implement community policing, and challenges). Components of the successful strate- change the culture of the department required gies implemented in the District of Columbia are that a number of obstacles be overcome. In 1999, discussed below. The Washington Post ran a series documenting that the MPD used deadly force more often (per There must be a broad definition of community capita) than any other police department in the that includes significant numbers of people who country. Community perceptions—as well as believe that police have the professional disposi- resistance to lasting change by police, community tion to welcome and respect their involvement. members, and others—presented a number of In April 1998, Charles H. Ramsey became the challenges. Concerns about use of force were chief of police of the nation’s capital. He served prevalent between the police and the variety of as chief for almost nine years. One of the greatest communities that they served and a major thor- challenges Chief Ramsey initially faced was oughfare of issues ran through the police depart- strained relations between the Latino community ment’s relationship to the city’s residents. For and the police department. Previously, there had example, use-of-force issues needed to be consid- been a high-profile use-of-force incident that ered in connection with the city’s efforts to imple- resulted in local rioting. To restore and build ment community policing. trust, Chief Ramsey began by hosting town hall It is gratifying to be able to report that the meetings in all police districts. At these sessions, MPD’s efforts to improve the community’s trust community members had the opportunity to offer in the police have produced successes, and that perspectives about the history of force in their the work that was accomplished by community neighborhoods and describe their desires about leaders and progressive police executives was public safety, crime prevention, and police cutting-edge. Police and community leaders accountability. seized the opportunity to create collaborative Chief Ramsey’s second significant step was partnerships that gave residents and the police a dealing head-on with use-of-force issues. In Janu- means of “working through” trust issues. They ary 1999, he made an unprecedented request that “expanded the partnership base” by creating new the U.S. Department of Justice review all aspects of liaison units for groups such as deaf residents the MPD’s use-of-force processes. He created the and gay and lesbian residents. They informed and Civil Rights and Force Investigations Division to educated residents, evangelized throughout com- investigate incidents in which officers used force. munities, and created new publications to spread The division would also monitor and improve the the word about success stories. department’s use-of-force policies and procedures. In June 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice, the

16 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force District of Columbia, and the Metropolitan Police Solving training teams, consisting of police com- Department entered into a Memorandum of manders and Community Partnership Section Agreement that addressed the department’s use- staffers, jointly presented Policing for Prevention of-force practices. to community workgroups from each of the seven The Metropolitan Police Department had police districts. The success of the team training made previous efforts at building trust with spe- became an outreach tool that attracted more cial-need populations when it established an community participation in local police service Asian Liaison Unit in 1996. Chief Ramsey area meetings for problem solving and partner- expanded upon this idea and established addi- ship activities. tional special population units—including the Latino Liaison and the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, The community must have realistic Gay and Lesbian, Gang Intervention and Preven- expectations of the department and its tion, Youth Violence Prevention, and Victim members. An informed community must Assistance units. Further, he employed a lan- have significant input. guage-line to provide translation services for Many community residents signed up to volun- street officers via the 911 system, and imple- teer as trainers for the Policing for Prevention mented a provision that provides monetary incen- strategy. However, as the Policing for Prevention tives for personnel who qualify to speak another strategy was shared with police officers, problems language. Additionally, a partnership between surfaced that included competing priorities, lack local clergy and the department proved invaluable of “buy-in” by some officers, and unrealistic in addressing some of the use-of-force issues as expectations from the community. These obsta- well as crime in general. cles began to weaken recently formed partnerships, and doubts about trust resurfaced. The community must know its role. Improvements in partnerships and training were This requires education and training. sorely needed. As a result, the Metropolitan In September 1998, the Metropolitan Police Police Department revamped the police academy Department created the Community Partnership curriculum to emphasize Policing for Prevention Section and charged the unit with creating a col- concepts. In addition, all officers were required laborative process that would train and engage to participate in a 40-hour in-service training the community and police in joint problem-solv- program that included the Policing for Prevention ing initiatives on local neighborhood crime and and Partnerships for Problem Solving curriculum. disorder issues. In the spring of 1999, the MPD, In 2003, Chief Ramsey held an executive com- working with community leaders, produced the mand staff retreat to determine the priority Partnerships for Problem Solving process—a sys- needs for instituting Policing for Prevention tem for training police officers, community volun- throughout the department. Professionalism was teers, and workers from other government determined to be the highest priority. As a result agencies to work together to solve neighborhood of the brainstorming, the department created a problems. The MPD also established Policing for new Audit and Compliance Inspection Unit. Fur- Prevention as the community policing strategy for ther, the Policing for Prevention Unit coordinated the department. At citywide events to introduce the Policing for Prevention strategy, Partnerships for Problem >> continued on page 18

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 17 >> box 2.1 continued department-wide training for all lieutenants and There must be successes, and captains on identified priority topics. they must be shared. The community had a number of opportuni- In Partnership for Problem Solving, shared suc- ties and resources that helped to inform their side cess began to build trust. As part of one of the of the partnership. The department developed steps of the Policing for Prevention process— Policing for Prevention resource manuals with sig- entitled “Evaluate and Celebrate”—police and nificant community input. Publications included community members enjoyed potluck meals, pre- the Partnerships for Problem Solving Manual as well sented certificates to outstanding community and as a document helping to establish community police partners, and publicized success stories in expectations, entitled Role of Community. In addi- local news outlets. The police department also tion, a computer listserv group was established in regularly publishes success stories in its internal each police district for officers and community publication. It also has instituted an annual members to share information daily. award ceremony in each of the seven policing dis- All partners should be attentive to the trust rela- tricts, as well as a citywide award ceremony, tionship, contribute and hold up their end of the where police and community representatives are partnership, keep their word, share information, acknowledged for outstanding work. and explain changes and limitations. Conclusion In the District of Columbia, it became apparent that community policing had intermittent success Time after time, partnerships have demonstrated with other city agency partners that needed to do that community trust can be achieved, commu- more to create lasting change in neighborhoods. nity policing can work, and mutual respect can be Then-Mayor Anthony Williams was receptive to established. Distrust can be diminished when all Chief Ramsey’s recommendations to ensure that the partners get involved, share information, and all city agencies became active and engaged part- are co-equal in their collaborative problem-solv- ners in community policing. ing efforts to create safer, healthier, and friendlier The City’s Office of Neighborhood Services neighborhoods. Even though community policing began to oversee mandated participation by all and the efforts to build community trust have had city agencies to work in 14 selected neighborhood a great deal of success, the potential to lapse back hot spots with high violent crime rates and a bar- into poor trust relationships is ever present. Con- rage of disorder, housing, infrastructure and tinued progress will require watchfulness and the human services problems. As crime rates capacity to respond by police and community declined in double digits in all but one of the hot leaders. Over time, responsible leadership can spots, trust among community residents, police, create community policing environments and lev- and other agencies deepened. els of community trust that are resilient. n

18 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force should be. True accountability may be manifested in use-of-force reports for all but the lowest-level uses. shared decision-making. Chapter 2 of Exploring the Challenges of Police Use In the following section, I describe some of Force (Ederheimer and Fridell 2005) describes increasingly common forms of accountability. some of the promising practices in this realm and These are likely familiar to most executives, so I highlights the need for meaningful review of such do not discuss them at length. In the subsequent reports by supervisors. Chapter 4 of this same PERF section, I present some promising practices in the publication (Anderson et al.) conveys the impor- realm of building trust around issues of force. Each tance of credible, timely, and substantive investiga- of these practices reflects an agency’s effort to tions of serious use-of-force incidents and account for its use of force (for instance, through describes some promising practices in this realm education, dialogue, or post-event tension-reducing that have a payoff in greater “external trust and con- mechanisms), and some represent our expanded fidence” (124).2 definition of accountability in that they involve citi- Agencies can increase trust around issues of zens in the process of deciding policies and practices force by implementing credible reporting, review, related to use of force. and investigation systems. Educating the public about these processes and their results is also important. INCREASINGLY COMMON FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY: TRUST- ENHANCING PRACTICES Credible and Transparent There are several accountability mechanisms Citizen Complaint Systems adopted by an increasing number of police agencies To hold officers accountable, promote the optimal in recent years that can build trust around issues of use of force, and earn the trust of its constituency, force. In The New World of Police Accountability, an agency must have a credible, transparent, and Sam Walker (2005) describes some of these mecha- accessible citizen complaint system. Again, the key nisms developed over the past 15 years, and he pro- elements and current uses of such systems are claims that “it is astonishing how much has familiar to most executives and have been changed in this field” over that time period (p. vii). addressed elsewhere (see, for instance, Ederheimer He describes various mechanisms of accountability and Fridell 2005 and Walker 2005). that have implications for the use of force, such as Many of these are internal accountability sys- investigations and reports on use of force and other tems in that the processes are wholly internal to the critical incidents, open and accessible citizen com- agencies. Over the past 15 to 20 years, an increasing plaint procedures, and early intervention systems. I number of jurisdictions have developed systems will discuss these and other more common prac- that incorporate citizens in the complaint receipt tices, including educating citizens about use-of- and review process. Models vary with regard to the force issues and conveying transparency in an effort extent and nature of citizen involvement. In some to reduce tensions following an incident. systems, citizens are involved in both the intake and investigation processes and have input into case dispositions. The Auditor Model, in contrast, main- Use-of-Force Reports and Investigations tains investigations within the police department Departments now document use of force by their but uses civilians to review, monitor, or audit the officers to a much greater extent than in the past. department’s complaint processes. The various Today most agencies require officers to submit models are described by Walker (2001, 2005).

2. See also Walker 2005 for discussions of the history and key elements of use-of-force reporting and investigations.

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 19 Early Intervention Systems understanding of force issues. Law enforcement More recently, an increasing number of agencies are agencies have, for many years, used various vehicles adopting early intervention systems. With these to educate the public about use of force and other systems—increasingly taking the form of electronic aspects of policing. For instance, citizens’ academies databases—agencies collect, combine, and monitor are used by many departments to provide this edu- information about individual officers’ behaviors. cation, as are special forums targeting particular These systems identify officers who may be experi- segments of the community. Some promising prac- encing personal or professional problems. Agencies tices in the realm of citizen education are set forth commonly use them to identify problematic or in Chapter 4 of Exploring the Challenges of Police potentially problematic officer behavior so they Use of Force (Anderson et al. 2005). may intervene sooner and prevent excessive use of This education allows citizens a transparent force, corrupt behavior, complaints, or lawsuits. view into police departments, and goes hand in The information gathered by early intervention sys- hand with accountability. It shows “this is what we tems also can be used to guide management deci- do and this is why we do it.”As Chief William Brat- sions, such as officer assignments. ton stated in a 1999 New York Times editorial, “A Much of the attention to early intervention police organization that willfully shuts itself off systems (EIS) has focused on the front-end part of from scrutiny and public exposure can lose public the system, including the identification of behav- trust.” iors and other relevant information—and the determination of the “thresholds” that will prompt Reducing Tension Following a review and/or intervention. A new publication Critical Use-of-Force Incident (Supervision and Intervention within Early Interven- tion Systems: A Guide for Law Enforcement Chief Chapter 4 of Exploring the Challenges of Police Use Executives [Walker and Milligan 2005]) gives of Force presents promising practices for handling needed attention to the reviews and interventions the aftermath of use of force incidents (Anderson et prompted by the identified thresholds.3 This docu- al. 2005). Being transparent and accountable to the ment provides guidance on “defining the role of the residents was the objective of the highlighted pro- first-line supervisor, structuring the intervention cedures, and promoting public trust was a key process for officers who have reached (or are about desired outcome. A message of the chapter was that to reach) a threshold within the system, identifying constructive outcomes following a controversial ways to provide the various programs and services use-of-force incident are most likely if the agency that supplement and reinforce EIS, and creating a executive has built up trust with the community broader culture of accountability in law enforce- ahead of time. According to the authors, “One of ment agencies” (3). It highlights promising prac- the most important factors influencing reactions to tices in agencies across the country.4 use of force is the level of trust that has been culti- vated between a law enforcement agency and the community before an incident occurs” (Anderson Citizen Education et al. 2005, 83). This valuable “capital of good will” Public concerns about police use of force generally (96) could be produced before the crisis by any of and perceptions of its abuse in specific situations the traditional and promising practices described are sometimes the result of citizens’ lack of in this chapter. In the period after a controversial

3. A companion guide written by the same authors is entitled Strategies for Intervening with Officers through Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Front-Line Supervisors. 4. This PERF document, which was funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, is available on the COPS Office website at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

20 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force incident, the authors advocate that the executive Promising Citizen Education Practices be as forthcoming as possible with information As noted above, citizen education has been a long- about the incident. The timely and comprehensive standing mechanism for enhancing trust in the release of information—manifesting transparency police. Two agencies, the Bakersfield (CA) Police and accountability—will facilitate trust. Lack of Department and the Seattle Police Department, information and defensiveness, on the other hand, have developed stronger versions of these tradi- will reduce it. The authors highlight the need for tional methods. credible and timely post-incident investigations. The Community Relations Service (CRS) of The Citizens’ Forum of the the U.S. Department of Justice has worked with Bakersfield (CA) Police Department many communities around the country to defuse Conducted by the training unit of the Bakers- tensions following allegations of excessive use of field Police Department (BPD) in California, The force against members of minority groups and Citizens’ Forum is an award-winning version of 5 other police-citizen incidents involving minorities. programs used by some departments nationwide to They provide technical assistance and mediation to inform citizens about the challenges associated communities during these times of potential crisis. with police use of force. Lt. Don De Geare, who The CRS “checklist” guiding police executives on manages the BPD training unit, reports in an April the heels of critical use-of-force incidents is con- 4, 2005 e-mail communication that they “wanted tained in Appendix 1 of this book. to move away from standard police forums that are ‘Q and A’ in nature, and turn into complaint sessions about tickets and barking dogs.”According to PROMISING PRACTICES Officer Ron Rice, who runs the program in the TO BUILD TRUST AROUND field, telling residents about the challenges police ISSUES OF FORCE face has little effect. Instead, he reports, residents In this section, I present some of the innovative prac- understand the difficult decisions and limitations tices individual police agencies around the country associated with use of force only when they them- are using. Some of these are creative enhancements selves are put into officers’ shoes. of traditional techniques, and others are cutting- The forum won the California State Attorney edge practices that involve shared police-citizen General’s Crime Prevention Award. In high decision-making around issues of force. Categories demand among professional and community of promising practices include community educa- groups, the program uses humor, music, props, and tion, police-community dialogue, reducing tensions other background visuals. The program does not following critical incidents, and shared decision- begin with the usual introductions and opening making. I include several of the outreach and part- remarks; instead, with music playing and slides nership efforts of the Seattle Police Department to portrayed on the wall, the facilitating officers (in convey the importance of an agency’s developing “trade show-like uniforms”) initiate the first use- multifaceted programs to strengthen and maintain of-force scenario. Audience members are brought trust with diverse communities. forward to play bystanders, officers, and “bad guys.”

5. As reported on the CRS Homepage (at www.usdoj.gov/crs), the “Community Relations Service is the [DOJ’s] ‘peacemaker’ for community conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, and national origin. Created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, CRS is the only Federal agency dedicated to assist State and local units of government, private and public organizations, and community groups with preventing and resolving racial and ethnic tensions, incidents, and civil disorders, and in restoring racial stability and harmony.” The CRS website contains various publications that address police and minority community relationships.

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 21 ARTICLE: box 2.2 Building Community Trust6 by Jessica Toliver and Joshua Ederheimer Lowell has traditionally been a community of immigrants, including Irish, Greek, and Puerto Law enforcement executives recognize that the Rican residents, so the police department has success of a police department is directly linked experience interacting with diverse communities. to the trust that a community affords it. Today, However, it had been a long period of time since more than ever, police departments are held the city experienced such a rapid demographic accountable to the community, and police execu- shift, so it was imperative for the police depart- tives are constantly developing strategies to ment to understand and respect its residents’ cul- enhance communication and organizational tures and their experiences with agents of transparency. Evolving community demograph- authority. Approximately 10 years ago, the Lowell ics, critical incidents, and even budgetary con- Police Department embraced the philosophy of straints influence police-community trust. community policing. Its goal today is to emphasize Edward Davis III, former superintendent of this philosophy in order to build a greater trust the Lowell (MA) Police Department and currently among the city’s new immigrant communities. Boston Police Department Commissioner; Chief The first steps Superintendent Davis and his Jack Harris of the Phoenix Police Department; officers pursued were to learn the community’s and former Chief Derrick Foxworth of the Portland expectations of police service and educate the (OR) Police Bureau were selected to speak at community on the department’s expectations of PERF’s 2005 Critical Issues in Policing Forum their behavior. The superintendent emphasized because of their successes in building community the importance of informing the citizenry of the trust in their jurisdictions. Each panelist qualities that help foster strong police-commu- described their community and shared their per- nity relationships. spectives to connect with the public and enhance Superintendent Davis also emphasized that community confidence. he believes the essential component of community policing is trust. He believes that building Superintendent Edward F. Davis III, trust requires personal interaction; therefore, he Lowell Police Department made a point of being visible in the community to From 1993 to 2006, Edward F. Davis III was in allow for personal interaction. It is critical to con- charge of Lowell Police Department, a mid-sized duct these meetings with the public prior to the police agency serving a population of more than occurrence of a high-profile sensitive incident, he 100,000 people. Lowell, described as an “old mill indicated. Accordingly, the superintendent estab- town,” has many diverse constituents, including lished an ongoing dialogue with many commu- burgeoning African and Asian communities. The nity-centered organizations, including local Asian community also includes the largest Cam- faith-based organizations. To begin strengthening bodian population east of the Mississippi River. community trust, the department established a This has brought unique policing challenges to race-relations council and invited people who the Lowell Police Department.

6. This article summarizes panelists’ discussions on this topic at the Police Executive Research Forum’s 2005 Critical Issues in Policing Conference in San Diego.

22 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force were not normally involved in positive police forming an equal partnership with community communication efforts. members is an effective method for gaining “buy- An initial meeting, facilitated by the Police in.” As a result, if a highly sensitive situation does Executive Research Forum (PERF), focused on occur, the focus is on resolving problems rather racial profiling issues. At that session, it was evi- than assigning blame. dent that tension existed between officers and community members. However, continued face- Chief Jack Harris, Phoenix Police Department to-face dialogue fostered communication and Jack Harris has served the Phoenix Police Depart- success in reducing tensions. At these sessions, ment for more than 30 years and was named chief line-level officers interacted directly with commu- in 2004. Phoenix has a population of approxi- nity members on specific topics. At one meeting mately 1.5 million residents, and its police depart- regarding use-of-force rules of engagement, it ment has generally enjoyed strong community became clear that the community perception of support. The demographics of the city (along with use-of-force training was drastically different from the approximately three million people living in reality, revealing a significant divide between jurisdictions surrounding it) are evolving. Nearly police and the community. As a result, specific 30 percent of the community is Hispanic, and with use-of-force training information was shared with the city’s proximity to the border, many are of Mex- the community to improve the public’s under- ican descent. In addition, there is a growing Cam- standing of police use-of-force realities. bodian population along with other minority Conversely, the superintendent and his offi- groups. A significant challenge facing the Phoenix cers learned a great deal from the community as Police Department is the divergent experiences of well. For example, they learned that in some Liber- the Mexican population. Some residents’ previous ian (and in other African) communities, it is a sign encounters with Mexican police have influenced of respect to exit your motor vehicle and walk back their interaction with American police, who have to a police officer’s vehicle—an act that is not different procedures and practices. This has led to encouraged in American policing. Additionally, in some degree of misunderstanding and mistrust. some Liberian communities it is customary to In order to address the city’s changing demo- keep wallets or similar valuables in socks, which graphics, Chief Harris said he emphasizes credi- might inadvertently escalate an interaction with bility and full community engagement, and police in the United States if a citizen reached maintains an “open-door” policy, not just for him- down during an encounter. Understanding cul- self, but for the entire police department. Chief tural norms allowed the Lowell Police Department Harris learned that community leaders want inter- to train its officers to be aware of these behaviors action with all levels of the department, especially in order to build community trust. directly with the chief as its leader. Accordingly, Superintendent Davis said he was pleased Chief Harris has developed an outreach program that such dialogue contributed to positive police- consisting of several advisory groups, including community understanding and that there had not representatives from Muslim, Sikh, and gay and been a significant sensitive incident due to mis- transsexual organizations, to meet with him every understandings or misperception. He noted that month. These meetings have contributed signifi- a chief executive’s responsibility involves deli- cantly to strengthening the bond between the cately balancing the support of police officers community and the police department. In fact, the while building trust with the community. He believes that Lowell officers have learned that >> continued on page 24

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 23 >> box 2.2 continued with the community, because it demonstrates meetings helped foster cooperation when the that the department is not hiding anything. police department involved members of the His- Finally, Chief Harris highlighted the impor- panic community in developing departmental pol- tance of hiring a diverse workforce to reflect the icy on interaction with Mexican immigrants. community being served. He believed that this Chief Harris has also encouraged and nour- positively affects community perceptions and ished an open relationship with the media. Jour- influences the way the department operates. nalists from both print and electronic media, along with community members, are invited to Chief Derrick Foxworth, Portland Police Bureau participate in a Citizen Police Academy, where Chief Derrick Foxworth served with the Portland they are given information about officer-training (OR) Police Bureau for more than 24 years, and protocols. These include such use-of-force topics served as chief from 2003 to 2006. Portland is as the 21-foot safety rule when confronting edged growing in size, and the police department now weapons, use of various types of police equip- serves a population of more than 550,000 resi- ment, and police tactics. Such communication is dents. The current mayor, Tom Potter, is Port- a two-way street. For example, following an inci- land’s former police chief. dent where a detective discharged a firearm at a When Chief Foxworth was first appointed to suspect who had thrown a brick at him, commu- his position, he was immediately faced with sev- nity members learned that detectives were not eral challenges. In May 2003, an African-Ameri- issued conducted energy devices. During a Citi- can woman was shot and killed by an officer zens Police Academy, community members during a traffic stop, and in March 2004, an inquired about why detectives were not armed African-American man was fatally wounded dur- with such devices. As a result, the department ing a traffic stop. In response to these shootings, began to explore this possibility, and later issued the relationship and trust between the commu- CEDs to all of its patrol officers. nity and the police department were strained. An Chief Harris emphasized that community external review of police department operations trust revolves around ensuring there is a public recommended several organizational and proce- perception that the police department wants to— dural changes. Chief Foxworth looked inward, and and is trying to—be professional and “do the focused on improving all facets of police opera- right thing.” The police department can demon- tions. According to Chief Foxworth, “people, pol- strate this through transparency. Chief Harris icy, and training” were all reviewed. The initial believes that greater accessibility results in step involved attracting police recruits who pos- greater trust, and therefore he has instituted an sessed desired characteristics. The police depart- open review process. For example, many agencies ment’s recruitment process was revamped to only provide summaries of internal affairs investi- focus on diversity and on hiring people who gations when case reports are requested. In the wanted to become police officers because they spirit of transparency, Chief Harris provides all cared about people, wanted to help people, and information for public review—including reports, expressed an interest in “making a difference.” To memos, and policies. He noted that there are accomplish this, the department concentrated its some restrictions, and in some cases information recruitment strategies to attract such candidates is redacted, but even interviews and statements on college campuses and other locations. will be released. Chief Harris credits this policy The chief also reinstated 40 hours of in-service with creating a successful relationship of trust training that had been previously discontinued for

24 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force budgetary reasons. The department also sought He instituted a set of core values and expects all community input on the types of training they police department employees to know them and thought officers needed. That input encouraged subscribe to them. They are: Integrity, Compassion, the department to focus classes on competencies Accountability, Respect, Excellence, and Service. that included cultural understanding, epilepsy Chief Foxworth believes these values are necessary awareness, TASER™ training, and firearms skills. for a successful relationship with the community. To encourage citizen involvement in the depart- Moreover, Chief Foxworth said he constantly ment’s use-of-force and discipline processes, analyzed public perceptions as well as internal Chief Foxworth took the Phoenix Police Depart- organizational operations. A recent department ment as a model and allowed the community to survey revealed that while Part-I offenses had review documents and become part of the declined, so had citizen satisfaction. Through process. The department also has embraced analysis of the survey results, Chief Foxworth transparency. There is now a performance review determined that officers must be more customer- board that includes citizens and police officers, focused and friendly. For example, he believes that which has helped to bolster citizen and employee responding officers should engage in more than confidence on how the department operates. report-taking and collecting basic information. At Chief Foxworth developed plans to continu- a burglary scene, for example, providing extra serv- ously improve the police department, and he set ice could include touring the rest of the house to goals—some of which have already been accom- see if anything else is missing, giving the resident plished—to continue reform within the agency. a brochure about being a victim of burglary, asking They include: if the person is a member of the neighborhood or block watch association, and providing referral n Creating an Office of Professional Standards, information to the victim for follow-up questions. n Instituting a strong policy-review procedure, Chief Foxworth recommended that police view every citizen contact as a “potential sale.” n Pursuing accreditation through the Commis- sion on Accreditation for Law Enforcement The law enforcement profession should begin to Agencies, think more like the private sector, he indicated. Chief Foxworth believes that such an approach n Establishing an early intervention system, will increase citizen satisfaction and build com- n Ensuring that neighborhood association meet- munity trust and support. ings always have a police officer present, Conclusion n Continuing the Chief’s Forum in which repre- Each of the panelists has embarked on a series of sentatives from each citizen council meet with activities to strengthen trust between the commu- the chief to discuss policy issues, and nity and the police department. It is challenging n Continuing and expanding the Crisis Response to meet both the needs of the community and Team of volunteers from the community to those of officers, and communication by the chief work directly with police and victims (and fam- to both constituencies is imperative. The desires ilies of victims) when traumatic incidents of officers and community members intersect, occur. and transparency and respect are mutually beneficial. These police executives have been success- Chief Foxworth underscored the importance ful in creating and emphasizing core values and of changing the culture of the police department. initiatives that foster such understanding. n

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 25 In one scenario, some audience members are Seattle Police Department’s brought up to serve as restaurant patrons as others Special Reports on Use of Force are outfitted in police shirts, badges, and duty belts. More and more in recent years, agencies have The duty belts hold a rubber baton, air gun, and provided information to the public regarding their handcuffs. The citizens portraying police are told use of force. This frequently comes in the form of they have been called to the restaurant because a an end-of-year report summarizing aggregate sta- man, seeming to be high on drugs, is inside the tistics on use of force. It might be a stand-alone establishment and is a possible danger to the document or might be part of a larger publication patrons. A large officer wearing a red man’s suit regarding the agency’s performance and accom- appears, “acting crazy.” The subject starts pushing plishments for the year. Under Chief Gil Ker- folks who are eating in the restaurant, requiring the likowske, the Seattle Police Department (SPD) has citizen-officers to act. According to Officer Rice, the been creative and comprehensive in its application citizen-officers “really get into it.” More often than of this traditional accountability measure. The not, he reports, they quickly understand that “it’s department has produced and uploaded some par- harder than it looks” and are surprised at their own ticularly comprehensive documents to keep the violent actions. This is revealed in a brief discussion community informed about the use of force. The following each scenario. Said one participant fol- department’s website (www.cityofseattle.net/ lowing her portrayal of an officer in the restaurant police/publications) includes the agency’s strategic scenario: “I’m as liberal as they come, but I shot this plan, reports from the office of professional guy. I can’t believe I did it, but I had to. I have to accountability, after-action reports (for instance, rethink some things.” Another man, a minority the “Mardi Gras After Action Report,” the “WTO community activist, shared that a particular sce- After Action Report”), a special report on the nario helped him understand a real-life event for agency’s response to the issue of racial profiling, which he had criticized the department. “I under- and so forth. With regard to force, community stand now why the officers did what they did,” members can read a variety of informative reports, he said. including the following:

The forum, which lasts two hours, proceeds at n September 2000 reports produced by an internal a quick pace with several preselected scenarios and agency committee and a community workgroup ends with an opportunity for residents to ask ques- on less-lethal weapons (the work of these two tions. If the officers are asked, for instance, “Why groups is described below), don’t you shoot the criminals in their legs or the May 2001 “Use of Force Report,” guns out of their hands,”the response is not verbal- n ized; it is portrayed through action. n May 2002 “M26 TASER™, Year One Implemen- According to Bakersfield Chief William Rec- tation, Special Report,” tor in a February 24, 2006 e-mail communication, n May 2002 “Less Lethal Options—Year One, “The Citizens’ Forum is a very valuable program for Progress Report,” the department and the community. The program was designed by a street-level patrol officer and has n April 2005 “Department Policy Governing Less proved to be one of the most innovative ways to Lethal Options: The TASER and the Patrol Less build our relationship with the community we Lethal Shotgun with Beanbag Rounds,” and serve. Many of the participants have personally told n August 2005 “TASER Use Update.” me that they have a much better understanding of what officers have to deal with on a day-to-day The 18-page “M26 TASER, Year One Imple- basis.” mentation”special report (Seattle Police Department

26 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force 2002) provides information to the public regarding Particularly instructive are the “Frequently the TASER and the history of its adoption by the Asked Questions” contained within each major sec- department; the extent to which TASERs have been tion. The questions that are posed and answered are deployed to line staff; the extent and nature of the ones that could be and are asked by citizens nation- weapon’s use; characteristics of the subjects against wide. They include: which the TASER was used (for instance, demo- What should people do if they feel unnecessary graphics, level of impairment, weapon possession); n or excessive force is being used on them? effectiveness of use; and outcomes (including injuries to officers and subjects). The report ends n When are police officers authorized to use deadly with a section on “Lessons from Year One of TASER force? Implementation.” Why don’t officers just shoot weapons out of According to Chief Kerlikowske, “the report n people’s hands or shoot to wound them? serves the public by giving it comprehensive information about the agency’s use of this new and n Often when there has been a police shooting, I sometimes controversial weapon, but also serves hear that the officer has been placed on “admin- the agency by helping to set appropriate commu- istrative duty.”What does this mean? nity expectations regarding the TASER.”To assist in If officers have less-lethal weapons, why do I hear conveying realistic expectations, the report reads: n about people still getting shot? “…the reality is that the TASER does not signal the end of police shootings. Instead, officers will still need to employ lethal force when situations so war- Promising Practices to rant. For officers’ part, the reality is that while the Educate and Enhance Dialogue TASER does some things really well, it is not the The education practices described above help the answer in all cases. There are some uses for which agency provide information to the community. the TASER is simply inappropriate; and it cannot Some promising practices are designed to facilitate overcome its inherent limitations in field applica- two-way communications and mutual education. tions” (p. 17). The Seattle Police Department uses its Community The May 2001 special report, Use of Force by Outreach Program (formerly called the “Citizen Seattle Police Department Officers, can serve as a Advisory Council Program”) to develop strong, model for other agencies because of its comprehen- ongoing relationships with various demographic sive and thoughtful content. This report, which is communities and also to facilitate the transmission included in Appendix 2, provides the public with of comprehensive and timely information follow- the following information: ing a potentially controversial use-of-force inci- n The nature and extent of overall use of force by dent. When Norm Stamper became chief in 1994, departments nationwide and by the Seattle Police he continued the Precinct Advisory Councils Department (PACs) developed by a predecessor. He noted, however, that primarily white, middle-class residents n The nature and extent of fatal police shootings by attended the meetings of these geographically departments nationwide and by the Seattle Police defined groups. As a result, in 1995, the chief cre- Department ated seven demographically focused advisory coun- n The need for less-lethal weapons and the types of cils. Chief Kerlikowske has expanded the program less-lethal force options available nationally and further to include the following communities: in Seattle African American; East African; Filipino; Korean;

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 27 Latino; Southeast Asian; Arab, Muslim, and Sikh; The council members “create their own agen- Native American; youth; and sexual minority.7 das, and strategize ways for making police services There are two major goals of the Community more responsive to their communities’ needs” Outreach Program (COP): (1) create and strengthen (Seattle Police Department n.d., 1). Each council communications between the police and minority has an officer assigned to it who, according to COP communities, which will, in turn, build mutual trust; documentation, will “attend the advisory council and (2) increase participation of residents from the meetings and spend non-enforcement time at com- various demographic communities to work in part- munity-based organizations referred by the advi- nership with the SPD on issues of public safety.8 sory councils, educate the community about the Efforts to reach the two goals are organized into Department and its role, respond to crisis situa- three components, each of which has its own objections in their respective communities, and facilitate tives. As indicated in the informational brochure for meetings regarding police/citizen interactions” (2). the Demographic Advisory Councils (see Appendix Additionally, Chief Kerlikowske linked each 3), these components and objectives are as follows: council to a particular assistant or deputy chief to give the members quick and effective access to the Relationship-Building Component highest levels of the police department. Civilian n OBJECTIVE 1. Break down negative perceptions of staffers, including a full-time program manager, law enforcement in minority communities by support and coordinate the work of the councils. building relationships between individual offi- Quarterly, the 10 demographic councils that cers and members of minority communities. form the Community Outreach Program come together with the five Seattle geographic (precinct) Education and Training Component councils as the City-Wide Advisory Council, cre- n OBJECTIVE 2. Improve officer training and educa- ated in October 2003. Attending these meetings, tion regarding cultural norms that may impact which are chaired by the chief, are representatives police and citizen interactions. from all demographic and geographic councils and n OBJECTIVE 3. Enhance the understanding of the the officers who serve as liaisons. The group dis- role of police in the United States through educa- cusses issues that may be affecting many different tional materials tailored to specific communities segments of the Seattle community. and translated into appropriate languages. One community forum, developed by a liaison officer, was designed to facilitate effective and Dialogue Component safe interactions between residents from East Africa n OBJECTIVE 4. Increase and institutionalize ongo- and police. As reported by Harris (2005, 38): “Since ing dialogue between Seattle Police and minority many East Africans have had unusual misunder- communities about perceptions of law enforce- standings with Seattle police officers during what ment in the community. should have been routine encounters, the work- shop, attended by members of both the East African OBJECTIVE 5. Increase internal Seattle Police dia- n community and the police department, addressed logue regarding issues in minority communities. areas of community concern through mutual n OBJECTIVE 6. Institutionalize what is learned education, with sessions on policing issues, on from minority communities into Seattle Police’s immigration, and even on becoming a city strategic planning and decision-making process. employee.” The police learned how to effectively

7. A sexual minority is a person of a sexual orientation that is not part of the majority (e.g., gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender). 8. Some of the recent work and development of the COP has been supported by funds from the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

28 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force and respectfully interact with the East African com- community meetings attended by Chief Ker- munity, and the community members learned how likowske and Deputy Chief John Diaz, who was the they should behave during a traffic stop. In East command staff liaison to the Latino Advisory Africa it is considered disrespectful to stay in the car Council. The chief and deputy chief explained to if an officer has stopped you. The common behav- community members the purpose of the raid, the ior is to exit the vehicle and approach the officer. association with ICE, and the department’s inten- Further, East African men often keep money and tion to deal aggressively with violent gang members documents (for instance, a driver’s license) in their but not to enforce immigration laws. socks (see Harris, 2005). Clearly, without dialogue Over the years, the post-event communica- to promote mutual education regarding expecta- tion mechanisms have become even stronger. Some tions, these behaviors could lead to misunderstand- of the councils have developed extensive phone ings and even use of force during an encounter. and/or e-mail trees so that when communications The Community Outreach Program has also regarding critical events come to the council leaders developed brochures, forums, and videos in the from the department, those leaders can, in turn, languages of the various communities that provide quickly disseminate the information further into information on the role of the police in the United their communities. States, how to most effectively interact with police, Following critical events, the department also and how to contact the police for services or to e-mails community leaders, conducts briefings for communicate concerns. Information transmitted elected officials, provides updates on the agency’s includes policies, procedures, and tools pertaining website, and provides comprehensive press brief- to use of force. ings. According to the chief, this dissemination of information generally occurs within 24 hours of the incident. Reducing Tensions Following a Critical Use-of-Force Incident Seattle’s Community Outreach Program is also Shared Decision Making used to getting accurate and timely information out Community policing has helped to promote part- following a critical incident, including but not lim- nerships between the police and residents. Most ited to a use-of-force incident. For instance, notably, police and residents come together to recently U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforce- jointly identify and solve problems in the various ment (ICE) conducted a drug raid on a Seattle communities. In describing the implementation of house occupied by suspected MS-13 gang mem- community policing, Bonnie Bucqueroux (2004, bers. Upon request, SPD provided assistance. The 73) reports, the police have done “a good job of joint operation concerned residents of a primarily reaching out to the community for help and sup- Latino neighborhood who thought SPD might be port.” She claims, however, that the full potential of assisting in the enforcement of immigration laws. community policing will not be manifested until Members of the Latino Advisory Council were able the police make the community “a full partner” to contact the officer liaison on his cell phone that (73). “In a true partnership, the police and citizens night and get some preliminary answers to the make important decisions together about agency questions that their fellow residents were asking.9 policies, practices and direction.” (Fridell 2004a, 5). Within 48 hours of the raid, the department held Yet a national survey of community-policing

9. Each liaison officer is assigned a cell phone by the department so that advisory council and other community members can access them quickly and easily. Officers are on an “Officer Liaison Crisis Notification List” so that they can be notified of events, including but not limited to crises that are occurring within their demographic communities.

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 29 ARTICLE: box 2.3 Managing the High-Profile Use-of-Force Incident

by Jessica Toliver and Joshua Ederheimer deputies discharged their service weapons and fired approximately 120 shots at the fleeing vehicle. High-profile use-of-force incidents can have a The incident was captured on video by the news defining effect on a law enforcement leader as media. The subject in the vehicle was wounded, well as on an entire organization. How such and bullets sprayed the neighborhood. crises are handled directly affects the level of trust Sheriff Baca immediately addressed the inci- and confidence that a community affords its law dent publicly. He believed it was important to set enforcement agency. Whether or not an incident a deadline for the investigation (and he was in a involves use of force or some other high-profile position to do so) because the crisis would remain occurrence, learning how other law enforcement in the public’s mind until it was settled. To make leaders have managed such situations has great the investigation more “transparent,” internal value. At PERF’s 2005 Critical Issues in Policing affairs investigators and civil rights attorneys from Forum, panelists shared their perspectives on the Office of Independent Review were involved in managing high-profile incidents that occurred in it. To further soothe community tension, the sher- their jurisdictions. iff attended five community meetings to assume The panel members—Sheriff Lee Baca, Los responsibility for the officers’ actions. He also met Angeles County Sheriff’s Department; Chief with highly visible advocacy leaders, including William Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department; Reverend Al Sharpton, at the scene of the incident. Chief Noble Wray, Madison (WI) Police Depart- In his conversations with Reverend Sharpton and ment; and Commander Simon Foy, London Met- others, Sheriff Baca acknowledged that his depart- ropolitan Police Service—were selected to speak ment’s policies and training were insufficient. He at the conference because of the successes their underscored his willingness to be accountable and agencies had in managing high-profile incidents. reassured the community that there would be a thorough investigation. Sheriff Lee Baca, Sheriff Baca noted that planning and prepara- Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department tion—combined with constant improvement— Sheriff Lee Baca joined the Los Angeles County helped the sheriff’s department manage this Sheriff’s Department more than 40 years ago. He high-profile incident. He shared his view of seven rose through the ranks and was elected sheriff in essential actions that are needed to handle such December 1998. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Depart- a high-profile incident. ment is the largest sheriff’s department in the First, Sheriff Baca stressed the need to create United States. In addition to operating jail facili- a value-driven law enforcement culture by estab- ties, it provides full-service law enforcement duties lishing core values, such as standing against all in locations throughout the county of Los Angeles. forms of racism, sexism, and homophobia. Sec- Sheriff Baca discussed his experiences in man- ond, he stated that law enforcement agencies aging a high-profile shooting involving members of should become leadership-driven organizations his department that occurred in the city of Comp- by conveying a belief that all police officers are ton. Following a low-speed pursuit, several sheriff’s leaders—that there is no distinction on that point

30 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force between ranks and titles. Third, he suggested that Chief Bratton emphasized that transparency is law enforcement agencies should establish them- essential. Failing to face up to organizational short- selves as learning organizations—agencies falls is not prudent, he said. He believes that it is should acknowledge that they do not know every- imperative to share information publicly and that thing, will never know everything, and that the failure to do so is inadvisable and futile. Chief Brat- agency’s posture is that it can always do better. ton believes that negative information finds a way Fourth, he suggested that officers be encouraged of surfacing in some manner—often in the news to participate in local charities, noting that his media—and that transparency fosters stronger department joins in the local Boys & Girls Club community trust. At the same time, he believes activities. Sheriff Baca sets an example by manag- that confidentiality is important. Though he noted ing four nonprofit Youth Athletic League Centers that it might seem contradictory to the principle of serving at-risk youths in after-school programs— transparency, there are instances—due to the all involving academics, sports, and cultural arts. nature of criminal investigations—that police are Fifth, he emphasized transparency, suggesting compelled to keep information confidential. that agencies make it a principle that “the good, Chief Bratton also highlighted the importance the bad, and the ugly” of an organization should of building trust with the news media. Building be revealed. This principle of openness conveys relationships with reporters prior to a high-profile that an agency has nothing to hide. Sixth, Sheriff incident is essential, he said. He noted that if Baca suggested that agencies promote a media- members of the media believe that the police are friendly strategy, noting that he rarely leaves a hiding something, they press even harder. Chief press conference without conversing with various Bratton also recommended that law enforcement media representatives, including camera opera- executives consider the political consequences of tors and assistants. Finally, the sheriff empha- a high-profile incident. He noted that a police sized that law enforcement leaders must support chief works for an elected leader or some type of their officers, taking responsibility—especially in council or commission, and those officials need areas of policy and training—instead of simply to be aware that the police chief will assume blaming officers and deputies. responsibility to address any incident, remedy any problems, and keep them informed. Chief William J. Bratton, Chief Bratton also discussed the importance Los Angeles Police Department of case resolution. Even though a municipal Chief William Bratton leads the third largest police chief has parameters that are different police department in the United States. Prior to from those of a sheriff—who often is the final becoming chief of the Los Angeles Police Depart- authority on internal investigative matters—both ment, he was the New York City Police Commis- police chiefs and sheriffs must keep in mind that sioner, Boston Police Commissioner, and chief of there is a need for timely and uniform resolution the New York City Transit Police Department. He of cases. Chief Bratton noted that reviews of high- was also chief of the Massachusetts Bay Trans- profile incidents in his jurisdiction—some por- portation Authority Police and the Massachusetts tions of which he does not control—can take Metropolitan District Commission Police. His more than a year to resolve. This time span, he vast experience in the field has taught him to rely points out, can allow community tension to fes- on what he refers to as two truisms: Everything old ter, but sometimes it serves as a cooling-off is new again and no two incidents are the same. >> continued on page 32

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 31 >> box 2.3 continued baseline report describing how CEDs have been period. Nonetheless, consistency in the resolu- used since their introduction in the department tion process is key to meeting community expec- during the summer of 2003. He then posted this tations and the complexity of the incident may report—and the department’s CED policy—on determine the appropriate timing for resolution, the agency’s website. Within several days, there he said. were more than 2,000 “hits” to their website. Finally, Chief Bratton emphasized that it is Next, Chief Wray asked community leaders about essential to continuously educate the public and their perspectives on CEDs and acknowledged the news media about the issues surrounding that he and the department could make policy specific high-profile incidents, highlighting the improvements. Third, Chief Wray recognized that differences and unique aspects of each incident gaps exist in the trust between the police and the for the public. He concluded that constant com- community, and that it is the police department’s munication can build trust and help ease tension responsibility to begin to address those gaps. between officers and the public. Fourth, he held a series of press conferences and media updates explaining CED policy and proce- Chief Noble Wray, dures. Fifth, he encouraged departments to learn Madison Police Department from external and internal resistance to changes. Noble Wray is a 21-year veteran of the Madison For example, police leaders should not ignore (WI) Police Department. He was appointed chief objections from line officers’ valid points that can in October 2004 after serving as acting chief for help ensure that proposed solutions to a problem six months. Early in his tenure, Chief Wray was are workable. Finally, Chief Wray recommended faced with his first high-profile incident—the humanizing the issue. He admitted to the com- alleged abduction of a University of Wisconsin munity that the way his department was using student, which was later revealed as a hoax. How- CEDs at the time may not have been the best way, ever, the national media attention forced him to and that he was seeking reform. prove himself as a strong manager while simulta- Additionally, Chief Wray noted that it is neously strengthening relationships with commu- important to be aware of—and address—things nity leaders. Chief Wray stated that this that may interfere with the ability of police to con- experience helped him when another high-profile nect with the community and establish trust. He incident arose involving the use of a conducted recommends that law enforcement executives energy device (CED) on a teenager on school understand the following eight key issues in order grounds. The controversial incident again to strengthen community trust: brought news media scrutiny to the Madison 1. Confusing jargon: When speaking to a layperson, Police Department, especially in light of other be mindful of the “language-disconnect” that CED incidents throughout the country. jargon can cause. Chief Wray chose to approach the CED incident as an opportunity to advance his trust-based 2. Lack of employee self-discipline: Law enforce- vision of policing. In order to achieve this goal, he ment agencies—and even officers involved in subscribed to several principles. First, he said, an incident—can take responsibility for actions educate the community on your department’s without demonizing the subject. capabilities and limitations with regard to use of 3. Refusing to reform: Agencies sometimes simply force. To accomplish this, Chief Wray created a fail to reform when change is needed.

32 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force 4. Tension between fairness and efficiency: It may be trains and on a bus. The bombings—killing 56 efficient to use a particular tactic or weapon— people and injuring 700 more—were the dead- but in some cases it is not appropriate to the liest attacks in London since 131 people were situation. killed by a V2 rocket on March 27, 1945, near the end of World War II. The bombings surprised a 5. Failure to adequately serve juveniles: Community city that was busy celebrating; the day before the standards may not mesh with police tactics- attack, London had been selected to host the even if they are sound (e.g., activating a juve- 2012 Summer Olympics. Two weeks later, a sec- nile with a CED). ond series of four explosions took place. Luckily, 6. Lack of empirical data: Maintaining objective only the detonators, and not the bombs them- data is important. In the CED case, the police selves, exploded, minimizing casualties. The department only had data provided by the man- attacks placed both the public and the police serv- ufacturer. ice on edge. Previously, the Metropolitan Police Service 7. Poor media communication: Announce when had begun a process of consultation about a pol- media briefings will occur—and then hold icy for situations when officers faced a suspected them. Chief Wray found it helpful in building suicide bomber. The policy—developed after trust with the public to communicate and fol- extensive research—was based on lessons low up when he said he would. learned from law enforcement officials in Israel 8. Lack of minority viewpoints: Chief Wray empha- and Sri Lanka, who have extensive experience sized the importance of understanding the with suicide bombers. Unfortunately, the policy, unique perspectives of various groups, such as combined with the high tension from the London women and minorities. bombings, set the stage for a tragic occurrence. The problem was that officers on the street did Chief Wray concluded that addressing these not have access to critical intelligence held by offi- issues will foster stronger bonds between the cials at higher levels, yet these officers were police department and the community when required to make split-second decisions about high-profile incidents occur. use of deadly force. The day after the failed second wave of bomb attacks, police in London were searching for individuals who they suspected Commander Simon Foy, were responsible for the attacks. Police became London Metropolitan Police Service suspicious of a male subject and believed he was Simon Foy is a commander with the London Met- a suicide bomber. Following a confrontation, offi- ropolitan Police Service. It is the largest police cers shot the man. It was later learned that the department in the United Kingdom and is prima- man was not a suicide bomber and was unarmed. rily an unarmed police service. Only about 10 per- The public reaction was one of shock and cent of the department’s more than 35,000 anger, especially in minority communities that officers are armed. feared they would be unfairly targeted in the Commander Foy shared perspectives on the future, Commander Foy said. Compounding the department’s handling of several events. On July situation was the fact that police-involved shoot- 7, 2005, four separate suicide bomber attacks ings are extremely rare in the primarily unarmed occurred on the London transit system—both on >> continued on page 34

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 33 >> box 2.3 continued police service. Moreover, the incident not only Sir Ian characterized it as direct-collaboration affected public perceptions, Commander Foy policing. In October 2005, a brochure explaining said, but also prompted discussions within the the department’s deadly-force policy was dissemi- police service about how to deal with the threats nated throughout the police service, clarifying posed by terrorists, when the police service is internal policy and communicating priorities and largely unarmed and most officers prefer to values within the agency. remain unarmed. Commander Foy said that Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the London Blair and the leadership of the London Metropol- Metropolitan Police Service, recognized that a itan Police Service are continuing to keep the pub- series of actions needed to be implemented in lic informed of developments related to the order to advance public confidence and trust in transit- shooting investigation, as well as seeking the police service. A significant obstacle was rec- their input on strategies to address terror threats onciling the fact that the police service is largely in accordance with public needs and expecta- unarmed with the need for authorities to inter- tions. He stated that the police service has vene and protect the citizenry. The police service enjoyed some significant success. On July 28, needs to address this issue—but do so within the 2005, the London Metropolitan Police Service accountability level that is demanded by a liberal successfully captured an Al Qaeda terrorist cell— democracy. Further, Commander Foy explained the only police organization in the world to do the police service was focusing on how to ensure so—without incident or casualties. that an individual police officer’s decision to use Commander Foy closed by emphasizing that force should be based on the best information the London Metropolitan Police Service will con- available, while acknowledging the reality that cer- tinue to inform and communicate with the public, tain types of intelligence about suspected terror- while at the same time preparing to thwart and ists cannot be routinely shared far and wide. respond to any threats to the United Kingdom. Commissioner Blair and Prime Minister Tony Blair both held numerous briefings to educate the Conclusion public about policing strategies in this area as well The panelists shared their experiences in dealing as to keep the citizenry informed of developments with high-profile incidents that occurred in their during the course of the shooting-review investi- communities. Each of the incidents affected pub- gation. The goals of these briefings were not only lic confidence—for individual police leaders and to inform the public but also to address policy departments as a whole. The panelists’ philoso- questions and calm fears. They issued assurances phy, strategies, and actions in dealing with these that the London Metropolitan Police Service unique situations offer opportunities for learning. would remain primarily unarmed, but asked the The lessons that they shared provide a better public to join in a strategy discussion of how a understanding of issues so that other police exec- largely unarmed force would combat terrorism. utives can make more informed decisions. n

34 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force practices conducted in 2002 indicates that only a of the pedestrians, SPD officers shot and killed the minority of agencies nationwide involve citizens in man. The community, including the members of decisions regarding the internal workings of the the various councils, expressed concern that there department. Less than 30 percent of the agencies were not alternative methods for controlling this reported that citizens participate in the promo- dangerous subject. The department developed two tional process, reviewed complaints against police, workgroups: one was an internal workgroup and participated in officer selection, helped to evaluate the other comprised Seattle residents. The groups personnel, or helped to develop policies (Fridell were asked to make recommendations to the chief 2004b). Likely movement in this direction has been about how to better prepare and arm officers for slow because chiefs acknowledge that involving res- dealing with such incidents. A key question was idents in such decisions can be risky because of a whether the department needed additional types of lack of understanding of policing by the citizenry. less-lethal technology to support the work of line As Chief John F. Timoney of the Miami Police personnel for dealing not just with citizens with Department explained in a September 19, 2005 mental illness but with other subjects as well. At interview, “Through no fault of their own, citizens that time, the department used batons and O.C. often do not have enough knowledge of police and spray as their primary less-lethal weapons. policing to provide valuable input.” The group of residents selected to form the As indicated by the samples in this section, committee represented a cross-section of the com- some executives have successfully involved residents munity, including members of the various demo- in making what are normally considered “internal graphic and geographic councils. Organizations decisions.”These chiefs are expanding the concept of represented by members of this Community Work- accountability beyond merely justifying an agency’s group on Less Lethal Options included: actions, to involving constituents in deciding what n East African Advisory Council those actions should be. These examples of shared decision-making pertain to selecting weapons and n U.S. Department of Justice, Community other tools for the agency and developing policies Relations Service regarding their use. Reflecting the important con- n Community Policing Action Council cern raised by Chief Timoney, these initiatives have included extensive citizen-participant education n Hispanic/Latino Advisory Council components. n West Precinct Advisory Council

Seattle Police Department n Mothers for Police Accountability

It was following discussions with the mem- n Seattle Neighborhood Group bers of SPD’s demographic councils that the leader- Minorities Advisory Council ship of the Seattle Police Department decided to n involve residents in decisions regarding less-lethal n Ballard Merchants’ Association. weaponry.10 In April 2000, a man with mental illness, armed with both a knife and gun, was heading Before developing their recommendations, the toward a downtown intersection around which members of the Community Workgroup received were a number of pedestrians. The man had fired at considerable education from SPD personnel. store security guards minutes before. Unable to Topics covered during their training included use- otherwise control the subject and ensure the safety of-force policies and procedures, firearms training,

10. Chief Kerlikowske gives the credit for this initiative to Assistant Chief Harry Bailey, who was serving at the time under acting Chief of Police Herbert V. Johnson.

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 35 COMMENTARY: box 2.4 Building the Public Trust: Leadership, Transparency, and Accountability by Christine Silverberg 2. Building or restoring and retaining the public trust depends on four key approaches: (1) a cul- “Building community trust”: That is a term we are ture of accountability within the police organi- seeing more and more often in relation to public zation, (2) an understanding of the central role institutions—government, health, education, to of leadership, (3) an embracing of the spirit of name a few, and yes, policing. The term, which transparency, and (4) ensuring that those who generally refers to the responsibility the public breach their fiduciary responsibilities are dealt places on a government or its institutions to care with appropriately, in a fair and consistent for their interests, is so popular now that there is process. risk that the term “the public trust” or “the com- 3. The police discipline process is a mechanism munity trust” will be tossed out as a time-limited of final resort. True public accountability rests phrase—trendy at best, meaningless at worst. on the connectivity among all the parties, Relegating the “public trust” to another “flavor of where governing authorities support police the month,” however, would be a serious mistake. leadership to establish ethical police services, There is nothing, in my view, that is more where police chiefs are responsible for strong important to the delivery of policing services leadership and inculcation of core values, and today than that it is supported by the trust of where police members are personally responsi- diverse communities. There must be broadly ble for engaging in ethical behaviors toward based confidence across communities, local gov- those they serve. ernments, and stakeholders in the ability of the police to deliver its services, ethically, in a trans- 4. The excellence with which policing services are parent and publicly accountable way, and with a delivered derives from excellence within the leadership dedicated to earning that trust. Over organization. Building such internal excellence the years, through the practice of policing, the requires competent and sustained leadership study of criminology, and the practice of law, I at the police chief and executive level—a lead- have come to several conclusions: ership schooled in the art and craft of policing, knowledgeable about organizational systems 1. The word “trust” has several definitions, and processes, and skilled in strengthening the including one not usually considered in the capacities of institutions, communities, and context of policing, a definition with a fiduciary individuals. aspect—“holding something of value for another person.” This raises the idea that the The police operate in a safety and well-being of the community are highly contextual environment. held in trust by the police for current and future The police often operate in a highly emotional generations. As a fiduciary, the police owe a atmosphere, in a context within which there are duty of care to the community, a duty founded differing views of the role and mandate of the on honesty and integrity, diligence and even- police and in an environment that is highly political handedness in approach.

36 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force and often ambiguous. In such an environment, ends” context, the impartiality of the police and there is little consistency in the public perception of their adherence to core values are often ques- the scope or depth of the services the police pro- tioned. In such a world, police use of force and the vide or the manner in which the police deliver application of coercive state authority come under them. This is especially so when the stimulus for intense scrutiny; public perceptions of the police public opinion is a crisis (such as the proliferation are influenced by what is happening not only in of gun crimes, gang violence, or serious officer one’s own community but around the globe; and misconduct) and the issue tends to be ephemeral, the ability of the police to build and sustain com- once media coverage diminishes. The challenge for munity trust is often shaken. The public trust is the police is in being responsive to these shifting not a partisan concept, and building it or restoring tides of public opinion and in managing the often- it means understanding diverse perspectives and changing and competing expectations of diverse delivering different, though equitable, services in communities, while at the same time retaining the these circumstances. Delivering such services independence of office. requires an agency to be flexibly organized and poised to respond to change and crisis by diversi- Public perception is both fying its methodologies, not altering its values. a driver and a challenge. There is a dichotomy that arises in public senti- Police accountability operates at two levels: ment towards the police. A rights-based culture individual and institutional. drives public perceptions as to what is considered The public will not tolerate real or perceived just treatment. The police are applauded when threats of injustice, corruption, police abuse of they provide services directed against those who power, or political influence from an institution violate the law or regulation, but criticized when that affects their daily lives and has the lawful there is a perceived or actual abuse of their power. authority to constrain their freedom or, in excep- This dualism is especially true when the public or tional circumstances, use deadly force to ensure any constituent group views police actions as dis- public safety. In some cases, elaborate proce- criminatory and thus a violation of the principle of dures and systems have been developed to even-handedness that is so much a part of the ensure that issues of police officer misconduct foundations of the public trust. are properly addressed. Aside from any criminal, civil, or disciplinary action that is taken in such Diversifying methodologies, not altering values, individual cases, policies or standards are often is key to delivery of policing services. articulated by governing bodies to prevent recur- In the post-9/11 era of anti-terrorism initiatives, rences of abuses. where there is increased power accorded to polic- Governance that is merely reactive to public ing authorities by the state and where freedoms complaint or misconduct, however, neglects the are frequently restricted for the very purpose of role of institutional accountability in the broader protecting those freedoms, there lies enormous accountability framework—an institutional risk of fractionalizing a community. This risk is accountability brought about by effective and amplified when one or more parts of a community inspirational organizational leadership focused or police agency rationalize or justify police abuse on developing a culture of accountability within of power or excessive use of force on the basis of the “greater good.” In such a “means versus >> continued on page 38

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 37 >> box 2.4 continued response to a crisis is multi-dimensional, focus- the organization, a culture founded on ethical ing across all issues, police leaders often appear decision-making and integrity of action. When a in public and simply state, “I have ordered an chief of police disciplines an officer for excessive immediate investigation into the incident and the use of force, for example, but fails to examine surrounding circumstances. As the matter is the systems and decision-making processes that under investigation, I am restrained from com- may have given rise to the conduct in the first menting further. Our sympathies go to the loved place, the chief has failed to reassure the public ones of all who died.” Such a response will do lit- that underlying causes are being addressed. tle to engender public trust. The police chief Intuitively, just as the public knows that good simultaneously must respond (1) internally to deal police work is not simply a series of independent with whatever policies, systems, and processes police actions but a complex network of interre- may be in place that shaped the alleged miscon- lated individual behaviors and organizational duct, and (2) externally, to demonstrate that the processes, so, too, officer misconduct is generally police understand their duty to the community not perceived by the public to be an isolated and will be held accountable both as an institu- event, but rather, the result of organizational sys- tion and as individuals for their conduct. Convey- tems gone awry. ing these sentiments and commitments to In the final analysis, it is a combination of per- the community cannot be done without honest, sonal, organizational, and situational factors that forthright, and transparent approaches. affect police decision-making, and it is a combi- Whenever incidents of officer misconduct nation of those same factors that is at the root of occur, the chief of police must be able to commu- police misconduct and institutional corruption. nicate, implicitly and explicitly, that accountability An individual officer can apply a wide margin of mechanisms are in place in the agency. Moreover, discretion in highly constructive or highly destruc- there must be a culture of accountability within the tive ways; however, focus on individual control of organization with members committed to core misconduct, while clearly critical as part of the values. Chiefs should exercise the leadership nec- broader scheme of accountability, becomes a essary to identify the issues and resolve gaps in bandage that falls short of addressing the under- service or accountability. Any discussion of police lying symptoms. Too often, the “bad apple” integrity and thus police accountability must tran- approach to officer misconduct supplants deeper scend an individualized focus to a broader exami- inquiry into organizational climate. nation of organizational systems and structures, leadership, and supervision. The chief should The public trust is earned demonstrate and articulate the department’s fidu- in the “here and now.” ciary relationship with the community. A police chief does not have the luxury of waiting weeks for an investigation report, or years for True accountability is brought about inquiry recommendations. Part of earning the by leadership, not coercion. public trust is balancing competing interests and Integral to any restoration of the public trust is an taking decisive action in the “here and now.” Tak- understanding that true accountability is institu- ing such decisive action is always risky for the tionally centered and culturally driven, brought chief of police trying to stay ahead of news reports about by leadership, not coercion. True accounta- and demonstrations. Even when the actual police bility is simply, in my experience, not achieved

38 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force only by laws, rules, regulations, and orders, but in failing relationships and a fracture in the also by effective and sustained leadership—lead- deep-seated trust that is fundamental to effective ership which is values-based, focused on people policing. and across systems, committed to learning, and built on a foundation of ethics. Leading such Policing from the inside out. change in police agencies is complex and requires The excellence with which police deliver their strategies aimed at ensuring that systems within services outside the organization is dependent on the organization are integrated one with the other the excellence within, a notion I call “policing and aligned with community needs. from the inside out.” While community policing contemplates change to policing structures and Systems thinking is critical. systems, attention to building a well-performing Both overcoming negative public perceptions police organization from the inside out is often built up over time and actively demonstrating ignored when budgets are limited and the police unfailing commitment to the principles underly- are faced with ongoing crises. In my experience, a ing the public trust require an ability on the part well-performing police organization has at least of police leaders to work within and between five characteristics: there is an emphasis on peo- communities as well as across the systems that ple; police leadership is participative and make up a community. Racially motivated attacks, embraces uninhibited dialogue up, down, and for example, require the police to understand across all ranks, throughout the organization; the both the historical wrongs and grievances of the values of excellence and high performance are the group involved as well as the motivations in a same on the street as they are in the executive particular incident. Solutions are found not only offices; the police are committed to their commu- in managing the specific incident from an opera- nities and believe that community consultation, tional perspective but by working closely with the participation, cooperation, and joint resolution of communities of interest to redress their griev- problems are central to how the police conduct ances as a whole. Thus, systems thinking and business; and finally, there is priority placed on “know-how” in systems integration are core com- continuous learning and systems thinking. petencies for policing leaders—the silos and partisanships that characterized police organiza- Leading-edge strategies. tions of yesterday must continuously be rejected In the Calgary Police Service, our strategies were in favor of a model in which relationships are leading-edge and were introduced at a time in his- built, not mere contacts made; issues analyzed; tory that paved the way for managing in more impacts understood; and expectations managed complex times. Among other initiatives, we person by person, community by community, and focused on rebuilding community policing across issue by issue. Fighting crime and disorder and a broad spectrum of communities; increased maintaining public safety are simply not one- investigative capacity; enhanced the capability of dimensional. Communities share in the responsi- analytical support and the utilization of technol- bility for maintaining peace and order; ogy to strengthen the effectiveness of front-line one-dimensional approaches by the police, such and investigative services; and built human as tactical operations without broader community resource systems and practices to reflect the and strategic considerations, are bound to result

>> continued on page 40

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 39 >> box 2.4 continued resource systems, including recruitment, pro- learning and development of members and the motion, transfer, and developmental assess- needs and expectations of communities. We also ment, all aligned with community expectations. redefined the roles of management to lower the levels of decision-making, increased systems Leadership courage, community synchronicity, capacity, and worked to align programs and serv- and enduring leadership practices. ices to community expectations and policing Police leaders require knowledge of organiza- requirements. A few specific initiatives include: tional systems and corporate culture as well as the art and craft of policing. Introducing complex n Introducing cross-functional and interdiscipli- systems changes requires courage, and there is a nary issue teams focused on diverse concerns of front-line personnel. need to ensure a synchronicity with the community. Of fundamental importance in a system in n Flattening the agency by creating a modified which the police have been given authority to matrix organizational structure, in which verti- restrict or remove the liberties of another, and in cal rank structures were established inside which police are routinely invited to help solve the functional divisions (to retain a command and community’s problems, are checks and balances control orientation for operational matters) that prevent the exercise of abusive or manipula- and horizontal structures allowed for strategic tive practices. Checks and balances on their own, decision making and more timely responsive however, will not sustain the public trust. Leader- communications. ship is pivotal. Without leadership guiding sus- n Introducing a strategic framework for an inte- tained and predictable strategies, accountability grated approach to competency-based human is moot and so, too, is the public trust. n

40 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force SWAT policies and procedures, law enforcement Richmond (VA) Police Department models for dealing with citizens with mental illness, Jerry Oliver, who served as chief of police in and the SPD’s Crisis Intervention Program. They Richmond, Virginia, from 1995 to 2002, expressed, observed, and some participated, in firearms simula- in an interview on November 15, 2005, his strong tor training. They also received education on less- belief in involving residents in the decisions of the lethal options and observed demonstrations of their department. According to Chief Oliver, community use. The education on various types of less-lethal policing is more than just working with citizens to weapons came from the internal work group refer- solve the problems in their own neighborhoods. enced above, named the Force Options Research Community policing means including residents Group (FORG), which had been charged with the more broadly in making decisions about how the same task of producing recommendations for the agency will serve its constituency—decisions nor- chief. This internal workgroup was asked to make mally made only by police personnel. To this chief, recommendations based on their examination of accountability is more than just justifying an agency’s “the state-of-the-art regarding less-lethal force actions; it also means involving constituents in decid- options and their deployment by law enforcement ing what those actions should be. Chief Oliver agencies … and make recommendations to ensure involved residents in critical decisions such as that SPD is at the forefront in the training, deploy- whether Project Exile—an initiative focused on ille- ment, and use of such tactics and munitions.”(Force gal guns—would be adopted in Richmond and Options Research Group 2000, 4). To this end, the much more minor ones such as the color of new members of the group reviewed the relevant litera- vehicles. He involved citizens when the agency ture and law, consulted with national experts on less- selected a new firearm. lethal weapons, surveyed other law enforcement His use of this shared decision-making model agencies, contacted vendors and distributors of vari- in early 1998 to select tools for the Richmond Police ous weapons, and tested various less-lethal options. Department Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) The Force Options Research Group shared its find- team produced great payoff in the form of shared ings with its community counterpart. accountability with residents. When the Richmond Other than the training of the Community Police SWAT team needed new equipment, Chief Workgroup by the Force Options Research Group, Oliver developed a committee comprising both the two groups worked independently, and each sub- Richmond Police personnel and Richmond resi- mitted recommendations to Chief Kerlikowske. The dents. He included a cross-section of residents, with two groups made similar recommendations. They priority for people from the high-crime areas where recommended that more training be provided to line the tools/weaponry would most likely be used. The officers on dealing with citizens with mental illness community residents on the committee received 16 and that a larger group of officers receive the more- hours of training across four sessions on why SWAT intensive Crisis Intervention Training. Further, both teams are needed, what these teams do, the kinds of groups recommended the adoption of TASERs and weapons and other tools that they need, and the Beanbag Launchers.11 Chief Kerlikowske reported kinds of weapons/tools that were available. The resin a February 15, 2006 e-mail communication that idents met the members of the SWAT team, who “these key recommendations have been adopted by discussed why they were selected and some of their the department. We valued the input of the commu- experiences as team members. nity and their full partnership in this process and we The police-citizen group selected frangible have all benefited from it.” (capable of breaking) breaching rounds to be fired

11. The full list of recommendations from each group is contained in their reports posted on the SPD website at http://www.seattle.gov/Police/Publications/default.htm.

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 41 from a shotgun for high-risk forced-door entries. that, since he and others were consulted, they could The rounds chosen by the agency were, according not condemn the police for what happened and to the manufacturer, “made of compressed pow- even shared responsibility for the tragic event. dered zinc, which disintegrates into fine powder Chief Oliver reported that there are multiple bene- upon impact with the target.” (Green v. Ingram fits of shared decision-making including, but not 2005, 7). The reported value of these rounds was limited to, enhanced trust. that the compressed metal slugs would defeat the door-lock mechanism but cause no further damage Orange County Sheriff’s Office or harm because the metal would then disintegrate Residents in Seattle and Richmond helped into powder. their police departments select weapons and other In one highly publicized case, these frangible tools. In Orange County (FL) and St. Petersburg breaching rounds were used when police went to a (FL), residents were involved in developing policies low-income, high-minority area to conduct a high- for the use of weapons. In both jurisdictions, the risk warrant search of a residence for weapons. weapon of focus was the TASER. Sheriff Kevin When the team ultimately gained entry, after firing Beary of Orange County started acquiring TASERs five of the breaching rounds into the door, they in 2000, and by 2004 approximately 80 percent of found a woman lying dead on the floor with her line personnel were carrying them. body draped over her 3-year-old daughter. It With a national controversy around TASERs appeared that her death was the result of the growing and Orange County at the center of the breaching process. (An autopsy later confirmed that controversy, the sheriff in 2004 decided to involve the woman’s death was caused by fragments from residents in discussions regarding their use. He the frangible rounds.) formed the TASER Task Force Committee, made up Within hours, Chief Oliver stood at the front of seven residents and five sworn personnel. Among of the police academy auditorium, which was filled the resident members were a minister, a representa- with angry community members as well as tive from the Hispanic Coalition of Central Florida, reporters. He conveyed to the group all he knew a past president of the Central Florida chapter of about the incident. There were hostile questions the NAACP, a member of the Orange County and comments, and then a resident of the neigh- School Board, and a doctor who practices forensic borhood stood up to speak. This person had been and social psychology. A lieutenant, one captain, one of the citizens who served on the SWAT tools and three sergeants represented patrol, professional committee. This man reported that residents had standards, and training. The lieutenant served as asked the police to rid the neighborhood of the per- chair, and one of the residents, a business leader in son whose home was searched. He reported that he the community, served as co-chair. The committee and his fellow citizens on Chief Oliver’s committee had a broad mandate to review policy, training, had helped to select the equipment that the police reporting, and other deployment issues. According had used during the incident. He conveyed that bad to Sheriff Beary in a February 2006 e-mail commu- things can happen even when police try to do nication, “the TASER has generated national inter- everything right—including consulting citizens est and in light of that attention, I thought that the about how they should do their jobs. The hostility assembly of a committee and a careful review of the and brewing community outrage abated consider- training and implementation of the M26 and X26 ably, and the tragic accidental death was a short- TASER would be both timely and appropriate.” lived news story. Before developing recommendations, the The underlying message of the statements committee received extensive education from sub- made by the citizen in the tense forum was one of ject-matter experts. The lieutenant who chaired the shared responsibility. The man seemed to be saying group, now a captain, reports, “The education

42 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force process was critical to the overall work of the com- n The sheriff’s office have a separate policy on mittee.” The resident members learned about: TASER instead of incorporating it within the overall use-of-force policy, n Use of force generally, including use-of-force continuums, statutes, and case law, n The agency continue to allow for TASER use at the level on the response-to-resistance matrix n The TASER denoting passive physical aggression on the part n How Orange County Sheriff’s Office (OCSO) of the subject, but the committee did “not officers were trained in TASER use and the his- encourage the use of a TASER on someone who tory of this training, merely verbally refuses to comply with a deputy’s order” (Ogden 2005, 38), and n The nature and extent of OCSO use of TASERs to date, and n The committee continued to exist for another year “to monitor its results and recommenda- n Use-of-force reporting-and-review requirements tions and be available to consult with on any and procedures. future initiatives with regards to the TASER.” (Ogden 2005, 39). Additionally, the committee read current medical literature pertaining to the TASER and The sheriff adopted all of the committee’s rec- requested input from local medical professionals. ommendations. In responding to the committee’s These professionals were asked to “independently concern about the use of TASERs against subjects look at the research and render an expert opinion whose verbal resistance did not indicate imminent on the medical aspects of TASER safety issues.” (Ogden 2005, 5). During their own training on how threat, the agency revised its response-to-resistance deputies were trained, several resident members matrix and provided two hours of in-service train- volunteered to be subjected to TASER activation. ing to all officers regarding this change. One member received three activations in order to Captain Dave Ogden, who led the committee, understand the various ways TASERs could be commented on one of the positive results of the deployed. The police-citizen committee held a pub- revised policies for TASER use and the process of lic forum to hear the opinions of other residents of sharing decision-making with stakeholders. In an Orange County. interview in January 2006, he stated, “We had pre- Three pages of recommendations for the viously been in the forefront of negative national sheriff addressed training, documentation, policy, news pertaining to TASER use. Now the coverage is and other issues. These included recommendations much less frequent and sometimes even positive.” that: Sheriff Beary reported, “I am most proud of the fact that a committee of 12 came together to n The general public receive education about the carefully and objectively examine the facts. They TASER and the OCSO’s use of it, held public meetings, documented data concerning n Initial training be expanded from four hours to these devices, and several members volunteered to eight hours, be activated themselves so they could fully understand the ramifications of the use of this tool. They Deputies not be required in training to be subject n provided my agency with the basis for the develop- to TASER activation, ment of an ECW [electronic control weapon, also n Data be collected on incidents where the pres- known as a conducted energy device] policy that is ence of the TASER appears to produce subject being reviewed and embraced by law enforcement compliance without its activation, agencies across the country.”

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 43 St. Petersburg (FL) Police Department The chief did not want the participants’ infor- St. Petersburg Police Department (SPPD) mation about the safety of the weapon to come Chief Chuck Harmon implemented a streamlined solely from a person representing TASER Interna- version of the Orange County involvement of tional. Instead, he arranged for three local medical citizens in developing force policy. Chief Harmon professionals to speak to this important issue. This had paid close attention to the debate swirling presentation included the medical examiner for the around TASERs and, only after much research and county, the medical director of the county’s emer- discussion, decided to deploy 400 TASERs in 2006 gency medical services, and a trauma surgeon. A in St. Petersburg. Groups of personnel had advised sergeant in the training unit described how the the chief on strategies for TASER deployment and SPPD would deploy TASERs and train personnel in training and had produced a draft policy for the their use. There were opportunities throughout the weapon’s use. Chief Harmon wanted to confer with day for participants to ask questions and make key community stakeholders regarding the circum- comments. stances of TASER use in their community. To that After the participants received this half-day of end, he organized an all-day “EMDW [Electro- education regarding use of force and TASERs, Chief Muscular Disruption Weapon] Committee Meet- Harmon presented them with the draft policy that ing” in October 2005. He invited approximately 20 the department had developed. He walked through St. Petersburg residents to this meeting. The chief the policy with the community stakeholders, answer- ensured that the group represented the broad com- ing questions as they arose and responding to community, but he also targeted stakeholders who ments. A key aspect of the discussion was the use of would likely have the most concern about TASER TASERs on school grounds. Based on these com- deployment, including local leaders in minority ments, the chief agreed to sit down with representa- communities. Included in the group were a home- tives from the school system to obtain additional less coalition advocate, several neighborhood asso- input. The chief agreed to consider the other feed- ciation presidents, the president and CEO of the back received during this discussion prior to finaliz- local Urban League, the deputy superintendent of ing the agency policy. Chief Harmon reports, “At the schools, members of the local youth council, and a end of the day, it was clear the process of involving the mental health professional. stakeholders was just as important as the outcome. Much of the gathering was spent presenting The group validated our proposed policies and information to the participants to facilitate an served as ambassadors in the community.” informed review of the draft policy that they would see towards the end of the day. Following introduc- C ONCLUSION tory remarks by the chief, an officer presented information on the department’s linear use-of- Good policing practices and accountability are force continuum (the Response-to-Resistance essential to developing trust with communities. Matrix) and the nature and extent of the training Agencies must use policy, training, and oversight that department recruits receive on this topic. The mechanisms to ensure, as much as possible, that president of the company that distributes TASER only justifiable and necessary force is used by their International products in Florida introduced the personnel. Agencies, too, must account to their TASER to the group and gave the manufacturer’s communities with regard to their power to use standard marketing presentation touting the bene- force, even deadly force, against them. fits of TASERs. This was followed by a demonstra- A strong majority of agencies in this country tion in which one of the members of the claim to be practicing community policing. Yet department’s command staff experienced TASER according to Smith (1994, 5), “No other police activation. activity has the capacity to place obstacles in the path of community policing like the use of force.”

44 — Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force He notes that “we ask police to take on a difficult educate citizens about pertinent police practices task when we expect them to convince wary com- and tactics (this would be extremely important, for munities to take the right hand of police partner- example, when jointly selecting the type of ammu- ship while the left hand holds a nightstick that may nition that officers will carry). The message from be used against them at any given moment.” But Seattle is that not a single program but, instead, agencies around the nation are taking on this diffi- multiple initiatives can go furthest in building up cult task and are doing so with great reward. trust with communities generally and with minor- I have reviewed in this chapter the more tra- ity communities in particular. ditional accountability mechanisms and presented We can be heartened that policing in this promising practices from around the nation. These country and relationships between police and com- initiatives have provided education to citizens, munities have come a long way since the turbulent facilitated police-community dialogue, reduced 1960s. Police initiatives to build trust—generally tensions following critical incidents, and brought and around issues of force—must continue. These shared decision-making by police and residents. sustained efforts will pay off in peaceful communi- For shared decision-making endeavors, it is impor- ties working together to address crime and improve tant for a law enforcement agency to properly the quality of life.

Chapter 2. Building Community Trust Around Issues of Force — 45

3 Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness

by MELISSA REULAND

ach day across the United States, police 1986 publication, “Managing Persons with Mental Eofficers respond to incidents involving someone Disabilities,”which PERF updated in 1997 (Murphy who is behaving erratically, irrationally, and per- 1986; PERF 1997). Since that time, PERF has haps dangerously. The person may be under the worked collaboratively with the Council of State influence of drugs or alcohol, may have a mental ill- Governments (CSG) on the “Criminal Justice/Men- ness, or may be experiencing a combination of tal Health Consensus Project,” which released its these or other factors. In some cases, the situation report in 2002. Most recently, in 2004 and 2005, will be calmed by law enforcement’s presence; in PERF produced two guides on implementing and other cases, the person’s behavior may escalate and enhancing police-based diversion programs for invoke an officer’s use of force. In the latter case, people with mental illness, through grants from the community and family reaction can be outrage and Technical Assistance and Policy Analysis (TAPA) sorrow, and involved officers can be deeply affected Center (Reuland 2004; Reuland and Cheney 2005). as well. These incidents often prompt demands that Currently, PERF and the Council of State Govern- the police department “do something” so that peo- ments are collaborating on a U.S. Department of ple who are disabled (by their addiction, their men- Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)-funded tal illness, or both) can be helped—not project to promote awareness of specialized law harmed—during police encounters. enforcement responses to people with mental ill- The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) ness. Deliverables from this project, called the BJA began to focus on policing and people with mental Law Enforcement/Mental Health Partnership Pro- illness almost 20 years ago with Gerard Murphy’s gram, will include an Essential Elements Policy

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 47 Brief, a Training Toolkit (including guidelines for changed since Bittner’s study, particularly the rea- developing training and content modules), a sons for police encounters with people with mental national program database, and a Statewide Law illness and officers’ disposition options. For exam- Enforcement Initiatives Policy Brief.1 ple, the emergence of larger numbers of people This chapter will draw on PERF’s previous with severe mental illness on city streets, and in pri- work, relevant current research, and agency experi- vate and group homes, is associated by many with ences shared at PERF’s 2005 Critical Issues in Polic- their release from state institutions in the 1970s. ing Forum in San Diego to describe the This “deinstitutionalization” began in characteristics of those difficult encounters, why response to several factors, including a federal court they occur, and the intersection of use of force and case that ruled that mental institutions were failing this population. The chapter will detail practices to provide for a Constitutionally guaranteed right law enforcement agencies can adopt to improve to treatment (Perez, Leifman, and Estrada 2003; safety and to provide appropriate assistance for Teplin 1984; Patch and Arrigo 1999). These agen- these citizens. cies were primarily warehousing people with mental illness, too often in inhumane circumstances (Perez et al. 2003). At the same time, psychotropic THE NATURE OF POLICE medications were beginning to show promise in ENCOUNTERS WITH PEOPLE managing the symptoms of mental illness, and WITH MENTAL ILLNESS2 community mental health centers were being cre- “Officers complain that taking someone to ated (Perez et al. 2003; Lamberti 2004). Conse- the psychiatric service of the hospital is a quently, the outcome of the federal court case was tedious, cumbersome and uncertain to order the release of individuals for whom com- procedure. They must often wait a long munity-based treatment would be appropriate. time… and are occasionally obliged to This situation left the states to assume the responsi- answer questions… that appear to place bility for creating a comprehensive community their own judgments in doubt.” treatment base with the funds available from clos- (BITTNER 1967, 281). ing the mental institutions (Perez et al. 2003). Although this quote comes from a 1967 article Although some communities did generate this care reporting on seminal research on police discretion continuum (Finn and Sullivan 1987), many areas regarding emergency detention of people with did not use funds to create community-based care, mental illness in the community, it could just as and stringent involuntary commitment criteria easily have come from a study done today. In were instituted to restrict access to the now-smaller Bittner’s field observations study, officers brought number of mental health institutions (Lamberti, 1,600 people to the hospital for emergency evalua- 2004; Lamb and Weinberger 1998; Abram and tion in one year (which equaled the total arrests for Teplin 1991; Wachholz and Mullaly 1993; Perkins, murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, grand theft, Cordner, and Scarborough 1999; Teplin 2000; Vick- and aggravated assault), but they handled the ers 2000). This landscape change created situations majority of their encounters with this population that continue to challenge community services in the field informally, often providing what Bittner agencies. DeCuir and Lamb (1996) wrote, “From termed “psychiatric first aid” (1967). While today’s law enforcement’s perspective, if the system were situation is similar in some ways, much has working as planned, the alleys and bus stations

1. See http://consensusproject.org/projects/law-enforcement for project information and updates. 2. This chapter uses the term “people with mental illness,” which respects the wishes of people with disabilities.

48 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness would not be filled with homeless mentally ill a month on these calls (DeCuir and Lamb 1996), people…and state jails would not be holding thou- and analysis of data from 60 mental health calls sands of psychotic misdemeanants.” received by a suburban Colorado police department revealed the average amount of time spent on these “Our experience is that police come into contact with three types of mentally ill calls was 74 minutes (Pogrebin 1986–87). The people: the homeless, 70 to 80 percent of amount of time it takes officers to deal with these whom have a substance abuse problem; encounters is disproportionate to the percentage of a mentally ill person who is acting out cases they handle and can frustrate officers under in public (because of failed medication pressure to respond to radio calls. Dispositions typ- regimen); and lastly, a category that doesn’t ically available to officers include informal resolu- get much attention, the housed mentally ill, tion at the scene (occurring the majority of the people who are living with aging parents or time) and transport to a mental health facility for siblings who are watching after them. These evaluation or arrest (Teplin 2000; Lamb, Wein- people will call the police because they have berger, and DeCuir 2002). In Teplin’s observational been assaulted by their own children. These study, data revealed that officers generally arrested families are attempting to deal with a people exhibiting signs of mental disturbance problem with limited resources and means, because the person fit into a “gray area”—the person and the only number they have to call is 911.” was not sick enough for admission to the mental —PASADENA (CA) CHIEF BERNARD MELEKIAN facility but was too sick to be left unsupervised (Teplin 1984). As a consequence of the limited alter- The frequency of law enforcement encounters natives for people in this “gray area,” the largest with people who are mentally ill today is undeni- mental institutions in the United States today are able.3 Despite the lack of national statistics, several actually jails—the Cook County Jail in Chicago, law enforcement agencies have individually tracked Riker’s Island in New York City, and the Los Angeles this trend. For example, according to the late James County Jail (http://consensusproject.org/info Fyfe, former director of training in the New York center/factsheets/fact_jails). On a national level, the City Police Department, the NYPD responds to a prevalence rate of severe mental disorder in jails is call involving a person with mental illness once 16 percent (Ditton 1999), and is nearly 9 percent for every 6.5 minutes. In one year, law enforcement offi- male detainees entering jail (Teplin 2000) and from cers in Florida transported persons with mental ill- 12.2 percent to 18 percent for female detainees ness for involuntary examination (Baker Acts) more (Teplin 2000; National GAINS Center 2001). than 40,000 times, which exceeds the number of arrests in the state for aggravated assault or burglary “Law enforcement officers are always the first (McGaha and Stiles 2001). Recent data also support responders in these situations because of a earlier estimates that encounters with people with lack of information and insufficient mental mental illness comprise approximately 3 to 7 per- health facilities; officers end up running cent of an agency’s call load (Deane et al. 1999; Ruiz people with mental illness through the and Miller 2004). These calls can also require that criminal justice system.” —SAN DIEGO (CA) officers spend a considerable amount of time man- EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT CHIEF BILL MAHEU aging the scene and/or attempting to effect a mental health evaluation. The Los Angeles Police Depart- The next section reviews existing literature on ment reports spending approximately 28,000 hours the intersection of police use of force in situations

3. This discussion focuses on people with mental illness who are the subject of the call to police. This discussion does not address situations where the person with mental illness is a victim of a crime, which also are frequent. For more information on victims with mental illness, see Hiday et al. 1999 and www.consensusproject.org.

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 49 involving people with mental illness. Unfortu- Man Says Police Killed His Son nately, as many communities know firsthand, situ- ‘In Cold Blood’ ations involving people with mental illness that – KSAT, SAN ANTONIO (TX) 2/27/06 result in injuries and deaths can galvanize community criticism of the police as few other circum- Media reports, such as those above taken from stances can. The literature reviewed below aims to recent U.S. media outlets, and advocacy literature provide a foundation for the emerging proactive may have fueled a public perception that police use models of police response that can reduce these force frequently in situations involving people with kinds of critical incidents. mental illness and that these situations result in injury and death (of either the officer or the person with mental illness) more often than in other cases. POLICE USE OF FORCE AND For example, a well-cited statistic released by the PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS Treatment Advocacy Center (TAC) is that people Whenever police agencies seek to revise policies with mental illness are killed by police at a rate four and procedures, they first look to understand the times greater than the general population (2005). nature and extent of the problem they are facing. These rates are misleading, however, because they For example, in this case, policy makers will likely were derived using national population estimates want to know how often police use force in situa- for the denominator. To accurately develop rates tions involving people with mental illness—and that would indicate whether police use force more with what outcomes—and why officers may use frequently in situations involving people with men- force in these situations. To understand why police tal illness than in situations involving emotionally officers use force in certain circumstances, healthy people, however, the denominators would researchers have examined the influence of two need to reflect the number of people with mental general factors: suspect characteristics (such as illness, and those without, who came into contact social standing and on-scene behavior) and officer with the police nationwide. Unfortunately, these characteristics (such as attitudes and past experi- figures are not known, nor is it known whether they ence) (Terrill and Mastrofski 2002). would serve to support or refute the commonly This section begins by reviewing the literature held beliefs. According to Lt. Paul Geggie of the Los on frequency of use of force in incidents involving people with mental illness and incidence of injuries Angeles Police Department, the LAPD has collected and death. The section then reviews relevant litera- information about the number of injuries and ture to identify the relationship between use of deaths to those involved in mental illness-related force and both suspect characteristics, such as vio- incidents. In this department, over a three-year lent or dangerous behavior, and officer attitudes period, 13 people with mental illness died during a about these encounters. police encounter—an average of just over four people per year. The author estimated that the Los Angeles Police Department responded to approxi- How frequently do police use force during mately 68,000 calls for service in 2003 involving encounters with the mentally ill? someone with mental illness. This frequency results Police Kill Bronx Man After He Stabs in a rate of 5.9 per 100,000 calls involving people Family Members with mental illness. Still, these estimates apply to – THE NEW YORK TIMES, Los Angeles specifically and cannot be extrapolated NEW YORK CITY 2/14/06 to the general public. A more reliable way to estimate use of force Man Dies After Trading Gunfire with Police involving people with mental illness is to conduct – THE REGISTER-GUARD, EUGENE (OR) 2/18/06 prospective studies of police behavior. Two such

50 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness research projects looked closely at the issue of differentiate between the different causes of impair- whether “mental impairment” is associated with use ment. Given that almost 25 percent of people with of force. In 2002, Terrill and Mastrofski analyzed mental illness also use substances (Epstein et al. data collected as part of the Project on Policing 2004), and nearly three-quarters of people with Neighborhoods (POPN). This study used field mental illness in jails and prisons have a substance- observations of more than 3,000 citizen-police use disorder (Abram and Teplin 1991), the likeli- encounters, and recorded information on a range of hood that police will encounter someone with use-of-force actions, including categories for “verbal co-occurring impairments is high. Policies and pro- commands and threats,” “restraint techniques,” and cedures addressed later in the chapter will need to “striking methods” (Terrill and Mastrofski 2002, account for this situation, particularly in light of 225). Field observers also recorded suspect charac- the findings presented next. teristics, such as attitude, demographics, and mental impairment, defined here as “the inability to perceive How often does the violent or dangerous situations as a reasonable person would or to control behavior of a person with mental illness one’s emotions and actions” (Terrill and Mastrofski result in police involvement? 2002, 233). Heightened emotional states (fear and anger) were coded elsewhere. Only 3 percent of the Several recent large-scale studies of the relationship police-citizen encounters were coded as involving a between mental illness and violence have shown lit- suspect with a mental impairment, and this variable tle association between severe mental illness and was not significantly related to use of force. violence (Angermeyer, Cooper, and Link 1998). The Unlike the study reviewed above, much of the relationship becomes robust when the person has a literature on the use of force and “impairments” has co-occurring substance-use disorder and is not tak- tended to collapse mental impairment with drug ing his or her medication (Steadman et al. 1998; and alcohol impairments. Because this work has Swartz, Swanson, and Burns 1998). Studies reveal been inconclusive, Kaminski and colleagues sur- that much of the violence is committed against veyed officers on their use of force to better under- caretakers and family members who call the police stand the independent contributions of the when they can no longer manage the ill person differing sorts of impairment (Kaminski, Digio- (Finn and Stalans 2002; Solomon, Cavanaugh, and vanni, and Downs 2004). The definition of mental Gelles 2005), but this violence is similar to domes- impairment is based on the “officer’s perception of tic violence perpetrated by people who are not whether the subject was mentally ill” (314). In the mentally ill (Steadman et al. 1998). series of 2,227 arrests occurring over seven months, The critical policy question for law enforce- officers categorized 2.4 percent of their arrests as ment is how often violent or dangerous behavior involving someone with mental illness. The data results in calls to the police. In an analysis of inter- showed that as a group, impaired people were sig- views with people who had been involuntarily com- nificantly more “threatening” to officers and mitted, Borum showed that recent violent behavior “required more effort to arrest” (319), but were not was indeed a significant predictor of police involve- more likely to injure officers. The data revealed no ment, as was the combination of medication non- significant relationship between use of force and compliance and substance abuse (Borum et al. either alcohol impairment or mental illness alone; 1998). Further, in another study, in approximately the significant relationship between impairment 30 percent of cases where violence involved family and use of force was due to drug use. members of the person with mental illness, the It may be difficult to extrapolate from these family member had called the police for help findings to policy and practice, however, because (Solomon, Cavanaugh, and Gelles 2005). for an officer in the field, it can be very difficult to

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 51 What are officer attitudes about dangerousness reflect community sentiments that any deaths of of encounters with people with mental illness people with mental illness at the hands of police are and do they relate to their use of force? unacceptable. To reduce as much as possible the In the decades after the creation of the “dangerous need for force against this population, agencies need to self or others” criteria for involuntary commit- to prepare officers to respond to situations involving ment, research has shown an increase in the num- people with mental illness that may be potentially ber of people who believe people with mental dangerous or violent, in ways that enhance every- illness are dangerous (Phelan and Link 1998). Offi- one’s safety. cers, like the citizenry they reflect, may also believe How can law enforcement agencies enhance that people with mental illness are dangerous, but safety and reduce use of force during encounters their perceptions may derive in part from respond- with people with mental illness? Since the seminal ing to calls for service where the person’s violent work of Egon Bittner in 1967, agencies have devel- behavior is at issue (Borum et al. 1998; Finn and oped two approaches to improve safety—specialized Stalans 2002; Solomon, Cavanaugh, and Gelles proactive approaches that reduce the likelihood that 2005). Two studies of police attitudes support this police encounters with someone with mental illness supposition. In the first, a survey of law enforce- will escalate into a crisis, and enhanced critical- ment agencies in Pennsylvania, Ruiz found that incident responses (to situations involving barri- 43.8 percent of the law enforcement agency respon- caded or suicidal suspects) that focus on less-lethal dents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: technologies and the on-scene availability of mental “People with mental illness are dangerous” (Ruiz health professionals that reduce the likelihood of and Miller 2004). In another study, which used a injuries or death. Some agencies have adopted both series of vignettes to assess officers’ decision-mak- of these approaches that are designed to deal with ing in situations involving people with mental ill- different types of situations. ness, respondents were significantly likely to view suspects with a “schizophrenic” label as more dan- Specialized Proactive Approaches: Overview gerous than other suspects (Watson, Corrigan, and Ottati 2004). The Watson study hypothesized that Law enforcement agencies across the country have officers who view suspects as potentially dangerous been changing practices to improve their responses would then interact more “aggressively” with those to people with mental illnesses coincident with suspects, perhaps escalating into use of force when deinstitutionalization. Survey data support the they might not otherwise (52). There is, however, growing trends in these types of responses, particu- no evidence that these attitudes are related to larly in large departments. For example, data from greater use of force. In fact, the Terrill and Mastrof- a 1996 survey of 174 U.S. cities with populations of ski analysis revealed that the belief that an 100,000 or more reveal that 78 departments have a encounter was “potentially violent” did not signifi- specialized response for people with mental ill- cantly increase the use of force in that encounter nesses (Deane et al. 1999). A recent conference on (Terrill and Mastrofski 2002). Crisis Intervention Teams,held in Columbus, Ohio, in May 2005, demonstrated the widespread adoption of these models in the last 10 years; more than APPROACHES THAT ENHANCE 700 attendees from across the United States SAFETY IN POLICE ENCOUNTERS attended the conference to share their experiences WITH PEOPLE WITH MENTAL and learn from others. Deane’s 1996 national sur- ILLNESS vey identified three types of strategies that involve While the research provides no indication that particularly important partnerships with the men- police use force more frequently in incidents involv- tal health community that are still in use today. The ing people with mental illness, media headlines first strategy, termed “police-based specialized

52 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness police response,” uses officers who have received the United States have built on the work of earlier special mental health training to provide crisis innovators to develop these specialized police intervention services and to act as liaisons to the responses to people with mental illness. PERF staff mental health system. Six of the 174 departments interviewed almost 30 agencies on two occasions to surveyed used this method. Deane and her col- learn how core program elements—such as special- leagues refer to the second strategy as “police-based ized training and partnership with mental health specialized mental health response.” Under this professionals—affect the police response from the strategy, police departments hire mental health initial point of contact through disposition (Reu- consultants to provide on-site and telephone con- land 2004; Reuland and Cheney 2005). Agency offi- sultations to officers (20 agencies). The third strat- cials described why approaches had been put into egy was referred to as the “mental-health-based practice, how law enforcement agencies initiated specialized mental health response” and included and implemented their approaches, and how agen- programs that relied solely on mobile crisis teams cies overcame challenges. This research showed that (52 of the surveyed agencies). agencies were continuing to develop the two police- The Criminal Justice Mental Health Consen- based approach styles identified by Deane and her sus Project was funded by public and private organ- colleagues (1999), now typically referred to as the izations in the late 1990s with the aim of translating Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) response, where a these strategies into a compendium of policy rec- cadre of specially trained officers responds to calls ommendations that would improve system involving people with mental illness (such as the responses to this population. (See www.consensus- program within the Memphis Police Department), project.org for detailed information about the proj- and the Co-Responder model, where certain law ect, its funding, and the project report.) A enforcement officers pair with mental health pro- multidisciplinary advisory board—composed of fessionals to offer crisis intervention and referral experts in mental health, advocates, and law services at the scene. These approaches involve sig- enforcement—developed the law enforcement rec- nificant change to police policies and procedures ommendations based on the pioneering work of and require strong partnerships with a wide range several law enforcement agencies (including Mem- of community members. The largest mental illness phis and San Diego County), and on their own advocacy group, the National Alliance on Mental expertise. As the project name implies, this board Illness (NAMI), actively supports and encourages was responsible for reaching consensus on the rec- these specialized approaches, as is evidenced by ommendations before they could be included in the their executive director’s statement on the Decem- report. The Consensus Project Report provides ber 8, 2005, shooting in Miami of a man with bipo- guidance for law enforcement agencies but does not lar disease (see box 3.1). advocate a particular model or approach. Instead, It is critical that each community spend ade- policy recommendations are offered for more than quate time adapting approaches that enhance safety 20 decision-making points along a continuum of to ensure that they are responsive to the nature of circumstances—from an initial failure to receive the problem the community is facing and that they adequate mental health treatment to a release from fit the characteristics of the jurisdiction. For exam- incarceration—where criminal justice and mental ple, factors that may determine which program is health professionals must choose how best to best for the jurisdiction include, among other respond to this population. It is left up to individ- things, the department philosophy, jurisdiction ual jurisdictions to decide where to focus their size, and available community mental health efforts (most likely where they are experiencing a resources. Therefore, CIT programs are better problem) and which model to implement. suited to agencies that support specialized teams Several additional projects have produced more generally, and Co-Responder models work information on how law enforcement agencies in well in communities with strong community-based

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 53 mental health resources. For agencies that follow a community members had raised questions about more generalized approach to policing or have troubling encounters with officers (Reuland and limited mental health resources, variations on these Cheney 2005). Importantly for this discussion, models likely will be more appropriate and will however, in almost half of the agencies PERF sur- encounter less resistance. An article from PERF’s veyed, the programs began because of a tragic inci- 2005 Critical Issues in Policing Forum, about initi- dent involving the death of an officer or a person ating special approaches to people with mental ill- with mental illness. ness, is included in box 3.2. “Since the start of the HOPE team, 120 Specialized approaches typically are adopted people have been helped into long-term in communities where there has been a problem. solutions, 308 have been diverted from jail, For instance, in some agencies studied by PERF, the and 300 are in hospitals. We responded to agency had become aware that encounters with 3,200 incidents, saved 2,400 hours of patrol people with mental illness were increasing and that time. We recently added a night team, which arrests were not solving the problem; and in others, has made a lot of difference. I have committed

STATEMENT: box 3.1 Statement of Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Executive Director, National Alliance on Mental Illness, December 8, 2005: Miami Shooting of Man with Bipolar Disorder

Reprinted by permission The U.S. Surgeon General has reported that: “The overall contribution of mental disorders to NAMI’s heart goes out to the family of Rigoberto the total level of violence in society is exception- Alpizar and to the marshals involved in the shoot- ally small.” Acts of violence are exceptional. When ing, who we know must be profoundly affected by they do occur, it is a sign that something has gone this tragedy. We recognize that air marshals have terribly wrong. very difficult jobs and sometimes have to make It is important to examine all factors that may split-second, life and death decisions. have contributed to the tragedy. Treatment of NAMI calls upon the Federal Air Marshal Ser- mental illnesses is effective. Unfortunately, news vice and all other law enforcement agencies to reports indicate that Mr. Alpizar may not have take a close look at its training and education pro- taken his medication, for whatever reason. tocols and, if currently lacking, adopt measures to Bipolar disorder is a serious brain disorder prepare officers to respond effectively to people that causes extreme shifts in mood, energy, and with severe mental illness. functioning. It affects 2.3 million adult Americans, Law enforcement officers frequently come which is about 1.2 percent of the population, and into contact with people who may be acting errat- can run in families. Bipolar disorder is a chronic ically or irrationally due to severe mental illnesses and generally life-long condition with recurring or other brain disorders, such as Alzheimer’s dis- episodes that often begin in adolescence or early ease. Many communities throughout the United adulthood, and occasionally even in children. States, including Miami, have adopted Crisis Bipolar disorder is characterized by episodes of Intervention Team (CIT) programs to better pre- mania and depression that can last from days to pare officers to respond to these situations. months. It can also lead to psychiatric episodes These programs work and save lives! marked by delusions or hallucinations. n

54 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness 1 percent of department staffing to this effort, providers and people with mental illness, and which is currently being funded by a Local improved awareness of mental illness, have been Law Enforcement Block Grant. Although the critical to fostering better long-term outcomes for grant will be gone next year, I am confident people with mental illness. An article from PERF’s the county will pick up the cost.” 2005 Critical Issues in Policing Forum about gener- —PASADENA (CA) CHIEF BERNARD MELEKIAN alist and specialist approaches in dealing with people with mental illness is included in box 3.3. Program objectives and goals tend to reflect a desire to improve the circumstances that instigated “I got a letter from a family member who program development. For example, police agen- had been very concerned about calling the police; she did not want them to exacerbate cies seek to reduce injuries to police and residents; her son’s situation When she learned about to provide better services to people with mental ill- the CIT in Appleton, she decided to call the nesses; to divert people from jail where appropriate; police and ask for a CIT officer. Her letter to improve officer understanding of mental illness said the officer clearly knew a lot about and crisis response in this population; and to mental illness, was very respectful, and strengthen their relationships with mental health convinced the person to go into treatment.” professionals, people with mental illnesses, and —APPLETON (WI) their families (Reuland and Cheney 2005). CHIEF RICHARD MYERS “CIT-trained officers understand how to deescalate the situation. We have seen Specialized Proactive Approaches: dramatic evidence that this results in Essential Program Elements getting people into treatment safely.” Research conducted to date on these specialized —APPLETON (WI) CHIEF RICHARD MYERS approaches (Deane et al. 1999; Steadman et al. 2000; Council of State Governments 2002; Reuland 2004; Although long-term program outcomes have Thompson, Reuland, and Souweine 2003) has iden- not been fully evaluated or have shown mixed tified several elements that are essential to compre- results (Steadman et al. 2000; Broner et al. 2004), hensive program development. As programs police agencies report that programs have achieved proliferate across the country, it has become ever a great deal in the short-term (Borum et al. 1998; more important to elucidate these elements clearly Cochran, Deane, and Borum 2000; Steadman and and to gain stakeholder agreement about them, so Naples 2005). Many communities report that offi- that policy makers can establish program bench- cers now have greater information and understand- marks and fidelity measures. Program outcomes can ing about mental illness and have built strong, then be assessed and more properly assured. The effective relationships with the community (Reu- new BJA Law Enforcement/Mental Health Partner- land and Cheney 2005). Data also demonstrate that ship Program (see above) will develop and promote specialized responses reduce the frequency of arrest widespread discussion of an Essential Elements Pol- of people with mental illness (Steadman et al. icy Brief, which is intended to delineate these fea- 2000). In addition, some jurisdictions report fewer tures and identify consensus about them. This injuries and SWAT team callouts (Dupont and project is in its early stages, and these elements, dis- Cochran 2000; Reuland and Cheney 2005). A vast cussed below, represent only the first iteration; it is majority of the agencies PERF surveyed noted that expected they will change over time.4 strong partnerships with mental health service

4. The document will be available at www.consensusproject.org.

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 55 ARTICLE: box 3.2 Initiating Specialized Police Approaches to People Who Are Mentally Ill by Melissa Reuland Panelists at PERF’s 2005 Critical Incidents in Policing Forum provided perspectives about how This article is one of three that includes perspectives their departments developed programs and their from two panel presentations and discussions from views about the best way to manage the organiza- PERF’s 2005 Critical Issues in Policing Forum in San tional changes that resulted. Appleton (WI) Chief Diego. The first panel, entitled Police Interaction Richard Myers discussed his department’s with People with Mental Illness—What We Know, emerging philosophy in responding to people contains information from this chapter’s author, who have mental illness and how it relates to the Melissa Reuland; Executive Assistant Chief Bill department’s use of force. Even though the Maheu, San Diego Police Department; and Dr. Lee Appleton department had been using less-lethal Bowlus, San Diego County Psychiatric Hospital. The force options for several years, there were still second panel, entitled Chief’s Response Models to cases in nearby departments when these options People with Mental Illness, contains perspectives resulted in death. One incident in particular made from Chief Richard Myers, Appleton (WI) Police the case for a new approach to incidents involving Department; Chief Bernard Melekian, Pasadena mental illness. In this case, officers from a nearby (CA) Police Department; Chief Theron Bowman, department responded to a mentally ill man Arlington (TX) Police Department; and Chief Dave whom that department had been in contact with Been, Tulsa Police Department. for years. The person had barricaded himself in his home, and officers used numerous impact In the Police Executive Research Forum’s rounds—both beanbag and rubber bullets—to 2002 survey of 28 agencies engaged in police- subdue him. The person went into a coma and based responses to people with mental illness, later died. interviewers asked about circumstances leading The Appleton Police Department began to up to the adoption of the specialized approach focus on its policies to improve their response to (Reuland 2004). Most frequently (in 13 out of 28 people with mental illness, and an officer came for- agencies), an incident involving the use of force ward with the idea to start a Crisis Intervention was the impetus for program development. These Team (CIT) locally. Organizational resistance to tragic incidents involved deaths of people with change can be strong, and the chief in Appleton mental illness as well as deaths of police officers. believes this strain can be eased by identifying a For the remaining 15 agencies, program develop- credible champion for the process. This champion ment stemmed from a recognition that calls should not be the chief, but should be someone involving people with mental illness either were from the line level of the department who has the increasing in number, were involving the same desire and the capacity to “pull the pieces people repeatedly, or were consuming a great together.” That person can then sell the program to deal of time. These situations led agencies to other officers “from the bottom up.” This dimin- work with community partners to seek long-term ishes resistance, because officers cannot disregard solutions. the approach as simply another program “the chief

56 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness got from a conference.” The interested officer Department implemented this program, it justi- became the CIT champion in Appleton. fied the focus on special populations based on Pasadena Police Chief Bernard Melekian the principle that the department has an obliga- began to think about situations involving people tion to help people who are mentally ill. Chief with mental illness as a consequence of a desire Melekian believed that principles such as this to manage Pasadena’s homeless population must be an integral part of the organizational cul- more effectively. The chief believed that home- ture. A chief can address resistance to change by lessness was not a result of failed economic pol- emphasizing how the program fits within the icy. Rather, homelessness is a result of a failed department’s core values: the why they are doing mental health system that releases people who it, not just the what. Although the chief is respon- have only a marginal ability to survive independ- sible for articulating the values, the department ently. Consequently, Pasadena’s initial focus on also needs champions who can echo the chief homelessness soon spread to include mental ill- and operationalize program elements. ness and even drug and alcohol abuse as well. In Tulsa, Chief David Been indicated that the The program in Pasadena also began with the police department’s culture promotes the dignity efforts of an interested patrol officer, who subse- of all people and is ingrained in a large majority of quently worked with the Los Angeles County Men- officers, so the program “wasn’t a hard sell.” In tal Health Department to identify clinicians who fact, the department has three times as many would be willing to pair with officers. Patterned applicants for each training session as they have after the Mental Evaluation Teams (MET) in Los space to accommodate. Chief Theron Bowman Angeles, Pasadena implemented the Homeless from Arlington (TX) agreed with the need for a Outreach and Psychological Evaluation (HOPE) champion but went further, stressing the need team in February 2002. The Homeless Outreach also for a catalyst. He noted that while the cham- and Psychological Evaluation team’s goal is to pions may exist, there must be a catalyst to iden- find alternatives to arrest and to improve long- tify them. Chief Bowman believes that the police term solutions, which can include placing a per- department should not limit itself to internal son into a rehabilitation program, into a hospital champions; he notes that police departments are for treatment, or into a shelter to prepare him/her often motivated by a citizen who comes to them for reentry to society. When the Pasadena Police with an emotional plea to get involved. n

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 57 ARTICLE: box 3.3 Should the Police Approach to People with Mental Illness Be Generalist or Specialist? by Melissa Reuland At the Police Executive Research Forum’s 2005 Critical Incidents in Policing Forum, a con- This article is the second of three that includes per- ference discussion revealed that the distinction spectives from two panel presentations and discus- between specialist and generalist approaches is sions from PERF’s 2005 Critical Issues in Policing in fact becoming blurred as agencies increase the Forum in San Diego. Box 3.2 provides a description baseline level of training all officers receive, while of these panels. at the same time offering advanced training for select teams. This “middle ground” approach When law enforcement agencies begin the acknowledges the realities of geographically large process of adapting specialized response models jurisdictions that cannot expect to have special to people with mental illness in their own jurisdic- teams respond first, while retaining the elements tions, they will need to decide whether to develop of a specialized response. a generalist or a specialist response. For example, Panelists at the conference’s session on the traditional Crisis Intervention Team model is police interaction with people with mental illness essentially a specialist approach, because it relies presented their views on this distinction and how on a cadre of officers who have received training it relates to the approach they chose. Arlington to enable them to respond effectively to situa- (TX) Chief Theron Bowman characterized his tions involving people with mental illness. These organization as embracing a community policing teams are dispatched directly to these incidents. philosophy. One of the issues Arlington police A generalist approach in this context would mean have struggled with generally is whether their that all officers receive specialized training, and community policing approach should be general- all are expected to handle calls involving people ist or specialist. In various contexts, the question with mental illness. has been, “Does everyone have a role, or should The choice of specialist or generalist a specialist group be responsible?” This debate approach is influenced by logistical realities carried over into Arlington’s choice of a response (department size and the size of the area it must to people with mental illness. patrol) as well as philosophical beliefs (whether Chief Bowman eventually chose a generalist all officers or only some are able or willing to approach, and the department prepares all of its respond to calls involving people with mental ill- officers to handle incidents involving mental illness). There are valid differences of opinion ness. This choice is consistent with his depart- among police leaders regarding whether training ment’s community policing philosophy. The chief can overcome individuals’ indifference to or recognizes it is highly likely that every officer will biases related to mental illness. It may not be confront a situation involving a person with men- possible to make all officers sensitive to the strug- tal illness who is in crisis, and he wants each offi- gle of people with mental illness. On the other cer to be prepared to address that situation. hand, it may not be possible to deploy special Further, he feels that there is often no time to dis- teams in geographically large jurisdictions or in patch a special team. especially small departments.

58 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness The choice to take a generalist approach and affected by mental illness. Many of our officers train every officer has resulted in his depart- have seen mental illness in their own families.” ment’s investment of significant organizational San Diego also chose the Co-Responder resources. Arlington, where approximately 5 per- model over a CIT approach because CIT cent of calls for service involve someone who is approaches attempt to train officers to be clini- mentally challenged, is seeing a “high return on cians, but this is “taking them out of the realm that investment,” Chief Bowman said. In 2005, of being police officers,” Executive Assistant Chief the police department transported approximately Maheu indicated. “These CIT teams are training 700 persons to the designated psychiatric unit, officers in de-escalation techniques and in and officers called the Mental Health Law bringing people into custody, but these officers Liaisons 391 times. do not reach the level of clinicians. A department In San Diego, the Co-Responder specialist could, in theory, train officers to the level of a approach was taken because agency leaders clinician, but they still won’t have access to med- believed that while “an agency can train officers to ical files because police lack patient/client privi- de-escalate situations as well as they can train lege.” This access to information is a significant them to do anything else in law enforcement, they benefit of the Co-Responder model because cannot train for the compassion needed to help a officers respond to calls with mental health family in crisis and cannot train for the passion clinicians in the patrol car. The department chose needed for the subject matter.” San Diego has not to pair the officer with the clinician, rather than had difficulty finding officers to volunteer for its have clinicians respond to the scene on their Psychiatric Emergency Response Teams (PERT). own (as mobile crisis teams do), because the Executive Assistant Chief Bill Maheu said, “It is not interaction provides an enhanced education for hard to find volunteers when one in five families is the officer. n

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 59 Element 1: do not possess mental health expertise can feel Collaborative Planning and Administration poorly prepared when confronted with a person The first essential element of these specialized who is acting irrationally. police responses is a strong collaboration between “We have worked to create a Mental Health law enforcement and advocates, consumers,5 med- Liaison Program where mental health ical and mental health professionals, and others who professionals are available 24/7 by phone to have a direct stake in improving conditions of peo- talk to any officer who has a question, or is ple with mental illness in the community. The goal facing a challenging situation. These officers of collaboration is to share the responsibility of need guidance. Last year, 384 officers called responding to this population and improve the the mental health liaison officer and received quality and continuity of services provided. Within advice. This program is particularly the collaborative framework, a committee should be important because when the full work force is involved, we must make sure no one falls constructed that represents all stakeholder parties. through the cracks. Having these services This committee is then responsible for developing available provides a safety net for the officers training, determining on-scene policies and proce- in the field.” dures, evaluating progress, and creating innovative —ARLINGTON (TX) solutions to seemingly intransigent problems. CHIEF THERON BOWMAN Participants in the collaborative committee should include those who have the ability to make Element 3: operational decisions on behalf of their agencies Unique Officer Role and are well respected in the community. Partici- These specialized approaches require police pants should share an understanding of the nature officers to fill a crisis management role that is quite of the problem in the community that has distinct from crisis management in other situa- prompted the need for the specialized program. tions. For example, officers generally are trained to While partnership success can be a function of display their authority to gain control over a situa- strong interpersonal relationships at the executive tion. In situations involving people with mental ill- level, this foundation can falter when staffing ness, however, officers must downplay this changes. An antidote to this challenge is the authority—by standing back and speaking softly in involvement of all organizational levels in crafting a non-threatening way—because authoritative dis- the program within the agency from the outset. plays can exacerbate the crisis. Officers who volunteer to become involved in the specialized response Element 2: must be able and ready to switch their tactics On-Scene Mental Health Expertise depending on the assessment they make of the sit- Specialized responses are unique in that they uation. The recruitment and selection process for bring mental health expertise directly to the scene these officers therefore is critical. in one of two ways: through police officers who are ment 4: trained to provide mental health assessments; or Ele Training through mental health experts, either as part of an on-scene response team or by telephone. This ele- Substantial and specially designed training is ment directly addresses one of the frequent difficul- critical to the specialized approach. A wide variety of ties agencies face when police officers must manage agency employees, including call takers, dispatchers, situations involving mental illness—officers who patrol officers, and mental health crisis workers, are

5. The term “consumers” is used in this chapter to refer to people with mental illness who are consumers of mental health services.

60 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness tasked with successfully handling calls involving expertise, and can be costly for communities with people with mental illness. Advanced in-service limited resources. Collaborating with mental health training is necessary, largely because police academy professionals, advocates, and consumer groups can coverage of issues related to mental illness is limited. counteract these challenges (Council of State Gov- A 1999 study of training requirements related to ernments 2002). An article from PERF’s 2005 Crit- mental health issues revealed that the median num- ical Issues in Policing Forum, about police training ber of recruit training hours was six, while the for interaction with people with mental illness, is median number of in-service hours was one (Hails included in box 3.4. and Borum 2003). The training required for specialized responses is extensive, typically 40 hours, and Element 5: includes information about mental illness assess- Call Taker and Dispatcher Protocols ment, co-occurring disorders, crisis de-escalation Call takers and dispatchers are vital to effec- techniques, determining appropriate dispositions, tive resolution of calls involving people with men- legal issues, psychotropic medications, and commu- tal illness, especially in departments with special nity resources. Trainers are often law enforcement response teams. One agency PERF surveyed noted, practitioners, mental health professionals, medical “Call dispatch is critical to the success of a CIT.” professionals, consumers, and family members. The Call takers are responsible for clarifying if a call training audience often includes both law enforce- might involve mental illness, whether the person ment and mental health crisis workers. has a history of mental illness or violence, and the Training methods and techniques that availability of weapons. Although this information enhance interactive learning opportunities are rec- may be difficult to obtain if the caller does not ommended. These can include role-playing, ride- know the person, it is important that call takers ask; alongs, site visits, and simulations of mental illness this information positions responders to protect symptoms. These opportunities invite people with the safety of those involved. mental illness to share their day-to-day experiences Agencies should use the computer-aided dis- with officers who serve them, and can enlighten patch (CAD) or other databases to track calls mental health partners about the realities of law involving mental illness. Tracking data serves two enforcement. Although officers may not typically purposes. First, if a location repeatedly involves rate these techniques as the most effective, as was mental illness or has involved violence in the past, a shown in a study of officers in Massachusetts who flag in the CAD system would alert the responding were not involved in specialized approaches (Ver- officer or team to what may be happening at the mette, Pinals, and Appelbaum 2005), CIT coordi- scene currently. Second, flagging locations helps the nators from around the country agree they are agency identify locations where they are responding critical for this training (Council of State Govern- repeatedly and perhaps not addressing the problem ments, forthcoming). Developing such extensive effectively. Most agencies that track call data do so training can present challenges for agencies imple- with flags or other hazard codes. menting specialized responses, and adaptations “It is important to know who and where may be required. For example, there may be a lack these special-needs people are. If we know of qualified trainers locally, and smaller or rural their locations and choose to flag them in the areas may lack resources either to send officers CAD system, there are important operational to outside training or to pay outside experts. In questions the department must address. addition, although some training topics related to In Arlington, we flag known locations in policing and people with mental illness are univer- dispatch, and if we receive subsequent calls sal, such as psychotropic medications, many other to that location, the dispatcher will tell the topics, such as community resources, must be tai- officer what has happened in the past. We lored to available resources. This takes time and

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 61 ARTICLE: box 3.4 Police Training for Interaction with People with Mental Illness by Melissa Reuland collaborate with community members to determine which training aspects are most critical to This article is the third of three that includes perspec- them and how much time the agency can realisti- tives from two panel presentations and discussions cally devote to the training. Fortunately, many from PERF’s December 2005 Critical Issues in Polic- communities have traveled this road and have ing Forum in San Diego. Box 3.2 describes these tremendous experience to assist others. panels. Panelists and attendees at PERF’s December 2005 conference on use of force discussed their Substantial training is indicated as an essen- experiences in adapting the typical 40-hour train- tial element of a specialized approach to people ing curriculum to their circumstances. For several with mental illness. For many agencies that imple- agencies, the solution has been to “raise the bar” ment Crisis Intervention Teams (CIT), this training for everyone in the department by increasing the typically consists of 40 hours of instruction. As basic training provided in the academy, while at agencies begin thinking about these the same time offering an advanced course for approaches—and adapting them to their own officers who wish to become certified or desig- jurisdictions and department philosophies—one nated as Crisis Intervention Team officers. These of the first questions that comes up is whether the officers go through the same selection process as training needs to be 40 hours in length. permanently assigned CIT officers. Departments need to develop training that For example, in Arlington, Texas, all new offi- will enable officers to safely and effectively resolve cers get 20 hours of training that relates to inter- incidents involving people with mental illness, acting with people with mental illness. In addition, while not stressing agency resources. The amount all officers receive periodic in-service training on of time spent in training is a function of two mental health issues, and interested officers are issues: the depth and breadth of topics covered by urged to complete Texas’s Mental Health Police the training, and the techniques used to impart Officer certification course. This course provides that knowledge. For example, one department 24 hours of instruction about problem-solving, may choose to spend four hours on a classroom domestic violence, and identifying and recogniz- discussion of the major mental illnesses and offi- ing mental health challenges. To date, 85 of Arling- cer identification of relevant signs. Another ton’s 240 patrol officers have been trained in this department may choose to spend less time in mental health course and have become certified classroom discussion and more time conducting Mental Health Police Officers. role plays during which officers can practice de- The coordinator of the specialized program in escalation skills. The second department may end Los Angeles made a similar adaptation to the cur- up using more time to address the same topic, but riculum. To accommodate the large number of it may produce a better result. LAPD officers who require training, the depart- Because no research has determined which ment is developing an online course, including specific topics and techniques present the most approximately 12 two-hour blocks of instruction, effective combination, police departments must which all field personnel—approximately 6,500

62 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness members—will be required to take over the next partner in the training has been sometimes turbu- two years. The purpose of this online course is to lent. One of the advocates who initially began increase the baseline awareness of all first respon- training officers alienated some of them by telling ders to issues related to encounters with the men- negative stories about police encounters with tally ill. Officers who are interested in receiving mentally ill people. The chief eventually convinced more advanced training, and obtaining the Crisis the advocate that a strong working relationship Intervention Team officer certification, will be required that both organizations move beyond selected to participate in an intensive eight-hour negative incidents in the past. Their relationship course at the academy that emphasizes role- has since improved greatly, and the department is playing scenarios. now making its training available to other agen- Ideally, police will work closely with commu- cies across the state. nity stakeholders to adapt the curriculum and The panelists raised another important train- make decisions regarding length of training. This ing issue related to time that can adversely affect team can also identify the community’s needs and community relationships: the extended time it can any overlap with existing training. When Tulsa take to develop curricula and train officers. For Chief David Been began exploring the Crisis Inter- example, in Tulsa, it took close to a year to develop vention Team concept, he obtained a copy of the the curriculum, and the department training is Memphis Police Department’s curriculum and ongoing. The amount of time it takes to train realized that his recruits already received approxi- enough officers for the program—sufficient to mately 36 of the 40 hours Memphis was providing provide adequate patrol shift coverage—is also in its Crisis Intervention Team course. Although affected by the chosen class size. For example, his agency was close to the requirement, he Tulsa determined that the class size for its nonetheless worked with a staff psychologist and advanced training should not exceed 20 officers hostage negotiation team to determine how they and five clinicians. The department has learned could improve their training. The Tulsa Police that teaming the clinicians with officers in small Department eventually created a Mental Health groups has had a great impact on relationships Response Officer Team (MHROT). MHROT offi- and learning. cers receive 40 hours of specialized training, but Both Tulsa and Appleton have had to reassure the training is tailored to Tulsa’s needs. The mis- their community partners about their commit- sion of the Mental Health Response Officer Team ment to the program and ask for their patience as is to assist people with mental illness safely and they “rolled it out” as quickly as possible. with dignity, and to increase positive mental Specialized training for the law enforcement health outcomes. Tulsa’s training minimizes lec- response to mental illness is explored in greater tures and maximizes practicing interventions, detail in a forthcoming Council of State Govern- which helps officers to acquire the needed skills. ments publication (check the www.consensus There has been great interest in taking the Tulsa project.org website for publication updates for the course, both by officers inside the department and Law Enforcement/Mental Health Partnership Pro- from law enforcement agencies around the state. gram) and is addressed in the Criminal In Appleton (WI) where police also based Justice/Mental Health Consensus Project Report training on the Memphis curriculum, a strong and other PERF publications (Council of State partnership with the National Alliance on Mental Governments 2002; Reuland 2004; Reuland and Illness (NAMI) has been critical, but involving the Cheney 2005). n

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 63 also dispatch a minimum of two officers The officer must use information collected at to each of these calls.” the scene to select the appropriate disposition for —ARLINGTON (TX) the person with mental illness. Specialized pro- CHIEF THERON BOWMAN grams such as these are unique because they pro- Training and specific protocols for dispatch vide a wider range of options for officers when the are also critical. When calls are dispatched, the dis- person falls into the “gray area” as described patcher must know who is trained to respond and above—too ill to be left alone and not ill enough to what to do if teams are not available. Also, dispatch- be brought for emergency evaluation. These pro- ers need to be aware that language used on the grams are also notable for their recognition of the radio can be stigmatizing to the individual, a point complexities surrounding involuntary emergency that is of great concern to consumers and their fam- evaluation. This process has been made stringent ilies. Specialized response programs either use 10 for many very good reasons; the involuntary com- codes, plain language that is not stigmatizing but mitment process involves deprivation of freedom still informative, or dispatch the call using the team and loss of vital personal control. Officers in spe- name only (“this is a CIT call”). cialized response programs know how important it is to encourage the person to seek voluntary help Element 6: first before resorting to involuntary commitment. On-Scene Assessment and Disposition On-scene practices typical of these Element 7: approaches enable officers to recognize the signs Connection to Mental Health Services and symptoms of mental illness and to de-escalate Without being able to make connections to crisis behavior. Officers will need to determine if readily available mental health options, programs the behavior that prompted the call to police is a would only come half the way toward improving consequence of the mental illness, and if a serious responses to people with mental illness. Once offi- crime has occurred. To assist in making that deter- cers have determined that mental illness is a factor mination, officers should engage the person, and in a situation and care is required, they must be knowledgeable others, to uncover the person’s his- aware of the full range of mental health services in tory of mental illness and medication use pattern, their community. Those services, including spe- and to identify case managers or others, such as cially designated psychiatric emergency depart- family members or friends, who may be able to ments, must streamline their intake of clients who help. are brought in by police for assessment. Mental health partners involved in the collab- “When an officer realizes that the person doesn’t reach the threshold of danger to oration can provide these linkages to community themselves or others, he or she has a choice services and resources and can negotiate with law either to leave the person or take a problem- enforcement to ensure procedures are “police- solving approach. My department embraces friendly” (Steadman et al. 2001). A variety of mental community policing and problem solving, health resources should be available, such as crisis and we don’t leave these mentally ill people centers, psychiatric emergency rooms, and mobile out of the loop. It is not enough to intervene crisis teams. Transportation can be a major barrier to and then leave when the person is stabilized. services. In these models, police often do provide As others have indicated, if we go once and courtesy transport, as do mental health partners; in leave, we will be back, and the next time, the some areas ambulances or even cabs are used. When- outcome may be worse.” ever possible, agencies should arrange transporta- —ARLINGTON (TX) CHIEF THERON BOWMAN tion using the least restrictive restraints possible to safeguard the dignity of the person who is in crisis.

64 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness Mental health services must be available seven people with mental illness, many agencies require days a week, 24 hours a day, and must maintain a officers to complete a tracking form designed “no refusal” policy for police. For example, as stated specifically for that purpose. These forms typically previously, many people with mental illness have a capture information related to the cause of the dis- co-occurring substance-use disorder. When such a turbance, the behavior of the person with mental person is in crisis, it may be very difficult for offi- illness (including violence and alcohol or drug use), cers—or even mental health professionals—to and the disposition of the incident. know whether observed behavior is due to the alco- Once data have been collected consistently hol or drug use or to an underlying mental illness. and accurately by the police department and other For this reason, arrangements must be made to partners, they can be analyzed both to assess pro- accept all individuals brought in by police who gram processes (how quickly officers are making it appear to be under the influence of substances. to the scene, how many people with mental illness have been seen by program partners) and program Element 8: outcomes (how many people who are referred to Engagement in Treatment and Supports the mental health services actually become engaged The mental health treatment options identi- in services). These types of analysis usually present fied for disposition of police-referred cases must data in the aggregate—no names are attached to the provide long-term care. Further, these resources reports, and individual privacy is respected. Part- must include a variety of supports as well as serv- ners can then communicate about problems that ices. Services typically include counseling and med- arise and develop solutions to manage them with- ication and even temporary housing. Supports out infringing on individual rights to privacy. include drop-in centers, clubhouses, and other However, some cases may require individual places where people with mental illness can find attention, as the program may find it is not achiev- help with employment and companionship. ing long-term solutions for certain people. These individuals may require individualized follow-up Element 9: contacts and planning. For this type of evaluation, Data Management and Evaluation strict adherence to confidentiality requirements When an agency or community decides to (see below) is necessary. embark on a specialized response, program evaluation issues must be considered at the outset so that Element 10: baseline data may be collected against which future Confidentiality processes and outcomes can be compared. Evalua- Information about a person’s mental illness, tion requires that communities set measurable like all medical information, is private. During the goals and objectives and be able to track their course of managing encounters with people with progress with objective data collection. As any mental illness, however, law enforcement officers information collected about people with mental ill- may become aware of personal mental health infor- ness can negatively impact their case processing, mation, either through the person, knowledgeable information collected should document only others, or the mental health partner (particularly if observable behaviors, rather than diagnoses. the situation constitutes an emergency). While men- Law enforcement agencies typically face chal- tal health professionals have access to mental health lenges in collecting data about patrol situations records, state and federal confidentiality laws limit that do not involve a crime. Although some agen- the information available to police responders. As cies have officers complete forms for non-criminal part of program planning, the partners must review incidents, agencies primarily collect information these laws and agency procedures, and must develop regarding criminal activity. As a way to assemble protocols to help overcome traditional barriers to information on specialized police responses to information sharing without invading the privacy

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 65 of the individual, violating the ethics of providers, “The TASER™ has proven to be extraordinarily or endangering public safety. Information shared effective in limiting violent confrontations. with law enforcement should be limited to what is In the last eight months, four people would relevant to the incident and should be shared appro- have been shot if the officer had not had the priately. Protocols must be developed to ensure that TASER.” —PASADENA (CA) this information does not enter a person’s arrest CHIEF BERNARD MELEKIAN record and is not used to jeopardize a person’s rights in criminal proceedings. For those encounters that occur very quickly, many departments have focused on training officers to use less-lethal force, such as beanbags and con- Enhanced Critical-Incident Responses ducted energy devices (CEDs), to subdue suspects with mental illness. In fact, a recent study of less- “The HOPE [Homeless Outreach Psychiatric lethal force methods used in “suicide-by-cop” inci- Evaluation] team cannot end all police- involved shootings. We recently had a tragic dents revealed these methods to be associated with shooting of a mentally ill person on the front better outcomes in these situations. This study lawn of a mental health facility. The subject reviewed 73 incidents of “suicide by cop” where the attacked the officer with scissors and the immediate deployment of lethal force was not obvi- officer retreated 150 feet in an attempt not to ously required (Homant and Kennedy 2000). The shoot him. The officer did end up killing the researchers compared outcomes of several types of person in front of his parents. It turned out police responses to suicide-by-cop incidents: less- the son was eight days away from giving his than-lethal (LTL) instrumental force, LTL physical mother one of his kidneys so she could force, and negotiation. Here, LTL instrumental force survive kidney failure. Although the HOPE included CEDs, batons, non-lethal bullets, and team was the second unit to arrive, the some form of gas or spray. The LTL physical force situation had already escalated.” generally meant the officer attempted to “over- —PASADENA (CA) CHIEF BERNARD MELEKIAN power” the suspect. Analysis of the data revealed that outcomes for the LTL options—both instru- The specialized proactive approaches described mental and physical—were associated with compar- above are designed to link people who have mental atively fewer suspect deaths (Homant and Kennedy illness with an effective treatment so that they will 2000). The authors caution strongly that their data no longer experience serious crises that require do not demonstrate a causal relationship between police intervention. These approaches are appro- LTL force and improved outcomes; they stress that priate for most situations in which police encounter additional research must be done to provide clarity a person with mental illness, but some situations on the exact nature of the relationship between will require enhancements of critical-incident these variables. Additional research on pepper spray responses. Although rare, people with mental ill- has suggested that this form of LTL force may not be ness can be involved in two types of critical inci- as effective in subduing a person with mental illness dents—those involving a weapon, which can unfold or someone who is under the influence of drugs very quickly, and those involving barricaded, often suicidal suspects, which can take a long time to (Edwards, Granfield, and Onnen 1997). resolve. Agencies must therefore contemplate two “In March, an officer went to a bar to distinct response strategies for these different event address a person who was not in control. He types. The discussion below is informed both by the saw the mental illness signs and realized this research literature and by experiences of agency was not just another out-of-control drunk. representatives who attended PERF’s 2005 Critical The officer deployed his TASER and was Issues in Policing Forum. concerned about health implications of the TASER round and took the person to the

66 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness emergency room. In this case, the CIT and in the specialized training. In Tulsa, hostage negoti- TASER training came together to have a ation and SWAT members are part of Mental Health good outcome.” Response Officer training. Here the Mental Health —APPLETON (WI) Response Officer coordinates issues until SWAT and CHIEF RICHARD MYERS police negotiators arrive. Once the SWAT or specialized teams arrive, they coordinate with the Mental In situations involving barricaded, suicidal Health Response Officer to ensure that commanders suspects who may or may not have hostages, the make informed decisions about entry. question becomes, “How do agencies coordinate the The Consensus Project report recommends roles of specialized teams—like those described that agencies “ensure that specially trained mental health professionals are available to respond to above—with SWAT and hostage negotiators to min- scenes involving barricaded or suicidal suspects” imize use of force?” In these situations, reasonable (Council of State Governments 2002). These pro- people will likely disagree about what is needed to fessionals should have expertise in crisis negotia- manage the negotiation. It is likely that SWAT mem- tion and familiarity with police operations, and bers will have one idea about how to proceed, while they may help understand the motivation for the the mental health team has another, such as a situa- incident, which is critical to defusing the situation. tion where SWAT wants to initiate force to resolve In the Tulsa Police Department, trained psycholo- the incident and mental health team members do gists respond to all critical incidents to provide this not. Tulsa Police Chief Dave Been noted this debate kind of support. In Los Angeles, the police depart- can be a healthy sign, because it means that a range ment has full-time SWAT and crisis negotiators, of options is being discussed. Chief Been said, “If two of whom are trained psychologists, who oper- you are not doing that, you may be missing a critical ate under specific protocols. In Los Angeles, the question. I like it that we don’t have one-size-fits-all special teams are often among the first to arrive at anymore. We need to look at the different variables; the scene of a barricaded suspect. Initially, these we should be uncomfortable and they should strug- teams were turned away, but SWAT now calls the gle.” In Pasadena and other cities, tactical incident teams in to support data-gathering. The Los Ange- commanders are in charge of decision-making at les Police Department Systemwide Mental Assess- the scene of a critical incident. Pasadena Police Chief ment Response Team (SMART) members can talk Bernard Melekian noted that the incident comman- to family members, who are a great resource, and der’s role is to synthesize the available information gather intelligence. Lieutenant Rick Wall of the Los and make the determination about when force will Angeles Police Department noted: “We bring out a be used. If the critical incident involves a person community substation and sit down with family with mental illness and the specialized Homeless and counselors and keep them apprised. Recently a Outreach Psychiatric Evaluation (HOPE) Team is barricaded subject called his uncle who was with us on duty, incident command stays with the com- in the substation. Eventually he agreed to speak mander, but the understanding is that the HOPE with the negotiator and surrender.” Team will work to resolve the incident. Chief Melekian noted, “If the person with mental illness is on the front porch holding someone hostage, the C ONCLUSION ideal is to take time to allow the incident to unfold, and the primary focus is on Homeless Outreach “We further propose that this work, which Psychiatric Evaluation Team officers.” has been called ‘keeping the peace’ in differentiation from ‘enforcing the law,’ One way to promote coordination among consists of occupational routines with SWAT and other specialized response teams is to in- particular procedures, skills, standards and clude SWAT team members and hostage negotiators

Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness — 67 information, in short, of craft, that meets Thankfully, the proactive, preventive certain tacit public expectations.” approaches and reactive, crisis approaches (BITTNER 1967, 292). described here position law enforcement agencies Bittner’s description of the police response to peo- not only to ensure the safety of people with mental ple with mental illness reflects both the need and illness, but also to have tremendous influence on the legitimacy of this role for police, as it was then their well-being. By engaging community partners, and as it is today. His comment is also aimed at including consumers and their family members, those who fear officers will not consider this “real” service providers and law enforcement agencies police work. The preceding discussion demon- have vastly improved their shared abilities to estab- strates that this work is indeed “craft” and that it lish critical linkages between people in crisis and 6 represents at least one fundamental aspect of police treatment. work—that of maintaining community safety.

6. For those concerned about the availability of mental health treatment services to meet these needs, state legislatures and state referenda are beginning to supply funding streams. For example, in 2004, California voters passed Resolution 63, which became known as the Mental Health Service Act (MHSA), which “imposed a 1-percent income tax on personal income in excess of $1 million.” This act is expected to generate revenue in the hundreds of millions of dollars in years to fund county mental health services and prevention efforts. (http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/MHSA/default.asp). The federal government is also supporting these activities. In recognition of the promise of specialized criminal justice approaches, the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act (S. 1194) was approved by Congress and signed into law by the President in October 2004. If appropriated at the recommended level, this law would authorize $50 million in federal grants to promote criminal justice and mental health agency collaboration at the state and local level to improve responses to people with mental illness who come to the attention of the criminal justice system. Grants can be used to develop pre- and post-booking interventions (including crisis intervention teams and law enforcement training), as well as other diversion programs in court and correctional settings (www.consensusproject.org). This law will allow more communities to attempt these types of specialized approaches. As these communities innovate and explore these programs, continual adaptation will occur. This situation presents a unique opportunity to conduct more rigorous evaluation of these approaches to determine which elements have the most impact on the stated goals—perhaps most importantly, the goal of improving the health and well-being of people with mental illness.

68 — Chapter 3. Police Use of Force and People with Mental Illness

4 Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making

by STEVE IJAMES and JOSHUA EDERHEIMER

dvancements in less-lethal weaponry and A logical approach involves using terms that Aforce decision-making have enabled police officers to describe the technology itself, (e.g., impact rounds, better resolve dangerous situations and reduce rates conducted energy devices, pepper spray, etc.) as of incident death and serious injury. Less-lethal opposed to what the technology was designed to do. weaponry can help resolve challenging situations For example, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of and confrontations safely and effectively. But the Appeals, in the 2001 case Deorle v. Rutherford (263 devices have also played a role in deaths and critical F. 3d 1106), stated that the term beanbag is “a injuries. This chapter shares the history of various euphemism that grossly underrates the dangerous- less-lethal technologies, examines the latest trends in ness of the projectile, that is not some sort of less-lethal weapon development, and discusses how hackey-sack; it is a projectile capable of inflicting officer decision-making influences force outcomes. serious injury or death, rather than some child’s toy.”This description is a characterization of one of the most commonly used less-lethal weapons today WHAT’ S IN A NAME? and was written after the court had concluded that Referring to a particular device as less lethal or the projectile had caused serious injury. non-lethal does not necessarily make it so. The Law enforcement leaders today should be labels are attached innocently enough, but they aware that nomenclature influences the perception can generate unrealistic expectations—both among of a weapon—by the public and officers alike. the public and among police officers—concerning Product names also influence perception, as termi- the potential for death and serious injury outcomes. nology such as “disruptor,”“shocker,”and “Xtreme”

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 71 can sensationalize a weapon and confuse the public. In American history, the aftermath of the coal As noted above, it would be prudent for police lead- field massacres in the early 1900s precipitated the ers to refer to weapons in simple terminology that move towards police use of force that is less likely to describes the technology it uses. result in death or serious injury. In Ludlow, Colo., and Matawan, W.Va., security guards used armored cars, machine guns, and dynamite against rioting HISTORICAL OVERVIEW union-member coal miners and their families (Uni- The Supreme Court has used the term force less versity of Denver, n.d.) This use of force by the secu- than deadly (Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 104 rity guards resulted in numerous deaths. The tragic L.Ed. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989)) to describe events led to a call for safer and more humane ways weapons designed to exert the will of one over to handle such situations. The U.S. military another without causing death or serious injury. responded in 1923 by sharing “non-lethal” crowd Accordingly, tools designed to incapacitate and control agents with civilian chemical companies in immobilize—as opposed to kill—have been docu- hope that they would be sold to civilian police and mented numerous times in conflicts during the security forces who would use them to control mobs course of human history (Thorp 1991). The Spar- without having to resort to deadly force. tans are credited with using the first area- deploy- Since that time, American law enforcement ment chemical munitions in 428 B.C. They burned has sought additional methods, tools, tactics, and piles of wood saturated with tar, pitch, and sulfur techniques to assist in overcoming resistance put upwind of their enemies, creating a tearing smoke forth by violent and non-compliant individuals in a that drove enemies from their positions of cover. safer manner. The initial focus was on tear gas In feudal Japan between 750 and 1800 A.D., (Chloroacetophenone-CN) grenades, used liberally those tasked with order maintenance used a wide to disperse crowds such as those that gathered dur- variety of tools to assist with safely subduing vio- ing the labor unrest situations noted earlier. The lent persons. These included metsubushi (meaning technique proved relatively safe and effective, espe- “to crush the eyes”), consisting of powdered red cially when compared to the deadly force that had pepper thrown into eyes to temporarily or perma- previously been more commonplace, and was wel- nently blind, and torimono sandogu (meaning comed by police and civilian observers alike. The “three tools of arresting”), consisting of an immo- public order successes led progressive police man- bilizing, U-shaped, long pole arm. Authorities agers to look for ways to use the new technology in employed such devices to subdue armed suspects more general police situations. This resulted in the (Cunningham 2004). development of tear gas launchers that were con- During the Civil War siege of Charleston, cealed inside ink pens and police batons. Officers Confederate forces burned wood and sulfur to cre- carried the portable devices and used them to sub- ate choking smoke to drive out Union troops. In due violent and resisting subjects. The launchers Singapore during the 1880s, police fired sections of used .38 caliber and 12-gauge blank cartridges to broom handles from black powder shotguns during propel CN particles towards a subject’s face. The riots. These rounds delivered baton-like energy high-velocity chemical impact earned a reputation from greater than hand-to-hand combat range, for effectively stopping even a determined adver- which allowed officers to suppress rioting crowds sary (Schmidt 1938). However, miniature CN gas without risking physical assault. In 1912, Paris projectiles sometimes caused permanent and dis- police were the first to use tear gas. They deployed a figuring eye injuries, which led agencies to discon- chemical agent, ethylbromacetate, designed to tinue their use (Levine and Stahl 1968). attack the tear ducts. They used it to force roving During the 1960s, the FBI Uniform Crime gangs of violent youths out of the center-city Reports and local newspaper headlines suggested business areas. that violent crime in America was on the rise.

72 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making CN “tear gas” pen guns and other hand-held chemical munitions Photo courtesy of Steve Ijames

and it could project a stream onto the face of a violent subject from approximately 10 feet away. This was intended to be a safer alternative than hands-on “baton- focused” tactics, and it gave officers immediate access to a device that allowed them to engage combative subjects from greater than contact range. Safe and generally Consequently, “law and order” and “crime in the effective, CN “Mace”was used by thousands of police streets” themes became key election issues during officers between 1965 and 1984. It eventually became the 1964 presidential campaign. President Lyndon less popular for two main reasons: Johnson, in an address to Congress in 1965, called 1. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the product for the establishment of a blue-ribbon panel to failed to stop a significant number of people who probe “fully and deeply into the problems of crime were sprayed—especially those who were intoxi- in our nation” (O’Bryant and Seghetti 2002). Presi- cated, under the influence of mind-altering sub- dent Johnson’s request led to the creation of the stances, or suffering from certain types of mental Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra- illness. Formal studies were not conducted to tion of Justice. The group, headed by Attorney Gen- determine the actual track record of the product, eral Nicholas Katzenbach, comprised a wide variety and rumors of poor performance continued to of experts who investigated virtually every aspect of spread. crime, law enforcement, and the administration of justice in the United States. In its report, The Chal- 2. The product earned a reputation for secondary lenge of Crime in a Free Society, the committee rec- contamination, and it was practically impossible ommended that the federal government provide for officers to work in an area—or effectively more financial assistance to state and local agencies handle suspects—once the agent had been for law enforcement purposes, and called for the deployed. More than one booking room was development of “non-lethal” weapons for police “cleared out” after a prisoner was sprayed, and officers in the field. This was the catalyst for a num- officers who used the product in the field often ber of innovative technological advancements and contaminated themselves or bystanders. led to the development of some of the most significant “less-lethal” force options in use by law Chemical Mace offered much to American enforcement today (O’Bryant and Seghetti 2002). law enforcement, in the context that it promoted a “less-intrusive” method to handling a subject than the use of “hands-on” force. It helped set the tone CN-Based Chemical Mace™ for how police could safely handle future con- In 1965, a belt-mounted CN gas-based chemical frontations. Although Chemical Mace would even- aerosol spray was introduced to American law tually disappear from police inventories, it was enforcement. The product was a five-by-one-inch around long enough for officers to grow accus- inch metal canister with an actuator/spray button on tomed to a personal chemical incapacitation tool. top. It contained approximately four ounces of They learned the inherent value of extending the 1-percent CN dissolved in a petroleum-based carrier, “reactionary gap” between officers and suspects and

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 73 using this distance to reduce injuries on both sides. or medical intervention required. The FBI study Next came Oleoresin Capsicum (pepper) sprays, strongly endorsed the use of O.C.-based sprays and which are now universally accepted by American in 1988 issued Cap-Stun to all of its field agents law enforcement. (Weaver and Jett, n.d.). In 1990, several major chemical-agent manufacturers began producing O.C.-based sprays, and Oleoresin Capsicum (O.C.) Spray within three years most police departments in In the early 1920s, the Army Chemical Research America were using it. In the years that followed, a Unit at the U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal extracted number of deaths occurred proximate to the use of the essential oil from the cayenne pepper plant and O.C. spray. Advocacy groups protested the use of produced a chemical that would later become the product and alleged that O.C. spray was killing known as oleoresin capsicum (U.S. Army 1997). those against whom it was used. Subsequent Human-effects testing revealed that the product reviews indicated that O.C. spray was generally safe was very effective on individuals but did not pro- and effective, and the benefits of its use greatly out- duce the secondary-drift contamination1 necessary weighed the potential concerns (IACP 1995). Oleo- for large-area battlefield deployment. The second- resin capsicum sprays have been in regular-duty use ary-drift finding would ultimately prove advanta- now for nearly two decades. They have been evalu- geous for law enforcement (Thorp 1991). ated in a number of studies and found to be effec- Oleoresin capsicum spray was developed in tive at incapacitating resistant subjects in 1960 at the University of Georgia by Professor approximately 81 percent of the cases (Edwards, James H. Jenkins and Dr. Frank Hayes to serve as an Granfield, and Onnen 1997). O.C. spray filled a effective repellent for attacking dogs. Their prod- void in the police use-of-force decision-making uct, Halt Animal Repellent™, was first sold com- process, adding a viable option between verbal dia- mercially in 1963 to the U.S. Postal Service. It logue and the baton during incidents in which offi- continues to be used by the Postal Service and is an cers have grounds to arrest or detain a person, and effective spray repellent that protects mail carriers the person indicates by action, word, or deed that from dog attacks (Lee Enterprises n.d.). physical violence will be used to resist arrest. In In 1970, complaints from police officers con- addition, O.C. spray is cost-effective, easy to use and cerning the effectiveness of CN-based Chemical deploy, and statistically unlikely to cause serious Mace led a Columbus, Ohio, entrepreneur to injury or death (IACP 2006). Because of these develop an O.C. spray/flashlight combination advantages, O.C. spray can now be found on nearly device called the Nebulizer. The idea of using O.C. every police duty belt in America and is considered spray as opposed to CN gas developed from suc- by many to be a significant incapacitation and cessful deployments that postal employees docu- injury-reduction tool in law enforcement (Jane’s mented following their use of the spray against Information Group, 2000). dogs. In 1987, the FBI Firearms Training Unit completed a study of O.C.-based sprays. The 18-month test exposed 899 persons to O.C. products; expo- Impact Projectiles sure included face/eye spray, direct skin contact, The use of extended-range impact energy is not and inhalation. The tests involved volunteers in a new. From Biblical times to the present, those who controlled environment as well as suspects in oper- have studied the dynamics of human physical con- ational contact with 39 police agencies and three flict have recognized the inherent safety that comes correctional institutions. The study revealed almost with distance. This is especially true when a person universal success (incapacitation), with no injuries is facing an adversary who has a weapon that

1. The movement of spray droplets outside a target site at the time of application.

74 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making 12-gauge shotgun bean-bag munition Photo courtesy of Steve Ijames

in which extended-range impact capability would prove beneficial were ever-increasing. Many police agencies already had 12-gauge shotguns, and bean- requires close contact to be effective (for instance, a bag rounds that worked in those guns were viewed knife). Police agencies understand this and have as a cost-effective alternative to the higher-priced taken advantage of the extended-range impact ARWEN projectiles. The new rounds were similar to technology developed and improved upon since previous ones, but their velocity was reduced 25 President Johnson’s law enforcement commission percent to 300 feet per second. Between 1989 and called for “non-lethal” weapons in 1967. 1997, less-lethal became the popular terminology in In the late 1960s, some police agencies on the American policing, and agencies clamored for tech- West Coast of the United States used 12-gauge and nology and equipment thought to be less likely to 37mm lead shot-filled “beanbags” to quell violent cause death or serious injury than conventional Vietnam War protests. These flexible projectiles police weapons. Manufacturers responded to this consisted of lead pellets sewn into sturdy cloth bags demand by providing almost 100 different types of and varied in weight from 40 to 150 grams. They impact rounds, ranging from single oak projectiles were designed to deliver “baton-like” impact energy to those containing hundreds of pieces of plastic without penetration and to deter violent and bird shot. riotous behavior such as rock throwing, assaults, This rapid influx of technology and procure- and property damage. The rounds were thought to ment outpaced objective evaluation of the various be “non-lethal,” but in 1971 police in New Mexico rounds and progressive training. The number of reported that a teenager died after being hit in the operational deployments dramatically increased, as chest with a beanbag round. This unexpected death did the number of deaths and serious injuries led many agencies to abandon impact-round tech- (Ijames 2001). Often, many of the negative out- nology. These weapons did not reappear in sub- comes occurred because officers did not under- stantial numbers until the late 1980s. In 1985, the stand how to prevent them, or they used rounds British ARWEN 37 (Anti-Riot-Weapon-Enfield) that were so inaccurate they couldn’t keep them baton launcher was imported to the United States from striking vulnerable areas—such as the eyes. As and procured by a number of police agencies. The a result, agencies began to improve training to pro- 37mm device had a rifled barrel for accuracy, a five- mote safe and effective use of impact technology, round capacity, and fired a 77.5-gram PVC projec- and sought to procure accurate single-round tile at 240 feet per second. This weapon, which deployment systems. The training initially came delivered 160 foot-pounds of impact energy, was intended to be used primarily when facing armed, mentally ill, and/or suicidal subjects. Many law enforcement agencies in the United States used the ARWEN 37 and found that it was an effective way to deal with some of law enforcement’s most challenging situations. In 1989, beanbag-type munitions began creeping back into ARWEN 37 baton launcher the American police arsenal. Situations Photo courtesy of Steve Ijames

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 75 COMMENTARY: box 4.1 High-Risk Entries and Less-Lethal Weapons

by David A. Klinger to use verbal tactics, or they may visually explore the area inside the opening (often with mirrors, Experienced police officers who engage in high- fiber optics, or video system) and then enter when risk entries are aware that there are three basic they believe it is safe to do so. The entry itself is sorts of high-risk entries in police work: dynamic made at a much slower pace than in the case of a entries for hostage rescue and to serve search war- dynamic entry, and officers then move slowly and rants for evidence; deliberate entries, which are cautiously through the location as they look for the generally undertaken to seek out hidden subjects; subject(s). and crisis entries, which are generally done to stop an imminent threat inside a location. Each of Crisis Entries these general sorts of entries is associated with a Crisis entries can occur in two distinct sorts of sit- specific pace of gaining entry into a location and uations: first, when officers on the scene of a fast- with specific tactics to secure the scene and make evolving threat believe they must enter using it safe once officers are inside. rapid deployment tactics to protect an innocent person from an immediately life-threatening situ- Dynamic Entries ation (e.g., an active shooter event); and second, With dynamic entries, officers attempt to use sur- when the commander on the scene of an prise, speed, domination, and prioritization to extended situation such as a hostage incident gain control of a location and occupants. Officers determines that the most prudent thing to do to breach a preselected entry point—usually a door, protect innocent life is to send officers (usually sometimes a window—as quickly as possible. members of a SWAT team) inside. In a rapid Officers usually employ mechanical tools, such as deployment scenario, a small number of officers metal rams, quickly enter the location, and then will come together, quickly determine assign- move swiftly through the site in an attempt to ments (e.g., point, rear guard, and so on), and secure subjects and evidence before subjects can then enter the location where the subject is situ- arm themselves, destroy evidence, or both. ated. Officers will then move as a team through the location until they confront the subject and Deliberate Entries take whatever action is necessary to immediately Deliberate entries are completely different. They stop the life-threatening behavior of the subject. normally occur as part of an extended police In crisis entries during extended situations, action (e.g., a barricaded-subject incident involv- officers who make entry are preassigned by the ing a SWAT team mobilization) in which the object tactical commander as an entry team, and are of police interest is normally aware that the police pre-positioned near a breach point and will gener- are outside the location. Deliberate entries happen ally make entry in one of two distinct sorts of cir- when the on-scene commander determines that cumstances. In the first scenario, a commander the tactical situation justifies the risk of having directs officers to enter immediately if a specific officers go inside. The first order of business is to event occurs that threatens innocent life. For determine the optimal entry point(s)—which example, a tactical commander may direct an could be a door, a window, or even a portion of a entry team to immediately enter a location and wall. The point is then breached with whatever attempt to rescue hostages if they hear gunfire tools are appropriate (a ram, explosives, etc.). The inside. The second type of scenario is a fully pre- officers may stay outside for some period of time planned entry in which a team enters only when (typically called a “breach and hold”) and attempt the commander gives the order to do so because

76 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making he or she has determined that doing so at that One option is to assign a small number of specific time is appropriate to protect innocent officers—even a single officer—to carry a less- life. Whatever the circumstances are that lead to lethal device as their primary weapon while other the initiation of a preplanned crisis entry, once officers on the entry team are armed with lethal inside, officers will move as rapidly as possible to firearms. With this approach, the officers carrying locate the subject and take whatever action is nec- less-lethal weapons will take a subordinate posi- essary to protect innocent people. tion as the team moves through the location, There are many variations on the three gen- remaining far enough behind officers carrying eral sorts of high-risk entries mentioned in this lethal weapons to permit those officers to quickly article. Different situations call for different tac- deal with any lethal threats that might present tics, and different operational philosophies will themselves—yet close enough to the lead ele- lead different groups of officers to make entry and ments that they can quickly be brought to bear on move through locations in varying ways. The a situation where their less-lethal weapon would objective of all high-risk entries is to permit offi- be appropriate. Many trainers recommend that in cers to carry out hazardous duties in the safest dynamic clearing operations, officers carrying a fashion possible. less-lethal device as their primary weapon remain near the entry point as a means to ensure their Use of Less-Lethal Weapons safety from lethal threats that may arise. A varia- In recent years, may law enforcement agencies tion on this theme is to have some officer carry have incorporated various less-lethal weapons less-lethal devices as a secondary weapon. Offi- (e.g., conducted energy devices and impact muni- cers so equipped then take subordinate positions tions) into their entry protocols as a means to on the entry team with their lethal weapons in increase their officers’ ability to effectively—and hand, but remain ready to transition to their non- safely—handle whatever level of resistance they lethal weapon if circumstances warrant it. might encounter inside a location. When officers A wholly different approach that some agen- make entry with only lethal weapons, their options cies have adopted is to integrate less-lethal are limited when they confront noncompliant sub- weapons into the primary firearm that officers jects whose level of resistance does not justify carry on entries. This controversial tactic is accom- deadly force. Officers must use verbal tactics and plished by mounting either a conducted energy hope the individual eventually complies, or go weapon or a single-shot 37/40mm launcher to the “hands-on” and use physical tactics to control the underside of the barrel of officers’ shoulder individual. Each of these options presents prob- weapons. When officers need to discharge a less- lems to officers during an entry scenario. Officers lethal weapon so mounted, they move their often cannot afford to stand fast and give repeated weak/support hand into a firing posture and pull verbal orders during the uncertain—and fre- the trigger. With this approach, each officer carry- quently quite dangerous—circumstances they ing the combined weapons system has both lethal confront during entries. Similarly, it is often tacti- and less-lethal force options—obviating the need cally untenable for officers to close in and to phys- to call upon another entry team member should ically take a subject down. the need arise to deliver less-lethal force from a Less-lethal weapons can help bridge the gap distance. There are great concerns with this method- in force/resistance options that occurs when offi- ology, notably the unintentional use of deadly force. cers face circumstances where deadly force is not In sum, whichever methodology a team uses appropriate, and it would be unsound to either to incorporate less-lethal weapons into its entry give repeated verbal orders to or physically close protocols, these tools help bridge the gap between in on a noncompliant subject. Several options are verbal and hands-on tactics and thus can enhance available to agencies that want to incorporate less- the capacity of a team to carry out successful lethal weapons into their entry protocols. entries. n

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 77 from sources independent of the manufacturers, to prevent such outcomes by ensuring officers are but it was to the manufacturers that agencies properly trained and equipped. This is especially turned when it came to procuring accurate rounds. true as it relates to where officers aim the weapons. The rifle barrel ARWEN was no longer being imported, so procurement officers approached the Penn Arms company, which responded by develop- Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs) ing the 37mm rifled system that would eventually In response to President Johnson’s blue-ribbon become the SAGE SL6 weapon. This weapon was panel’s call for less-lethal alternatives for police, the ballistically identical to the ARWEN 37, used the industry responded with the development of chem- same ammunition, and offered six accurate shots as ical munitions and impact rounds. Scientist Jack compared to the five shots of its British predecessor. Cover responded by experimenting with electricity. The SL6 was a higher-quality, more accurate sys- He discovered that a short duration-high energy tem, but a vast majority of agencies still used a 12- DC current could be applied to humans via fish- gauge shotgun platform and were not yet inclined hook type probes and fine wire and cause immedi- to switch to the new tool. ate incapacitation of a person with no apparent The traditional square beanbag had signifi- negative side effects. This work eventually led to his cant problems. It was notoriously inaccurate creation of the TASER™ conducted energy device. beyond 30 feet and, as a result, sometimes struck The device has evolved, and the M26 and X26 mod- areas of the body that were not intentionally tar- els now dominate the CED police marketplace. A geted. The square projectile also had a propensity to broader history of the TASER and other CEDs is strike on its edge and sometimes penetrate the skin. available in several publications, including PERF’s Manufacturers responded in 1998 by introducing Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force (Eder- rounder projectiles that were shaped like a small heimer and Fridell 2005). In addition to covering sock. This simple design change transformed bean- the history of CEDs, the book describes promising bag performance and corrected the accuracy, angle practices in conducted energy device policy, policy of presentation, energy density, and related safety enforcement, and training. Further, the latest infor- deficiencies that had plagued this class of weapon mation about CEDs can be found in Chapter 5 of since its inception. The 12-gauge beanbag projectile this book, including PERF’s CED guidelines for of today is the most common impact-delivery sys- consideration and glossary of CED terms. tem in American policing. TASER International reports that CEDs are All of these devices were intended to be used being used by more than 9,500 police agencies in when officers have the need and justification to use the United States and abroad, with more than 2,500 impact energy and are unable to safely approach a agencies issuing them to all patrol officers (TASER possibly dangerous person. This often occurred International n.d.). Anecdotal evidence from the when officers were facing a person who was not field suggests that the effectiveness of the CED may aggressive or overtly assaultive, but who might be possibly exceed that of other law enforcement inca- suicidal, suffering from mental illness, armed in pacitation tools. While CEDs cause muscular dis- some manner, and/or noncompliant. Properly ruption, many other less-lethal weapons (such as trained and equipped officers have successfully used O.C. spray, batons, and impact projectiles) cause impact projectiles to safely assist in the resolution of some degree of pain to gain compliance. However, countless high-risk situations across the United it appears that a large number of people confronted States and abroad. However, the devices have been by police are under the influence of mind-altering associated with some deaths and critical injuries in drugs or alcoholic beverages and/or are suffering the United States and Canada (Ijames 2005). As a from mental illness. These factors can influence a result, special consideration must be given to the person’s tolerance for pain, which correspondingly potential for negative outcomes, as well as the need decreases the effectiveness of pain-compliance

78 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making weapons in those circumstances. The effectiveness combat casualties (U.S. Department of Defense of CEDs in these situations has helped to fuel their n.d.). It is anticipated that the new system will offer increased deployment. precision accuracy and non-lethal effects to a maxi- The CED, however, has also generated a level mum expected effective range of 100 meters. The of public criticism. As of January 2006, it is esti- device will attempt to accomplish this by adding a mated that more than 175 people in the United proximity sensor that determines target range and States and Canada have died following a CED acti- “time to contact” for each projectile fired. This vation (Hall 2006). PERF has conducted research to smart technology would allow the round to “sense” identify practices that might reduce such outcomes how far it is from the target and reduce its energy to (see Chapter 5), but it is important to note that a safe level by increasing surface area and slowing deaths that occur in proximity to police restraint the projectile down prior to impact (Defense are not a new phenomenon. Approximately 200 Update n.d., a). custodial deaths are reported in the United States each year (Hall 2006). In-custody deaths have been linked to numerous factors in the past, including Dual Use Impact/Chemical Systems choke holds, positional asphyxia, excited delirium, Dual-use impact-round systems are available today. pepper spray, and now conducted energy devices. Dual-use, less-lethal weapons consist of both impact There is ongoing research and debate on the topic projectile and chemical incapacitant sprays in a sin- of deaths that occurred in proximity to the use of a gle system. They have varying energy levels, as well conducted energy device. as being able to handle various size payloads of O.C. spray or C.S. gas, and they have accurate marking capabilities (similar to paintball technology). THE FUTURE OF Several manufacturers are developing what LESS- LETHAL WEAPONS they describe as enhanced versions of the dual-use The future of less-lethal weaponry is encourag- impact/chemical projectile systems, characterized ing—especially if we view this issue from a techno- as long-range, discriminating chemical rounds. logical standpoint and in terms of what the Efforts appear primarily geared towards public dis- profession hopes to see in the years ahead. There are order situations. Single targets might be more effec- “high-tech” less-lethal devices that are being devel- tively engaged at longer ranges than with the oped today, and research is under way that is technology currently available—as the targeted intended to further expand the number of less- subject is exposed to impact energy and the instan- lethal weapon options. A review of available litera- taneous effects of a high-tech bursting, encapsu- ture reveals that a significant amount of time, lated round filled with liquid or micropulverized energy, and money is being expended on improving C.S. dust or PAVA-synthetic O.C. spray (Police Sci- and developing technologies for police officers. entific Development Branch n.d.).

Impact Rounds Conducted Energy Devices Law enforcement agencies are likely to see improve- CEDs continue to be updated and modified. New ment in the overall accuracy and effective range of products are now available, with Stinger Systems impact projectiles, with a corresponding reduction reporting near full production of its four-dart in the risks associated with excessive amounts of launcher—a CED that the company claims offers energy being expended on close-range targets. The greater velocity, accuracy, and effective range than Range Variable Non-Lethal Kinetic Energy Munition other devices currently on the market (Stinger presently under development by the U.S. military is Systems n.d.). TASER International now offers a being designed to reduce both noncombatant and video battery pack for its X26 model that provides

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 79 COMMENTARY: box 4.2 A Force Accountability Model of Integrity: A Systems Perspective by Will Johnson and Bryce Kolpack and effective supervision, it is important to objectively evaluate and manage the use-of-force cul- Police use of force is undoubtedly one of the most ture of an agency. important issues facing communities and the The Broward County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office policing profession. Ineffective force policies partnered with the Police Executive Research and/or practices can undermine community Forum (PERF) to develop a Force Accountability policing, reduce agency effectiveness, and Model under the auspices of an initiative spon- increase a jurisdiction’s civil liability. Even a single sored by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office incident of inappropriate use of force can have of Community Oriented Policing Services, enti- far-reaching ramifications for a department and tled Creating a Culture of Integrity. This commen- its community. A lack of organizational trans- tary summarizes the model, the goal of which is parency and ineffective communication regarding to effectively manage organizational culture force can damage public trust—the cornerstone related to the use of force. Key components of the of all successful police activities. In order to more model are set forth in Figure 4.1, which lists the fully understand the cause-and-effect relationship ways that use of force can become a department between the use of force, employee behaviors, liability.

Figure 4.1: When Can the Use of Force Become a Department Liability?

Policy Development n Failure to utilize or recognize complaints of unreasonable alternative resources or tools force or disparity of force used. No department policy is n in lieu of force. issued or policy is unclear, Documentation overly broad, or too narrow. Communication Failure to thoroughly docu- Accepted practice is not in n n Internal failures; departmental ment the use of force and conformance with policy. n executive’s expectations were subsequent use-of-force n Policy is not consistent with not clearly stated. investigations. legal mandates or not rou- External failures; stakeholders Failure to conduct and docu- tinely updated. n n were not informed about ment trend analysis and dis- n Conflicting policies or con- acceptable alternatives, poli- tribute findings to appropriate flicts between training stan- cies or legal mandates. personnel. dards and actual practices. Inability to track complaints Supervision n Training and complaint dispositions. n Failure to identify trends n Insufficient training provided and/or failure to intervene in Oversight/Accountability to employees. a timely manner, i.e., no early n Employee intentional actions n Employee lack of knowledge intervention. of misconduct. or experience. n Failure to provide immediate n Employee act of omission that n Misapplied knowledge or and consistent field supervision. is in conflict with use-of-force tactics. n Failure to hold employees philosophy. accountable for behaviors and to be responsive to

80 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making Law enforcement executives face the chal- The Force Accountability Model can be viewed as lenge of instilling an appropriate use-of-force a process map. Components of the model con- vision throughout an organization, and aligning tain different functions such as tasks, decisions, all aspects of service delivery to support that intermediate results, and review. Since the actual vision. This is a complex task, because police force event represents an organizational transi- organizations are highly compartmentalized. The tion point, it is also represented in the model. The logistics of providing service 24 hours a day dic- legend contained in Figure 4.2 identifies symbols tates that many employees—including key man- used in the model. agement officials—may have limited interaction This model will not automatically influence with members working elsewhere in the organiza- behavior, just as a strong mission or values state- tion. Lack of communication and understanding ment will not necessarily influence employee within a police department can erode positive behaviors. However, it can serve as a tool to organizational culture, especially related to the observe, monitor, and evaluate behaviors. When use of force. reinforced, it can provide the process for police The key to understanding organizational cul- executives and managers to effectively implement ture is the concept of “shared values and goals.” and manage force philosophy. When all the com- Having a clear mission statement and clearly ponents of the model are effectively managed and expressing organizational values is critical, but to coordinated, it can unite the department’s efforts develop consistent behavior or performance, the at every level, bridge informational silos, and pro- philosophy should be embraced by all members duce an environment where “shared values” can of the department. When positive behaviors are thrive and promote positive behavior. The Force in concert with the values of the department, the Accountability Model is circular in design to department has a culture with integrity. stress the interdependence of each component Every law enforcement agency has an organi- on the others (see Figure 4.3). zational culture regarding the use of force. Although culture is an intangible concept, the Policy Development results of a police use of force are readily observ- The first component of the model is the adoption able to the community. A positive force philoso- of sound use-of-force policies (Ederheimer and phy emphasizes restraint and the use of force Fridell 2005). Policy is the written expression of the only when necessary. Agencies whose leaders philosophy of any organization. It is necessary for have effectively communicated such a philosophy agencies to enact strong policies that thoroughly will likely have fewer misapplications of force than convey organizational expectations and scope of agencies that have low expectations or do not authority and define reasonable actions. Police communicate a positive force philosophy effec- administrators should not be hesitant to develop tively. A positive force culture can reduce the comprehensive, strong, and definitive policies and potential for unnecessary or excessive force and procedures; they should not be fearful that these can optimize community relations. strong policies will prove prejudicial to a future A comprehensive Force Accountability court assessment of an officer’s conduct. Model—developed from a systems perspective— Organizations that choose to gain accredita- is helpful in understanding how to improve an tion from the Commission on Accreditation for agency’s use-of-force culture. The Force Account- Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) have already ability Model discussed in this essay addresses demonstrated their desire to develop comprehen- several key components of a successful account- sive policies. However, in the creation of a culture ability model and can serve as a foundation to of integrity, it is necessary to view these CALEA sustain a culture of integrity. Components of the standards as a foundation on which to build. The model include policy development, hiring, train- authority to use force is periodically refined by ing, supervision, and review and accountability. >> continued on page 82

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 81 >> box 4.2 continued

Figure 4.2

FORCE INTERMEDIATE TASK DECISION REVIEW EVENT RESULT

Figure 4.3: Force Accountability Model

Termination

DEPARTMENT CULTURE

Discipline Review Early & Intervention Accountability

Appropriate Use of Force

Internal Force Field Training Affairs Event Supervision Investigation

Training Applicant Hiring Policy Issue Pool Process Development Policy Failure

DEPARTMENT CULTURE

82 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making regulatory agencies, the legislative process, and Departments should adopt a strategic hiring the judicial system. Departments must ensure plan for finding and employing personnel who that all policies and procedures are continually meet organizational standards as well as the high updated to be consistent with these various expectations of the community. This strategic sources of law. plan should identify the critical values and atti- In some cases, it is necessary for the agency tudes expected from new recruits. It should set to decide if policy will be consistent with or more forth not just the minimum requirements for restrictive than the law requires. Further, the recruits, but also the higher standards that will agency must decide which officer actions, besides allow the agency to achieve a culture of integrity. use of firearms, are to be categorized as deadly Senior executives of the department should force. Less-lethal force should be addressed in convey unambiguous expectations to the hiring policy with the same level of detail as deadly staff regarding the standards for recruits. The hir- force, and uses of it should receive equivalent ing expectations can be incorporated into depart- scrutiny. ment policies and in the recruitment materials Strong and clear language in policy will com- and recruiting activities. The department execu- municate expectations regarding how supervisors tives should provide direct and measured feed- are to manage less-lethal and deadly-force inci- back to hiring staff members on the outcomes of dents. Through policies that promote effective recruitment and hiring practices. There are police field management, the needs of the employee, chiefs from small and medium- sized depart- the community, and the investigation of an inci- ments who personally interview each final appli- dent can all be met. cant. While this is labor-intensive, these chiefs feel the time invested is well spent. Interview pan- Hiring els and assessment centers should use a behav- The goal of the hiring process is to identify and iorally anchored rating scale that incorporates the select individuals who possess the requisite edu- characteristics found in the work of effective cational credentials and life experiences and who police officers. Obviously, agencies should con- display behaviors and character attributes that duct a thorough background investigation of all are compatible with current organizational candidates who successfully complete the initial beliefs. Failure to effectively execute the hiring testing process. function can lead to the selection of employees who will not be able to assimilate into the desired Training culture of the organization. Obviously, successful The training component is a vital part of the Force recruitment and retention of high-quality employ- Accountability Model. In addition to covering ees leads to healthier organizations. communication skills, problem solving, defensive Agencies should focus on hiring individuals tactics, diversity and managerial skills, training who mirror the organization’s critical values. The can and should be used to convey the values of service-oriented traits that have been identified as the department as they pertain to the use of force. being critical for effective policing include Prior to the implementation of use-of-force train- integrity, courage, teamwork, strong communica- ing programs, a careful review and planning tion skills, and highly developed interpersonal process should take place. The planning process skills. Executives should consult with the local should be guided by the mission statement of the community in efforts to hire officers who reflect organization and should include an analysis of positive community values. Local residents, who the actual circumstances in which force is used have an investment in the community and want and the circumstances in which force might be to see the department succeed, can provide use- used unnecessarily or excessively. ful insights into the type of person who best reflects community values. >> continued on page 84

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 83 >> box 4.2 continued With regard to force documentation and Integrated training programs will combine review, the first-line supervisors should not be a the skills pertaining to the various types of use-of- “rubber stamp.” Supervisors must provide a level force, decision-making, and communication of review that will not have to be duplicated at skills. The communication skills will enable other staff positions. Supervisors should also be trainees to defuse and de-escalate potentially vio- required to complete their own reports of their lent situations and resolve them without force or observations and actions at the scene of a use-of- with less force than might otherwise have been force incident. Supervisors’ reports should necessary. A critical component of every segment include their observations of events, persons con- of training in the use of force should be the option tacted, observations of the suspect’s demeanor, of disengaging from the subject. Management suspect injuries or lack thereof, statements training related to the supervision of the use of obtained, and comments about the incident force should also be provided. Finally, agencies and/or investigation. should regularly review training curricula that per- The messages sent by first-line supervisors— tain directly or indirectly to use of force. conveyed in many ways, including how they manage use-of-force incidents—can have a profound Supervision impact on the use-of-force culture of the agency. Field supervision is critical for identifying potential policy failures and misapplications of force Review and Accountability that can damage a healthy culture and place the Effective monitoring of use of force within the organization in a position of increased risk. The Force Accountability Model includes documenta- particular roles of a law enforcement supervisor tion, incident review, and trend analysis. The are twofold. First, during day-to-day work activity, development of a use-of-force reporting form is the supervisor monitors the performance of all critical. This instrument should produce suffi- officers during all types of calls, but particularly cient information to support accountability and during critical-incident calls for service. Secondly, build community confidence. Policy and practice after a use-of-force incident has occurred, the should ensure that the information is timely and supervisor ensures that appropriate documenta- accurate (IACP National Law Enforcement Policy tion and forms are completed, and reviews those Center n.d.). Failure to adhere to reasonably forms and forwards them through the appropri- established reporting deadlines can reduce the ate chain of command. department’s ability to identify emerging trends Regarding day-to-day oversight, the effective and implement corrective measures. Accurate first-line supervisor monitors dispatched calls information will facilitate useful analysis and and officer-initiated activities, and responds to advance the integrity of the review process. the scene of incidents where force might be used. To establish an effective review process, it is During a critical incident, the on-scene supervisor important that clearly defined procedures express monitors the activities of the assigned officers to which use-of-force actions require reporting, to ensure that department policies are followed and whom, and how the information is to be commu- provides needed resources. When supervisors nicated. The primary goal of this process is to observe officer conduct that could be described increase the level of accountability, which, in turn, as tactically incorrect or not in alignment with the can increase public trust. Supervisors should be department’s mission, the supervisor should held accountable for officer actions they approve proactively provide immediate correction or sug- to reduce the likelihood of “rubber stamping” or gestions for change. After the critical incident has passively condoning undesirable behavior. been resolved, the supervisor should provide The unit supervisor and the officers’ chain of informal feedback on the performance of officers. command will review most routine incidents.

84 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making While an administrative review may adequately all use-of-force incidents and evaluate the effec- assess whether a minor incident was conducted tiveness of tactics used to determine if additional within department policy, a more in-depth review training should be developed or existing training may be required for serious use-of-force inci- modified. Finally, agencies should consider dents. Some large-sized law enforcement agen- implementing a Force Review Board as part of the cies have a full-time internal staff—commonly review process. Such boards can serve as a credi- Internal Affairs or Professional Compliance ble, transparent force-management tool. Units—which are responsible for responding to Not only should individual incidents be the scene of use-of-force incidents. Policies reviewed, but also information regarding force should outline the circumstances under which incidents should be aggregated to provide an the unit will respond to incidents, which use-of- overall agency picture of the use of force. A review force thresholds would initiate an investigation, of the total number of use-of-force incidents and the responsibilities of the internal investiga- should be conducted annually, and trends over tive team. Most law enforcement agencies do not time should be evaluated. Publishing a summary have a fully staffed, full-time internal unit review increases public trust and increases com- assigned the responsibility of investigating use- munication with community stakeholders. The of-force incidents. As an alternative, some agen- department should seek routine and frequent cies call upon unit supervisors to comprise a community input, as meaningful community temporary review team. Under most circum- input and interaction with the police are stances, the review team should not impanel absolutely necessary for the creation of a culture members from the same work unit as the officers of integrity. Agencies should actively communi- involved in the incident. Moreover, some smaller cate how citizens can commend or complain agencies have pooled resources—-including about an officer’s behavior. trained personnel—in order to create regional teams to conduct use-of-force investigations. Conclusion Finally, regardless of assignment, agencies’ use- The processes within the components of the of-force review panel members should receive ini- Force Accountability Model are not new. Many tial training in conducting internal use-of-force agencies are already implementing the processes investigations. we describe under the components of policy, hir- Just as positive behavior must be praised, ing, training, supervision, and review and behavior found through the incident investigation accountability. The value of the Force Account- to be inconsistent with agency philosophy or pol- ability Model is that it is a tool that views force icy must be dealt with swiftly and fairly. Failure to from a systems, rather than from a task, perspec- address negative behavior is the same as affirm- tive. It can be difficult to measure success in ing or supporting the behavior. Behavior that is changing organizational culture, and it can be egregious and inconsistent with the philosophy likewise difficult to identify specific responsibili- should lead to severe repercussions. This is a crit- ties for specific individuals when trying to do so. ical point in the Force Accountability Model. Just This is the benefit of a process map like the Force as the act of hiring seeks to identify individuals Accountability Model, which visually depicts each with beliefs consistent with the department’s area of the organization that contributes to the expectations, termination of employment is the use-of-force culture and demonstrates the inter- removal of individuals whose behaviors are dependence of each component and the value of inconsistent with the department’s expectations. each to achieving an overall positive culture. n The incident reports and reviews can also be of value to training personnel. They should review

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 85 digital recording capability. This technology pro- primarily because of police deployment of such duces documentation of the circumstances of an devices during civil rights demonstrations in the officer-subject encounter. 1960s (University of Virginia n.d.). Accordingly, In the near future, hand-held, medium-range many fire departments today have strict policies wireless electronic incapacitation devices will that prohibit using water hoses against human reportedly be available. The L-3 Titan Group has beings as a direct result of such abuses. It would created operational versions of its Sticky Shocker™ likely take a concerted effort to generate under- weapon (L-3 Titan Group n.d.). This device com- standing and support for this technology (Univer- bines 37mm impact energy with a 50,000-volt shock sity of Virginia n.d.). (Defense Update n.d., b), and extends the effective range of electronic incapacitation by sticking a pro- pelled device to a suspect using a barb and an adhe- Laser Light Technology sive projectile tip. TASER International announced Research is being conducted to determine the via- that in 2007, it will produce a wireless CED projec- bility and practicality of using light and laser tech- tile. According to the company, a projectile fired nology to divert and/or distract a subject’s attention from a 12-gauge shotgun (the company calls it the by creating an optical shield that would limit subject Extended Range Electro-Muscular Projectile, or access to a particular area. This type of device XREP) will produce effects similar to an impact would be beneficial in mass demonstration and sit- round combined with a wireless conducted energy uations in which police wish to deny persons access effect. The company claims the device will be effec- to a certain area. However, concern has been raised tive at 30 meters (TASER International 2006). about the potential for eye injury in cases where sufficient energy is focused (either laser or light) to create a desired effect. Historically, laser light sys- Water Cannons tems have been too powerful at close ranges and Hydro technology has been proven safe and effec- ineffective at long ranges. The U.S. Air Force tive in large-scale public disorder situations around Research Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base in the world. Advancements in flow rate, pressure, New Mexico recently announced that it has opera- accuracy, and payload modification—including tional prototypes of the first portable laser-driven pepper-based water—appear likely to enhance its optical deterrent device intended for controlling performance even further. Water cannon delivery crowds and protecting personnel. The device, called systems are expensive but generally recognized as the PHaSR, was created by the laboratory's Directed one of the most efficient methods available for Energy Directorate. It is intended to temporarily managing large, violent, and unruly crowds. The impair adversaries by illuminating or "dazzling" water cannon is able to engage specific individuals them with the beam of super-high-intensity light. at ranges of up to 200 feet—although agencies must The National Institute of Justice recently awarded avoid high-pressure application directly to the face ScorpWorks Corporation a grant to make an or other vital body parts, especially at close range. advanced prototype that will add an eye-safe laser Water cannons have been successfully deployed range finder into the Air Force’s PHaSR device outside the United States for public disorder situa- (Blaylock 2005). tions, and tactics have been updated to address The model that is being pursued by the mili- human rights issues. For example, the Police Ser- tary and others using laser technology is a high-tech vice of Northern Ireland requires that the water manifestation of a tool that law enforcement has temperature used in such devices be regulated to used for years—extremely bright flashlights. Add minimize discomfort. Despite a positive perform- the distracting and disorienting effects of a strobe ance record, there is a significant negative attitude light, and a readily available, effective, non-contact towards water cannon use in the United States— distraction device is created. The Gladius device is

86 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making manufactured by Strategos International (Strategos takeoff in the 125 dB range, and a tactical noise-flash International n.d.) and is an 80+ lumen LED flash- diversionary device in the 175 dB range. The LRAD is light that offers a rapid strobe effect. Preliminary capable of transmitting spoken words as well as a research suggests that the strobe effect offers more shrill high-pitched warning tone similar to a smoke than just distraction but other effects, too, such as detector. It has been effectively deployed in Iraq, in “imbalance, involuntary closing of the eyes, turning Afghanistan, and by some large police departments in of the head, a loss of depth perception, a feeling of the United States for use during mass demonstrations pending physical impact, and an increase in heart and other public disorder situations. and respiration rate due to the psychological stress caused by the mental overload” (Borelli 2004). Malodorants The use of extremely foul-smelling substances is Acoustic Devices not a 21st Century less-lethal breakthrough, but Studies are under way examining the viability of rather an outgrowth of the Office of Strategic Ser- using acoustics as a less-lethal weapon. Acoustic vices and CIA espionage campaigns waged during technology devices—beyond basic noise genera- World War II and in Vietnam (Police Scientific tors—are large, unwieldy, and generally unsuitable Development Branch n.d.). The renewed interest is for most police applications. Nonetheless, various not geared towards clandestine operations, but acoustical devices are being considered for use in towards compelling crowds to leave a particular public-disorder and barricaded-subject situations. area or covertly disrupting illegal public activity. The inner ear regulates spatial orientation; thus, Eco Technologies Corporation patented the odor of saturation by high-intensity sound can cause dis- human feces in 2001. Company officials report, orientation in people. Loud music was used by “The use of obnoxious olfactory stimuli to control American military personnel to help force Manuel or modify human behavior is an attractive concept Noriega from the Vatican Embassy in Panama in for modern urban warfare.” Military psychological 1990. The Curdler, a device that emits a high shriek- studies at the U.S. Military’s Edgewood Arsenal in ing noise at irregular intervals, was used success- Maryland have concluded that malodorants would fully by the British as a means of deterring rioters in generally not be an effective stand-alone option but Northern Ireland. More potent and intrusive would be potentially valuable as a force multiplier devices are also under consideration. In the early when combined with other minimally intrusive 1990s, the Russian government developed a high- tactics (Police Scientific Development Branch n.d.). powered, very-low-frequency (VLF) modulator that was capable of deploying an “acoustic bullet” from a one- to two-meter electronic dish. Tests Active-Denial Devices determined that at low power, the system could Active-denial technology uses electromagnetic cause general physical discomfort, and increasing energy to rapidly heat up an approaching subject’s the power could induce nausea, vomiting, and skin and ultimately deter the subject from advanc- abdominal pains (Globalsecurity.org 2005a). ing on a particular position. Active-denial technol- The Long Range Acoustic Device (or LRAD) is ogy uses a transmitter to send a narrow beam of a crowd-control and deterrent sonic weapon devel- 95-GHz millimeter waves toward a specific subject oped by the American Technology Corporation. The or group. Traveling at the speed of light, the energy device weighs 45 pounds and is generally vehicle- reaches the subject and penetrates less than 1/64 of mounted. It can direct sound in a 15- to 30-degree an inch into the skin, heating it to 130 degrees in beam at up to 151 decibels (dB). By comparison, a less than two seconds. This produces an intense busy office has a sound level in the 65 dB range, heavy burning sensation that stops when the transmitter motor vehicle traffic in the 90 dB range, a jet aircraft is switched off or when the individual backs away

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 87 from the beam. Injury risks are minimal, as some- Officers may attempt to meet these objectives one would need to stay in the beam for approxi- by maintaining a safe distance, keeping passersby mately four minutes before it burned the skin away, and talking the subject into surrendering. In (Globalsecurity.org 2005b). some cases, however, ineffective dialogue may frus- However, one of the challenges of public trate the officers, who in the absence of adequate order management is that those in the front of a training and supervision may feel compelled to take crowd often have no control over those in the back. steps that do not further their objectives. This could Should a group of several thousand people advance involve getting closer to the subject and attempting on a police position equipped with an active-denial to use O.C. spray or a baton in a manner that the system, those in the front of the crowd could be devices were not designed for or intended to be pushed into the beam of electromagnetic energy used. and could be physically unable to retreat once the Officers may endanger themselves by using effects were felt. poor tactics and closing in on an armed and/or dangerous subject and placing themselves in dangerous proximity to them. Organizations should provide FORCE DECISION MAKING - clearly established policies, training, and tactics that Advancements in technology are exciting, and con- reduce inappropriate officer-created jeopardy. Police siderable amounts of time, energy, and money are executives should seek to develop policies and train- being committed to improving the less-lethal ing that foster not only justifiable use of force but weapons that are available. However, the pursuit of justifiable and necessary use of force. technology has focused many in the law enforcement profession on less-lethal weapons but has not emphasized less-lethal outcomes. Some have sug- UNDERSTANDING AND gested that the future of less-lethal successes will be C OMMUNICATING THE ROLE found in use-of-force processes, rather than simply OF LESS- LETHAL WEAPONS use-of-force equipment (IACP n.d.). Many people in the community, as well as some in While there are situations in which police law enforcement, incorrectly view less-lethal officers have an absolute need and obligation to weapons solely as alternatives to deadly force. It is confront subjects, there are also scenarios where important for police management to address this direct confrontation is ill-advised and possibly even issue and clarify that less-lethal weapons are not counterproductive. Sometimes officers create sce- intended to be substitutes for deadly force. When a narios that permit the justifiable use of force, but if police officer faces imminent deadly jeopardy, the officer had handled the situation with different deadly force is an appropriate response. On rare tactics, he could have avoided an escalation of the occasions, an opportunity may present itself where confrontation. Some in the profession describe this deadly force is legally justified, but a less-lethal as “officer-created jeopardy.” option can be deployed safely and appropriately. For example, consider a scenario in which Less-lethal weapons are designed to be used when officers are dispatched to a “check the well-being” force is needed to overcome subject resistance, but call. Upon arrival, they find a person pressing a not in all cases where force likely to cause death or knife against his own throat, telling officers to stay serious physical injury is justified. away. In circumstances such as this, most officers appropriately focus on the following objectives: CONCLUSION Ensure officer and surrounding citizen safety, and n Policing in a democratic society is challenging, and n Prevent the self-destructive behavior and save the no area of this endeavor is more complex or contro- subject’s life. versial than police-citizen interactions involving

88 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making the use of physical force. The profession has heeded the call of President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. There are an increasing number of less-lethal force options available to law enforcement, including chemical sprays, impact projectiles, and CEDs, and more are under development. As indicated by our current situation with CEDs, these developments sometimes bring criticism and challenges. The endeavor, however, is worthwhile, because less- lethal weapons can help our officers on the street resolve violent or potentially violent situations with reduced risk to themselves and the people they face.

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 89 ARTICLE: box 4.3 Implementing Less-Lethal Technology: A Chief’s Perspective by Jessica Toliver and Joshua Ederheimer In February 2001, he deployed CEDs into the field in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Law enforcement executives are constantly seek- Chief Stephens chose to approach the use of ing out strategies to reduce deadly-force inci- CEDs by implementing the technology gradually, dents. Strategies have included reforms to policy, deploying the devices to one police division for a training curricula, tactics, as well as the introduc- trial period of about a year. Prior to deploying tion of new technologies. Since 2000, the advent CEDs, members of the police department met of conducted energy devices (CEDs) has greatly with members of the community to introduce impacted the profession, and many claim that the them to the devices and educate them on the use introduction of these devices into the field has led and effects of this new tool. The department ini- to reductions in police use of deadly force. tially deployed the TASER M-26 models. The com- The panel that was assembled at PERF’s 2005 munity component of the CED rollout lasted Critical Issues in Policing Forum brought together approximately six weeks, and emphasis was police executives who had introduced this new placed on sharing the police department’s technology. Chief James Corwin, Kansas City desired outcome of reduced injuries and deaths (MO) Police Department; Chief Harold Hurtt, to both police officers and suspects. The depart- Houston Police Department; Chief Albert Najera, ment established three seminal guidelines upon Sacramento Police Department; and Chief Darrel implementation: Stephens, Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police 1. The CED was not to be used unless there was a Department, all offered their perspectives on the physical threat to the officer. implementation of TASER™-brand conducted energy devices in their jurisdictions. 2. When a CED was activated on a person, that All of these police leaders felt the obligation person was required to be transported to a to provide their officers with an additional less- medical facility to have the probes removed. lethal alternative. Their experiences in this area 3. A use-of-force investigation was required on were shared at the conference, and their perspec- any deployment of the device. The initial inves- tives can serve to inform police executives about tigation was to be conducted by the officer’s implementation strategies and dealing with criti- supervisor and reviewed by Internal Affairs. cal incidents involving CEDs.

Chief Darrel Stephens, During the initial pilot year, the department Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department found CEDs were not routinely activated, but that their appearance and display by officers provided Darrel Stephens has been chief of the Charlotte- a significant deterrent effect. Due to this success Mecklenburg Police Department since 1999. He and belief that the CED was a useful tool, the was previously the city administrator for the City devices were deployed throughout the depart- of St. Petersburg, Florida, and also served as ment; by January 2004, nearly 600 TASERs were police chief there. He is also the former chief in deployed. The police department publishes a Newport News, Virginia, and Largo, Florida, and detailed report on CED use at the end of each year the former executive director of PERF. Chief to provide information and updates to the com- Stephens also has held leadership positions in munity. Using 2002 as a comparison point, the other agencies and police organizations. In all of following results were highlighted: his endeavors, he has continuously sought ways to reduce incidents of police use of deadly force. n In 2004, there were 122 recorded uses of the CED.

90 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making n While arrest statistics have remained about the recommendations on CED deployment—includ- same, overall police use of force was down 18 ing those issued by the Police Executive Research percent. Forum and the Northern California American Civil Liberties Union. Chief Najera has adopted the n Officer injuries had declined 56 percent. majority of recommendations from these organi- n Suspect injuries fell 80 percent. zations—many of which are congruent—and he believes that this has greatly enhanced his depart- n There were no custodial deaths. ment’s accountability for the use of these devices. Chief Najera believes that these actions have One controversy that did arise in relation to addressed community concerns and that the CEDs was the activation of the device in high Sacramento Police Department is enjoying strong school settings. The department reached out to community support in this area. the community and emphasized the value of the CED in the context of the results noted above. Chief Harold L. Hurtt, Houston Police Department Chief Albert Najera, Sacramento Police Department Harold Hurtt was appointed chief of the Houston Police Department in February 2004. During his Albert Najera became chief of the Sacramento 38 years of law enforcement service, he has Police Department in October 2003, after serving served as chief of police in Oxnard, California, as interim chief for seven months. Chief Najera and Phoenix, Arizona. During his career, Chief has served as a member of the Sacramento Police Hurtt has been a proponent of less-lethal technol- Department for more than 32 years, so he ogy, and he has championed the use of con- brought with him an extensive knowledge of the ducted energy devices. During his tenure in culture of the police department and the commu- Phoenix, the Police Department was the first large nity. Like Chief Stephens, Chief Najera was seek- agency to deploy CEDs to all officers in patrol. ing additional less-lethal alternatives for his Currently, the Houston Police Department department in an effort to reduce deadly-force deploys more CEDs in the field than any other incidents. In addition, he was searching for new police department in the world. strategies to manage mass demonstrations that Upon his arrival at the Houston Police occur in Sacramento, the capital of California. Department, Chief Hurtt discovered that signifi- Chief Najera applied a similar approach in cant community concerns existed about police deploying CEDs in that he kept members of the use-of-force issues. Prior to his appointment, two community informed about the devices and their unarmed teenagers had been killed by police offi- deployment to the field. The chief was prepared cers, causing significant public consternation. for the difficulties and controversies often associ- Therefore, addressing use-of-force issues became ated with the implementation of a new police his first priority to address as chief. Chief Hurtt tool, but he found that the community did not decided to introduce CEDs into the field to reduce react negatively to the introduction of the devices. the likelihood of police deadly-force incidents. He Chief Najera noted that the use of the devices found that, initially, police officers and commu- during a mass-demonstration event—when used nity members alike were skeptical of the devices. properly—can be extremely effective in managing To educate both constituencies, Chief Hurtt insti- crowds and providing a deterrent affect. tuted a working group of police officers, trainers, Chief Najera said that his department later and supervisors to develop training for the use experienced the death of a person in proximity of CEDs. The training that was developed origi- to the activation of a CED and that this event nally consisted of four hours per officer; it now focused community attention on the devices. has been extended to eight hours, and includes As a result, Chief Najera reexamined the department’s CED policies and reviewed various >> continued on page 92

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 91 >> box 4.3 continued a police use-of-force controversy involving a CED. extensive scenario-based training. The chief also An in-car police camera caught on videotape an has filmed a video—his own personal message to incident in which officers stopped a car and officers—outlining his expectations and the repeatedly activated an irate individual with a proper use of CEDs. CED. Chief Corwin felt strongly that in order to Chief Hurtt and the Houston Police Depart- maintain community credibility, he had to ment played an active role in PERF’s efforts to demonstrate that officers would be held account- develop national guidelines for consideration of able for their actions. The officers involved in that CED use. A national summit on CEDs was coincident were eventually removed from the hosted by the Houston Police Department and department. held in Houston in October 2005. Following the The Kansas City Police Department updated development of the PERF guidelines, Chief Hurtt its CED policy in 2005. The department restricts updated his agency’s policies in several areas. CED use against passive persons and permits One change requires that all persons stunned activation only when a person is exhibiting active (activated) by a CED be seen or examined by aggression. Further, the department specifically medical personnel or brought to the jail for treat- prohibits activation of the device in a punitive ment by health care technicians there. manner. In addition, Chief Corwin requires that Chief Hurtt believes that the deployment of a supervisor respond to the scene of all CED CEDs into the field has been successful and that activations. deadly-force incidents have been averted. Specifi- Chief Corwin promotes the department’s cally, at the time of this writing, the Houston Customer Service Task Group that was created to Police Department had identified 48 cases in achieve the goals of the department’s strategic which a CED was used where deadly force would plan and provide excellent customer service. In have been justified. Chief Hurtt is extremely this vein, Chief Corwin emphasized that constant pleased with the success that the police depart- communication with the community and a focus ment has enjoyed in this area. on customer service can improve the public’s perception of the police department—especially fol- Chief James Corwin, lowing a high-profile use-of-force incident. Kansas City (MO) Police Department James Corwin has been a member of the Kansas Conclusion City Police Department for more than 26 years All of the police leaders on the panel felt that it is and was named chief in October 2004. Like Chief imperative to continuously seek out various Najera, Chief Corwin rose through the ranks of strategies to reduce incidents of deadly force. the department and has a deep understanding They all found that CEDs—when used properly of the culture of the police department and the in accordance with sound department policy— community. were excellent force options and contributed to a In 2004, the Kansas City Police Department reduction in deadly-force incidents. The panelists deployed TASER conducted energy devices to all all emphasized that a full understanding of the officers in patrol. Chief Corwin noted that 2004 devices is necessary—both by the public and also saw the fewest police-involved shootings in by police officers. Education and transparent nine years. Some speculate that CEDs affected processes concerning CEDs help to raise aware- this figure. However, shortly after his appoint- ness and protect the police and the people they ment as chief, Corwin was immediately faced with encounter. n

92 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making COMMENTARY: box 4.4 Policing Us More Gently: An Australian Case Study on the Police Use of Force by Christine Nixon and David Bradley have some 11,000 sworn and 2,000 non-sworn members. In common with other Australian There are two ways in which the modern liberal police, the operational officers of the Victoria state can deliberately kill its citizens—execution Police Department are routinely armed—in our following conviction or shooting by police. The case with the .38 Smith and Wesson revolver. Offi- former takes place (in an increasingly rare num- cers are also equipped with handcuffs, batons, ber of places in the developed world) through the and capsicum spray, and are trained in defensive elaborate, ritualized, and methodical official weaponless tactics. The routine general bearing processes of investigation, charge, trial, sentence, of arms by our operational police came only and appeal with their accompanying checks and recently and gradually, during the late 1970s. The balances. The latter typically takes place in brief, police union had pressed for it as a safety issue. largely unpredicted confrontations between citi- Until then, uniformed police could be required zens and police officers. The official, lengthy judg- under particular, predictably dangerous circum- mental phase comes afterwards. stances to bear a Colt or Browning .32 pistol hid- Having insisted that its citizens must not use den beneath the tunic, but at all times were able violence against each other to resolve disputes, to call upon a “crime car” whose occupants were the state has a monopoly in the use of legitimate armed officers. Detectives were routinely armed. coercive force. This monopoly is exercised by the This changed during the 1980s, with all opera- police; indeed, some regard this as the unique tional police trained and required to wear the .38 feature of the public police (Bittner 1980). All model Smith and Wesson revolver. What did this police forces have access to firearms and the mean in terms of fatal police-involved shootings? capability to use them. Some organize this lethal With a growing population (now at about five mil- capacity through specialist backup squads, spe- lion) and a growing police force, and in contrast cial operations groups, tactical operations to some other developed democratic states, squads, tactical response groups, and the like— between 1980 and 2005 police fatal shootings with general-duty officers not routinely armed or generally were sporadic and “small” in number. armed only under particular nonroutine sets of During these 26 years, the police shot dead 48 circumstances. Others, including all U.S. and people, an average annual number of police Australian police, require all operational police to shooting fatalities of just under two. For all but routinely bear firearms as both a general deter- two of those years, the number of police fatal rent against the use of violence by citizens and shootings ranged between zero and three, with also to resolve incidents in which lives—those of no fatalities occurring in seven of the years. How- police and/or others—are put at risk by the ever, two spikes are discernible over these years. threatened or actual violent actions of citizens. In 1988, there were six deaths; and in 1994, nine Which arrangements are a feature of which police deaths. agencies is a product of the particular history and The 1988 aberration did not generate a public traditions of different societies. The British still crisis; however, the 1994 deaths did. This case pride themselves on their generally unarmed dis- study is about the crisis of 1994 and how we as a position, but more and more of their officers are police force reacted to it and what lessons we becoming routinely armed. learned that are still relevant today with regard to The Victoria Police Department is the single the police use of lethal force. public police agency for the state of Victoria, part of the Federal Commonwealth of Australia. We >> continued on page 94

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 93 >> box 4.4 continued Some crises can occur instantaneously. Oth- In Victoria, as with all the other Australian ers creep up. The Victoria Police use-of-force cri- states and territories, the fatal shooting of a citi- sis was of the latter kind. A portent of the crisis zen by a police officer is generally a rare event. was the police-involved shooting deaths of two Such events are taken seriously, of course, both suspects of the Walsh Street police murders, by the police agency concerned and by the inde- which some perceived as a reprisal. Then in the pendent state coroner. The latter will determine first week of 1994, over two successive days, the lawfulness of the death and comment upon police fatally shot two mentally disturbed per- its circumstances and what might be learned sons—one a woman who lunged at responding about police policies and procedures. But as rare police with a knife, the other a man who pulled a events, generally precipitated during a robbery or knife on an officer, who shot and killed him. The by the actions of a violent and mentally disturbed public debate that ensued raised the question of person, police shooting fatalities are publicly why police were treating mentally ill people in the regarded as regrettable but unavoidable, as trau- same way they treated criminals. The debate matic and upsetting for the police involved as started to widen to encompass the actions of the much as for the deceased person’s family and public health authorities. friends. What happened in 1994 in Victoria was The deinstitutionalization of long-term chron- quite different. ically and episodically acute mentally ill people, In 1994, following a recent rate of around two through the closing down of psychiatric hospitals deaths per annum, Victoria Police shot and killed and the return of their inmates to the community, nine citizens. The year before, only one police- was to be welcomed. But, questions arose about involved fatality was recorded, although an whether there was a commensurate shift of increase of 10 police woundings occurred. In con- resources from the closed-down hospitals to ade- trast with the earlier rise in 1988, the media- quate care in the community. A shift had now informed public reaction this time was of occurred in the content and tenor of the public heightened concern. Previously, the general debate about fatal police-involved shootings. At response to the police use of force was that, dur- first, the government, police chief, and police ing times of growing rates of violent crime, the union went on the defensive. But as the shootings police had a difficult and dangerous job to do and increased and the public debate grew more criti- were deserving of strong public support. In 1985, a cal, the police chief felt the need to do something, man shot and wounded five police officers. He and then later so did the police minister. The was later shot and killed by police. In March 1986, police union eventually threatened to sue the gov- a car bomb was detonated outside Police Head- ernment both for its inadequate community sup- quarters, killing a young female constable, wound- port for the mentally ill and for not properly ing 11 other officers, and injuring 22 members of providing resources for police training. the public. In September that year, car thieves shot The acting chief commissioner of police had and killed a constable with his own revolver. In denied that a significant problem existed, but he 1987, two shooting rampages occurred, resulting sought to reassure the public. He instituted a in the deaths of a total of 15 members of the pub- range of independent inquiries into the police lic. In 1988, two officers were assassinated by response to critical incidents and into police armed criminals after being called out at night to training, inquiries that involved participation by examine a car (deliberately) abandoned in the the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and the middle of Walsh Street (Grogan 1998). In this con- Royal Canadian Mounted Police, both perceived text it is understandable that the police began to as “best practice” police agencies (Victoria Police feel vulnerable and that the public would give 1996). In the meantime, public attention had them strong and sympathetic support. But, times been drawn to the contrast between Victoria and circumstances were to change. Police and the police in the neighboring state of

94 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making New South Wales. Why did the smaller Victoria training recognized that this more gentle policy Police kill 28 people between 1986 and 1994 while and set of practices would most certainly take up the larger New South Wales Police killed “only” more resources and require longer time frames, 10? As the debate continued along these lines, but this was considered an acceptable price to three more police fatal shootings occurred in Vic- pay for saving lives. Beacon also abandoned the toria, and now the police minister intervened, not, use of a “continuum of force” model for fear it as before, to offer unqualified support for his could lock police decision-making into an other- police, but to suggest that there must be some wise unnecessary escalation. Instead, police were social or cultural factor unique to Victoria Police trained in the use of a “Tactical Options Model.” that caused the spate of killings. He invited the At its hub were “Communication and Safety” and, Australian Institute of Criminology, located at the around its rim, a range of options including federal capital Canberra, to review the Victoria “Presence,” “Tactical Disengagement,” “Negotia- police shootings. The state coroner then added to tions,” “O.C. spray,” and “Empty Hand Tactics.” the plausibility of the minister’s suggestion of a Underpinning the curriculum was a comprehen- police “cultural” factor in his report on one of the sive “Incident Planning” decision-making model deaths, in which he maintained that in his exami- (Victoria Police 1996). nation of it he detected a police culture of “conse- The year 1996 saw no fatal police shootings in quential confrontation” (Grogan 1998). The Victoria. Project Beacon was announced a suc- acting chief commissioner of police publicly cess and, as it was a special project, it was closed admitted that his force was in crisis. “There is a down. However, its legacy was substantial. Now problem and we are going to fix it,” he wrote in a all operational police are required to undertake letter published in all the main newspapers (Vic- two two-day refresher training sessions in officer toria Police 1996). safety and tactics. In policy terms, officers now The fix took the form of Project Beacon (Vic- have to report all incidents in which they use force toria Police 1996). By March 1995, all operational in encounters with citizens, from push-and-shove police, over 8,500 of them, had undertaken a five- to handcuffing, use of capsicum spray and foam, day training program on how to deal with critical and the drawing as well as discharge of firearms. incidents likely to involve the use of force. When Use of Force forms are faxed to a Use of Force earlier general-duties police had been routinely Register Unit, and the latter now constitutes an equipped with the American-manufactured .38 intelligence databank from which trends, loca- Smith and Wesson revolver, their training had tions, and patterns in the police use of force can been drawn from the United States but, appar- be monitored. Further, these data can be used to ently on grounds of cost, only with regard to the identify officers and teams appearing to be asso- technical safe handing and use of the weapon ciated with higher than might be expected violent (Grogan 1998). The other elements of “best prac- incidents. tice”—planned containment and the use of less- All these are the lessons learned from Beacon, lethal options, such as negotiation—had not and all are now embedded in the way we do police been included. Now they were made part of business here in Victoria and in Australia generally the training. Project Beacon was based on a phi- (Hamdorf et al. 1998). Police fatal shootings losophy of “safety first.” Its 10 principles included appear to have remained rare events, each closely risk assessment, effective command and control, examined in the context of Beacon’s philosophy the conversion of unplanned responses to of safety first and the minimal, reasonable use planned responses, cordon and containment of force. Also now in place is a new Office of where at all possible, avoidance of confrontation, Police Integrity (OPI). Part of the Ombudsman’s tactical withdrawal, avoidance of use of force, and Office—and reporting directly to Parliament— only minimal use of force where it could not be the Office of Police Integrity has the authority to avoided in order to save innocent lives. The >> continued on page 96

Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making — 95 >> box 4.4 continued Carefully, Victoria Police will continue to sus- initiate any inquiry into the actions of the Victoria tain and improve its safety-first philosophy in Police. A recent OPI report on police shootings regard to the use of force. The TASER™ is now an reminds us of the need to maintain an intelli- additional option to be used only by special gence-based monitoring of the police use of force, response units. We have been invited to look at and of the need to sustain the intensity and how we might adopt the Memphis Model of a integrity of continuing police education in officer larger number of additional trained volunteer safety tactics (Office of Police Integrity [OPI] police to serve as members of critical incident 2005). We are reminded, too, that police must response teams, especially in Victoria with its work harder and more effectively in collaborating large land mass and small population (OPI with other agencies, especially with the Public 2005). We are fortunate that Project Beacon has Health Mental Health Branch. We have improved given us a strong, evidence-based foundation our capability and capacity to respond to critical upon which to police as gently as possible in pur- incidents through the creation of Critical Incident suit of the safety and security of our citizens. n Response Teams (CIRTs) that provide a level of response that fills a gap between initial-response general duties and the Specialist Operations units.

96 — Chapter 4. Less-Lethal Weaponry and Less-Lethal Force Decision-Making

5 Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration

by WILL JOHNSON, MARK WARREN, JOSHUA EDERHEIMER, and LORIE A. FRIDELL

INTRODUCTION developed for sale to law enforcement agencies in the future. Many law enforcement executives have Conducted energy device (CED) technology has praised the devices, citing them as an effective less- gained a dominant place in the law enforcement arsenal of less-lethal weaponry over the past several lethal option; CED devices have been credited with years. Conducted energy devices deliver an electri- helping to reduce instances of deadly force. More cal current that interferes with the human body’s information on the history and operation of these neuromuscular system, temporarily incapacitating devices is available in Chapter 4 of this book and in a person. It is estimated that more than 8,000 law PERF’s 2005 use-of-force publication entitled enforcement agencies have purchased such devices, Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force. and more than 100,000 of them are currently However, as deployments of CEDs increased deployed in the field in the United States. While across the United States, controversy emerged. the most common devices in use are the TASER™ Advocacy organizations raised questions about the M26 and X26 models, several other companies have devices, claiming that they were being misused and entered the market.1 It is likely that more types of overused and that they pose health risks. Law devices using this kind of technology will be enforcement executives were inundated with

1. Other CED products include the Stinger 4-Dart Less Lethal Gun®; the LEA Stun Gun®; and Titan’s Sticky Shocker®.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 99 questions about CEDs, and yet there was little avail- Nonetheless, the information from both of the able information to help them formulate answers. PERF studies was instrumental in the creation of To produce information that would help police the PERF CED guidelines and helped police execu- leaders make informed CED policy decisions, tives answer some of the challenging questions that PERF’s Center on Force & Accountability (CFA) had emerged. It is likely that, since that time, many and PERF’s Law Enforcement Center for Survey law enforcement agencies have updated their CED Research (LECSR) conducted two major national policies and procedures as new information has surveys of law enforcement organizations. These emerged about this latest technology. What these two studies, and a national summit of law enforce- studies have not addressed are the positive and neg- ment experts that was supported by the U.S. ative outcomes of CED deployment. In late 2006, Department of Justice Office of Community Ori- PERF began conducting a national study of the ented Policing Services, were instrumental in pro- impact that the devices have had in the field. Focus ducing the 52 CED guidelines and accompanying topics include injuries to officers and members of CED glossary that PERF released in October 2005. the public; circumstances where the CED was used The guidelines and the glossary are included in this to resolve police-citizen encounters; and instances chapter. where the use of the CED affected the application The first study, conducted in early 2005, was of more serious levels of force. In addition, CED coordinated by Major Mark Warren of the Balti- issues will be explored in the context of a larger, more County (MD) Police Department, who served long-term joint study on less-lethal weapons that as a PERF research fellow. Recognizing that police PERF is conducting with partners and with funding CED practices were rapidly changing, the study from the National Institute of Justice.2 sought to determine the state of the field to better understand how the devices were being used. The study provided a national snapshot of the field at PERF’S FIRST STUDY: the time. The information was valuable in develop- CEDS — THE INITIAL STATE ing questions for the second study and later in the OF THE FIELD development of the guidelines. As more and more law enforcement agencies The second study, coordinated by Lieutenant adopted CEDs, deployment and policy issues Will Johnson of the Arlington (TX) Police Depart- received increasing attention. Police executives issu- ment, who also served as a PERF research fellow, ing CEDs were facing questions such as: who focused on deaths occurring in proximity to a CED should get the weapons; how should they be car- activation. Information was collected on various ried; where should they be placed on a use-of-force aspects of specific incidents in which proximity continuum; for which subject populations should deaths occurred. In addition, data were collected use be restricted; what restrictions, if any, should be from a comparison group of CED incidents where placed on the number and length of activations; a death did not occur. The information learned and so forth. To find out how agencies were from this study helped to not only better under- approaching these issues, PERF conducted an stand the state of the field as it related to proximity exploratory study to determine the state of the field deaths but also to identify factors present when the in early 2005. Through this study, PERF hoped to deaths occurred. identify critical issues and trends related to CED It is important to note that much has changed deployment and policy in order to aid agencies since the first exploratory survey took place. nationwide.

2. Partners include the University of South Carolina and the University of South Florida.

100 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration Methodology form into the survey database at PERF. Of the 82 Prior to drafting the questions for the survey, PERF agencies targeted for the survey, 74 participated. developed a master list of potential issues by examining news articles, manufacturer and stakeholder Findings reports, and agency policies, and by speaking with law enforcement practitioners nationwide. After the Setting the Stage initial set of questions was developed, they were Portions of the survey solicited information reviewed by PERF staffers and other subject-matter regarding general agency characteristics, CED experts. Once the survey was finalized, it was acquisition history, types of CEDs being used, and piloted by law enforcement professionals with frequency of CED use. expertise in use-of-force issues. PERF identified 82 law enforcement agencies Agency Type and Level of CED Deployment that each deployed at least 100 conducted energy The group of 74 participating agencies varied devices to the field or experienced significant issues significantly and comprised 52 local police depart- with them.3 The agencies represented a cross-section ments, four state law enforcement agencies, and 18 of departments, varying by size, geography, and sheriff’s offices. The sizes of the participating agen- jurisdiction. Agencies were asked to participate on a cies varied significantly in terms of authorized voluntary basis, with the understanding that no strength and number of CEDs in use. Officer agencies or individual participants would be identi- strength varied from as few as 65 officers to a high fied in the survey results. Each agency was asked to of more than 13,000 officers. The number of CEDs designate an employee knowledgeable about their in use within each agency varied from nine to more agency’s CED practices to (1) participate in the sur- than 3,000. Overall, the average participating vey and (2) provide copies of policies regarding CED agency had just over 1,100 officers and 46 civilian use and general use of force, for post-survey policy employees, and had more than 400 CEDs in use at analysis. In most cases, participating agencies tasked the time of the survey. officers from their departments who were familiar with both policy and training issues (often agency CED Acquisition CED instructors) to complete the PERF survey. The purchase of the CEDs took many forms, The surveys were all conducted via telephone and many agencies used more than one funding interview by Mark Warren. Having a single person source to acquire the devices. Almost 80 percent of conduct all interviews ensured consistency in sur- the respondent agencies used their agency budget, vey administration. The survey instrument itself while 28.4 percent purchased the weapons with was generated electronically in the software pro- grant funds. Only one agency (1.4 percent) had the gram Teleform and was placed on a website where it officers pay for their own CEDs. Another 13.5 per- could be accessed by both the interviewer and the cent used other resources for acquiring CEDs, interviewee simultaneously. (The interviewee could including: risk management funds, asset forfeiture print the survey in advance of the interview and funds, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- revisit the website as necessary during the two- tions (RICO) funds, school board funds (for school month period that the survey was administered.) resource officers), civilian donations, federal appro- Although both individuals could access the survey priations, and trade-in exchanges of other weapons. at the time of the interview, only the interviewer The acquisition of CEDs in the participating agen- was able to enter data and submit the completed cies has been a recent occurrence. Only eight percent

3. TASER International provided PERF with a list of agencies deploying at least 100 CEDs.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 101 of the participating agencies utilized CEDs prior to drawn rather than a deadly weapon, helping to 2000. At the time of the survey, in early 2005, the vast reduce the possibility that higher levels of force will majority of initial CED acquisitions—more than 90 be inappropriately introduced by responding offi- percent—had been spread fairly evenly over the cers. Agencies may consider providing darker-col- years 2000 to 2004. ored CEDs to tactical and other specialized units that require higher degrees of concealment, and CED Types in Use providing brighter-colored CEDs to line officers. The CEDs in use by our respondent agencies This would follow a practice used by some agencies were TASER-brand products. (At the time the sur- to use specific colors to distinguish less-lethal and vey began, other conducted energy devices prod- deadly weapons. ucts were not yet available.) The respondent agencies used both the M26 and X26 TASER brand CED Activation Statistics models, with the majority using both versions. The survey solicited information regarding Among respondent agencies utilizing M26 CEDs, the number of CED uses during four full calendar 76.5 percent had black models and 28.8 percent had years. These numbers encompass activations of a yellow models. This was very similar to respondent CED in either the probe mode or the drive stun agencies using X26 CEDs; 76.3 percent had black mode and do not include mere display or arcing of models and only 26.3 percent had yellow styles. the CED or use of the laser dot. For the agencies Both color styles have advantages and disadvan- participating in the survey, CED activations tages. During discussions with representatives from appeared to have increased during the 2001 to 2004 respondent agencies, it was noted that the black reference period. This is consistent with agencies’ model gives officers an advantage in a concealment gradual acquisition of new devices since 2000, as situation, in that a subject may not readily see or noted earlier. The average number of activations identify the CED. On the other hand, an officer per year per agency (Table 5.1) and the number of arriving as a secondary unit to an incident may see agencies having at least 100 activations in any one another officer with a black model and confuse it calendar year (Table 5.2) are noted below. with a firearm, creating the possibility of escalating This rise is further demonstrated by the force levels. The yellow model makes it apparent to reduced percentage of agencies reporting no CED other officers that a less-lethal weapon has been activations during each year (Table 5.3).

Table 5.1: Average number of CED activations Table 5.3: Percentages of agencies reporting per year per agency (N=74) no activations (by year) Year Average # of Activations Percent of Agencies 2001 17.6 Year with No Activations 2002 39.4 2001 41.7 % 2003 72.0 2002 30.0 % 2004 150.2 2003 12.7 % 2004 1.5 % Table 5.2: Number of agencies with at least 100 activations in a calendar year Year 100 or More Activations 2001 1 agency 2002 4 agencies 2003 11 agencies 2004 29 agencies

102 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration Assignment of CEDs Deployment Restrictions Almost all of the agencies assigned CED Also pertaining to agency policy, the survey devices to both front-line officers and supervisors. solicited information regarding how and where the Further, the majority of respondent agencies CED was placed on a use-of-force continuum. assigned CEDs to or permitted their use by specialized units, including tactical teams or other support Type of Crime or Incident operations-type units. Respondent agencies were Respondent agencies were asked whether not asked which personnel received M26 versus crime classifications were linked to parameters in X26 devices. Several respondents noted, however, policy on use of a CED. In all but one case, the type that M26 models were favored by individuals in of crime confronted had no bearing on whether a specialized units such as tactical teams due to their CED could be used (one agency would not allow large grips, while the X26 models were favored by use of a CED during a property crime). With regard front-line officers due to their smaller overall size to non-criminal incidents, 96 percent of respon- and the ease of carrying them on their gun belts. dent agencies permitted use of a CED when con- With regard to individual assignment, 85 percent of fronting a suicidal person. Respondent agencies participating agencies permanently assigned CEDs were also asked about incidents in which subjects to their officers, while 24 percent required that their were armed. More than 93 percent of agencies per- officers sign out the CED at the beginning of their mitted use of CEDs against a subject with a firearm, shifts. Some agencies utilized both methods of while 99 percent permitted use against a subject assignment, and one agency assigned the CED to with an edged weapon. In most cases, however, the patrol vehicle permanently, rather than to a des- respondent agencies pointed out that the tactical use ignated officer. of cover was a key factor in determining whether the CED would be used in a deadly-force situation. Policy Models and Off-Duty Restrictions Information was collected regarding whether Compliance and Resistance agency CED policies were stand-alone or not and As noted above, the type of crime was gener- whether and how they restricted off-duty use of ally not a factor in setting parameters on CED use. CEDs by officers. When asked about their CED A key factor was the level of resistance demon- policies, 51 percent of respondent agencies strated by the subject. All of the respondent agen- described it as a “stand-alone” policy and 47 per- cies said that the CED could be used in an incident cent described it as part of their general use-of- involving aggressive resistance, and 87 percent of force policy. Several reported that they maintained respondent agencies permitted CED use during individual CED policies and integrated CED use active resistance. Thirty percent permitted CED use into their use-of-force continuum, which was usu- against a subject manifesting passive resistance. ally contained in their general use-of-force policy. Some agencies explained that their definition of Since many agencies permanently assign passive resistance included verbal resistance by a CEDs to their officers, off-duty use was examined. subject displaying an intention to disregard the offi- Seventy-seven percent of respondent agencies per- cer’s orders. Others reported that the use of a CED mitted use of the CED during secondary employ- at the level of passive resistance could be permitted ment when the officer was in uniform, and 56 based on the subject’s stance or the officer’s knowl- percent allowed CED use when the officer was not edge of the subject’s past behavior. Further infor- in uniform. Some agencies qualified their remarks mation regarding CED placement relative to other by noting that the secondary employment had to be weapons is contained in this chapter in the section related to a law enforcement function for CED use on training. It is noted that definitions concerning to be permitted. aggression levels vary widely among agencies. PERF

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 103 has established a CED glossary of terms that helps dot, or arcing of the weapon was frequently effec- to foster consistency and a better understanding of tive in deterring and dispersing crowds. terms. The glossary is included later in this chapter. Flammability Situations Situational Limitations Because there is a potential for a CED activa- Responding agencies were asked about policy tion to start a fire, respondent agencies were restrictions on shooting CEDs to or from vehicles, queried as to whether the CEDs could be used in CED use in crowd control situations and for home- situations where flammability might be an issue, land defense, and policy parameters for flammable such as around methamphetamine laboratories or situations and situations where secondary injury of in proximity to alcohol-based O.C. spray, gas leaks the subject is possible. or fumes, or hair gels. Only seven percent of respondent agencies allowed the activation of CEDs Vehicle-Related Incidents in any of those situations. A primary concern is the Fifty-seven percent of respondent agencies activation of a CED in conjunction with O.C. spray, permitted the activation of a CED at an individual because a spark from a CED can ignite an alcohol- operating a vehicle. However, many respondents based O.C. spray (Donnelly et al 2002).4 Many pointed out that—like a firearm—even if the CED respondent agencies indicated that they transi- use is successful, there is a risk that the vehicle will tioned to a water-based O.C. spray upon acquiring not stop or will veer off the road, causing other their CEDs. Several respondent agencies, however, injuries or fatalities. Also, they noted that the poten- were unsure as to the type of O.C. spray carried by tial for success was low. It is difficult to hit a moving neighboring jurisdictions. target, and to effectively do so through a car window would be a challenge. Because of the difficulties and Secondary Injury Risks dangers associated with CED use against people A consideration in the use of a CED is the operating vehicles, many agencies prohibit CED potential for injury from a fall or from the environ- activation on persons operating all-terrain vehicles ment in which the subject will land after being acti- (ATVs), minibikes, and even bicycles. Because these vated by a CED. To that end, respondent agencies other vehicles do not have safety features like seat- were asked whether their officers could use a CED belts or airbags, the potential for secondary injuries against subjects in the following at-risk situations: from falling off of the vehicle is great. in or near water, or on a ledge or otherwise in an area above ground level. Most agencies allowed use Crowd Control of a CED against someone in or near water as well CEDs have been deployed for events like the as in areas above ground level. In these situations, World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in several respondent agencies qualified their remarks 1999, the Winter Olympics in 2002, and the Demo- by noting that CED use was permitted only if the cratic National Convention in 2004. More than 90 officers had formulated a plan (for instance, a plan percent of the respondents said their agencies per- for preventing a subject from drowning or for mit- mitted CED use in crowd control situations. Several igating the effects of a fall). One agency used this respondent agencies noted that in crowd control prudent formula: “The potential for injury from the situations, actual activation of the CED was not CED strike must be less than the potential for injury always necessary; a simple display of the CED, laser from the activity in which the subject was engaged at the time of CED deployment.”

4. In its report entitled Evaluation of Taser Devices, the UK Police Scientific Development Branch found that use of PAVA (similar to O.C. spray but made from a synthetic source) in conjunction with a CED activation could produce target ignition.

104 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration Secondary injuries were also a concern with many respondent agencies reported their successful regard to handcuffed subjects. Although most use against aggressive dogs in particular. This use agencies allowed use of a CED against a handcuffed may result in fewer aggressive dogs being fatally subject, many did so with specific limitations. Fac- shot by police responding to calls for service. tors the officers were to consider in those situations included: level of resistance, potential for injury Target (Subject) Considerations (from kicking, head butting, and so forth), position Many agencies across the country have policy of handcuffs (front versus back), mobility of sub- provisions that pertain to specific target populations. ject (that is, in leg irons or other containment), and The survey collected information about provisions environment (for instance, whether the subject is in regarding juveniles, pregnant women, and the elderly. a police vehicle or open space). Juveniles Homeland Defense Community stakeholders have expressed par- Also considered was where CEDs fit in rela- ticular concern about use of CEDs on juveniles. tion to homeland defense. The majority of respon- Despite the sensitivity to this type of CED use, all dent agencies indicated that a CED could be used surveyed agencies permitted use on a juvenile, but against a suicide bomber, while some agencies do only under certain circumstances. As with elderly not permit use on a suicide bomber because there and pregnant subjects (discussed below), the may be a risk of activating an electric detonator. threshold of deadly force was frequently cited as a Respondent agencies noted that CEDs have been requirement for CED use on a juvenile; in some considered for use in vessels and ports as well as on policies, officers must be able to articulate reasons airplanes and in airports. One respondent offered that use against a juvenile was required. Only 11 that CEDs would be an effective tool against an percent of respondent agencies actually cited an age individual attempting to leave a quarantined area. limit for CED use. Their cut-off points for CED use It should be noted that PERF is developing are noted in Table 5.4. guidelines for patrol-level response to a suicide Two respondent agencies cited weight, rather bomb threat that will address the use of a CED in than age, limits, with one prohibiting activation on such a circumstance. The guidelines will be released juveniles who are 60 pounds or less and the other in mid-2007. prohibiting activation on juveniles weighing 80 pounds or less. Other Situations Almost 98 percent of respondent agencies permitted CED use during adverse weather. In fact, few had concerns about the weapon’s reaction in adverse weather as much as they did about the clothing worn by a subject. The more adverse the weather, the more protective—and usually heavier—the Table 5.4: Number of agencies prohibiting subject’s clothing. The heavy clothing can make it CED activation by specific age more difficult to obtain an effective probe strike on Age Restriction # of Agencies Prohibiting a subject. Some respondent agencies also noted that (in years) Activation Against Specific Age extreme cold may cause the CED’s plastic parts to 7 3 crack or may shrink the CED cartridge doors, 9 1 reducing their ability to open. 12 1 Ninety-three percent of respondent agencies 13 2 permitted CED use against animals. Although the 14 1 M26 and X26 devices are designed for humans,

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 105 Pregnant Women Tactics Eighty percent of respondent agencies allowed The respondents provided information use of a CED on a pregnant subject. As mentioned regarding policy priorities for probe and drive stun before, some respondent agencies adopted a deadly- modes, tactical considerations included in policy, force threshold for visibly pregnant women; one and pre-deployment requirements. agency’s policy specifically referenced women who were in late-term pregnancy. Many agencies were CED Modes concerned with the potential for harm due to a sec- All respondent agencies said that their agency ondary injury (to mother and/or fetus) from falling permitted CED use in both the probe and the drive forward after a CED activation. stun mode. (In the drive stun mode, officers remove the probe cartridge and apply the CED The Elderly directly to the subject’s body. The drive stun feature All but one agency allowed CED use on the can help subdue a subject by administering pain, elderly. Only two agencies had age limit restric- but it does not have a significant incapacitating tions—age 70 and older and age 81 and older. Just effect on the central nervous system.) Agencies also as with juveniles and pregnant women, good judg- were asked whether their policies classified these ment was mentioned as a key factor, and the modes as either primary or secondary. Forty per- deadly-force threshold was sometimes linked to cent of agencies utilized those terms, and of those, this group in the policy. all listed the probe mode as primary and the drive stun as secondary. Activation and Effectiveness Another CED feature is the laser used for The policing profession is learning more aiming and targeting. Placing the laser dot on the about the number and length of activations used to subject prior to activating the CED greatly gain compliance from a subject. At the time of this improves the potential for good probe placement. survey, most agencies had not yet established This action is very popular in law enforcement and restrictions on activations. For TASER-brand is considered an effective tool for deterring resist- CEDs, the activation from a single trigger pull is ance as well. usually five seconds, although it can be longer if the deploying officer continues to depress the trigger. Tactical Considerations Respondent agencies were asked whether their pol- How the CED is carried affects its accessibil- icy had a specified threshold for abandoning the ity. Ninety-six percent of respondent agencies had CED in favor of another weapon due to the ineffec- some or all of their officers carry the CED in a hol- tiveness of the CED. Twenty-eight percent of ster on their person. Seventeen percent had some respondent agencies said that their policy had lan- or all of their officers secure the CED in a vehicle. guage to that effect. Decisions regarding the num- All of respondent agencies that had officers carry ber of activations and whether to go to another type the CED in a holster permitted officers to carry it of force are crucial ones. While many respondent on their weak (support) side; 17 percent permitted agencies noted the authority of a supervisor to carrying on the strong (sidearm) side. Another overrule an officer, all respondent agencies stated issue is whether agencies permit the use of the CED that because of rapidly evolving scenarios, the ini- and their departmentally issued sidearm at the tial decision pertaining to number and length of same time (that is, one in each hand). Thirty-two activations would be at the discretion of the officer percent of respondent agencies allowed this deploying the CED. This question is explored fur- practice. ther later in this chapter, and is addressed in PERF’s This is a controversial tactic, as there is a risk CED guidelines for consideration. that deadly force could be used unintentionally.

106 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration Also, at a time of increased regionalization Post-Deployment Response and need for sharing of resources, agencies must Virtually all policies reference post-deploy- also consider their use of weapons in multijurisdic- ment responsibilities of officers on the scene or oth- tional situations. In our survey, respondent agen- ers. Key provisions address subject aftercare and cies were asked whether they would allow reporting/ investigation. CED-certified officers from another agency to use their CEDs in a multi-jurisdictional incident. Subject Aftercare Forty-four percent of respondent agencies permit- One of the things law enforcement agencies ted such a practice. must do is provide appropriate aftercare to persons activated by a CED. The survey focused on aftercare Pre-Deployment Requirements subsequent to an activation and/or dart penetra- Virtually every agency has some requirement tion from the probe mode. Sixty-eight percent of that must be met prior to the deployment of a CED respondent agencies permitted law enforcement during an incident. One consideration is the role of personnel to remove the probe darts. Within that supervision. Only three percent of our participating group of respondent agencies, 98 percent said that agencies required supervisory approval prior to officers trained and certified to use a CED could CED deployment. Only four percent required that a perform that removal. One caveat to the above supervisor respond to the scene before a CED could responses was the occurrence of darts striking sen- be deployed, although many respondent agencies sitive areas of the body such as the breast, groin, commented that a supervisor is required to respond eye, and cheek. Sixty percent of respondent agen- after a CED deployment. Several respondent agencies reported that a dart penetration of a sensitive cies noted that the spontaneity and quick escalation area required fire, EMS, or hospital attention. One of incidents usually precluded significant supervi- agency required EMS response in every deployment sory participation prior to deployment. Fifty-eight to check an activated subject’s vital signs. Another percent of respondent agencies indicated that when agency required that any juvenile activated by a feasible, additional officers should be present before CED be transported to the hospital for treatment. a CED activation. Another consideration related to aftercare Another consideration is the potential need for was whether additional medical treatment was emergency medical services (EMS) after CED required—even after the darts had been removed at deployment. Again, noting how quickly a situation the incident scene. Twenty-nine percent of respon- can escalate, in many situations it would be impossi- dent agencies required additional treatment. ble to request EMS response prior to CED deployment. Within that context, respondent agencies were CED Activation Investigations asked if they were required to request EMS response Since agencies are under great scrutiny prior to CED deployment when feasible. Eight per- regarding the potential for CED abuse, it is imper- cent of respondent agencies indicated that policy ative that activations be properly documented and required such action be taken. Most other respon- investigated. The need for transparency extends to dent agencies indicated that EMS response, when accidental CED activations. required, would be requested post-deployment. Every respondent agency indicated it used The final consideration relates to warnings of one or more post-incident reporting processes. To pending CED deployment. Fifty-three percent of document elements of the activation, 81 percent of respondent agencies indicated that their personnel respondent agencies utilized a general form, while were required by policy, when feasible, to give a vocal 38 percent used a CED-specific form. Fifty-six warning to a subject prior to CED deployment. percent of respondent agencies had an accidental- Eighty-nine percent of respondent agencies required discharge investigation procedure. In many that a warning be given to other officers on the scene. instances, respondent agencies noted that they

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 107 COMMENTARY: box 5.1 Accelerated Triage for Medical Evaluations Following CED Activations by Dr. Gary M. Vilke, Dr. Christian M. Sloane, a medical evaluation that would include local and Dr. Theodore C. Chan wound care and updating tetanus status; however, this could potentially be performed by med- As the use of conducted energy devices (CEDs) by ical staff at the jail or by field paramedics. This police officers continues to increase, the fre- practice will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. quency with which the emergency medical com- However, many CED activations will occur in munity will be interacting with law enforcement subjects who do not meet these criteria after acti- will also continue to increase. Many uses of CEDs vation. Many subjects under the influence of illicit will result in an unruly individual’s becoming drugs or with untreated psychiatric illnesses will more compliant—allowing for a facilitated arrest exhibit combative, hallucinatory, and noncompli- into custody. With these individuals, often the ant behavior, and when they undergo CED activa- only medical evaluation and treatment required is tion in order to be taken into custody by police, removal of the CED dart, as well as addressing these subjects are at risk to develop what is local wound care and tetanus status as needed. termed excited delirium, a clinical syndrome Alternatively, individuals under the influence of based on several medical findings—which may drugs or suffering from decompensated psychi- include agitation, disorientation, delirium or con- atric disorders may not have their behavior mod- fusion, hallucinations, and abnormal vital signs ified with one or multiple activations of a CED. including elevated body temperature and heart These individuals are more likely to require addi- rate. Not all of these findings will be found in tional physical-restraint measures and are the every patient. Law enforcement officers should same individuals who are more likely to be recognize that subjects presenting with these exhibiting signs of excited delirium. types of findings, particularly with a history of The Police Executive Research Forum’s cocaine, methamphetamine, or PCP use or an (PERF) CED guidelines for consideration that were untreated psychiatric illness, are possibly suffer- released in October 2005 included a guideline that ing from excited delirium. The importance of sus- stated, “All persons who have been exposed to a pecting excited delirium—with or without CED CED activation should receive a medical evalua- activation—is that these persons need rapid tion.” Options and considerations for this medical medical evaluation and treatment because of evaluation will be briefly reviewed here. their increased risk for sudden death syndrome. Uncomplicated CED activations are ones that Officers should consider calling for EMS follow- occur in individuals where (1) the dart is not in an ing or even prior to CED activation whenever pos- anatomically sensitive location, and (2) the sub- sible in this population of subjects. ject is alert, acting appropriately, and compliant For logistical, training, or medico-legal rea- after the activation. In these cases, many law sons, some law enforcement agencies have opted enforcement agencies have policies and proce- not to train their officers to remove CED darts. In dures to allow police officers to remove the darts. this case, medical clearance by a physician with This seems reasonable if the officer has been removal of the dart is often required prior to the specifically trained in the dart removal, if the offi- subject’s being accepted for booking at a police cer utilizes universal precautions (the darts are facility or jail. The transport of the subject to the considered a biohazard), and if the dart is not local emergency department by police for medical located in a medically sensitive area—typically clearance can result in a long wait for the subject considered as the face, neck, female breast tissue, to be seen as a patient. Moreover, uncomplicated groin or genitalia. The subject should still obtain CED patients may get triaged as a lower-acuity

108 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration patient, resulting in even longer waiting times in needs of activated subjects, but also addresses the emergency department. These delays often law enforcement’s operational needs to limit result in frustration for the accompanying police police officer downtime. The ACT program has officers and increased staffing costs for the arrest- been successful in getting low-risk compliant and ing agency. controlled patients quickly discharged from the ACT, or Accelerated Care at Triage, is a novel emergency department and police officers back approach created by a collaboration between the onto the streets. ACT also has offered the oppor- San Diego Police Department and the University tunity for earlier evaluation and initiation of ther- of California, San Diego (UCSD) Medical Center. apy for patients brought in by police who are still ACT is a program implemented at the UCSD Med- agitated and combative and, thus, at higher risk ical Center Emergency Department to facilitate the for morbidity and mortality. This is exactly the evaluation and rapid disposition of subjects who population of patients who need rapid evaluation received an uncomplicated CED activation and and treatment. Another positive effect of the ACT have no other obvious medical issues. The ACT program is that it has improved relations between algorithm is demonstrated in Figure 5.1. police officers and medical staff, as both groups The ACT program establishes a systematic feel that optimum care for these patients is deliv- process that not only addresses medical assessment ered in an appropriate time frame. n

Figure 5.1: Accelerated Care at Triage Protocol for Conducted Energy Device Activation University of California, San Diego, Medical Center

CED-activated RN calls MD to Accelerated Care at patient presents at Triage for evalua- Triage (ACT) Protocol Emergency Depart- tion (if no ED bed ment (ED) Triage available) for CED Activation

Significant acute medical condition (i.e., delirium, trauma, chest pain, shortness of breath) OR YES To ED room CED probe in sensitive area (i.e., face, breast, for further ED care neck, groin) and evaluation OR At risk co-morbidities (i.e., cardiac disease, pregnancy, pacemaker)

Remove CED probe Discharge with wound at Triage and care instructions and update tetanus follow up at jail clinic as needed

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 109 required officers to self-report in order to obtain for use on a subject threatening an officer with a replacement cartridges. CED. Ninety-four percent allowed deadly force in With regard to intentional activations, 82 per- that situation. Although deadly force is a legitimate cent of respondent agencies required that a super- consideration, other mitigating factors may exist. visor conduct an investigation. Twelve percent of For example, the presence of other officers on the respondent agencies allowed activating officers to scene may remove the need for deadly force, as investigate their own CED deployments. According might the lack of a cartridge in the subject’s CED. to some respondents, this was more likely to be the Further, deadly force may not apply to a subject practice in agencies that have outlying posts and using the CED in the drive stun mode or a subject limited access to supervisors. Respondent agencies outside of the maximum range of the CED. were asked to indicate the minimum types of evi- Twenty-five percent of respondent agencies dence collected after every CED activation. Their provided training about CEDs to some noncertified responses are noted in Table 5.5. personnel (such as noncertified patrol officers, forensic technicians, and evidence couriers). Training Issues Responding agencies provided information CED Exposure During Training on CED-related training, including training pro- CED training exposure means that as part of gram components, whether officers were required the certification process, an officer is subjected to to experience activation, and training injuries. experiencing a CED activation. Many agencies have moved away from mandatory exposure, with some Program Components actually forbidding exposure. Ten percent of respon- Eighty-two percent of respondent agencies dent agencies had mandatory exposure for certifica- indicated that their training program had a sce- tion. Of those 10 percent, four of the agencies nario-based component. Fifty-three of respondent requiring exposure conducted a general health agencies indicated that they had a weapons reten- screening for its officers (for instance, screening for tion component built into their CED program. osteoporosis, prescription medications, and over-the- In light of the availability of CEDs to the pub- counter drugs) prior to administering activations. lic, 74 percent of respondent agencies trained their officers on how to confront a subject armed with a Training Injuries CED. Twenty-four percent of respondent agencies Twenty-seven percent of respondent agencies had a policy dictating the type of force permissible had experienced officer injuries during certification

Table 5.5: CED activation physical evidence collection Table 5.6: Force option placement in relation to (percentage of agencies requiring collection by type CED placement in a force model of evidence)(N=74) Below Equal to Above Percent of Agencies Force Option CED CED CED Evidence Type Requiring Collection Verbal control 100 % 0 % 0 % Photographs of subject injuries 76 % Control holds 58 % 32 % 10 % CED cartridge 65 % Chemical 16 % 77 % 7 % Darts/prongs 61 % Chemical/kinetic Data downloads 37 % (hybrid) 12 % 53 % 36 % Car video 37 % Strikes/batons 3 % 33 % 64 % Confetti ID tags (AFIDs) 35 % Impact (beanbags) 1 % 31 % 67 % Photographs of incident scene 22 % Firearms 0 % 0 % 100 % Radio transcripts 4 %

110 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration training. Of the respondent agencies reporting offi- Inspections of CEDs cer injuries during CED training, only two agencies Seventy-four percent of respondent agencies reported injuries that were considered serious or conducted physical inspections of the CEDs that required hospitalization. beyond their officers’ daily spark tests. Of those respondent agencies, 72 percent conducted sched- CEDs and Use-of-Force Policies uled inspections—usually at in-service or annual In regard to where the CED fits into an agency’s range training, while 50 percent conducted random use-of-force policy, many agencies use a linear force inspections. continuum, while others have instituted a circular In regard to periodic CED data analysis— response-to-force resistance model. Regardless of the whether through data downloads or CED use sta- type of force model used, respondent agencies were tistics—68 percent of respondent agencies asked to compare the CED to several general force indicated they did conduct periodic data analysis options and measure them as: below, equal to, or (Table 5.7). above a CED in their particular model (Table 5.6). Twenty-eight percent of respondent agencies also conducted random—and unannounced— CED Weapon Draw CED data audits. Usually these downloads are con- Ninety-three percent of respondent agencies ducted by quality assurance units like Professional allowed their officers to draw the CED with their Standards or Internal Affairs. One respondent strong (sidearm) hand, while 39 percent allowed noted that random data audits are not just impor- officers to draw the CED with their weak (support) tant for maintaining departmental integrity, but hand. With regard to the strong-hand draw, 96 per- also to ensure that officers are conducting required cent of respondent agencies allowed a cross draw, daily test activations. while only 15 percent allowed a strong-side draw. The strong-side CED draw presents the danger of grabbing a firearm accidentally due to the close Conclusion proximity of the weapons on the body. With regard The procurement and use of CEDs by law enforce- to agencies that permitted a weak-hand draw, 75 ment continues to grow. As technology advances, so percent trained their officers to transfer the CED will the number and type of CED weapons. During from the weak hand to the strong hand for activa- this time, law enforcement professionals will need tion purposes. Twenty-five percent of respondent to continually examine the evolving issues sur- agencies allowed their officers to activate the CED rounding these and other less-lethal devices. This with either the weak hand or the strong hand. study enabled PERF to provide the law enforcement profession with a better understanding of the criti- Table 5.7: Percentages of respondent agencies cal issues surrounding CEDs at that time. This collecting CED data by data analysis schedule study—the first receiving full and comprehensive (N=49) participation from agencies throughout the country—identified trends and universal issues. It estab- CED Data Analysis Schedule Frequency lished the foundation for PERF’s proximity-death Annual 37 % study (described below) and played a seminal role When requested 16 % in the development of PERF’s CED guidelines for Semiannual 16 % consideration and glossary of terms. Finally, as Quarterly 12 % mentioned earlier, it is important to note that CEDs Monthly 8 % are still relatively new to the field, and many agencies For cause 8 % have made significant changes to their policies as new As needed 6 % information emerged. Weekly 2 %

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 111 PERF’S SECOND STUDY: Some of these reasons include preexisting health issues, at-risk behavior such as illicit drug use, and CEDS — A REVIEW OF CUSTODIAL DEATHS IN PROXIMITY TO USE use of force. To assist in understanding and tracking this issue, the U.S. Department of Justice As the frequency of CED use has increased, so have Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) requires that all questions regarding the safety of these devices and states report custodial deaths.5 Prior to the 2000 concerns about possible misuse. Deaths following enactment of the Death in Custody Reporting Act the use of a CED have resulted in increased public (DICRA), BJS collected custodial death informa- notoriety, news media attention, and speculation tion primarily as it pertained to corrections envi- concerning CED policies, practices, and safety. Civil ronments—specifically persons incarcerated in rights groups, individual activists, and academics federal and state penal institutions. Despite the pas- have questioned the value of CED technology. Sev- eral of these groups have raised concerns that cus- sage of DICRA, collection of valid statistics has todial deaths occurring in proximity to the use of a been a challenging task. BJS is planning to issue a CED may have been caused by the device. PERF’s comprehensive report that should offer researchers, second study did not provide a medical review of police executives, and others at least baseline infor- CEDs and did not produce medical recommenda- mation concerning police custodial deaths to assist tions. However, the information gathered for the in monitoring trends. Although not comprehen- study does provide law enforcement executives with sive, custody-death information collected from 42 meaningful information concerning agency experi- states and the District of Columbia for 2004 sug- ences surrounding these custodial deaths. gested that approximately 600 subjects died for var- PERF examined deaths nationwide that ious reasons while in police custody. occurred in proximity to a CED activation that occurred between September 1999 and May 2005. Methodology The goal was to better understand these incidents and circumstances surrounding CED use, as well as For this study, PERF used a targeted approach and to provide information to police executives in order identified 118 deaths in proximity to a CED activa- to reduce the risk of future deaths occurring, if pos- tion in the United States. These deaths occurred in sible. This research produced a profile of these 96 law enforcement jurisdictions within 26 states proximity deaths and identified factors that distin- between September 1999 and May 2005. All 96 guished these incidents from others where CEDs agencies were invited to participate in a voluntary, were used and no deaths occurred. anonymous survey. Agencies invited to participate represented a broad range of departments in terms of types (that is, municipal and sheriffs’ depart- Background ments), size, and geographic location. Agencies Many discussions involving custodial deaths in were informed that participation was not an affir- proximity to CED use—especially in the news mation that a CED was the cause of death, but media—have focused on the fact that a death rather that a custodial death was experienced and a occurred and a CED was used, followed by a discus- CED was used at some point during the incident. sion of concerns regarding the safety of CEDs. Information surrounding 77 deaths was obtained. These deaths are not discussed in the context of the PERF’s staff developed a comprehensive sur- total number of police custodial deaths that occur vey instrument. An independent panel reviewed the in the United States every year. Many people die in survey for content and clarity. The panel also was police custody every year for a variety of reasons. tasked with ensuring that the law enforcement

5. Death in Custody Reporting Act (DICRA) of 2000 (Public Law 106-297).

112 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration terminology would be uniformly understood by an average of one million calls for service per year. agency personnel across the nation. This electronic Eight percent of these calls for service resulted in an survey was placed on a secure website, and partici- arrest. Importantly, only one-tenth of 1 percent of pants were provided with instructions and a pass- these calls for service resulted in the use of force, as word to complete it. Each agency was given a noted below (Table 5.8). control number that allowed PERF staff to validate The use of force occurred infrequently in completed surveys and track the response rate. All relation to the total number of contacts with the information identifying participating agencies was community. Respondents reported that 25 percent discarded following the data collection phase of the of the total reported use-of-force incidents involved study to ensure confidentiality for respondents. a CED. Figure 5.2 depicts the trend of use-of-force Respondents provided comprehensive data incidents reported by the respondents since 2002. for each death. The survey instrument was designed The rise in CED activations is expected, given to identify information in three general categories: the increased number of agencies that acquired and agency information, incident information, and use the devices. Further research is required to post-incident information. These data provided insight into the collective experience and established a description of the subjects activated, tactics Table 5.8: Percent of respondent agency calls for used, and autopsy findings. service resulting in arrest and use of force Importantly, PERF staff also developed a com- Percent of parison group of CED incidents where a person did Calls for not die. Comparison data from 662 incidents in Calls for Service Average Service which a custodial death in proximity to a CED acti- Total calls vation did not occur were collected and examined. for service 1,074,502 N/A Total number of arrests 86,345 8 % Findings Total number of use-of-force incidents 1,145 0.1 % Agency Information6 The survey asked a series of questions regarding Figure 5.2: Responding Agencies’ Overall Use of Force and Use of CEDs, total calls for service Number of Incidents, 2002–2005 answered, arrests made, use- of-force incidents, and the total number of CED activations. It is generally understood that the frequency with which police use force is relatively small compared to overall contact with the community, and the survey results support this point. Between January 1, 2002, and May 31, 2005, respon- *Graph represents a full-year projection based upon dents reported answering actual data received for the first five months of 2005.

6. Comparison agencies not included.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 113 assess the increases in the context of all police use- aggression. It appears that officers in these incidents of-force incidents. For example, while there may be did not uniformly view an armed subject as a deadly an increase in the use of CEDs, there may be reduc- threat. In several follow-up interviews with respon- tions in the use of other forms of less-lethal dents, it was determined that in some of the cases weapons such as collapsible batons and O.C. spray. the subjects disarmed themselves sometime during the incident. However, the majority of the respon- Additional Information Concerning Incidents dents indicated that officers sought to avoid using Aggression Encountered deadly force against even an armed opponent. It is imperative to begin any use-of-force inci- Situational Factors dent review with an evaluation of the aggression or The level of aggression presented is just one resistance encountered. The type of aggression factor in the decision regarding appropriate use of would dictate the appropriate police response or range of responses. Each agency described the force. Situational factors include: the amount of behaviors exhibited by the deceased subject. The information available prior to arriving on the following conveys the highest level of aggression scene, the number of suspects or officers, spatial encountered for the cases reviewed (Table 5.9, limitations, and tactical considerations. response categories are not mutually exclusive). The type of call for police service is related to Twenty-six percent of the subjects were the level of information that officers have prior armed or attempted to arm themselves during the to making contact with a subject. Calls for service incident. Of those, 20 percent were armed with a that prompted police response were classified as fol- firearm, 40 percent with a knife or cutting object, lows: suspicious persons, 30 percent; drunk and dis- 25 percent with a club or blunt object, and 25 per- orderly, 18 percent; property crimes, 10 percent; cent were armed with some other weapon. violent crimes, 17 percent; domestic offenses, 15 per- In six percent of the incidents, the respondent cent; assist fire or EMS, 5 percent; barricaded per- agency considered the subject as manifesting deadly sons, 1 percent; and other types of calls, 16 percent.

Table 5.9: Highest level of aggression encountered Table 5.10: Percentage of CED incidents by location during an incident that resulted in a CED activation (not mutually exclusive) Level of Aggression7 Percent Location Percent Passive–Dead Weight 2 % Outside 57 % Noncompliant 12 % In a dwelling 31 % Active Aggression 22 % In a vehicle 6 % Severe Aggression 59 % Police facility (and jails) 5 % Deadly Aggression 6 % In a business 3 % Hospital/crisis center 2 % Other 12 %

7. This survey was completed prior to the creation of the CED glossary. Therefore, for the purposes of this survey, levels of aggression were defined as: Passive-Dead Weight—Physical actions that do not prevent the officer’s attempt to control. For example, a person who remains in a limp, prone position; Noncompliant—Subject was failing to comply with officer’s orders but was not physically engaging in any other type of resistance; Active Aggression—Physically evasive movements to defeat an officer’s attempt at control, including bracing, tensing, pushing, or verbally signaling an intention to avoid or prevent being taken into or retained in custody; Severe Aggression—A threat or overt act of an assault, coupled with the present ability to carry out the threat or assault, which reasonably indicates that an assault or injury to any person is imminent; and Deadly Aggression—subject was threatening or assault- ing an officer in a manner that would likely result in death or serious bodily injury.

114 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration CED incidents occurred in a variety of physical loca- First, a significant number of respondents indicated tions (Table 5.10). the presence of biohazards such as subjects covered Respondents identified additional tactical in blood. Not only is this a potential health risk for considerations relevant to each case. Multiple fac- officers, but it also can increase the difficulty in tors could be recorded depending on the circum- bringing a subject under control by physical hands- stances of the incident. These tactical considerations on tactics. The second point of interest was the low are reflected in Table 5.11. percentage of respondents listing availability of The need for immediate incapacitation—the cover as a consideration. Cover can be described as most prevalent response—was in many instances a position of safety for officers. Because the avail- accompanied with an explanation. One of the most ability of a CED does not replace lethal force, the frequent explanations was that the incident presence and availability of cover are particularly occurred in, or near, lanes of traffic of busy road- necessary for an officer attempting to use a CED on ways. Other respondents described the need to an armed subject. immediately place the subject under control because the subject was attempting to take a hostage, had a Subject Information weapon or was attempting to reach for a weapon, or Subjects involved in the incidents resulting in was actively fighting with officers. Spatial limita- death were predominately male (96 percent). Forty- tions were also frequently cited as a tactical factor. six percent of the subjects were white and 40 per- Explanations included subjects inside small storage cent were black. Hispanics made up the remaining areas, closets, on rooftops, and on narrow staircases. 14 percent. Ninety-two percent of the subjects were The inability to approach subjects from a tactically between 21 and 50 years of age. This breakdown of prudent position because of limited space could subjects by age is contained in Table 5.12. have reduced the force options available to officers. A description of subjects who died in proxim- Two other interesting points were discovered when ity to a CED activation is provided in Table 5.13. reviewing responses for tactical considerations.

Table 5.11: Tactical considerations reported during Table 5.12: Age of subjects who died in proximity to CED activations CED use Percent Years of Age Percent Tactical Considerations of Cases 16– 20 3 % Need for immediate incapacitation 65 % 21– 30 27 % Spatial limitations 38 % 31– 40 38 % Poor lighting conditions 32 % 41– 50 27 % Bystanders 29 % 51– 60 5 % Officer size relative to subject size 18 % Presence of a weapon 16 % Table 5.13: Characteristics by highest percentage of Availability of cover 3 % subjects who died in proximity to a CED activation Other 3 % CED Proximity Deaths Findings Percent Subject sex Male 96 % Subject age 31– 40 years 38 % Subject height 5’7’’– 6’0’’ 71 % Subject weight 161– 280 lbs 85 % History of violence Yes 56 % Local criminal history Yes 70 %

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 115 Officer Information in probe mode. The number of officers present during a use- The number of CED cycles and the total of-force incident is a vital factor when evaluating duration of CED activations were reviewed. Several the reasonableness of force used and the effective- challenges were encountered trying to obtain this ness of tactics employed. Two officers were present information. The internal recording device for the for 39 percent of the cases reviewed. Only seven M26—which was used in the majority of cases— percent of the cases involved a single officer. Sixteen does not record the length of the CED activation. percent had three officers present, 18 percent had The X26 records both number and duration of acti- four, and 21 percent had five or more officers. vations. Additionally, both the M26 and X26 are Eighty percent of the cases involved the use of a designed to cycle activation for five seconds after CED by a line officer, while 18 percent of the cases the trigger has been depressed, but if the trigger is involved the use of a CED by a supervisor. held down the device will activate continuously. Both models can be manually shut off before the full CED Use five-second cycle is completed. CEDs in these incidents were almost exclu- Several respondents reported that in some sively devices produced by TASER International. instances data retrieved from M26 models have Model M26 was used in 59 percent of the cases, been faulty. Incorrect dates, times, and days of the while model X26 was used in 40 percent of the week were cited. Figure 5.3—from an actual down- cases. An early model Air TASER was used in one load—depicts an M26 download with incorrect case. There were no reported occurrences of multi- data. This download indicates multiple trigger pulls ple CEDs being used simultaneously. Seventy-seven occurring during what was in fact a single activa- percent of the incidents involved CED applications tion, based on time intervals noted.

Figure 5.3: A Sample M26 Download With Incorrect Data

116 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration Respondents provided the total duration Post-Incident Information of activation and the number of cycles for each Medical attention was given to 91 percent of incident. This total duration does not necessarily the subjects following activation. Seventy-eight represent a continuous exposure to CED activation, percent of the subjects were transported to the hos- but rather the cumulative activations that occurred pital. Thirty-six percent were transported in the during the incident. It is possible, however, that the first 10 minutes, 66 percent in the first 20 minutes, CED exposure occurred in a single application. The and 88 percent were transported in the first 30 min- total duration was evaluated in three different cate- utes following CED usage. In the reported cases, the gories: when only probes were used, when only average time of death following the use of a CED drive stun was used, and when a combination of was 63 minutes (see Figure 5.4). both was used. In addition to providing the average duration, Table 5.14 includes the median and mode for the total duration.8

Table 5.14: Total duration of CED activation (in seconds) during incidents where a person died in proximity to exposure Mean Median Mode Activation Duration Duration Duration Probe 28 seconds 25 seconds 25 seconds Drive stun 31 seconds 25 seconds 20 seconds Both 39 seconds 30 seconds 25 seconds

Figure 5.4: Time Elapsed Between CED Activation and Subject’s Death

8. The mean time represents the duration of CED activations obtained by dividing the sum of reported duration times by the reported number of incidents; the median time represents the time duration at the midpoint of all reported duration times; and the mode time reflects the most frequently reported duration time.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 117 Autopsy Results observations, certain behaviors can prompt a series Autopsy findings have proved to be a critical, of procedural responses. Officers may readily often contested, source of information in proximity observe obesity and the effects of illicit drug and death cases. Much discussion has revolved around alcohol use in a person. Recognition of such factors medical examiner findings; attention is paid to can and should affect decisions to obtain medical whether the CED was listed as a contributing or treatment for the subject. primary factor in the death, reports of the level and Excited delirium is an important contributing toxicity of drugs, and other contributing factors. factor. The PERF CED glossary describes excited Respondents indicated that autopsies were per- delirium as a state of extreme mental and physiologi- formed in 92 percent of the cases.“Primary cause of cal excitement, characterized by extreme agitation, death” findings were grouped into six different cat- hyperthermia, epiphoria, hostility, exceptional egories in Table 5.15. Autopsy data were provided to strength, and endurance without fatigue. There is not PERF from law enforcement agencies. agreement within the medical community whether Toxicology reports are indicated in Table 5.16. this diagnosis for a conglomerate of symptoms is Respondents reported that in some cases there medically valid. Proponents of the concept of were several contributing factors that influenced excited delirium argue that it is a valid medical diag- death. Contributing factors are listed in Table 5.17. nosis and represents a medical emergency. Regard- Contributing factors provide insight as to less, it would be prudent for law enforcement to behaviors that officers observed during the con- focus training not on the final possible diagnosis of frontations. Although it is unrealistic to expect excited delirium, but rather on the signs of this state that officers can diagnose a subject based on field that field personnel might observe.

Table 5.15: Number and percentage of primary cause Table 5.16: Reported toxicology results in primary of death findings in CED proximity deaths incidents cause of death findings involving reported deaths occurring in proximity to a CED activation Number Cause of Death of Cases Percent Overdose Drug issues 20 26 % Probably or Critical Excited delirium Drug Detected Intoxicated Toxicity and drug-use issues 16 21 % Alcohol 15 % 18 % 2 % Excited delirium 10 13 % Prescription drugs 6 % –5% Health and Illicit drugs 9 % 10 % 69 % drug-use issues 810% Unknown 810% Health issues 4 5 % Table 5.17: Contributing factors that influenced death in cases where persons died in proximity Autopsy not finished 2 3 % to a CED activation CED 1 1 % Other 8 10 % Contributing Factors Percent Illicit drug use 82 % Excited delirium 39 % Health problems 33 % Alcohol use 13 % Obesity 11 % CED Use 8 % Prescription drug use 5 % Positional asphyxia 3 %

118 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration Comparison Group armed with some other type of weapon. Seventeen The comparison group used for this study consisted percent of the subjects were described as behaving of 662 incidents involving CED activations that as if they suffered from a mental illness, while 67 were not fatal. Two cities (Madison, Wisc., and Seat- percent were described as under the influence of tle) that maintained comprehensive electronic data alcohol, illicit drugs, or both. on CED use—and were not part of the original PERF also examined the duration of CED sample of 96 law enforcement agencies with prox- activations for both nonfatal and proximity death 9 imity deaths—were selected as comparison sites. It incidents. In nonfatal situations, 88 percent of is noted that there are methodological limitations the subjects were activated for 15 seconds or less. of using these comparison groups, which are dis- Forty-five percent of the nonfatal cases consisted 10 cussed at the end of this chapter. These cases of only one five-second cycle. occurred between 2001 and 2005. An incident pro- In proximity death situations where probe file was created to compare individual and situa- mode was used, subjects were activated for an aver- tional facts against the reported proximity death age of 28 seconds. In proximity death situations cases. Several aspects of both proximity death and where drive-stun mode was used, subjects were non-fatal cases were similar. The gender and race of activated an average of 31 seconds. In proximity individuals involved were consistent. Subjects death situations where both probe and drive-stun involved in nonfatal cases were 92 percent male, 46 modes were used, subjects were activated an aver- percent white, 42 percent black, and 12 percent age of 39 seconds. Figure 5.5 depicts the contrasting other. Officers experienced similar levels of aggres- applications between proximity death and non- sion and resistance as those involved in the proxim- fatal cases. ity death cases. Subjects in nonfatal cases exhibited 38 percent active aggression, 31 percent severe aggression, and 11 percent deadly aggression, while in proximity death cases officers experienced 22 Figure 5.5: Comparison of Proximity Death and Non-Fatal Cases by percent active aggression, 59 per- Number of CED Cycles cent severe aggression, and 6 per- (For the purposes of this study, a cycle was defined as five seconds.) cent deadly aggression. Percent of death and non-fatal CED cases Fifteen percent of the sub- by number of CED cycles jects in the comparison group were noncompliant, compared to 12 percent in proximity death cases. The proportion of armed subjects was also similar. Twenty percent of the individuals involved in nonfatal cases were armed or attempted to arm themselves during the confrontation. These included 13 percent armed with firearms, 49 percent armed with edged weapons, and 38 percent

9. For the purposes of this study, a CED cycle was defined as 5 seconds. 10. Comparison data do not distinguish between probe and drive-stun mode.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 119 Risk Mitigation Factors training that emphasized the individual depart- Bivariate statistical techniques were used to comment’s use of force philosophy—rather than a pare the death and non-death cases. Using this generic version from a manufacturer; and, impor- method, several significant variables were identified tantly, emphasizing in training that if a CED (or as having an association with proximity death other force option) is not producing the desired cases. While we recognize that association does not effect, then changing to a different force option or mean causation, there are important issues that were tactic may be necessary. identified that may influence policy development. Proximity death cases seems more likely to involve: Caveats/Limitations of Information n A longer duration of activation, Regarding PERF CED Data n Multiple CED cycles in either probe, drive stun, The goal of the PERF CED project was to make a or combination (the greater number of cycles contribution to the field that would help law increases the risk of a proximity death occurring), enforcement leaders make more informed decisions about CEDs. This has largely been achieved. n Multiple officers using a CED, Nonetheless, PERF notes several items related to n A subject exhibiting severe aggression and/or the data that were used in these exploratory studies. fleeing, All information used by PERF was obtained directly from law enforcement agencies. However, in the n A subject who appeared to be under the influ- first study, prior to contacting law enforcement ence of drugs, agencies directly, PERF relied on a list obtained n A subject who appeared to be under the influ- from TASER International consisting of agencies ence of both alcohol and drugs, that purchased at least 100 CEDs. In the second study, prior to contacting law enforcement agencies A subject who appeared to be suffering from a n directly, PERF used information from the Arizona mental illness, Republic and Amnesty International about deaths n The use of a CED in probe mode, occurring in proximity to a CED activation. In both cases, PERF used such information from these An incident where an officer is injured, and/or n organizations because they were at the time the n A traffic incident. major source of available data for identifying agencies using CEDs and agencies that had experienced Respondents were asked to describe any les- proximity deaths. However, the information we sons learned after internal investigations were com- received was obviously limited to the quality of the pleted in each death case. While few agencies record-keeping system and honest cooperation indicated that their department would no longer from the aforementioned sources. It is possible that use CED technology, many respondents indicated we might have missed some eligible agencies in our that training and CED policies needed to be study. A survey of all law enforcement agencies in improved. The recurring themes that emerged the United States obviously would have been more were: mandatory monitoring periods for individu- comprehensive.11 Further, both PERF CED studies als who received a CED activation; a more compre- are based on self-reports12 from agencies them- hensive policy for CED use; more thorough selves, without independent verification of the

11. Given the exploratory nature of this study, data sources were deemed to be reasonably reliable for the descriptive purposes of our research. 12. The response rate for the first survey was 90% (74/82); the response to the second survey was 65% (77/118).

120 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration information provided (e.g., interviewing the offi- presented here will be important in guiding police cers involved in the CED incident). The issue of executives and policy-makers as they develop and relying on self-reports is not a limitation unique to refine policies and procedures. policing studies. The 52 PERF CED Guidelines for Considera- In addition, it would have been desirable to tion and the PERF CED Glossary—contained in also collect data on non-death CED activations the next section—can significantly aid law enforce- from the original sample of 96 law enforcement ment executives who are developing CED policies, agencies rather than only the two comparison sites. training, and procedures. As noted earlier, these two However, to complete the study in a timely manner, studies and a summit of law enforcement experts PERF instead chose a large sample from only those were instrumental in crafting these conservative, two sites.13 The limitations of using non-equivalent narrow, and pragmatic guidelines. However, there is comparative designs are well documented, but clearly more research needed to better understand PERF believes that the 662 incidents studied were both the strengths and limitations of these devices. sufficient for these initial exploratory studies.14 Finally, PERF relied on existing electronic data from the two comparison cities, and the data col- THE DEVELOPMENT OF lected were not originally collected for PERF’s sur- PERF CED GUIDELINES vey but for internal law enforcement agency use, FOR CONSIDERATION AND thus limiting the number of comparisons that CED GLOSSARY OF TERMS could be conducted. Police executives are constantly striving to identify new strategies to create safe encounters between police officers and violent persons. An important Conclusion part of any such strategy involves the identification Ultimately, additional longitudinal research studies and deployment of less-lethal weapons such as con- are necessary to achieve a more complete under- ducted energy devices. It was in this context that standing of the effects of conducted energy devices law enforcement agencies throughout the United on individuals, especially individuals engaging in States began to acquire and deploy CEDs. Any at-risk behaviors like illicit drug usage and physical technology—especially one that has the potential to aggression toward police. These types of studies can cause injury and possible death—must be carefully take years to complete and can be costly. Law assessed using whatever reliable information is enforcement executives do not have the luxury to available. While longitudinal research on CEDs is wait years for definitive results. The need for cur- necessary and indeed under way, long-term studies rent information is critical. Like many other public can take years to complete, and police executives policy decisions, police administrators must for- needed CED information quickly so they could mulate use-of-force strategies based on organiza- develop effective new policies—or refine, calibrate, tional needs and the needs of a diverse community. and strengthen current ones. This pressing need for Police executives need to evaluate and prioritize standardization and well-researched guidelines disparate information to formulate policies and prompted PERF to begin examining CEDs in training that effectively serve their officers and their depth. communities. It is our hope that the information

13. Such an approach would have avoided the problem of comparing cases from different places that are subject to a variety of different environmental factors (e.g., different policies and training for officers on the use of CEDs in one community compared to another). 14. See Campbell, D. T., & J. S. Stanley (1963). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 121 COMMENTARY: box 5.2 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in a Use-of-Force Context by Daniel Dugan health care provider that transmits health information in electronic form (45 C.F.R.). On August 21, 1996, Congress passed the Health Initially, there was some confusion about the Insurance Portability and Accountability Act complex statute when it came to exemptions of (HIPAA/Public Law 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1996). protected health information for law enforcement With this law, Congress ordered the development purposes. Police officers interact with the medical of a series of new regulations to simplify the community on a daily basis and have a legitimate administration of health insurance (Bilimoria need for protected health information. A signifi- 2002). HIPAA amended the Internal Revenue cant issue that was raised about HIPAA is Code of 1986, and its purpose was to improve the whether its exemptions actually undermine its portability and continuity of health insurance as strong privacy protections. There is a long list of well as to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in instances in which protected health information health care and health insurance. The law can be disclosed without the patient’s consent resulted in establishment of privacy standards (45 C.F.R.). Included in that list are exceptions for that directly impact law enforcement practices in law enforcement. Investigations of police use-of- a use-of-force context—notably in access to sub- force incidents routinely include documentation jects’ and officers’ medical records. of any injuries to the subject. This is a legitimate The Act required the U.S. Department of goal of the use-of-force evaluation and documen- Health and Human Services to submit recom- tation process. Some law enforcement agencies mendations for national privacy standards to specify medical provider interviews, photographs Congress. Regulations were finalized on April 14, of injuries, and/or retrieval of medical records as 2001. Health care providers required to comply part of the minimum required investigation into a with the HIPAA privacy standards were then given use-of-force event (Bozeman 2005). a compliance deadline, and on April 14, 2003, the The Department of Health and Human Ser- grace period ended and the privacy provisions vices has provided guidance to frequently asked went into effect. questions relating to the HIPAA’s privacy rules, HIPAA privacy provisions apply to all health including when entities are permitted to disclose information regardless of format: electronic, protected health information to law enforcement paper, or oral. The privacy provisions apply to all officials (U.S. Department of Health and Human states and preempt contrary state law, unless the Services, 2005). The privacy rules are balanced to contrary state law provision is more stringent protect an individual’s privacy while allowing than HIPAA. HIPAA’s privacy provisions prohibit important law enforcement functions to con- a covered entity from disclosing protected health tinue. The rule permits covered entities to dis- information, except as authorized by the individ- close protected health information to law ual who is subject of the information or as explic- enforcement officials without the individual’s itly permitted by regulation. Protected health written authorization under specific circum- information is defined as individually identifiable stances. Highlighted circumstances are listed health information that is (a) transmitted by elec- below (45 C.F.R.): tronic media, (b) maintained in an electronic n To comply with a court order or court-ordered medium, or (c) transmitted or maintained in any warrant, a subpoena or summons issued by a other form or medium (Title 45 Code of Federal judicial officer, or a grand jury subpoena; Regulations). A covered entity is defined as any health plan, health care clearinghouse, or any n To respond to an administrative request;

122 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration n To respond to a request for protected health Except when required by law, in disclosures to information for purposes of identifying or law enforcement by a covered entity, the entity locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness, or may rely upon the representations of law enforce- missing person; ment officials as to what information is the minimum necessary for their lawful purpose (45 n To identify a suspected perpetrator of a crime C.F.R.). Moreover, if the law enforcement official when the report is made by the victim who is a making the request for information is not known member of the covered entity’s workforce; to the covered entity, the covered entity must ver- n To identify or apprehend an individual who has ify the identity and authority of such person prior admitted participation in a violent crime to disclosing the information (45 C.F.R.). Further, in some states, local statutes may be more strin- n To respond to a request for protected health gent than HIPAA regulations; therefore, it is information about a victim of a crime, if the vic- important for law enforcement agencies to under- tim agrees; stand their own jurisdiction’s laws on protected n In cases of child abuse or neglect; health information (45 C.F.R.). n In cases of adult abuse, neglect, or domestic Law enforcement agencies should prepare in violence (where individuals agree, a report is advance for medical records retrieval. It is impor- required by law or expressly authorized by law, tant that agencies understand the needs and or the information is necessary to prevent seri- requirements of medical facilities and, conversely, ous harm to the individual or others); that medical facilities understand the needs and n To report protected health information to law requirements of law enforcement. Some agencies enforcement when required by law have an internal or municipal legal affairs office that can help develop a police department’s n To alert law enforcement to the death of the HIPAA-related processes. Further, included in individual; Appendix 4 of this book are sample templates of n To report protected health information that the memoranda forms for law enforcement agencies covered entity in good faith believes to be evi- to use in order to obtain medical information. The dence of a crime that occurred on the covered forms were developed by Dr. William P. Bozeman, entity’s premises; a professor of Emergency Medicine at Wake For- est University, who is leading a National Institute n To identify or apprehend an individual who of Justice study on injuries resulting from the use appears to have escaped from lawful custody of less-lethal weapons. The forms are included n To federal officials authorized to conduct intel- with his permission. ligence, counter-intelligence, and other Law enforcement agencies must develop pro- national security activities; or cedures for obtaining protected health information, both to achieve legitimate law enforcement n To respond to a request for protected health objectives and to respect an individual’s privacy information by a correctional institution or a regarding medical information. This article pro- law enforcement official having lawful custody vides a broad overview of HIPAA-related issues of a person. and shares information that will help police executives make informed decisions about police department health-information policies. n

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 123 PERF began its research by identifying and need to better protect the public and the safety of assessing available academic and professional stud- their officers. PERF was pleased to bring this infor- ies and reports. PERF participated in and hosted mation to the field to convey the best possible several international symposiums on CEDs, and police service to all communities, and to provide partnered with Canadian and British counterparts. officers with the maximum number of alternatives We reviewed a large number of police and sheriff’s in use-of-force situations. department policies, consulted with medical doc- These CED guidelines for consideration are tors, and examined media reports. PERF used the presented with the understanding that many use- data collected to develop and conduct the two of-force situations can change rapidly and may national CED studies presented in this book. Sub- require law enforcement officers to make quick sequently, on October 18, 2005, with the support of decisions about force options. It is impossible to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Ser- anticipate every possible use-of-force situation or vices (COPS) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance circumstance that may occur, and in all cases offi- of the United States Department of Justice, PERF cers need to rely on their training, judgment, and brought together representatives from more than instincts. However, the guidelines that follow can 50 law enforcement agencies that used CEDs, med- help law enforcement officers make more informed ical doctors, labor union representatives, academic judgments about CEDs and how and when to use researchers, and other experts to carefully vet a set CEDs to protect themselves and the public. of proposed CED guidelines and glossary. All of While every effort was made to consider the these efforts culminated with the painstaking devel- views of all contributors and the best thinking on opment of the 52 PERF CED Guidelines for Con- the vast amount of information received, the result- sideration and CED Glossary of Terms presented in ing PERF guidelines do not necessarily reflect the this book. A detailed report chronicling the devel- individual views of every stakeholder involved in opment of the PERF CED guidelines and glossary is the development process, nor the views of the U.S. available in a COPS Office publication entitled Department of Justice. What they do represent is Conducted Energy Devices: Development of Stan- our best judgment given the available information dards for Consistency and Guidance. we had at the time of these studies. It is our hope The field urgently needed this guidance about that as new information and research become avail- CEDs. While the guidelines and glossary are not able, researchers and policy makers will continue to meant to represent the final and definitive perspec- review and refine these guidelines. tives on CEDs, they do provide needed clarification, information, and consistency that can help guide police executives in developing and refining CED PERF CED Guidelines for policy. The glossary and guidelines address such crit- Consideration ical topics as delineating the levels of a subject’s resistance to police authority at which CED activation is 1. CEDs should only be used against persons who permissible; parameters on the number and duration are actively resisting or exhibiting active aggres- of CED cycles that can be applied; restrictions on sion, or to prevent individuals from harming CED use against at-risk populations; how police themselves or others. CEDs should not be used should respond to a suspect who is armed with a against a passive suspect. CED; tactical considerations about when a CED can 2. No more than one officer should activate a CED be activated; and numerous other concerns. against a person at a time. PERF developed the glossary of terms and guidelines for consideration in the hope that they 3. When activating a CED, law enforcement officers will be useful in providing the kind of information should use it for one standard cycle and stop to that law enforcement leaders and policy makers evaluate the situation (a standard cycle is five

124 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration seconds). If subsequent cycles are necessary, 12. Officers should avoid firing darts at a subject’s agency policy should restrict the number and head, neck and genitalia. duration of those cycles to the minimum activa- 13. All persons who have been exposed to a CED tions necessary to place the subject in custody. activation should receive a medical evaluation. 4. Training protocols should emphasize that multi- Agencies shall consult with local medical per- ple activations and continuous cycling of a CED sonnel to develop appropriate police-medical appear to increase the risk of death or serious protocols. injury and should be avoided where practical. 14. All persons who have been subjected to a CED 5. Training should include recognizing the limita- activation should be monitored regularly while tions of CED activation and being prepared to in police custody even if they received medical transition to other force options as needed. care. 6. That a subject is fleeing should not be the sole 15. CED darts should be treated as a biohazard. justification for police use of a CED. Severity of Officers should not generally remove CED offense and other circumstances should be con- darts from a subject that have penetrated the sidered before officers’ use of a CED on the flee- skin unless they have been trained to do so. ing subject. Agencies should coordinate with medical personnel to develop training for such removal. 7. CEDs should not generally be used against preg- Only medical personnel should remove darts nant women, elderly persons, young children, that have penetrated a person’s sensitive areas. and visibly frail persons unless exigent circumstances exist. 16. Following a CED activation, officers should use a restraint technique that does not impair 8. CEDs should not be used on handcuffed persons respiration. unless they are actively resisting or exhibiting active aggression, and/or to prevent individuals 17. CEDs should not be used in the known pres- from harming themselves or others. ence of combustible vapors and liquids or other flammable substances including but not lim- 9. CEDs should not generally be used when a sub- ited to alcohol-based Oleoresin Capsicum ject is in a location where a fall may cause sub- (O.C.) Spray carriers. Agencies utilizing both stantial injury or death. CEDs and O.C. Spray should use a water-based 10. When a subject is armed with a CED and attacks spray. or threatens to attack a police officer, the officer 18. Agencies should create stand-alone policies and may defend him- or herself to avoid becoming training curriculum for CEDs and all less-lethal incapacitated and risking the possibility that the weapons, and ensure that they are integrated subject could gain control of the officer’s with the department’s overall use-of-force policy. firearm. When possible, officers should attempt to move outside the device’s range (approxi- 19. Agencies should partner with adjacent jurisdic- mately 21 feet) and seek cover, as well as request tions and enter into a Memorandum of Under- back-up officers to mitigate the danger. standing to develop joint CED policies and protocols. This should include addressing non- 11. When possible, emergency medical personnel alcoholic O.C. Spray carriers. Agencies should should be notified when officers respond to also establish multijurisdictional CED training, calls for service in which it is anticipated that a collaboration and policy. CED may be activated against a person.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 125 20. If officers’ privately owned CEDs are permitted to 29. When applicable, an announcement should be be used on duty, policy should dictate specifica- made to other officers on the scene that a CED tions, regulations, qualifications, etc. The devices is going to be activated. should be registered with the department. 30. A supervisor should respond to all incident 21. The CED “Probe Mode” should be the primary scenes where a CED was activated. setting option, with “Drive Stun Mode” gener- 31. A supervisor should conduct an initial review ally used as a secondary option. of a CED activation. 22. CEDs should be regulated while officers are off 32. Every instance of CED use, including an acci- duty under rules similar to service firearms dental discharge, should be accounted for in a (including storage, transportation, use, etc.). use-of-force report. 23. CEDs should not be used against suspects in 33. Agencies should consider initiating force inves- physical control of a vehicle in motion to tigations outside the chain of command when include automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, any of the following factors are involved: ATVs, bicycles and scooters unless exigent circumstances exist. a. A subject experiences death or serious injury; 24. The use of brightly colored CEDs (e.g., yellow) b. A person experiences prolonged CED acti- reduces the risk of escalating a force situation vation; because they are plainly visible and thus c. The CED appears to have been used in a decrease the possibility that a secondary unit punitive or abusive manner; mistakes the CED for a firearm (sympathetic d. There appears to be a substantial deviation fire). Note that specialized units (e.g., SWAT from training; and Units) may want dark-colored CEDs for tacti- e. A person in an at-risk category has been cal concealment purposes. subjected to activation (e.g., young chil- 25. CEDs should be maintained in a holster on an dren; persons who are elderly/frail, preg- officer’s weak (support) side to avoid the acci- nant women, and any other activation as dental drawing and/or firing of an officer’s determined by a supervisor). sidearm. 34. When possible, supervisors and back-up offi- 26. Officers should be trained that the TASER™ cers should anticipate on-scene officers’ use of CED’s optimum range is 15 feet.15 CEDs by responding to calls for service that have a high propensity for arrest and/or use of 27. Auxiliary/Reserve officers can be armed with a CED. CEDs provided they receive all mandated training and maintain all requalification require- 35. Every substantial investigation (and when pos- ments. Training and local statutes may dictate sible every preliminary investigation) should policy. include: a. Location and interview of witnesses 28. A warning should be given to a person prior to (including other officers); activating the CED unless to do so would place any other person at risk. b. Photographs of subject and officer injuries; c. Photographs of cartridges/darts;

15. Association of Chief Police Officers, 2004. Independent Evaluation of the Operational Trial of TASER.™

126 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration d. Collection of CED cartridges, darts/prongs, 44. Statistics should be maintained to identify CED data downloads, car video, confetti ID tags; trends and deployment concerns. Agencies and may include display and arcing of weapons to e. Copies of the device data download. measure prevention/deterrence effectiveness. f. Other information as indicated in guide- CED statistics should be constantly analyzed line #45. and made publicly available. 36. Police leaders should be aware that CED down- 45. The following statistical information should be load data may be unreliable. Police leaders and included when collecting information about investigators should be able to articulate the CED use: difference between the actual duration of a a. Date, time, location of incident; CED activation on a person and the total time b. The use of the laser dot or display of the of discharge registered on a CED device. CED that deterred a subject and gained compliance; 37. CED activations should be tracked in the c. Identifying and descriptive information of department’s early intervention system (EIS). the suspect (including membership in an 38. The department should periodically conduct at-risk population), all officers firing CEDs, random audits of CED data downloads and rec- all officer witnesses, and all other witnesses; oncile use-of-force reports with recorded activa- d. The type and brand of CED used; tions. Departments should take necessary action e. The number of CED cycles, the duration of as appropriate when inconsistencies are detected. each cycle, the duration between cycles and 39. Audits should be conducted to ensure that all the duration that the subject was actually officers who carry CEDs have attended initial activated; and recertification training. f. Level of aggression encountered; g. Any weapons possessed by the suspect; 40. Departments should not solely rely on training h. The type of crime/incident the subject curriculum provided by a CED manufacturer. was involved in; Agencies should ensure that manufacturers’ training does not contradict their use-of-force i. Determination of whether deadly force policies and values. Agencies should ensure that would have been justified; their CED curriculum is integrated into their j. The type of clothing worn by the subject; overall use-of-force systems. k. The range at which the CED was used; l. The type of mode used (probe or drive 41. CED recertification should occur at least annu- stun); ally and consist of physical competency and m. The point of impact of probes on a subject device retention, changes in agency policy, in probe mode; technology changes, and reviews of local and national trends in CED use. n. The point of impact on a subject in drive stun mode; 42. Exposure to CED activation in training should o. Location of missed probe(s); be voluntary; all officers agreeing to be subjected p. Terrain and weather conditions during to a CED activation should be apprised of risks CED use; associated with exposure to a CED activation. q. Lighting conditions; 43. Supervisors and command staff should receive r. The type of cartridge used; CED awareness training so they can make edu- s. Officer suspicion that subject was under cated decisions about the administrative inves- the influence of drugs (specify if available); tigations they review.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 127 t. Medical care provided to the subject; and Active Aggression — A threat or overt act of an u. Any injuries incurred by an officer or assault (through physical or verbal means), coupled subject. with the present ability to carry out the threat or assault, which reasonably indicates that an assault 46. Law enforcement agencies should conduct or injury to any person is imminent. neighborhood programs that focus on CED awareness training. CED training should be Actively Resisting — Physically evasive movements part of any citizen’s training academy program. to defeat an officer’s attempt at control, including 47. The agency’s Public Information Officer should bracing, tensing, pushing, or verbally signaling an receive extensive training on CEDs in order to intention to avoid or prevent being taken into or better inform the media and the public about retained in custody. the devices. Members of the media should be briefed on the department’s policies and use of Aggravated Active Aggression — Deadly force CEDs. encounter.

48. CED awareness should extend to law enforce- Air Cartridge — A replaceable cartridge which uses ment partners such as local medical personnel, compressed gases to fire two probes on connecting citizen review boards, medical examiners, wires, sending a high voltage/low current signal mental health professionals, judges and local into a subject. prosecutors. 49. CEDs can be effective against aggressive ani- Applicable Response — Response determined mals. Policies should indicate whether use appropriate for the given operational scenario. against animals is permitted. Arcing/Arching — Activating a CED without a 50. Officers should be aware that there is a higher cartridge. risk of sudden death in people under the influence of drugs and/or symptoms associated with Automatic External Defibrillator (AED) — An excited delirium. apparatus that monitors the heart of the patient 51. CED cartridges with longer barbs may be more and then automatically administers a controlled effective in extremely cold climates. electric shock to the chest to restore normal heart rhythm. 52. Agencies should be aware that CED cartridges have experienced firing problems in extremely B cold weather. Basis Response — Generic responses that describe PERF CED Glossary of Terms how people routinely behave as the result of the application of a weapon or technology [or tactic, or procedure] employed against them. A Bodily Injury — Injury to the human body that Accidental Discharge — The unintentional firing requires treatment by a doctor or other health of a conducted energy device (CED). professional.

Activate — Depressing the trigger of a CED causing a CED to arc or to fire probes.

128 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration C Crowd Control — The use of police action to stop the activities of persons assembled. CED Cycle — Duration of a CED electrical discharge following a CED activation. Crowd Management — Observing, monitoring, and facilitating the activities of persons assembled. Central Information Display (CID) — Display of data on the back of a conducted energy device. D

Circular Situational Force Model — A circular Dart Placement — Point of entry for a probe on a force training model that promotes continuous person’s body. critical assessment and evaluation of a force incident in which the level of response is based upon Dart (Barb) Removal — The act of removing a the situation encountered and level of resistance probe from a person’s body or clothing. offered by a subject. The situational assessment helps officers determine the appropriate force Darts — Projectiles that are fired from a CED and option, ranging from physical presence to deadly penetrate the skin; wires are attached to the probes force. leading back to the CED.

Coincidental Injury — Injuries received in the Deadly Force — Any tactic or use of force that has incident not directly related to CED use (such as an intended, natural, and probable consequence of baton use, self-inflicted wounds, gunshot wounds). serious physical injury or death.

Conducted Energy Device (CED) — A weapon Defensive Resistance — Physical actions that primarily designed to disrupt a subject’s central attempt to prevent officer’s control including flight nervous system by means of deploying electrical or attempt to flee, but do not involve attempts to energy sufficient to cause uncontrolled muscle con- harm the officer. tractions and override an individual’s voluntary motor responses. Deployment — Sending CED devices into the field with law enforcement officers. Confetti Tags — Confetti-like tags expelled from a cartridge of a CED when fired to shoot probes. Discharge — Barbs fired at a subject. Each tag contains a serial number unique to the specific cartridge used. Drive Stun — To stun a subject with a CED by making direct contact with the body after a CED Continuum of Force/Response to Resistance — cartridge has been expended or removed for pain A training model/philosophy that supports the pro- compliance. gressive and reasonable escalation and de-escalation of officer-applied force in proportional Duration — The aggregate period of time that response to the actions and level of resistance CED shocks are activated. offered by a subject. The level of response is based upon the situation encountered at the scene and the E actions of the subject in response to the officer’s commands. Such response may progress from the Electrocardiogram Monitor (ECG/EKG) — The officer’s physical presence at the scene to the appli- machine that measures and records the electrical cation of deadly force. activity of the heart.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 129 Electromuscular Disruption/Incapacitation (EMD) Intentional Discharge Investigation — An investi- (EMI) — Effect CED has on the body. Overrides the gation of the circumstances surrounding the firing brain’s communication with the body and prevents or drive-stunning of a CED. the voluntary control over the muscles. Intermediate Weapon — A weapon usage category Environmental Factors — Factors such as wind situated between a verbal command and lethal speed, temperature, humidity, lighting, precipita- force on a traditional force continuum. tion, terrain, etc. L Excessive Force — The application of an unreasonable amount (or force too long applied) of force Laser Pointing (Red Dot) — Unholstering and in a given incident based on the totality of the pointing a CED at a person and activating the circumstances. device’s laser dot.

Excited Delirium — State of extreme mental and Less Lethal — A concept of planning and force physiological excitement, characterized by extreme application that meets an operational or tactical agitation, hyperthermia, epiphoria, hostility, excep- objective, with less potential for causing death or tional strength, and endurance without fatigue. serious injury than conventional more-lethal police tactics. Exigent Circumstances — Circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that Less-Lethal Weapon — Any apprehension or prompt action is necessary to prevent physical restraint device that, when used as designed and harm to civilians and/or officers. intended, has less potential for causing death or serious injury than conventional police lethal F weapons.

Firing — Discharging CED darts at a person. M

Fleeing — An active attempt by a person to avoid Measures of Effectiveness — Measures indicating apprehension by a law enforcement officer through the degree to which a target response satisfies a evasive actions while attempting to leave the scene. requirement within an operational context.

G Measures of Response — Measures indicating how a target reacts to a system’s effects. Group Cohesion — The ability to disrupt or control a group of individuals by either restricting or O enhancing their organization, cooperation, and density. Objective Reasonableness — Reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the I perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the Initial Basic Operator Training — The first basic officer. CED training provided to officers prior to issuance of a CED. Onset Time — (ideally equal to zero) The period between the deployment of a less-lethal weapon

130 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration system [or tactic, technique, or procedure] and the Physical Weapon Characteristics — The intrinsic point when the magnitude of the desired effect qualities of a weapon including dimensional design attains some particular threshold. values associated with a weapon (weight, caliber, size, power requirement, shelf life, etc.). Operational Effectiveness — That level of force necessary to achieve compliance, safeguard persons S and property, or prevent injury. Secondary Injury (2nd Order Effect) — Physical Operational Safety — That degree of risk deter- trauma indirectly associated with CED use (e.g., mined to be acceptable in order to accomplish a injuries from falls). mission without unduly endangering officers, bystanders, or suspects. Sensitive Areas — A person’s head, neck, genital area, and a female’s breast areas. P Serious Bodily Injury — Bodily injury that, either Passive Resistance — Physical actions that do not at the time of the actual injury or at a later time, prevent the officer’s attempt to control, for exam- involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial ple, a person who remains in a limp, prone posi- risk of serious permanent disfigurement, a substan- tion, passive demonstrators, etc. tial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body, or breaks, Pointing/Aiming — Unholstering and pointing a fractures, or burns of the second or third degree. CED at a person. Spark Test — Non-contact testing of a CED by arc- Post-Activation Investigation — An investigation ing it to ensure it is in proper working order. of the circumstances surrounding the intentional or unintentional firing of probes or drive-stunning Standard CED Cycle — A five second electrical dis- of a CED. charge occurring when a CED trigger is pressed and released. The standard five-second cycle may be Primary Injury (1st Order Effect) — Immediate or shortened by turning the CED off. (Note: If a CED delayed consequences of a CED resulting directly trigger is pressed and held beyond five seconds, the from an electrical current flow in the body. CED will continue to deliver an electrical discharge until the trigger is released.) Probe Spread — The amount of distance between probes fired from a CED (e.g., approximately one Substantial Investigation — An extensive investi- foot spread for every seven feet travel distance). gation into the use of a conducted energy device that is conducted by investigators outside the chain Proximity Death — The death of a person that of command of the firing officer. occurred in proximity to the use of a conducted energy device (usually within 24 hours). T

Psychological Intimidation — Non-verbal cues in Target Recovery — (ideally full recovery immediately attitude, appearance, demeanor, posture, or physi- at the end of the desired duration) The period when cal readiness that indicate an unwillingness to the target response falls below a particular threshold cooperate, pre-assaultive posturing, or a threat. and a full recovery of unimpaired functionality is desired in an operationally meaningful context.

Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration — 131 U

Unintentional Discharge — The unintentional firing of a CED (includes discharges caused by involuntary muscle contraction and mechanical malfunction).

Ventricular Fibrillation (VF) — Ventricular fibrillation is a condition in which the heart’s electrical activity becomes disordered.

Verbal Non-Compliance — Verbal responses indicating an unwillingness to comply with an officer’s directions.

132 — Chapter 5. Conducted Energy Devices: PERF’s National Studies and Guidelines for Consideration Book Conclusion

by JOSHUA EDERHEIMER

A merican society has continually trans- more collaborative, transparent, and accountable. formed itself to meet the challenges of the modern This desire for collaboration is also illustrated in age. So too has law enforcement. Every aspect of law enforcement’s efforts to improve how it inter- policing has evolved, from policy and practice to acts with people with mental illness. equipment and tactics. Progressive police leaders In regard to less-lethal weaponry, law enforce- have led the profession’s advancement by seeking ment leaders will continue to seek ways to mini- out new ideas and implementing innovative strate- mize use of force and create greater opportunities gies. Two issues that have remained a constant focus for de-escalation of conflicts. This book helps in for police throughout this evolution have been use understanding the historical evolution of current of force and police accountability. And the impor- less-lethal devices, and adds context to their tance of community collaboration and public con- deployment and use today. Further, this book’s fidence have emerged as critical factors in examination of future less-lethal technologies will measuring police success. help police leaders think about the possibilities of Law enforcement agencies are now more more efficient weapons and tactics. Moreover, the “transparent,” and they have learned that collabora- book helps police executives to look beyond less- tion with a variety of other organizations and indi- lethal weapons and focus on desired force out- viduals leads to more effective policing. In addition, comes. Finally, the information provided in this police officers today are more accountable than they book on conducted energy devices (CEDs) led to have ever been before. This is, in part, due to cul- the development of PERF’s 52 CED guidelines for tural and technological advancements. Communi- consideration and CED glossary. This information, ties, better informed because they have greater and the accompanying guidelines, are being used access to information technology, have demanded throughout the United States. more police accountability. These demands, along The information in this book provides law with the leadership of progressive police leaders, enforcement leaders with practical guidance on have led to positive change. This book’s emphasis on these sensitive and timely issues. It is important for building community trust is a reflection of this pos- law enforcement leaders to continually scrutinize itive change. The dialogue and collaborations that their policies, practices, tactics, and weapon alterna- have occurred between the police and the public— tives. Law enforcement leaders must always seek out especially interactions that occur before the occur- new concepts and strategies by looking to fellow rence of a high-profile incident—have led to a police leaders—as well as outside the profession— greater degree of mutual understanding. to be better equipped to handle the challenges of The strategies cited in this book for reducing the future. community tensions, improving citizen complaint We hope that this book will play a role in fuel- processes, intervening early when officers shows ing innovation in policing and will contribute to signs of being troubled, and fostering citizen/police the progress that the law enforcement profession education demonstrate police agency efforts to be has enjoyed.

Book Conclusion — 133

APPENDIX 1 U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Service1 Responding to Incidents Involving Allegations of Excessive Use of Force A Checklist to Guide Police Executives

Years of good policing practices and community trust can be jeopardized by a single act of, or perception of, police excessive use of force (EUF). When an EUF incident occurs, police executives should be prepared to take appropriate and carefully considered action to promote peace, maintain community trust, and sustain departmental morale. When there are allegations of EUF, the department’s officers and staff, as well as the community they serve, must be assured of a fair and impartial investigation. Community tensions and violence may develop in the aftermath of an incident involving use of force or other police conduct. This checklist of immediate steps suggests actions to take right after an incident. The checklist of other actions identifies steps which can help create positive police-community relationships—the best protection against violent community reaction to an EUF incident.

IMMEDIATE STEPS II. Get an Investigation Underway Promptly I. Provide Information Promptly _____ Advise the family of the involved person(s) and the public about the investigation, including its _____ Advise the Mayor, County Executive, and scope, resources allocated, and projected timetables. other officials, key civic and community leaders and clergy about the situation. _____ Publicly clarify departmental policies governing the status of the involved officer(s) while the _____ Provide what information you can to the investigation is underway. public about the incident and the circumstances which prompted police action, but avoid any nega- _____ Announce publicly your willingness to tive comments about the suspect(s) or victim(s). cooperate with investigations by other agencies (local, State, and Federal). _____ Avoid making any prejudgments about the officers’ conduct before you have complete infor- _____ Hold periodic meetings with community mation and the investigation is completed. leaders to advise them of the progress of the investigation and any other developments. _____ Take precautions to avoid new incidents or confrontations.

1. No copyright is claimed on the text of this document.

Appendix 1. Responding to Incidents Involving Allegations of Excessive Use of Force — 135 III. Enlist the Community’s Help and Support Other Actions

_____ Brief community leaders and ask for their Below is a list of questions which police leaders should help in defusing community tensions by getting review periodically to assure adequacy of policies and accurate information to the community, organizing procedures governing issues involving Police Use of community street patrols, and scheduling neigh- Force. borhood meetings. _____ Does the Department have a written, _____ Conduct dialogues with community legally sound and publicly understood policy gov- groups to help establish a common understanding erning the circumstances for appropriate use of of the legal and administrative requirements of force? Were community representatives consulted EUF investigations. in the drafting or review of this document? _____ Survey community perspectives and invite _____ Does the Department keep accurate commentary and any expression of concerns about records of incidents of the use of force? Are these police arrests, stops, ticketing, profiling, and other records reviewed regularly for trends, officer pat- issues. terns, and other potential areas of concern? _____ What are the attitudes of the department’s IV. Anticipate and Plan for the Announcement of officers and staff about use of force issues? the Results of Investigations _____ Are these attitudes consistent with the _____ Brief the family, their associates, and com- Department’s policies? Is additional orientation or munity leaders on the results of the investigation training required? before making a public announcement. Seek their _____ Does the Department have a Standard assistance in keeping the community peaceful. Operating Procedure (SOP) governing its response _____ Arrange, where possible, for at least two to allegations of EUF? Does the SOP caution hour advance notice of public announcement of against making any premature judgments about the the decision by a grand jury, district attorney, or circumstances of the EUF incident and actions of court. the involved officer? _____ Be ready to implement a contingency plan _____ Does the SOP include arranging prompt in the event that the announcement may lead to assistance, including community resources, for the community tension or unrest. family of any alleged victims? Does the SOP provide for timely updates on the resources commit- _____ Meet with leaders of protest activities to ted, and progress and results of any investigation? secure agreement on the scope and limits of marches, flash points, demonstration sites, use of _____ Does the Department have established marshals, and other ground rules. contacts with all levels of community leadership who can be called upon in times of crisis? _____ Deploy sufficient resources to contain any disruptive activity or disorder. _____ What training is made available to officers on alternatives to use of force, including conflict resolution, problem solving, and communications skills? _____ Does the Department have a written complaint procedure that is simple to activate and requires a minimum of forms?

136 — Appendix 1. Responding to Incidents Involving Allegations of Excessive Use of Force _____ How does the Department respond to pub- The Community Relations Service (CRS), U.S. lic reports of use of force? How is the Department’s Department of Justice, has additional information response viewed by its staff and the community it and guidance for police departments on respond- serves? ing to excessive use of force incidents. Contact the Regional office nearest to you (see listing) or access _____ Does the Department have a SOP on its website at (address). CRS can help you prepare involving community leadership in ongoing discus- for and respond to EUF incidents. Its services are sion of community/police concerns? How do patrol available free of charge. officers and all other ranks participate in the discussions? CRS Contact: CRS Headquarters, 202-305-2935 _____ Has the Department developed a mission Fax: 202-305-3009 statement and set of Department values? Are www.usdoj.gov/crs community leaders aware of the values of the Department? (Revised April 2007)

Appendix 1. Responding to Incidents Involving Allegations of Excessive Use of Force — 137

APPENDIX 2 Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers1 c o u r t e s y o f t h e S e a t t l e P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t , 2 0 0 1. Full report available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/police/Publications/useforce/default.htm. 1

Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 139 140 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 141 142 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 143 144 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 145 146 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 147 148 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 149 150 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 151 152 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 153 154 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 155 156 — Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers Appendix 2. Seattle Police Department Special Report: Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers — 157

APPENDIX 3 Seattle Police Department Demographic Advisory Councils c o u r t e s y o f t h e S e a t t l e P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t , 2 0 0 1

Appendix 3. Seattle Police Department Demographic Advisory Councils — 159 160 — Appendix 3. Seattle Police Department Demographic Advisory Councils APPENDIX 4 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Guidelines (courtesy of Dr. William Bozeman)

— Law Enforcement Agency Letterhead —

Hospital Medical Records Retrieval

To: Medical Records Department, ______Hospital From: ______Date: ______Re : Administrative Request for Health Information

Suspect / Patient Information Name: ______Date of Birth: ______Date of Medical Evaluation: ______Social Security Number: ______

The above referenced individual was evaluated at your medical facility on or around the above referenced date while in police custody. The apprehension of that individual is now the subject of an authorized investigation by this department. Physical injuries sustained, if any, during his/her apprehension are pertinent to this investigation.

Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. §164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C), we are hereby requesting that you provide us with the following information: Copies of records related to the medical evaluation provided and any physical injuries sustained including prehospital, emergency department, radiology, laboratory, operative reports, inpatient records, and any other pertinent documents.

This Department, in accordance with 45 C.F.R. §164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C), hereby certifies that: (1) The information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry; (2) The request is specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which the information is sought; and (3) De-identified information could not reasonably be used.

This request for information is in full compliance with the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations (See 45 C.F.R. §164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C)). Patient authorization for release of this information is not required. (See reverse of this page.)

Thank you for your immediate attention and compliance.

Appendix 4. HIPAA Guidelines — 161 — Law Enforcement Agency Letterhead —

EMS Records Retrieval

To: ______ From: ______Date: ______Re : Administrative Request for Health Information

Suspect / Patient Information Name: ______Date of Birth: ______Date of Medical Evaluation: ______Social Security Number: ______

The above referenced individual was evaluated by your agency’s prehospital medical care providers on or around the above referenced date while in police custody. The apprehension of that individual is now the subject of an authorized investigation by this department. Physical injuries sustained, if any, during his/her apprehension are pertinent to this investigation.

Thank you for your immediate attention and compliance.

162 — Appendix 4. HIPAA Guidelines — Law Enforcement Agency Letterhead —

Medical Examiner Records Retrieval

To: ______ From: ______Date: ______Re : Administrative Request for Health Information

Suspect / Patient Information Name: ______Date of Birth: ______Date of Death: ______Social Security Number: ______

An autopsy was performed on the above referenced individual on or around the above referenced date. The apprehension of that individual prior to death is now the subject of an investigation by this department. Physical injuries sustained, if any, during his/her apprehension are pertinent to this investigation.

Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. §164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C), we are hereby requesting that you provide us with the following information: Copies of autopsy records documenting any physical injuries found.

Thank you for your immediate attention and compliance.

Appendix 4. HIPAA Guidelines — 163 (Back page of all 3 memo versions)

HIPAA regulations pertaining to Law Enforcement investigations: Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations state [45 CFR section 164.512(f)] that patient consent, written authorization, or opportunity to agree or object is not required for disclosures of privileged health information for law enforcement purposes. Applicable portions are highlighted below.

45 CFR Section 164.512 Uses and disclosures for which consent, an authorization, or opportunity to agree or object is not required. A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information without the written authorization of the individual, or the opportunity for the individual to agree or object, in the situations covered by this section, subject to the applicable requirements of this section. (a) Standard: uses and disclosures required by law. (b) Standard: uses and disclosures for public health activities. (c) Standard: disclosures about victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence. (d) Standard: uses and disclosures for health oversight activities. (e) Standard: disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings. (f) Standard: disclosures for law enforcement purposes. (1) Permitted disclosures: pursuant to process and as otherwise required by law. A covered entity may disclose protected health information: (i) As required by law including laws that require the reporting of certain types of wounds or other physical injuries, except for laws subject to paragraph (b)(1)(ii) or (c)(1)(i) of this section; or (ii) In compliance with and as limited by the relevant requirements of: (A) A court order or court-ordered warrant, or a subpoena or summons issued by a judicial officer; (B) A grand jury subpoena; or (C) An administrative request, including an administrative subpoena or summons, a civil or an authorized investigative demand, or similar process authorized under law, provided that: (1) The information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry; (2) The request is specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which the information is sought; and (3) De-identified information could not reasonably be used. (g) Standard: uses and disclosures about decedents. (h) Standard: uses and disclosures for cadaveric organ, eye or tissue donation purposes.

164 — Appendix 4. HIPAA Guidelines References

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References — 171 About the Editor/Authors/Contributors

ABOUT THE EDITOR ABOUT THE AUTHORS Joshua Ederheimer is a Captain with the Metro- Dr. Lorie A. Fridell is an associate professor in the politan Police Department of the District of Department of Criminology at the University of Columbia. He is currently serving in the Executive South Florida (USF). Prior to joining USF in Office of the Chief, coordinating the transition August 2005, she served for six years as the director efforts for newly appointed police chief Cathy L. of research at the Police Executive Research Forum Lanier. (PERF). Dr. Fridell has 20 years of experience con- Captain Ederheimer is the former director of ducting research on law enforcement. Her subject the Police Executive Research Forum’s Center on areas include police use of deadly force, use of less- Force and Accountability (CFA) in Washington, than-lethal weapons, police-minority relations, D.C. He joined PERF in January 2004 as a senior police pursuits, violence against police, and com- associate after a successful career with the Metro- munity policing. With regard to police use of force, politan Police Department. He subsequently she has authored, coauthored, or edited the follow- returned to MPD in January 2007. ing books: Police Use of Force: Official Reports, Citi- At MPD, he had attained the rank of Inspec- zen Complaints and Legal Consequences; Police tor and was named Director of the D.C. Police Civil Vehicles and Firearms: Instruments of Deadly Force; Rights and Force Investigations Division. During and Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force. his tenure at the MPD, he acquired expertise as a She completed her bachelor’s degree in psychology commanding officer in several areas, including: at Linfield College in McMinnville (OR), and both internal affairs; use of force; equal employment her master’s and Ph.D. in social ecology at the Uni- opportunity; and civil rights divisions. Captain versity of California at Irvine. Ederheimer reengineered numerous processes, and Steve Ijames is a major with the Springfield developed and led several operational units that (MO) Police Department, and has been a police emerged as national models in such areas as: inter- officer for the past 28 years. Major Ijames is the nal and force investigations, consent decree imple- course developer of the International Association of mentation, police accountability, policing in public Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers housing, and environmental crimes investigations. Association’s (NTOA) less-lethal force options He specializes in police leadership, manage- instructor/trainer programs. He has provided such ment reform, and business process reengineering. training on behalf of the IACP, NTOA, and U.S. Captain Ederheimer is also an adjunct professor at Department of State across the United States and in American University’s Department of Law, Justice, 33 foreign countries, including such diverse places and Society, where he has taught both graduate and as Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Yemen, and East Timor. undergraduate courses. He holds a bachelor’s He has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice degree in justice from American University, and a administration and a master’s degree in public master’s degree in management from Johns Hop- administration and is a graduate of the 186th FBI kins University. National Academy.

172 — About the Editor/Authors/Contributors Will Johnson is a lieutenant with the Arling- Executive Seminar. Recently, he completed a six- ton (TX) Police Department and a Police Executive month fellowship with the Police Executive Research Research Forum executive fellow with experience in Forum. Several years ago, he graduated summa cum administration, field operations, training, commu- laude from the University of Baltimore’s Criminal nity services, and media relations. He has served as Justice Program, where he was awarded the Merit a consultant and lectured on the use of force by Award as the top student in the class. police, managing the media, and police accountability. Currently, Lieutenant Johnson is assigned to the Operations Bureau, where he is a geographical ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS commander. He is also responsible for all decentral- David Bradley was a founder of the Centre for ized investigations for this area. Lieutenant Johnson Police Studies, Strathclyde University, Glasgow, holds a master’s in liberal arts from Texas Christian United Kingdom. He became the Foundation Dean University and a bachelor of arts from Texas Tech of Studies with the New South Wales Police in 1987. University. He is a graduate of the Texas Law His long-term project there was the pursuit of Enforcement Management Institute’s 45th Leader- police professionalization, the development of ship Command College. leading-edge police training, and the eventual relo- Melissa Reuland is an independent consultant cation of police foundational education into the on research and technical assistance projects related university system. He is the author of many books to law enforcement’s response to people with men- and papers on policing. In 2002, he became the Vic- tal illness. Ms. Reuland worked at the Police Execu- toria Police Research Fellow, developing a range of tive Research Forum from 1994 through 2004, strategic partnerships between police and univer- following 10 years in the social and medical sciences sity research groups. Victoria Police currently have managing research projects and analyzing large sets eight such research partnerships, with a range of of survey data. While at PERF, Ms. Reuland was a university groups, on topics including counter-ter- senior research associate, where she directed two rorism and policing multifaith communities, net- projects funded by the Technical Assistance Policy work policing, integrity and high-performance Analysis (TAPA) Center on Models for Law Enforce- policing, quality part-time work and corporate cit- ment Diversion of People with Mental Illness, which izenship in policing, and the police response to resulted in two monographs describing keys to pro- adult sexual assault. gram implementation. Ms. Reuland directed the Dr. Theodore C. Chan is professor on the fac- Law Enforcement Track of the Criminal Justice/ ulty in the Department of Emergency Medicine at Mental Health Consensus Project and PERF’s prior the University of California, San Diego, Medical project on the Police Response to People with Mental Center. Dr. Chan serves as the clinical director for Illnesses, coauthoring the publication of the same both of the university’s emergency departments as name. Ms. Reuland received her master’s in crimi- well as the codirector for custody services at UCSD. nal justice from the University of Baltimore. He has been principal investigator on two National Mark Warren is a 21-year veteran of the Bal- Institute of Justice-funded studies on O.C. spray timore County Police Department and is currently and conducted energy devices. Dr. Chan has been a major and commander of its Community involved in numerous studies evaluating law Resources Division. In addition to working in sev- enforcement restraint and control techniques, and eral different precincts, he has worked in the Strate- has also served as editor for a new textbook on gic Planning Unit, the Personnel Services Division, deaths in police custody. the Internal Affairs Section, the School Resources Daniel Dugan is a deputy chief with the Section, and has served as the department’s night Chicago Police Department and is responsible for the commander. He is a graduate of the FBI National four police districts that comprise the northeast cor- Academy and has attended the U.S. Secret Service ner of the city. He currently chairs the department’s

About the Editor/Authors/Contributors — 173 committee on conducted energy devices. Deputy effectiveness and efficiency of all operational and Chief Dugan’s previous assignment oversaw the administrative components, and delivers written citywide Special Operations Section. At the time, reports of findings and recommendations. Mr. Kol- the Special Operations Section included Hostage/ pack joined the PERF staff after a 23-year law Barricaded/Terrorist (HBT) Containment teams as enforcement career, including the last 20 years with well as a contingent of rapidly deployable officers. the Appleton (WI) Police Department, a CALEA- Canine handlers and part of uniformed patrol also accredited agency. Mr. Kolpack was deputy chief in were components of the Special Operations Sec- Appleton for nine years prior to joining PERF, and tion, along with the Canine Training Center, which his responsibilities included development and had the responsibility of training dogs for the Nar- management of the agency’s budget as well as over- cotics Section and bomb dogs for the airports. In sight of all operational services. Mr. Kolpack has a addition, subordinate units included the Marine bachelor of science degree in management and a Unit, Mounted Unit, Targeted Response Unit, master’s degree in management and organizational School Patrol Unit, Summer Mobile Force, and the behavior. He is a graduate of the FBI National Enhanced Foot Patrol. Deputy Chief Dugan Academy and the Senior Management Institute for received his bachelor of science degree in law Police. enforcement administration from Western Illinois Christine Nixon joined the New South Wales University and is a graduate of the 165th FBI Police Service in 1972 and became a member of the National Academy. first group of policewomen to be operationally Dr. David A. Klinger is associate professor of deployed in uniformed and armed general duties in criminology and criminal justice at the University the inner suburb of Darlinghurst in Sydney. In her of Missouri-St. Louis. He also has held positions as years with New South Wales Police, she enjoyed a assistant professor (1992–1998) and associate pro- varied policing career in policy-making, training, fessor of sociology (1998–1999) at the University of research, human resource management and, even- Houston. Prior to pursuing his graduate degrees, tually, as assistant commissioner in charge of a large Professor Klinger was a “street cop” with the Los operational region. She has been a Harkness Angeles Police Department and in Redmond (WA). Scholar, was seconded to the London Metropolitan He has held research positions at the Police Foun- Police, and has been a visiting lecturer at a number dation in Washington, D.C.; the University of of universities. In 2001, she became the first woman Washington, Seattle; the Washington State’s Attor- in Australia to head a police agency when she was ney’s Office; and the Seattle Police Department. In appointed chief commissioner of police, Victoria addition to his scholarly pursuits, Professor Klinger Police. She has been the recipient of many awards conducts training sessions for police officers and and honorary doctorates, including the Australian managers on the use of deadly force, serves as a Police Medal in 1997 and the Glass Ceiling Award police-practices expert in law enforcement litiga- of the National Center for Women and Policing in tion, and is regularly sought out by the news media 2002. She spent two years’ study leave in the United regarding various police issues. He holds an M.A. in States, where she graduated with a master of public justice from American University in Washington, administration from Harvard University. D.C., and a Ph.D. in sociology from the University Annie Russell has more than 30 years of pro- of Washington in Seattle. fessional experience in community organizing. She Bryce Kolpack is the former deputy director was recruited to join the District of Columbia’s Met- of the Management Services Division at PERF. ropolitan Police Department (MPD) in 1998. She Mr. Kolpack conducts ongoing research and pro- presently serves as the executive director of the MPD vides management services to police departments Policing for Prevention division that is charged with around the United States. He assesses current prac- internal and external community-policing policy tices, develops recommendations for enhanced development, partnership development, and

174 — About the Editor/Authors/Contributors training. Her commitment to ensuring that people Darrel W. Stephens was appointed Charlotte- have the information and opportunity for full par- Mecklenburg (NC) police chief in September 1999. ticipation in building safe and healthy neighbor- Under his leadership, the department has continued hoods has earned her many awards, such as the and expanded its community problem-oriented Harold Washington Award for Leadership, the policing philosophy. He has served as police chief in Chicago Police Department Partnership Award, and St. Petersburg (FL) (1992–97); executive director of the Metropolitan Police Department’s Meritorious the Police Executive Research Forum (1986–92); Service Medal. Ms. Russell earned a B.A. in adult police chief in Newport News (VA) (1983–86); education and curriculum development from police chief in Largo (FL) (1979–83); assistant chief Chicago State University and completed M.S. studies in Lawrence (KS) (1976–79); and police officer, ser- in management and development of human geant, and unit commander in Kansas City (MO) resources at National-Louis University. (1968–76). He also served for two years as the St. Christine Silverberg is an accomplished chief Petersburg city administrator (1997–99). He cur- executive and respected leader whose career in pub- rently serves as the vice president of the Major Cities lic safety spanned 30 years in both eastern and Chiefs Association. He was a member of the Har- western Canada. Ms. Silverberg was admitted to the vard Kennedy School Executive Session on Domes- Bar of Alberta in June 2005 and now practices at the tic Preparation, which produced several national law firm Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP. policy-oriented publications on terrorism issues Prior to her current job, she retired in the fall of between 2000 and 2003. He has coauthored several 2000 after a five-year term as chief of the Calgary books and published many articles on policing Police Service, then commenced studies at the Uni- issues. He holds a B.S. degree in the administration versity of Calgary Law School. At the same time, she of justice from the University of Missouri-Kansas launched a successful consulting practice advising City and an M.S. degree in public administration chief executives and governance authorities on from Central Missouri State University. managing important issues facing policing agen- Jessica Toliver joined PERF as a research cies, governments, and private-sector clients. She is associate in April 2005. Her work experience a graduate of both Ontario and Canadian Police includes criminal justice and homeland security Colleges. In addition to her LLB, she holds an M.A. research, analysis, and technical assistance. Prior to in criminology from the University of Toronto, joining PERF, she served as a policy analyst in the Professional Accreditation in Public Relations, is a Homeland Security and Technology Division at the graduate of the Queen’s University School of Busi- National Governors Association. There she devel- ness Executive Program, and is a graduate and oped, executed, and publicized the Anniversary member of the FBI’s National Executive Institute. Survey project; managed homeland security grant Dr. Christian M. Sloane is an assistant pro- programs; and organized policy academies to professor on the faculty in the Department of Emer- vide technical assistance to state teams. Ms. Toliver gency Medicine at the University of California, San received her bachelor’s degree in political science Diego, Medical Center. Dr. Sloane is an experienced and journalism from the University of Richmond and active educator of emergency-medicine resi- and her master’s degree in public policy from the dency and medical students. His research focus has Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the Uni- been in the area of CED use. He has recently coau- versity of Michigan. thored a textbook chapter that reviews the com- Dr. Gary M. Vilke is a professor on the faculty plete medical literature for deaths associated with in the Department of Emergency Medicine at the CED use. Dr. Sloane also serves as a physician University of California, San Diego, Medical Center. leader for the San Diego-based CA-4 Disaster Med- Dr. Vilke serves as medical director for the County ical Assistant Team (DMAT). of San Diego Emergency Medical Services (EMS) as

About the Editor/Authors/Contributors — 175 well as codirector for custody services at UCSD. He medicine and prehospital care. Additionally, Dr. is active in prehospital policy and serves on multi- Vilke serves as a medical director for the San Diego ple local and national EMS committees. His County Metropolitan Medical Strike Team research focus has been in the areas of tactical (MMST).

176 — About the Editor/Authors/Contributors About the Police Executive Research Forum

he Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) development training to police chiefs and law Tis a professional organization of progressive chief enforcement executives. Convened annually in executives of city, county and state law enforcement Boston, SMIP instructors include professors from agencies who collectively serve more than 50 per- leading universities, with the core faculty from Har- cent of the U.S. population. In addition, PERF has vard University’s Kennedy School of Government. established formal relationships with international PERF’s success is built on the active involve- police executives and law enforcement organiza- ment of its members. The organization also has tions from around the globe. Membership includes types of membership that allow the organization to police chiefs, superintendents, sheriffs, state police benefit from the diverse views of criminal justice directors, university police chiefs, public safety researchers, law enforcement professionals of all directors, and other law enforcement professionals. ranks, and others committed to advancing policing Established in 1976 as a nonprofit organization, services to all communities. As a nonprofit organi- PERF is unique in its commitment to the applica- zation, PERF is committed to the application of tion of research in policing and the importance of research in policing and to promoting innovation higher education for police executives. Besides a that will enhance the quality of life in our commu- commitment to police innovation and profession- nities. PERF’s objective is to improve the delivery of alism, PERF members must hold a four-year college police services and the effectiveness of crime con- degree. trol through the exercise of strong national leader- PERF continues to conduct some of the most ship, the public debate of criminal justice issues, the innovative police and criminal justice research and development of a body of research about policing, provides a wide variety of management and techni- and the provision of vital management services to cal assistance programs to police agencies through- all police agencies. out the world. PERF’s groundbreaking work on PERF has developed and published some of community and problem-oriented policing, racial the leading literature in the law enforcement field. profiling, use of force, less-lethal weapons, and Recently, PERF released two publications on con- crime reduction strategies has earned it a promi- temporary law enforcement issues. The books— nent position in the police community. PERF is one entitled Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of of the founding agencies of the Community Polic- Force and Police Management of Mass Demonstra- ing Consortium and the Commission on Accredita- tions: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches— tion for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). serve as practical guides to help police leaders make PERF continues to work toward increased profes- more informed decisions. In addition, PERF has sionalism and excellence in the field through its released a series of white papers on terrorism in the publications and training programs. PERF spon- local law enforcement context, Protecting Your sors and conducts the Senior Management Institute Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local for Police (SMIP). This program provides compre- Law Enforcement, which examined such issues as hensive professional management and executive local-federal partnerships, working with diverse

About the Police Executive Research Forum — 177 communities, bioterrorism, and intelligence shar- All: Understanding and Controlling Police Use of ing. Other recent publications include Managing a Deadly Force (1995); Why Police Organizations Multijurisdictional Case: Identifying Lessons Learned Change: A Study of Community-Oriented Policing from the Sniper Investigation (2004) and Commu- (1996); and Police Antidrug Tactics: New Approaches nity Policing: The Past, Present and Future (2004). and Applications (1996). PERF publications are Other PERF titles include the only authoritative used for training and promotion exams and to work on racial profiling, Racial Profiling: A Princi- inform police professionals about innovative pled Response (2001); Recognizing Value in Policing approaches to community problems. The hallmark (2002); The Police Response to Mental Illness (2002); of the program is translating the latest research and Citizen Review Resource Manual (1995); Managing thinking about a topic into police practices that can Innovation in Policing (1995); Crime Analysis be tailored to the unique needs of a jurisdiction. Through Computer Mapping (1995); And Justice For

To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.

178 — About the Police Executive Research Forum About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability

reated in April 2005, the PERF Center on investigations; police canines; policy development; CForce and Accountability (CFA) is designed to be a review boards; tactics; technology; training; trends significant resource for PERF members and others and identification of promising approaches; statis- in law enforcement, and to serve as the principal tics, tracking, and analysis; vehicle pursuits; and clearinghouse for ideas, strategies, and data that violence against law enforcement officers. Regard- will address problems related to police use of force ing police accountability, CFA competencies and accountability. Ultimately, the Center provides include community involvement; consent law enforcement executives with information and decrees/memoranda of agreement; discipline and strategies that will help them make more informed conduct review; early intervention systems and decisions as they serve their communities. processes; equal employment opportunities; inter- The PERF Center on Force and Accountabil- nal investigations; law enforcement ethics; miscon- ity has four primary objectives: duct statistics, tracking, and analysis; policy development; technology; training; and trends and Identify emerging trends and seek out effective n identification of promising approaches. new strategies; The CFA released national guidelines for con- n Conduct groundbreaking research; ducted energy devices that have been embraced by law enforcement agencies throughout the country. Provide high-quality technical assistance to law n Further, the CFA completed two guides on early enforcement agencies; intervention systems to help agencies better n Create a central resource for information regard- manage their human resources. The CFA provided ing use-of-force and police accountability issues. technical assistance to municipalities seeking to assess their use of force and disciplinary systems To that end, the CFA is continually develop- within their police departments. The CFA also ing competencies in several specific areas. For use of examined critical use of force issues in a 2005 force, CFA competencies include community out- publication entitled Exploring the Challenges of reach and accountability; equipment and weapons; Police Use of Force.

To learn more about PERF and the Center on Force & Accountability, visit www.policeforum.org.

About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability — 179 About Motorola

otorola is a Fortune 100 global com- providing innovative products and services to the Mmunications leader that provides seamless mobility home. products and solutions across broadband, embed- Mobile Devices offers market-changing icons ded systems and wireless networks. Seamless of personal technology—transforming the device mobility means you can reach the people, things formerly known as the cell phone into a universal and information you need in your home, auto, remote control for life. A leader in multi-mode, workplace and all spaces in between. Seamless multi-band communications products and tech- mobility harnesses the power of technology conver- nologies, Mobile Devices designs, manufactures, sells gence and enables smarter, faster, cost-effective and and services wireless subscriber and server equip- flexible communication. Motorola had sales of U.S. ment for cellular systems, portable energy storage $35.3 billion in 2005. products and systems, servers and software solutions Today, Motorola is comprised of three busi- and related software and accessory products. nesses: Connected Home Solutions; Mobile Networks & Enterprise is a leading provider Devices; and Networks & Enterprise. of end-to-end infrastructure, integrated voice and Connected Home Solutions provides a scala- data communications, and information solutions. ble, integrated end-to-end system for the delivery of Networks & Enterprise delivers mission-critical broadband services that keeps consumers secure two-way radio, cellular and wireless broad- informed, entertained and connected. Its technol- band systems to meet the needs of public safety, ogy enables network operators and retailers to cre- government, private, service provider and enter- ate and execute on new business opportunities by prise customers worldwide.

For more information go to www.motorola.com.

180 — About Motorola